Wednesday July 25. In Convention

Clause relating to the Executive being again under consideration [11]

[ [11] "Permit me to hint, whether it would not be wise & seasonable to provide a strong check to the admission of Foreigners into the administration of our national Government; and to declare expressly that the command in chief of the American army shall not be given to, nor devolve on, any but a natural born citizen."–John Jay to Washington, July 25, 1787 (Wash. MSS.).

Mr Elseworth moved "that the Executive be appointed by the Legislature," except when the magistrate last chosen shall have continued in office the whole term for which he was chosen, & be reeligible, in which case the choice shall be by Electors appointed by the Legislatures of the States for that purpose. By this means a deserving magistrate may be reelected without making him dependent on the Legislature.

Mr Gerry repeated his remark that an election at all by the Natl Legislature was radically and incurably wrong; and moved that the Executive be appointed by the Governours & Presidents of the States, with advice of their Councils, and where there are no Councils by Electors chosen by the Legislatures. The executives to vote in the following proportions: viz—

Mr Madison. There are objections agst every mode that has been, or perhaps can be proposed. The election must be made either by some existing authority under the Natl or State Constitutions–or by some special authority derived from the people–or by the people themselves.–The two Existing authorities under the Natl Constitution wd be the Legislative & Judiciary. The latter he presumed was out of the question. The former was in his Judgment liable to insuperable objections. Besides the general influence of that mode on the independence of the Executive, 1. the election of the Chief Magistrate would agitate & divide the legislature so much that the public interest would materially suffer by it. Public bodies are always apt to be thrown into contentions, but into more violent ones by such occasions than by any others. 2. the candidate would intrigue with the Legislature, would derive his appointment from the predominant faction, and be apt to render his administration subservient to its views. 3. The Ministers of foreign powers would have and would make use of, the opportunity to mix their intrigues & influence with the Election. Limited as the powers of the Executive are, it will be an object of great moment with the great rival powers of Europe who have American possessions, to have at the head of our Governmt a man attached to their respective politics & interests. No pains, nor perhaps expence, will be spared, to gain from the Legislature an appointmt favorable to their wishes. Germany & Poland are witnesses of this danger. In the former, the election of the Head of the Empire, till it became in a manner hereditary, interested all Europe, and was much influenced by foreign interference. In the latter, altho' the elective Magistrate has very little real power, his election has at all times produced the most eager interference of foreign princes, and has in fact at length slid entirely into foreign hands. The existing authorities in the States are the Legislative, Executive & Judiciary. The appointment of the Natl Executive by the first was objectionable in many points of view, some of which had been already mentioned. He would mention one which of itself would decide his opinion. The Legislatures of the States had betrayed a strong propensity to a variety of pernicious measures. One object of the Natl Legislre was to controul this propensity. One object of the Natl Executive, so far as it would have a negative on the laws, was to controul the Natl Legislature so far as it might be infected with a similar propensity. Refer the appointmt of the Natl Executive to the State Legislatures, and this controuling purpose may be defeated. The Legislatures can & will act with some kind of regular plan, and will promote the appointmt of a man who will not oppose himself to a favorite object. Should a majority of the Legislatures at the time of election have the same object, or different objects of the same kind, The Natl Executive would be rendered subservient to them.–An appointment by the State Executives, was liable among other objections to this insuperable one, that being standing bodies, they could & would be courted, and intrigued with by the Candidates, by their partizans, and by the Ministers of foreign powers. The State Judiciary had not & he presumed wd not be proposed as a proper source of appointment. The option before us then lay between an appointment by Electors chosen by the people–and an immediate appointment by the people. He thought the former mode free from many of the objections which had been urged agst it, and greatly preferable to an appointment by the Natl Legislature. As the electors would be chosen for the occasion, would meet at once, & proceed immediately to an appointment, there would be very little opportunity for cabal, or corruption. As a further precaution, it might be required that they should meet at some place, distinct from the seat of Govt and even that no person within a certain distance of the place at the time shd be eligible. This Mode however had been rejected so recently & by so great a majority that it probably would not be proposed anew. The remaining mode was an election by the people or rather by the qualified part of them, at large: With all its imperfections he liked this best. He would not repeat either the general argumts. for or the objections agst this mode. He would only take notice of two difficulties which he admitted to have weight. The first arose from the disposition in the people to prefer a Citizen of their own State, and the disadvantage this wd throw on the smaller States. Great as this objection might be he did not think it equal to such as lay agst every other mode which had been proposed. He thought too that some expedient might be hit upon that would obviate it. The second difficulty arose from the disproportion of qualified voters in the N. & S. States, and the disadvantages which this mode would throw on the latter. The answer to this objection was 1. that this disproportion would be continually decreasing under the influence of the Republican laws introduced in the S. States, and the more rapid increase of their population. 2. That local considerations must give way to the general interest. As an individual from the S. States, he was willing to make the sacrifice.

Mr Elseworth. The objection drawn from the different sizes of the States, is unanswerable. The Citizens of the largest States would invariably prefer the candidate within the State; and the largest States wd invariably have the man.

Question on Mr Elseworth's motion as above.

N. H. ay. Mass. no. Ct ay. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. no. Md ay. Va no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

Mr Pinkney moved that the election by the Legislature be qualified with a proviso that no person be eligible for more than 6 years in any twelve years. He thought this would have all the advantage & at the same time avoid in some degree the inconveniency, of an absolute ineligibility a 2d time.

Col. Mason approved the idea. It had the sanction of experience in the instance of Congs and some of the Executives of the States. It rendered the Executive as effectually independent, as an ineligibility after his first election, and opened the way at the same time for the advantage of his future services. He preferred on the whole the election by the Natl Legislature: Tho' Candor obliged him to admit, that there was great danger of foreign influence, as had been suggested. This was the most serious objection with him that had been urged.

Mr Butler. The two great evils to be avoided are cabal at home, & influence from abroad. It will be difficult to avoid either if the Election be made by the Natl Legislature. On the other hand. The Govt should not be made so complex & unwieldy as to disgust the States. This would be the case, if the election shd be referred to the people. He liked best an election by Electors chosen by the Legislatures of the States. He was agst a re-eligibility at all events. He was also agst a ratio of votes in the States. An equality should prevail in this case. The reasons for departing from it do not hold in the case of the Executive as in that of the Legislature.

Mr Gerry approved of Mr Pinkney's motion as lessening the evil.

Mr Govr Morris was agst a rotation in every case. It formed a political School, in wch we were always governed by the scholars, and not by the Masters. The evils to be guarded agst in this case are. 1. the undue influence of the Legislature. 2. instability of Councils. 3. misconduct in office. To guard agst the first, we run into the second evil. We adopt a rotation which produces instability of Councils. To avoid Sylla we fall into Charibdis. A change of men is ever followed by a change of measures. We see this fully exemplified in the vicissitudes among ourselves, particularly in the State of Pena. The self-sufficiency of a victorious party scorns to tread in the paths of their predecessors. Rehoboam will not imitate Soloman. 2. the Rotation in office will not prevent intrigue and dependence on the Legislature. The man in office will look forward to the period at which he will become re-eligible. The distance of the period, the improbability of such a protraction of his life will be no obstacle. Such is the nature of man, formed by his benevolent author no doubt for wise ends, that altho' he knows his existence to be limited to a span, he takes his measures as if he were to live for ever. But taking another supposition, the inefficacy of the expedient will be manifest. If the magistrate does not look forward to his re-election to the Executive, he will be pretty sure to keep in view the opportunity of his going into the Legislature itself. He will have little objection then to an extension of power on a theatre where he expects to act a distinguished part; and will be very unwilling to take any step that may endanger his popularity with the Legislature, on his influence over which the figure he is to make will depend. 3. To avoid the third evil, impeachments will be essential. And hence an additional reason agst an election by the Legislature. He considered an election by the people as the best, by the Legislature as the worst, mode. Putting both these aside, he could not but favor the idea of Mr Wilson, of introducing a mixture of lot. It will diminish, if not destroy both cabal & dependence.

Mr Williamson was sensible that strong objections lay agst an election of the Executive by the Legislature, and that it opened a door for foreign influence. The principal objection agst an election by the people seemed to be, the disadvantage under which it would place the smaller States. He suggested as a cure for this difficulty, that each man should vote for 3 candidates, one of them he observed would be probably of his own State, the other 2. of some other States; and as probably of a small as a large one.

Mr Govr Morris liked the idea, suggesting as an amendment that each man should vote for two persons one of whom at least should not be of his own State.

Mr Madison also thought something valuable might be made of the suggestion with the proposed amendment of it. The second best man in this case would probably be the first, in fact. The only objection which occurred was that each Citizen after havg given his vote for his favorite fellow Citizen, wd throw away his second on some obscure Citizen of another State, in order to ensure the object of his first choice. But it could hardly be supposed that the Citizens of many States would be so sanguine of having their favorite elected, as not to give their second vote with sincerity to the next object of their choice. It might moreover be provided in favor of the smaller States that the Executive should not be eligible more than –— times in –— years from the same State.

Mr Gerry. A popular election in this case is radically vicious. The ignorance of the people would put it in the power of some one set of men dispersed through the Union & acting in Concert to delude them into any appointment. He observed that such a Society of men existed in the Order of the Cincinnati. They are respectable, united, and influential. They will in fact elect the chief Magistrate in every instance, if the election be referred to the people. His respect for the characters composing this Society could not blind him to the danger & impropriety of throwing such a power into their hands.

Mr Dickinson. As far as he could judge from the discussions which had taken place during his attendance, insuperable objections lay agst an election of the Executive by the Natl Legislature; as also by the Legislatures or Executives of the States. He had long leaned towards an election by the people which he regarded as the best & purest source. Objections he was aware lay agst this mode, but not so great he thought as agst the other modes. The greatest difficulty in the opinion of the House seemed to arise from the partiality of the States to their respective Citizens. But might not this very partiality be turned to a useful purpose. Let the people of each State chuse its best Citizen. The people will know the most eminent characters of their own States, and the people of different States will feel an emulation in selecting those of which they will have the greatest reason to be proud. Out of the thirteen names thus selected, an Executive Magistrate may be chosen either by the Natl Legislature, or by Electors appointed by it.

On a Question which was moved for postponing Mr Pinkney's motion, in order to make way for some such proposition as had been hinted by Mr Williamson & others, it passed in the negative.

N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct ay. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. no. Md ay. Va ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

On Mr Pinkney's motion that no person shall serve in the Executive more than 6 years in 12. years, it passed in the negative.

N. H. ay. Mass. ay. Ct no. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. no. Md no. Va no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

On a motion that the members of the Committee be furnished with copies of the proceedings it was so determined; S. Carolina alone being in the negative.

It was then moved that the members of the House might take copies of the Resolutions which had been agreed to; which passed in the negative.

N. H. no. Mas. no. Con. ay. N. J. ay. Pa no. Del. ay. Maryd no. Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.

Mr Gerry & Mr Butler moved to refer the resolution relating to the Executive (except the clause making it consist of a single person) to the Com̃ittee of detail.

Mr Wilson hoped that so important a branch of the System wd not be committed untill a general principle shd be fixed by a vote of the House.

Mr Langdon. was for the commitment–Adjd.

Thursday July. 26. in Convention. [12]

[ [12] "The affairs of the federal government are, I believe, in the utmost confusion: The convention is an expedient that will produce a decisive effect. It will either recover us from our present embarrassments or complete our ruin; for I do suspect that if what they recommend shod be rejected this wod be the case. But I trust that the presence of Genl Washington will have great weight in the body itself so as to overawe & keep under the demon of party, & that the signature of his name to whatever act shall be the result of their deliberations will secure its passage thro' the union."–Monroe to Jefferson, July 27, 1787 (Writings of Monroe, i., 173).

Col. Mason. In every stage of the Question relative to the Executive, the difficulty of the subject and the diversity of the opinions concerning it have appeared. Nor have any of the modes of constituting that department been satisfactory. 1. It has been proposed that the election should be made by the people at large; that is that an act which ought to be performed by those who know most of Eminent characters, & qualifications, should be performed by those who know least. 2. that the election should be made by the Legislatures of the States. 3. by the Executives of the States. Agst these modes also strong objections have been urged. 4. It has been proposed that the election should be made by Electors chosen by the people for that purpose. This was at first agreed to: But on further consideration has been rejected. 5. Since which, the mode of Mr Williamson, requiring each freeholder to vote for several candidates has been proposed. This seemed like many other propositions, to carry a plausible face, but on closer inspection is liable to fatal objections. A popular election in any form, as Mr Gerry has observed, would throw the appointment into the hands of the Cincinnati, a Society for the members of which he had a great respect, but which he never wished to have a preponderating influence in the Govt. 6. Another expedient was proposed by Mr Dickinson, which is liable to so palpable & material an inconvenience that he had little doubt of its being by this time rejected by himself. It would exclude every man who happened not to be popular within his own State; tho' the causes of his local unpopularity might be of such a nature as to recommend him to the States at large. 7. Among other expedients, a lottery has been introduced. But as the tickets do not appear to be in much demand, it will probably, not be carried on, and nothing therefore need be said on that subject. After reviewing all these various modes, he was led to conclude, that an election by the Natl Legislature as originally proposed, was the best. If it was liable to objections, it was liable to fewer than any other. He conceived at the same time that a second election ought to be absolutely prohibited. Having for his primary object for the pole-star of his political conduct, the preservation of the rights of the people, he held it as an essential point, as the very palladium of civil liberty, that the Great officers of State, and particularly the Executive should at fixed periods return to that mass from which they were at first taken, in order that they may feel & respect those rights & interests, Which are again to be personally valuable to them. He concluded with moving that the constitution of the Executive as reported by the Come of the whole be reinstated, viz. "that the Executive be appointed for seven years, & be ineligible a 2d time."

Mr Davie seconded the motion.

Docr Franklin. It seems to have been imagined by some that the returning to the mass of the people was degrading the magistrate. This he thought was contrary to republican principles. In free Governments the rulers are the servants, and the people their superiors & sovereigns. For the former therefore to return among the latter was not to degrade but to promote them. And it would be imposing an unreasonable burden on them, to keep them always in a State of servitude, and not allow them to become again one of the Masters.

Question on Col. Masons motion as above; which passed in the affirmative

N. H. ay. Massts not on floor. Ct no. N. J. ay. Pa no. Del. no. Md ay. Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Mr Govr Morris was now agst the whole paragraph. In answer to Col. Mason's position that a periodical return of the great officers of the State into the mass of the people, was the palladium of Civil liberty he wd observe that on the same principle the Judiciary ought to be periodically degraded; certain it was that the Legislature ought on every principle, yet no one had proposed, or conceived that the members of it should not be re-eligible. In answer to Docr Franklin, that a return into the mass of the people would be a promotion, instead of a degradation, he had no doubt that our Executive like most others would have too much patriotism to shrink from the burthen of his office, and too much modesty not to be willing to decline the promotion.

On the question on the whole resolution as amended in the words following–"that a National Executive be instituted–to consist of a single person–to be chosen by the Natl legislature–for the term of seven years–to be ineligible a 2d time–with power to carry into execution the natl laws–to appoint to offices in cases not otherwise provided for–to be removable on impeachment & conviction of mal-practice or neglect of duty–to receive a fixt compensation for the devotion of his time to the public service, to be paid out of the Natl treasury"–it passed in the affirmative

N. H. ay. Mass. not on floor. Ct ay. N. J. ay. Pa no. Del. no. Md no. Va divd. Mr Blair & Col. Mason ay. Genl Washington & Mr Madison no. Mr Randolph happened to be out of the House. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Mr Mason moved "that the Com̃ittee of detail be instructed to receive a clause requiring certain qualifications of landed property & citizenship of the U. States, in members of the Legislature, and disqualifying persons having unsettled Accts with or being indebted to the U. S., from being members of the Natl Legislature."–He observed that persons of the latter descriptions had frequently got into the State Legislatures, in order to promote laws that might shelter their delinquencies; and that this evil had crept into Congs if Report was to be regarded.

Mr Pinckney seconded the motion.

Mr. Govr Morris. If qualifications are proper, he wd prefer them in the electors rather than the elected. As to debtors of the U. S. they are but few. As to persons having unsettled accounts he believed them to be pretty many. He thought however that such a discrimination would be both odious & useless, and in many instances, unjust & cruel. The delay of settlemt had been more the fault of the Public than of the individuals. What will be done with those patriotic Citizens who have lent money, or services or property to their Country, without having been yet able to obtain a liquidation of their claims? Are they to be excluded?

Mr Ghorum was for leaving to the Legislature the providing agst such abuses as had been mentioned.

Col. Mason mentioned the parliamentary qualifications adopted in the Reign of Queen Anne, which he said had met with universal approbation.

Mr Madison had witnessed the zeal of men having accts with the public, to get into the Legislatures for sinister purposes. He thought however that if any precaution were taken for excluding them, the one proposed by Col. Mason ought to be new modelled. It might be well to limit the exclusion to persons who had recd money from the public, and had not accounted for it.

Mr Govr Morris. It was a precept of great antiquity as well as of high authority that we should not be righteous overmuch. He thought we ought to be equally on our guard agst being wise overmuch. The proposed regulation would enable the Governt to exclude particular persons from office as long as they pleased. He mentioned the case of the Com̃ander in Chief's presenting his account for secret services, which he said was so moderate that every one was astonished at it; and so simple that no doubt could arise on it. Yet had the Auditor been disposed to delay the settlement, how easily he might have effected it, & how cruel wd it be in such a case to keep a distinguished & meritorious Citizen under a temporary disability & disfranchisement. He mentioned this case merely to illustrate the objectionable nature of the proposition. He was opposed to such minutious regulations in a Constitution. The parliamentary qualifications quoted by Col. Mason, had been disregarded in practice; and was but a scheme of the landed agst the monied interest.

Mr Pinckney & Genl Pinckney moved to insert by way of amendmt the words Judiciary & Executive so as to extend the qualifications to those departments which was agreed to nem con.

Mr Gerry thought the inconveniency of excluding a few worthy individuals who might be public debtors or have unsettled accts ought not to be put in the scale agst the public advantages of the regulation, and that the motion did not go far enough.

Mr King observed that there might be great danger in requiring landed property as a qualification since it would exclude the monied interest, whose aids may be essential in particular emergencies to the public safety.

Mr Dickinson, was agst any recital of qualifications in the Constitution. It was impossible to make a compleat one, and a partial one wd by implication tie up the hands of the Legislature from supplying the omissions. The best defence lay in the freeholders who were to elect the Legislature. Whilst this Source should remain pure, the Public interest would be safe. If it ever should be corrupt, no little expedients would repel the danger. He doubted the policy of interweaving into a Republican constitution a veneration for wealth. He had always understood that a veneration for poverty & virtue, were the objects of republican encouragement. It seemed improper that any man of merit should be subjected to disabilities in a Republic where merit was understood to form the great title to public trust, honors & rewards.

Mr Gerry if property be one object of Government, provisions to secure it cannot be improper.

Mr Madison moved to strike out the word landed, before the word "qualifications." If the proposition sd be agreed to he wished the Committee to be at liberty to report the best criterion they could devise. Landed possessions were no certain evidence of real wealth. Many enjoyed them to a great extent who were more in debt than they were worth. The unjust Laws of the States had proceeded more from this class of men, than any others. It had often happened that men who had acquired landed property on credit, got into the Legislatures with a view of promoting an unjust protection agst their Creditors. In the next place, if a small quantity of land should be made the standard, it would be no security; if a large one, it would exclude the proper representatives of those classes of Citizens who were not landholders. It was politic as well as just that the interests & rights of every class should be duly represented & understood in the public Councils. It was a provision every where established that the Country should be divided into districts & representatives taken from each, in order that the Legislative Assembly might equally understand & sympathize with the rights of the people in every part of the Community. It was not less proper that every class of Citizens should have an opportunity of making their rights be felt & understood in the public Councils. The three principal classes into which our citizens were divisible, were the landed the commercial, & the manufacturing. The 2d & 3d class, bear as yet a small proportion to the first. The proportion however will daily increase. We see in the populous Countries in Europe now, what we shall be hereafter. These classes understand much less of each others interests & affairs, than men of the same class inhabiting different districts. It is particularly requisite therefore that the interests of one or two of them should not be left entirely to the care, or impartiality of the third. This must be the case if landed qualifications should be required; few of the mercantile, & scarcely any of the manufacturing class chusing whilst they continue in business to turn any part of their Stock into landed property. For these reasons he wished if it were possible that some other criterion than the mere possession of land should be devised. He concurred with Mr Govr Morris in thinking that qualifications in the Electors would be much more effectual than in the elected. The former would discriminate between real & ostensible property in the latter; But he was aware of the difficulty of forming any uniform standard that would suit the different circumstances & opinions prevailing in the different States.

Mr Govr Morris 2ded the motion.

On the Question for striking out "landed"

N. H. ay. Mass. ay. Ct ay. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md no. Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

On Question on 1st part of Col. Masons proposition as to "qualification of property & citizenship," as so amended

N. H. ay. Masts ay. Ct no. N. J. ay. Pa no. Del. no. Md ay. Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

"The 2d part, for disqualifying debtors, and persons having unsettled accounts," being under consideration

Mr Carrol moved to strike out "having unsettled accounts"

Mr Ghorum seconded the motion; observing that it would put the commercial & manufacturing part of the people on a worse footing than others as they would be most likely to have dealings with the public.

Mr L. Martin, if these words should be struck out, and the remaining words concerning debtors retained, it will be the interest of the latter class to keep their accounts unsettled as long as possible.

Mr Wilson was for striking them out. They put too much power in the hands of the Auditors, who might combine with rivals in delaying settlements in order to prolong the disqualifications of particular men. We should consider that we are providing a Constitution for future generations, and not merely for the peculiar circumstances of the moment. The time has been, and will again be, when the public safety may depend on the voluntary aids of individuals which will necessarily open accts with the public, and when such accts will be a characteristic of patriotism. Besides a partial enumeration of cases will disable the Legislature from disqualifying odious & dangerous characters.

Mr Langdon [13] was for striking out the whole clause for the reasons given by Mr Wilson. So many exclusions he thought too would render the system unacceptable to the people.

[ [13] "Mr Langdon is a man of considerable fortune, possesses a liberal mind, and a good plain understanding–about 40 years old."–Pierce's Notes, Am. Hist. Rev., iii., 325.

Mr Gerry. If the argumts used today were to prevail, we might have a Legislature composed of Public debtors, pensioners, placemen & contractors. He thought the proposed qualifications would be pleasing to the people. They will be considered as a security agst unnecessary or undue burdens being imposed on them. He moved to add "pensioners" to the disqualified characters which was negatived.

N. H. no. Mas. ay. Con. no. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. no. Maryd ay. Va no. N. C. divided. S. C. no. Geo. ay.

Mr Govr Morris. The last clause, relating to public debtors will exclude every importing merchant. Revenue will be drawn it is foreseen as much as possible, from trade. Duties of course will be bonded, and the Merchts will remain debtors to the public. He repeated that it had not been so much the fault of individuals as of the public that transactions between them had not been more generally liquidated & adjusted. At all events to draw from our short & scanty experience rules that are to operate through succeeding ages, does not savour much of real wisdom.

On question for striking out, "persons having unsettled accounts with the U. States."

N. H. ay. Mass. ay. Ct ay. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md ay. Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no.

Mr Elseworth was for disagreeing to the remainder of the clause disqualifying Public debtors; and for leaving to the wisdom of the Legislature and the virtue of the Citizens, the task of providing agst such evils. Is the smallest as well as the largest debtor to be excluded? Then every arrear of taxes will disqualify. Besides how is it to be known to the people when they elect who are or are not public debtors. The exclusion of pensioners & placemen in Engld is founded on a consideration not existing here. As persons of that sort are dependent on the Crown, they tend to increase its influence.

Mr Pinkney sd he was at first a friend to the proposition, for the sake of the clause relating to qualifications of property; but he disliked the exclusion of public debtors; it went too far. It wd exclude persons who had purchased confiscated property or should purchase Western territory of the public, and might be some obstacle to the sale of the latter.

On the question for agreeing to the clause disqualifying public debtors

N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct no. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. no. Md no. Va no. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay.

Col. Mason, observed that it would be proper, as he thought, that some provision should be made in the Constitution agst choosing for the Seat of the Genl Govt the City or place at which the Seat of any State Govt might be fixt. There were 2 objections agst having them at the same place, which without mentioning others, required some precaution on the subject. The 1st was that it tended to produce disputes concerning jurisdiction. The 2d & principal one was that the intermixture of the two Legislatures tended to give a provincial tincture to ye Natl deliberations. He moved that the Come be instructed to receive a clause to prevent the seat of the Natl Govt being in the same City or town with the Seat of the Govt of any State longer than untill the necessary public buildings could be erected.

Mr Alex. Martin 2ded the motion.

Mr Govr Morris did not dislike the idea, but was apprehensive that such a clause might make enemies of Philada & N. York which had expectations of becoming the Seat of the Genl Govt.

Mr Langdon approved the idea also: but suggested the case of a State moving its seat of Govt to the natl Seat after the erection of the Public buildings.

Mr Ghorum. The precaution may be evaded by the Natl Legislre by delaying to erect the Public buildings.

Mr Gerry conceived it to be the genl sense of America, that neither the Seat of a State Govt nor any large commercial City should be the seat of the Genl Govt.

Mr Williamson liked the idea, but knowing how much the passions of men were agitated by this matter, was apprehensive of turning them agst the System. He apprehended also that an evasion, might be practised in the way hinted by Mr Ghorum.

Mr Pinkney thought the Seat of a State Govt ought to be avoided; but that a large town or its vicinity would be proper for the Seat of the Genl Govt.

Col. Mason did not mean to press the motion at this time, nor to excite any hostile passions agst the system. He was content to withdraw the motion for the present.

Mr Butler was for fixing by the Constitution the place, & a central one, for the seat of the Natl Govt.

The proceedings since Monday last were referred unanimously to the Come of detail, and the Convention then unanimously adjourned till Monday, Augst 6. that the Come of detail might have time to prepare & report the Constitution. The whole proceedings as referred are as follow [14]:

[ [14] Madison's note says: "here copy them from the Journal p. 207." In the Journal they are given as having been "collected from the proceedings of the convention, as they are spread over the journal from June 19th to July 26th."—Journal of Federal Convention, 207. The dates show when the resolutions were agreed to, and are correct.

June 20. I. Resolved, That the Government of the United States ought to consist of a supreme legislative, judiciary, and executive.

June 21.II. Resolved, That the legislature consist of two branches.

June 22.III. Resolved, That the members of the first branch of the legislature ought to be elected by the people of the several states, for the term of two years; to be paid out of the publick treasury; to receive an adequate June 23. compensation for their services; to be of the age of twenty-five years at least; to be ineligible and incapable of holding any office under the authority of the United States (except those peculiarly belonging to the functions of the first branch) during the term of service of the first branch.

June 25.IV. Resolved, That the members of the second branch of the legislature of the United States ought to be chosen by the individual legislatures; to be of June 26.the age of thirty years at least; to hold their offices for six years, one third to go out biennally; to receive a compensation for the devotion of their time to the publick service; to be ineligible to and incapable of holding any office, under the authority of the United States (except those peculiarly belonging to the functions of the second branch) during the term for which they are elected, and for one year thereafter.

V. Resolved, That each branch ought to possess the right of originating acts.

Postponed 27.
July 16. VI. Resolved, That the national legislature ought to possess the legislative rights vested in Congress by the confederation; and moreover, to legislate in all cases for the general interests July 17. of the union, and also in those to which the states are separately incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation.

July 17VII. Resolved, That the legislative acts of the United States, made by virtue and in pursuance of the articles of union, and all treaties made and ratified under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the respective states, as far as those acts or treaties shall relate to the said states, or their citizens and inhabitants; and that the judiciaries of the several states shall be bound thereby in their decisions, any thing in the respective laws of the individual States to the contrary, notwithstanding.

July 16.VIII. Resolved, That in the original formation of the legislature of the United States, the first branch thereof shall consist of sixty-five members; of which number

New Hampshire shall send . three,
Massachusetts . . . . . . . eight,
Rhode Island . . . . . . . one,
Connecticut . . . . . . . . five,
New York . . . . . . . . . six,
New Jersey . . . . . . . . four,
Pennsylvania . . . . . . . eight,
Delaware . . . . . . . . . one,
Maryland . . . . . . . . . six,
Virginia . . . . . . . . . ten,
North Carolina . . . . . . five,
South Carolina . . . . . . five,
Georgia . . . . . . . . . . three.

But as the present situation of the states may probably alter in the number of their inhabitants, the legislature of the United States shall be authorized, from time to time, to apportion the number of representatives; and in case any of the states shall hereafter be divided, or enlarged by addition of territory, or any two or more states united, or any new states created within the limits of the United States, the legislature of the United States shall possess authority to regulate the number of representatives, in any of the foregoing cases, upon the principle of their number of inhabitants according to the provisions hereafter mentioned, namely–Provided always, that representation ought to be proportioned to direct taxation. And in order to ascertain the alteration in the direct taxation, which may be required from time to time by the changes in the relative circumstances of the states—

IX. Resolved, That a census be taken within six years from the first meeting of the legislature of the United States, and once within the term of every ten years afterwards, of all the inhabitants of the United States, in the manner and according to the ratio recommended by Congress in their resolution of April 18, 1783; and that the legislature of the United States shall proportion the direct taxation accordingly.

X. Resolved, That all bills for raising or appropriating money, and for fixing the salaries of the officers of the government of the United States, shall originate in the first branch of the legislature of the United States, and shall not be altered or amended by the second branch; and that no money shall be drawn from the publick treasury, but in pursuance of appropriations to be originated by the first branch.

XI. Resolved, That in the second branch of the legislature of the United States, each state shall have an equal vote.

July 26. XII. Resolved, That a national executive be instituted, to consist of a single person; to be chosen by the national legislature, for the term of seven years; to be ineligible a second time; with power to carry into execution the national laws; to appoint to offices in cases not otherwise provided for; to be removable on impeachment, and conviction of mal-practice or neglect of duty; to receive a fixed compensation for the devotion of his time to the publick service; to be paid out of the publick treasury.

July 21. XIII. Resolved, That the national executive shall have a right to negative any legislative act, which shall not be afterwards passed, unless by two third parts of each branch of the national legislature.

July 18.XIV. Resolved, That a national judiciary be established, to consist of one supreme tribunal, the judges of which shall be appointed by the second branch July 21. of the national legislature; to hold their offices during good July 18. behaviour; to receive punctually, at stated times, a fixed compensation for their services, in which no diminution shall be made, so as to affect the persons actually in office at the time of such diminution.

XV. Resolved, That the national legislature be empowered to appoint inferior tribunals.

XVI. Resolved, That the jurisdiction of the national judiciary shall extend to cases arising under laws passed by the general legislature; and to such other questions as involve the national peace and harmony.

XVII. Resolved, That provision ought to be made for the admission of states lawfully arising within the limits of the United States, whether from a voluntary junction of government and territory, or otherwise, with the consent of a number of voices in the national legislature less than the whole.

XVIII. Resolved, That a republican form of government shall be guarantied to each state; and that each state shall be protected against foreign and domestick violence.

July 23. XIX. Resolved, That provision ought to be made for the amendment of the articles of union, whensoever it shall seem necessary.

XX. Resolved, That the legislative, executive, and judiciary powers within the several states, and of the national government, ought to be bound, by oath, to support the articles of union.

XXI. Resolved, That the amendments which shall be offered to the confederation by the convention ought, at a proper time or times after the approbation of Congress, to be submitted to an assembly or assemblies of representatives, recommended by the several legislatures, to be expressly chosen by the people to consider and decide thereon.

XXII. Resolved, That the representation in the second branch of the legislature of the United States consist of two members from each state, who shall vote per capita.

July 26.

XXIII. Resolved, That it be an instruction to the committee, to whom were referred the proceedings of the convention for the establishment of a national government, to receive a clause or clauses, requiring certain qualifications of property and citizenship, in the United States, for the executive, the judiciary, and the members of both branches of the legislature of the United States.

With the above resolutions were referred the propositions offered by Mr C. Pinckney on the 29th of May, & by Mr Patterson on the 15th of June. [15]

[ [15]"Aug 1. 1787 Williamsb.

Dear Col.

"We are here & I believe every where all Impatience to know something of your conventional Deliberations. If you cannot tell us what you are doing, you might at least give us some Information of what you are not doing. This wd afford food for political conjecture, and perhaps be sufficient to satisfy present Impatience. I hope you have already discovered the means of preserving the American Empire united–& that the scheme of a Disunion has been found pregnant with ye greatest Evils–But we are not at this distance able to judge with any accuracy upon subjects so truly important & interesting as those wch must engage you at present–We can only hope, that you will all resemble Cæsar, at least in one particular: 'nil actum reputans si quid superesset agendum';–& that your Exertions will be commensurate to ye great Expectations wch have been formed....

"J. Madison." [A]

[ [A] President of William and Mary College, and the first Bishop of the Episcopal Church in Virginia. He was a second cousin of James Madison, of Orange.

(Mad. MSS.)

Richmond Augt 5. 87.

"Dear Sir,

"I am much obliged to you for your communication of the proceedings of ye Convention, since I left them; for I feel that anxiety about ye result, which it's Importance must give to every honest citizen. If I thought that my return could contribute in the smallest degree to it's Improvement, nothing should Keep me away. But as I know that the talents, knowledge, & well-established character, of our present delegates have justly inspired the country with ye most entire confidence in their determinations; & that my vote could only operate to produce a division, & so destroy ye vote of ye State, I think that my attendance now would certainly be useless, perhaps injurious.

"I am credibly inform'd that Mr Henry has openly express'd his disapprobation of the circular letter of Congress, respecting ye payment of British debts; & that he has declared his opinion that ye Interests of this state cannot safely be trusted with that body. The doctrine of three confederacies, or great Republics, has its advocates here. I have heard Hervie support it, along with ye extinction of State Legislatures within each great Department. The necessity of some independent power to controul the Assembly by a negative, seems now to be admitted by ye most zealous republicans–they only differ about ye mode of constituting such a power. B. Randolph seems to think that a magistrate annually elected by ye people might exercise such a controul as independently as ye King of G. B. I hope that our representative, Marshall, will be a powerful aid to Mason in the next Assembly. He has observ'd the actual depravation of mens manners, under ye corrupting Influence of our Legislature; and is convinc'd that nothing but ye adoption of some efficient plan from ye Convention can prevent anarchy first, & civil convulsions afterwards. Mr H–—y has certainly converted a majority of Prince Edward, formerly ye most averse to paper money, to ye patronage of it....

"Your friend & humble servt.

"James Mcclurg."
(Mad. MSS.)

Monday August 6TH. in Convention

Mr John Francis Mercer from Maryland took his seat.

Mr Rutlidge delivered in the Report of the Committee of detail as follows: a printed copy being at the same time furnished to each member [16]:

"We the people of the States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North-Carolina, South-Carolina, and Georgia, do ordain, declare, and establish the following Constitution for the Government of Ourselves and our Posterity.

[ [16] Madison's printed copy is marked: "As Reported by Come of Detail viz of five. Aug. 6. 1787." It is a large folio of seven pages. In the enumeration of the Articles by a misprint VI. was repeated, and the alterations in Article VII. and succeeding articles were made by Madison. In Sect. II of Article VI., as it was printed, it appeared: "The enacting stile of the laws of the United States shall be. 'Be it enacted and it is hereby enacted by the House of Representatives, and by the Senate of the United States, in Congress assembled,'" which Madison altered to read: "The enacting stile of the laws of the United States shall be. 'Be it enacted by the Senate & representatives, in Congress assembled.'" The printed copy among the Madison papers is a duplicate of the copy filed by General Washington with the papers of the Constitution, and Sec. II is there given as actually printed.—Journal of the Federal Convention, 219. (Const. MSS.)

Madison accurately transcribed the report for his journal and it is this copy which is used in the text.

Article I

The stile of the Government shall be, "The United States of America."

II

The Government shall consist of supreme legislative, executive, and judicial powers.