Harvard Psychological Studies, Volume 2

by Unknown

TABLE VI

Obs.			One Pair		One Visual and Many Auditory		Many Pairs
A	Threshold Mean	After Letter	.005 (sec.)	After Letter	.022 (sec.)	After Letter	.042 (sec.)
	Range		.021 (sec.)		.024 (sec.)		.039 (sec.)
G	Threshold Mean	After Letter	.022 (sec.)	After Letter	.009 (sec.)	After Letter	.005 (sec.)
	Range (sec.)		.078 (sec.)		.083 (sec.)		.084 (sec.)
H	Threshold Mean	Before Letter	.011 (sec.)	After Letter	.006 (sec.)	After Letter	.012 (sec.)
	Range		.035 (sec.)		.035 (sec.)		.039 (sec.)
Hy	Threshold Mean	After Letter	.034 (sec.)	After Letter	.030 (sec.)	After Letter	.046 (sec.)
	Range		.089 (sec.)		.074 (sec.)		.072 (sec.)
St	Threshold Mean	After Letter	.054 (sec.)	After Letter	.037 (sec.)	After Letter	.041 (sec.)
	Range		.096 (sec.)		.080 (sec.)		.083 (sec.)

In this experiment, the observers A, H, and Hy, show an increasing distance of the threshold mean after the visual stimulus, with the successive introductions of the auditory series and the combined series. In other words, the second column negative displacement is larger than that of the first, and the third column has a still larger. G and St are again exceptions, as they would be expected to be from the above analysis of their methods. Each did his most accurate work in a case where there was some rhythm present. St said in regard to this work "the one pair abolishes the sound as a standard." The rhythmic factor most missed by these observers, in the case of the single pair, was the sound; for their results are almost the same in the second and third columns. Introduction of the repetition of the visual series does not make any decided difference. A, H, and Hy were able so to adjust their attention as to get the best results in the case of the single pair. The rhythm seemed to introduce for them a subjective rhythm which upset the nice adjustment of attention and so increased the displacement or the time between the threshold mean and the visual stimulus. The negative displacement was increased under these circumstances, probably as a result of the facilitation of the auditory perceptive process. It has an opened path. It is a case of pre-perception. Even when both were repeated (many pairs) the auditory dominated, and so did the most at opening its path. But it seems more likely to me that the rhythm, as such, whether auditory or auditory and visual, claimed the attention and so proved a distraction from the work of accurately discriminating the times of the impressions. And this exaggerated the displacement or lack of discrimination in whichever direction it was tending before.

In the successive stages of the investigation thus far, the complication experiment has been stripped down by degrees to the simple problem of the shortest possible interval between two disparate stimuli,—in this case shortest auditory-visual and visual-auditory intervals, as in the one-letter experiment of Table IV and the one-pair experiment of Table VI. The various factors in the complication experiment which have been successively analyzed out—the interval between members of the auditory series, the length of the visual series, the position of the visual series in relation to the auditory stimulus, and the auditory series itself—have all been shown to be factors intimately connected with the way the observer attends to the stimuli in question. From the present standpoint, it may be said they are all factors which, being introduced into the simple interval discrimination experiment, modify the resulting judgment with regard to the interval, by an interference with the normal attention-processes in the discrimination of intervals.

INTERVAL DISCRIMINATION

The method of interval discrimination deserves special consideration. Some of the introspective observations made by observers while engaged in the work, already reported, are instructive in this connection. In the case of a single pair, one observer said, "I know which is first because it gets hit first." This remark is a very apt expression of my own experience in trying to answer the same question. "Getting hit first" clearly means, to my mind, some kind of action on the part of the observer. He was ready, in the moment of preparation for the experiment, to see a flash of red with his right eye (either eye could have been used) and to hear a click with his left ear. (The stimuli were each produced 25 cm. from the respective sense-organs.) His preparation consisted in securing the "hair-trigger" condition in the two parts of the cortex and conduction apparatus immediately in question in the sensing of the two expected stimuli, and other parts are in a shut-off-from-discharge condition. This is the interpretation which seems to me an appropriate explanation of the feeling of special readiness to discharge in these two directions, when the expected stimuli shall come. The eye- and ear-muscles, in such case, are held tense on the sides (in the organs) where the stimuli are expected. The breath is held, and the whole trunk is under a strain. All bodily processes, in so far as they are controlled, are directed in such wise as to get whichever of these expected impressions shall come first, in as short time as possible, in order to know that it is first.

The reaction which gives the basis for the judgment may be a conscious "hitting" of the first. Or it may be a reaction, ostensibly as a part of the whole apperceptive process of which the auditory and visual processes are parts. This reaction may be any one of many kinds. Often it is a letting-go of the held breath. The exhalation or other reaction comes in response to the whole stimulating or "setting-off" process, and the one or the other of the two stimuli is judged to be first by certain peculiar relations within the experience of the moment. Such an explanation is in part suggested by the expression of St, that the visual impression when it came before the auditory, appeared as a "grace-note," and when it came after the auditory, as an "after-strike." St played the piano. He himself thought that this discrimination was a motor affair, i. e., a difference judged on the basis of a difference in the motor response. The judgment of the temporal order of the two impressions seemed to be an interpretation or translation of the different motor responses.

A, whose method brought the shortest range in Tables IV, V, and VI, said, "I hold my breath at the moment of expected stimulation, and it goes at the first impression." At another time he said, "When I say 'click first' I have the feeling that the click is left, and when I say 'click last,' that the click is on the right." He interpreted this to mean that when the click sounded first, he had moved slightly toward it, that is, to the left, and that when the visual stimulus had come first, he had moved slightly toward it (it was sensed by his left eye), and this was rather away from the sound, which would have come before the movement could have been more than initiated.

In my own case, I felt distinctly different motor responses in the two cases. There was an immediate feeling of release in whichever organ the stimulus first reached. A little involuntary jerk occurred in the musculature of this sense-organ, and sometimes the head moved slightly in the direction of the first stimulus. The condition of the next moment from which the judgment proceeded seemed to be best expressed thus, "I had it at a time when the other was not there." The attention was accurately set for both. Right eye and left ear were both distinctly innervated. The first stimulus "struck" the appropriate organ, and the "set" of the organ was released.

I am persuaded that the difference in sensitivity to intervals between auditory and visual impressions is due, in part, to a difference in the power of "cocking the ear" to hear, as one fixates the eye to see. The observers who got the smallest ranges between upper and lower thresholds had the most distinct kinæsthetic sensations in the moment of preparation, in the middle ear and about the external meatus. All had some sensations from the side of the head in question. The less accurate had a general feeling in the neck-muscles. Accuracy of discrimination was in no wise connected with voluntary control of the musculature moving the pinna. This was subject of careful enquiry with all observers.

If this introspective evidence leads me aright, it seems that the non-discriminable interval between auditory and visual impressions is due principally to two things, (1) the impossibility of perfect balance in the preparation of the attention for two expected stimuli, and (2) the possible difference in time it takes to react to the different impressions. The various complicating conditions which are added to the simple interval discrimination in the cases of a complication experiment, such as we started with in this investigation, are chiefly interferences with the first-named factor. They disturb the nice balances of attention. In this simple discrimination experiment, under favorable conditions, a close approximation to a balance can be attained. Any difference in the reaction-times to different stimuli will remain as a constant error of displacement. It is well known that reaction-times to visual stimuli are longer than those to auditory. There is a retinal inertia which delays the perception of the visual impression, in comparison with the auditory, coming from exactly simultaneous stimuli. Having this physiological basis, it will be relatively constant, as compared with the ever-varying attention-differences.

THE COEXISTENCE OF MENTAL PROCESSES

Having given, then, these relatively fixed temperamental conditions of reactions to different stimuli, which remain after practice (training in the control of attention) has reduced the reactions to their lowest terms, and has secured the conditions which are favorable for the best balancing of the attention, there is yet one other question very germane to the subject. It will have occurred already to any one reading the above, that while the response to one stimulus is being made, the other may be held in abeyance in the fringe region of the attention-field, and that it is only brought up to clear perception when the first has been disposed of. In other words, it may well be that the first of two simultaneous but disparate stimuli, which gets a start at setting-off its appropriate response in its sense-organ, will bring out this response and be perceived before the other one gets started,—that we do only one thing at a time,—that even in such minute processes as this there is no possibility of division of attention. It is hardly probable on the basis of the experimentation already reported, that this is the case. There is some division of attention. Otherwise there would be an equal certainty of judgment in every case, no matter how small the separating interval. But still the question as to how two mental processes, starting at the same moment of time, do proceed, as compared to the progress of each of the same processes when it holds the field alone, is very vital to the understanding of the psychology of interval-discrimination. And thus the question of objective time-relations is necessarily involved in that of making judgments of the time-relations of simple mental processes (subjective time-relations). The question is, Do these processes, starting simultaneously, proceed just as freely as if they were the sole occupants of the field of attention and so had the whole energy of attention concentrated upon the single process, or do they interfere with each other?

Distribution of attention, of some sort, is granted. It is generally conceded that there must be some sort of overlapping of the processes in any complex mental operation. But there is the greatest lack of information as to how this overlapping takes place,—as to the mechanism of the distribution of attention. Fechner held to the notion of a fixed maximum of available psychophysical energy. If this energy is being consumed in a single process, that process is very vivid, and all other processes are below the threshold. If, on the other hand, it is distributed over several simultaneous processes, they are all of diminished vividness. Distribution of attention always means diminution of vividness, and concentration of attention, increase of vividness. (See Elemente der Psychophysik, vol. 2, p. 451, 1860.) There is no question of the truth of the last statement, and very likely Fechner's fundamental concept is a true one; but there is need of more definite data on the conditions and nature of simple mental processes occurring at the same time, before it is considered proved.

Such researches as those of Paulhan,[115] Jastrow,[116] Loeb,[117] and De Sanctis[118] all dealt with the combination of processes which were themselves quite complex. It may well be that such processes as reciting a poem, performing a subtraction or multiplication of long numbers on paper, or keeping time with a metronome with the hand, seem to go along together when combined, so that the time taken to do the two of them together is much less than the sum of the times required for their separate performance, and, in some cases, no greater than the time required for either alone, and yet there may be no real proceeding together. The apparent saving of time may be due, as Paulhan suggested, to a rapid oscillation from one to the other of the two complex processes which are largely automatic and can proceed, to such extent as they are automatic, without any attention. This illustrates how these investigations have probably missed the real point at issue with regard to the division and distribution of attention. The attention might be distributed over several of the minuter part-processes of these processes so that many were proceeding at the same time, and yet the method of these experiments would not reveal it. They were not planned with sufficient precision. There is a problem in the division of attention which they did not come within sight of, and this is the real question of division in case of the simplest processes.

This problem is really that of the mechanism of mental assimilation. The process it investigates is illustrated by the maturing collective idea, as a melody or a spoken sentence. There is a gradual enrichment or growth in meaning, as such a process goes on toward its completion. At any instant during the process, implicit associative and nascent perceptive elements are working together to their own mutual clarification and explication. All focal content is the result of complicated interworkings of such fringe material. It is impossible, it seems to me, to question the causal relation of the fringe elements or processes of one moment to the focal of the next; and it is equally impossible to deny the complication of these same fringe processes. They must go on at the same time in order to enter into one and the same resultant process. The question of direct interest at this point in the discussion is, To what extent do they proceed at the same time?

It would seem from the way in which this question, of the relationship and interference of mental processes which proceed or start to proceed at the same time, has come up in this investigation, that the natural method of pursuing it would be that of comparing reaction times for cognition reactions to the single and combined stimuli. But we are warned against this by very clear inferences from an investigation of Professor Münsterberg's in which he used the reaction method.[119] By an ingenious use of the reaction experiment, the author shows that two-part processes in a reaction, as, for example, a restricted judgment of class and a subjective preference, occupy about the same time when combined in a single reaction as when either is performed in a separate reaction. In other words, two judgments of distinctly different kinds can be made in the same time as either can be made when it has all the attention concentrated upon it. The conclusion that these elementary processes go on together—that at least there is some degree of overlapping—seems unavoidable.

But when the first part of the same report is considered in relation to the second, it is clearly shown that the reaction experiment is not adapted to the finer investigation of this problem. For the first part shows that no matter how much a motor reaction is complicated by choices or other judgments, it always takes place in just about the same time as the simple reaction. The complications may be such as actually to double the reaction time in the case of a sensory reaction, and yet a motor reaction, under precisely the same conditions as far as they may be the same for a motor, shows no increase in time. The "set" of the attention in the motor reaction is, no doubt, such a change in the order of succession of the parts of the process that some of those, which come after the stimulus is received in the case of the sensory reaction, are made to come before the stimulus in the motor. When, however, it is found that the motor response to the question, "Is this the name of a scientist, philosopher, poet, statesman, or musician,—Sappho?" is made by the appropriate finger, as previously agreed upon, in just as short a time as the observer can make a motor response with any finger to a simple auditory stimulus, it indicates, either that the whole of the choice judgment has been made before the stimulus was received, or that the judgment itself is so automatic that it is practically a reflex. This latter cannot be true. The judgment, as conscious choice, cannot be made before the stimulus is given, i. e., until the question is completed. And judgment cannot be made automatic and yet be a judgment. In fact both alternatives are untenable, and there is no other course than to hold the situation which gave rise to them at fault. If the judgment process here required previous to the reaction does take time apart from the processes of the simple reaction, the reaction process is shown by these experiments to be unable to exhibit it. A more microscopic method is demanded before the matter can be settled.

The Leipsic method of measuring the scope of attention by means of the tachistoscope is the standard means of securing data as to the number of elementary processes which can go on at the same time in consciousness. The same question, with which we are here concerned, grows directly out of the investigation of the number of processes which can go on together. Wundt acknowledges the great difficulty which inheres in the investigation of this problem.[120] Cattell's early work with the tachistoscope showing the numbers of letters, syllables, and words, which could be apperceived under the same objective conditions, indicated the great importance of what we may best call meaning, in apperception, and its influence on the number of different processes which may proceed together. In fact the number depends upon the definition of the unit with which the investigator starts out. Wirth, the latest emendator of the tachistoscopic method, has shown,[121] in a very thoroughgoing and genuinely constructive criticism of earlier work, that the one question of primary importance in investigations of the content of the moment of consciousness, i. e., scope of attention, is to set forth the relative clearnesses of the elementary processes there proceeding together. He shows that the different grades of clearness which may present themselves in the field of consciousness of a momentary act indicate, on the one hand, the impossibility of sharply distinguishing the "scope of attention" from the "scope of consciousness" as Wundt uses these terms, and, on the other, the serious indefiniteness of any merely numerical statement of the scope of attention. His main purpose is to set forth a method by which this field can be enriched by exhaustive statements of the relative clearnesses of the processes going on at the same time. All the work of the present study had been performed before the publication of Wirth's work. Otherwise some of his suggestions would have been used in the plan of the experiments following. I may say, however, that I believe the method here used has its own distinctive merits.

GENERAL METHOD FOR TESTS IN COEXISTENCE

Taking the suggestions offered by Professor Münsterberg's study of apperceptive and associative processes, I selected simple judgments of comparison as the best means of trying-out this question of coexistence. The perceptive act itself is made up of judgments, and these may very properly be the processes studied in combination as in the tachistoscopic experiment. But the judgment which has a previous perceptive act as its condition, determining its start, seems to be better under control. It is itself a central process, not dependent upon the variations of the objective factors in sensation. My plan was to have the stimuli so arranged as to give rise to two or more perceived conditions at the same moment, and so have one or more judgments of comparison between the perceived features made at the moment the perceptions were completed and immediately stated. If one makes two series of single judgments of comparison, and a series wherein these two judgments are combined in a single act, all three under precisely the same objective conditions, and the same subjective conditions, saving only the necessary changes in the direction of the attention, and the percentage of correct judgments is recorded in each case, providing always that in no single series of judgments were the conditions such that all judgments could be correctly given, he would then have reasonable grounds for making inferences with respect to the interference of simple mental processes going on at the same time,—whether there is any, and, if there is, how much there is. Interference would be indicated by the falling-off in percentage of correct judgments as the combinations were increased.

Such relative accuracy of judgments, single and combined, was the test sought after and relied upon in the following experiments. It was very necessary to have the objective conditions such that the results in cases of single judgments, later to be combined, should be short of absolute correctness, in order that interference from the combination should show itself in impaired accuracy. Otherwise there might be some free energy of attention, which could readily take up the extra work when the judgments were combined, and so there would be no impairment of accuracy. It was the aim to have the objective conditions, such as duration and extent, so regulated that about ninety per cent correct judgments resulted in the series of single judgments. If, then, when two were combined, eighty per cent were given correctly, and when three were combined, seventy per cent, the inference would seem reasonable that this falling-off in correctness was due to interference. The failure of the perceptive process, indicated by the ten per cent incorrect judgments in the series of singles, would remain a constant source of error throughout.

There is, however, one other source of increasing error, with the increasing combination of judgments, supposed above. The judgment processes might go on at the same time without any impairment of the accuracy of the single judgment, and yet the results, as expressed, might show a falling-off in accuracy. This imperfection would then be due to a partial failure of the retentive and reproductive processes, and not to the imperfection of the judgment processes. I have found no sure means of separating this factor and excluding it. As the experiments were arranged and conducted, though, I believe any impairment in accuracy resulting from combination is more likely due to interference of the judgment processes.

If neither of these factors is efficient, on the other hand, there will result no falling-off in accuracy of results when single judgments are combined. To be sure the conditions of the experiment, as outlined so far, do not preclude the possibility of the combined judgments occurring in succession, and so giving rise to as large a percentage of correct results as when occurring singly. That is, while one of the so-called combined judgments was in process, the latent conditions of the other would remain for the moment as mere physiological or possibly psychical dispositions, and to these one would "hark back" in the next moment. Here the reaction method is suggested as the means of assurance that this is not the case. But this method, we have already seen, will not lend itself to work of such precision as this. The probability of this succession of judgments is reduced to a minimum in the experimental groups following.

It can be practically precluded by a prevention of all sensory images. In these experiments every precaution was used to prevent them. In all cases where visual stimuli were used, for instance, a brightly illuminated blue field immediately succeeded the momentary stimulus, while comparative darkness preceded it. I cannot be so sure that there were no memory images functioning. But all observers were carefully questioned on this point at frequent intervals during the experiments, and no evidence of their existence was found in any case. I feel sure sensory images were excluded and think memory images very improbable.

SINGLE AND COMBINED JUDGMENTS FROM VISUAL AND TACTUAL STIMULI

In this group of experiments, I used judgments from visual and tactual stimuli, singly and in combination. Both stimuli were given by means of a large pendulum in the Harvard laboratory, specially constructed for Professor Münsterberg. This pendulum is about one and a half metres in length. It is hung in a heavy steel frame which rests upon a large table. A curved steel bar, concentric with the swing of the pendulum, and ninety degrees in extent, is so set to the frame that it serves as the attachment for an electro-magnet, at any point in the swing of the pendulum. The pendulum-rod carries an armature which fits this magnet. By means of this magnet, the pendulum may be held at any point between the position of rest and forty-five degrees out in either direction; and it may be released by breaking the circuit through the magnet. The pendulum also carries a segmental screen of about seventy degrees extent. An opening about nine by eight centimetres near the centre of the screen affords means of tachistoscopic observations. A sliding shutter makes the slit as narrow as may be desired. In these experiments a black tube was set up, at right angles to the direction of the motion of the pendulum, and at the height of the slit in the screen. On the other side of the pendulum screen, and directly opposite the tube, was placed a support for holding the object to be shown.

The object for the visual stimulus was one of two light gray lines on a black background. These lines were 4 mm. wide, and one 44 mm. long, and the other 40 mm. The work was done in a dark room. The stimulus card was illuminated by an electric light hanging between it and the screen. Both cards were shown the observer several times, before experimenting, till he was sure of their lengths. Upon one being shown, in experiment, he was asked to say whether it was the longer or shorter. The touch apparatus was so arranged that the experimenter could at will give the observer one or two contacts on the back of his right hand. The contacts were made by means of an electro-magnet. This was actuated by a current which was made by the closing of a switch which was secured by a set-screw to the same curved steel bar as bore the pendulum magnet. This switch was closed by the pendulum in passing. It was adjustable on the bar. Another similar switch, opened by the falling pendulum the next instant, removed the tactual stimuli. These switches were so placed in the course of the pendulum fall that the tactual and visual stimuli were exactly simultaneous. The tactual judgments were, one or two points touched. Results are presented in Table VII for three observers, A, B, and Bo. The number of series which were averaged in each case is given, in order properly to weight the results.