Narrative and Critical History of America, Vol. 6 (of 8) / The United States of North America, Part I

by Unknown

CHAPTER IV.

THE STRUGGLE FOR THE HUDSON.

BY GEORGE W. CULLUM,

Major-General United States Army.

WHEN, in March, 1776, the British evacuated Boston, Washington felt assured that New York, already threatened, would be their objective point, not only on account of its commercial and strategical importance, but because it was the great arsenal of America. He therefore, as soon as practicable, concentrated in and about it his whole disposable force, and pushed forward the defences of the city and of its vicinity, already planned and partly executed by General Lee. Until the arrival of Washington, April 13, 1776, General Putnam commanded at New York, and General Greene, with a considerable body of troops, took charge of the incomplete intrenchments of Brooklyn, extending from the Wallabout (the present Navy Yard) to Gowanus Cove on New York Bay. These were now strengthened by four redoubts armed with twenty pieces of artillery, and by a strong interior keep mounting seven guns. These Brooklyn Heights, from their proximity and command of New York, were considered the key of the defence of this valuable city.

Fort George, with several redoubts and batteries, guarded the southern end of Manhattan Island, while the fortified hills overlooking Kingsbridge protected its northern extremity. On Red and Paulus Hooks, and at various points along the shores of the East and Hudson rivers, were erected earthworks, and a strong redoubt was built upon Governor's Island. Between the latter and the "Battery", hulks were sunk to obstruct the main channel. Notwithstanding all these defences, Manhattan Island, as events proved, was assailable at many points.

To defend these works, scattered over more than twenty miles, Washington had an army of only 17,225 men, of whom 6,711 were sick, on furlough, or detached, leaving but 10,514 present for duty. Most of these were militia, badly clothed, imperfectly armed, without discipline or military experience, and their artillery was old and of various patterns and calibres.

There had been dispatched from England a powerful fleet under Lord Howe, convoying a large body of troops to reinforce those already in America. The army of General William Howe (brother of the Admiral) on Staten Island in August (including some 8,600 German hirelings) numbered, as stated by General Clinton, 31,625 rank and file, of whom 24,464 were well-appointed, disciplined soldiers, fit for duty and equal to any in Europe.

The struggle for the Hudson, by the coöperation of the army of Canada with Howe, was now about to begin; but Washington was at his wits' end to foresee the particular point upon which the blow would fall. Hence he was obliged to retain the greater part of his troops in New York to defend the city, holding them ready, however, to support any point in the vicinity whether assailed by the enemy's large fleet or by their powerful army.

THE MORTIER HOUSE, RICHMOND HILL.
(Washington's Headquarters.)

From a plate in the New York Magazine, June, 1790, when the house, then owned by Mrs. Jephson, was occupied by John Adams, as Vice-President of the United States. It was at one time the home of Aaron Burr. See Parton's Burr, i. 81.

Washington's first headquarters in New York were probably at a house, 180 Pearl St., opposite Cedar St., sometimes called the house of Gov. Geo. Clinton, of which a view is given in Valentine's Manual, 1854, p. 446, and in Lossing's Mary and Martha Washington (N. Y., 1886), p. 153. He is also supposed by some to have occupied for a short interval the Kennedy mansion, No. 1 Broadway, known to have been used certainly by Col. Knox as artillery headquarters, of which a view is given in Irving's Washington, illus. ed. ii. 211, and in Gay's Pop. Hist. U. S., iii. 495. (Cf. Drake's Knox; Lossing's Field-Book, ii. 594; Johnston's Campaign of 1776, p. 86.) In June, if not earlier, he removed to the Mortier House on Richmond Hill, and remained there till September, when he transferred his headquarters first to the Apthorp House (view in Mag. of Amer. Hist., 1885, p. 227), still standing at the corner of Ninth Avenue and Ninety-first Street, and next to the Morris House at Harlem.—Ed.

On the morning of August 22, 1776, General Howe, under cover of the guns of the British ships, without mishap, delay, or opposition, debarked, as stated by Admiral Howe, about 15,000 men, with artillery, baggage, and stores, on Long Island, in the vicinity of the Narrows; and on the 25th, General de Heister's German division was landed at Gravesend Cove. This invading force of "upwards of 20,000 rank and file", well armed and with forty cannon, promptly occupied a line extending from the Narrows, through Gravesend, to Flatlands, and made ready for an immediate advance through the passes of the long range of densely wooded hills running eastwardly from the Narrows to Jamaica, about two and a half miles in front of Brooklyn. To oppose this large force of regular troops, the Americans had not quite 8,000 men, most of whom were raw militia, and of these about one half were outside of the defences of Brooklyn, ready to participate in the impending battle.

LORD HOWE.

From Andrews's Hist. of the War, Lond., 1785, vol. ii.—Ed.

The most direct route from the British landing-place to the Brooklyn intrenchments was by the road running nearly parallel to the bay, and passing through a gorge just back of the Red Lion Tavern, where Martense Lane joins the usual thoroughfare at the edge of Greenwood Cemetery. A second road led from Flatbush directly through the pass defended by General Sullivan's intrenchments. The third was by the road from Flatbush to Bedford. Finally, the fourth, extending to Flushing, intersected the Bedford and Jamaica road at the pass between the present Evergreen and Cypress Cemeteries, about three miles east of Bedford, or about ten miles from the Narrows.

GEN. SIR WM. HOWE.

From the upper part of an engraving of full length in An Impartial Hist. of the War in America, Lond., 1780, p. 204. Smith in his Brit. Mez. Portraits records a print, standing posture, sash and star, right elbow on block, left hand on hip, marked "Corbutt delin't et fecit. Lond. 10 Nov. 1777."—Ed.

When the British landed on the 22d, Colonel Hand's regiment was deployed to oppose them, but the enemy proving to be in too great force, Hand fell back to Prospect Hill and thence to Flatbush, burning property which would be of immediate use to the foe; but he did not at once apprise the commanding general of the real character of the British movement. So soon, however, as Washington heard of the landing, he dispatched six regiments to reinforce the garrison of Brooklyn Heights, and ordered additional forces to be in readiness to cross the East River from Manhattan Island, if Howe's movement did not prove to be a feint to cover a real attack upon New York. General Greene, unfortunately, was too sick to retain the active command on Long Island, every point of which, between Hell Gate and the Narrows, he had carefully studied. He was succeeded, August 20th, by General Sullivan, a far inferior officer. As Washington said of him, he was "active, spirited, and zealously attached to the cause", but was tinctured with "vanity, which now and then led him into embarrassments;" besides which he lacked "experience to move on a large scale", as he had just shown in Canada. On the 24th of August, Washington placed Putnam in command over Sullivan. Putnam was a brave soldier, but wholly ignorant of the science of war, besides being advanced in years. He was entirely unacquainted with the arrangements which had been made for the defence of his position, and he never went beyond the Brooklyn Heights intrenchments on the day of the battle. The truth is, no one exercised a general command in that conflict.

De Heister's division, constituting the enemy's centre, occupied Flatbush August 26th, threatening the pass in front, which Sullivan held with a large force under cover of intrenchments. During the evening, Cornwallis withdrew from Flatbush to Flatlands, there becoming the reserve of the British right, which was composed of choice regiments under General Clinton, aided by Lord Percy and accompanied by the commander-in-chief.

The British plan of attack would have been very hazardous in the presence of an enterprising enemy; but against undisciplined troops, small in numbers and without skilful leadership, it proved a brilliant success. The right, under Clinton, by a night march was to seize the Cypress Hill pass, and then move down the Jamaica road towards Bedford to get in the rear of Sullivan's left. To divert the attention of the Americans from this stealthy march, General Grant was to menace their right, towards Gravesend, before daybreak, and De Heister at the same time was to cannonade the American centre under Colonel Hand. These attacks were not, however, to be pressed till General Clinton's guns were heard in the rear of Sullivan, when the Americans were to be assailed with the utmost vigor from all quarters. Besides these land operations a squadron of five ships, under Sir Peter Parker, was to menace New York and keep up a cannonade against Governor's Island and the right flank of the American defences.

Sir Henry Clinton, the principal actor in this contest, with his heavy column and its artillery, guided by a Tory farmer, at nine in the evening of the 26th, moved silently forward from Flatlands through New Lots (now East New York), having successfully crossed Shoemaker's narrow causeway over a long marsh. At three on the morning of the 27th, Clinton arrived within half a mile of the pass he was to force, being followed and joined before daybreak by the main body under Lord Percy. Soon after daylight a small American patrol was captured and the unguarded pass occupied. Thus the whole right wing of the enemy, after partaking of refreshments, was marching unopposed directly to Brooklyn Heights. The battle, by this bold and lucky manœuvre, was in this way virtually gained before any real struggle had begun.

General Grant, on the enemy's left, with two brigades and a regiment, two companies of Tories and ten pieces of artillery, in the mean time advanced along the bay road against the flying Americans, and, at daybreak of the 27th, got through the pass in the hills and was marching on the Brooklyn lines. General Parsons, in command of the American outpost on the right, succeeded in rallying some of the fugitives and posting them advantageously on a hill until the arrival of Lord Stirling, who, with 1,500 choice Continental troops, had been sent by Putnam on learning the condition of affairs. For some hours Grant amused Stirling by slight skirmishes about Battle Hill (now in Greenwood Cemetery), till Clinton had reached his destined goal, when Grant, with quadruple forces, pushed forward to grapple in a death-struggle with his gallant foe. At the same time De Heister, who had slept upon his arms during the night at Flatbush, as soon as he heard Clinton's signal guns, sent Count Donop to storm the redoubt which protected Sullivan and defended the pass through the hills, while he himself pressed forward with the main body of the Hessians. Sullivan, hemmed in on all sides, ordered a retreat to the Brooklyn lines, but it was too late, as he was already ensnared in the prepared net, and before long all was a scene of confusion, consternation, and slaughter. Some of the Americans, after fighting desperately, broke through the enemy's line, but a large number were killed, wounded, or taken prisoners. Washington, from Brooklyn, witnessed this sad catastrophe, but was powerless to prevent it.

Stirling in like manner, met by the force under Cornwallis, which had been detached from Clinton's column, was nearly surrounded, having no chance for escape except across Gowanus Creek, in which the tide was fast rising. After a terrible conflict of twenty minutes, the mass of Stirling's command succeeded in passing the muddy stream, but the general and some of his bravest companions were compelled to surrender to superior numbers. Washington wrung his hands in agony at the sight of such disaster. "Good God", he cried, "what brave fellows I must this day lose!"

STIRLING.

After a photograph of a portrait in a family brooch, attested by H. S. Watts, Oct. 8, 1879 (in Harvard College library, given by Professor C. E. Norton). There is a picture, taken at a later day, engraved in Duer's Life of Stirling.—Ed.

By two o'clock in the afternoon, this battle, or rather this series of skirmishes between forces very unequal in numbers, quality, and skill, was terminated by the retreat of the remnant of Americans which had escaped capture. Howe stated his loss at 367 killed, wounded, and missing; and he estimated that of the Americans at 3,300, though probably it did not exceed one half of that number, of whom 1,076, including Generals Stirling, Sullivan, and Woodhull (captured at Jamaica on the next day), were made prisoners.

Fortunately the victor, instead of pressing his advantage and at once assaulting the Brooklyn intrenchments, which covered the demoralized troops, waited till the next day, when he broke ground as for a regular siege, and began cannonading the American works. "By such ill-timed caution", says Lord Mahon, "arising probably from an overestimate of the insurgents' force, the English general flung away the fairest opportunity of utterly destroying or capturing the flower of the American army;" yet such was the joy of the British government over this cheap success that General Howe was knighted for a victory over inexperienced troops one fifth his own numbers.

Washington, promptly profiting by the over-caution of his antagonist, strengthened his position, and conceived the masterly measures for his retreat from Long Island. Without the knowledge of Howe, availing himself of a dense fog and rain, and favored by a fair wind, he safely crossed the East River with all his troops, stores, and artillery, except a few heavy pieces which the mud prevented him from moving. The army reached New York on the morning of the 30th, Washington leaving in the last boat after having been forty-eight hours almost continuously in the saddle without once closing his eyes. "Whoever", says Botta, "will attend to all the details of this retreat will easily believe that no military operation was ever conducted by great captains with more ability and prudence, or under more unfavorable auspices."

Though the British general had gained a decided success, he was as far as ever from the object of his campaign—the capture of New York. The victors and the vanquished now confronted each other from opposite sides of a stream half a mile broad, each making ready for a decisive effort. Howe possessed a large, veteran, and disciplined European army, while Washington's troops, for the most part, were a demoralized assemblage of heterogeneous organizations, not much superior to an armed mob.

"Our situation", writes Washington to the President of Congress, "is truly distressing. The check our detachment sustained on the 27th ultimo has dispirited too great a proportion of our troops, and filled their minds with apprehension and despair. The militia, instead of calling forth their utmost efforts to a brave and manly opposition in order to repair our losses, are discouraged, intractable, and impatient to return. Great numbers of them have gone off: in some instances almost by whole regiments, by half ones, and by companies at a time. This circumstance of itself, independently of others, when fronted by a well-appointed enemy superior in numbers to our whole collected force, would be sufficiently disagreeable; but when their example has infected another part of the army, when their want of discipline and refusal of almost every kind of restraint and government have produced a like conduct but too common to the whole, and an entire disregard of that order and subordination necessary to the well-doing of an army, and which had been inculcated before, as well as the nature of our military establishment would admit of, our condition becomes more alarming; and, with the deepest concern, I am obliged to confess my want of confidence in the generality of the troops.

"All these circumstances fully confirm the opinion I ever entertained, and which I more than once in my letters took the liberty of mentioning to Congress, that no dependence could be put in a militia, or other troops, than those enlisted and embodied for a longer period than our regulations heretofore have prescribed. I am persuaded, and as fully convinced as I am of any one fact that has happened, that our liberties must of necessity be greatly hazarded, if not entirely lost, if their defence is left to any but a permanent standing army; I mean, one to exist during the war. Nor would the expense incident to the support of such a body of troops as would be competent to almost every emergency far exceed that which is daily incurred by calling in succor and new enlistments, which, when effected, are not attended with any good consequences. Men who have been free and subject to no control cannot be reduced to order in an instant; and the privileges and exemptions, which they claim and will have, influence the conduct of others; and the aid derived from them is nearly counterbalanced by the disorder, irregularity, and confusion they occasion."

Three weeks later, he again writes: "It becomes evident to me, then, that, as this contest is not likely to be the work of a day, as the war must be carried on systematically, and to do it you must have good officers, there are no other possible means to obtain them but by establishing your army upon a permanent footing, and giving your officers good pay. This will induce gentlemen and men of character to engage; and till the bulk of your officers is composed of such persons as are actuated by principles of honor and a spirit of enterprise, you have little to expect from them.... But while the only merit an officer possesses is his ability to raise men, while these men consider and treat him as an equal, and in the character of an officer regard him no more than a broomstick, being mixed together as one common herd, no order nor discipline can prevail; nor will the officer ever meet with that respect which is essentially necessary to due subordination. To place any dependence upon militia is assuredly resting upon a broken staff.... To bring men to a proper degree of subordination is not the work of a day, a month, or even a year; and unhappily for us and the cause we are engaged in, the little discipline I have been laboring to establish in the army under my immediate command is in a manner done away with by having such a mixture of troops as have been called together within these few months....

"The jealousy of a standing army and the evils to be apprehended from one are remote, and in my judgment, situated and circumstanced as we are, not at all to be dreaded; but the consequence of wanting one, according to my ideas formed from the present view of things, is certain and inevitable ruin. For, if I was called upon to declare upon oath whether the militia have been most serviceable or hurtful, upon the whole, I should subscribe to the latter."

The defeat of the American army on Long Island, a heavy blow to the patriot cause, suggested a desperate remedy to the mind of Washington,—no less a measure than the deliberate destruction of the great commercial city of New York. "Till of late", he writes to the President of Congress, "I had no doubt in my own mind of defending this place; nor should I have yet if the men would do their duty, but this I despair of.... If we should be obliged to abandon the town, ought it to stand as winter-quarters for the enemy? They would derive great conveniences from it on the one hand, and much property would be destroyed on the other.... At present I dare say the enemy mean to preserve it if they can. If Congress, therefore, should resolve upon the destruction of it, the resolution should be a profound secret, as the knowledge of it will make a capital change in their plans." General Greene, John Jay, and many others of note were of the same opinion. Congress decided otherwise, and Howe forbore to bombard it from Brooklyn Heights and Governor's Island, both belligerents deeming its possession of far greater service to either than its destruction.

As New York was not to be destroyed, it became a serious question how a city swarming with Tories was to be defended with less than twenty thousand militia against a powerful army. Washington, Greene, Putnam, and others were opposed to the attempt, but were overruled by a council of war. The question was finally left by Congress to the commander-in-chief, who, deeming the city untenable, made preparations, September 10th, for its speedy evacuation, which was concurred in, two days later, by a new council of war. This determination was timely, as the Americans were about to be driven out.

Howe, anticipating Washington's design, determined to prevent the execution of it by the same manœuvre he had tried so successfully on Long Island,—that was to threaten the city's front and right flank by the fleet, while his army, assembled about the present site of Astoria, should cross the East River, turn Washington's left flank, cut off his communications with the mainland, oblige him to fight on the enemy's terms, and force him to surrender at discretion, or by a brilliant stroke break the American army in pieces, and secure their arms and stores.

On the evening of September 14th Howe began his crossing of the East River by taking possession of Montressor (Randall's) Island, and the next morning he sent three ships up the Hudson as high as Bloomingdale, which stopped any further evacuation of the city by water. Soon after, under the fire of ten vessels-of-war, the main British force, under Sir Henry Clinton, embarked upon flatboats, barges, and galleys, at the mouth of Newtown Creek, and by the favoring tide was carried to Kip's Bay (34th Street), where they disembarked and quickly put to rout the panic-stricken American militia, and pursued the fugitives in disorderly flight over the fields to Murray Hill.

So soon as Washington heard the enemy's cannonade he rode with all speed to the front, and used every exertion to rally the runaways; but his efforts, though seconded by the officers in immediate command, were utterly futile. Mortified and in despair at such poltroonery, the commander-in-chief almost lost control of himself, and, says General Greene, "sought death rather than life" at the hands of the enemy.

Unopposed, the British marched to the Incleberg on Murray Hill and encamped, while the Americans retreated to Harlem Heights. Putnam, at the sacrifice of baggage and stores, and of most of his heavy artillery, by taking the river road, barely escaped with the troops remaining in the city. Howe was in close pursuit of this rear-guard of about four thousand men, but unexpectedly stopped for nearly two hours at the residence of Mrs. Murray[721] to enjoy her old Madeira, so that, in the language of the times, "Mrs. Murray saved the American army."

WASHINGTON'S HEADQUARTERS AT HARLEM
(Sept., 1776)

This was the house of Col. Roger Morris, and at a later day the residence of Madam Jumel. It follows a drawing in Valentine's N. Y. City Manual, 1854, p. 362. Cf. Lossing's Field-Book, ii. 816; Gay's Pop. Hist. U. S., iii. 505; and for a view of the hall, Harper's Magazine, lii. 640. Its position was east of Tenth Avenue, near One Hundred and Sixtieth Street.—Ed.

The British, on September 15, 1776, took possession of New York with a large detachment under General Robertson; while Howe with the main body of the army encamped on the outskirts of the city. The northern line of their camp extended from Horen's Hook on the East River to Bloomingdale on the Hudson, which line was fortified with field-works and protected on the flanks by vessels-of-war. Behind this line lay their disciplined army of twenty-five thousand British and Germans.

Washington took position in their front, and for the protection of his army of about fourteen thousand fit for duty he fortified Harlem Heights with a triple line of intrenchments extending across Manhattan Island. Immediately after securing his position, Washington, to arouse some military ardor in his discomfited militia, formed the design of cutting off some of the enemy's light troops, who, encouraged by their recent successes, had advanced to the extremity of the high ground opposite to the American camp. To effect this object, Colonel Knowlton, of Bunker Hill fame, and Major Leitch were detached with parties of rangers and riflemen to get in their rear, while Washington diverted their attention by a feigned direct attack. By some mistake, the fire was begun on the front instead of upon their flank and rear, by which the enemy, though defeated, secured their escape to their main body. This successful skirmish, called the battle of Harlem Plains, was purchased by the loss of the brave Knowlton and Leitch, both of whom were mortally wounded.

The British rejoicings upon the occupation of their snug winter-quarters in New York were suddenly interrupted, early on the morning of September 21st, by the breaking out of flames from a low groggery near Whitehall Slip, which, for want of proper fire apparatus to check them, spread rapidly over one fourth of the city, consuming five hundred buildings, including the Lutheran and Trinity churches. Whether this was the work of incendiaries is not positively known. Congress and the city's inhabitants had strenuously opposed such an act, though it was strongly recommended as a military necessity by Washington and by others of high rank and position.

While Howe "continued at gaze" awaiting coming events, Washington continued to strengthen his position on Harlem Heights, and established alarm posts on the east side of Harlem River as far as Throg's Neck on the Sound, to insure surveillance of the whole field of operations.

The Harlem lines being too strong for a front attack, Howe, after leaving a sufficient force under Lord Percy to watch them and guard the city, embarked, October 12th, his main army on ninety flatboats, to execute by his favorite manœuvre the turning of these obstacles and of Washington's left flank. His object was to cut off Washington's retreat and shut him up on Manhattan Island, the only exit from which was by Kingsbridge. Adverse winds so delayed the British general that he only passed Hell Gate on the afternoon of the 14th, and the fleet did not reach Throg's Neck till nightfall. Here Howe had previously landed his advance-guard, but Washington had anticipated him by occupying, on the 12th, the passes leading to the mainland.

The enemy's design being now fully developed, it was decided in a council of war, held in the American camp on the 16th, to leave Harlem Heights, no longer tenable, and to evacuate the whole of Manhattan Island except Fort Washington, which General Greene deemed impregnable and of great value for future operations. Accordingly, the American army formed a series of intrenched camps on the hills skirting the right bank of the swollen Bronx, and extending thirteen miles, from Fordham Heights to White Plains, and protected from the enemy by the river in front.

After waiting five days for supplies, Howe, on the 18th, left Throg's Neck, debarked again on Pell's Point, and on the march northward encountered Glover's brigade well posted behind stone fences. After a hot skirmish Glover slowly fell back, while the enemy advanced to the heights of New Rochelle. Here the British encamped till the 22d, when they were joined by the second division of Hessians under General Knyphausen. This delay gave Washington ample time to strengthen himself at White Plains, where he held a strong and important strategic position commanding the roads leading up the Hudson and to New England.

On the morning of the 28th of October the opposing armies, each about thirteen thousand strong, confronted each other. Washington's intrenchments, partly a double line, occupied the hilly ground within the village of White Plains, the left resting upon a mill-pond and the right on a bend of the Bronx, which protected its flank and rear. Across the Bronx rose Chatterton's Hill, presenting a steep rocky front to the enemy, but it was not fortified.

Howe, believing he was now to fight the decisive battle of the war, moved up in two heavy columns, Clinton commanding the one on the right and De Heister that on the left. They seemed at first as if intending to attack in front; but they soon filed off to the left, extending their line to the front of Chatterton's Hill. Here the main body halted, while a column four thousand strong proceeded to cross the Bronx and storm the hill under cover of the fire of twenty pieces of artillery. General McDougall with fifteen hundred Continentals and militia, and Captain Alexander Hamilton with two pieces of artillery, immediately arrayed themselves on the rocky brow of the hill for its defence. As the main British body, under General Leslie, clambered up the steep acclivity it was met by a withering fire from the infantry and artillery, from which it recoiled and sought shelter. A second assault up the slope met with an equally determined resistance, and for some time the enemy was held in check. Rahl, with two regiments that had forded the Bronx a quarter of a mile below, now appeared on the American right, and drove the militia from their post. This break compelled McDougall, exposed to a heavy fire in front and flank, to retreat across the Bronx to White Plains, though with his six hundred Continentals he maintained an obstinate conflict for an hour, and carried off all his wounded and artillery. The American loss in the engagement was 30 prisoners and 130 killed and wounded, while their opponents' losses were 231.

Howe contemplated an assault, the next morning, upon the American camp, but was deterred by the apparent strength of the lines. These had been built hastily, as General Heath says, of corn-stalks, the tops being turned inwards, and the roots with the adhering earth outwards. The British army, strongly reinforced by the arrival of Lord Percy on the 30th, designed attacking the American works on the following day, but a storm delayed their operations, and gave Washington time to withdraw his forces to the heights of New Castle, where he erected strong defences. In the meanwhile Knyphausen had been ordered to move from New Rochelle to Kingsbridge, where he encamped on November 2d, the Americans retiring to Fort Washington on his approach. Howe in person suddenly left White Plains on the night of the 5th for Dobbs's Ferry, to which his army was already moving. "The design of this manœuvre", wrote Washington on the 6th to the President of Congress, "is a matter of much conjecture and speculation, and cannot be accounted for with any degree of certainty." A council of war which met that day evidently inferred that it threatened a movement across or up the Hudson, for it was unanimously agreed immediately to throw a body of troops into New Jersey, and station three thousand at Peekskill to guard the Highlands. Howe really contemplated a far different move—the capture of Fort Washington.

Why Sir William did not again attack Washington, and why he changed his whole plan, is now well understood to be due to the treason of William Demont, the adjutant of Colonel Magaw, in command of Fort Washington. This man, on the 2d of November, undiscovered, passed into the British camp, and placed in the hands of Lord Percy complete plans of the defences of Mount Washington and a statement of their armament and garrisons. This detailed information was immediately sent, with its author, to Howe, and must have reached him a day or two before his sudden departure from White Plains. The conclusive evidence of this treason is furnished by the culprit himself in his letter,[722] dated London, January 16, 1792, to the Rev. Dr. Peters, of the Church of England, which was first published by Mr. E. F. DeLancey, in the Magazine of American History (Feb., 1877).

Fort Washington, built by Colonel Rufus Putnam soon after the evacuation of Boston, occupied the highest ground at the northern end of Manhattan Island. It was a pentagonal bastioned earthwork without a keep, having a feeble profile and scarcely any ditch. In its vicinity were batteries, redoubts, and intrenched lines. These various field fortifications, of which Fort Washington may be considered the citadel, extended north and south over two and a half miles, and had a circuit of six miles. The three intrenched lines of Harlem Heights, crossing the island, were to the south; Laurel Hill, with Fort George at its northern extremity, lay to the east; upon the River Ridge, near Tubby Hook, was Fort Tryon, and close to Spuyten Duyvel Creek were some slight works known as "Cork Hill Fort;" and across the creek, on Tetard's Hill, was Fort Independence. The main communication with these various works was the old Albany road, crossing Harlem River at Kingsbridge. This road was obstructed by three lines of abatis, extending from Laurel Hill to the River Ridge.

Fort Washington mounted not more than eighteen guns en barbette, of various calibres, from nines to thirty-twos. The garrison of all the various works was less than 3,000 men, mostly Pennsylvanians, who were commanded by Colonel Magaw, an officer of but little military experience. The ground about the fort was well suited for defence, and the works not only protected the upper part of Manhattan Island, but in conjunction with Fort Lee, on the palisades opposite, commanded the Hudson. However, from their too elevated positions and distance from each other, these two works, on the opposite sides of the river, with their feeble armament, proved insufficient, even with a partially constructed barrier of sunken hulks, to prevent the passage of the British vessels-of-war.

As these forts did not close the river, Washington did not deem it expedient to weaken his force, which was necessary to him for field operations, by leaving a large garrison on an island essentially in the hands of the enemy. To the opinion of General Greene, in general command of these works, and in deference to the expressed wishes of Congress to hold them at any cost, Washington yielded his better judgment. His modesty and sense of imperfect knowledge of the science and practice of war led him, as it did on several occasions, to defer too much to others, and though he did not think it "prudent to hazard the men and stores at Mount Washington", he left it discretionary with Greene to give the necessary orders for its evacuation.

Howe, November 15th, demanded the surrender of Fort Washington, stating that, if he were compelled to take it by assault, the garrison would be put to the sword. Magaw replied that to propose such an alternative was unworthy of a British officer, and that, for himself, he should defend the fort to the last extremity.

On the 15th Washington started across the river from Fort Lee, to which he had come, to determine the condition of the garrison at Fort Washington. He says, "I had partly crossed the North River when I met General Putnam and General Greene, who were just returning from thence, and they informed me that the troops were in high spirits and would make a good defence, and, it being late at night, I returned."

Magaw, awaiting the enemy's attack, made a judicious disposition of his forces to defend Fort Washington and the various intrenchments in its vicinity. Colonel Rawlings took command of Fort Tryon and the northern end of the River Ridge, with an outpost at Cork Hill Fort; Colonel Baxter held Fort George and the summit of Laurel Hill; Colonel Cadwallader occupied the Harlem Lines; while Magaw, at his central position of Fort Washington, directed the whole.

Howe's attack upon Fort Washington was skilfully planned and admirably executed. A vessel-of-war, the "Pearl", took up a position in the Hudson to protect the contemplated movement of the Hessian troops and enfilade the northern outworks of Fort Washington; while thirty flatboats were in the Harlem River for ferrying troops,—these boats having eluded the vigilance of the American sentries on the night of the 14th, when passing up the Hudson and through Spuyten Duyvel Creek.

On the morning of the 16th, under a furious cannonade from the heights on the east bank of the Harlem, three distinct assaults were ordered to be made upon the American defences, besides a fourth movement, which, though designed as a feint, became a real attack at the critical moment. The first British column, under General Knyphausen, moved down from Kingsbridge, and with him were Rahl's Germans marching close to the Hudson; the second, under General Matthews, supported by Lord Cornwallis, crossed the Harlem and moved upon Fort George and the northern end of Laurel Hill; the third, or feint, under Lieut.-Col. Stirling, floated down the Harlem to threaten the southerly part of Laurel Hill; while the fourth, of British and Hessians, led by Earl Percy and accompanied by Howe, moved from Harlem Plain upon the triple lines of Harlem Heights.

The latter column, advancing from the south, began the attack upon the outer or southernmost American line, where Cadwallader, unable to check Lord Percy's superior forces, fell back to his stronger middle line. Howe then ordered Stirling to land from the Harlem and clamber up the steep slope of Laurel Hill to threaten the rear of Cadwallader. The latter sent a detachment, as did also Colonel Magaw, to oppose Stirling's landing, without avail. Matthews at the same time debarked his column and attacked the Americans on Laurel Hill, where Baxter was killed. The united forces of Matthews and Stirling overcame all opposition and took 170 prisoners. Baxter's force was compelled, as was also Cadwallader, when pressed by Percy, to seek refuge in Fort Washington. About noon the Hessian column from the north was in motion. Rahl soon scattered the small guard in Cork Hill Fort and advanced upon Fort Tryon, crowding Rawlings by superior force nearly back to Fort Washington, when, being joined by Knyphausen, who had made his way over wooded and difficult ground and across abatis, the reunited German columns bore down all opposition. The Americans at this point also, after a spirited resistance, were compelled to take refuge in Fort Washington, which, now overcrowded and exposed to the deadly concentric fire of the enemy, left Magaw no alternative but surrender. He asked for a parley of four hours, but he was allowed only half an hour. In the end he capitulated, upon honorable terms, to General Knyphausen, to whom the glory of the day belonged. Magaw had received a promise from Washington to attempt to bring off the troops if he would hold out till night, which Magaw deemed impossible, with troops huddled together and exposed to destruction from the enemy's near circle of fire. This capture cost the enemy nearly 500 men in killed and wounded. The American loss was 150 killed and wounded, 2,634 taken prisoners (including many of their best troops), 43 pieces of artillery of from three to thirty-two pounds calibre, a large number of small arms, and much ammunition and stores. The whole of Manhattan Island thus passed into British hands.

Immediately after the capture of Fort Washington, Sir William Howe crossed with his army into New Jersey, it being too late for any coöperation with the Northern army under General Carleton, who had already retreated from Crown Point into Canada.[723]

This New York campaign had been most disastrous to the American cause; yet it was far from a brilliant success for the Anglo-Hessian arms. Washington, with troops inferior in numbers, arms, organization, discipline, and experience, had outgeneralled Howe, with a superior veteran army, whenever he acted upon his own good judgment and did not yield his convictions to his subordinates, to whom most of the errors of the campaign were due.

It is doubtful whether there was any necessity whatever for the British to fight the battle of Long Island, as their fleet might have occupied the East River, as it subsequently did, and thus have caged the part of Washington's army which was on Long Island. It is true that the American batteries on Brooklyn Heights and Governor's Island might have done the fleet much damage; but if it was too dangerous to run the gauntlet of the Buttermilk Channel, four fathoms deep, it would have been an easy matter to sail around the eastern end of Long Island, and safely enter the East River from that direction.

Had the East River been occupied by the British fleet, it could, while cutting off half of our army from the defence of New York, at the same time have threatened the city front pending the transportation of the British army by water to points above the city from whence to turn either or both flanks of Manhattan Island. Washington, thus shut up, would have been compelled to fight at great disadvantage, and possibly surrender at discretion.

Even admitting that the battle of Long Island was necessary, Howe, in dividing his army into three masses, stretching over a line of more than ten miles, ran great risk of being beaten in detail had all of the American forces on the island been concentrated at a central position, ready to be thrown successively upon his isolated columns. It is true the undisciplined American forces might not have been able to cope in the open field with British and German regulars; but Howe had no right to presume their inferiority after his own experience of their good conduct at Bunker Hill and Clinton's trial at Sullivan's Island.

The American general also committed a great military blunder in leaving with raw troops the shelter of the Brooklyn intrenchments for the precarious protection of the Long Island Ridge, several important passes in which were left entirely unguarded, though Washington had ordered their careful observation.

After the retreat of the American army to New York, Howe wasted two precious weeks, during which Washington had time to organize his defence; and when the British general crossed the East River, he committed a great mistake in debarking at Kip's Bay,—a halfway measure which involved a long land march to his objective, White Plains. Washington, with great vigor, seized his advantage, and, by availing himself of his shorter interior line, arrived first at the coveted position and fortified it. Had Howe moved to this point by water immediately after the battle of Long Island, he undoubtedly would have succeeded in turning Washington's left flank, and would thus have cut off his retreat. The British general's delay of two months after the battle of Long Island in moving less than thirty miles to reach White Plains was inexcusable. In a shorter period Moltke began and ended the campaign of 1866, which so humbled the great power of the Austrian empire.

When Howe decided to attack the American army at White Plains he should have thrown his entire force upon Washington's centre, and thus have won a decisive victory with his superior troops; whereas he used less than one third of his army in driving Washington's right wing from Chatterton's Hill upon his main body, which then successfully retreated before the tardy and inert British general.

Howe's good fortune in capturing Fort Washington was due more to the treason of Magaw's adjutant and to Washington's yielding to bad advice, than to any skill of the British commander.[724]

With the invasion of New Jersey by the Anglo-Hessian army all military operations at the mouth of the Hudson were terminated. The struggle for the control of this great river was to be transferred to its upper waters, and it was expected that the coming campaign would be so conducted as soon to force the whole power of the colonies into silence and submission.

General Gates, who was appointed the successor of Sullivan in the command of the army of Canada, was, says Horace Walpole, "the son of a housekeeper of the second Duke of Leeds." He had neither brilliant qualities nor military genius, but possessed the vanity and ambition to covet the highest position, for the attainment of which he resorted to disgraceful intrigue. When assigned to this command, in June, 1776, the army of Canada was flying to Crown Point; so, like Sancho Panza, Gates found himself a governor without a government; but, nothing abashed, he at once claimed the command of the Northern department, then under Schuyler. Congress sustained the latter, whereupon Gates took post at Ticonderoga, where the remnant of the American army had retired upon the abandonment of Crown Point, and promptly adopted vigorous measures to put the work in good condition for defence and to reinforce its garrison against any forward movement of General Carleton.

To secure control of Lake Champlain, a squadron of small vessels was ordered to be constructed at its head (Skenesborough), which, to the number of nine, mounting in all fifty-five guns, were completed by the middle of August. Arnold, in command of these and some additional galleys from Ticonderoga, moved down to the foot of the lake, and anchored his vessels across it to bar the passage of the enemy.

From Political Magazine (1780), i. 743, with a memoir of Burgoyne. There are modern engravings of this likeness in Moore's Diary of the Amer. Rev., i. p. 513; and in Lossing's Field Book, i. 37.—Ed.

Carleton, as active as his adversary, had built at St. Johns a flotilla of "thirty fighting vessels." When Arnold discovered the superiority of the enemy's fleet in vessels and guns to be more than double his own, and that they were manned by picked British sailors, he fell back and formed line of battle between Valcour's Island and the western shore of the lake. In this disadvantageous position he was attacked, October 11th, by Captain Pringle, of the British navy, with thirty-eight vessels and boats, mounting 123 guns. Though the crews of Arnold's flotilla were landsmen, he maintained a desperate fight from eleven in the forenoon until dark, when, availing himself of the obscurity of a thick fog, he escaped with part of his vessels, unobserved, through the enemy's fleet; but, owing to adverse winds and his crippled condition, he was overtaken on the 13th off Split Rock, where he was again attacked. Some of his flotilla escaped and some were captured, but he himself, after fighting four hours, ran his remaining vessels ashore, set them on fire with their flags flying, and escaped with their crews through the forests to Ticonderoga. General Carleton now advanced to Crown Point, of which he took possession October 14th, and pushed a reconnoissance to within sight of Ticonderoga. When Carleton's boats appeared, Gates made an effective display of his garrison, whereupon the British general fell back to Crown Point, which he evacuated, and, it being too late for further active operations, he retired to Canada.

BURGOYNE.

From Andrews's Hist. of the War, London, 1785, vol. iii. Fonblanque gives a likeness painted by Ramsay at Rome in 1750, and this is repeated in Gay's Pop. Hist. U. S., iii. 567. Reynolds painted him in 1766 (Fonblanque, p. 86). J. C. Smith (Brit. Mez. Portraits, ii. 710) records a picture by Pine. Cf. Jones's Campaign for the Conquest of Canada, p. 194, and the illus. ed. of Irving's Washington, iii.—Ed.

The enemy had scarcely departed when Schuyler applied himself with tireless assiduity to prepare against a new invasion during that winter or in the coming year. He continually pressed upon Congress and Washington the wants of his department in men and munitions of war. In every way he tried to conciliate the Indian tribes; and he lost no opportunity of gaining information of the enemy's designs and movements.

Burgoyne, after the battle of Bunker Hill, had suggested to Lord Rochefort, Secretary of State for the colonies, that, as there was "no probable prospect of bringing the war to a speedy conclusion with any force that Great Britain and Ireland could supply", there should be employed "a large army of such foreign troops as might be hired, to begin their operations up the Hudson River; another army, composed partly of old disciplined troops and partly of Canadians, to act from Canada; a large levy of Indians and a supply of arms for the blacks, to awe the Southern provinces, conjointly with detachments of regulars; and a numerous fleet to sweep the whole coast,—might possibly do the business in one campaign."

The importance of securing the control of the Hudson, thereby to separate the New England from the Middle and Southern States, was eminently correct; but the proposed mode of accomplishing it was, as the sequel proved, entirely wrong.

Burgoyne, like many other Englishmen, had held American prowess in contempt, and ridiculed the enrolment of provincials as "a preposterous parade of military arrangement." His later experience probably changed his views, for when he had supplanted that noble soldier Sir Guy Carleton in the command of the British army in Canada, through "family support" more than from "military merit", he took good care to secure a strong and veteran force, commanded by officers of noted skill and long experience.

Burgoyne's army, which took the field in July, 1777, had a total, rank and file, of 7,902, of which 4,135 were British, 3,116 Germans, 148 Canadian militia, and 503 Indians. The artillery corps and train were of the most serviceable character, "probably the finest and most excellently supplied as to officers and private men that had ever been allotted to second the operations of any army."

The commander-in-chief was a polished gentleman, a popular dramatist, an effective speaker, a useful member of Parliament, and a gallant officer who had won laurels in Portugal; Major-General Phillips, the second in command, was a distinguished artillerist who had earned a high reputation in Germany; Major-General Riedesel had been selected because of his long experience, especially in the Seven Years' War; Brigadier-General Fraser, who commanded the light brigade, was a knightly soldier, ambitious of glory, who had seen much service in America; Hamilton and Powel, who commanded brigades, had been twenty years on active duty; Lord Balcarras and Major Acland, commanding respectively the light infantry and grenadiers, were soldiers of high professional attainments; La Corne St. Luc, the commander of the Indians, had been an active partisan of the French in Canada wars, and "was notorious for brutal inhumanity;" and the many staff and regimental officers were already men of mark, or subsequently rose to high positions.

With such a thoroughly disciplined and well-appointed army, Burgoyne fondly anticipated making a triumphal march of two hundred miles to Albany, there to meet St. Leger descending the Mohawk, and Howe ascending the Hudson, and thus by combined movements to dismember the thirteen United States. This march of the Northern army seemed not arduous, as most of Burgoyne's way was by water through the Sorel, Lake Champlain, and the upper Hudson; but he had taken little account of the extraordinary physical difficulties he was doomed to encounter, and the hostility of the inhabitants along much of his route.

LORD GEORGE GERMAIN.

From Murray's Impartial Hist. of the present War, i. 190.—Ed.

Another embarrassment greatly marred the British plans. Lord George Germain, the Secretary of State for the colonies, had given Burgoyne positive orders for his march to Albany, from which he was not to deviate; while Howe was left, through a piece of criminal negligence,[725] without any imperative instructions to coöperate with the army in Canada; besides which, it was almost impossible to arrange any concerted action between forces separated by four hundred miles of hostile country.

Burgoyne, however, like a true soldier, determined to obey orders, though it might break empires. Consequently, on June 13th, at St. Johns, the standard of England was hoisted on board the "Radeau", and saluted by all the rest of the shipping and forts, thus announcing the beginning of this eventful and important campaign.

On the 20th, Burgoyne issued, with seeming royal prerogative, a bombastic proclamation, commending the justice and clemency of the king, who had directed "that Indians be employed;" denouncing the obstinacy of Americans as "wilful outcasts;" threatening the terrors of savage warfare of the "thousands of Indians" under his command, "to overtake the hardened enemies of Great Britain;" and, "in consciousness of Christianity and the honor of soldiership", warned all of his opposers that "the messengers of justice and wrath await them on the field, and devastation, famine, and every concomitant horror that a reluctant but indispensable prosecution of military duty must occasion."[726]

Burgoyne, after delivering himself of this pronunciamiento of loving-kindness towards his American erring brothers, and setting forth the sweet humanity of his dusky allies, who "had sharpened their affections upon their hatchets", proceeded up Lake Champlain, pioneered by these children of the forest in their birch canoes, the fleet and army following, with music and banners, as if engaged in a splendid regatta.

While Burgoyne with the main army was moving south, Lieutenant-Colonel St. Leger, in conformity with instructions from the British cabinet, with a detachment of about 1,000 men (English regulars, provincials, and Indians), was rapidly advancing west to Fort Stanwix, by the St. Lawrence and Lakes Ontario and Oneida. After reducing this post and subjugating the patriots of the Mohawk valley, he was ordered to join his chief at or near Albany.

Burgoyne's formidable invading force of 7,863 men, with 42 pieces of artillery, which reached Crown Point June 27th, advanced thence, July 1st, in battle array: the right wing of British troops under General Phillips, upon Fort Ticonderoga on the west bank of the lake; the left wing of Germans under General Riedesel, upon Fort Independence on the east bank; and the floating batteries in line across the lake. Burgoyne had announced in orders: "This army must not retreat."

General Schuyler had recently visited Forts Ticonderoga and Independence, where, instead of a garrison of 5,000 men, he found only 2,546 half-armed and poorly provided Continental troops and 900 raw militia, "many of them mere boys, and one third of the whole force unfit for duty." He noted, with serious forebodings, the unfitness of the works to resist attack, a state to which lack of workmen and the neglect of Gates had brought them. The reduction of this stronghold was indispensable to Burgoyne's progress, not only as insuring his communications with Canada, but because of the danger of leaving such a force in his rear.

In an endeavor to strengthen these fortifications, of which General St. Clair had recently taken command, the works had been too much extended, and the key-points—Mount Hope, commanding Fort Ticonderoga, and Mount Defiance, a supposed inaccessible eminence at the confluence of the waters of Lakes George and Champlain—had not been occupied; consequently, they were seized by the British and artillery was planted upon them.

St. Clair, no favorite of fortune, finding himself nearly invested on the 5th, and exposed to a plunging fire from these heights, which he could not return, wisely determined to evacuate all his works that night, under pretence of making a sortie. As soon as it was dark enough, the women and wounded, together with some ammunition and stores, were placed upon 200 bateaux, which were to be escorted to Skenesborough by five armed galleys and a guard of 600 men, all under the command of Colonel Long. In thus abandoning Ticonderoga, St. Clair justified himself, saying that "we had lost a post, but saved a province."

St. Clair, leaving his heavy artillery and many supplies behind, with the garrison of Fort Ticonderoga passed undisturbed, at midnight, over the floating bridge across the lake. On the southern side the troops from Fort Independence joined him, and all were safely escaping, when, without orders, General De Fermois's headquarters were fired, the blaze of which disclosed the retreat to the enemy. The alarm was at once given, and the deserted forts were seized by the British. General Fraser was in pursuit at daylight of the 6th, followed soon after by General Riedesel with the German grenadiers.

ARTHUR ST. CLAIR.

From a photograph of a miniature furnished by Mr. F. D. Stone. It was painted near the close of the war. Daniel Goodwin, Jr., Provincial Pictures, p. 72, says there is another miniature on ivory, owned by Miss Mary R. Sheets, of Indianapolis.

A likeness by C. W. Peale hangs in Independence Hall in Philadelphia. It was drawn by J. B. Longacre, and engraved by E. Wellmore. It represents him at the time he was governor of the Northwest Territory. Cf. St. Clair Papers; Goodwin's Provincial Pictures, p.72. There is also a pencil sketch by John Trumbull given in the St. Clair Papers, and in the illustrated edition of Irving's Washington. Cf. 2 Penna. Archives, vol. x.; Lossing's Field-Book, i. 132. A view of his home is given in Egle's Pennsylvania, p. 1156.—Ed.

Meanwhile, Burgoyne and Phillips, in the fleet, broke through the boom and bridge across the lake, in chase of Colonel Long and the American flotilla, which, on the afternoon of the 7th, was overtaken and attacked at the wharves of Skenesborough. Two of the covering galleys struck their colors, and the others were blown up by their crews. The bateaux, mills, and stockade there were promptly burned, and then the detachment fled to Fort Anne, eleven miles below. Early the next morning Long sallied out and had a sharp encounter with his pursuers under Colonel Hill; but when victory was almost within his grasp, the enemy was reinforced by a number of savages sent forward by Burgoyne, who had remained at Skenesborough. Colonel Long, after burning Fort Anne, retreated sixteen miles to Fort Edward, where he met Schuyler on his way to Ticonderoga with a small reinforcement.

St. Clair, with the main body, was even less fortunate. He retreated through the wilderness to Castleton, his rear-guard of 1,200 men, under Colonel Warner, stopping over night at Hubbardton, where on the morning of the 8th it was attacked by Fraser with an inferior force. After a spirited engagement Hale's militia regiment abandoned the field, and the enemy was reinforced by the arrival of Riedesel's Brunswickers, which latter turned the American right flank and compelled their retreat to Rutland, the rendezvous appointed by St. Clair in the event of disaster. From here the remnant of St. Clair's forces, by a circuitous march of more than a hundred miles, on the 12th reached Fort Edward, where Schuyler, on the 20th, could muster only 4,467 men fit for duty. This little army was deficient in almost every requisite for battle, while Burgoyne, flushed with victory, lay within a day's forced march with his veteran army of nearly double the American force.

Schuyler was charged by Congress with "neglect of duty" in not ordering a timely retreat of the garrison from Ticonderoga, if untenable; and, if to be defended, not to have been present at the attack upon it. The court-martial, of thirteen distinguished officers, unanimously acquitted him "with the highest honor."[727]

These reverses, which closed the first act of the drama of varied events in this checkered campaign, seemed to open the way to Burgoyne's triumph, and they spread universal alarm among the patriots, who had considered Ticonderoga the closed gate to northern invasion. These disasters, however, were blessings in disguise, despite the desertion of the militia. Washington predicted ultimate success, and Schuyler was roused to great efforts to oppose the enemy's advance. Wood Creek was at once obstructed with logs and huge stones; all roads were broken up and their bridges destroyed; dry land was converted into morass, trees were felled in every direction, and the whole of this wild and savage country was stripped of cattle and supplies, for which the enemy had consequently to depend upon Canada and remoter England.

Having provided this barrier against the enemy, Schuyler, who had been joined by Arnold, fell back to Fort Miller with his artillery (brought from Fort George), where he tarried till he had ruined the road over which he passed, and thence proceeded to Stillwater to await reinforcements, making that his fortified headquarters, while his little army occupied a camp, which was intrenched on Van Schaick's Island, near the mouth of the Mohawk.

Burgoyne was so elated by his successes that he dispatched his aide-de-camp Captain Gardner to England, "with news so important to the king's service, and so honorable to the troops under his command." But while the British colors were flying over Ticonderoga, he little dreamed of the difficulties and reverses which were awaiting him. To provide garrisons for these works in his rear, to which he had sent all his surplus artillery and baggage, he was compelled "to drain the life-blood of his army", since Carleton had declined to supply the necessary troops for their defence, on the ground that his jurisdiction as governor did not extend beyond the bounds of Canada.

Burgoyne availed himself of the water transportation of Lake George for most of his artillery and stores; but, for the march of his army from Skenesborough, a trackless wilderness confronted him, through which he had to remove countless obstacles, cut a new pathway, and build no less than forty bridges, one of which, over a swamp, was two miles long. Wood Creek had also to be opened for his bateaux. In these laborious undertakings his army was exhausted with overwork, and suffered terribly with midsummer heat and innumerable insects. Consequently, with his utmost efforts, he did not reach Fort Edward till July 30th, or twenty-four days after leaving Lake Champlain, a distance of only twenty-six miles. Burgoyne remained at Fort Edward till August 15th, awaiting the transportation across the portage from Lake George of the necessary artillery, ammunition, provisions, and bateaux for his descent of the Hudson.

During this enforced delay important events were occurring elsewhere, on the Mohawk and near Bennington. General Lincoln at the same time was recruiting troops in New England, with which to attempt the recapture of Ticonderoga and cut off the British retreat to Canada.

Fort Stanwix, or Fort Schuyler as it was subsequently called, on the head-waters of the Mohawk, near the present Rome, N. Y., was built in 1758, and in April, 1777, was put under command of Colonel Gansevoort, who, with Colonel Marinus Willet, placed it in a better condition of defence. The garrison of the work was 750 Continental troops, before which St. Leger, accompanied by the loyalist Sir John Johnson, and Joseph Brant the great Mohawk chief, appeared, August 2, and the next day summoned it to surrender. Gansevoort paying no attention to this, the British colonel prepared for a regular siege, and sent out detachments to cut off all succor.

The inhabitants of Tryon County were panic-stricken, but the aged General Herkimer by great efforts collected 800 militia and marched to Oriskany, within eight miles of the fort, to which he sent a messenger with a request that upon the messenger's arrival three guns should be fired and a sortie made to facilitate the advance of the succoring party through the besiegers. The signal was delayed, and, unfortunately, Herkimer's better judgment was overruled by his younger officers, who were impatient of delay. This led to his moving forward and to his being ambushed in a valley, the head of which was held by loyalists, while Indian allies under Brant occupied the sides. Here a desperate hand-to-hand fight of five hours ensued, early in which the brave Herkimer was mortally wounded; but seated upon his saddle, and propped against a tree, he calmly continued to give his orders and animate his men with his own heroism till the end of the battle.

At length the long-expected signal guns were heard, when Colonel Willet with 250 men made a sudden dash upon a weak part of the besiegers' camp. Though he failed to reach Herkimer, he destroyed two sections of the enemy's intrenchments, and captured the British camp equipage, Sir John Johnson's papers, five flags, and some prisoners.

The Indians, who had lost many of their braves at Oriskany, hearing the sound of Willet's musketry in their rear, quickly retreated, and were soon followed by the loyalists, leaving Herkimer in possession of the field. St. Leger still continued the siege of the fort, where now floated for the first time the American flag, just adopted by Congress, made of alternate stripes of a soldier's white shirt and a camp-woman's red petticoat, the field being cut out of an old blue overcoat. Beneath this were hung the five captured British standards.

St. Leger on the 7th again demanded the surrender of the fort, threatening Indian vengeance, and falsely stating that Burgoyne was in possession of Albany. Gansevoort returned an indignant refusal to this disgraceful threat. Soon came rumors of the approach of the intrepid Arnold to raise the siege. Statements sent forward of his numbers, purposely exaggerated, caused the flight of the panic-stricken Indians, and St. Leger, August 22, abandoned his trenches, some artillery and camp equipage, and fled to Canada. The right wing of the invaders being thus paralyzed, Arnold returned in triumph to join Schuyler.

Burgoyne's difficulties increased. His Indian allies were insubordinate, and the patriots swelled the American ranks. Finding that his scanty supplies had to be replenished from his distant base in Canada, or rather from England, he decided to make a raid upon Bennington, to secure horses, cattle, and provisions from the depot there. He hoped also that this move would strike terror among the unfriendly inhabitants of the New Hampshire Grants, who hung "like a gathering storm upon his left", and also would elevate the flagging spirits of his army, by a victory which he supposed would be easy. Accordingly, Lieutenant-Colonel Baum was dispatched with a select corps of 550 British, German, and loyalist troops and 150 Indians. Colonel Breyman, with 642 heavy dismounted Brunswick chasseurs, was sent on the 15th as a support. To oppose this expedition, General John Stark hastily collected 1,400 trained militia.

JOHN STARK.

After a silhouette given in Rev. Albert Tyler's Bennington, the battle, 1777; Centennial Celebration, 1877 (Worcester, 1878). This book is of some interest for its account of the ground and its landmarks, and relics of the battle. A view of Stark's monument is given in Potter's Manchester, N. H., p. 584; and an account of his homestead is in the Granite Monthly, v. 84. The usual portrait of Stark is that given in Caleb Stark's Memoir of Gen. John Stark (Concord, 1860), and in the illustrated ed. of Irving's Washington, ii. 437. Cf. N. E. Hist. Geneal. Reg., July, 1853, and the original ed. of the Stark Memoirs, for another likeness.—Ed.

Though constant skirmishing took place on the 15th, a pouring rain prevented a general engagement till the next day, when the determined Yankee leader declared he would beat the invader or "before night Molly Stark would be a widow." To fulfil his pledge he seized the initiative, attacked the enemy on three sides, stormed their intrenchments on the Walloomscoick River and captured their guns, dispersed the Indians and loyalists, and went in hot pursuit of the Germans and British, when his exhausted forces were checked by Breyman's supporting detachment. Colonel Warner's excellent regiment, at once fresh and eager, arrived that afternoon and renewed the action, which was continued till dark, when Breyman, under the cover of night, made good his retreat. Baum was mortally wounded, 207 men were killed, 700 were captured, including the wounded; and 1,000 stand of small arms, all the enemy's artillery and most of their baggage fell into the hands of the Americans. Had there been another hour of daylight, none would have escaped. Stark's losses were 40 killed and 42 wounded.

This victory and the success in the Mohawk valley were as inspiriting to the American as depressing to the Anglo-German army. Burgoyne was now beset with danger on every side. Formidable obstacles accumulated in his path, famine stared him in the face; all his English flour and beef had been consumed, and the whole surrounding country was sending enthusiastic volunteers to bar his progress.

Nearly a month before, Washington had predicted that Burgoyne's successes "would precipitate his ruin", and that his "acting in detachments was the course of all others most favorable to the American cause", as cutting off any of them "would inspirit the people and do away with much of their present anxiety." The beginning of the end had already come.

The first stage in this eventful campaign was for Burgoyne a great success; the second was an equally great failure; and now the last was coming, in which the most decisive results and the highest plaudits were to be won or lost. Schuyler unquestionably would have been the hero of this final development had he not most inopportunely been replaced by Gates, a mediocre soldier. Fortunately, the latter's deficiencies were compensated by officers inferior in rank but superior in ability,—the dashing Arnold, the daring Morgan, not to name others.

HORATIO GATES.

From An Impartial Hist. of the War in Amer., London, 1780, p. 494. The engraving in the Boston edition, 1781, vol. ii., is by J. Norman. Smith (Brit. Mez. Portraits) records an engraving published in London, Jan. 2, 1778, which represents him holding a similar scroll, but "with right hand on hip."—Ed.

Congress, in the exercise of its prerogative, made and displaced generals at its will, and too often was influenced by sectional interests and rivalries. The command of the Northern Department was especially the prize of party favorites. Wooster, Thomas, Sullivan, Schuyler, and Gates had in rapid succession followed each other, and now Schuyler, after all he had done to baffle the enemy and organize victory, was to be the victim of prejudice—of New England against New York—which dated back to colonial days. Schuyler placed little reliance upon New England troops, and their representatives in Congress had as little confidence in Schuyler's generalship.

From Murray's Impartial Hist. of the Present War, vol. ii. There is a portrait by Stuart, published in 1798 as engraved by Tiebout, given in steel (bust only) by H. B. Hall in Jones's Campaign for the Conquest of Canada (p. 140), and in photogravure (whole picture) in Mason's Stuart (p. 183). The expression in this last is wholly different from the steel engraving. There is also a picture in the Heads of Illustrious Americans, London, 1783. There are other likenesses,—cf. Gay's Pop. Hist. U. S., iii. 586; Lossing's Field-Book, ii. 669.

Gates after the war lived for a while on his estate in the Shenandoah valley (view of his house in Appleton's Journal, July 19, 1873, p. 69, and Mrs. Lamb's Homes of America), but finally removed to New York, and lived near what is now Second Avenue and Twenty-third Street. A view of the house occupied by him as headquarters at Saratoga is in Lossing's Hudson River, p. 94.—Ed.

Each misjudged the other; but the outcome of this feeling between Dutch and Puritan blood was unfortunate in superseding the soldierly Schuyler by the intriguing Gates. And it was a cruel reverse to the former, just as his skilful plans were culminating in the utter discomfiture of the enemy, and his successes at Stanwix and Bennington were bringing reinforcements from every quarter to his standard with which to take the offensive, that he should be shorn of the laurels which were about to crown him as the brilliant leader in this most important campaign of the Revolution. If Schuyler had been left in command, probably all the after-complications connected with Burgoyne's surrender would have been avoided.

The resolution of Congress superseding Schuyler reached him on the 10th of August. The noble patriot responded to this ungenerous censure by renewed efforts for his army till Gates's arrival on the 19th, and then he extended to his unworthy successor the courtesy of a true gentleman, for with him the country's welfare was paramount to all personal wrongs.

Gates, clothed with plenary powers and granted by Congress almost everything denied to Schuyler, moved, after a delay of three weeks, with his army, 6,000 strong, from the mouth of the Mohawk to Bemis's Heights, a commanding position on the west bank of the Hudson, which was selected by Arnold and fortified by the engineer Kosciusko. The principal hill was occupied on three sides by extensive intrenchments and redoubts with an abatis. A line of breastworks on the east extended from the hill to the Hudson, to guard a floating bridge across the river and to sweep the plain in front; and on the west was a lower hill which was only partially fortified. The whole position was covered by a ravine in front, through which flowed a branch of Mill Creek.

Gates took personal command of the right wing of the army, occupying the intrenchments between the Hudson and the heights to the west; Learned held the centre; while Arnold had charge of the left wing, comprising Morgan's riflemen, some Continental troops, and a body of militia.

To coöperate in checking the advance of the enemy, General Lincoln with 2,000 militia was sent to threaten Burgoyne's communications. Colonel Brown with 500 of Lincoln's force, on September 18th, surprised the outposts and key-points of Ticonderoga, destroyed over two hundred bateaux and gunboats, captured 293 prisoners and 5 cannon, released 100 Americans, and brought away the Continental standard left flying over the fort when abandoned by St. Clair.

Burgoyne was greatly perplexed. To retreat was to acknowledge his weakness, and to advance was possibly to sacrifice his army and lose his coveted peerage. Under these circumstances he stood still, hoping his recent defeats would soon be forgotten, and he should be strengthened for the future.

Having finally received from Lake George his artillery, military stores, and thirty days' provisions, Burgoyne crossed to the west bank of the Hudson; September 13th-14th, he moved with his army to Saratoga; on the 15th-16th he tarried at Dovegot (near Coveville) to reconnoitre, repair bridges, and open roads over this rugged country; on the 17th he marched to Sword's Farm; on the 18th he advanced to Wilbur's Basin, within two miles of the American position, having constantly to skirmish with Arnold; and on the morning of the 19th he was engaged in reconnoitring and making preparations to attack Gates, if deemed expedient.

A table-land, intersected with ravines through which flowed Mill Creek and its branches, separated the two armies. Except a narrow cultivated strip, adjoining the Hudson, the ground was covered in great part by a dense forest. The river formed its eastern boundary, and on the north, west, and south sides were wooded heights, separated from each other by valleys.

While the Americans occupied the south heights, the Anglo-German army made ready to take possession of those on the north, and then to turn the western hills, thus to get in rear of the American left by a flank movement of their right, while their centre attacked in front and was supported by their left.

About eleven o'clock on the morning of the 19th, Burgoyne's army advanced in three columns. He, in person, in command of the centre column, moved towards Freeman's Farm, opposite to the American left; Riedesel and Phillips with a large train of artillery, forming the left column, followed the river road, and, after the attack had begun, turned westward to support and prolong the line of battle of the deployed centre; while, by a circuitous march, Fraser, with Breyman's German riflemen, having his flanks covered by Canadians, loyalists, and Indians, moved with the right column, taking post westward of the centre, thus greatly overlapping the American left, which it was designed to turn and rout.

Gates, called by Burgoyne "an old midwife", impassively looked on, giving no orders and evincing no desire to fight, while the impatient Arnold, foreseeing the enemy's movement to turn his left, sent Morgan's riflemen and some of Dearborn's light infantry to check it. They rushed upon the enemy, and dispersed the Canadians and Indians; but following up their success too eagerly, they soon encountered the British line of battle, and were overpowered by superior numbers. This being reported to Gates, the Continental troops were sent to support Morgan, but the entire force proved insufficient to cope with and counteract Fraser's movement. Arnold, undismayed, then changed his direction, and fell suddenly upon the enemy's centre with a view of separating Burgoyne from Fraser. The battle was waged with great fury by both antagonists, and as each received reinforcements the conflict deepened, and, with varying success, became more and more stubborn. Burgoyne finally escaped defeat by the timely coming up of Riedesel with Pausch's artillery. After this death-struggle of four hours' duration, darkness terminated the contest. The Americans fell back in good order to their intrenchments, while the Anglo-German army, lying on their arms, retained the barren field of their foiled efforts to advance. Though both sides claimed the victory, neither had triumphed at "Freeman's Farm." It was in reality a drawn battle. The forces engaged in the conflict were nearly equal, the Americans having about 3,000 and the enemy nearly 3,500 of their best troops. The loss of the former was 65 killed, 218 wounded, and 38 missing; while that of the latter, according to their own authorities, was about 600 killed and wounded. British bayonets and abundant artillery were fully matched by American rifles, without a single piece of ordnance. Had Arnold been properly reinforced by Gates, he might have broken the enemy's line and have gained a complete victory.

Gates's army was confident and jubilant as to the issue of the campaign, Burgoyne's anxious and despondent; while both generals strengthened their positions, and their camps resounded with "dreadful note of preparation" for a coming conflict.

From Andrews's Hist. of the War, London, 1785, vol. iii. There is also a likeness in Murray's Impartial Hist. Cf. Mag. of Amer. Hist. October, 1883, p. 326.—Ed.

The quarrel which had been brewing between Gates and Arnold, growing out of former jealousy and the supersedure of Schuyler, ripened into open hostility. The crisis of the feud came when Gates failed in his official report to make any mention of Arnold's personal participation in the battle of Freeman's Farm. Thereupon a violent altercation ensued, resulting in Arnold being relieved of his command and excluded from headquarters.

Though unemployed, he continued with the army, the officers of his division begging him not to leave them, as another battle was impending.

The two armies confronted each other within cannon-shot, and scarcely a night passed without some contest between pickets or foraging parties. Burgoyne, anxiously awaiting news of Sir Henry Clinton's coöperation from New York, tenaciously held his ground, though living upon half rations. Gates in the mean time supinely rested in his camp, awaiting the day when the ripened fruit of Schuyler's skill, in retarding the enemy's march and cutting off his detachments, should fall at his feet, and Burgoyne be compelled to starve or pass under the Caudine Forks.

Sir Henry Clinton, having been reinforced from England, left New York, October 3, with a large fleet and 3,000 troops, to effect the long-expected junction with Burgoyne. On the 5th he reached Verplanck's Point, on the Hudson River, from which he made a feint upon Peekskill. Having by this ruse deceived the aged Putnam, in command of the Hudson Highlands, Clinton crossed with his main body on the 6th to King's Ferry, and, by following a circuitous route around the Dunderberg Mountain, the British general in the afternoon carried by assault the feebly garrisoned but bravely defended Forts Montgomery and Clinton. The enemy's fleet then destroyed the boom and chain across the river, forced the Americans to burn two frigates, which could not escape, and ended their excursion up the Hudson at Esopus (now Kingston) by laying it in ashes and returning to New York, it being too late to save Burgoyne.

SIR HENRY CLINTON.

From Murray's Impartial Hist. of the Present War, i. p. 526.—Ed.

The American army, after the battle of Freeman's Farm, was daily growing stronger in men and fortifications, while the Anglo-German force was constantly becoming weaker and worn out by watching and incessant alarms. Burgoyne's situation was critical, for he could neither advance nor retreat with safety, and to stand still was to starve. Already the loyalists and Canadians were deserting in numbers, and his Indians, having little opportunity for plundering and scalping, were abandoning him altogether.

Receiving no tidings from Sir Henry Clinton, Burgoyne determined to make an armed reconnoissance of the American left on the 7th of October, and attack the next day, should there be a reasonable prospect of success; if not, to fall back on the 11th behind the Batten-Kill.

Accordingly, leaving proper guards for his camp, Burgoyne in person, at ten A. M. of the 7th, with 1,500 choice troops and ten pieces of artillery, moved out for the contemplated reconnoissance, which was at the same time to cover a foraging party to gather wheat for the pressing necessities of his army. His troops were formed in three columns, and when within three quarters of a mile of the American left were deployed in line of battle upon open ground behind a screen of dense forest. Fraser, with 500 picked men, formed the right, ready to fall upon Gates's left; Riedesel, with his Brunswickers, held the centre; Phillips was in charge of the British left; while the Indians, rangers, and provincials were to work their way through the woods to gain the left and rear of the American camp, in which Lincoln then commanded the right, and Gates had taken Arnold's place on the left.

So soon as the enemy moved and the foragers were at work, Gates ordered out Morgan. Divining Burgoyne's intention, Morgan was to seize the high ground on the enemy's right by making a wide sweep; Learned was to hold the German centre in check; and Poor, with his brigade of Continentals and some militia, concealed by the woods, was to assail the British left. Poor, supported by Learned, opened the battle at half past two with great fury against Major Acland's grenadiers, and extended his blows to Riedesel's centre; Morgan and Dearborn almost simultaneously fell like a thunderbolt upon the enemy's right.

GEORGE CLINTON.

Reproduced from Delaplaine's Repository of the lives and portraits of Distinguished Americans (Philad.). It was painted by Ames. It is engraved on steel in Allen C. Beach's Centennial Celebrations of the State of New York (Albany, 1879), and by J. B. Forrest in Irving's Washington, ii. 209. A profile likeness by St. Memin is engraved in the Doc. Hist. N. Y., vol. iv. A portrait in uniform at an earlier age was etched by H. B. Hall, in 1866, and appears in the Mag. of American History, December, 1881. An engraving of a bust by Ceracchi (owned by the N. Y. Hist. Soc.) accompanies a memoir of Clinton by W. L. Stone in Ibid., iii. 336.—Ed.

Burgoyne, seeing the danger of Fraser's right being turned, ordered him to fall back to a new position, in doing which Fraser was mortally wounded by one of Morgan's sharpshooters. In the mean time, Poor was playing wild havoc with Acland's grenadiers, captured Phillips's artillery after killing nearly all of its gunners, and then turned their own pieces upon the British, putting the entire left of their army to flight.

The Germans still firmly held their ground in the centre, when Arnold, maddened by his wrongs, dashed wildly into the thickest of the fight, without authority assumed command of his old division, with audacity and judgment led regiment after regiment to the attack at different points, roused his troops to the highest enthusiasm, and forced back by his impetuous assaults the already shattered British line, which Burgoyne then courageously led in person. But all of the British commander's determination was of little avail, his entire forces being driven back into their intrenched camp. Here the wreck of the Anglo-German army made a firm stand; but Arnold still sought new dangers. With desperation he and his fearless followers mounted embankments and abatis to assail Balcarras, then dashed upon the strong works of the German camp, and ceased not his furious onsets till the whole of the enemy's fortified position lay open, when night closed the scene.

The American army in this decisive battle lost 50 killed and 150 wounded, including among the latter the dauntless Arnold. The enemy, besides nine guns, a large supply of ammunition, and much baggage, lost 176 killed, about 250 wounded, and some 200 prisoners. Among those who lost their lives were the gallant Fraser and the sturdy Breyman, and included in the wounded were several British officers of high rank.

Burgoyne, signally defeated and exposed to a new attack by double his fighting force, prudently retreated, on the stormy night of the 8th, to Saratoga, leaving behind his sick, wounded, and everything he could possibly spare. General Fraser was buried, as he had requested, in a large redoubt near the Hudson, the guns fired over his grave being the American artillery aimed at the group of distinguished mourners before knowing the occasion of their assembling.

Gates, who had not been personally engaged in either battle of his army, remained two days with his main body in the abandoned camp of the enemy at Wilbur's Basin, he judiciously having sent detachments to take advantageous positions to hem in Burgoyne. On the 11th, Gates ordered his main body to cross the Fishkill, supposing Burgoyne had further retreated; but his advanced guard of 1,500 men under Nixon quickly withdrew, having discovered the enemy intrenched and in battle array on the other side of the stream.

Burgoyne, now finding himself exposed to the concentric fire of the Americans, who nearly surrounded him, and having no opening through which to retreat to Lake George or to Lake Champlain, called a council of war to deliberate upon his desperate situation. "By their unanimous concurrence and advice", says he, "I was induced to open a treaty with Major-General Gates." At ten A. M. of the 14th, a flag of truce was sent by Burgoyne, asking for a parley, during which Gates demanded an unconditional surrender of the enemy's troops as prisoners of war. This proposition Burgoyne peremptorily refused to entertain. Hostilities in the mean time were suspended, and modified proposals were made. After two days' delay, Gates, hearing of Sir Henry Clinton's advance up the Hudson, and fearing that he might reach Albany, agreed upon the terms, dictated by Burgoyne, as follows:—

The Anglo-German troops to march out of their camp with all the honors of war, and their artillery to be moved to the bank of the Hudson River, and there left, together with the soldiers' arms, which were to be piled at the word of command from their own officers. It was further agreed that a free passage to Great Britain should be granted to the troops on condition of their not serving again in the present contest; that all officers should retain their baggage and side-arms, and not be separated from their men; and that all, of whatever country they might be, following the camp, should be included in the terms of capitulation. Before signing the treaty, Burgoyne demurred to designate it as a capitulation, whereupon Gates readily consented to its being called a Treaty of Convention, and as such it was signed October 16, 1777.

BURGOYNE TO GATES.

Somewhat reduced, after the fac-simile in Wilkinson's Memoirs, i. 282.—Ed.

Burgoyne in a rich uniform, accompanied by his brilliant staff and general officers, rode, on October 17, to the headquarters of General Gates, who was simply attired in a plain blue coat. Reining up their horses, Burgoyne gracefully raising his cocked hat, said, "The fortune of war, General Gates, has made me your prisoner;" to which the victor, gracefully returning the salute, replied, "I shall always be ready to bear testimony that it has not been through any fault of your excellency."

WASHINGTON AND GATES.

From Bickerstaff's Boston Almanac. This is from the title of the number for 1778, and shows the kind of effigies popularly current in such publications.—Ed.

On the site of old Fort Hardy the Anglo-German army, October 17, grounded their arms at the command of their own officers, none of the American troops being present to witness this humiliation of the enemy. In the afternoon the captured troops crossed the Hudson, and, escorted by a company of light dragoons, were marched between the parallel lines of American soldiers, preceded by two officers, unfurling "the stars and stripes" just adopted by Congress. While this ceremony took place in the presence of Burgoyne and Gates, the former drew his sword and presented it to the latter, which being received was courteously returned, when both generals retired into Gates's tent.[728]

While the prisoners, under guard of General Heath, were marching to Boston, Gates hurried to Albany to oppose any movement of Sir Henry Clinton; and Major Wilkinson was sent to Congress to communicate the joyful tidings of Burgoyne's surrender. Rejoicings were heard throughout the United States, and the successful general was so elated and his vanity so stimulated that he aspired to supplant Washington, as he had Schuyler.

A few criticisms upon the plan of the campaign of 1777, and the mode of conducting it, may be permitted. The British cabinet wisely decided upon the seizure of the Hudson as the most efficient way of breaking the power of the revolted colonies; but, in carrying out its design, it violated a fundamental maxim of war. No principle of strategy is better established than the superiority of interior as against exterior lines of operation of armies, as was so admirably illustrated in the "Seven Years' War." Frederic the Great, without any frontier barriers and open to attack on all sides, from his central position kept at bay France, Austria, Russia, Saxony, Sweden, and the Germanic body, whose united population was over twenty times as great as that of Prussia, including Silesia, a recently conquered province. In like manner, the Americans, in July, 1777, were within a great circle,—Schuyler on the upper Hudson, Putnam at the Highlands, and Washington in New Jersey, within supporting distance of each other; while the British armies were widely separated upon its vast circumference,—St. Leger moving to the upper Mohawk, Burgoyne from Canada, Clinton at New York, and Howe sailing to the Chesapeake.

In the struggle for the Hudson, the two independent British armies—one in Canada and the other in New York—were expected to coöperate in order to attain a common object, while Burgoyne with the one was tied down by fixed orders, and Clinton with the other had no instructions as to the part he was expected to perform. Besides, their bases were separated by about four hundred miles of wild, hostile, and thinly populated country, rendering intercommunication so difficult that, of ten messengers sent out by different routes to Howe, not one returned to Burgoyne.

No precaution was taken to provide for the losses of Burgoyne's army, nor to supply the necessary drafts upon it to garrison the posts in his rear, guarding his communications with Canada. When he gained possession of Ticonderoga, he called upon Sir Guy Carleton to furnish the necessary force to hold the place; but Carleton did not feel justified, under his precise orders, to send troops beyond his jurisdiction. Consequently, Burgoyne "drained the life-blood of his force" in the field to provide for the defence of this and other works left behind.

Burgoyne's logistics, or means of supplying and moving his army, were very defective. Not till June 7, 1777, a month after his arrival in Canada, did he make provision for the transportation of either stores or artillery, and then his arrangements were so entirely inadequate that they seemed based upon the assumption that his adversary was his inferior in all military qualities. Hence, he decided "to trust to the resources of the expedition for the rest", while for his own personal baggage he used no less than "thirty carts." Most of his provisions had to be brought from England, a distance of 3,600 miles; some from Canada; and for the rest he relied upon the meagre resources of the hostile country he was to traverse. Consequently his army was often on reduced rations, sometimes nearly starving, and finally, to secure its existence, he undertook his disastrous raid upon Bennington.

After the pursuit of St. Clair, Burgoyne should have returned with his army to Ticonderoga, and taken the water route by Lake George, instead of forcing his way through an obstructed wilderness to Fort Edward, which he did not reach till July 30th, nor leave till August 14th. Had Schuyler directed Burgoyne's operations he could not have planned measures more conducive to his own advantage. On the Lake George route were only two small armed schooners to oppose any resistance, and from the head of the lake was a direct road to Albany, which had been followed by Abercrombie and Amherst. As it was, Burgoyne was compelled to send his supplies and artillery by the lake, and then carry them over the portage to Fort Edward, which consumed more time than would have been necessary to move in light marching order direct to Albany. General De Peyster, a careful student of this campaign, says: "Burgoyne could have been reassembled at 'Old Ty' by the 10th July; could have been transported to Fort George by the 12th; and, having left his heavy guns and all but his light artillery and indispensable materials there or at Ty, in depot, with a sufficient guard, could have reached Fort Edward on the evening of the 13th July. From this point to Albany is about fifty miles. With six or ten days' rations and an extra supply of ammunition sufficient for a battle of that period, Burgoyne could have swept Schuyler out of his path with ease, and, allowing one day's delay for a fight, could have occupied Albany on the 16th July." But the British commander had proclaimed, "This army must not retreat." Though he subsequently tried to palliate his mistake, all his correspondence shows that pride in carrying out his declaration, not military principles, made him persevere in the false movement which lost him the campaign, and secured in the end American independence.

Burgoyne, after his brilliant success at the opening of the campaign, suddenly relapsed into the sluggishness of his German allies. Instead of rapidly pursuing his demoralized foe, he tarried at Skenesborough till his pathway was thoroughly obstructed and the fugitives had recovered from their panic. After he had lost his prestige and the Americans had gained confidence by success at Stanwix and Bennington, he attempted with diminished forces to cope with the growing strength of his opponent. Thus, by delay, he lost in September what he might have achieved in July. From his arrival at Skenesborough till he had reached his southernmost point at Freeman's Farm, he moved only fifty miles in seventy-four days.

Slow in all his movements, Burgoyne's tardiness was increased by his large and superfluous train of artillery which accompanied all his toilsome marches. Even when he required the greatest celerity, he chose for his raid upon Bennington, not the nimble-footed light infantry under the dashing Fraser, but cumbrous dismounted German dragoons moving only a mile and a third an hour.

Burgoyne was not only slow, but he was irresolute. After his disastrous defeat at Bemis's Heights he lost five precious days in fatal indecision while retreat was possible. On October 12th his last chance had passed, he then being completely invested by the Americans, and nothing was left to him but surrender. According to Madame Riedesel, he had given in this crisis of his fate more attention to his mistress than to his army. Aspasia had triumphed over Mars.

While Burgoyne committed many blunders, his opponents had their shortcomings also. The fortifications of Ticonderoga, after falling into the hands of the Americans, were too much extended for their defence by a moderate garrison; but the most fatal error was the failure to occupy Mount Defiance, which completely commanded all the American works, and, when seized by the British, left St. Clair no alternative but hasty retreat and the abandonment of much artillery and considerable supplies. The fugitives then counted largely on the delay of their pursuers, who followed them with celerity, severely punishing them at Skenesborough and Hubbardton.

Congress committed the most criminal error, outweighing all others, in substituting, at the most critical moment of the campaign, a military charlatan for an accomplished soldier,—in supplanting Schuyler, who was the organizer of the victories, by Gates, who "had no fitness for command and wanted personal courage." To say nothing of the difference in merit of the two commanders, the time for making the change was most inopportune.

Putnam, a brave officer but no general, managed things so badly in the Highlands that Forts Montgomery and Clinton were lost, and the Hudson was opened to the enemy whenever he chose to advance.[729]

[CRITICAL ESSAY ON THE SOURCES OF INFORMATION.]

THE titles alone of the numerous works which have been consulted in the preparation of the foregoing narratives would fill many of these pages. Therefore, to avoid repetition, as most of them are common to all the chapters of this History of the American Revolution, reference will be made only to those authorities which have a bearing upon disputed points, or to newly discovered facts respecting the "Struggle for the Hudson."

Of the many authors who have written of the New York campaign of 1776, nearly all have followed the narrations given in Sparks's Washington and in the official despatches of the various officers engaged. For topographical details we have relied upon Des Barres' Atlantic Neptune (1780-81), with its plans of battles, sieges, etc., and maps of the seat of war, and upon the recent Coast Survey charts. Local historians have supplied many minor particulars, which need not be enumerated, except, perhaps, the one relating to the treason of William Demont, already referred to in the text. Much new light has been thrown upon the Burgoyne campaign by works published within the last few years.[730]

One of the most earnestly disputed points of Burgoyne's campaign is whether Arnold was personally engaged with the enemy at the battle of Freeman's Farm, on Sept. 19, 1777. Some authorities, notably Bancroft, while admitting that Arnold's troops were in the thickest of the fray, deny that the general himself was on the battlefield; while Stedman, Irving, Stone, and many others, equally competent to weigh the facts, maintain that Arnold was the conquering hero of the fight, and that, but for him, Burgoyne would have marched straight on to Albany.

Just after Gates had superseded Schuyler in the command of the Northern army, Arnold had returned from the Mohawk valley flushed with success and impatient to win new laurels. He was incessantly engaged in skirmishing with the enemy and adding to his reputation as a brilliant, dashing officer. Gates was envious of Arnold's growing fame, and resentful of his partiality for Schuyler. Hence arose a coolness towards Arnold, which rapidly ripened into bitter hostility. That the action of Freeman's Farm, a five hours' battle, full of skilful movements, was purely a series of chance operations without a guiding spirit, is utterly preposterous. As Gates was not engaged, whose was the directing mind but Arnold's, the second in command?

It seems impossible that one devoid of fear, brave even to rashness, who even courted danger at the risk of death, and one too who was filled with ambition and love of military glory, could possibly have allowed his command to go into action without leading its movements and sharing its perils. His subsequent heroism amid the carnage of battle at Bemis's Heights would seem a sufficient refutation of the charge that he who was always in the thickest of the fight was only a looker-on while the conflict of September 19th was raging around Freeman's Farm.

Gates, in his official report of the battle of Freeman's Farm, makes no mention of Arnold being engaged; and his adjutant-general, Wilkinson, in his Memoirs, written long after Arnold's good name had been blasted by his treason, says: "Not a single general officer was on the field of battle on the 19th of September, until evening, when General Learned was ordered out."

Under ordinary circumstances, the testimony of the commander-in-chief and his adjutant-general would be considered conclusive; but it must be borne in mind that both of these officers were inimical to Arnold, that neither was personally engaged in the battle, and that the wooded character of the ground precluded either from following any one's movements through the conflict.

On the other side, we have the contemporary testimony of officers present on the battlefield, newspaper accounts of the time, and Arnold's own division order of the day after the battle, in which he speaks of the zeal and spirit of the company officers engaged, in a manner which none but a close observer could notice. Besides, we have the direct evidence of two of Arnold's staff officers—Colonels Livingston and Varick—that their chief was the hero of the battle of Freeman's Farm; the former warmly lauding "his conduct during the late action", and declaring that "to him alone is due the honor of our late victory." Even the enemy's chief, Burgoyne, said in the British House of Commons: "Mr. Gates had determined to receive the attack in his lines. Mr. Arnold, who commanded on the left, foreseeing the danger of being turned, advanced without consultation with his general, and gave instead of receiving battle."

Another much-disputed point is whether to Schuyler or Gates is chiefly due the triumph of our arms in the Burgoyne campaign. Bancroft, in his History of the United States (vol. ix. ch. 21, orig. ed.), states that Schuyler lacked military talents, failed to harry the advance of Burgoyne, wanted personal courage, and had no influence with the people. All these charges have been triumphantly refuted by his grandson and by his biographer.[731]

General Schuyler's zeal, energy, ability, and sterling virtues have been so fully set forth in the preceding narrative of the Burgoyne campaign that any amplification here is needless; but it may be proper to add the testimony of some of our most distinguished countrymen as to the merits of this true gentleman, noble soldier, and patriotic Fabian hero. Chief Justice Marshall says: "In this gloomy state of things no officer could have exerted more diligence and skill than Schuyler." Chancellor Kent writes: "In acuteness of intellect, profound thought, indefatigable activity, exhaustless energy, pure patriotism, and persevering and intrepid public efforts, Schuyler had no superior." Daniel Webster said: "I consider Schuyler as second only to Washington in the services he rendered to the country in the war of the Revolution. His zeal and devotion to the cause under difficulties which would have paralyzed the efforts of most men, and his fortitude and courage when assailed by malicious attacks upon his public and private character, every one of which was proved to be false, have impressed me with a strong desire to express publicly my sense of his great qualities."

Washington, Hamilton, Jay, Jefferson, and most of the great men of the Revolution had unbounded confidence in Schuyler; and modern historians, such as Irving, Sparks, Lossing, and others, bear like testimony to his virtues and services. Even Congress, which had so unjustly removed Schuyler from his command, when convinced of its error, would not consent to his resignation from the army till he persistently demanded it. Though Schuyler's military career did not sparkle with "feats of broil and battle", he exhibited those great qualities which are as conducive to the success of war as "the magnificently stern array" of arms in the heady fight. He was ready in expedients to foil the enemy, skilful and persevering in executing them, and resolute and untiring till his end was obtained. Never discouraged by disaster, and stimulated to higher effort as fortune frowned, he continued sanguine of success in the darkest hour of adversity. Every assault upon his reputation fell harmless before his invulnerable patriotism; no injustice could swerve him from the path of honor; and to him, as to all true men, the meaning of life was concentrated in the single word Duty.

[NOTE BY GENERAL CULLUM.]

Disposal of the Convention Troops.[732]—In accordance with Article IV. of the convention, the captured army was marched, under guard of General Glover, to the neighborhood of Boston, where it arrived about Nov. 6th. The British troops were barracked on Prospect Hill and the German troops on Winter Hill, the officers being quartered in Cambridge and the neighboring towns. Much complaint was made of the character and insufficiency of their accommodations, but considering the limited supply of houses at the disposal of General Heath, commanding the Eastern department, he did the best in his power, without the aid of the State of Massachusetts, to whose Council he appealed for the use of "at least one of the colleges" for their comfort. At the worst, however, these captives fared far better than our own troops at Valley Forge during that winter.[733]

Under Article V. supplies were to be furnished to Burgoyne's army "at the same rates." This was interpreted by Congress, Dec. 19th, to mean "that the accounts of all provisions and other necessaries which already have been or which hereafter may be supplied by the public to prisoners in the power of these States shall be discharged by either receiving from the British Commissary of Prisoners, or any of his agents, provisions or other necessaries, equal in quality and kind to what had been supplied, or the amount thereof in gold or silver."

Exacting provisions in kind, though inconvenient to the British commissary, was not unreasonable, considering their scarcity; but the condition that expenditures made in depreciated Continental money should be liquidated, dollar for dollar, in gold and silver, was a hard one. As a justification for this latter requirement, it was stated by Congress "that General Howe had required that provisions should be sent in for the subsistence of the American prisoners in his possession, and that for the purchase of such necessaries he had forbidden the circulation of the currency of the States within such parts as are subject to his power."

By Article II. General Howe was authorized to send transports to Boston to receive the troops for their conveyance to England. For its failure to carry out the obligation imposed upon it by its own general, the American government, through Congress, justified itself by claiming that Burgoyne had already evaded the provisions of Article I. of the convention. Bancroft, in his History of the United States, contends that it had been broken by Burgoyne at the time of the surrender, by the concealment of the military chest and other public property, of which the United States were thus defrauded.[734] He therefore sustains Congress in its subsequent demand for the descriptive lists "of all persons comprehended in the surrender", and the postponing of the embarkation of Burgoyne's army "until his capitulation should be expressly confirmed by Great Britain."

On the other side are many high authorities, among whom is Dr. Charles Deane, who, Oct. 22, 1877, made an exhaustive report upon the subject of the Convention of Saratoga to the American Antiquarian Society. He contends that the acts of Congress "were not marked by the highest exhibition of good policy or of good faith."[735]

Fair inferences, from the facts in evidence, lead to the belief that neither party was scrupulous in carrying out its obligations. Burgoyne, after a preliminary agreement to the terms of the convention, was in favor of breaking the treaty, because, before affixing his signature to it, he had heard of the success of Sir Henry Clinton in the Hudson Highlands. He was willing, therefore, to barter his plighted promise to further his own interest, and actually submitted to a council of his officers "whether it was consistent with public faith, and if so, expedient, to suspend the execution of the treaty, and trust to events." To the honor of the officers of the Anglo-German army, a decided majority of the council overruled the wishes of the general-in-chief, whereupon Burgoyne, Oct. 17, signed the convention.

Its second article stipulated that "a free passage be granted to the army, under Lieutenant-General Burgoyne, to Great Britain, on condition of not serving again in North America during the present contest." It seems almost incredible that even Gates could have been guilty of such fatuity in sacrificing by this article all the fruits of the past campaign, and jeoparding American independence. It would have been better to have disarmed and disbanded these demoralized troops on the spot. He could thus have saved the country much anxiety, inconvenience, and expense, in guarding, housing, and caring for them till rested from their fatigues and embarked for England, where they could be exchanged for an army of fresh troops, which might cross the ocean in the spring to plague the inventors of such a stupid compact, or convention.

Burgoyne was not slow to avail himself of a literal interpretation of words he had designedly used in drawing up the convention, for we find him, only three days after the surrender, writing to his friend, Colonel Phillopson: "I dictated terms of convention which save the army to the State for the next campaign."

Was it in the same spirit that Burgoyne carried out the first article of the convention, by which his "arms and artillery" were to be left piled on the banks of the Hudson? By a literal interpretation this might mean only muskets and cannon, but certainly such would not be the accepted military meaning of that article, especially as it had to be construed in connection with the sixth article, permitting all officers "to retain their carriages, bat-horses, and other cattle, and no baggage to be molested or searched; Lieutenant-General Burgoyne giving his honor that there are no public stores secreted therein." But, notwithstanding all this, Madame Riedesel, the wife of General Riedesel, says in her journal: "Now I was forced to consider how I should safely carry the colors of our German regiments still further, as we had made the Americans at Saratoga believe that they were burnt up—a circumstance which they at first took in bad part, though afterwards they tacitly overlooked it. But it was only the staves that had been burned, the colors having been thus far concealed. Now my husband confided to me his secret, and entrusted me with their still further concealment. I therefore shut myself in with a right honorable tailor, who helped me make a mattress in which we sewed every one of them. Captain O'Connell, under pretence of some errand, was dispatched to New York and passed the mattress off as his bed. He sent it to Halifax, where we again found it on our passage from New York to Canada, and where—in order to ward off all suspicion in case our ship should be taken—I transferred it into my cabin, and slept during the whole of the remaining voyage to Canada upon those honorable badges." She truly called them "honorable badges", for to an army they are the insignia of nationality and emblems of power, under which the soldier ventures his life and reputation.

How was it with the British flags? Burgoyne stated that they were all left in Canada. But it happens that one of them was displayed at Ticonderoga upon the evacuation of that place by St. Clair; and five of them were captured at Fort Stanwix from St. Leger, whose detachment accompanied Burgoyne till just before leaving Canada upon his great campaign. Further, it is written in the Historical Record of the Ninth Regiment that Lieutenant-Colonel Hill, of that regiment, "being anxious to preserve the colors, took them off the staves and concealed them in his baggage, which he was permitted to retain." Subsequently these colors, hidden among his baggage, in which Burgoyne had given his honor that no public property was secreted, Colonel Hill presented "to George III., who rewarded his faithful services with the appointment of aide-de-camp to his Majesty, and the rank of Colonel in the army."

As Burgoyne was by Article I. allowed to march to the ground of surrender "with the honors of war", General Horatio Rogers, with the sentiment of a true soldier, says in one of his admirable annotations of Hadden's Journal: "Had Burgoyne's officers believed that their colors were not embraced in the terms of the convention, they would have flung them to the breeze and proudly marched out under them, as an indication of how much of their honor they had preserved, especially when they supposed they were about to embark for England; for soldiers lay down their lives for their flags, the loss, surrender, or concealment of which, save in rare instances, is synonymous with defeat and humiliation."[736]

Though it appears that all of the accoutrements and other public property of the Anglo-German army were not surrendered and a considerable part was found unserviceable, it is unnecessary to make a special point of this minor matter, after presenting the graver delinquencies on Burgoyne's part.

General Halleck, one of the best authorities on the Laws of War, in his work on International Law, says: "The general phrase, 'with all the honors of war,' is usually construed to include the right to march with colors displayed, drums beating, etc.... A capitulation includes all property in the place not expressly excepted, and a commander who destroys military stores or other property after entering into such agreement not only forfeits all its benefits, but he subjects himself to severe punishment for his perfidy. So, after a capitulation for the surrender of an army in the field, any officer who destroys his side arms or his insignia of rank deprives himself of all the privileges of that rank, and may be treated as a private soldier. The reason of the rule is manifest. The victor is entitled to all the honors and benefits of his agreement the moment it is entered into, and to destroy colors, arms, etc. thereafter is to deprive him of his just rights. Such conduct is both dishonorable and criminal."

Whether the shortcomings of the British general-in-chief were known to Washington cannot be determined, but the latter's correspondence clearly indicates what he believed would be the action of George III. upon the arrival of the convention troops in Great Britain. Hence he writes, November 13, to General Heath: "Policy and a regard to our own interest are strongly opposed to our adopting or pursuing any measures to facilitate their embarkation and passage home, which are not required of us by the capitulation."[737] Congress, December 17, concurred in these views, and consequently refused Burgoyne's application for his army to embark from Newport or some port on Long Island Sound, to avoid the long and dangerous winter passage around Cape Cod of the British transports which were to receive the troops.

In this, as in all matters involving the success of the Revolution, Washington was not only patriotic, but morally right. We had committed a blunder at Saratoga, but there was no reason why we should increase the mischievous effect of it by expediting the enemy's movements from Boston, and thus add to the danger of our destruction by enabling him to replace Burgoyne's troops in America by others they might relieve elsewhere, in time for the next year's campaign.

Congress had, November 8th, instructed General Heath to require descriptive lists of all the convention troops, to secure us against their reappearing in arms against us during the war. This Burgoyne resented as impeaching the honor of his nation, but he subsequently complied with a measure so essential to our protection.

In Burgoyne's complaint of November 14th regarding the quarters for his officers and men, he inadvertently said, "The public faith is broke", which unguarded expression was at once seized upon by Congress; when a committee, of which Francis Lightfoot Lee was chairman, submitted its report, upon which Congress, then composed "of but a few members, and all of them not the most suitable for the station", adopted, January 8, 1778, the following resolutions:—

"Resolved, that as many of the cartouch-boxes and several other articles of military accoutrements annexed to the persons of the non-commissioned officers and soldiers included in the Convention of Saratoga have not been delivered up, the Convention, on the part of the British army, has not been strictly complied with.

"Resolved, that the refusal of Lieutenant-General Burgoyne to give descriptive lists of the non-commissioned officers and privates belonging to his army, subsequent to his declaration that the public faith was broke, is considered by Congress in an alarming point of view; since a compliance with the resolution of Congress could only have been prejudicial to that army in case of an infraction of the convention on their part.

"Resolved, that the charge made by Lieutenant-General Burgoyne, in his letter to Major-General Gates of the 14th of November, of a breach of the public faith on the part of these States, is not warranted by the just construction of any article of the Convention of Saratoga; that it is a strong indication of his intention, and affords just ground of fear that he will avail himself of such pretended breach of the convention, in order to disengage himself and the army under him of the obligation they are under to these United States; and that the security which these States have had in his personal honor is thereby destroyed.

"Resolved, therefore, that the embarkation of Lieutenant-General Burgoyne and the troops under his command be suspended till a distinct and explicit ratification of the Convention of Saratoga shall be properly notified by the court of Great Britain to Congress."[738]

Delays followed these resolutions, and finally, February 3, 1778, General Heath was instructed that the embarkation of the troops was to be indefinitely postponed, the transports upon their arrival to be ordered away from the port of Boston, and the guard over the prisoners to be strengthened. General Burgoyne, of course, was indignant, and offered that, "should any doubt still subsist that the idea of being released from the engagement of the convention has been adopted by any part of the troops", he would give a further pledge of the faith of every officer in his command, "provided the suspension is immediately broken off." This frank offer was referred to a committee, which reported that in their opinion it contained nothing "sufficient to induce Congress to recede from their resolution of the 8th of January;" and the report was agreed to March 2, 1778.

This disingenuous resolution of Congress, "that the embarkation be suspended" until the happening of some further contingent event, was returning the poisoned chalice to Burgoyne's lips, being exactly in keeping with his proposition submitted, October 15, 1777, to a council of his officers, "whether it was consistent with public faith, and if so, expedient, to suspend the execution of the treaty and trust to events."

Notwithstanding many members had no confidence in the political integrity of Great Britain,[739] such holding of the convention troops as prisoners of war, contrary to the principles of international law, certainly placed Congress in a most unfavorable light. Even so distinguished a member as Richard Henry Lee, writing to Washington, says: "It is unfortunately too true that our enemies pay little regard to good faith, or any obligations of justice and humanity which render the Convention of Saratoga a matter of great moment; and it is also, as you justly observe, an affair of infinite delicacy. The undoubted advantage they will take even of the appearance of infraction on our part, and the American character, which is concerned in preserving its faith inviolate, cover this affair with difficulties, and prove the disadvantage we are under in conducting war against an old, corrupt, and powerful people, who, having much credit and influence in the world, will venture on things that would totally ruin the reputation of young and rising communities like ours." We would further remark that the moral standard of even the most civilized nations was not then as high as in this more advanced age, and that upon the construction of this convention hung the independence of the United States. Napier said of the Convention of Cintra in 1808: "A convention implies some weakness, and must be weighed in the scales of prudence, not those of justice."

General Burgoyne and his staff were allowed by Congress to return to England on parole. Soon after their departure the British troops were removed to Rutland, Mass., because of fears of their being rescued by the British forces then at Newport, R. I. Congress finally directed that the Convention troops, in order to be more easily subsisted, should be removed to Charlottesville, Virginia,[740] where they arrived in January, 1779, and they were detained in the United States till the conclusion of peace with Great Britain. Most of the officers had in the mean time been exchanged.

Dr. Deane, in concluding his investigation of this subject, says: "There can be no doubt that the supreme authority in the State would always have the right, as it has the power, to revise a treaty made by its agents, as in the case we have been considering. This follows from the nature of sovereignty itself. An Arnold might be bribed to to capitulate to the enemy. But where such treaties are entered into in good faith, and the obvious powers of the commanders have not been exceeded, the agreements between the victor and the vanquished are regarded by the highest authorities as to be sacredly kept. Humanity demands it; otherwise there would be no cessation of hostilities till the annihilation of both belligerents."[741]

While Great Britain had just cause to complain of the violation of the Convention of Saratoga by the American Congress, she might ask herself, did she always observe strict faith with her revolted colonies.

According to the Articles of Capitulation of Charleston, S. C., May 12, 1780, the garrison were allowed some of the honors of war. They were to march out and deposit their arms between the canal and the works of the place, but the drums were not to beat a British march, nor the colors to be uncased; the Continental troops and seamen, keeping their baggage, were to remain prisoners of war until exchanged; the militia were to be permitted to return to their respective homes as prisoners on parole, and while they kept their parole were not to be molested in their property by the British troops; the citizens of all descriptions were to be considered as prisoners on parole, and to hold their property in the town on the same terms as the militia.

After the capitulation, Sir Henry Clinton sent out three expeditions and issued three proclamations, all having in view the subjugation of South Carolina. The butchery which Tarleton inflicted is well known; and even the British historian, Stedman, who was then an officer under General Clinton, says of it: "The virtue of humanity was totally forgot." The enemy's detachments, sent to various parts of the State, paid little regard to the rights and property of its inhabitants. Sir Henry, assuming that the province was already conquered, issued, before his departure to New York, a proclamation discharging all the military prisoners, except those captured in Fort Moultrie and Charleston, from their parole after June 20, 1780. Thus, without their own consent, by Clinton's arbitrary fiat, these paroled persons were converted from their neutrality into British subjects, and compelled to take up arms against their neighbors, or, failing to comply with this enforced allegiance, were treated as rebels. The Whig inhabitants were worried, plundered, and murdered by Tories, in open violation of all British pledges; leading men were confined in prison-ships; and patriotic citizens, who had resumed their swords upon finding all guaranties violated, had their property sequestrated, and themselves were severely punished, sometimes with death. The British rule was truly a reign of terror.

Lord Mahon stigmatizes in the severest language American faith as utterly derelict in carrying out the Convention of Saratoga,[742] while of the sequel of the capitulation of Charleston he has no holy horror. His only remark is: "Perhaps these measures exceeded the bounds of justice; certainly they did the bounds of policy." This same English historian, in his account of Arnold's treason, speaks of the death of André as the "greatest blot" upon the career of Washington. He contends that it was unjust to arrest André, because he had a safeguard from Arnold; and sneers at the twelve distinguished American generals upon the Board which condemned the spy, as incompetent plebeians, drawn from "the plough-handle and from the shop-board." According to Mahon's fallacious mode of reasoning, Washington should not only have let André go free, because protected by the traitor's pass, but should have given up West Point, its garrison and arms, to Sir Henry Clinton, as fully agreed upon by Arnold, the duly constituted American commander. According to such reasoning, Judas Iscariot was justified in betraying the Saviour, because he had been one of the trusted twelve who sat down to the Last Supper. The just fate of the spy and betrayer was the same, except that Judas was his own executioner.

Of the various military conventions, that of Kloster-Zeven, of September 8, 1757, between the Duke of Cumberland and Marshal Richelieu, most resembles that of Saratoga. In both the victors had the vanquished at their mercy; in both the terms of surrender, under the circumstances, were moderate beyond all necessity; in both the capitulations were unsatisfactory to the governments concerned; and in both the treaties were broken from motives of expediency, frivolous pretexts being used to cover the odium of bad faith.

George II., as Elector of Hanover, "to clear himself", says Sir Edward Cust, "from the dishonor of the convention, disavowed his son's authority to sign it", recalled him from his command, and declared that the hero of Culloden had ruined his father and disgraced himself. We cannot enter into the reasons assigned by the British ministry for abrogating this compact, but they were at the least as invalid as those used by our Congress in suspending the execution of the Convention of Saratoga. When the Hanoverian army, under Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick, took the field in contravention of agreement, Marshal Richelieu declared his own fidelity in keeping the treaty, and that, should the enemy "commit any act of hostility", he, as authorized by the laws of war, "would push matters to the last extremity." The declaration of the French marshal "was seconded", says Smollett, the British historian, "by the Count de Lynar, the Danish ambassador, who had meditated the Convention of Kloster-Zeven under direction of his master to save Hanover from the horrors of war."

[EDITORIAL NOTES ON THE AUTHORITIES.]

I. The Campaign around New York City in 1776.—The Americans had been early warned of the British plans to secure the line of the Hudson (Journal of the Provincial Congress of New York, 172; Lossing's Schuyler, ii. 16), and on the American side plans of obstructing and defending the river had been made as early as Sept., 1775, and they ever after constituted a chief anxiety of the continental and provincial authorities.[743] Several early maps making record of these efforts have been preserved.[744]

FORT MONTGOMERY, May 31, 1776.

CHAIN AT FORT MONTGOMERY.

Reduced from the cut in Ruttenber's Obstructions to the Navigation of Hudson's River, p. 64.

Key. A, Fort Montgomery. B, Fort Clinton. C, Poplopen's Kill. D, Anthony's Nose. a, floats to chain. b b b, boom in front of chain. c c c, chain. d, rock at which the chain was secured and large iron roller. e e, cribs and anchors. f, blocks and purchase for tightening chain. g h, ground batteries for defence of chain. [S, section showing floats and chain; c c c, chain; f f f, floats.] The cut follows the original drawing found in the papers of the secret committee. There is a plate showing the boom and chain at West Point in Boynton's West Point, p. 70.

The anomalous condition of New York during the later part of 1775 is shown from the Tory point of view in Jones's New York during the Revolution. Rivington's press was destroyed in Nov., 1775 (N. Y. City Manual, 1868, p. 813). There was an irruption from New Jersey into Long Island in Jan., 1776 (Jones, i. 68). In Feb. the military control appears in Col. David Waterbury's orderly-book (Mag. of American Hist., Dec., 1884, p. 555). Moore gives current published reports, including Gov. Tryon's proclamation in March (Diary of the Rev., i. 216). During the same month Lee made a report on the fortifications of the city (N. Y. Hist. Soc. Coll., 1871, p. 354), and Field, in his Battle of Long Island, traces the measures of Lee to convert New York into a camp and to root out the Tories on Long Island.

CONSTITUTION ISLAND, 1776.

From the Sparks Maps. Key: "A, Gravel Hill battery, 11 guns. B, Hill clift battery, 3 in front, not finished. C, Marine battery, 8 guns. D, Romain's battery, 14 guns. E, Round Tower, 8 guns." These works were later commanded by those erected at West Point.

Stirling had also been exercising command in New York (Duer's Stirling, 139), and had seized Gov. Franklin of New Jersey (N. J. Archives, x. 702). In April, 1776, Putnam arrived with instructions from Washington (Sparks's Washington, iii. 337), finding Heath fresh from a review of the troops (Moore, i. 228).[745]

With the arrival of Washington in the middle of April, 1776, the campaign may be said to have begun. His batteries soon sent the few British ships in the harbor down to Sandy Hook, and Benjamin Tupper, commanding the little American flotilla, tried to destroy the lighthouse at that point, June 21.[746] Beside the official letters of this time there are numerous private ones.[747]

Late in June and early in July Lord Howe's fleet arrived in the lower harbor, and the troops were landed on Staten Island.[748]

The harbor of New York necessarily had more or less hydrographical treatment in all the early plans. Before the outbreak of hostilities, this may be seen, not only in the Des Barres series of maps, but in the chart of 1764,[749] reproduced in Valentine's Manual (1861, p. 597).[750] After the war began, we find several harbor maps worthy of note.[751]

During June came the plot for assassinating Washington in New York.[752] Washington was discouraged with the progress of the recruiting. "Washington and Mercer's camps recruit with amazing slowness", wrote Jefferson from Philadelphia, July 20th.[753] Mercer commanded the Flying Camp of militia from Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Maryland, which were hovering between the British and Philadelphia.[754]

Clinton's expeditionary force returned from Sullivan's Island Aug. 1st, and the active campaign began when, three weeks later, Howe moved a large part of his force across from Staten Island[755] to Gravesend, on Long Island, Aug. 22d, Sir George Collier commanding the fleet which covered the landing,[756] and the advance then began towards the lines near Brooklyn which General Greene had had the charge of constructing.[757]

Respecting the orders antecedent to and during the battle, those of Washington are in Force; but Johnston adds to them from the orderly-books.[758] Washington's own account can be found in his letters to Congress, to Gov. Trumbull, to the Mass. Assembly,[759] and he probably dictated the letter of Col. Harrison, his secretary, to Congress.[760]

BATTLE OF LONG ISLAND, 1776.

Sketched from a part of a MS. Hessian map in the library of Congress, called Plan générale des opérations de l'armée Britannique contre les Rebelles, etc.

Key: "A, Le camp du Général Howe sur Staten Island à l'arrivée du général de Heister avec la 1re division des troupes Hessoises le 22 d'Aoust, 1776. B, Le camp qu'on occupa sur Staten Island cette division après du debarqué. C, L'endroit où les troupes debarquerent sur Long Island. D, Camp du général Howe près de Gravesend. E, Camp du général de Heister après la descente sur Long Island le 27 d'Aoust, 1776. F, Marche de la colonne droite commandée par le général Clinton vers Bedford dans la nuit du 26 au 27 Aoust. G, Marche de la colonne gauche, commandée par le général Grant. H, Attaque de l'avant garde du général Clinton du 27me Aoust. J, Où le général Clinton forma sa colonne pour continuer l'attaque. K, Attaque du général Grant. L, Attaque du général de Heister. M, Les lignes des enemis à Brooklin. N, Corps détachés de l'enemis hors de ses lignes. O, Les redoutes de l'enemis à Readhook. Q, Les redoutes à Gouverneur island."

The lines (·—·—) represent roads. The blocks, half-black and half-white, are the Americans; those divided diagonally are the Hessians; the solid black are the British.

A Hessian officer's map, obtained from Brunswick, and showing Ratzer's topography, is given in fac-simile in Field's monograph (p. 310), and a German map of Long Island is given in the Geographische Belustigungen (Leipzig, 1776). There is a somewhat coarse-colored map among the Rochambeau maps (no. 25), measuring fifteen inches wide by eighteen high, called Attaque de l'armée des Provinciaux dans Long Island du 27 Août, 1776. Publié, 1776. A MS. "Plan of the Attack of the Rebels on Long Island by an officer of the army" is among the Faden maps (no. 56) in the library of Congress. The map used in Stedman is re-engraved, with additions, in Irving's Washington, illus. ed., ii. 309.

LONG ISLAND, August, 27, 1776.

Sketched from a large Plan of the Battle of Long Island and of the Brooklyn defences, Aug. 27, 1776, compiled by Henry P. Johnston, which accompanies his Campaign of 1776, and is based, as he says, on Ratzer's map of Brooklyn (1767-68) and the United States coast survey. Before daylight on the morning of the 27th, the British advance under General Grant disturbed the American pickets at the Red Lion, which is near the westerly angle of the present Greenwood Cemetery area, marked on the plan with a dotted line. As the day wore on, the conflict pressed between the British at P and Q and the Americans under Stirling and Parsons at O and N,—Smallwood's Marylanders holding the extreme right on the water, and Huntington's Connecticut regiment on the extreme left. Johnston (p. 165) says Stirling's position was between 18th and 20th streets of the modern Brooklyn, and not as Sparks's map places him, near the Narrows. Meanwhile, a British column at 9 o'clock the previous evening had begun to move from Flatlands, and at 3 the next morning captured an American patrol at B, and at 6 the British column (marching in this order,—Clinton, Cornwallis, Percy, Howe) neared the American advance under Miles at C, who retired; and at 9 A. M. the British column was at Bedford and threw out a force to M, which began to attack the American outposts of D (Miles), E (Wyley), and F (Chester), forcing them to retire upon Sullivan, who commanded the forces of Johnston (H), Hitchcock (J), and Little (G), with pickets at K,—all within or near the present limits of Prospect Park, shown by the dotted line. Threatened by the British flanking column as well as by the Hessians in front, approaching from Flatbush under Heister with the commands of Von Stirn (S), Von Mirbach (T), and Donop (U), the Americans, after the capture of Sullivan himself, retreated as best they could across the creek and got within the lines. The column of the British advancing from Bedford threw out a force under Vaughan towards L to menace Fort Putnam and that part of the American works, while Cornwallis advancing towards R had a conflict there round the Cortelyou house at 11.30 A. M. with Stirling, who was trying to check this rear attack of the British, while such of his troops as could be controlled retreated from N and O, and, passing the marsh, crossed the creek (half a dozen or so being drowned), and reached dry land near some redoubts within the American line of defence. The point A represents the position of the present City Hall of Brooklyn. Stirling, meanwhile, with Smallwood's Marylanders in danger of being crushed between Cornwallis and Grant, and foiled in the attempt to reach Fort Box, retreated towards Flatbush, but encountered in that direction Gen. Heister's Hessians, and gave himself up to that officer.

T. W. Field in his monograph, the Battle of Long Island, gives a large plan showing the relations of the modern streets to the old landmarks, and marking "the natural defensible line, as nearly as it could be authenticated by documentary and traditionary evidence." Field adds that "the routes of the British were generally over country roads long since abandoned, and now covered with buildings; but their localities were accurately surveyed by the author before their traces were lost." Field also says (p. 145) that the American works were at once levelled by the British, and new ones were erected on interior lines. (Cf. G. W. Greene's General Greene, i. 159.) These latter lines are shown, as well as the earlier American works, in a Map of Brooklyn at the time of the Revolution, drawn by Gen. Jeremiah Johnson (Valentine's Manual, 1858). A rude map by J. Ewing, made Sept., 1776, is given in fac-simile in Johnston's Campaign of 1776 (Documents, p. 50) and in 2d ser. Penna. Archives, x. 194. Dr. Stiles made a rough plan in his diary, which he based upon a map of the ground and upon the information given him by one who was at Red Hook at the time. It is given in fac-simile by Johnston (p. 70).

The plan in Carrington's Battles (p. 214) is extended enough to illustrate the movements after the British occupation of New York; that in H. R. Stiles's Brooklyn (vol. i. 250) is an eclectic one, made with care, and his text attempts to identify the position of the lines and forts in relation to present landmarks. Gordon acknowledges receiving from Greene a map improved by that general (Hist. Mag., xiii. 25).

There are other plans in Marshall's Washington (large and small atlas); Sparks's Washington, iv. 68, repeated in Duer's Stirling (p. 162); Guizot's Washington; Samuel Ward's lecture on the battle, 1839; J. T. Bailey's Hist. Sketch of Brooklyn (Brooklyn, 1840); W. L. Stone's New York City, p. 246; Henry Onderdonk, Jr.'s Queens County, and Suffolk and Kings Counties; Ridpath's United States; Lossing's Field-Book, ii. 806, 809, 810; Lowell's Hessians; Harper's Monthly, Aug., 1876. Ratzer's map of Brooklyn is reproduced in Stiles's Brooklyn (i. 63), with a view of the same date (p. 217). Cf. map in Valentine's N. Y. Manual (1856). Cf. the bibliography of Long Island in Amer. Bibliopolist, Oct., 1872, and in Furman's Antiquities of Long Island, App.

Sullivan's letter is in effect a defence of himself,[761] and other letters from participants and observers are preserved,[762] as well as journals of actors on the field,[763] and other personal recitals,[764] and narratives in the public press.[765] On the British side we have Howe's despatch[766] of Sept. 3, with the comments and inquiry which it elicited,[767] and the report and journals of Sir George Collier, in command of the fleet.[768] In addition we have a number of personal experiences and accounts of eye-witnesses,[769] as well as statements from the German participants.[770]

The circumstances of the battle and retreat have occasioned some controversy, in which Bancroft has been criticised by the grandsons of Gen. Greene[771] and Joseph Reed.[772]

Respecting the armies on both sides and their losses, there is ground for dispute. It is claimed that the British had about double the numbers of the Americans, and the losses of killed and wounded were about equal on both sides, though the Americans also lost heavily in prisoners.[773] But on this point see the preceding chapter.

Without enumerating at length the treatment of the general histories,[774] and the biographies of participants,[775] the battle of Long Island has had much special local[776] and monographic treatment, particularly at the hands of Field, Johnston, Dawson, and Carrington.[777] On the English side we have contemporary and later examples of historical treatment.[778] It was the first substantial victory for the royal arms, and had little of the disheartening influence which the forcing of the redoubt at Bunker Hill had brought with it. The effect was correspondingly inspiriting to the Tories in America and to the government party in England.[779]

In transferring the scene across the river to New York, it is best in the first place to trace the topography of the town and island by the maps of the period, and to follow the cartographical records of the military movements during the campaign, before classifying the authorities.

John Hill's large plan of New York, extending as far north as Thirty-fourth Street, surveyed in 1782, and dedicated to Gov. George Clinton, was drawn in 1785.[780] He marks all the works of the Revolution,—coloring yellow those thrown up by the Americans in 1776; orange, those of the Americans which the British repaired; and green, those later erected by the royal forces. Johnston's map[781] adopts these yellow lines. Loosing (Field-Book, ii. 593, 799), in describing the New York lines, differs somewhat from Hill's map. Johnston controverts Jones and De Lancey (Jones's New York during the Revolutionary War), who claim that the American lines were levelled by the British; he also cites Smythe, who described them in March, 1777, as was also done by Thomas Eddis in Aug., 1777,[782] and by Anburey in 1781, and he depends on Hill's draft of them in 1782. Johnston (p. 36) also describes the appearance of the town at the opening of the war.[783] Johnston (p. 194) claims that his eclectic map is the first to give the entire island as it was in 1776. He followed the surveys of Ratzer and Montresor as far north as Fiftieth Street, and from that point to Kingsbridge he used the map of 1814, made by Randall for the commissioners to lay out streets. The annexed sketch of Johnston's map shows the fortifications surrounding the town of New York.

The following key explains the figures: 1, Fort George; 2, Trinity Church; 5, Old Dutch Church; 6, New Eng. Dutch Church; 8, Presbyterian meeting; 10, French Church; 11, Lutheran Church; 13, Calvinist Church; 16, New Scots' meeting; 17, Quakers' meeting; 18, Jews' synagogue; 20, Free English School; 21, Secretary's office; 22, City Hall; 25, Exchange; 26, Barracks; 27, Fish Market; 28, Old slip; 31, Oswego Market.

This is the best contemporary map on a large scale of the city of New York. It is dedicated to Gov. Moore, and made after surveys by Lieut. B. Ratzer in 1767. The whole map is given in Valentine's Manual, 1854; Dawson's New York City during the Amer. Rev. (1861); Jones's N. Y. during the Rev. War, i. 388. There is an original in Harvard College library. Cf. Map Catal. Brit. Mus., 1885, col. 2972. It was reissued in 1776 and 1777. Cf. Lamb's New York, i. 757, 760. This map of the town is a different one from Ratzer's map of the city and vicinity, which has at the bottom a southwest view of the town.

Thomas Kitchen, the English cartographer, published a map, after Ratzer's surveys, of New York city and vicinity in the London Mag., 1778. It has been reproduced in Shannon's N. Y. City Manual, 1869, and in the Mag. of Amer. Hist., 1885, p. 549.

A Plan of the City of New York and its Environs, "surveyed in the winter of 1766", and dedicated to Gen. Gage by John Montresor, is given in Jefferys' General Topog. of North America and the West Indies (London, 1768). Another form of it, purporting to be a later work, is the large folding Plan of the City of New York and its environs, ... surveyed in the winter, 1775, also dedicated to Gen. Gage by John Montresor, and published in London. It has been reproduced in D. T. Valentine's N. Y. City Manual, 1855, p. 482. It has a corner chart of the bay from Hoboken to Sandy Hook. Cf. the American Atlas, nos. 20 and 25. Montresor's plan was reproduced in Paris by Le Rouge in 1777.

Major Holland, the British surveyor-general, made a plan of the city of New York, which appeared separately and as a part of his Map of New York and New Jersey (1776). Cf. Valentine's Manual, 1863, p. 533, and the small plan of New York and vicinity, eight miles to an inch, which is given in New York City in the Revolution (1861). A plan of part of the city made in 1771 is given in Valentine's Manual, 1856, p. 426. There are among the Rochambeau maps several plans of New York and its environs, rather coarse and faded (nos. 26, 27, 28, 31). Contemporary printed maps are in Gaine's Universal Register (N. Y., 1776) and in the Universal Mag., 1776.

A survey of the region of Turtle Bay in 1771 is given in Valentine's Manual, 1860, p. 572, and a view at a later day in Ibid., 1858, p. 600. A MS. plan of Fort George (New York) by Sauthier is among the Faden maps (no. 95) in the library of Congress.

Howe was much criticised for his dilatoriness and his failure promptly to use his fleet to get in the rear of Washington's army.[784] There was a division of counsels among Washington's officers as to the advisability of attempting to hold the city; but a decision to evacuate finally prevailed.[785] Washington's army was gradually dwindling, for Congress and the country had hardly reached a conception of the necessity of long enlistments.[786] Finally on Sept. 15th the British passed over from Long Island to Kip's Bay, and the Americans fled in a panic;[787] and, with loss of many stores, Washington gathered his forces within the Harlem lines. Johnston's draft of the works on Harlem Heights follows Sauthier's plan. The site of the fight thereabouts is west of Eighth Avenue and north of One Hundred and Twenty-fifth Street of the modern city. Johnston (p. 258) identifies the localities by the present landmarks, and says (p.264) that "some of the works are well preserved to-day" (1878). He also says that Randall, when he surveyed the island in 1812, found the remains of the works agreeing with Sauthier's drafts.[788]

Sauthier's draft of the conflict at Harlem Plains is reproduced in the Mag. of Amer. Hist., May, 1880. Later plans of the locality, drawn with reference to the landmarks of the battle, or interesting for comparison, are the map of 1814 in Valentine's Manual (1856) and the large folding plan of the upper part of New York, with the modern streets, upon which, in colors, is superposed a draft of this action. This last is given, with an account of the fight, in Shannon's N. Y. City Manual, 1868, p. 812.[789] We may note some of the principal contemporary and later authorities on this action of Harlem Plains.[790]

The origin of the fire of Sept. 21st, by which a considerable part of New York was burned, has been a subject of dispute, the Tories charging it upon the Americans;[791] but later authorities, English as well as American, agree in not believing it the work of incendiaries. It is known that Washington advocated the burning of the city if evacuation became necessary, and Jones (i. p. 84) says committees of Congress had agreed upon it, but that body certainly in the end directed Washington to spare it (Journals, Sept. 3, 1776).[792]

JOHNSTON'S NEW YORK ISLAND, 1776.

A marks the position of Trinity Church; B, the City Hall Park; C, the Mortier house, the American headquarters; D, Badlam's fort; E, Spencer's fort; F, the redoubt on Jones's hill; G, Bayard Hill fort; H, Hospital. Fort Stirling, in Brooklyn, is at K. The figures represent the batteries and redoubts: 1, Grand battery; 2, Whitehall battery; 3, Waterbury's battery; 4, redoubts; 5, Grenadier battery; 6, Jersey battery; 7, McDougal's battery; 8, Oyster (?) battery. The other marks indicate the positions of barricades.

When the British, leaving Newtown Creek, on Long Island, landed at Kip's Bay, the shore batteries thereabouts were abandoned by the Americans. Scott, at L, retreated by the broken line (— — —), and crossed along Bowery Lane, the ground now covered by Union and Madison squares (shown by the dotted oblongs). Wadsworth and Douglas retreated from M and N respectively, back upon Parsons at P and Fellows at Q, and all pursued the Bloomingdale road, just skirting the southwesterly corner of the area now known as Central Park (the large dotted oblong E E). Meanwhile, the garrison of the town lines, under Putnam and Silliman, retreated by the road leading from Fort G towards Greenwich; and near Bloomingdale the several columns joined and pursued their march to the lines on the heights above Harlem. Parton (Life of Burr, 86) describes how Burr at this time led Knox's brigade successfully away from Bunker Hill. Howe, who had advanced from Kip's Bay, dallied at the Murray house at O, and so failed to intercept the fugitives. Chester (R) and Sargeant (S) also deserted the works at Horn's Hook, and, striking the Kingsbridge or post read, retreated through McGowan's Pass at T. Thus all, by one road or another, got within the lines on Harlem Heights. Farther on in the text this map will be again referred to, for later movements. Cf. map in Gay's Pop. Hist. U. S., iii. 491.

THE SAUTHIER-FADEN PLAN, 1776.

The movement of Howe, which now forced Washington off New York Island and to a position at White Plains, is illustrated by a sketch of the "Sauthier-Faden plan", herewith given, and which may be explained by the annexed note[793] in connection with the special original sources,[794] and later historians.[795]

The reader may now revert to two outline maps already given, namely Johnston's New York Island and the Sauthier-Faden plan, in order to follow the movements which led to the fall of Fort Washington, using the annexed descriptive key;[796] but the outline of the original sources of the fall of Fort Washington, as well as the later accounts, are much the same as for the earlier events of the campaign.[797]

A part of the map made by Claude Joseph Sauthier in 1774, by order of Gov. Tryon, and published by William Faden in London, Jan. 1, 1779, as a Chorographical Map of the Province of New York in North America, Compiled from actual surveys deposited in the Patent Office at New York. This section is reproduced from a reduction made in 1849 by David Vaughan, and published in the Doc. Hist. N. Y., vol. i., where Tryon's report on the province in 1774 is printed. There is a copy of the original in Harvard College library (portfolio 3520). It was the basis of the map Carte des troubles de l'Amérique, par ordre du Chev. Tryon, par Sauthier et Ratzer, traduite de l'Anglais, à Paris, chez Le Rouge, 1778, which is included in the Atlas Amériquain, no. 15. It was also followed in maps published at Augsburg in 1777, and at Nuremberg, 1778. There is another Special Karte von den Brittischen Colonien in Nord America, showing the New England and Middle colonies, published in Christian Leiste's Beschreibung des Brittischen Amerika zur Ersparung der Englischen Karten, Wolfenbüttel, 1778. An English map with a Swedish title, Krigs Theatre in America, is found in the Beskrifning öfver de Engelska Colonierne i Nord America, 1776-1777 (Stockholm, 1777). Sauthier's surveys also appear in A map of the province of New York by Sauthier, to which is added New Jersey from the topographical observations of Sauthier and Ratzer, 1776. Cf. also A map of the provinces of New York and New Jersey ... from the topographical observations of Sauthier, Lotter, 1777 (Brit. Mus. Maps, 1885, col. 3,666).

Sauthier's drafts may be compared with A map of the province of New York with part of Pensilvania and New England from an actual survey by Captain Montresor, engineer, 1775, which was published in London, June 10, 1775, by A. Dury, making four sheets, and was republished "with great improvements", April 1, 1777 (Brit. Mus. Map Catal., 1885, col. 2,969). It was reëngraved in Paris and published in 1777 by Le Rouge, separately, and as nos. 13 and 14 of the Atlas Amériquain in 1778. Ithiel Town, in the preface of his Particular services, etc.,—now a scarce book, as only seventy copies escaped a fire,—speaks of his having obtained from a family near London maps of the American war, mostly about Boston, New York, and Philadelphia, made by Montresor, which were submitted to Marshall. There is a portrait and account of Montresor in Scull's Evelyns in America, 251.

Another important map is The Provinces of New York and New Jersey with part of Pensilvania and the province of Quebec, drawn by Major Holland, Surveyor-General of the northern district in America, corrected and improved from the original materials by Govern^r, Pownall, Member of Parliament. It was first published in London, June 15, 1775, and in a second edition, in 1776, there were added to it marginal maps of Amboy and the city and bay of New York. The Brit. Mus. Map, 1885, col. 2,969, shows the plates with different titles, dated 1775, 1776; also Frankfort, 1777, and London, 1777. Cf. the map in Mills's Boundaries of Ontario; the Evans map as reproduced by Jefferys, 1775 (see Vol. V. p. 85); the map in the American Atlas, and that of the country from the Chesapeake to the Connecticut, in the Gent. Mag., September, 1776.

The letters of Washington and Greene are still the main source of information for the evacuation of Fort Lee, which at once followed.[798]

It may be well now to note some of the contemporary maps of the whole campaign, as indicating the extent and character of the geographical knowledge then current. The earliest of these is one which appeared in the supplement (p. 607) of the Gentleman's Magazine, 1776, and is called a Map of the Progress of his Majesty's Armies. Two of the American household manuals, Low's Almanac (1776) and Isaac Warren's Almanac (1777), had the same rude cut, a fac-simile of which, with the key, is shown below.

LOW'S ALMANAC, 1777.

Key: A, Gen. Washington's lines on New York Island; B, fort at Powles Hook; C, Bunker Hill, near New York; D, the Sound; E, Kingsbridge; F, Hell Gate; G, Fort Constitution [Washington]; H, Mount Washington; I, Governor's Island.

A popular map (price one shilling) of The Country twenty-five miles round New York, drawn by a gentleman from that City, was also published in London, Jan. 1, 1777, by W. Hawkes, with a chronological table of events from Dec. 16, 1773, to Oct. 18, 1776.

Des Barres issued in London, Jan. 17, 1777, a large map, Plan of the operations of the army and fleet of Admiral and Lord Howe near New York, 1776,[799] and a more popular presentation of the same field was made in the Political Mag., vol. ii. p. 657. The earliest attempt at historical rendering, Capt. Hall's History of the Civil War in America (London, 1780), was accompanied by a map, a portion of which is here given in fac-simile; and Gordon (ii. 310), a few years later, gave an eclectic map, made in the main from American data.[800]

CAMPAIGN OF 1776. (Hall.)

A, the landing of the British near Utrecht on Long Island, under cover of the "Phœnix", "Rose", and "Greyhound", with the "Thunder" and "Carcass" bombs, Aug. 22, 1776; B, pass at Flatbush and field of action where the rebels were defeated, Aug. 27th; C, British and Hessian encampment, Aug. 28th; D, encampments of the British army, Sept. 1st; E, embarkation of the British troops at Newtown Inlet, and then landing at New York Island, Sept. 15th; F, skirmish on Vanderwater's Height, the rebels retiring, Sept. 16th; G, route of British in boats to Frog's Neck, Oct. 12th; H, several corps of British troops in boats go to Pell's Point, Oct. 18th; I, skirmish, rebels routed, Oct. 18th. Then followed fighting at Mararo Neck (shown on the full map), the rebels retreating, Oct. 21st; on the road to Kingsbridge, Oct. 23d; again approaching White Plains, Oct. 28th; at Brunx's River, Oct. 28th; followed Nov. 1st by the rebel evacuation of their intrenchments near White Plains, and by Cornwallis's landing on the Jersey shore, Nov. 18th. Q, attack on Fort Washington, Nov. 16th; R, Fort Lee surprised, Nov. 20th.

In giving detailed references for the several stages of the campaign, the letters from and to Washington have been a source of the first importance; and beside those given by Sparks in his printed works, there are others registered in the Sparks MSS. (no. xxix.), the Heath Papers (Mass. Hist. Coll., xliv.), not to name less important gatherings,[801] all of which form a general running commentary on events of the summer's and autumn's campaign, which could be further elucidated by the memoirs of Heath and Graydon, the lives of Reed and Greene, and by various diaries on both sides.[802]

CAMPAIGN ABOVE NEW YORK, 1776.

A section of a large Hessian map in the library of Congress, Plan général des opérations de l'armée Britannique contre les Rebelles, etc. The lines (·—·—) represent roads. Key: "3, Marche du général de Heister et le camp qu'il occupa le 14^me Juin.—-S, Les batteries faites à Remsen's Mill à Hell Gate. T, Lieu du rendezvous donné aux troupes destinées à faire une descente sur York islande. U, Les vaisseaux de guerre postes pour proteger cette descente. V, Descente de l'armée sur York island. W, Position d'une partie de la première division après la descente. Y, Redoutes de l'armée devant son camp. Z, Où le général Howe, après avoir laissé le général Percy sur York island, debarqua et campa avec le général de Heister le 12^me Oct., 1776.—a, Descente du général Clinton à Pell's point le 18 Oct. b, Camp de l'armée depuis New Rochelle jusqu'à Pell's Point. c, Camp du général de Knyphausen après son arrivée avec la 2^de division des Troupes Hessoises le 23^me Oct. d, Marche de la colonne droite sous les ordres du général Clinton. e, Celle de la colonne gauche commandée par le général de Heister. f, Engagement du général de Heister avec l'enemis aux environs de White Plains [apparently not on the original map]. g, Position de l'enemis après sa retraite. h, Position de l'armée. i, Position des généraux Clinton et Heister à Dobbs' Ferry. k, Position de général Cornwallis à Courtland House. m, Campement de toute l'armée après que pleusieurs regiments laissés dans differents endroits par le général de Knyphausen l'eurent rejoints. n, La colonne droite du général de Knyphausen sous les ordres du Colonel Rall. o, Où le général Cornwallis se placa pour soutenir l'attaque du Fort Washington. p, Corps commandé par le général Matheu. q, Descente des troupes Angloises. r, Attaque du général Sterling vis-a-vis de Morris House. s, Batteries faites pour soutenir l'attaque. t, Batteries construites de l'autre coté du creek d'Harlem. u, Le fort du Washington avec ses lignes de defences. v, Attaque du général Percy."

There is among the Rochambeau maps (no. 24), measuring about 16 inches wide by 18 high, a map of the campaigns of 1776 and 1777, giving detail with considerable precision, and accompanied by a good key.

II. The Northern Campaign, 1776-1777.—Gates had taken command in Canada early in the summer of 1776, under instructions from Washington;[803] but as his army fell back within the department which had been assigned to Schuyler, questions of authority arose between them.[804]

The condition of the army during the summer is noted in Colonel Trumbull's Autobiography (p. 302), and in General Gates's returns of September 22, 1776, in 5 Force's American Archives (ii. 479).[805]

There is a list of armed vessels on Lake Champlain in 1776 in Letters and Papers, 1761-1776 (MSS. in Mass. Hist. Soc.). Arnold received his instructions from Gates.[806]

Arnold's reports on the fight near Valcour's Island, Oct., 1776, are dated Oct. 12 (to Gates) and Oct. 15 (to Schuyler).[807]

Waterbury's account to Congress, Oct. 24, is in Dawson (i. p. 173) and in Hadden's Journal (App.). Gen. Maxwell gave no very flattering account of Arnold's manœuvres in a letter from Ticonderoga, Oct. 20, in Sedgwick's Livingston (p. 209).[808]

On the English side, Carleton's despatch, Oct. 14, and Capt. Pringle's, are in Dawson (pp. 174, 175). The Hanau artillerist Pausch covers the fight in his journal.[809]

ARNOLD'S FIGHT. (Sparks's copy.)

Key: A, schooner "Carleton." B, the "Royal Savage" on shore, and burnt on the 11th of October. C, the "Inflexible." D, schooner "Maria." E, gondola "Royal Convert. F, radeau Thunderer." G, Point au Sable is forty-eight miles from Crown Point. H, The French vessels sunk here in 1759.

The map of the action accompanying Hadden's Journal (p. 23) is very similar to the Sparks map; and a marginal note says that the gunboats are from 30 to 36 feet long, and 10, 16, or 18 feet wide. Gen. Rogers thinks Hadden's map is based on Brassier, whose amended plate is in the American Pocket Atlas (1776). Rogers objects to the view that Arnold's retreat was round the north end of Valcour's Island (instead of the route marked on the map), as has been maintained by Palmer in his Lake Champlain, and by W. C. Watson in the Amer. Hist. Record (iii. 438, 501) and Mag. of Amer. Hist. (June, 1881, vol. vi. p. 414).

The earliest plan of this naval action seems to have been added to the then recently published plate of Lake Champlain, engraved after surveys by William Brassier, by order of Amherst, in 1762,[810] which, with Jackson's survey of Lake George, was published by Sayer and Bennett, in London, Aug. 5, 1776. Some copies of the map with the same date show the position of Arnold's fight of Oct. 11. The plate has been altered at that point, and it is this section of the map which Lossing copies in his Field-Book[811] (i. 163) and in his paper in Harper's Monthly (vol. xxiii. p. 726). The annexed sketch is based upon a plan in the Sparks maps (Cornell University), kindly transmitted to the editor by the librarian.[812]

In the winter of 1776-77, Burgoyne had submitted to the government some "Thoughts for conducting the war from the side of Canada",—a paper which, barring some important changes, became the scheme of the summer's plans.[813]

The stages of the preparation in Canada can be followed in Force's American Archives; and references will be found in the Index to MSS. in the British Museum (particularly under "Canada" and "Burgoyne", in those acquired 1854-1875).[814]

The records of the Germans are mentioned in Lowell's Hessians (p. 117), and in the sources indicated by Mr. Lowell in another chapter of the present volume[815]

In the spring of 1777 St. Clair was designated for the command at Ticonderoga, the advanced post against the invasion of Burgoyne (St. Clair Papers). The light-headed Sullivan thought it unfair that he was not selected for the post (Correspondence of the Rev., i. 352). The British onset was appalling. James Lovell, in March, wrote, "It is plain that we must look forward for another summer's bloody work" (Mass. Hist. Soc. Proc., April, 1860, p. 9). Congress was emphasizing the stories of British brutality (Journals of Congress, ii. 97).

On May 22d Schuyler had been confirmed in his command of the Northern department, and Gates had gone to Philadelphia to lay his grievances before Congress (Lossing's Schuyler, ii.; Irving's Washington, iii.). Burgoyne (Fonblanque, App. E) was talking to his Indians in June, and two days later he made his famous proclamation to frighten or allure the country people. Fonblanque (p. 23) is not unmindful of its unworthy bombast, and Lecky (vi. 64) says it was "greatly and justly blamed."[816]

There will be occasion later to enumerate the maps illustrating the successive stages and conflicts of the campaign; but it may be well at this point to append in a note the principal maps of the entire movement of the British army, which cover also the field of its actions on both flanks.[817]

The most important source respecting the siege and evacuation of Ticonderoga is the Proceedings of a General Court Martial, held at Whiteplains, N. Y., for the trial of Maj.-Gen. St. Clair, Aug. 25, 1778 (Philad., 1778).[818] It was reprinted in the Collections of the N. Y. Hist. Soc. in 1880. It includes various letters of Schuyler and St. Clair in June (pp. 14, 101, 121, etc.), the doings of the council of war, July 5th, which decided upon a retreat (p. 33), and the letters of St. Clair at Ticonderoga, and one to Hancock, July 14th, from Fort Edward (p. 69, etc.). Three days later, July 17th, St. Clair sent an account from Fort Edward to Washington, which, with the letter of Schuyler, likewise to Washington, is in Sparks's Corresp. of the Rev., i. 393, 400.[819] Much of this material is also included in the published St. Clair Papers.[820] Sparks had earlier added copies of some of the St. Clair papers to his Collection of Manuscripts.[821]

On the English side, Burgoyne's letters are in Fonblanque's Burgoyne (p. 248), Gent. Mag., Aug., 1777, and Dawson's Battles. Anburey's Travels (letter xxx.) throws some light.

For the effect of the evacuation on the country, see Journals of Congress, iv. 719; Wells's Sam. Adams, ii. 485, 488; Diplomatic Correspondence of the Amer. Rev., i. 315. The apprehension felt in the adjacent country is shown in letters of Ira Allen and others in the N. H. State Papers, viii. 632, 633, 643, 644, 648, 651.

We have some contemporary maps of Ticonderoga previous to and during the siege. In August, 1776, Colonel John Trumbull made a plan which is engraved in his Autobiography (N. Y., 1841, p. 32),[822] and is reproduced herewith.[823] The map used at the trial of St. Clair is engraved in the Proceedings; and from a MS. copy made for Sparks, and now at Cornell University, the annexed sketch (p. 353) is drawn.

On the affair at Hubbardton, July 7th, the official accounts of St. Clair (July 14th) and Burgoyne (July 11th) are given in Dawson's Battles (i. 224, 229, 231), and other contemporary accounts in the Vermont Hist. Soc. Coll., i. p. 168, etc.[824]

In Burgoyne's State of the Expedition is a "plan of the action at Huberton under Brig.-Gen. Fraser, supported by Maj.-Gen. Riedesel, on the 7th July, 1777, drawn by P. Gerlach, engraved by Wm. Faden", and published at London, Feb. 1, 1780.[825] Three days later, Burgoyne (July 10) issued a proclamation to the inhabitants of Vermont, and Schuyler (July 13) made a counter proclamation.[826]

The chief sources of documentary evidence regarding the movements in 1777 around Fort Stanwix are 5 Force's Archives (vols. i., ii., and iii.) and the Gansevoort Papers (copies in Sparks MSS., lx.), including a letter of Arnold, August 22, 1777, dated at German Flats, which Sparks has indorsed "evidently intended to be intercepted." On the American side, we have further Colonel Willet's letter[827] to Trumbull, Aug. 11th, in Dawson (i. 248); the account in the Penna. Evening Post, given in Moore's Diary (i. 477); Wilkinson's Memoirs (pp. 204, 212); the Journals of the New York Provincial Congress (vol. i.); and Sparks's Corresp. of the Rev. (ii. 578). Gordon gives some details from eye-witnesses, mainly through reports made to him by the Rev. Samuel Kirkland. Dwight picked up anecdotes about the battlefield in 1799, which he prints in his Travels (vol. iii.). The best eclectic accounts are those by William L. Stone, father and son,—the elder giving us his Life of Brant (i. ch. 10 and 11), and the younger, his Orderly-book of Sir John Johnson during the Oriskany campaign, 1776-1777, annotated by William L. Stone. With an historical introduction illustrating the life of Sir John Johnson, by J. Watts De Peyster. And some tracings from the footprints of the tories or loyalists in America contributed by Theodorus Bailey Myers (Albany, 1882), being no. 11 of Munsell's historical series.[828] The younger Stone's labors took a wider range in that portion of his Campaign of Lieutenant-Gen. John Burgoyne which is given to the expedition of St. Leger, though he followed in the main his father's Life of Brant. In the Orderly-book, just mentioned, however he modified some of his views.

There is rather too much of patriotic fervor for a discriminating analysis in a monograph, The Battle of Oriskany, its place in History, an address at the Centennial Celebration, Aug. 6, 1877, by Ellis H. Roberts (Utica, 1877), but it is in most respects valuable and a convenient gathering of information, not otherwise found without much trouble, and is well fortified with notes.[829]

The principal English source is the account by St. Leger.[830]

To illustrate the movements near Fort Schuyler or Stanwix, we have the plan made by Fleury in Sept., 1777, which is engraved in Stone's Life of Brant, i. p. 230,—the essential portion of which is given herewith.[831]

TICONDEROGA AND ITS DEPENDENCIES. August, 1776. J. T.
(Trumbull's Plan.)

TICONDEROGA, 1777. (Sketched from the St. Clair trial map.)

Key: A, old fort in very bad condition, wanting repair; could not be defended with less than 500 men. B, stone redoubt; about 200 men would defend it; overlooketh the line Y, opposite the Lake, in Fort Independence. C, block-house for 100 men. D, French redoubt upon the low ground for about 200 men, commanded by the opposite side. E, new breastwork for 200 men. F, new fleche for 100 men. G, new redoubt for 150 men. H, new redoubt for 100 men. I, redoubt upon the low ground for 250 men, commanded by the opposite side. K, Jersey redoubt upon the low ground for 300 men, commanded by the opposite side. L, redoubt upon the low ground for 100 men. M, redoubt upon the low ground for 100 men. N, French lines upon the high ground; overlooks all the works on Ticonderoga side; for 2,000 men and not less, considering the great length and importance of the place. O, P, Q, R, new works in addition to the French lines. S, high ground occupied by the enemy, and overlooks the French lines. T, Mount Hope; overlooks ground, S, occupied by the enemy. U, block-house burnt by the enemy. VV, high hill; overlooks Ticonderoga and Mount Independence. X, the bridge [and boom]. Y, line upon the low ground, commanded by the opposite side (B), for 800 men. Z, barbet battery.

1, sloops. 2, line only marked upon the ground. 3, picket-fort for 600 men. 4, block-house for 100 men. 5, 6, line with three new-made batteries for 1,500 men and not less. 7, block-house for 100 men. 8, battery made by the enemy. 9, road made by the enemy to cut off the communication from Mount Independence to Skenesborough.

The drawn plan in Hadden's Journal (p. 83) speaks of the lines protecting Fort Independence on the land side as being made "of logs thrown up but not completed", from which a "path for cattle" led to Hubbardton. Mount Defiance is called "Sugar Loaf Hill." The English are represented as landing at the point marked "Camp", and the Germans on the opposite shore. Gen. Phillips took the position on Mount Hope. Lossing (Field-Book, i. 131) gives a view from the top of Mount Defiance. A description of the fortifications about Ticonderoga, from Riedesel's Memoirs, is in Stone's Campaign of Burgoyne (p. 434).

The position of the ground as shown by Fleury can be compared with that of a Topographical map of the country between the Mohawk River and Wood Creek, from an actual survey taken in Nov., 1758, which is engraved from the original MS. (in the N. Y. State library) in the Doc. Hist. N. Y. (quarto ed. iv. p. 324), where will also be found (p. 327) a detailed plan of Fort Stanwix, as erected in 1758 (see Vol. V., p. 528).[832]

Respecting the action (Aug. 16th) at Bennington, General Lincoln sent the first accounts to Schuyler, who transmitted them to Washington (Sparks's Corresp. of the Rev., i. 425). Stark's letter to Gates, of Aug. 22d, is in Wilkinson's Memoirs (p. 209); Vermont Hist. Coll. (i. 206); Dawson's Battles (i. 260). His letter of the same day to the Council of New Hampshire is in the N. H. State Papers, viii. 670. The papers of Stark were used by Sparks in copies in the Sparks MSS. (no. xxxix.).[833]

There is in the Gates Papers (copies in Sparks MSS., xx.) an "account of the enemy's loss in the late action of the 16th Aug., 1777, near Bennington",—amounting to 991 killed, wounded, and prisoners; Hessians, Canadians, and Tories. American loss, killed, between twenty and thirty; wounded, not known.[834]

Burgoyne's original instructions to Baum are in the cabinet of the Mass. Hist. Soc.,[835] and are printed in their Collections (vol. ii.).[836]

Letters of Baum and Burgoyne, Riedesel's report to the Duke of Brunswick, Breymann's report[837] to Burgoyne, and Burgoyne's reports to Germain, are in the Documents in relation to the part taken by Vermont in resisting the invasion of Burgoyne (Vt. Hist. Soc. Coll., vol. i. pp. 198, 223, 225); Dawson's Battles (i. 261-264); Eelking's Riedesel (iii. 184, 210, 261). A long account by Glick, a German officer, is also in the Vt. Hist. Coll. (i. 211). On the jealousy of the British and Hessians, see a letter by Hagan in the N. E. Hist. and Geneal. Reg. (1864, p. 33).[838] An account "by a gentleman who was present" is copied from the Penna. Evening Post, Sept. 4th, in Moore's Diary of the Rev. (p. 479). A narrative by the Rev. Mr. Allen in the Connecticut Courant, Aug. 25th, is copied in Smith's Pittsfield, Mass.[839]

FORT STANWIX OR SCHUYLER

Key: A, Fort Schuyler. B, Flagstaff, 3 guns. C, Northwest, 4 guns. D, Northeast, 3 guns. E, Southeast, 4 guns. F, Powder magazine. G, Laboratory. H, Barracks. I, Hornwork begun. J, Drawbridge. K, Covered way. L, Glacis. M, Sally-port. N, Commandant's quarters. O, Willett's attack. The following are British batteries, etc. 1, three guns. 2, four mortars. 3, three guns. 4, redoubts to cover the batteries. 5, lines of approaches. 6, British encampment. 7, Loyalists. 8, Indians. 9, ruins of Fort Newport. There is a copy of the map made for Mr. Sparks among the Sparks Maps at Cornell University.

The local aspects of the fight are touched upon in Hall's and other histories of Vermont,[840] and the general authorities necessarily enlarge more or less upon it, as an episode.[841] At the first anniversary of the Bennington fight, in 1778, a speech was made by Noah Smith, which was printed at Hartford in 1779, and is reprinted in the Vermont Hist. Coll. (i. p. 251). On Oct. 20, 1848, James D. Butler gave an address before the Legislature of Vermont, which "contained original testimonies of witnesses now long dead, and notes from papers since burned in the Vermont State House." When printed at Burlington, in 1849, it was accompanied by an address by George Frederick Houghton on the life and services of Col. Seth Warner.[842] The centennial observances of 1877 produced several memorials.[843]

Gen. Carrington (Battles, p. 334) gives one of the best plans of the Bennington fight. There is among the Sparks MSS. (no. xxviii.) a sketch map, with this indorsement by Mr. Sparks: "Drawn by Mr. Hiland Hall, Bennington, Oct. 13, 1826. Very accurate. Ground examined by myself at the time." It shows the Walloomsack River (a branch of the Hoosick River) with the skirting road to Bennington, three times crossing the river. On this road, going up stream, are marked (in order) the beginning of the second action, the hill where the stand was attempted, the places where Breyman was met by Warner, where the cannon were posted in the first battle, and the line of Stark's advance.

In Burgoyne's State of the Expedition is a plan called "Position of the Detachment under Lieut.-Col. Baum, at Walmscook, near Bennington, shewing the attacks of the enemy on the 16th of August, 1777, drawn by Lieut. Durnford, engineer; engraved by Wm. Faden", and published at London, Feb. 1, 1780.[844]

Meanwhile Schuyler was gathering an army as best he could. In July he wrote to Heath that its spirits were recovering (Heath Papers, i. 300). The militia were called out early in August to assist him (Journals of Congress, ii. 214). W. L. Stone tells the story of Moses Harris, his faithful spy, in the Mag. of Amer. Hist. (ii. 414). The discontent with Schuyler on the part of the politicians was beginning to be shaped to party measures, and led to his being superseded in August by Gates, while a battle was imminent, as Schuyler thought.[845]

Bancroft (vol. ix.) does not hold Schuyler free from the responsibility of the ill success of the campaign up to this time; but he is controverted by G. W. Schuyler in his Correspondence and Remarks upon Bancroft's History of the Northern Campaign; by Lossing in his Schuyler; and by J. W. De Peyster in the Mag. of Amer. Hist. (February, 1877, vol. i. 134).[846]

Burgoyne meanwhile (August 26) was writing to Germain that the campaign was looking badly, and the loyalists not as helpful as he hoped. The conflict which Schuyler thought impending took place September 19, and is variously known as the battle of Freeman's Farm, or Stillwater, or the first battle of Bemis's Heights. Gates had already appealed to the Green Mountain boys for assistance, as the records of the Vermont Council of Safety show (Stevens, Bibl. Geog., 1870, no. 693). Gen. Glover's letters to James Warren during Aug. and Sept. are in the Sparks MSS. (no. xlvii.) and in Upham's Glover, and his account of the battle of the 19th is in Essex Institute Hist. Coll. (v. no. 3). Col. Varick's letter to Schuyler is in the Sparks MSS., lxvi. Wilkinson gives the best account of any participant (i. ch. 6), and his letter of Sept. 20 is in Dawson (i. 301). Gates's letter to Congress, Sept. 22, is also in Dawson (i. 301). Gordon gives the American loss.[847]

The question of Arnold's participancy in the battle of the 19th, while the left wing—his own command—was engaged, has been the subject of controversy.[848]

The attempt of an American force to cut Burgoyne's line of communications by the lakes is described in the "Fight at Diamond Island", Sept. 24, by De Costa, who gives the official report of Col. Brown (N. E. Hist. and Geneal. Reg., 1872, p. 147). These evidences come mainly from the Gates Papers, and are recapitulated in Stone's Campaign of Burgoyne (App. 10).

Respecting the action of Oct. 7, the earliest official accounts are in Glover's letter of Oct. 9, and in Gates's to Congress, of Oct. 18,—both of which are reprinted by Dawson (i. 302, 303). James Wilkinson's letter of Oct. 9 is in the New York Archives, with various other letters of the campaign (Sparks MSS., no. xxix.). A letter of Oliver Wolcott from Bemis's Heights is in the Trumbull MSS. (vol. vii.). The lives of Arnold (by I. N. Arnold, ch. 10, etc.) indicate his important influence on the field, where he was wounded.[849]

On the action of Col. Brooks in the field see Mass. Hist. Soc. Proc. (vii. 478). There is an account by Samuel Woodruff, an eye-witness, in the appendix of An account of Burgoyne's Campaign and the memorable battles of Bemis's Heights, Sept. 19th, and October 7th, 1777, from the most authentic resources of information, including many incidents connected with the same, by Charles Neilson (Albany, 1844).[850]

The story of Major Acland and Lady Acland has long been one of the romantic episodes of the campaign. The family account is given by W. L. Stone in the Mag. of Amer. Hist. 1877 (iv. 50), and Jan., 1880, and in Lippincott's Mag., Oct., 1879.[851]

The various stages of the negotiations which resulted in what is known as the "Convention" can be followed in the documents given in Fonblanque (p. 306); Wilkinson's Memoirs (pp. 304, 306, 317); Dawson (i. 303); Stedman's Amer. War; Stone's Campaign of Burgoyne (p. 102); and O'Callaghan's Orderly-Book of Burgoyne. The original definitive articles are in the N. Y. Hist. Soc., and fac-similes of the signatures are in Lossing's Field-Book (i. 79).[852]

Wilkinson carried the news of the surrender to Congress (Wilkinson's Memoirs; Wells's Sam. Adams, ii. 494). Gates describes his own success to his wife (Moore's Diary, 511). Chaplain Smith gives some details of the meeting of Gates and Burgoyne (Chaplain Smith and the Baptists, p. 222). There are reminiscences in Surgeon Meyrick's letter in Trumbull's Autobiography (p. 301), and papers in Pennsylvania Archives (vol. v.). Recollections of Gen. Ebenezer Mattoon, an actor in the scene as written out in 1835, are in the Appendix (no. 13) of Stone's Campaign of Burgoyne. The comment of Wm. Whipple is in N. H. State Papers, viii. 707. Burgoyne's letter from Albany, Oct. 20, to Germain is in his State of the Expedition.[853]

De Lancey (App. p. 674, to Jones's New York during the Rev.) collates the authorities on the strength of the respective armies. Gates's returns of his army (11,098) are in the Gates MSS. Burgoyne, in his State of the Expedition, gives Gates's returns as 18,624,—the difference may be the number of sick and furloughed men. Burgoyne praised Gates's men after he had seen them (Fonblanque, 316). The numbers of Burgoyne's army are given in Appendix D in Fonblanque. The question is also examined in the App. of Stone's Campaign of Burgoyne. Gordon (Amer. Rev., ii. 578) gives the number surrendered at 5,791; but there is a great difference in the estimates. Alexander Scammell makes it 10,611 in Letters and Papers, 1777-80 (Mass. Hist. Soc. Cabinet). In the Stark MSS. is a table of Burgoyne's losses (14,000), covering the whole campaign, and put into verse (Sparks MSS., xxxix.).[854]

Respecting the campaign as a whole, the best contemporary accounts on the American side are found in the official correspondence as embraced in Sparks's Washington (iv. 486, etc.) and Correspondence of the Revolution (vol. ii., App.), and in the letters of the commanding generals.[855]

Various important letters are put in evidence in the Proceedings of the general court martial for the trial of Maj.-Gen. Schuyler, Oct. 1, 1778 (Philad., 1778).[856]

An account of Alexander Bryan, Gates's chief scout, is in the App. of Stone's Campaign of Burgoyne.

There are among the copies of the Lincoln Papers in the Sparks MSS. (xii.) various letters, etc., respecting the campaign against Burgoyne. The earliest is one from Gen. Schuyler to Lincoln, dated at Saratoga, July 31, 1777, and the last is one from Lincoln to Gov. Clinton, Oct. 5, 1777, expressing anxiety lest Putnam should not be able to resist Gen. Clinton, to whom Burgoyne in his straits was looking for relief.[857] At a later day Lincoln wrote a long letter from Boston, Feb. 5, 1781, to John Laurens, recounting his part in this campaign from the time of Gates's taking command to the date of Lincoln's being wounded, Oct. 8th (Sparks's Corresp. of the Rev., ii. 533).

Various letters of Henry Brockholst Livingston during the Northern campaign of 1777 (June-Aug.), only parts of which are printed in Sedgwick's Livingston, are among the papers of Gov. William Livingston, which, when Sparks made his copies in 1832 (Sparks MSS., lii., vol. iii.) were in the possession of Theodore Sedgwick, Jr. Other letters will be found in the Trumbull MSS. (Mass. Hist. Soc.)[858]

The campaign of Burgoyne has necessarily made part of the labors of the general historians. Gordon and Ramsay were among the earliest, on the American, and Stedman (i. ch. 16) on the English side. Of the later writers, Bancroft gives it three chapters (21, 22, 24) in his original edition, and four in his final revision[859] (10, 11, 12, 13). Lowell finds it an important section of his history of the German auxiliaries (Hessians, p. 221, etc.). The lives of principal participants, like Arnold, Lincoln, Gates, and Schuyler on the American side, cover it.

A recent life of Morgan, The Hero of Cowpens, by Rebecca McConkey (N. Y., 1881), would claim for the Virginian the praise which is usually given to Arnold. The general surveys of Marshall (iii. ch. 5) and Irving (iii. ch. 9-22) brought it within the scope of their lives of Washington; and J. C. Hamilton's Republic of the United States includes it. Local aspects are treated in Dunlap's New York; Holden's Queensbury (p. 433); Hollister's Connecticut; Hinman's Connecticut during the Revolution (p. 112); and Mrs. Bonney's Historical Gleanings (i. 58). Robin's New Travels (letter 12) gives the current accounts prevailing a little later.

The earliest considerable monographic narrative was Charles Neilson's Original, Compiled and Corrected Account of Burgoyne's Campaign, and the Memorable Battle of Bemis's Heights, September 19, and October 7, 1777, from the most Authentic Sources of Information, etc. (Albany, 1844).

The most devoted chronicler of the campaign, however, is the younger William L. Stone (b. 1835), who published Reminiscences of Saratoga and Ballston in 1875, an article on "Burgoyne in a new light" in The Galaxy (v. 78), and one on the campaign in Harper's Monthly in 1877 (vol. lv. p. 673), and in the same year the most important work on the subject yet produced, The Campaign of Lieutenant-General John Burgoyne and the Expedition of Lieutenant-Colonel Barry St. Leger, which draws from every important help to the study of the military movements which had been so far brought to light. In the next year (1878), Mr. Stone prepared the Memoir of the Centennial Celebration of Burgoyne's Surrender, Schuylerville, Oct. 17, 1875. It included an historical address by Mr. Stone himself, others by Horatio Seymour and George William Curtis.[860]

The English later writers have been in the main fair in their statements. Mahon (vi. 191), while praising the army of Gates, denies him the merit of its successful conduct, giving it essentially to Stark and Arnold. The American student finds little to question in the unusually impartial narrative embodied in Edward Barrington De Fonblanque's Political and Military episodes in the latter half of the Eighteenth Century, derived from the life and Correspondence of John Burgoyne (London, 1776).[861]

On the German side the main sources are Max von Eelking's Die Deutschen Hülfstruppen im nord-amerikanischen Befreiungskriege, 1776-1783 (Hannover, 1863,—2 vols.), who gives chapters 7 and 8 to this campaign; the same writer's Leben und Wirken des Herzoglich-Braunschweig'schen General-lieutenants Friedrich Adolph von Riedesel (Leipzig, 1856,—3 vols.) and Generalin von Riedesel's Berufs-Reise nach Amerika (Berlin, 1801), both of which Riedesel memoirs have been translated by W. L. Stone.[862]

The succession of battles and movements preceding the final surrender of Burgoyne have been well mapped.[863]

Note.—The main British map of the attack of Clinton and Montgomery (Oct. 6, 1777) is one made by John Hills, and published in London by Faden, Jan., 1784, a portion of which, showing the detail, is annexed. The same map is used by Stedman (i. 362), and there is a reduction in the Catal. of Hist. MSS. rel. to the War of the Rev. (Albany, 1868, ii. 298), and in the illus. ed. of Irving's Washington, iii. 244. Cf. also the maps in Sparks's Washington (v. 92); Harper's Mag., lii. 648; and in Lossing's Field-Book, ii. 166. Original MS. drafts, showing the attack on the forts, made by Holland, by the Hessian Wangenheim, and by others, are among the Faden maps (nos. 70-73) in the library of Congress. Holland's surveys were followed in the plans of Montgomery and Clinton (1777) by Lieut. John Knight, of the Royal Navy.

Respecting the diversion of Clinton in Burgoyne's favor, the letters of Putnam, whose business it was to hold the passes of the Hudson against the British, are in Sparks's Washington (v. App. p. 471), and in his Correspondence of the Revolution (i. 438; ii. App. 536, etc.), and in the Western Reserve Hist. Soc. Tracts, no. 46.[864] Dawson, beside the despatch of Putnam to Washington on the capture, gives also George Clinton's to Washington (i. 341, 342).[865] Contemporary American accounts of the capture and of the burning of Kingston are in Moore's Diary (p. 506, 510); and a narrative, by G. W. Pratt, of the Kingston episode is in the Ulster Hist. Soc. Coll. (i. 107).

On the British side, Sir Henry Clinton's despatches are in Almon's Remembrancer (vol. v.), and that to Howe of Oct. 9th is in Dawson (i. 344), with one from Commodore Hotham to Howe (p. 346).[866]

The maps of the Hudson already enumerated are of use in the study of this movement.[867] Plans of intended works (1776) and obstructions in the river near Fort Montgomery are given in the Calendar of Historical MSS. relating to the War of the Rev. (Albany, 1868, vol. i. 474, 616),[868] and a MS. plan of William A. Patterson, first lieutenant, 15th reg., April 22, 1776, is in the Heath MSS., i. 246 (Mass. Hist. Soc.).

The correspondence of the committee of Congress with the commissioners in France, regarding the effect of the surrender of Burgoyne, is in Diplomatic Correspondence (i. 338, 355). Cf. Stuart's Jonathan Trumbull. Jonathan Loring Austin, dispatched by the Massachusetts authorities, carried the first intelligence to France.[869] Schulenberg wrote to the commissioners from Berlin (Diplom. Corresp., ii. 120), and Izard replied (Ibid., ii. 370).[870]

Burgoyne sailed from Rhode Island for England in April, 1778.[871] On arriving, he had an early interview with Lord George Germain, but the king refused to see him. He appeared in Parliament,[872] where he had earlier been a firm but not bellicose upholder of the government,[873] on May 21st, and on the 26th and 28th made speeches in his own defence, which were published in London, June 16, 1778, as The substance of General Burgoyne's speeches, ... with an appendix containing Gen. Washington's letter to Gen. Burgoyne.[874]

The king, piqued at finding Burgoyne on the side of the opposition in Parliament, ordered him to return to his imprisoned troops, and, rather than go, the general resigned his civil and military offices, and printed an explanation in A letter from Lieutenant-General Burgoyne to his constituents, with the correspondence between the secretaries of war and him, relative to his return to America (London, 1779).[875]

ATTACK ON CLINTON AND MONTGOMERY.

After the plan in Leake's Life of Lamb, p. 176. The legend in northwest corner of the map reads by error "Halt of the right [should be left] column." Other eclectic maps are given in Sparks's Washington, v. 92; in Boynton's West Point; and in Carrington's Battles, p. 362.

Lord George Germain, or, as some have thought, Sir John Dalrymple, published a Reply to Lieutenant-General Burgoyne's letter to his constituents[876] (London, 1779), pronouncing it a libel upon the king's government, and this was seconded by an anonymous Letter to Lieutenant-General Burgoyne on his letter to his constituents (London, 1779).[877]

The further controversy over Burgoyne's failure includes the following publications:—

A brief examination of the plan and conduct of the Northern expedition in America in 1777, and of the surrender of the army under the command of Lieutenant-General Burgoyne (London, 1779),—a severe attack.[878]

An Enquiry into and remarks upon the Conduct of Lieutenant-General Burgoyne; the plan of operations for the campaign of 1777; the instructions from the Secretary of State, and the circumstances that led to the loss of the northern army (London, 1780).[879]

Essay on modern martyrs, with a letter to General Burgoyne (London, 1780),[880]—charging him with being the personal cause of his own misfortunes.

In addition, there were some publications reviewing the conduct of Howe's as well as Burgoyne's campaigns in 1777, which will be noticed in another place.

Burgoyne's main defence against all these charges appeared in his A State of the Expedition from Canada as laid before the House of Commons, with a collection of Authentic Documents, and an addition of many circumstances which were prevented from appearing before the House by the Prorogation of Parliament, written and collated by himself, with plans (London, 1780).[881] In his introduction Burgoyne says, that, being denied a professional examination of his conduct, and disappointed in a parliamentary one, he was induced to make this publication.[882]

This publication was followed by A Supplement to the State of the Expedition from Canada, containing Gen. Burgoyne's Orders respecting the Principal Movements and Operations of the Army to the Raising of the Siege of Ticonderoga (London, 1780).[883]

Burgoyne was attacked in return in the following: Remarks on General Burgoyne's State of the Expedition from Canada (London, 1780),[884] being a defence of the ministry, and holding that Burgoyne had forfeited all claims to pity. A letter to Lieutenant-General Burgoyne occasioned by a second edition of his State of the Expedition, etc. (London, 1780).[885] Fonblanque (ch. viii.) portrays the effect in England of the parliamentary inquiry. Cf. Macknight's Burke (ch. 30). The Rev. Samuel Peters' reply to Burgoyne in the Appendix of Jones's New York during the Revolutionary War (vol. i. p. 683).

The Centennial Celebrations of the State of New York (Albany, 1879) gives the addresses of that period, by M. I. Townshend and John A. Stevens.[886]

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