PEACE BY CONGRESSIONAL ENACTMENT FAILS
President Wilson Vetoes Knox Resolution Declaring State of War Ended
The failure of the Peace Treaty of ratification for the second time on March 19, 1920, with the Lodge reservations attached, and the determined refusal of the Republican majority to ratify it in the form desired by President Wilson, showed quite conclusively that under existing political alignment no peace might be expected for the country through the Treaty of Versailles. The Republicans, therefore, turned their efforts in a new direction to bring about peace without yielding to the President.
On April 1st the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives reported favorably a joint resolution declaring the state of war between Germany and the United States at an end and terminating the operation of all Congressional acts and Presidential proclamations dependent for their duration on the termination of the war or of the "present or existing emergency." It gave Germany forty-five days in which similarly to declare the ending of the war with the United States, and to waive all claims against this country, which she would not have had the right to assert had the United States ratified the Treaty of Versailles. For failure to comply with this provision, all commercial intercourse and the furnishing of loans and other financial assistance by this country to Germany were prohibited, except by license of the President. In answer to Democratic criticisms that the resolution was not only insincere, but also unconstitutional in arrogating to Congress the treaty-making power of the President, the Republican leaders conceded that, while the negotiation of peace terms rested with the President, the declaration of a status of peace was quite within the proper functions of Congress.
TEXT OF HOUSE RESOLUTION
The original resolution, as introduced in the House, read as follows:
Whereas the President of the United States, in the performance of his constitutional duty to give to Congress information of the state of the Union, has advised Congress that the war with the Imperial German Government has ended;
Resolved, by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the state of war declared to exist between the Imperial German Government and the people of the United States by a joint resolution of Congress, approved April 6, 1917, is hereby declared at an end.
Section 2—That in the interpretation of any provision relating to the date of the termination of the present war, or of the present or existing emergency in any acts of Congress, joint resolutions or proclamations of the President containing provisions contingent upon the date of the termination of the war, or of the present or existing emergency, the date when this resolution becomes effective shall be construed and treated as the date of the termination of the war, or of the present or existing emergency, notwithstanding any provision in any act of Congress or joint resolution providing any other mode of determination of the date of the termination of the war, or of the present or existing emergency.
Section 3—That, with a view to securing reciprocal trade with the German Government and its nationals, and for this purpose, it is hereby provided that unless within forty-five days from the date when this resolution becomes effective the German Government shall duly notify the President of the United States that it has declared a termination of the war with the United States and that it waives and renounces on behalf of itself and its nationals any claim, demand, right or benefit against the United States, or its nationals, that it or they would not have the right to assert had the United States ratified the Treaty of Versailles, the President of the United States shall have the power, and it shall be his duty, to proclaim the fact that the German Government has not given the notification hereinbefore mentioned, and thereupon, and until the President shall have proclaimed the receipt of such notification, commercial intercourse between the United States and Germany and the making of loans or credits, and the furnishing of financial assistance or supplies to the German Government or the inhabitants of Germany, directly or indirectly, by the Government or the inhabitants of the United States, shall, except with the license of the President, be prohibited.
Section 4—That whoever shall willfully violate the foregoing prohibition, whenever the same shall be in force, shall upon conviction be fined not more than $10,000, or, if a natural person, imprisoned for not more than two years, or both; and the officer, director or agent of any corporation who knowingly participates in such violation shall be punished by a like fine, imprisonment, or both, and any property, funds, securities, papers, or other articles or documents, or any vessel, together with her tackle, apparel, furniture, and equipment, concerned in such violation, shall be forfeited to the United States.
Section 5—That nothing herein contained shall be construed as a waiver by the United States of its rights, privileges, indemnities, reparations or advantages to which the United States has become entitled under the terms of the armistice signed November 11, 1918, or which were acquired by or are in the possession of the United States by reason of its participation in the war or otherwise; and all fines, forfeitures, penalties, and seizures imposed or made by the United States are hereby ratified, confirmed, and maintained.
MINORITY OPPOSITION
The Democratic members of the Foreign Affairs Committee presented a minority report severely arraigning the Republican majority both for the spirit and the provisions of the resolution, which, the report contended, "outrageously surrendered" American rights and, by the spirit in which it was conceived, laid open its authors to the charge of "sharp practice." The chief points made in the minority report were:
"The preamble states that the President of the United States, in the performance of his constitutional duty to give to Congress information of the state of the Union, has advised Congress that the war with the Imperial German Government has ended. At no time and under no circumstances has the President made any such assertion.
"It is true that, on the signing of the armistice, the President, in the course of an address to Congress, used the words, 'the war thus comes to an end.' But he spoke of actual hostilities, as every one knew, and not of the technical state of war.
"It takes a treaty to end a war. Hostilities had ceased, but the war had not ended, and will not end until it is terminated in a constitutional manner. The drafters of the resolution and the members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs who voted for it knew that this was the case.
"By quoting this statement of the President as the basis for this resolution the authors of the resolution lay themselves open to the charge of insincerity and sharp practice. The President never declared that the technical state of war which this resolution undertakes to declare at an end had come to an end, and the Supreme Court of the United States has recently declared that what the President had done did not announce the termination of the war. [32]
[32] The reference is to the Supreme Court decision on the question of war-time prohibition in the Kentucky distilleries case.
"This resolution contains some provisions that are within the power of Congress, and others that are not. So far as it seeks to declare peace, and so far as it seeks to direct the President to issue a proclamation to the German Government, it trenches upon the treaty-making powers and is not within the power of Congress.
"So far as it prohibits the United States citizens and residents from commercial intercourse with Germany or its nationals, and provides penalties for the violation of such restriction, it is valid. So far as it attempts to repeal war legislation, it is, of course, within the power of Congress."
With regard to Section 2, which fixed the date of the termination of the war as the date when the resolution shall become effective, the report said:
"There is much war and emergency legislation that should be repealed. This section does not repeal this legislation, however, and it gives no relief from the burdens, inconveniences, extravagances and losses which come from the existence of this legislation. Much of this legislation is burdensome, and oppressive in time of peace.
"Congress has the power to repeal it, and it should address itself to this task instead of frittering away its time in attempting to pass unconstitutional legislation for the purpose of embarrassing the executive department of the Government, or for some other political purpose."
Objection was raised against Section 3 for not adequately protecting American rights. The report, which was presented by Representative Flood, observed on this subject:
"The first thought which comes to one's mind in connection with this section is that it gives to Germany and her nationals all the rights they would have had if the United States had ratified the Treaty of Versailles. Without the provisions of the treaty great uncertainty prevails as to the title to and right to use German ships. The Versailles Treaty contains Germany's assent to the use of the property seized by the Alien Property Custodian, amounting to more than $500,000,000, to pay claims of the United States against Germany. This resolution does not pretend to accomplish this result.
"If we are dependent for a status of peace upon this resolution, I fail to see how we could be able to demand reimbursement for the cost of our army of occupation.
"Under the treaty Germany can become a League of Nations member, and, having under this resolution all the rights it would have had under the treaty when it became a member of the League, it would be entitled to assert against the United States the same rights which any other nation could assert, had our country ratified the treaty. We would thus be in the position of being compelled to protect the independence and territorial integrity of Germany against the aggressions of any or all of our allies.
"Section 5 is an attempt to preserve something out of the wreck of American rights which have been so outrageously surrendered in former sections of the resolution."
RESOLUTION PASSES HOUSE, 242 TO 150
The first test of strength between the supporters and the opponents of the resolution came on April 8th, when a rule limiting debate was adopted by a nearly strict party vote of 214 to 155, the Republicans, as were to be expected, supporting, and the Democrats opposing the rule. The vote on the resolution itself came next day, April 9th, when, after a flow of oratory characterized chiefly by bitterly partisan attacks from both sides of the House, the resolution was adopted by a vote of 242 to 150. Twenty-two Democrats joined the Republicans in voting for it, and two Republicans broke party lines in opposing it. Despite the comfortable majority, however, the result showed that without the President's approval efforts to declare peace by Congressional action would prove futile, since the vote lacked twenty of the two-thirds majority necessary to override a veto.
SENATE TAKES UP FIGHT TO FORCE PEACE
The scene now shifted to the Senate. Here the fortunes of the resolution were placed in the hands of Senator Philander C. Knox, of Pennsylvania, Secretary of State in President Taft's cabinet and a recognized authority on international law. Senator Knox redrafted the House resolution so as to repeal specifically the joint resolutions of war against Germany on April 6, 1917, and against Austria-Hungary on December 7, 1917, and thus, by annulling Congressional action declaring a state of war, to re-establish status quo ante bellum.
Such a solution of the problem, it was felt, did not encroach at all upon the President's right of making treaties. In fact, the resolution specifically requested the President to open negotiations for the purpose of establishing friendly relations and commercial intercourse between the United States and Germany, and the United States and the successors of the Austro-Hungarian government. The resolution also provided for the retention by the United States government of all enemy property seized during the war until all American claims against enemy governments had been settled, and declared further that, although the United States had not ratified the Treaty of Versailles, nevertheless it did not waive any of the "rights, privileges, indemnities, reparations or advantages" stipulated for its benefit in the terms of that document.
TEXT OF ORIGINAL KNOX RESOLUTION
The text of the Knox resolution, as favorably reported to the Senate on April 30th by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, read:
Joint resolution repealing the joint resolution of April 6, 1917, declaring a state of war to exist between the United States and Germany, and the joint resolution of December 7, 1917, declaring that a state of war exists between the United States and the Austro-Hungarian Government.
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled, that the joint resolution of Congress passed April 6, 1917, declaring a state of war to exist between the Imperial German Government and the Government and people of the United States, and making provisions to prosecute the same, be, and the same is hereby declared at an end.
Provided, however, that all property of the Imperial German Government or its successor or successors, and of all German nationalists which was on April 6, 1917, in or has since that date come into the possession or under control of the Government of the United States or of any of its officers, agents, or employees, from any source or by any agency whatsoever, shall be retained by the United States and no disposition thereof made, except as shall specifically be hereafter provided by Congress, until such time as the German Government has by treaty with the United States, ratification whereof is to be made by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, made suitable provisions for the satisfaction of all claims against the German Government of all persons wheresoever domiciled, who owe permanent allegiance to the United States, whether such persons have suffered through the acts of the German Government or its agents since July 31, 1914, loss, damage or injury to persons or property, directly or indirectly, through the ownership of shares of stock in German, American, or other corporations, or otherwise, and until the German Government has given further undertakings and made provisions by treaty, to be ratified by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, for granting to persons owing permanent allegiance to the United States, most favored nation treatment, whether the same be national or otherwise, in all matters affecting residence, business, profession, trade, navigation, commerce, and industrial property rights, and confirming to the United States all fines, forfeitures, penalties, and seizures imposed or made by the United States during the war, whether in respect to the property of the German government or German nationalists, and waiving any pecuniary claim based on events which occurred at any time before the coming into force of such treaty, any existing treaty between the United States and Germany to the contrary notwithstanding.
To these ends, and for the purpose of establishing fully friendly relations and commercial intercourse between the United States and Germany, the President is hereby requested immediately to open negotiations with the Government of Germany.
Section 2—That in the interpretation of any provision relating to the date of the termination of the present war or of the present or existing emergency in any acts of Congress, joint resolutions or proclamations of the President containing provisions contingent upon the date of the termination of the war or of the present or existing emergency, the date when this resolution becomes effective, shall be construed and treated as the date of the termination of the war or of the present or existing emergency, notwithstanding any provision in any act of Congress or joint resolution providing any other mode of determining the date of the termination of the war or of the present or existing emergency.
Section 3—That until by treaty or act or joint resolution of Congress it shall be determined otherwise, the United States, although it has not ratified the Treaty of Versailles, does not waive any of the rights, privileges, indemnities, reparations, or advantages to which it and its nationals have become entitled under the terms of the armistice signed November 11, 1918, or any extensions or modifications thereof or which, under the Treaty of Versailles, have been stipulated for its benefit as one of the principal allied and associated powers and to which it is entitled.
Section 4—That the joint resolution of Congress, approved December 7, 1917, declaring that a state of war exists between the Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Government and the Government and people of the United States, and making provisions to prosecute the same, be and the same is hereby repealed, and said state of war is hereby declared at an end, and the President is hereby requested immediately to open negotiations with the successor or successors of said Government for the purpose of establishing fully friendly relations and commercial intercourse between the United States and the Governments and peoples of Austria and Hungary.
A DEMOCRAT PAYS HIS RESPECTS TO REPUBLICANS
The attitude of leaders of the Democratic party on Republican maneuvers to force peace by Congressional action was indicated by a statement issued by Homer S. Cummings, chairman of the Democratic National Committee, in which the Knox resolution was characterized as "renewed evidence of the moral leprosy which is eating out the heart of the Republican party," and which, according to Mr. Cummings, proposed dishonor in the name of peace. As reported in the press, the statement said:
"The so-called Knox peace resolution, which has just been reported by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, is renewed evidence of the moral leprosy which is eating out the heart of the Republican party. In the name of peace it proposes dishonor.
"An analysis of the resolution discloses that:
"First, it recognizes the defect in the recent House resolution, which attempted to make a separate treaty with Germany by act of Congress.
Senator Philander C. Knox of Pennsylvania
A former United States Attorney-General and Secretary of State, and one of the "irreconcilable" opponents of the League of Nations and Treaty of Versailles. He was the author of the peace resolution declaring war with Germany ended which was passed by Congress but vetoed by President Wilson
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"Second, as an alternative proposition, it requests the President to commence negotiations for a separate peace with Germany.
"Third, it seeks to terminate, by a paper resolution, a state of war without protecting American rights.
"Fourth, it attempts to take advantage of the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles without becoming a party to that treaty and,
"Fifth, it requests the President to negotiate a separate peace with Austria.
"These are the outstanding features of the resolution. If any group of leaders a year ago had dared to suggest that we should abandon our allies and negotiate a separate treaty of peace, they would have found themselves isolated and discredited. Republican leaders have lost their moral sense in their mad lust for power.
"There has not been one moment since November, 1918, during which America has not suffered in honor, prestige, and power, as the result of the elections of that year. Since that time everything has been in confusion, and the frantic attempt of Republican leaders to find a legal method in which to do the dishonorable thing merely adds to the confusion. There is but one clear path of duty. It is likewise the path of honor and of peace and of permanent security.
"The path lies straight before us, and consists simply in ratifying the treaty of peace which our companions in arms have already ratified. The more the matter is debated the more it will become apparent that there are no substitutes for the requirements of plain duty and American honor."
KNOX URGES SEPARATE PEACE WITH GERMANY
On May 5th the debate on the resolution was opened in the Senate with a carefully prepared speech by Senator Knox, which outlined in detail arguments not only for the propriety and validity of the resolution, but for the absolute necessity of its adoption. Senator Knox contended that the war had ended, in fact and in law; that the objects for which the United States had entered the struggle had been achieved; that a "power-maddened administration" was continuing the technical state of war solely for the purpose of coercing the Senate into ratifying the Versailles Treaty, which had been universally discredited in all its parts; and that, since there was no hope of co-operation from the President, Congress must find means of ending the technical state of war independently of him. Said Senator Knox:
"The welfare and safety of the nation imperatively demands that we know we have peace. The whole world seethes with revolution. Our own nation is in ferment and turmoil. Force and strife are rampant and threaten the destruction not only of our property, but of our free institutions and even of our very lives. And yet we stand, and have stood for months, as a rudderless ship foundering in the trough of tremendous seas. We must not dare longer to delay a return to the ordered government of peace. As a preliminary step, the Executive must be returned to his peace-time powers and prerogatives. Need, propriety, wisdom, cannot question this. The resolution before us is designed to bring us to this.
WILSON TO BLAME
"The course of the President ever since he cruised to Europe to participate in the Peace Conference leaves no chance for doubt that he will continue hereafter as heretofore to thwart, so far as he is able, every attempt on the part of the Senate, the Congress, or the people, to take any action immediately or remotely affecting, in however slight a degree, through change or modification, the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles as it came to us fresh from his signature. He preferred to keep the country in an alleged state of war for now almost a year rather than abate one jot or tittle of the full measure his isolated will had set for the nation. Constitutional order, lawful functions, rights and duties of position, oaths of office as affecting the members of this body, he has noticed only to bring into contempt. He has conjured up every power within the whole vast executive domain in his efforts to compel this Senate to surrender its will and judgment to him, to become mere automatons to register his mandate—to approve this treaty in its last minutiæ of detail as he sent it to us.
"Now, in the face of this situation, it will be idle for us to pass any resolution looking to the immediate establishment of peace that does not contemplate the unqualified acceptance of the treaty, if that resolution requires from the President the performance of any act or duty in order to secure peace, because if we do, he will, if the statements of his representatives are accepted, so delay or ignore that act or duty as to defeat the end and purpose of our action, for in his opinion wisdom lies only in following the behests of his will. Therefore, if the resolution is to be effective, it must be self-operative. Nothing necessary to the bringing of peace must be left for his accomplishment.
WHY UNITED STATES WENT TO WAR
"Our purposes, as stated by the President, were three-fold:
"First, the defeat and elimination of the Imperial German Government and Prussian autocracy;
"Next, the liberation from their yoke of despotism of the Germans themselves—for whom we had nothing but sympathy and friendship—to the end that they might be masters of their own fates and fortunes; and
"Lastly, the establishment, as sincere friends of the German people, of intimate relations of mutual advantage between them and us.
"In so far as my information goes, the German Government never declared war against the United States. They merely accepted the status which this declaration recognized and probably created; for it must be remembered that while we interpreted, and rightly so, that German submarine warfare, as directed against the United States, was illegal, constituting acts of war, the German Government never acquiesced in that view and, on the contrary, maintained the legality of all general measures taken.
"The Imperial German Government, against whom we declared war, did cease to exist at the time of the signing of the armistice, leaving us from thence on without any titular enemy against which to wage a war unless we were warring with the German people, and we have clearly estopped ourselves to make such a contention.
"Thus from this point of view also the armistice brought us not alone the end of hostilities, but the actual peace. There remained only the making of arrangements covering the ordinary peace-time intercourse.
WAR AT END, IN FACT AND IN LAW
"As a matter of law and of fact we are at peace with Germany; first, because of the terms of the armistice of November 11, 1918, its amendments and renewals; second, because of the 'silent ceasing' of hostilities; third, because of the disappearance, the extinction of the Government against which we declared war, and fourth, because of the negotiation by us and our allies or associates in the war with the people who were lately our enemies, and the ratification by our allies or associates and our enemies, of a treaty of peace which specifically provides both for the termination of hostilities to be followed by a resumption of diplomatic relations, and also for the status that should exist during our future peace-time intercourse; which treaty is now in force and observed everywhere except in the United States, and has in fact and in international law brought peace to the whole world, including ourselves.
"Having thus in law and in fact international peace, having nothing left but a domestic status of war created by a legislative declaration of war, with no hostilities heretofore or now existent or possible in the territory over which this paper-war status exists, it is not only legally sound, but economically, morally, and patriotically necessary and indispensable that we at once repeal the declaration of war and so immediately end the despotic war powers with which a power-maddened administration continues to misrule this great people.
VERSAILLES TREATY IMPOSSIBLE
"To what end has all this juggling with obvious facts and universally recognized principles been maintained? The answer is easy and known to all. The purpose has been to coerce the Senate to approve the Treaty of Versailles—a treaty that is almost universally discredited in all its parts. The majority of its negotiators concede this. Its economic terms are impossible; its League of Nations is an aggravated imitation of the worst features of the ill-fated and foolish Holy Alliance of a century ago. It promises little but mischief unless recast on such radical lines as will entirely obliterate its identity.
"Wisdom requires the negotiation of a separate treaty between the United States and Germany, which should provide reciprocal rights and obligations between us and that country alone."
KNOX RESOLUTION PASSES BOTH HOUSES
In the course of its consideration in the Senate, the provision of the resolution requesting the President to negotiate a separate treaty with Germany was eliminated, but the request for a treaty with the successors of the Austro-Hungarian government was retained. In its amended form the resolution was brought to a decision in the Senate on May 15th, and adopted by a vote of 43 to 38, three Democrats voting with its supporters and one Republican with the opposition.
As the text of the Knox resolution adopted by the Senate differed from the measure which had been passed by the House of Representatives on April 9th, the House, to expedite matters, dropped its own resolution, and passed, on May 21st, the Senate draft by a vote of 228 to 139, seventeen short of the two-thirds majority necessary to override the expected Presidential veto.
TEXT OF AMENDED RESOLUTION
The text of the peace resolution as passed by the Senate and later concurred in by the House of Representatives, read as follows:
The joint resolution of Congress, passed April 6, 1917, declaring a state of war to exist between the Imperial German Government and the Government and people of the United States, and making provisions to prosecute the same, be, and the same is hereby repealed and said state of war is hereby declared at an end.
Provided, however, that all property of the Imperial German Government, or its successor or successors, and of all German nationals which was on April 6, 1917, is or has since that date come into the possession or under control of the Government of the United States or any of its officers, agents or employees from any source or by any agency whatsoever, shall be retained by the United States and no disposition thereof made, except as shall specifically be hereafter provided by Congress, until such time as the German Government has, by treaty with the United States, ratification whereof is to be made by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, made suitable provisions for the satisfaction of all claims against the German Government of all persons, wheresoever domiciled, who owe permanent allegiance to the United States, whether such persons have suffered through the acts of the German Government or its agents since July 31, 1914, loss, damage, or injury to their persons or property, directly or indirectly, through the ownership of shares of stock in German, American, or other corporations, or have suffered damage directly in consequence of hostilities or any operations of war, or otherwise, or until the German Government has given further undertakings and made provisions by treaty, to be ratified by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, for granting to persons owing permanent allegiance to the United States, most favored nation treatment, whether the same be national or otherwise, in all matters affecting residence, business, profession, trade, navigation, commerce and industrial property rights, and confirming to the United States all fines, forfeitures, penalties, and seizures imposed or made by the United States during the war, whether in respect to the property of the German Government or German nationals, and waiving any pecuniary claim based on events which occurred at any time before the coming into force of such treaty, any existing treaty between the United States and Germany to the contrary notwithstanding.
That in the interpretation of any provision relating to the date of the termination of the war or of the present or existing emergency in any acts of Congress, joint resolutions or proclamations of the President containing provisions contingent upon the date of the termination of the war or of the present or existing emergency, the date when this resolution becomes effective shall be construed and treated as the date of the termination of the war or of the present or existing emergency, notwithstanding any provision in any act of Congress or joint resolution, providing any other mode of determining the date of the termination of the war or of the present or existing emergency.
That until by treaty or act or joint resolution of Congress it shall be determined otherwise, the United States, although it has not ratified the Treaty of Versailles, does not waive any of the rights, privileges, indemnities, reparations or advantages to which it and its nationals have become entitled under the terms of the armistice signed November 11, 1918, or any extensions or modifications thereof or which under the Treaty of Versailles have been stipulated for its benefit as one of the principal allied and associated powers and to which it is entitled.
That the joint resolution of Congress approved December 7, 1917, declaring that a state of war exists between the Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Government and the Government and the people of the United States and making provisions to prosecute the same, be, and the same is hereby repealed, and said state of war is hereby declared at an end, and the President is hereby requested immediately to open negotiations with the successor or successors of said Government for the purpose of establishing fully friendly relations and commercial intercourse between the United States and the Governments and peoples of Austria and Hungary.
PRESIDENT'S VETO
The resolution now came before the President for his signature. On May 27th he returned it to the House without his approval, and in an accompanying message explained the reasons for his veto. The President did not touch upon the question of constitutionality which had been raised frequently during the debates, but gave as his chief reason refusal to become party to an action which, he felt, would place "ineffaceable stain upon the gallantry and honor of the United States."
Following is the text of President Wilson's message vetoing the peace resolution:
"To the House of Representatives:
"I return herewith, without my signature, House Joint Resolution 327, intended to repeal the Joint Resolution of April 6, 1917, declaring a state of war to exist between the United States and Germany, and the Joint Resolution of December 7, 1917, declaring a state of war to exist between the United States and the Austro-Hungarian Government, and to declare a state of peace. I have not felt at liberty to sign this resolution because I cannot bring myself to become party to an action which would place ineffaceable stain upon the gallantry and honor of the United States.
"The resolution seeks to establish peace with the German Empire without exacting from the German Government any action by way of setting right the infinite wrongs which it did to the peoples whom it attacked and whom we professed it our purpose to assist when we entered the war. Have we sacrificed the lives of more than one hundred thousand Americans and ruined the lives of thousands of others and brought upon thousands of American families an unhappiness that can never end for purposes which we do not now care to state or take further steps to attain?
"The attainment of these purposes is provided for in the Treaty of Versailles by terms deemed adequate by the leading statesmen and experts of all the great peoples who were associated in the war against Germany. Do we now not care to join in the effort to secure them?
"We entered the war most reluctantly. Our people were profoundly disinclined to take part in a European war, and at last did so, only because they became convinced that it could not in truth be regarded as only a European war, but must be regarded as a war in which civilization itself was involved and human rights of every kind as against a belligerent Government. Moreover, when we entered the war we set forth very definitely the purposes for which we entered, partly because we did not wish to be considered as merely taking part in a European contest. This Joint Resolution which I return does not seek to accomplish any of these objects, but in effect makes a complete surrender of the rights of the United States so far as the German Government is concerned.
"A treaty of peace was signed at Versailles on the twenty-eighth of June last which did seek to accomplish the objects which we had declared to be in our minds, because all the great Governments and peoples which united against Germany had adopted our declarations of purpose as their own and had in solemn form embodied them in communications to the German Government preliminary to the armistice of November 11, 1918. But the treaty, as signed at Versailles, has been rejected by the Senate of the United States, though it has been ratified by Germany. By that rejection and by its methods we had in effect declared that we wish to draw apart and pursue objects and interests of our own, unhampered by any connections of interest or of purpose with other Governments and peoples.
"Notwithstanding the fact that upon our entrance into the war we professed to be seeking to assist in the maintenance of common interests, nothing is said in this resolution about the freedom of navigation upon the seas, or the reduction of armaments, or the vindication of the rights of Belgium, or the rectification of wrongs done to France, or the release of the Christian populations of the Ottoman Empire from the intolerable subjugation which they have had for so many generations to endure, or the establishment of an independent Polish State, or the continued maintenance of any kind of understanding among the great powers of the world which would be calculated to prevent in the future such outrages as Germany attempted and in part consummated.
"We have now, in effect, declared that we do not care to take any further risks or to assume any further responsibilities with regard to the freedom of nations or the sacredness of international obligations or the safety of independent peoples. Such a peace with Germany—a peace in which none of the essential interests which we had at heart when we entered the war is safeguarded—is, or ought to be, inconceivable, as inconsistent with the dignity of the United States, with the rights and liberties of her citizens, and with the very fundamental conditions of civilization.
"I hope that in these statements I have sufficiently set forth the reasons why I have felt it incumbent upon me to withhold my signature."
Woodrow Wilson.
The White House, May 27, 1920.
Next day, May 28th, the resolution was brought before the House in an attempt to repass it over the veto, but the vote, 219 to 152, lacked twenty-nine of the necessary two-thirds majority. On the original House resolution, passed April 9th, the vote had been 242 to 150, and on the Knox resolution, passed by the House on May 21st, 228 to 139. A few days later Congress adjourned until the winter session in December.
THE MAP OF EUROPE REMADE
Proposed Form of Government, Countries from Which Formed and Ethnic or Racial Stock of Newly Established Political Units Resulting from the World War.
(From a paper prepared in January, 1920, by O. P. Austin, Statistical Department, National City Bank.)
| [33]Area | [33]Population | Date established | Form of Government | Countries from which formed | Ethnic or Racial Stock | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Poland | 141,854 | 36,000,000 | Nov., 1916 | Republic | Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary | Slavic, Semitic |
| Czecho-Slovakia | 60,000 | 13,000,000 | Oct., 1918 | Republic | Austria-Hungary | Slavic |
| Jugo-Slavia | 85,000 | 10,500,000 | Oct., 1918 | Kingdom | Austria-Hungary, Serbia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro | Slavic, Serbs, Croats |
| Ukrainia | 215,000 | 30,000,000 | Nov., 1917 | Republic | Russia, Austria-Hungary | Slavic |
| Esthonia | 7,300 | 1,750,000 | Apr., 1918 | Republic | Russia | Slavic |
| Livonia | 17,000 | 1,650,000 | Apr., 1918 | Republic | Russia | Slavic |
| Courland | 10,000 | 600,000 | Apr., 1918 | Republic | Russia | Slavic |
| Letvia | 9,000 | 1,500,000 | Apr., 1918 | Republic | Russia | Letts (Balto- Slavs) |
| Lithuania | 90,000 | 10,000,000 | Apr., 1918 | Republic | Russia | Slavic, Germania |
| White Russia | 140,000 | 5,000,000 | May, 1918 | Republic | Russia | Slavic |
| North Russia | 275,000 | 400,000 | Nov., 1918 | Military Gov | Russia | Slavic, Finns |
| Rus. Fed. Soviet Rep | Undet'd | Undet'd | Nov., 1917 | Soviet Rep | Russia | Slavic |
| Don Rep | 63,000 | 4,000,000 | Jan., 1918 | Military Gov | Russia | Slavic, Cossack |
| Kuban Rep | 36,000 | 3,000,000 | Nov., 1918 | Republic | Russia | Slavic |
| Tauride Rep | 23,000 | 1,800,000 | Mar., 1918 | Republic | Russia | Slavic, Tartar |
| Terek Rep | 28,000 | 1,300,000 | Sept., 1918 | Republic | Russia | Turko-Tartar |
| Tatar-Bashkir Rep | 175,000 | 9,000,000 | Oct., 1918 | Military | Russia | Turko- Tartar |
| Yakutsk Rep | 1,000,000 | 400,000 | May, 1918 | Military | Siberian Russia | Yakuts, Cossack |
| Rep. of Siberia | Undet'd | Undet'd | Dec., 1917 | Military | Siberian Russia | Slav, Mongol, Tartar |
| Rep. of Georgia | 40,000 | 2,500,000 | Jan., 1918 | Republic | Russia, Turkey | Georgian, Armenian |
| Rep. of Turkestan | 400,000 | 6,500,000 | Jan., 1918 | Military | Russia | Turko-Tartar |
| Eastern Karelia | 68,000 | 250,000 | May, 1919 | Military | Russia | Balto-Slavic |
| Finland | 125,000 | 3,500,000 | Dec., 1917 | Republic | Russia | Finns |
| Murman Region | 35,000 | 100,000 | July, 1918 | Military | Russian | Finns |
| German Rep | 175,000 | 60,000,000 | Nov., 1918 | Republic | Germany | Germanic |
| Rep of German Austria | 28,000 | 10,000,000 | Oct., 1918 | Republic | Austria | Germanic |
| Hungarian Rep | 32,000 | 9,000,000 | Nov., 1918 | Soviet Rep | Hungary | Magyar |
| [34]Rumania | 110,000 | 12,500,000 | 1919 | Kingdom | Rumania, Hungary, Bessarabia | Rumanian, Magyar |
| Turkey in Europe | 10,000 | 1,900,000 | Undet'd | Turkey | Turkish | |
| Anatolia, Asia Minor | 145,000 | 5,000,000 | Undet'd | Turkey | Turkish | |
| Armenia, Asia Minor | 75,000 | 2,500,000 | Aug., 1918 | Undet'd | Turkey | Armenians |
| Mesopotamia, Asia Minor | 143,000 | 2,000,000 | 1917 | British Admin. | Turkey | Turks, Arabs, Persian |
| Syria, Asia Minor | 37,000 | 1,000,000 | 1919 | Undet'd | Turkey | Syrian, Turkish |
| Palestine, Asia Minor | 16,000 | 500,000 | 1917 | British Admin. | Turkey | Turks, Arabs, Jews |
| Kingdom of Hejaz | 96,500 | 300,000 | June, 1916 | Kingdom | Turkey | Arabs, Turks |
| Nejd & Hasa, Arabia | No data | No data | 1913 | Emirate | Turkey | Arabs |
| Jebel Shammar, Arabia | No data | No data | 1918 | Emirate | Turkey | Bedouin |
| Asir, Arabia | No data | No data | 1918 | Principate | Turkey | Arabs |
| Yemen, Arabia | No data | No data | 1918 | Imamate | Turkey | Arabs |
| Koweit, Arabia | No data | No data | 1918 | Sultanate | Turkey | Arabs |
| Oman, Arabia | 82,000 | 500,000 | 1913 | G. Brit & France | Turkey | Arabs |
| Egypt | 350,000 | 12,000,000 | 1914 | Great Britain | Turkey | Egyptian |
| German East Africa | 384,000 | 8,000,000 | 1918 | Great Britain | German Colony | Bantu |
| German S. W. Africa | 322,000 | 200,000 | 1915 | British S. Africa | German Colony | Hottentots |
| Kamerun | 191,000 | 2,500,000 | 1916 | British & French | German Colony | Sudanese |
| Togo | 33,000 | 1,000,000 | 1914 | Allied Mil | German Colony | Hamitic |
| Kaiser Wilhelm Land | 70,000 | 250,000 | 1918 | Australia | German Colony | Malay |
| Ger. Samoan Islands | 1,200 | 40,000 | 1918 | Australia | German Colony | Samoan |
| Nauru Islands | [35] | 1918 | Mandate—British | German Colony | Samoan | |
| Ger. S. Pacific Islands | 15,000 | 350,000 | 1918 | Australia | German Colony | Malay |
| Ger. N. Pacific Islands | 5,000 | 600,000 | 1918 | Mandate— Japan | German Colony | Malay |
| Kiau Chau | 200 | 200,000 | 1918 | Mandate— Japan | German Colony | Chinese |
[33]Latest available estimate.
[34]Enlarged by absorption of Hungarian territory.
[35]A small island in the Marshall Group occupied as a wireless station; also known as Pleasant Island.
OUR PART IN WINNING THE WAR
Official Figures That Reveal the Enormous Contribution of This Country in Men, Money and Supplies
FIGURES OF AMERICAN PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR [36]
Revised to August 1, 1919
| Total armed forces, including Army, Navy, Marine Corps, etc. | 4,800,000 |
| Total men in the Army | 4,000,000 |
| Men who went overseas | 2,086,000 |
| Men who fought in France | 1,390,000 |
| Greatest number sent in one month | 306,000 |
| Greatest number returning in one month | 333,000 |
| Tons of supplies shipped from America to France | 7,500,000 |
| Total registered in draft | 24,234,021 |
| Total draft inductions | 2,810,296 |
| Greatest number inducted in one month | 400,000 |
| Graduates of Line Officers' Training Schools | 80,568 |
| Cost of war to April 30, 1919 | $21,850,000,000 |
| Cost of Army to April 30, 1919 | $13,930,000,000 |
| Battles fought by American troops | 13 |
| Months of American participation in the war | 19 |
| Days of battle | 200 |
| Days of duration of Meuse-Argonne battle | 47 |
| Americans in Meuse-Argonne battle | 1,200,000 |
| American casualties in Meuse-Argonne battle | 120,000 |
| American battle deaths in war | 50,300 |
| American wounded in war | 205,690 |
| American deaths from disease | 57,500 |
| Total deaths in the Army | 115,500 |
[36] From the War with Germany—A Statistical Summary, by Leonard P. Ayres, Colonel, General Staff, U. S. A. (For statistics of American casualties revised to the end of 1919, see Vol. III, pp. 403-6.)
The part played by the United States in the war is statistically and graphically summarized in a compact little book prepared by Colonel Leonard P. Ayres of the Statistical Staff of the War Department. Attentively as the public may have followed the published reports of the many progressive steps and stages of our preparation for and participation in the war, much of the matter in The War With Germany—A Statistical Summary will have surprising interest. It is the first time a comprehensive view of the character and magnitude of our war activities has been made possible through anything so concrete and authoritative. The data were obtained from official reports, during the war, to the President, Secretary of War and Chief-of-Staff from the American Peace Commission in Paris, from the files of the Supreme War Council in Versailles, and other sources; and though, as Colonel Ayres states, it was still impossible to get final figures on some points or wholly reliable ones on others, care was taken to insure the degree of reliability reasonably practicable. The diagrams, figures and other information presented here and elsewhere in this volume are reproduced from Colonel Ayres' Summary, second edition, revised to August 1, 1919.
Official Government Statistics.
Male Population Registered and Not Registered
THE SELECTIVE SERVICE
"The willingness," Colonel Ayres says, "with which the American people accepted the universal draft was the most remarkable feature in the history of our preparation for war. It is a noteworthy evidence of the enthusiastic support given the war program that, despite the previous hostility to the principle of universal liability for military service, a few months after the selective service law was passed, the standing of the drafted soldier was fully as honorable in the estimation of his companions and of the country in general as was that of the man who enlisted voluntarily. Moreover, the record of desertions from the Army shows that the total was smaller than in previous wars and a smaller percentage occurred among drafted men than among those who volunteered. The Selective Service Law was passed on May 19, 1917, and as subsequently amended, it mobilized all the man power of the nation from the ages of 18 to 45 inclusive. Under this act, 24,234,021 men were registered and slightly more than 2,800,000 were inducted into the military service on the first draft. But during the war, from April 6, 1917, to November 11, 1918, about 4,000,000 served in the Army of the United States." The total number serving the armed forces of the country, including Army, Navy, Marine Corps and other services, amounted to 4,800,000. Approximately five men out of every 100 citizens were in arms. Of these, 2,086,000, constituting the American Expeditionary Force, were in service on the Western front. Those who saw actual fighting were 1,390,000.
It is interesting in this connection to record the fact that in our greatest previous war, the Civil War, 2,400,000 men served in the Northern Armies and in the Navy. In that struggle 10 men in each 100 inhabitants of the Northern States served as soldiers or sailors.
The fact is pointed out by Colonel Ayres that though the British sent to France more men in their first year than we did in our first year, it took England three years to reach a strength of 2,000,000 men in France whereas the United States reached that strength in France in a year and a half. But as an offset, it must be borne in mind that the British had to use men from the beginning to fill terrible casualty gaps, which was not the case with the American steadily building forces, and that the British also were sending men to several other battle fronts than those of France.
HOW THE DRAFT WAS MADE UP
Under the draft, registrants were subjected to a preliminary examination by the local boards to determine who were not of sufficient soundness and vigor for military life. Those accepted as qualified for service were sent to training camps where they underwent a second examination and rejections were made of those in any serious way defective. The not surprising result of the examinations was the demonstration that men representing the highest order of physical condition came from agricultural districts, the country bred boys far excelling those reared in the city. Taken by States it is noteworthy that men from the Middle West and those from Kentucky and Arkansas of the Southern States had the highest record, their physical condition enabling 70 to 80 percent. to pass the two examinations. The lowest percentage was in the New England States, in New York, in Michigan and in Western States that have for years been health resorts, where subnormal persons from all over the country resort. The percentage of men from those states who passed the two examinations was but 50 to 59. The intermediate ranges were 60 to 69. Under the two examinations not only did country boys make a better showing than city boys (100,000 country boys would furnish for military service 4,700 more soldiers than would an equal number of city boys), but the white registrants were better than the colored, the native-born better than the alien-born. Under the analysis 100,000 whites would furnish 1,240 more soldiers than would an equal number of colored; and 100,000 native-born would yield 3,500 more soldiers than would the like number of foreign-born. As 3,500 men are equivalent to an infantry regiment at full war strength, the value of these differences can be appreciated.
Official Government Statistics.
Comparative Losses of Merchant Shipping During the War
About 200,000 commissioned officers were required for the Army. Less than 9,000 were in the Federal Service at the beginning of the war,—5,791 were Regulars and 3,199 were officers of the National Guard in Federal Service. Thus out of every six officers one had had previous training in the army, Guard or ranks; three trained for their commissions in officers' training camps; two went from civil life into the army with little or no military training—the latter being in the majority physicians, ministers or technical men.
CAMPS AND TRAINING
Shelter was constructed in a few months for the accommodation of 1,800,000 men under training. For the National Guard and National Army divisions there were 16 camps and 16 cantonments, chiefly in the North. For National Guard Units organized during the summer of 1917 there were canvas camps in the South. One division, the Rainbow, required no training field, as it was assembled directly at Camp Mills for early transportation to France. The average American soldier who went to France received six months' training before he sailed and two months more in a quiet sector after reaching France, before entering the battle line.
The infantry soldier was trained in the division, the American typical unit, composed of about 1,000 officers and 27,000 men. Before the signing of the armistice there had been trained and sent overseas 42 divisions, the training of 12 more was well advanced and 4 others were being organized. Had the war continued this country would have had 80 divisions overseas before July, 1919, and 100 by the end of that year.
This country had the benefit in its training camps of 547 of the ablest French and English officers who had seen service on the Western front and were sent over to bring to the training of our men the approved methods developed in the experiences of the war. There were besides 226 non-commissioned British officers detailed as instructors. Colonel Ayres says they rendered services out of all proportion to their number, being a significant contribution to our training program.
GETTING THE TROOPS OVER
Especially impressive are the figures dealing with troop movements:
"During our nineteen months of war more than 2,000,000 American soldiers were carried to France. Half a million of these went over in the first thirteen months, the others in the last six months.
"The highest troop-carrying records are those of July, 1918, when 306,000 soldiers were carried to Europe, and June, 1919, when 364,000 were brought home to America.
"Most of the troops who sailed for France left from New York. Half of them landed in England and the other half landed in France.
"Among every 100 Americans who went over forty-nine went in British ships, forty-five in American ships, three in Italian, two in French, and one in Russian shipping under English control.
"Our cargo ships averaged one complete trip every seventy days and our troopships one complete trip every thirty-five days.
"The cargo fleet was almost exclusively American. It reached the size of 2,700,000 dead-weight tons and carried to Europe about 7,500,000 tons of cargo.
"The greatest troopship among all the ships has been the Leviathan, which landed 12,000 men (the equivalent of a German division) in France every month.
"The fastest transports have been the Great Northern and the Northern Pacific, which have made complete turn-arounds, taken on new troops and started back again in nineteen days."
TRANSPORTATION EXTRAORDINARY
Apropos of the rapid transportation Colonel Ayres says:
"In June (1918) with the German drives in full swing, the Allies called on us to continue the extraordinary transportation of troops begun in April. The early movement had been met by filling up the divisions that sailed with the best trained men wherever they could be found. Divisions embarked after July 1 had to meet shortages with men called to the colors in the spring. By November the average period of training in the United States had been shortened to close to four months, and the average for the period July 1 to Nov. 11 was probably five months.
"In the last months of the war, the induction of men was carried forward at top speed and every device was used for hastening training. The result fully justified the effort. Into the great Meuse-Argonne offensive we were able to throw a force of 1,200,000 men, while we had many thousands of troops engaged in other parts of the line. Our training camp officers stood up to the test; our men with their intensive drilling in open-order fighting, which has characterized American training, routed the best of the German divisions from the Argonne Forest and the Valley of the Meuse."
FEEDING AND CLOTHING PROBLEMS
When an army is 3,000 or 4,000 miles from its sources of supply the amounts of supplies in reserve and in transit are enormous as compared with the quantities actually consumed each month. As an example the army purchases of blankets in 1918 were two and one-quarter times as great as the entire American production in 1914. Put differently, the blankets bought in one year for the use of 4,000,000 or 5,000,000 soldiers would have been sufficient to make good the normal consumption of blankets by 100,000,000 American civilians for two and a quarter years. So proportionately with other things, the rule for clothing was that for every man at the front there must be a three months' reserve in France, another two or three months' reserve in the United States and a third three months' supply continuously in transit.
The same thing was true of other supplies and munitions. The need for reserves and the time required for transportation called for the supply of enormous quantities and called for it at once.
An indication of the quartermaster problem may be obtained from the fact that between April 6, 1917, and May 31, 1918, there was delivered to the army 131,800,000 pairs of wool stockings, 85,000,000 undershirts, 83,600,000 drawers, 30,700,000 pairs of shoes, 26,500,000 flannel shirts, 21,700,000 blankets, 21,700,000 wool breeches, 13,900,000 wool coats, and 8,300,000 overcoats. When the troop movement was speeded up in 1918 Colonel Ayres states that the margin of woolen clothing was dangerously narrow, and to secure these and other articles in sufficient quantity it was found necessary to take control of all states of the manufacturing process, from assembling the raw material to inspecting the finished product.
At no time was there a shortage of food in the expeditionary forces. Soldiers sometimes went hungry in this as in all other wars, but the condition was local and temporary. It occurred because of transportation difficulties during periods of active fighting or rapid movement when the units outran their rolling kitchens.
In France American engineers built seventeen new ship berths and 1,000 miles of standard and 125 miles of narrow gauge railroads. The Signal Corps strung 100,000 miles of telephone wires, and 40,000 American made motor trucks were shipped overseas. In this country army construction projects cost twice as much as the Panama Canal and were on nearly as large a scale overseas.
The storage space constructed in France was more than nine-tenths as large as that built at home. The amount of food on hand from the time the American troops entered active fighting never fell below a 45 days' supply, and at the time of the submarine scare, was kept at 59 to 72 days' supply.
Likewise the supply of clothing arose to the emergency of combat.
"The records of the quartermaster show that during the six months of hard fighting, from June to November, the enlisted man in the A. E. F. received on the average:
"Slicker and overcoat, every 5 months; blanket, flannel shirt, and breeches, every 2 months; coat, every 79 days; shoes and puttees, every 51 days; drawers and undershirt, every 34 days; woolen socks, every 23 days."
GUNS AND MUNITIONS
When war was declared we had on hand nearly 600,000 Springfield rifles. The American Enfield rifle was designed and manufactured. The total production of the two up to the signing of the armistice was over 2,500,000. The production of rifle ammunition amounted to 3,500,000,000, of which half was shipped overseas, in addition to the 200,000,000 rounds secured from the French and British.
During the war the Browning automatic rifle and the Browning machine gun were developed, put into quantity production and used in large numbers in the final battles in France. Before the war the allowance of machine guns in the American Army was four guns to a regiment; the allowance now is 336 to a regiment, testimony to the demonstrated importance in war of that effective weapon. The Browning machine guns are believed to be more effective than the corresponding weapons used in any other army.
The total number of machine guns produced in America up to the end of 1918 was 226,557, of these 69,960 being of the light Browning and 56,612 of the heavy Browning type. The Vickers field machine guns produced totaled 12,125, the other field guns 6,366, the Lewis aircraft guns, 39,200, the Browning aircraft 580, the Marlin aircraft 38,000, and the Vickers aircraft 3,714. Before Nov. 1, 1918, 29,000 light Brownings, 27,000 heavy Brownings, and 1,500,000,000 rounds of rifle and machine-gun ammunition were shipped.
When war was declared the United States had sufficient light artillery to equip an army of 500,000 men, and shortly found itself confronted with the problem of preparing to equip 5,000,000 men. To meet the situation, it was decided in June, 1917, to allot our guns to training purposes and to equip our forces in France with artillery conforming to the French and British standard calibers. It was arranged that we should purchase from the French and British the artillery needed for our first divisions and ship them in return equivalent amounts of steel, copper and other raw materials so that they could either manufacture guns for us in their own factories or give us guns out of their stocks and replace them by new ones made from our materials.
Up to the end of April, 1919, the number of complete artillery units produced in American plants was more than 3,000, or equal to all those purchased from the French and British during the war. The number of rounds of complete artillery ammunition produced in American plants was in excess of 20,000,000, as compared with 10,000,000 rounds secured from the French and British. In the first twenty months after the declaration of war by each country, the British did better than we did in the production of light artillery, and we excelled them in producing heavy artillery and both light and heavy shells.
THE ARTILLERY SUPPLY
Colonel Ayres says:
"The most important single fact about our artillery in France is that we always had a sufficient supply of light artillery for the combat divisions that were ready for front-line service. This does not mean that when the divisions went into the battle line they always had their artillery with them, for in a number of cases they did not.
"The result of the compilation is to show that in every 100 days that our combat divisions were in line they were supported by their own artillery for seventy-five days, by British artillery for five days, by French for one and one-half days, and were without artillery for eighteen and one-half days out of the 100. Of these eighteen and one-half days, however, eighteen days were in quiet sectors and only one-half of one day in each hundred was in active sectors. There are only three records of American divisions being in an active sector without artillery support. The total of these three cases amounts to one-half of 1 per cent., or about fourteen hours out of the typical 100 days just analyzed.
"The facts can be summarized in round numbers with approximate accuracy by saying that we had in France 3,500 pieces of artillery of which nearly 500 were made in America, and we used on the firing line 2,250, of which over 100 were made in America."
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1919
At the conclusion of his chapter on rifles and machine guns Colonel Ayres has an interesting bit of semi-critical comment on the question of foresight, of which some desk-experts have been inclined to doubt the United States authorities were possessed. He says:
"At this point it is appropriate to comment on the fact that there are many articles of munitions in which American production reached great amounts by the fall of 1918 but which were not used in large quantities at the front because the armistice was signed before big supplies of them reached France. In the main, these munitions are articles of ordnance and aviation equipment, involving such technical difficulties of manufacture that their production could not be improvised or even greatly abbreviated in time.
"As the production figures are scrutinized in retrospect, and it is realized that many millions of dollars were spent on army equipment that was never used at the front, it seems fair to question whether prudent foresight could not have avoided some of this expense.
"Perhaps the best answer to the question is to be found in the record of a conference that took place in the little French town of Trois Fontaines on October 4, 1918, between Marshal Foch and the American Secretary of War.
"In that conference the Allied Commander-in-Chief made final arrangements with the American Secretary as to the shipment of American troops and munitions in great numbers during the fall and winter preparatory for the campaign of 1919.
"This was one day before the first German peace note and 38 days before the end of the war, but Marshal Foch was then calling upon America to make her great shipments of munitions and her supreme contribution of man-power for the campaign of the following year."
GAS AND EXPLOSIVES
One of the striking contributions to the cause of the Allies was the enormous quantity of smokeless powder and high explosives produced. From April 1, 1917, to November 11, 1918, the production of smokeless powder in the United States was 632,000,000 pounds, which was almost equal to the combined production of France and Great Britain. But by the time the war ended the production of smokeless powder in this country was 45 per cent. greater than that of France and Great Britain combined.
The output of high explosives, T.N.T. and others, increased rapidly from its pre-war status to a quantity 40 percent. greater than that of Great Britain, and nearly double the French production at the close of the war.
"The result of the high rate of production of both smokeless powder and high explosives was that the artillery ammunition program was never held up for lack of either the powder which hurls the bullet or the shell from the gun, or the high explosive which makes the shell effective when it reaches its destination."
Colonel Ayres says of toxic gases:
"When the clouds of chlorine suddenly enveloped the British and French lines in the Ypres salient, early in 1915, a new weapon was introduced into the war. That it was a powerful weapon is evidenced by the fact that during the year 1918 from 20 to 30 percent. of all our battle casualties were due to gas.
"At the time we entered the war we had practically no experience in manufacturing toxic gases, and no existing facilities which could be readily converted to such use. At the signing of the armistice we were equipped to produce gas at a more rapid rate than France, England, or Germany."
THE AIR SERVICE
"On the declaration of war the United States had fifty-five training airplanes, of which fifty-one were classified as obsolete and the other four as obsolescent. When we entered the war the Allies made the designs of their planes available to us and before the end of hostilities furnished us from their own manufacture 3,800 service planes.
"Aviation training schools in the United States graduated 8,602 men from elementary courses and 4,028 from advanced courses. More than 5,000 pilots and observers were sent overseas. The total personnel of the Air Service, officers, students, and enlisted men, increased from 1,200 at the outbreak of the war to nearly 200,000 at its close.
"There were produced in the United States to Nov. 30, 1918, more than 8,000 training planes and more than 16,000 training engines.
"The De Haviland-4 observation and day bombing plane was the only plane the United States put into quantity production. Before the signing of the armistice 3,227 had been completed and 1,885 shipped overseas. The plane was successfully used at the front for three months.
"The production of the 12-cylinder Liberty engine was America's chief contribution to aviation. Before the armistice 13,574 had been completed, 4,435 shipped to the expeditionary forces, and 1,025 delivered to the Allies.
"The first fliers in action wearing the American uniforms were members of the Lafayette Escadrille, who were transferred to the American service in December, 1917.
"The American air force at the front grew from 3 squadrons in April to 45 in November, 1918. On Nov. 11 the 45 squadrons had an equipment of 740 planes.
"Of 2,698 planes sent to the zone of the advance for American aviators 667, or nearly one-fourth, were of American manufacture.
"American air squadrons played important rôles in the battles of Château-Thierry, St. Mihiel, and the Meuse-Argonne. They brought down in combat 755 enemy planes, while their own losses of planes numbered only 357."
"The squadrons were of four types: Observation squadrons, whose business it is to make observations, take photographs, and direct artillery fire; pursuit squadrons, using light fighting planes to protect the observation planes at their work, to drive the enemy from the air, or to strafe marching columns by machine-gun fire; the day bombers, whose work was the dropping of bombs on railways or roads; and the night bombers, carrying heavier bomb loads for the destruction of strategic enemy works."
Official Government Statistics
Production of Training Planes and Engines to the End of Each Month
At the armistice there were on the front 20 pursuit squadrons, 18 observation squadrons and 7 bomber squadrons with 1,238 flying officers and 740 service planes, in addition to which there were 23 balloon companies.
CARGO SHIPMENTS
Altogether, from our entrance into the war through April, 1919, the Army shipped from this side of the Atlantic nearly seven and a half million tons (7,500,000) of cargo.
Included in the cargo shipment were 1,791 consolidation locomotives of the 100-ton type. Of these, 650 were shipped, set up on their own wheels so that they could be unloaded in France and run off in a few hours under their own steam.
The Army also shipped 26,994 standard-gauge freight cars; motor car trucks to the number of 47,018, and rails and fittings for the reinforcing of French railways and for the construction of our own lines of communications to the aggregate of 423,000 tons. The Army also shipped 68,694 horses and mules.
SIGNAL CORPS STATISTICS
In order to operate the transportation of supplies in France the Signal Corps strung its wires over nearly every part of that country. At the end of the war the Signal Corps was operating 282 telephone exchanges and 133 complete telegraph stations. The telephone lines numbered 14,956, reaching 8,959 stations. More than 100,000 miles of wire had been strung. The peak load of operation reached was 47,555 telegrams a day, averaging 60 words each.
Official Government Statistics
Number of Battle Aeroplanes in Each Army at the Date of the Armistice
CONSTRUCTION STATISTICS
In building factories and storage warehouses for supplies as well as housing for troops, 200,000 workmen in the United States were kept continuously occupied for the period of the war.
The operations of the Construction Division constituted what was probably the largest contracting business ever handled in one office. The total expenditures in this enterprise to November 11, 1918, were about $800,000,000.
Construction projects were conducted in France by the Corps of Engineers under the services of supplies. Up to the signing of the armistice these projects had been undertaken to the number of 831, distributed all over France. To economize tonnage, materials were obtained in Europe as far as possible. The Engineer Corps ran its own quarries, and its own logging camps and saw-mills. The labor force consisted largely of American soldiers and German prisoners, though French and English civilians and Chinese coolies were used wherever available.
TWO HUNDRED DAYS OF BATTLE
Of our combat forces Colonel Ayres says:
"Two out of every three American soldiers who reached France took part in battle. The number who reached France was 2,086,000, and of these 1,390,000 saw active service in the front line.
"American combat forces were organized into divisions, which consisted of some 28,000 officers and men. These divisions were the largest on the Western front, since the British division numbered about 15,000 and those of the French and Germans about 12,000 each. There were sent overseas 42 American divisions and several hundred thousand supplementary artillery and service of supply troops.
"Of the 42 divisions that reached France 29 took part in active combat service, while the others were used for replacements or were just arriving during the last month of hostilities. The battle record of the United States Army in this war is largely the history of these 29 combat divisions. Seven of them were Regular Army divisions, 11 were organized from the National Guard, and 11 were made up of National Army troops.
"American combat divisions were in battle for 200 days, from the 25th of April, 1918, when the first Regular division after long training in quiet sectors, entered an active sector on the Picardy front, until the signing of the armistice. During these 200 days they were engaged in 13 major operations, of which 11 were joint enterprises with the French, British, and Italians, and 2 were distinctively American.
"At the time of their greatest activity in the second week of October all 29 American divisions were in action. They then held 101 miles of front, or 23 percent. of the entire allied battle line. From the middle of August until the end of the war they held, during the greater part of the time a front longer than that held by the British. Their strength tipped the balance of man-power in favor of the Allies, so that from the middle of June, 1918, to the end of the war the Allied forces were superior in numbers to those of the enemy."
Our Flag in Alsace
A scene in Alsace after the armistice when American doughboys occupied a small town. They were welcomed there by the inhabitants.
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The total battle advances of the American divisions amounted to 782 kilometers, or 485 miles, an average advance for each division of 17 miles, nearly all of it against desperate enemy resistance. They captured 63,000 prisoners, 1,378 pieces of artillery, 708 trench mortars, and 9,650 machine guns. In June and July they helped to shatter the enemy advance toward Paris, and to turn retreat into a triumphant offensive.
It is stated in reference to the part played by the American divisions in the Argonne-Meuse that it was the 77th Division of New York selective draft men that achieved the greatest advance against the enemy—71½ kilometers, or nearly 45 miles.
In that battle the American Army captured 16,059 prisoners, liberated 150 French towns and villages, and as an army penetrated 34 miles into territory previously held by the Germans.
THE DEADLIEST WAR
In his chapter on "Health and Casualties," Colonel Ayres reminds us that "the war was undoubtedly the bloodiest that has ever been fought." The total battle deaths is given as 7,450,200. Russia led the death list with 1,700,000; Germany came next with 1,600,000; France next with 1,385,300; Great Britain next with 900,000; Austria, 800,000; Italy, 364,000; Turkey, 250,000; Serbia and Montenegro, 125,000; Belgium, 102,000; Rumania and Bulgaria 100,000 each; the United States, 50,300; Greece, 7,000; Portugal, 2,000.
Of every 100 American soldiers and sailors who took part, 2 were killed or died of disease during the period of hostilities. Among the other nations between 20 and 25 in every 100 were killed or died.
The total deaths were greater than all the deaths in all wars for more than one hundred years previous. In the above figures only deaths resulting directly from action are included. The total deaths from all causes is very much larger. Some of the armies lost more heavily through disease and privation than from battle. With regard to civilians' deaths due to the war, see Volume XII.
National Service Magazine
Secretary of War Baker Drawing Registration Numbers
The head of the War Department is drawing for the first capsule after the registration of young men who have become of age in the past year. All told 24,000,000 names were registered in the draft.
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