Combat lessons, no. 1, rank and file in combat

by United States. War Department

SICILY—ITALY—ATTU

NIGHT ATTACK

Surprise Saves Lives Major John R. Patterson, Infantry, Sicily: “The mission of our battalion after landing south of Gela in Sicily was to capture the airport at Biscari. The battalion used the silent night attack. The three rifle companies were in line with the heavy-weapons company in reserve. To reach its line of departure, the battalion crossed two precipitous ridges using two control lines, then climbed the cliff at the airport to the line of departure. All this was done silently under cover of darkness.

“The attack was started with a hand grenade. We didn’t fire until the Germans counterattacked. We went in with bayonets and hand grenades and caught some of the Germans undressed and dressing. The MK IV tanks fired their guns but wouldn’t close on us. The enemy knew their men were all about, so fired their machine guns and rifles mainly into the air.

“The first counterattack came in two hours, and there was one about each hour thereafter until 1600. They had all emplacements wired and fixed with trip-wire booby traps. We removed the traps and used the emplacements during counterattacks.

“We found a line of airplane bombs wired to blow up the area; we de-activated them. A German plane landed just as we were ready to leave the line of departure. Later, one of our men grenaded it.

“The battalion took no transportation. I had with me the S-3, one runner, and one 511 radio.[A] The wire came up thirty minutes later, but was not necessary.

[A] A twenty-pound, battery-operated, short-range transmitter-receiver.

“I estimate the enemy had a reinforced battalion. His tanks and self-propelled’s came up later. Some of the enemy were air personnel, and there were about eleven AA guns set up for antipersonnel use.

“Our attack lasted thirty minutes. We had no casualties during the attack; two were killed during the counterattacks.”

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Hand-to-Hand Fighting Captain Jarrold, Infantry: “At Biscari Airport I used my trench knife twice. One of my men got three with his bayonet. He shot one, then another tried to grab his bayonet. He got this one with the bayonet. That got him started, so he got three in all before it was over.

Small Arms Against Armor “We found that caliber .30 AP pierces enemy armored half-tracks at close ranges.”

★

Platoon Action Lieutenant Hollerich, Infantry: “Company A, moving forward in darkness to participate in the Biscari Airport fight, ran right into the enemy position. Before the fight started, my platoon crossed the road just above a culvert and reached the south edge of the airport, but I was ordered to take it back to a position just east of the culvert. I wish I could have stayed where I was because it was a perfect place from which to envelop the resistance in front of my company.

“When the enemy machine guns opened up we threw grenades. The machine guns pulled back out of grenade fire. Then NCO’s and Browning Automatic Riflemen went up over the embankment, through and beyond the initial enemy positions. Eventually we had a base of fire of about twenty men including the BAR’s.

“During the enemy counterattacks we did pretty well with other fire, too. Lead was flying fast and furiously at twenty to thirty yards. We fire at flashes. In this kind of firing you learn to fire and roll to one side or they’ll soon get you.”

“One of the corporals sneaked up on a dug-in vehicle and got it with an ’03 rifle grenade at 25 yards.

“The ‘bazooka’ man of my platoon heard ‘Tanks to the right,’ went around a bend in the road, and fired at about 35 yards. He got the first of a pair of vehicles. A German officer tried to capture him with a pistol, but he gave the officer an uppercut and then killed him with his helmet. I don’t know how the other vehicle was knocked out, but one of the BAR men got its driver.

COMMENT: In these accounts of a successful night attack by a small unit the application of the following principles is worthy of note:

a. Close control during the approach by the use of control lines adjusted to difficult terrain features.

b. Designation of a Line of Departure as close to the objective as possible and after all major terrain obstacles had been passed. This is essential to assure proper organization of the unit immediately prior to the assault.

c. Attainment of the vital element of surprise (Germans caught undressed and dressing, airplanes landing on the field).

d. Use of the bayonet and hand grenades with no weapon firing permitted. It may often be advisable to prohibit the loading of rifles.

e. Use of frontal attack only. Any attempt at envelopment tends to cause disorder and confusion. Note that one platoon which had advanced ahead of the general line was pulled back to conform.

f. A definite and limited objective—capture of an airfield, in this case—in which the entire front could be covered by manpower rather than fire-power.

These are the major elements of a successful night attack brought out in the foregoing account. Others not mentioned but which were undoubtedly contributing factors in this operation are:

Careful planning in minute detail.

Precise, specific orders.

Careful arrangements for maintenance of direction.

Thorough daylight reconnaissance by as many of the leaders as possible.

Use of compact columns in the approach formation until the Line of Departure is reached.

KNOCKING OUT PILLBOXES

Colonel Rogers, Infantry, Sicily: “The neutralization and reduction of concrete pillboxes played an important part in the Sicilian campaign. In the initial landing phases alone, this regiment cleaned out over thirty of these pillboxes. They were located all over the place as we went inland.

“They were cleverly constructed and elaborately camouflaged. Many were covered with brush, grass, straw, or other natural stuff. Others had cane houses built over them to represent peasant outbuildings or huts. All those we encountered in and about villages and towns were covered over with some kind of house to conceal them. Most of these were cane or wood shacks, though some were actually covered with plaster or stucco to represent real houses. Many had dummy houses built right over the pillbox, and windows arranged to give full freedom of fire from the embrasures of the pillbox inside the shell of the building. In the open country a number were also built with hay ricks and straw stacks over them, all very natural and innocent looking.

“Reduction of these often proved very simple, and in many cases the enemy simply dug his own grave in his efforts at camouflage. When we learned not to be surprised by them and recognized them for what they were, we developed a very simple method of dealing with the ones concealed by straw, hay, cane, and other inflammable material. We dosed them freely with white phosphorus, especially from the attached chemical mortars, and this did the work to perfection. We set the camouflage on fire, blinded the gunners inside, and choked them with the phosphorus and the smoke from the burning hay, straw, and other material. The fire and heat, too, made the interiors untenable, and the occupants would become terrified and come out and surrender in a bunch.

“In one place near Licata there were several of these straw- and hay-covered pillboxes, also some concealed with cane huts, arranged at key positions in country covered with wheat fields and terraced grain plantings. We simply set a first-class prairie fire with our white phosphorus, and burned out a position over 2,500 yards long. We waited until the wind was right and let them have it. Every pillbox was burned out. The more difficult pillboxes that wouldn’t burn we attacked with massed fire from mortars of all types, AT guns, and heavy machine guns. In the case of very tough ones that were reinforced, we used ‘bazooka’ rockets and at times sent men up close under heavy covering fire and knocked them out with bangalore torpedoes.”

COMMENT: The use of fire is, of course, dependent on favorable weather conditions. Careful coordination is also necessary to insure that the resulting smoke does not interfere with the operations and observation of adjacent units.

INDIVIDUAL INITIATIVE

The following cases of individual initiative and heroism during the Salerno landing were reported by the —th Infantry:

“Sergeant Manuel Gonzales, upon landing, discovered the position of a German ‘88’ in the sand dunes near the beach. This gun was firing on the assault boats as they landed. The Sergeant crept around the position under machine-gun fire which set his pack on fire, and despite the hand grenades being thrown at him. He then calmly tossed several hand grenades into the gun emplacement, killing the crew and blowing up their ammunition.

“Near Paestum Sergeant John Y. McGill jumped on an enemy tank and dropped a hand grenade into the open turret, killing all the crew.

“Private Clayton I. Tallman, on Hill 424, observed that the enemy was attempting an envelopment of the left flank of his company. Taking up a better position, he killed an enemy machine-gun crew with three carefully aimed shots. In a few minutes he repeated the same action when another enemy machine-gun crew appeared. He alone protected the left flank of the company until the rest of the platoon arrived.

“Private Burrell B. Reitch discovered that he and a group of five men had been cut off from his company. He immediately organized them in a defensive position on a small knoll. They repulsed three rushes by the enemy, who were attempting to establish machine-gun positions on the flank. Private Reitch was completely in command of the situation, giving fire orders and shouting encouragement.

“Staff Sergeant Quillian H. McMitchen was shot in the chest and shoulder before his assault boat reached the shore. When the boat beached, the landing ramp stuck and would not drop. The Sergeant, despite his wounds, kicked the ramp loose and then led his section ashore, continuing to direct their operations until he received a fatal shot from enemy gun fire.

“Our men steadily moved ahead in the face of the intense fire and cleared the beach as soon as possible. Lieutenant Carey, soon after reaching the shore, was fired upon by three Germans armed with machine pistols. He returned the fire, but his carbine jammed after killing one of his adversaries. He then grasped his weapon as a club and advancing in the face of their fire clubbed the second. He then physically tackled, subdued, and disarmed the third German, taking him prisoner.”

COMMENT: The ability of the individual soldier to grasp the implications of the situation and take the necessary action should be fully exploited. The results of combat are the fruits of the combined efforts of individuals. Every soldier should be indoctrinated with the idea that his individual action may be the decisive factor in the final result.

ACTION ON ATTU

Operations report, Regimental Combat Team: “To fight the Japs in this country our troops must stick to the high ground and not only outflank but ‘out-altitude’ the enemy.

“Continuous movement is necessary to keep the spark in an attack. If a machine gun covers one point, then a group not at that point must continue to advance. When fire is shifted, the original group must move. If even a platoon is entirely halted by the fire of enemy guns, then the commitment of additional troops results, whereas by proper coordination some portion of the platoon can be kept moving and the force committed kept to a minimum.

“The tendency of lower commanders to commit reserves too early must be curbed.

“Security cannot be overemphasized. Any movement or group on the battlefield, even in rear areas, is subject to enemy action. In this connection, consideration must be given to the protection of medical installations. At present these are left unprotected, without even individual arms for their personnel. In the event of any enemy penetration through our front-line positions it is practically certain that these installations will be hit.

“Aggressive patrolling, particularly to maintain active contact, is of vital importance and can mean the difference between defeat and victory. However, mere numbers of patrols will not solve the problem. Special training in patrolling and organizing patrols must be initiated. Commanders must plan to have reasonably fresh men available for night contact. It is vital to organize patrol activity carefully to insure that all lines are familiar with the routes of returning patrols so that the danger of mistaken identity in the darkness will be minimized.”

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Lieutenant General Simon B. Buckner, Commanding General, Alaskan Department: “It was apparent that the enemy was particularly vulnerable to attack by units of our infantry which pushed forward vigorously while the enemy was held down by artillery fire. Those units which had learned to advance closely behind their own artillery supporting fire had the greatest success.

“The Japs do not like our coordinated artillery fire nor do they like our attacks with the bayonet. When under fire from small arms they stay down in their holes and are easily approached. When attacking small groups of foxholes, our troops were able to keep the Japs down by fire from rifles and the Browning Automatic Rifle while some of our men approached and dropped hand grenades into their holes. This was our favorite mop-up method.

“When about to be run out of a position, the Japs seemed to feel it necessary to counterattack. These attacks were not well coordinated and were welcomed by our troops, who were able then to shoot down the enemy in great numbers. These Jap counterattacks were of a suicidal character and were pressed home regardless of losses until practically all of the counterattacking troops were exterminated.

“The enemy may believe that, in such terrain, he can hold up the advance of an entire battalion with three men and a light machine gun. In fact, however, he is critically vulnerable to intelligent action by officers and men who understand the necessity for immediate maneuver against small parties of the enemy seeking to hold them up. The fact was that small maneuvering patrols easily disposed of machine-gun positions on reverse slopes behind mountain spurs, whereas any tendency to lie down and call for artillery support would have resulted only in tremendous wastage of artillery fire in attempting to seek out targets which, in fact, were inaccessible to artillery fire.

“The Attu action likewise indicated that standard Japanese infiltration tactics can be offset by a system of ‘anti-termite’ patrols organized behind our lines, protecting our artillery, command posts, and supply lines. Wherever troops know that these friendly patrols are behind them, fire in their rear will mean to them simply that our patrols are exterminating the infiltrating Japs. This feeling was well expressed by General Nathan Bedford Forrest [Confederate cavalry commander, Civil War], when one of his staff officers approached him in great excitement and said, ‘General, the enemy is in our rear.’ Forrest calmly replied: ‘If they’re in our’n, we must be in their’n.’”