Narrative and Critical History of America, Vol. 6 (of 8) / The United States of North America, Part I

by Unknown

CHAPTER V.

THE STRUGGLE FOR THE DELAWARE.—PHILADELPHIA UNDER HOWE AND UNDER ARNOLD.

BY FREDERICK D. STONE,

Librarian of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania.

"THESE are the times that try men's souls. The summer soldier and the sunshine patriot will in this crisis shrink from the service of his country, but he that stands it now deserves the love and thanks of man and woman."

So wrote Thomas Paine, December 19, 1776. The preceding month had been fraught with adversity. The loss of Fort Washington on the 16th of November had rendered Fort Lee useless, as with it alone the passage of the river could not be obstructed. Its evacuation was immediately ordered, and the ammunition and some of the guns were removed. Before all could be taken away, however, the fort became the object of the enemy's attention. On the night of the 19th, two columns under Cornwallis, composed of British and Germans, with a detachment from the fleet, in all about six thousand men, crossed the river and landed at Closter dock, seven miles above Fort Lee, then commanded by General Greene. The night was stormy, and the movement escaped the notice of Greene's sentries. By morning the sailors had dragged the artillery to the top of the Palisades, and everything was ready for an advance upon the fort. Greene was informed of the landing of Cornwallis, and immediately took steps to secure a retreat for his command, then numbering about three thousand men. Word was sent to Washington, who was at the village of Hackensack with the troops which he had brought with him from White Plains. In three quarters of an hour the commanding general was at Greene's side. Seeing that the fort was not tenable, he ordered a retreat. No time was to be lost; and leaving the tents standing, the kettles over the fires, and such stores as could not be removed, the troops were hurried towards the advancing enemy with such speed that they gained the road leading to the only bridge over the Hackensack before Cornwallis could intercept them.

The situation of the Americans was now more precarious than it had been at Fort Lee. They were in danger of being shut in between the Hackensack and Passaic rivers; they were in a perfectly flat country, without intrenching tools or camp equipage; their right flank could be turned and their line of retreat threatened if the British should land a force at the head of Newark Bay or at Amboy. Washington's forces were greatly reduced by reverses and by desertions. Nearly all that were left were militia of the flying camp, called out for an emergency, and impatient to return home, as their time of service had nearly expired. Small as his numbers were, Washington was obliged to post some at Amboy and others at Brunswick, to protect his flanks. As those remaining were insufficient to hinder the advance of the enemy in his front, he ordered Lee, whom he had left in command on the east of the Hudson, to cross that river and join him, and, with hardly three thousand men, Washington began his retreat through the Jerseys.

On the 21st he was at Aquacknoc Bridge on the Passaic, and by the 23d at Newark. On the 28th he left Newark, the advance-guard of the British entering the town as his rear-guard quitted it, and the next day he arrived at Brunswick. Here an attempt would have been made to prevent the enemy crossing the Raritan, but the stream was fordable in a number of places. As the British approached, the Jersey and Maryland brigades, whose terms of service expired that day, refused to stay an hour longer, and as the British crossed the river the line of march was again taken up for Trenton. This point was reached on the 2d of December, two brigades having been left at Princeton, under Stirling, to watch the enemy.

Having seen his stores and baggage safely over the Delaware, and being reinforced by about twelve hundred militia from the neighborhood of Philadelphia, Washington faced about on the 6th, with such men as were fit for service, and set out to join Stirling at Princeton.

It had not been the intention of Howe, when he ordered Cornwallis over the Hudson, to do more than take possession of and hold East Jersey, and Cornwallis's orders did not permit him to go beyond Brunswick. But the slight opposition which Washington was able to offer to the British advance excited in Howe the hopes of capturing Philadelphia, and he joined Cornwallis in person at Brunswick. After a short halt, he pushed on towards Stirling at Princeton, and before Washington could reach that general Stirling was in full retreat, to avoid being intercepted. A retrograde movement was ordered, and by the 8th the American army was on the west bank of the Delaware. The advance of Cornwallis's column reached the river before the rear-guard of the Americans had landed on the Pennsylvania side; but as Washington had secured all the boats for a considerable distance above and below Trenton, his position was comparatively a safe one. Here for a time he rested his men, and urged upon Congress the necessity of raising additional troops, and the importance of preparing for the defence of Philadelphia, as the military stores were in that city.

In his retreat through the Jerseys, Washington was greatly embarrassed by the conduct of General Charles Lee. The instructions he had given Lee on the 17th of November to join him may have been discretionary, but the language and frequency of his orders left no doubt of the expectations of the commander-in-chief. But Lee chose to read the orders in the light of his wishes. On the east of the Hudson he had an independent command, which he purposed to retain as long as he could. Schemes and suggestions that should have had no weight were allowed to delay his passage over the river until December 2d, and then his advance was slow and hesitating. The prospect of receiving reinforcements from the Northern army, which would make his command equal to that of Washington, strengthened his wish to act independently. He proposed, as soon as the troops from the north should join him, to attack the rear of the enemy. While this plan may not have been devoid of military judgment, it is doubtful if it would have had more than a temporary effect on Howe's movements, while it would have deprived Washington of the reinforcements he so greatly needed. Notwithstanding Washington's explicit directions to avoid the enemy in joining him, Lee hung so close to the enemy's flank as to leave a doubt of his real intentions, and on the morning of the 13th, just after having put on record that he believed Washington to be "damnably deficient", he was surprised and taken prisoner by Lieutenant-Colonel Harcourt, at White's tavern, near Baskingridge, three miles from his camp.

CHARLES LEE

From Murray's Impartial Hist. of the Present War, i. p. 478.

The estimation in which Lee was held gave an undue importance to his capture. The British thought that in it they had deprived their opponents of nearly all the military science they possessed, and they styled him the American Palladium. With the Americans he had many friends, who were flattered that a soldier of European distinction should have espoused their cause, and, dazzled with his success at Charleston, they rated him higher than Washington, and, unintentionally perhaps, weakened the confidence that should have been reposed in the commander-in-chief by his subordinates.

Having failed to overtake Washington in New Jersey, Howe turned northward to Coryell's Ferry, fifteen miles above Trenton, in hopes of finding boats to enable him to cross the Delaware; but in this he was disappointed. He then took post at Pennington with a portion of his force, while with the remainder he returned to Trenton, repaired the bridges below the town which the Americans had destroyed, and extended his line as far as Burlington.

So great was the terror spread through New Jersey as the British advanced, that many of her citizens took advantage of the amnesty which was offered by the Howes to all who would put themselves under their protection within sixty days from the 30th of November. Chief among these was Samuel Tucker, president of the Committee of Safety, who had held many positions of honor and trust. Nor was this defection confined to the east side of the Delaware. It was now that Joseph Galloway, and citizens of Philadelphia, like the Allens, who had supported the cause of the colonies until independence became the avowed object of the war, sought safety within the British lines. But the influence which their conduct might have exercised upon the people was neutralized by what was soon endured at the hands of the British and Hessian troops. Never before had any of the colonies been exposed to the unbridled impulses of a mercenary and licentious soldiery. Houses were plundered and their contents destroyed in mere wantonness, women were forced to submit to indignities, and all the horrors which usually attended the invasion of a European country by a foreign army in the eighteenth century were transferred to the soil of New Jersey.[887]

In Philadelphia the excitement was intense. On the 28th of November a meeting was held in the State House yard to consider the condition of affairs. It was addressed by Mifflin, who had been sent to the city to warn Congress of the danger which threatened the army. He spoke with animation, and endeavored to rouse the people to action. His efforts met with some success, and in a few days the troops that reinforced Washington prior to his retreat into Pennsylvania were in motion. On the 30th the Council of Safety advised the citizens to prepare, upon short notice, to remove their wives and children to places of safety. On December 2d, when it was known in the city that Howe's army was at Brunswick, crowds gathered at the Coffee House to learn the news. The stores and schools were closed, and all business was suspended. No one was allowed to cross the Delaware without a pass, while recruiting parties with drums beating paraded in the streets. The roads leading from the city were crowded with vehicles of every description, bearing the families of citizens and their effects to places of refuge.

AN APPEAL.

Reduced from an original in the library of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania.

When these means of transportation failed, the water craft on the Delaware was pressed into service. Women with children in their arms were crowded in smoky cabins so low that they could not sit upright, while the younger girls were quartered on the decks, from whence they were driven by the snow and rain. But sadder sights presented themselves in the streets of the city. The sick of the army arrived daily. Many of the men had gone to the field clad only for a summer campaign. They had succumbed to exposure, and had reached Philadelphia in an almost naked condition. Measures were at once set on foot for their relief. Vacant houses were taken for their accommodation. The most seriously afflicted were sent to the hospitals, while committees of citizens went from door to door begging clothing for their use.

BROADSIDE.

Reduced from an original in the Historical Society of Pennsylvania.

Handbills were issued giving information of the advance of the enemy, and to awaken the indignation of the people printed sheets were circulated describing the insults to which the women of New Jersey had been subjected. Some of the citizens refused to take the Continental money, as it was rumored that Congress would soon disperse. On the 11th of December Congress requested Washington to contradict this rumor in general orders, and to assure the army that the delegates would remain in Philadelphia until it was certain the enemy would capture the city. It was well that Washington exercised his discretion in this matter, for the next day the crushing news was known throughout the city that he had been obliged to cross the Delaware. Congress at once adjourned to Baltimore, having first conferred on Washington "full power to order and direct all things relative to the department and to the operations of the war."

The state of political affairs in Pennsylvania was the chief cause of the inefficiency which exposed Philadelphia to the danger of capture and of the panic with which her citizens were seized. The old colonial charter had been abrogated, but the new constitution had not been put into effect, and the condition of society bordered upon anarchy.

For two weeks after Washington had retreated across the Delaware there seemed little chance of impeding the British advance. "Day by day the little handful was decreasing, from sickness and other causes." The services of all the regular troops in it, with the exception of those from Virginia and Maryland, expired on the first of the year, and the militia could not be depended upon. "They come", wrote Washington, "you cannot tell how, go you cannot tell when, and act you cannot tell where, consume your provisions, exhaust your stores, and leave you at last at a critical moment." "These", he said again to Congress, on the 20th of December, "are the men I am to depend upon ten days hence." On Congress he urged the importance of raising at once an army upon a more substantial basis, and impressed upon those around him the necessity of the utmost vigilance. But in the anguish of the moment he wrote to his brother: "If every nerve is not strained to recruit the new army with all possible expedition, I think the game is pretty nearly up.... I cannot entertain the idea that [our cause] will finally sink, though it may remain for some time under a cloud."

Each day brought new difficulties to be overcome. When it was learned that the fleet that had sailed from New York had appeared off New London, the march of a portion of Heath's troops, which had been ordered from Peekskill, was countermanded, and three regiments from Ticonderoga were directed to halt at Morristown, where about eight hundred militia had been collected, and General Maxwell was sent to command them. On the 20th, the troops under Gates and Sullivan joined Washington. The former had been sent by Schuyler. Sullivan's division was that which had been commanded by Lee up to the time of his capture. Washington had been led to believe that a portion of these troops had reënlisted, and he had been waiting until they should join him to strike a blow at Howe's forces. Only a small number of the men had done so, however, and he found that on the first of the year he would have but fifteen hundred men independent of the militia. It was evident, therefore, that the blow must be struck at once.

On the 14th of December the British troops went into winter-quarters. They were stationed at Brunswick, Princeton, Trenton, and Bordentown. Howe returned to his easy quarters in New York. Cornwallis obtained permission to visit England, and left Grant at Brunswick in command of New Jersey. The troops at Trenton were under the Hessian, Lieut.-Col. Rahl; those at Bordentown were commanded by his superior, Count Donop, who had some outposts as far south as Burlington and Mount Holly. Howe knew his line was too far extended, but he wished to cover the county of Monmouth, where there were indications of an outbreak on the part of some loyalists. The American army reached from Coryell's Ferry to Bristol. The crossings above Trenton were guarded by Stirling, Mercer, Stephen, and Fermoy. Ewing lay opposite Trenton. Dickinson with a few New Jersey troops was opposite Bordentown, and Cadwalader with the Pennsylvania militia was at Bristol.

Washington decided to attack the troops at Trenton. His men fit for duty did not exceed five thousand, and of these nearly two thousand were militia. The troops under Rahl consisted of three battalions of Hessians, having with them six field-pieces, fifty chasseurs, and twenty dragoons,—twelve hundred in all. Circumstances favored the plan which Washington now adopted. Colonel Griffin, with two companies of Virginians and some militia, had driven a party of Hessians, who had penetrated as far south as Moorestown and Haddonfield, back to Mount Holly, where they had been reinforced by Donop, who was thus too far removed from Trenton to support Rahl in case of an emergency. The success of Griffin made the militia at Bristol anxious for service, and it was decided by Cadwalader and Reed, who was with him, to gratify them by supporting Griffin. To this Washington assented, and at the same time confided to Reed and Cadwalader his contemplated movement against Trenton. On the morning of the 23d he wrote to them asking if the plan had been carried out, and informed them that one hour before day on the morning of the 26th was the time he had fixed upon for attacking Rahl. "For heaven's sake", he wrote, "keep this to yourselves as the discovery of it may prove fatal to us. Our numbers, sorry I am to say, being less than I had any conception of; but necessity, dire necessity, will, nay must justify an attack. Prepare and concert with Griffin; attack as many of their posts as you possibly can with a prospect of success; the more we can attack at the same instant the more confusion we shall spread, and the greater good will result from it."

Washington was informed that it was impracticable to act with Griffin; and Reed repaired to Philadelphia to urge Putnam to create a diversion by crossing the river at Cooper's Ferry. He found, however, that little could be expected from Putnam, and returned to Bristol on the 25th, where Cadwalader was preparing to carry out the part which Washington had assigned to him. It was the intention of Washington to cross the Delaware above Trenton with about one half of his command, and attack the enemy, while Ewing and Cadwalader should cross opposite Trenton and Bristol, and not only cut Rahl's line of retreat but prevent Donop from reinforcing him.

Notwithstanding the fact that no aid could be expected from Putnam, Washington determined to proceed, and urged Cadwalader to do all in his power to support him. The boats had been gathered at McKonkey's Ferry, nine miles above Trenton, and as the men marched to them the footprints they left in the snow were here and there tinged with blood from the feet of those who wore broken shoes. The boats were promptly manned by Glover's regiment from Marblehead, and at dark the crossing began. It was three o'clock before the artillery was landed, and four before the troops took up the line of march. The attack was to have been made about five, and against a more vigilant enemy this delay would have proved fatal. But Rahl was not vigilant. He despised his opponents, and refused to protect his position with redoubts as instructed by Donop. He had been informed of Washington's intended movement, but paid no attention to the report. It so happened that on the morning of the attack his outposts had been fired upon by a body of strolling militia, and this he supposed was the attack he was to look for. Washington had with him two thousand four hundred men. These he divided into two columns. One was commanded by Sullivan, and marched by the river road which entered the town on the northwest. The other, under Greene, took the Pennington road which approached the town from the north. The Americans advanced in a violent storm of snow and hail. Greene's command arrived at the outskirts of the town three minutes before Sullivan's. The attacks of both parties were almost simultaneously. Many of the guns were rendered useless by the storm, and the men were ordered to charge. Those who had bayonets fixed them and rushed upon the pickets, who retired. The Hessians were taken entirely by surprise. For a while Rahl was allowed to remain undisturbed in bed, but when matters grew serious he was aroused and hurriedly assumed command. Some of his half-formed regiments were advanced towards the Americans, but were driven back, throwing those in their rear into inextricable confusion. Two lines of retreat were open to Rahl. One lay over the bridge which crossed the Assanpink, south of the town; the other was the road to Brunswick. But Sullivan's attack was so spirited that the Hessians were driven past the road which led to the bridge, and as they attempted to escape towards Brunswick, Washington intercepted them with Hand's riflemen and held them in check. A battery under Captain Thomas Forrest created great havoc in their ranks, and two of their guns were turned against it. These were immediately charged by the Americans, who were led by Captain William Washington and Lieutenant James Monroe. Both were wounded, but the guns were captured. Rahl was mortally wounded in trying to rally his men, and shortly after he fell his command surrendered. All was over in three quarters of an hour. With the exception of the horse and a small number of the infantry which escaped over the Assanpink or to Brunswick, Rahl's entire force was either killed or captured. The prisoners numbered nine hundred and eighteen. The killed, Washington thought, did not exceed twenty or thirty. The Americans had two privates killed, one frozen to death, and two officers and four men wounded. As the enemy were supposed to be in force at Princeton and Bordentown, and the Americans were in no condition to withstand an attack, it was thought best not to risk the advantage which had been gained, and as soon as the men were rested the army, with its prisoners, returned to Pennsylvania.

Ewing and Cadwalader had been unable to carry out the parts assigned them, on account of the ice. The latter sent a portion of his infantry over the river, but recalled it when he found he could not land his artillery. With no definite news of Washington's success, Cadwalader recrossed on the morning of the 27th, supposing Washington to be at Trenton. He soon learned his mistake, but discovered that Donop had retreated towards Brunswick when he heard of the action at Trenton. Cadwalader then moved on to Burlington, and on the 29th marched to Crosswicks. The desperate condition of affairs previous to the battle had stimulated the people to extraordinary efforts, and the news of the victory raised their spirits in proportion to the depression they had so lately suffered. Ignorant of the victory Washington had achieved, Congress on the 27th vested him with powers that virtually constituted him a military dictator for the period of six months. To convince the people of the reality of the victory, the Hessians were marched through the streets of Philadelphia, and one of their standards was hung up in the chamber of Congress at Baltimore. Public rejoicings broke forth on every side. "The Lord of Hosts has heard the cry of the distressed, and sent an angel to their assistance", exclaimed Muhlenberg, the patriarch of the Lutherans. On the 27th and 28th of December, fifteen hundred militia under Mifflin followed Cadwalader into New Jersey, while the Jerseymen gathered at Morristown and other points. In the face of this feeling it was necessary that the offensive should be resumed, and on the 30th Washington occupied Trenton. The service of the New England troops expired on the first of the year; but through the efforts of Robert Morris money was raised to offer bounties, which, with appeals to their patriotism, induced them to remain six weeks longer with the army.

As soon as Cornwallis heard of the surprise at Trenton, he gave up his visit to England and hastily joined Grant at Brunswick. On the 30th, with 8,000 men, he marched towards Trenton, with the determination of driving Washington over the Delaware or capturing his entire force. Washington immediately ordered Cadwalader and Mifflin to Trenton, and sent forward a detachment under General Fermoy to retard the advance of Cornwallis. On the night of January the 1st this detachment was at Five Mile Run, between Trenton and Princeton. Early on the morning of the 2d Cornwallis set out from Princeton, where he had halted the night previous. The Americans retired before him, disputing every foot of ground. Hand's riflemen, Scott's Virginians, and Forrest's battery bore the brunt of the fighting. It was nearly noon by the time Shabbakong Creek was reached, and two hours passed before the British succeeded in crossing it. The main portion of the American army was strongly posted on the south side of the Assanpink, the banks being sufficiently high to enable the men in the rear to fire over the heads of those in front of them. As the British approached Trenton, troops were sent forward by Washington to support the Americans. A battery placed on a hill beyond Trenton held the British in check for a short time, but the Americans were soon driven into the town and across the bridge. The cannonading on both sides was heavy, but the British were unable to force their way across the stream, and as night approached Cornwallis, against the advice of his officers, withdrew his troops, determined to renew the conflict in the morning. "If ever there was a crisis in the affairs of the Revolution", wrote Wilkinson, "this was the moment. Thirty minutes would have sufficed to have brought the two armies into contact, and thirty minutes more would have decided the combat." Washington's position was indeed critical. It was hardly possible that with his raw levies he could continue to hold in check the well-disciplined troops of Cornwallis, which in the morning would be reinforced with troops he had left at Maidenhead and Princeton. The Delaware behind Washington was full of floating ice, and to cross it in that condition was impossible. If Cornwallis should force the Americans' position, the victory of the British would be decisive. Immediately after dark a council of war was held. It was then decided to turn the left flank of the enemy, strike a blow at Princeton, where the garrison was small, and march on Brunswick, the depository of the British stores. The sentries of both armies were posted along the banks of the Assanpink, and at some points were within one hundred and fifty yards of each other. Working parties were sent within hearing distance of the enemy to throw up intrenchments, the guards were doubled, and everything was done to indicate that Washington intended to defend his position to the last. But at midnight the fires were replenished and the troops silently withdrawn. Marching by the Quaker road, Washington turned the left flank of Cornwallis, and by daybreak reached a point directly south of Princeton. With the main body he moved directly on the town, and ordered a detachment under Mercer to march to the left and demolish the bridge over Stony Brook, thus destroying direct communication with Cornwallis. The garrison at Princeton consisted of the 17th, 40th, and 55th regiments and three companies of light horse. The 17th and 55th, with a few dragoons, started at sunrise on the morning of the 3d to join Cornwallis. The 17th, under Colonel Mawhood, had crossed the bridge over Stony Brook, that Mercer was to destroy, and was some distance beyond it, when Mawhood discovered Mercer on his flank and rear, moving north on the east side of the stream. He at once recrossed the bridge, and both parties endeavored to gain the high ground east of the stream. As the Americans had the shortest distance to march, they were successful, and with their rifles they poured a deadly fire into the 17th and 55th, as they advanced to drive them from their position. They had no bayonets, however, and were unable to stand the charge of the British. They fled through an orchard in their rear, leaving their commander mortally wounded on the ground. It was not until Mawhood emerged from the orchard that he was aware that the whole American army was within supporting distance of the troops he had just engaged. On hearing the firing on his left, Washington halted his column, and with the Pennsylvania militia moved to the support of Mercer. Encouraged by the irresolution of the militia, Mawhood charged them, but other regiments coming up and the militia gaining confidence, the British halted, and then fled, as the Americans in turn advanced against them. The 55th retreated to Princeton and joined the 40th. They made a mere show of defending the town, took refuge in the college building, deserted it, and were soon seen in full retreat across the Millstone towards Brunswick. Washington's troops had been under arms for over eighteen hours, and were too much fatigued to follow them. Having dispersed the 17th regiment, he destroyed the bridge over Stony Brook and Millstone as the head of Cornwallis's rear-guard came in sight. It was commanded by Leslie, who had marched from Maidenhead as soon as he heard the firing in his rear. Washington turned north at Kingston, and proceeded to Somerset Court-House, where he rested his men. Cornwallis was not aware that the Americans had been withdrawn from his front until he heard the sound of the guns at Princeton. Realizing at once that he had been outgeneralled, and that his stores were in danger, he ordered a retreat. Failing to reach Princeton in time to be of service, he continued his march to Brunswick, and made no attempt to follow Washington. The losses of the British in these engagements were severe; those on the 2d of January were never known. At Princeton, Washington estimated that one hundred men were left dead upon the field, and that the killed, wounded, and prisoners amounted to five hundred. Ensign Inman, of the 17th, wrote that of the two hundred and twenty-four rank and file of his regiment, which set out on the morning of the 3d, one hundred and one were either killed or wounded, and that he was the only officer of the right wing not injured. The Americans lost only twenty or thirty privates, but many officers. Bravely had they urged their men on in the thickest of the fight. That Washington escaped seemed a miracle to those who saw him lead the troops which drove Mawhood back. Hazlet, Morris, Neal, and Shippin fell upon the field. Mercer, mortally wounded, died upon the 12th, lamented by the whole country. From Somerset Court-House Washington marched to Morristown, where he went into winter-quarters. The British troops were soon all withdrawn to Amboy and Brunswick. In less than three weeks Washington had turned back the tide of adversity, and had compelled his opponents to evacuate West Jersey.

Washington remained at Morristown from the 7th of January until the 28th of May, during which time no military movement of importance took place. His men left for their homes as soon as their terms of service expired, and as few militia entered the camp to take their places, at times it seemed as if the army would be so reduced as to be unworthy of the name. It was not until late in the spring that the new levies reached headquarters. On the 28th of May the Americans marched to Middlebrook, and took position behind the Raritan. On the 13th of June Howe marched from Brunswick and extended his line to Somerset Court-House, and Arnold was sent to Trenton to take measures to prevent his crossing the Delaware. The militia turned out in a spirited manner, and Howe did not care to advance in the face of the opposition they could offer, with Washington on his flank. He endeavored to bring on a general engagement with the latter, but Washington refused to leave the strong position he occupied, and Howe retired to Amboy.

Early in April Howe had settled upon a campaign having for its object the capture of Philadelphia. He determined to embark his troops and transport them to the banks of the Delaware or Chesapeake, and march directly on the city. With the object of reaching the fleet he started to cross to Staten Island; but learning that Washington was at Quibbletown, he recalled his men and proceeded to Westfield, hoping to outflank him. But, as Washington retired, Howe was unsuccessful, and finally passed over to Staten Island, totally evacuating New Jersey.

For over six weeks Washington was ignorant of Howe's intentions. Supposing that he would endeavor to coöperate with Burgoyne, and would sail up the Hudson, Washington moved his army to Ramapo, in New York. On the 23d of July, after Howe's troops had been three weeks on the vessels, the fleet sailed, shaping its course southwesterly. Its departure was promptly reported to Congress. Signal fires were lighted along the Jersey coast as it was seen from time to time by those who were watching for it, and messengers carried inland the news of its progress. At last, on the 30th, it was spoken off the capes of Delaware, but Lord Howe deemed it too hazardous to sail up that river, and after consulting with his brother, the general, continued on his course southward. On the 15th of August he entered Chesapeake Bay, and on the 25th the troops were landed at Elk Ferry.

On the 24th of July Washington heard that the fleet had sailed southward, and in consequence marched his army from Ramapo to Coryell's Ferry. He continued his march to Philadelphia, when he learned that the fleet was off the capes of Delaware; but as it was soon lost sight of, he retraced his steps, and halted in Bucks County, Pennsylvania, twenty miles from Philadelphia. While there, Lafayette, De Kalb, and Pulaski joined the army.

LORD HOWE.

From Murray's Impartial Hist. of the present War, ii. p. 96. Cf. cut in European Mag., ii. 432. There is a colossal statue of Howe, by Flaxman, in St. Paul's, London.

For a while everything was in suspense. Concluding at last that Howe had sailed for Charleston, Washington consulted with his officers, and decided to return to the Hudson, so that Burgoyne could be opposed or New York attacked, as circumstances should direct. He was just about to do this when word was brought that the fleet had entered Chesapeake Bay, and was at least two hundred miles from the capes. This news created great consternation in Philadelphia, but the excitement was not as great as it had been the previous winter, when Howe was at Trenton. Repeated alarms had made the people callous, and internal political differences continued to divide them. Besides this, the pacific influence which the presence of a large Quaker population exercised seemed to bear down all military efforts. Stirring appeals were made by the authorities, new bodies of militia were ordered to be raised, handbills calculated to arouse the people were issued, but all with unsatisfactory results. To impress the lukewarm with the strength of his forces, and to inspire hopes in the breasts of the patriotic, on the 24th of August Washington marched his army through the streets of Philadelphia. The men were poorly armed and clothed, and to give them some uniformity they wore sprigs of green in their hats.

The Americans halted south of Wilmington, and a picked corps under Maxwell was thrown to the front. The country below was patrolled by parties of Delaware militia under Rodney, and Washington reconnoitred it in person. The disembarkation of Howe's army on the 25th was watched by a few militia, who fled when a landing was effected. Howe's men were in good health, but hundreds of his horses had died on the voyage, and those that survived were little better than carrion. His advance, therefore, was slow. He moved in two columns, one on each side of Elk River. Several days were spent in collecting horses, and on the 3d of September the columns joined at Aitken's tavern. Here a severe skirmish took place with Maxwell's corps, which was driven back. Washington's force then lay behind Red Clay Creek, his left resting on Christiana Creek, and extending in the direction of Newport. On the 8th the British advanced as if to attack the American left, but by night Washington learned that the greater part of Howe's army was at Milltown, on his right. Fearing that Howe would push past him in that direction, cross the Brandywine, and gain the road to Philadelphia, Washington, on the evening of the 8th, quietly withdrew his troops from Red Clay Creek, and threw them in front of Howe, at Chad's Ford, on the Brandywine. A redoubt, commanded by Proctor, was thrown up on the east bank to protect the crossing. Wayne's division, formerly Lincoln's, was within supporting distance, and Greene's, still further to the rear, was to act as a reserve. The Pennsylvania militia, under Armstrong, formed the left wing. They were posted at the fords below Chad's, which were easily protected. The right wing was commanded by Sullivan. It was composed of his own division and those of Stirling and Stephen. Both Washington and Sullivan were unacquainted with the country to their right, and supposed that, when they guarded the fords three miles above where Sullivan was stationed, the enemy could not approach from that direction without their receiving timely notice.

The British marched from Milltown to Kennett Square. On the morning of the 11th, Knyphausen with 7,000 men took the direct road to Chad's Ford. He skirmished with Maxwell, who had crossed the stream to meet him, and drove him back over the Brandywine. At daybreak on the same day, another column, 7,000 strong, set out from Kennett Square. It was commanded by Cornwallis, and Howe accompanied it in person. It took a road leading north to a point above the forks of the Brandywine, turned to the east, crossed the west branch at Trimble's Ford and the east at Jeffrey's, and then moved south. The plan was that Knyphausen should engage the attention of the Americans in front until Cornwallis had gained a position to attack their right. In this Knyphausen was successful, his attempts to cross the Brandywine at Chad's Ford being only feints.

About noon Washington heard of Cornwallis's march. He promptly determined to cross the stream and engage Knyphausen, while Cornwallis was too far distant to reinforce him or threaten the American right. Wayne, Greene, and Sullivan's divisions were ordered to advance. Greene had gained the west bank when word was received from Sullivan that a Major Spear had assured him that there must be some mistake. He had that morning passed over the road Cornwallis was said to be on, and had seen nothing of him. Fearing that Cornwallis's march was only a feint, and that he had returned and rejoined Knyphausen, Washington ordered Greene back and sent scouts out for additional information. By two o'clock it was obtained. Cornwallis was discovered on the road to Dilworth, and would soon be in the rear of the Americans. Stirling and Stephen were deployed on the hill southwest of Birmingham Meeting-House, and Sullivan's division was ordered to join them. Before it could reach its position Cornwallis began the attack. As he attempted to turn the American right, Sullivan endeavored to move his three divisions to the east. His own division had been formed in line half a mile from those of Stirling and Stephen, and in closing the gap it fell into confusion and was routed. With the divisions of Stirling and Stephen, Sullivan made every effort to hold the position; but he was outnumbered, his left flank was uncovered, and his entire command was finally driven in confusion from the field. Sullivan, Stirling, and Conway had encouraged their men with exhibitions of personal bravery, and Lafayette, who acted as a volunteer, was wounded while endeavoring to rally some fugitives. When Washington heard the firing in the direction of Birmingham he rode thither with the utmost speed. Meeting the fugitives, he ordered Greene to support the right wing. The order was executed with wonderful promptness. Greene, throwing Weedon's brigade on the flank of the enemy and Muhlenberg's in their front, checked the pursuit. But the Americans were obliged to fall back until they came to a narrow defile, flanked on both sides by woods, from which the British could not drive them, and night ended the conflict. When Knyphausen learned that Cornwallis was engaged he pushed across the stream at Chad's Ford, but Wayne, Maxwell, and Proctor held him in check until they found that the right wing had been defeated, when they retired in good order, fighting as they fell back towards Chester. There at night the defeated army gathered, and Washington reported to Congress that, notwithstanding the misfortunes of the day, his troops were in good spirits.

The American loss was about one thousand, killed, wounded, and prisoners; that of the British, five hundred and seventy-nine. That the conduct of the Americans inspired their opponents with respect is shown by the language of Sir William Howe in summarizing the opposition he had met with up to this time. "They fought the king's army", he wrote, "on Long Island; they sustained the attack at Fort Washington; they stood the battle at Brandywine: and our loss upon those occasions, though by no means equal to theirs, was not inconsiderable."

The day after the battle Washington marched from Chester to Philadelphia. He rested his army two days at Germantown, and then recrossed the Schuylkill; public opinion demanding that another battle should be risked before the city should be given up. On the 16th the two armies met on the high ground south of Chester Valley and prepared for action. The skirmishing had actually begun, when a violent storm stopped the engagement by ruining the ammunition of both armies. Washington withdrew to the hills north of the valley, and finding it impossible to repair the damage done by the storm, retreated again over the Schuylkill, leaving Wayne behind him to watch the enemy and attack their rear should they attempt to follow. Wayne was to have been reinforced by detachments under Smallwood and Gist, which did not reach him. When the British moved nearer to the Lancaster road, Wayne took position in their rear. He supposed that they were ignorant of his presence, and wrote to Washington to that effect. But on the night of the 20th he was attacked by a strong detachment under Major-General Grey, and although he had taken measures to guard against a surprise, the onslaught was so sudden that his men, who were sleeping on their arms, were unable to make an effective resistance, and about one hundred and fifty were either killed or wounded by the bayonet.

GENERAL GREY.

From Doyle's Official Baronage, ii. 76. There is a print in the European Mag., Oct., 1797, and in Murray's Impartial Hist., vol. ii. p. 433.

Howe on the 21st resumed his march towards Philadelphia. Finding that the Americans had thrown up intrenchments at Swedes Ford, he turned up the river as if to cross above. Washington feared that it was his intention to strike at Reading, where his stores were deposited, and to protect them marched in the same direction on the opposite side of the river. When he reached Potts Grove, now Pottstown, he discovered that Howe, by a retrograde movement on the night of the 22d, had crossed at Fatland and Gordon's fords, and was in full march for Philadelphia.

On the day of the battle of Brandywine the citizens of Philadelphia heard the sound of cannon in the west, and gathered in the streets to discuss and wonder what the future would bring forth. At night a messenger arrived with news of the disaster. Everything was in confusion, and when, on the morning of the 19th, about one o'clock, a letter was received from Colonel Hamilton stating that the British were marching on the city, the members of Congress were aroused from their beds, and departed in haste for Lancaster, where they had agreed to meet should their removal from Philadelphia become necessary.

GENERAL HOWE.

From Murray's Impartial Hist. of the present War, i. 280.

"It was a beautiful still moonlight night, and the streets as full of men, women, and children as on a market day." The alarm was premature, but on the 25th Howe's army encamped at Germantown. Through Thomas Willing, a leading citizen of Philadelphia, the inhabitants were promised by Sir William Howe that if they should remain peaceably in their dwellings they would not be molested. The next morning, Cornwallis, with three thousand men, took possession of the city. The troops marched down Second Street to the music of "God save the King", and were greeted by some of the inhabitants with "acclamations of joy", but the people generally "appeared sad and serious." Howe immediately began to throw up a line of intrenchments north of the city, extending from the Delaware to the Schuylkill, and informed his brother, the admiral, who was in Delaware Bay, that the army was in possession of the city. The defences of the river prevented the fleet from approaching, and the day after the occupation an attempt was made by the American flotilla to cannonade the city. The smaller vessels were driven off before they had done serious damage, but the frigate "Delaware" ran aground and was captured.

ALEXANDER HAMILTON.

After a crayon in the Hist. Soc. of Pennsylvania. There is a picture in Independence Hall. Ceracchi's bust is given in stipple in Delaplaine's Repository (1815).

For view of "The Grange", Hamilton's home, see Valentine's N. Y. Manual, 1858, p. 468; Mrs. Lamb's Homes of America; Lossing's Hudson, 275.—Ed.

The main portion of Howe's army remained at Germantown, a village of a single street, two miles in length, and five from the city. In the centre stood the market-house, and along the road which there crosses the main street Howe's army was encamped. The left under Knyphausen reached to the Schuylkill, the right under Grant and Mathews to the York road. At the upper end of the town stood the large stone mansion of Benjamin Chew, late chief justice of the province, and in a field opposite the 40th Regiment under Colonel Musgrave was encamped. The advance was a mile beyond at Mount Pleasant, where the second battalion of light infantry was stationed, with their pickets thrown out at Mount Airy still further on. After Howe crossed the Schuylkill, Washington marched to Pennybacker's Mills, and thence to Metutchen Hills, fifteen miles from Philadelphia. He had been reinforced by McDougall's brigade and other troops; and learning that Howe had detached a portion of his command to reduce the forts on the Delaware, he determined to attack him at Germantown. His plan was to engage the troops at Mount Pleasant with a portion of his army, while a large force under Greene should move down the Lime Kiln road, which enters the town from the east at the market-house, and attack Grant and Mathews. At the same time the Pennsylvania and Jersey militia were to make demonstrations on the enemy's left and right flanks respectively.

ANTHONY WAYNE.

From the New York Magazine, March, 1797, following a picture by Trumbull, now at New Haven. Other engravings are in the National Portrait Gallery (N. Y., 1834); Irving's Washington, quarto ed., vol. iii.; in Jones's Georgia, vol. ii., engraved by H. B. Hall; Lossing's Field-Book, ii. 177. It has been engraved by I. B. Forrest, J. F. E. Prud'homme, and others. A portrait by Henry Elonis is engraved by Geo. Grahame. A likeness, front face, without hat, is in the Mag. of Amer. History, Feb., 1886, and History of Chester County by Futhy and Cope. Cf. Penna. Archives, vol. x., and the sketch by J. W. De Peyster, and a new portrait in United Service, March, 1886, p. 304.

A view of Wayne's house is given in Egle's Pennsylvania, p. 540; Lossing's Field-Book, ii. 373; Harper's Mag., April, 1880.—Ed.

Washington moved from his quarters on the evening of October 3d. Sullivan commanded the troops that were to attack the enemy in front, and was followed by the reserve under Stirling, which Washington accompanied. Sullivan arrived at Chestnut Hill on the morning of the 4th at sunrise, and halted two hours to allow Greene to gain his ground, that the attacks might be made at the same time. Captain Allen McLane's company and a portion of Conway's brigade were then ordered to advance. They drove the guard at Mount Airy back on the light infantry, and held them in check while Sullivan formed his line. Wayne's division was on the east of the road, Sullivan's on the west. The whole under Sullivan then moved forward, driving the light infantry before them. A thick fog enveloped everything, and the men could not see forty yards in front of them. But Wayne's men dashed on, calling to each other to remember Paoli and crying for vengeance. The light infantry were reinforced by the 40th Regiment under Musgrave. Just then Howe rode up, calling out: "For shame, light infantry! I never saw you retreat before." But he found the attack was general, and rode back to the main line. Down the main street and past Chew's house Sullivan and Wayne pursued the flying troops. But here the rout of the British was checked by Agnew, who hastened forward with a portion of the left wing. As the reserve passed Chew's house they were fired upon by six companies of the 40th that had taken refuge there with their commander Musgrave. Stirling endeavored to dislodge them, but the effort was futile. Lieutenant-Colonel John Laurens and Major Louis Fleury daringly attempted to fire the house, but were unsuccessful. While this was going on, Greene made his attack on the right wing. His march had taken half an hour longer than anticipated, while he still met the enemy sooner than planned, as their first battalion of light infantry had been moved forward the night before on the Lime Kiln road. Greene attempted to advance in line of battle, but his line was thrown into confusion. He drove a portion of the troops back to the market-house, but when he encountered Grant he was obliged to retire, and a part of his command was captured. Woodford's brigade wandered so far from Greene's right as to reach the rear of Chew's house. It was then directly behind Wayne's division, and when the brigade fired on the house Wayne's men retired, as they supposed the enemy were in their rear. This uncovered Sullivan's flank, and he too was obliged to fall back. The British pursued until Whitemarsh was reached, where Wayne checked them with a battery posted on the hill, near the church. The Americans lost nearly eleven hundred killed, wounded, and prisoners; the British, five hundred and twenty-one. The American General Nash, of North Carolina, and the British General Agnew were mortally wounded. While the Americans were defeated in their object, the moral results of the battle were in their favor. It inspired them with confidence, and showed the world that though driven from the field of Brandywine they were still aggressive.

It was now evident to Howe that he must open communication with New York by water, or his army would be in a state of siege. His attention was therefore turned to the defences of the Delaware which were held by the Americans. The most formidable of these was Fort Mifflin, situated on an island in the river a short distance below the mouth of the Schuylkill. Opposite this, at Red Bank, on the Jersey shore, was Fort Mercer, while four or five miles below, at Billingsport, was another fortification. Opposite these points chevaux-de-frise were sunk in the channel, which were protected by the batteries and by a fleet of small vessels, known as the Pennsylvania navy, commanded by Commodore John Hazelwood. Besides these, there were several larger vessels which had been built by order of Congress.

On the 19th of October Howe withdrew his troops from Germantown and encamped them behind his lines of intrenchments on the north side of the city. Before this he had erected batteries to attack Fort Mifflin. He now sent a body of men, under Colonel Stirling, over the river from Chester to capture the fort at Billingsport. The garrison there was not sufficient for the defence of the fort, and as the British approached they evacuated the post. By the 21st Admiral Howe succeeded in passing the lower chevaux-de-frise, and his vessels sailed up the river to a point nearly opposite Fort Mifflin. On the same day three battalions of Hessians, with artillery, crossed into Jersey from Philadelphia to attack Fort Mercer. They arrived before the fort on the afternoon of the 22d. It was commanded by Colonel Christopher Greene, of Rhode Island, who had with him but six hundred men. The fortifications were unfinished, but a strong redoubt, with an abatis, had been constructed. Donop summoned the garrison to surrender, and upon receiving a refusal formed his regiments for the attack. They rushed upon the embankments and passed the abandoned lines with little opposition. But when they charged the redoubt, they were met with a fire that nearly filled the ditches with killed and wounded. Most of the men retired in confusion, and those who attempted to scale the works were beaten back in a hand-to-hand conflict. It was intended that the fleet should coöperate with Donop; that the "Vigilant", with sixteen 24-pounders, should pass to the west of Fort Mifflin, while other vessels should engage Hazelwood and prevent his offering assistance to Greene. The plan failed, however, at all points. The "Vigilant" could not sail up the west channel, and Hazelwood was more than a match for the vessels sent against him. He drove them back, while some of his boats sailed close to the shore and poured an effective fire into the flank of Donop's column. It was in vain that Donop and his officers re-formed the men and led them back to the attack. They were shot down in scores as they attempted to remove the abatis, and in three quarters of an hour from the time the engagement opened the men withdrew for the last time, leaving Donop behind them, mortally wounded. He died three days afterwards, "finishing", to use his own words, "a noble career early." His command had numbered about twenty-five hundred men, one sixth of whom were either killed or wounded. The Americans had but fourteen killed and twenty-three wounded. Two of the vessels which had been sent against Hazelwood, the "Augusta" and the "Merlin", ran aground, and were discovered in that position by the Americans on the 22d. They were at once attacked, and the magazine of the "Augusta" exploded with terrific force. She had been set on fire either by accident or by a shot from the American batteries, and blew up before all of her crew could be removed. It was found impossible to save the "Merlin", and she was fired by her officers and destroyed.

THE DESTRUCTION OF THE AUGUSTA.

After a painting in gallery of the Hist. Soc. of Pennsylvania, said to have been painted by a French officer. Cf. Wallace's Col. Wm. Bradford.

Taught caution by these reverses, Howe made no further effort to capture the forts until he had succeeded in erecting a number of batteries on the Pennsylvania shore within range of Fort Mifflin. On the 10th of November these were opened with serious result to the Americans. The reply from the fort was spirited, and the damage done to it in daytime was repaired during the night. On the first day, Colonel Samuel Smith, of Maryland, who commanded the garrison, was wounded, and was taken to Red Bank. The second in command, Lieutenant-Colonel Russell, was relieved, on account of ill-health, by Major Simeon Thayer, of Rhode Island, and the defence of the fort was continued. On the 15th the "Vigilant", carrying sixteen 24-pounders, and a hulk with three guns of the same capacity, succeeded in passing up the west channel and taking the fort in the rear, while other vessels engaged the fleet. The fort by this time was little more than a mass of ruins. The ammunition was nearly exhausted. Major Fleury, the engineer of the fort, and Major Talbot were wounded; nearly all the guns were dismounted, and whenever the men appeared on the platforms they were picked off by sharpshooters in the shrouds of the vessels. During the night of the 15th the garrison was removed to Red Bank, as preparations were being made to storm the place the next day, and on the morning of the 16th the British took possession of the place. The gallant defence of this fort by about three hundred men called forth commendations from all sides. Swords were voted to Hazelwood and Smith by Congress, while Fleury and Thayer were promoted. Fort Mercer was now the only water-defence held by the Americans. With the object of capturing it, on the 18th Cornwallis marched to Chester and crossed to Billingsport. Greene was sent to oppose him, and crossed the Delaware at Bristol; but before he could render any assistance to Varnum, who commanded the troops on the Jersey side of the river, that officer was obliged to retire before Cornwallis and abandon Fort Mercer, which the British now destroyed. Lafayette, who was with Greene, made a spirited attack on a body of Hessians encamped near Gloucester, for which he gained considerable credit. The majority of the small vessels of the Pennsylvania navy succeeded in passing up the river by the batteries that Howe had erected at Philadelphia, but the larger ones, together with nearly all those built by Congress, were destroyed.

A few days after the fall of Fort Mifflin the British transports made their way up to Philadelphia, and to some extent relieved the distress that the scarcity of provisions occasioned. About the end of October Washington removed his headquarters to Whitemarsh, and on November 24th reconnoitred the enemy's lines with a view to attack them. A majority of his officers, however, opposed the plan. It was soon evident that Sir William Howe was about to resume the offensive, and Greene was recalled from Jersey. On the evening of December 4th, Howe, with nearly all his army, marched out of Philadelphia with the avowed intention of driving Washington over the mountains. His advance-guard arrived at Chestnut Hill about daylight the next morning. General James Irvine with the Pennsylvania militia met them at the foot of the hill, and, after a sharp skirmish, the militia fled, leaving Irvine wounded in the hands of the British. When Howe arrived in front of Washington's lines he found them so strong that he did not dare to attack them, and after spending four days in endeavoring to gain a position that would compel Washington to attack him, he suddenly gave up the design and returned to the city.

As the season was advancing, and the Americans were in no condition to keep the field, it was decided to go into winter-quarters at Valley Forge, on the west side of the Schuylkill, where the Valley Creek empties into the river. The surrounding hills were covered with woods and presented an inhospitable appearance. The choice was severely criticised, and De Kalb described it as a wilderness. But the position was central and easily defended. The army arrived there about the middle of December, and the erection of huts began. They were built of logs, and were fourteen by fifteen feet each. The windows were covered with oiled paper, and the openings between the logs were closed with clay. The huts were arranged in streets, giving the place the appearance of a city. It was the first of the year, however, before they were occupied, and previous to that the suffering of the army had become great. Although the weather was intensely cold the men were obliged to work at the buildings, with nothing to support life but flour mixed with water, which they baked into cakes at the open fires. "My brigade's out of provisions, nor can the commissary obtain any meat", wrote Huntington on the 22d of December. "Three days successively we have been destitute of bread", said Varnum the same day, "and two days we have been entirely without meat." Soap, vinegar, and other articles necessary for the health of the men were never furnished, and so imperfectly did the clothier-general perform his duties that many of the men were without shirts, and hundreds were confined to the hospitals and farm-houses for want of shoes. Blankets and proper coverings were so scarce that numbers, after toiling during the day, were obliged to sit by the fires all night to keep from freezing. By the 23d of December two thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight men were unfit for duty, because they were barefoot and otherwise naked. The horses died of starvation by hundreds, and the men were obliged to haul their own provisions and firewood. As straw could not be found to protect the men from the cold ground, sickness spread through their quarters with fearful rapidity. "The unfortunate soldiers", wrote Lafayette, in after-years, "were in want of everything; they had neither coats, hats, shirts, nor shoes; their feet and their legs froze till they became black, and it was often necessary to amputate them.... The army frequently remained whole days without provisions, and the patient endurance of both soldiers and officers was a miracle which each moment served to renew." At times, however, it seemed as if the forbearance of the men was exhausted, and that the war would end in mutiny. But the officers succeeded in allaying the feelings of discontent, and under the management of Greene, who assumed the duties of quarter-master-general on the 23d of March, a change for the better took place.

While the country around Valley Forge was so impoverished by the military operations of the previous summer as to make it impossible for it to support the army, the sufferings of the latter were chiefly owing to the inefficiency of Congress. That body met at Lancaster after leaving Philadelphia, and at once adjourned to York, where its sessions were continued. But it in no way equalled the congresses which had preceded it. "The Continental Congress and the currency", wrote Gouverneur Morris in 1778, "have greatly depreciated." Many of the members entertained the widespread fear of a standing army, and refused to follow the advice given by Washington for the relief of the men who defended them. Some of the delegates, indeed, did not hesitate to criticise the judgment of Washington, and question his abilities. The capture of Burgoyne gave them an opportunity of comparing the results of the Northern and Southern campaigns. In writing of Washington's army a member of Congress said to Gates: "We have had a noble army melted down by ill-judged marches, which disgrace their authors and directors, and which have occasioned the severest and most just sarcasm and contempt of our enemies. How much you are to be envied, my dear general! How different your conduct and your fortune! In short, this army will be totally lost unless you come down and collect the virtuous band, who wish to fight under your banner, and with their aid save the southern hemisphere. Congress must send for you." "I am weary", exclaimed John Adams, "with so much insipidity." "I am sick of Fabian systems in all quarters." It was a matter for thanksgiving, he thought, that the credit of defending the Delaware was "not immediately due to the commander-in-chief nor to Southern troops. If it had been, idolatry and adulation would have been unbounded." The prevalence of these sentiments made it easy for disappointed soldiers like Mifflin and Conway to spread dissensions which, if they had been allowed to grow, would have brought about the removal of Washington. Mifflin's eloquence and abilities as a politician far exceeded his merits in the field; and he was jealous of the preference shown by Washington for Greene and Knox. Conway aspired to a major-generalship, and was chagrined that Washington opposed him. If Washington had been removed and Lee or Gates appointed in his place, Mifflin and Conway would have been benefited by the change. The schemes of the last two were warmly supported by James Lovell and Dr. Benjamin Rush, and the most insidious measures were entered upon to undermine the reputation of Washington. Anonymous letters were circulated for this purpose, and the country was made to ring with the cry that, under a Gates, a Lee, or a Conway, the Southern army would be victorious. Through the influence of this faction, Gates was made president of the Board of War, of which Mifflin was a member, and authority which belonged to the commander-in-chief was vested in it. To separate Lafayette from Washington, and gain for themselves the influence of his name, the "Cabal", as it has been called, proposed an impracticable winter campaign against Canada, which Lafayette was to command, with Conway to assist him. But here the faction spent its strength. The friends of Washington had been put on their guard by the disclosure of a correspondence which showed the malignity of his enemies. Wilkinson, who was on Gates's staff, repeated, while his tongue was loosened with wine, an opinion expressed in a letter that Conway had written to Gates. Gates read it to his military family. "Heaven has been determined to save your country", it said, "or a weak general and bad counsellors would have ruined it." The words reached Washington, who enclosed them to Conway, simply informing him that he understood they formed a portion of a letter of his to Gates. It was in vain that the members of the Cabal attempted at first to carry the matter through with a high hand, then to deny that such a letter had ever been written, and finally to excuse themselves. Their ends were discovered and their power was gone. Lafayette would have nothing to do with the Canadian expedition unless De Kalb was made his second in command. He repaired to Albany only to find that no measures had been taken to carry out the promises made him, and as the friends of Washington were soon in the ascendency in Congress, Lafayette was recalled to Valley Forge.

Through the advice of a committee which Congress had sent to camp to inquire into the condition of the army, many defects and abuses were corrected, and its organization was improved. The new troops that had been called for came in slowly, but their effectiveness was increased through the exertion of Baron Steuben, who joined the army about the close of February. A pupil of Frederick the Great, and a distinguished officer in the Prussian service, he won the esteem of Congress by offering to serve as a volunteer. His experience and industry soon instilled a discipline into the army which it had never known, and in May he was made inspector-general, with the rank and pay of a major-general.

While the American army was suffering at Valley Forge the British were comfortably quartered in Philadelphia. When they first entered the city it presented a sorry appearance: 590 dwellings and 240 stores were unoccupied; the leaden spouts of many houses had been taken down to mould into bullets, and the bells of the churches and public buildings had been removed to places of safety. The male population between the ages of eighteen and sixty numbered but 5,335, and of these one fifth were Quakers. The feelings of the Quaker citizens had been greatly outraged by the arrest and banishment to the western part of Virginia of a number of their people. Sullivan had discovered on his march through New Jersey what he believed to be a treasonable correspondence on their part with the enemy, and he had forwarded the papers to Congress. The matter had been referred to the authorities of Pennsylvania, who found in the correspondence, and in an address issued by the Quaker meeting in December, the grounds for sending the Quaker leaders into exile. It was but natural that the families of these men should have looked upon the British as their deliverers from an outrageous tyranny. But they soon found to their sorrow that their opposition to war afforded them as little protection from one side as from the other. The property destroyed by the British was enormous, and a revulsion of feeling was the consequence. At one time seventeen handsome houses beyond the lines were set on fire to prevent their being occupied by the American pickets. Persons living in the neighborhood of the city were robbed by both parties, and their crops carried off or destroyed. The temptation to sell their produce for hard money induced some of the neighboring farmers to supply the enemy with luxuries, though they found access to the city hazardous. The Americans under Smallwood guarded the roads leading to Wilmington, while Generals Potter and Lacy scoured the country west and north of the city. Captains Allen McLane, Clark, and Lee watched the movements of the enemy and reported them to Washington, but they could not oppose the large forces that Howe frequently sent out to protect those who were willing to risk furnishing him with provisions.

Note.—The play-bill on the opposite page is after a fac-simile given in Smith's Amer. Hist. and Lit. Curios., 2d series. A list of such bills printed in Philadelphia at this time is given in Hildeburn's Issues of the Press in Penna., ii. pp. 315, 316.

The desolation which surrounded the town was soon in striking contrast with the scenes within. The empty stores were occupied by itinerant traders from New York, who offered for sale articles of luxury that the war had driven from the American market. The officers of the army were quartered on the citizens, and after the campaign closed they gave themselves up to social enjoyments. Clubs met at the public-houses, and weekly balls were given at the City Tavern. As many of the officers were men of education and refinement, they were warmly welcomed in the families of leading citizens; but there was another class who did much to change the moral aspect of the city, when, by following the loose example of their commander, Sir William Howe, they shocked the staid citizens with their immorality. Cock-fighting and gambling were favorite amusements, and a faro-table kept by a foreigner proved the ruin of many young officers. The theatre on South Street was fitted up under directions of Captains André and De Lancey. Some of the scenes were painted by André. The profits of the performances were divided among the widows and orphans of the soldiers. As spring approached, horse-racing was added to the list of amusements. While citizens of wealth could take part in the gaieties which surrounded them, those in moderate circumstances suffered privations. Firewood was extremely scarce and provisions high. "Nothing but hard money will pass", wrote a resident to a relative outside of the lines. "There is plenty of goods, but little money among the tradespeople. The market is poor. I received the butter by J——; we are no longer accustomed to eat butter on our bread. I keep it to make water soup, which we have nearly every day." The army of occupation, on the other hand, was plentifully supplied with military stores after the defences on the Delaware were captured.

Martial law ruled supreme. The appointment of Joseph Galloway to be superintendent of police and the designation of magistrates under him were the only steps taken towards the revival of civil authority, and Galloway received his orders from headquarters.

The supineness of Howe robbed the British of all the benefits that might have resulted from the capture of Philadelphia. Attempts were made to raise regiments of loyalists, but so little support did the scheme receive that it was only partially successful. The "Pennsylvania Loyalists", of which William Allen, Jr., was colonel, and the "Queen's Rangers", commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Simcoe, were the most efficient of these corps. No attempt was made to drive Washington's half-starved forces from their camp, although their condition was perfectly well known to Howe through the deserters that flocked to the city. The military movements of Howe while in Philadelphia were confined to foraging expeditions and attacks on isolated posts that could be surprised and broken up with little danger of loss. While these were successful, they gave to the war a predatory character that reflected little credit on British arms, and intensified the bitterness entertained for all representatives of royal authority.

The British government, dissatisfied with the results of Howe's campaigns, decided early in 1778 upon his recall. Sir Henry Clinton, his successor, arrived in Philadelphia the 8th of May, and on the 18th an entertainment was given by the officers of the army in honor of the retiring commander. The fête was styled the "Mischianza", and consisted of a regatta, a mock tournament, and a ball. But "Knights of the Burning Mountain" and of the "Blended Rose", with squires and ladies decked with spangles and ribbons, could not disguise the fact that the royal army had failed in accomplishing the task assigned to it, and the chagrin of its veterans was deepened by the frivolous scenes which marked the retirement of Sir William Howe.

The alliance with France made it necessary for the British to contract their operations, and Sir Henry Clinton brought with him orders to evacuate Philadelphia. His intention of doing so became known to Washington, and that his information might be more certain he ordered Lafayette, with a body of two thousand four hundred men, the flower of the army, to cross the Schuylkill and take a position near the city. This movement was made on the very day of the Mischianza, and on the morning of the 19th Howe learned that Lafayette was at Barren Hill, twelve miles distant. Clinton had not yet assumed command, and in the hope of closing his career in America by a brilliant stroke, Howe determined to make an effort to capture the young Frenchman and his detachment. So confident was he of doing this, that, before leaving the city, he invited his friends to meet Lafayette, whom he promised to bring with him on his return, while his brother, the admiral, prepared a vessel in which to take the distinguished captive to England. On the night of the 19th Grant, with five thousand men, marched by way of Frankford and Oxford, and by morning he had gained a point on the Swedes Ford road two miles in the rear of Lafayette. Another detachment, under Grey, was sent by way of Chestnut Hill to attack Lafayette's flank; while the main portion of the army, under Howe, took the Ridge road, to attack him in front. Lafayette's position was on high ground, and was naturally strong. Neither Grey nor Howe could approach him without his being aware of their advance. In his rear were two roads. One led along the riverside to Matson's Ford, three miles distant; the other along a ridge, a short distance from the river, to Swedes Ford, still higher up. The ground between the roads was heavily wooded. Had Grant, who held the Swedes Ford road, sent a portion of his force to Matson's Ford (which he could have done by a cross-road), Lafayette's only line of retreat would have been destroyed. But in place of doing this he marched down the Swedes Ford road to attack the American rear. Through the carelessness of his scouts, Lafayette was ignorant of Grant's position. He was preparing his force to receive Howe, when he heard of the column advancing from Chestnut Hill. He had just faced a portion of his troops in that direction when he learned that Grant was in his rear. Lafayette's danger was now apparent, but he was equal to the occasion. Without losing a moment, he sent troops through the woods, with orders to allow themselves to be seen at times by Grant, and lead him to suppose that they were the advance-guards of larger numbers. He also left a small body to engage the attention of Howe and Grey, and then silently marched his detachment along the river road, below Grant, to Matson's Ford. Grant was entirely deceived. He halted his men, reconnoitred the troops seen in the woods, and then pushed on to Barren Hill, where he met the other columns and discovered that Lafayette had escaped. The British pursued him to the ford, but by the time they reached it Lafayette had drawn up his force on the other side, and his rear-guard could be seen following him, dotting the river like the corks of a seine. Fearing that Lafayette had been reinforced by the entire American army, Howe made no attempt to follow him, but returned to the city, and on the 24th sailed for England.

The evacuation of Philadelphia was now only a question of time, and the news that it had been decided upon was appalling to the Tory citizens who had openly committed themselves to the royal side. In their despair they offered to raise three thousand men, if two thousand of the royal army could be left in addition, to protect the city. Howe had advised some of them to make terms with Congress, but those who had been most active in serving him decided to leave with the army. One hundred and eighty transports arrived in the Delaware, and such diligence was used in loading them that for days light carts drawn by soldiers, and every kind of carriage, from wagons to wheelbarrows, were constantly rolling between the houses and the river. As fast as the transports received their cargoes they dropped down the river. The defences were dismantled. On the 30th of May bodies of troops were thrown across the Delaware to protect the passage of the army. Everything was now ready for the departure of the British, but the final movement was delayed for a few days on account of the arrival of the commissioners appointed under the conciliatory bills of Parliament. At last, on the morning of June 18th, the men were withdrawn from the lines and marched below the city, where they were embarked upon boats and taken over to Gloucester. This was done so quietly that many of the citizens were not aware of the departure of the army until they noticed the absence of the redcoats in the streets. "They did not go away", wrote a resident, "they vanished."

By narrowly watching the movements of the enemy Washington was convinced that it was Clinton's intention to march the greater part of his army across Jersey. In this opinion he was opposed by the erratic Charles Lee, who had been exchanged, and had reached the camp. Lee could not believe that the British would give up Pennsylvania, and argued that it was more probable that they would strike at Lancaster, or possibly cross the lower Susquehanna and take up a position on its west bank. Before this, however, Washington had sent all of the Jersey troops into that State. He had put them under the command of Maxwell, with directions to coöperate with Dickinson, who commanded the militia, in opposing any attempt Clinton should make to cross the State. On the 18th of June George Roberts rode at full speed into camp at Valley Forge. He had been at the ferry over the Schuylkill at Market Street, and citizens on the Philadelphia side had shouted over the water that the British had gone. They had destroyed the bridge, so that he was unable to cross, but the intelligence could be relied upon. Shortly afterwards a letter was received from Captain Allen McLane confirming the news. He had ridden into the city from the north, and had picked up some stragglers.

Washington had everything in readiness to move the army at a moment's notice. Six brigades were immediately put in motion, and the remainder of the army followed the next day. Crossing the Schuylkill at Valley Forge, Washington marched directly for Coryell's Ferry on the Delaware, which he crossed on the 22d. He now sent a picked corps under Morgan to assist Maxwell. At Hopewell a council of war was held. Lee opposed any attack, and argued that, on military grounds, rather than delay the British, he would build a bridge of gold to facilitate their march. He so successfully urged his views that it was decided to move on a line parallel with the enemy, and send only a detachment of fifteen hundred men under Scott to aid Maxwell in annoying their flanks. Greene, Lafayette, and Wayne protested against the decision of the Council, and as their views agreed with Washington's, and were supported by Steuben and Du Portail, Washington determined to attack Clinton if an opportunity offered. For this purpose he moved his army to Kingston, whence he could strike at Clinton's line if he attempted to cross the Raritan. He also sent Wayne with a thousand men and Poor's detachment to join Scott and Maxwell. The command of this body belonged to Lee, but as he did not approve of the change in the plans, he declined it in favor of Lafayette. Subsequently, however, Lee claimed it, and to relieve Washington from an embarrassing position, and save Lee's feelings, Lafayette magnanimously yielded. The Jersey militia had turned out in a spirited manner, and under Dickinson and Forman were doing all in their power to retard Clinton's advance. They destroyed the bridges as they retired from Haddonfield to Mount Holly, and filled up the wells so that the enemy could not obtain water. The heat was intense and the British suffered severely. Clinton arrived at Crosswicks on the 23d, just in time to save a bridge over the creek at that place. There he learned that Washington was in Jersey, and would soon be on his flank if he continued to march in his present direction. Encumbered as he was with a baggage train twelve miles long, Clinton knew it would be impossible to protect it in crossing the Raritan. He determined, therefore, to march by the way of Freehold to the Neversink Hills, from which place he could embark his army for New York. Morgan and Maxwell hung on his rear from the time he left Crosswicks, and to protect his baggage Clinton sent it to the head of the column. As he approached Freehold, he knew from the frequency with which troops were seen on his left that he was in close proximity to the American army. He arrived at Freehold, where the court-house of Monmouth County is situated, on the morning of the 26th, and there encamped. The head of his column extended a mile and a half beyond the court-house on the road to Middletown. His left was on the road just marched over from Crosswicks to Freehold. The village was entered on the west by a road leading to Cranberry. It passed over low ground that was intersected by several swamps and ravines, which, with woods, completely covered the left of Clinton's line. The American army reached Cranberry, eight miles from Freehold, on the morning of the 26th. On account of a violent storm it was obliged to halt there, but the advance under Lee was within five miles of the enemy. When Washington heard of Clinton's position he ordered Lee to prepare a plan to attack him as soon as he resumed his march, unless it should prove that there were strong reasons for his not doing so. On the evening of the 27th Lee called his officers together only to tell them that no plan could be decided upon until the field was reached. At sunrise on the morning of the 28th, Knyphausen, with the baggage, began his march towards Middletown. At eight o'clock he was followed by the rest of the army. Scarcely had the rear-guard moved from its ground when it was fired upon by the militia under Dickinson. The militia were forced to retire, and as they did so were met by Lee's detachment as it advanced from Englishtown. On account of conflicting information the Americans halted for a short time, and then engaged the enemy and drove them towards their retreating columns. As matters were growing serious, Clinton reinforced his rear-guard, and the fighting promised to become general. But Lee had no faith in the ability of the Americans to cope with the British, and as the latter occupied strong ground he withdrew his men. From the time Clinton began his march across Jersey, Lee had contended that all the Americans could hope to do was to fall upon some isolated party of the enemy and either rout or capture it. To effect this he endeavored to draw the rear-guard of the British across the ravines intersecting the low ground west of Freehold, and while they were thus separated from the main body to defeat them. But his men could not understand his strategy. As they were withdrawn from one position after another they lost heart. It seemed to them that they were flying from a shadow, and so frequently were they ordered back that the retreat became rapid and confused. When Washington heard that Dickinson had engaged the enemy he again sent word to Lee to attack them also, unless there were powerful reasons for the contrary, and he would support him with the entire army. The day was excessively hot, and the men threw off their knapsacks that they might march more quickly. As they came to the church which stands between Englishtown and Freehold, stragglers were met who told them that Lee was retreating. Unwilling to believe the story, Washington spurred to the front to learn the truth. After passing the ravine which borders the low ground we have spoken of, on the west, he met Lee and his men in full retreat. A stormy scene ensued. Overwhelmed by the indignation which Washington manifested, Lee vainly endeavored to excuse his conduct. Little time, however, was lost in wasting words. Calling upon Colonels Stewart and Ramsey, who were near him with their regiments, to check the enemy, then but two hundred yards distant, Washington crossed the ravine in his rear, and formed his men as they came up on its western bank. Greene was placed on the right and Stirling on the left, while Wayne remained east of the ravine in front of Greene. In this position a severe engagement took place. Encouraged by the retreat of Lee, Clinton sent additional reinforcements to his rear, and vainly strove to drive Washington from his chosen ground. A battery under the Chevalier de Mauduit Duplessis, planted on an elevation on Greene's right, kept up an effective fire on the enemy's left, while Wayne repelled a desperate charge led by Lieutenant-Colonel Monckton, in which that officer fell at the head of his men. Night ended the conflict, and both parties slept on the ground which they had occupied. At midnight Clinton withdrew his troops, and, leaving his dead unburied, resumed his march to Middletown. He retired so silently that Poor, who lay close to his right, was not aware of the movement, and on the morning of the 29th the Americans found themselves alone on the field. By daybreak Clinton was on too strong ground to be attacked, and after resting his men a few days Washington marched to the North River, and Clinton embarked for New York.

The battle of Monmouth, as the conflict at Freehold was called, was the last general engagement fought on Northern soil. The Americans had 229 killed and wounded, the British over 400. Besides this, the latter lost many by desertion on their march, and numbers fell from the effects of the heat, which registered ninety-six degrees on the day of the battle.

Lee's conduct would probably have passed unnoticed had he not, in a letter to Washington, endeavored to defend himself, while he demanded the grounds which called forth the remarks addressed to him on the battlefield. The letter was written in a highly improper spirit, and the result was a court-martial, that found Lee guilty of disobedience of orders, misbehavior before the enemy, and disrespect of the commander-in-chief. For these reasons he was suspended from command for twelve months, and before he was again ordered to service he was dismissed from the army for having written an impertinent letter to Congress.

Before leaving Valley Forge, Washington directed General Arnold, who had not fully recovered from the wounds received at Saratoga, to proceed to Philadelphia and take military command of the city. The duties assigned him were of a delicate nature. Congress had ordered that when the Americans took possession of the city no goods should be sold or removed until their ownership had been decided upon by a properly constituted commission. The object of this was to secure for the army such goods as the British and Tories might have abandoned or parted with at nominal prices to their friends. In his instructions to Arnold, Washington had referred him to the resolutions of Congress for his guidance, and had urged him to take every step in his power to preserve tranquillity and give security to individuals of every class until the restoration of civil power. Arnold arrived on the morning of the 19th of June, and with the approbation of several of the principal citizens issued a proclamation that closed the stores and suspended business. It also commanded the citizens to make returns to the town major of goods in their possession, beyond those needed for family use, that the purchasing agents of the army might contract for those they required. The temptation to benefit himself by the power he now exercised was greater than Arnold could withstand, and three days after he issued his first proclamation he entered into an agreement with the clothier-general of the army and another individual, that all goods purchased for the public and found to be superfluous should be charged to them and sold for their joint account. It soon became noised about that Arnold was personally interested in the purchases ostensibly made for the government, and although the secret of the agreement was preserved until after his treason, the knowledge of his speculations in Montreal gave such a color of truth to the rumor that the community were greatly dissatisfied: besides, he took up his abode in a spacious mansion on Market Street, formerly the residence of Governor Penn, which Howe had just vacated, and entered upon a style of living far beyond his means.

When the exiled Whigs returned to their homes they found the city in a filthy condition, and its surroundings a scene of desolation. The houses in the built-up portions of the city were not much injured, but many of them had been stripped of their furniture, and the papers were filled with advertisements of missing articles which the owners hoped to recover. The Supreme Executive Council resumed its sessions in Philadelphia on the 26th of June. Its patriotic president, Thomas Wharton, Jr., had died at Lancaster the month previous, and it was presided over by the vice-president, George Bryan. The Congress assembled more slowly. On the 2d of July a few delegates gathered in the State House, and two days afterwards celebrated the anniversary of Independence at the City Tavern; but it was not until the 7th that a sufficient number were present to conduct business. On the 12th, Gérard, the French ambassador, arrived. Until a suitable residence could be found for him he was the guest of Arnold. Congress received and entertained him on the 6th of August. No opportunity was lost of honoring the new ally. On the birthday of Louis XVI. the president and members of Congress called upon his ambassador and offered their congratulations, and on the 25th were in turn entertained by Gérard.

In the midst of their rejoicings the Whigs did not forget the Tories, whom they looked upon as promoters of their sufferings. Many of them had been attainted of treason while the government was at Lancaster, but the most obnoxious had gone off with the British. Such as remained were summoned before the authorities, and so great was the clamor against them that several were executed for aiding the enemy. The new Constitution had been put into effect, but it was opposed by a number of conscientious Whigs, and its administration was largely in the hands of new men, who did not command universal respect. The depreciation of the currency had also a demoralizing effect. Speculation ran wild, and the greatest extravagance prevailed. The prices of all kinds of commodities rose to enormous figures, and the attempts of Congress to regulate them by law and fix the value of the currency only served to increase the evil. The community was soon divided into two classes. The Anti-Constitutionalists and the Tories formed one party; the supporters of the new government the other. The latter zealously advocated all the measures of Congress, and, classing their opponents under the one head of "Tories", accused them of being the authors of all the difficulties that embarrassed the government; it was through their efforts that traitors were allowed to go unpunished, and the necessaries of life locked up so that higher prices could be wrung from the people. "Party disputes and personal quarrels", wrote Washington from Philadelphia, in December, "are the great business of the day; whilst the momentous concerns of an empire, a great and accumulating debt, ruined finances, depreciated money, and want of credit ... are but secondary considerations." "Our money", he continued, "is now sinking fifty per cent. a day in this city; and yet an assembly, a concert, a dinner, or a supper, that will cost three or four hundred pounds, will not only take men off from acting in this business, but even from thinking of it."

It was in a community thus rent by faction and passion that Arnold commanded. The early restoration of civil power limited his authority, but his arrogance soon brought him in conflict with the new government. Unable to brook the restraint it put upon him, he joined its opponents, and was soon the centre of a gay and fashionable circle that gladly added so distinguished a soldier to their number. Arnold at that time was a widower, in his thirty-eighth year. He was of a susceptible nature, and before long fell in love with Miss Peggy Shippen, the daughter of Edward Shippen, a leading lawyer of character and position, whose political opinions caused him to be numbered among the disaffected. In this company the temptations to spend money were not easily resisted, and Arnold soon yielded to them. He gave elegant entertainments, and lived ostentatiously, if not extravagantly. He was soon involved in debt, and in the hopes of extracting himself entered into questionable speculations. His quarrel with the state authorities became more bitter, and in February, 1779, the Council published a series of charges which were referred to Congress. The committee who considered them failed to find Arnold guilty of any intentional wrong, and on the 19th of March he resigned the command of Philadelphia, and on the 8th of April was married to Miss Shippen. The Pennsylvania authorities were dissatisfied with the action of the committee of Congress, and succeeded in having the case reconsidered. After considerable delay, it was determined that the whole matter should be referred to a court-martial, to be appointed by the commander-in-chief. The court met in December, and the following month found Arnold guilty of two of the charges that had been preferred against him. The most serious one, that of speculating in goods bought for the public while the stores were closed, was not sustained for want of evidence, which was not discovered until after his treason. The acts he was found guilty of were indiscretions rather than crimes; and for these he was sentenced to be reprimanded by the commander-in-chief.

[EDITORIAL NOTES ON THE SOURCES OF INFORMATION.]

During the movements of Washington to check the British in their attempts to secure New York, what Congress called a flying camp was formed of some militia in Jersey, under Mercer, to impede the enemy's advance in case he turned towards Philadelphia.[888]

In Nov., 1776, Washington, crossing into New Jersey,[889] left Lee in command on the New York side, but Washington, at first requesting, afterwards instructed Lee to follow him (Sparks's Washington, iv. 168, 186-7, 193; 5 Force, iii. 779; N. Y. Hist. Soc. Coll., 1872, p. 267). Lee's secret purpose was to find some excuse for delaying, and so to prolong his independent command, with a chance of making a brilliant stroke. He endeavored at first to quiet Washington's importunities by detaching a part of Heath's force at Peekskill, but Heath would take orders only from Washington (Memoirs).[890] Finally Lee was moved to follow (Dec. 2d and 3d), and while crossing Jersey "to reconquer it" he was surprised at his transient quarters, Dec. 13, 1776, and captured. Captain Bradford, Lee's aid, gave Stiles the account which is entered in his diary (Johnston's Campaign of 1776, Docs., p. 146, and N. E. Hist. and Geneal. Reg., 1860, p. 33).[891]

(From the Gentleman's Magazine.)

We have abundant evidence of the consternation which ensued in Philadelphia upon the advance of the British to Trenton.[892] The political condition of the government of the colony was very unstable. The colonial charter, under the instigation of Congress (May 10, 1776), had been overthrown by a convention called in the interests of the patriot party, which in July had met to frame a new constitution.[893] This, however, upon its adoption, failed of being effective, by its opponents' obstructive movements to prevent the organization of an executive council, so that in the interim the supreme power, such as it was, resided in a Council of Safety, which was hampered in its control of the militia. Such was the conjunction when fear of an invasion came, and the Quaker element was passive under the alarm, and, indeed, antagonistic to measures of resistance.[894]

JOS. REED.

From Du Simitière's Thirteen Portraits (Lond., 1783). Cf. also Heads of illustrious Americans (London, 1783). A likeness by C. W. Peale, engraved by Sartain, is in W. B. Reed's Life of Jos. Reed, vol. i. A copy of the original painting is in the Hist. Society of Penna. There is also the profile likeness in 2 Penna. Archives, xi.; Scharf and Westcott's Philadelphia, i. 279. There is a painting in Independence Hall by C. W. Peale, which differs from that engraved by Sartain.

The Jersey campaign in general can be followed in original authorities in Sparks's Washington, vol. iv.; Force's 5 Amer. Archives, iii.; in Joseph Reed's "Narrative of the movements of the American army in the neighborhood of Trenton in the winter of 1776-1777", which, having been used in Reed's Reed, i. ch. 14, is printed in the Penna. Mag. of Hist., Dec., 1884, p. 391; the account by Congress,—not very correct,—dated Baltimore, Jan. 9, 1777, and sent to France (Lee's R. H. Lee, and E. E. Hale's Franklin in France, 97); and the current reports sent from Boston, Feb. 27, by Bowdoin to Franklin (Hale, p. 110.)[895]

The principal British contemporary accounts are in Stedman, Annual Register, Howe's Narrative, the evidence of Cornwallis in the Detail and Conduct of the War, and Letter to a Nobleman, 1779.

CHARLES LEE.

From An Impartial Hist. of the War in America, Lond., 1780, p. 319, where the print represents his full length. Compare with this a print by Thomlinson, published in London, Oct. 31, 1755, with cannon and a flag bearing the motto "Appeal to Heaven", which is reproduced in Smith's British Mezzotint Portraits, and the engraving by G. R. Hall in Moore's Treason of Charles Lee, and in the quarto edition of Irving's Washington. There is a German print in the Geschichte der Kriege in und ausser Europa (Nürnberg, 1778).

Dr. Moore considers the only picture of Lee which "bears any evidence of authenticity, or answers to the descriptions given by his contemporary friends and biographers", to be one drawn by Barham Rushbrooke at the time of Lee's return from Poland, and showing him dressed in the uniform of an aid of King Stanislaus. It was first engraved in 1813 in Dr. Thomas Gridlestone's treatise to prove that Lee was Junius, and that writer said of it that, "though designed as a caricature, it was allowed, by all who knew General Lee, to be the only successful delineation of his countenance or person." It is familiar in prints, representing his extremely attenuated figure in profile, with a small dog in front of him. It is given in Moore's Treason of Lee; Gay's Pop. Hist. U. S., iii. 460; in Scull's Evelyns in America (p. 295,—also see p. 196); and in K. M. Rowland's "Virginia Cavaliers" in the Southern Bivouac, April, 1886.

There are views of Lee's house in Virginia in J. E. Cooke's "Historic houses in the Shenandoah", in Appleton's Journal, p. 69, July 19, 1873, and in Mrs. Lamb's Homes of America.

The principal sources of Lee's history are: Edward Langworthy's Memoirs of the Life of the late Charles Lee, to which are added his Political and Military Essays (London, 1792; Dublin, 1792; New York, 1792, 1793). It was reproduced as Life and Memoirs of Maj.-Gen. Charles Lee (N. Y., 1795, 1813), as Political and Military Essays, with Memoirs, etc., 2d ed., with App. (London, 1797), and with new title as Anecdotes of the late Charles Lee, Esq. (London, 1797). Cf. Sparks's Life of Charles Lee (1846); Moore's Treason of Lee; the Papers of Charles Lee, published by the N. Y. Hist. Soc. in their collections; Irving's Washington, i. 377; Fonblanque's Burgoyne, 160; Jones's N. Y. during the Rev., ii. ch. 23; John Bernard's Retrospections of America (1887), p. 96.

The story is also told in local monographs,[896] and by the general historians.[897]

On the temporary clothing of Washington with dictatorial powers, see the Circular of Congress (Dec. 28th), explaining why it was done (Journals, i. 585). Cf. also Sparks's Washington, iv. 550; Greene's Greene, i. 292; Thacher's Military Journal, 74; Wells's Sam. Adams, ii. 458, and the adverse views of Abraham Clark in N. Jersey Rev. Corresp., p. 68.

The purpose of some sudden stroke on Washington's part is well indicated.[898] The advance of Griffin with militia was opportune in drawing Donop forward to Mount Holly, so that he was too distant to support Rahl at Trenton.

On the attack on Trenton there is special record from the Washington papers in Sparks (iv. 242, 246, 541), Dawson, i. 20 (to Congress), Mass. Soc. Hist. Col., xliv. 32 (to Heath, and Heath's letter in N. H. State Papers, viii. 445). Others are in 5 Force, iii., a full record of the battle. Congress wrote to the agents in France (Diplom. Corresp., i. 246.)[899]

What is known as the Reed-Cadwalader controversy, hinging upon the alleged weakness or defection of Joseph Reed at this time, is more particularly examined in another place.

On the English side we have Howe's despatch in Dawson (i. 202) Tryon to Germain in N. Y. Col. Doc. (viii. 694). The effect of the battle in England to discourage the expatriated loyalists is told in Hutchinson's Diary, ii. 139. Stedman accuses Howe of bad judgment in placing so unfit a man in command as Rahl. Adolphus (ii. 385), On "private information" supposed to have been Arnold's, says that Arnold suggested to Washington the movement, and Mahon (vi. 130) has followed Adolphus.

TRENTON, PRINCETON, MONMOUTH.

From the map in Marshall's Atlas to his Washington (1804). Cf. also Sparks's Washington, iv. 258; Guizot's Atlas to his Washington. The plans of Trenton and Princeton in Carrington (pp. 270, 302) vary somewhat from the contemporary ones as to roads. The chief contemporary English map of New Jersey is one based on the surveys of Bernard Ratzer in 1769, which was published in London, Dec. 1, 1777, by William Faden, and called The Province of New Jersey, divided into East and West, commonly called the Jerseys (32 × 23 inches). It was improved from surveys by Gerard Banker. It was reissued in fac-simile by the Geological Survey of New Jersey in 1877, and this fac-simile is in W. S. Sharp's reprint of Smith's New Jersey, 1877. Another fac-simile was published in 1884. A second edition of the original was published in 1778, corrected by the British and Hessian engineers.

An American map of the campaign, by Erskine, is given in the illustrated ed. of Irving's Washington, ii. 430. There are English maps in the Gent. Mag., Sept., 1776, and in Stedman's American War. Gordon gives a map (vol. ii. 525). Cf. Lossing's Field-Book, vol. ii.

We have Hessian maps of some of the movements preceding Howe's evacuation of New Jersey in 1777, which are among the Faden MS. maps in the library of Congress, and bear the name of Wangenheim, a "lieutenant dans les chasseurs Hessois, 1777", namely: No. 75, "Plan de l'affaire de Westfield et du camp de Raway, 1777, Jan. 26, 27." No. 76, "Plan de notre camp à New Brunswick, le 12^e Juin; notre marche le 14 à Middlebush; la situation du camp le 15^e Juin, et celle de Gen. Washington à Boundbrook." No. 77, "Position de notre camp le 24 Juin, 1777, à Perth Amboy."

TRENTON AND PRINCETON.

A section of a large map in the library of Congress, apparently of Hessian origin, Plan général des opérations de l'armée Britannique contre les Rebelles, etc. The broken lines represent roads. The Americans are represented by blocks, half white and half black. The British are solid black. Key: "76, Marche du Général Cornwallis. 77, Marche du Général Knyphausen le 23 Juin, et son camp près de Richardstown."

FADEN'S MAP OF TRENTON AND PRINCETON.

Sketched from a Plan of the Operations of General Washington against the king's troops in New Jersey, from the 26th of December, 1776, to the 3d January, 1777, by William Faden. London, 15th April, 1777. This map also makes part of the American Atlas, and the original MS. draft is among the Faden maps in the library of Congress. The map (the roads being represented by broken lines) bears legends to the following purport: Washington from his headquarters at Newtown moved his men on the evening of December 25th to 1, and by 4 o'clock on the morning of the 26th he had crossed to 2, where he divided his army into two divisions. The left, composed of 1,200 men with ten field-pieces under Greene, but accompanied by Washington himself, proceeded through 3 towards Trenton; the right, under Sullivan, consisting of 1,500 men with ten field-pieces, went through 4. Meanwhile "Erwin's" and Cadwallader's forces came to 5, hoping to cross the ferry, but the ice in the river prevented. At 8 o'clock on the morning of the 26th, Rahl at Trenton was surprised, and the entire force of Hessians with him were captured except 200 men, who, with some chasseurs and dragoons, escaped to "Burdenton", where they net Count Donop, who now, joined by these fugitives, proceeded with his command to Crosswicks, thence to Allenstown and Princeton. Washington, after his victory, encamped at 6, where he was reinforced by troops from Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania. On January 2d the position was this: Washington had been confronted at 7 by the advance of Cornwallis at 8. The second brigade of the British under Leslie was at Maidenhead, and Lieutenant-Colonel Mawhood, with the 17th, 40th, and 55th British regiments, was on the road at 10,—all these troops having moved forward from Princeton after Washington's attack at Trenton. During the night of January 2d, Washington having withdrawn his detachments over the bridge, left fires along the southern bank of the Assumpink Creek to deceive the British, and marched from his camp at 6 to Allenstown, then turned towards Princeton, but his force in part left the road, and by the dotted line proceeded to 9, and on the morning of Jan. 3d attacked Mawhood at 10. Of the three British regiments here, the 17th was driven upon Leslie at Maidenhead, while the 40th and 55th retreated through Princeton and Kingstown towards Brunswick, beyond 12. Washington followed them to Kingstown and encamped there on Jan. 3, after having broken down the bridge over the Millstone to interfere with Cornwallis's overtaking him. On Jan. 4 Washington took the road through 11 to the passes in the hills, while Cornwallis, reaching Kingstown the same day, proceeded through 12 towards Brunswick.

TRENTON.

Wiederhold's plan from the archives at Marburg, sketched from a fac-simile furnished by Mr. E. J. Lowell. (Cf. his Hessians, 92.) A marks the centre of the village. The Hessian outposts were at B, one officer and 24 men; C, Captain Altenbocum's company of the Lossberg regiment, quartered in the neighborhood, which formed in front of the captain's quarters, while the picket at B occupied the enemy; D, one captain, one officer, and 75 men; E, one officer and 50 Jägers, who retreated over the bridge on Sullivan's approach; F, one officer and 30 men, who joined Donop over the Bordentown road. The two columns of Washington and Sullivan emerged from the woods at G G. The broken lines (— — — —) indicate their line of march and successive positions, till they surrounded the Hessians. The beginning of the dotted lines (. . . . .) in the village shows where the Hessians attempted to form; but Rahl and Lossberg were driven back to H, and Knyphausen to J, and surrounded they surrendered. Knyphausen endeavored to reach the bridge, having with him the Lossberg cannon, which got stuck in the marsh at K, and the delay in extricating them was sufficient for Sullivan to occupy the bridge and cut off Knyphausen's retreat. His own cannon were at M, and were not used. Rahl's cannon were at N, and early dismounted. The Americans used cannon at s s s, etc. There is also among the Rochambeau maps (no. 18) a map done in faint colors, with an elaborate key, which is marked Engagement de Trenton, by Wiederhold, measuring about eight inches wide by ten high. A French plan is given in Mag. of Amer. Hist., 1880, p. 369. Cf. map in Raum's Trenton; Lossing's Field-Book, ii. 228 (with Rahl's headquarters, p. 228, and a view, p. 222). Carrington's special map of Trenton (p. 278) gives more detail than the contemporary plans.

Bancroft (ix. 217; cf. Irving, ii. 466) notes the Hessian journals which he had used.[900]

The affair at Princeton has special treatment in the Washington papers (Sparks, iv. 259; Dawson, i. 204), and is necessarily covered by the general historians.[901] On the English side Howe's letter (Jan. 5, 1777) to Germain is the principal source, and it will be found in Gent. Mag., Feb., 1777; C. C. Haven's Thirty days, 60; Dawson, i. 210. Cf. Mahon, vi. 132.[902]

FROM WILKINSON'S ATLAS.

Sullivan delayed at F to give Washington a chance to make his longer detour by A before he (Sullivan) advanced by D. Washington attacked at B, and threw out riflemen at G and H. Rahl, deserted by a part of his force, who fled to Donop at Bordentown, surrendered at I, when he became aware of Sullivan's approach behind him.

Wilkinson also gives a map showing the movements between Dec. 25, 1776, and Jan. 3, 1777, and this is the basis of the map in C. C. Haven's New Historic Manual concerning the battles of Trenton and Princeton (Trenton, 1871).

FROM WILKINSON'S ATLAS.

The advance, with which Wilkinson was, came by G to the vicinity of the wood A and Quaker meeting-house B. The main column turned off and followed the line b. Gen. Mercer proceeded to f. A detachment of the British at d, with officers reconnoitring at a a, discovered the American line on the route h; but coming to g, they also discovered Mercer at f, who wheeled by the line c, and gaining the orchard of Wm. Clark's house (5) confronted at 1—2 the British detachment now formed at 3—4. The Americans retreated when the British advanced to the slope (o o o), where they saw Moulder's battery, X, near Thomas Clark's house (7), which Washington had sent from his main line at h, together with other troops by the line r r, which induced the British to retreat on the line e e, while Mawhood, their commander, fled with a few infantry by the line, s s. At this juncture another British regiment, which had advanced from Princeton to C, fell back, and joining other troops took post at K and C, where they confronted Washington's main body, which now deployed at i i; and as the Americans attacked, the British fled to the college building (P), and then beyond by the route t t. Cf. plan in Lossing's Field-Book, ii. 235. Carrington's plan of Princeton (p. 278) gives further details from later study.

CAMPAIGN OF 1777.

A map in Captain Hall's Hist. of the Civil War in America (London, 1780), vol. i.

Howe's campaign of 1777 was the ruin of his military reputation.[903] Jones, in his severe criticism upon Howe, unjustly charges Galloway with making the suggestion of the expedition to the Head of Elk.[904] It is certain that Galloway threw himself upon Howe's protection not far from the time when Howe committed himself to a plan of capturing Philadelphia. About the same time it has been charged that General Lee, by a treasonable project, aided Howe's purposes in the same direction.

CAMPAIGN OF 1777.

From Galloway's Letters to a Nobleman, London, 1779. Key: A, the British army before the battle of Brandywine. B, Gen. Knyphausen's advance to the attack. C, Lord Cornwallis having turned the right wing of the rebel army. D, Sullivan advanced to oppose him. E, position of the rebel army. F, General Howe's quarters, in which he remained five days after the rebel defeat. a a a, Washington's retreat to Chester and Philadelphia. G, his camp at Chester, where he remained fourteen hours after the battle. The roads with the zigzag mark show those by which the rebels might have been intercepted after the battle. H, Washington's flight after the skirmish at Goshen. I, Washington's retreat when Sir Wm. Howe crossed the Schuylkill. K, Washington's camp, whence he marched to surprise the British army at Germantown, and to which he retreated after the battle. L, Washington's camp at Whitemarsh. (For his headquarters see Lossing's Field-Book, ii. 321, and his Mary and Martha Washington, p. 162.) M, the first position of the British. N, the second. O, O, O, where Washington's camp might have been attacked with advantage. P, British camp at Germantown. The line ——— denotes marches of the British army; the line of dots . . . . . . . . the marches of the rebel army. Q, Washington's lines at Valley Forge in the winter 1777. R, R, R, R, R, positions which might have been taken to besiege or assault the rebel quarters. S, the bridge. This map is also reproduced in The Evelyns in America, p. 252.

The principal contemporary engraved maps of this part of the country were the 1770 edition of Scull's Map of Pennsylvania (see Vol. V. p. 240), which was at this time included in the American Atlas (London, 1776), and the Atlas Amériquain (Paris, 1777), and Pownall's edition, 1776, of Evans's Map of the Middle Colonies (see Vol. V. p. 85), as well as Jefferys' edition, 1775, of the same, not so accurate. To these might be added Montresor's Province of New York and Pennsylvania, 1777; Mellish and Tanner's Seat of War in America; Faden's map of July 1, 1778, given in fac-simile in the Penna. Mag. of Hist., i. 285; the maps in the Gentleman's Mag., 1776 and 1777; Almon's Seat of War in New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania, 1777. A modern map, covering the same field to illustrate the campaign, is given in Theodore W. Bean's Washington at Valley Forge one hundred years ago, and is repeated, with a few changes, in Proceedings at the Dedication of the Paoli Monument (Westchester, 1877). The contemporary French maps are Du Chesnoy's Théâtre de la Guerre, 1775-1778, Beaurain's Carte pour servir à l'intelligence de la guerre (Paris, 1777), Brion de la Tour's Théâtre de la Guerre (Paris, 1777), with another by Phelippeaux "pour servir de suite", and Bourgoin's Théâtre de la Guerre (Paris). There is a German map in the Geschichte der Kriege in und ausser Europa. There is in the Maryland Hist. Soc. library a map of stage routes between Baltimore and New York, showing the operations of the British from Elk River (1777) to Neversink (1778). (Lewis Mayer's Catal. of MSS. etc., in Maryland Hist. Soc., 1854.)

Cf. also the maps in Sparks's Washington, v. 66; Moore's Diary of the Revolution, orig. ed., 495; Penna. Archives, 2d ser. vol. iii.; Moorsom's Fifty-second Regiment; Hamilton's Coldstream Guards; Carrington's Battles, p. 398.

George H. Moore laid before the N. Y. Hist. Soc., in June, 1859, the document in Lee's handwriting, dated March 29, 1777, while he was a prisoner in New York, in which he sketches a plan for Howe's guidance in the coming campaign. The "plan" in fac-simile, together with an elucidation of it, was printed in Moore's Treason of Charles Lee, New York, 1860. The "plan" is also in N. Y. Hist. Soc. Coll., 1872, p. 361. Lee was at that time trying to induce Congress to send commissioners to New York to confer with him (Bancroft, ix. ch. 19), but Congress was not ensnared. Moore contends (p. 84) that the "plan" is responsible for Howe turning towards Philadelphia, instead of going north to help Burgoyne. Bancroft (ix. 333; also see p. 211) asserts that it could have had no influence on Howe's movements.[905]

Lecky quotes Galloway's testimony, that of the 66,000 men voted by Congress for this campaign, hardly 16,000 were in the field. Bancroft admits that no one better than Marshall (iii. ch. 3) has described the part of Washington in this campaign.[906]

At the opening of the campaign Washington was kept long in suspense as to the purpose of Howe. The eastern people feared his object was Boston.[907] Alexander Hamilton early in the season had become Washington's aide, and his letters at once begin to contain speculations on Howe's purpose (Works, Lodge's ed., vii. 481, 496, 500). On May 28th, Washington moved his headquarters from Morristown[908] to Middlebrook, and it was thought Howe would attempt to march direct for Philadelphia. On June 12th, Sullivan writes to Weare that Howe was to be confronted the next day (N. H. State Papers, viii. 584); and when it was known that Howe was retiring towards New York, Washington, June 23d, little credited a report, then prevalent, that the British army was panic-struck (Mass. Hist. Soc. Coll., vii. 138).[909] Cf., for all these movements, Montresor's Journal.

GENERAL HOWE.

From The Impartial Hist. of the War in America.

In July, when news came of the fall of Ticonderoga, there were no signs that Howe was preparing to coöperate with Burgoyne, and Hamilton wondered (Works, vii. 507, 515). When Howe sailed from New York, Washington was in suspense.[910] On July 31st, it was learned that Howe's fleet was at the capes of Delaware, and the next day the vessels had disappeared.[911] It was now supposed that Howe had gone to Charleston, S. C., and that Washington might safely reinforce the Northern army (Hamilton's Works, vii. 517). Lafayette first took his seat at a council of war called to consider the propriety of this (Sparks's Washington, v. 445).

In August, 1777, Gen. Sullivan conducted a raid into Staten Island to seize Tories. He captured some papers which implicated the Philadelphia Quakers in inimical movements. (Cf. Journals of Congress, ii. 246, 253.) In other respects the incursion was unfortunate, and his movements were examined by a court of inquiry, which acquitted him.[912]

Howe had been six weeks at sea, with three weeks' provisions, when he landed at the Head of Elk.[913]

Upon Washington's march to confront Howe, see, for the preliminary movements, William J. Buck's paper on "Washington's Head Quarters on the Neshaminy", in the Penna. Mag. Hist., i. 275.[914]

GENERAL SIR WILLIAM HOWE.

From Andrews's Hist. of the War, London, 1785, vol. i. It is reëngraved in Gay's Pop. Hist. U.S., iii. 412. Cf. engraving in Irving's Washington, illus. ed., New York, 1857, ii. Sargent gives a clever presentation of the character of Howe in his André, p. 136.

Upon the battle on the Brandywine the main American source is the letters of Washington. With Washington's aid, R. H. Harrison wrote to Congress from Chad's Ford, Sept. 11th, at 5 P. M., a letter which was at once circulated in broadside (Sabin, iii. p. 463; Hildeburn, no. 3,533). Pickering drafted for the commander-in-chief the report (Life of T. Pickering, i. 157) written at Chester, at midnight, September 11th (Sparks, i. 251; v. 58; Dawson, i. 278). Hamilton was on Washington's staff (J. C. Hamilton's Life of Hamilton). C. C. Pinckney, also on the staff, wrote a letter in 1820 (Hist. Mag., July, 1866, x. 202). Marshall, as a participant, drew somewhat upon personal experience in his account in the Life of Washington. Lafayette's narrative, as given to Sparks, is in the Sparks MSS. (no. xxxii. Cf. also Lafayette's Mémoires). There is a journal of Capt. William Beatty, of the Maryland line, in the Hist. Mag., 2d. ser., i. 79. Sparks examines some of the disputed points of the battle.[915]

There are contemporary records and opinions in the Penna. Archives, 2d ser., x. 316; the letter of the N. H. delegates in Congress in N. H. State Papers, viii. 678; current reports in Moore's Diary, 495; gossip in Adams's Familiar Letters, 296, etc.; Knox's account (Sept. 13th) in Drake's Knox, 48.[916]

On the British side, we find Howe's report, Oct. 10th, to Germain in Almon, v. 409; Dawson, i. 281. Cf. the evidence before Parliament in the Conduct of the War and the narrative in Stedman.[917]

The Hessian participancy is examined in Lowell's Hessians, 197. Bancroft quotes Ewald's Beyspiele grosser Helden as the testimony of an eye-witness of Washington's well-conducted retreat.[918]

A portion of the British troops used breech-loaders.[919]

The movements of the opposing armies toward Philadelphia can be followed in the main in the authorities cited for the battle. Some local details are in Pennypacker's Phœnixville, and an account of the damage done by the British on the march is in Smith's Delaware County (p. 544).

For the Paoli attack, we have Wayne's defence at the court-martial in Dawson, i. 315, and in the One hundredth anniversary of the Paoli massacre, p. 52, which last contains also, beside sundry contemporary records, the addresses of J. S. Futhey (also in Penna. Mag. Hist., i. 285) and Wayne McVeagh. The report of Howe to Germain is in Dawson, i. 317.[920]

On Sept. 26th, Washington described the state of the army, then at Potsgrove (Mag. Amer. Hist., Nov., 1884, p. 461). He was foiled by a rain in an effort to hold the British once more at bay, and Howe entered Philadelphia.[921]

Note to the Opposite Map.—Washington's map of the Brandywine campaign, on the opposite page, is reduced from a tracing of the original in the possession of the Pennsylvania Historical Society. The legends upon it in Washington's handwriting are noted in the following key by letters, while those of the surveyor are given by figures. At one end of the map is the following inscription: "Laid down at 200 p^s in an Inch, the 27^th day of August, An. Domⁱ 1777. P^r Jais. Broom, Surv^r. N. Castle Co^y." At the other end is the following table:—

	"m.	q.	ps.
From Chester County to Brandywine	7	0	21
From Brandywine to New Castle	6	1	19
From New Castle to Red Lyon	7	1	0
From Red Lyon to St. George	3	2	46
From St. George to Cantwell's Bridge	7	0	60
From Cantwell's to Blackbird	5	2	70
	—	—	—
	37	0	56
From Chester County to Brandywine	7	0	21
From Brandywine to Newport	4	0	79
From Newport to Bridgetown	5	0	12
From Bridgetown to Red Lyon	4	0	19
From Red Lyon to Harris Inn	5	2	51
From Harris Inn to Witherspoon's	6	1	44
From Witherspoon's to Blackbird	6	1	42
	—	—	—
	38	3	28
From New Castle to Christiana Bridge	4	3	45	"

Key: A, Chandler Ford, very good, but very broken ground and narrow defiles on the Et. side. B, Fording place by Thomas Gibson's. C, To Gibson's Ford. D, Road leading to Kennet's Square. E, Road leading towards Red Clay Creek. F, Hendrickson's Tavern. G, Richland fording place. H, Tavern. I, Smith's Store. J, James Walker. K, Mill Town. L, Rising Sun Tavern.

1, The Bottom Road, passing Brandywine at Chad's Ford (18). 2, Newlin's. 3, The line dividing the counties of Chester and Newcastle. [This is the curved northern boundary of Delaware.] 4, Gibson's Mill. 5, Gibson's Ford. The Center Road [runs to F]. 6, Kennet Meeting-house. 7, Clark's Inn. 8 [to 7 and beyond], The Road leading from Wilmington to Kennet's. 9, Naaman's Creek. 10, Grubb's Inn. Grubb's Road [leads from 10 to 5]. 11, The Road leading from Wilmington to Chester. 12, Shelpot Creek. 13, Foulk's Road. 14, The Concord Road. 15, Brandywine Creek. This creek, except the fording place, impassable. 16, Bridge. 17, M'Kim's [?] Mill. 18, Chad's Ford. 19, 20, Delaware River. 21, Wm. Miller's Mill. 22, Red Clay Creek. 23, Christiana River. 24, The Borough of Wilmington. 25, The Road leading from Wilmington towards Lancaster. 26, Mill Creek. 27, Bridge. 28, The Road leading from Wilmington to Newcastle. 29, Ferry. 30, Newport. 31, The Road leading from Newport towards Lancaster with bridge at 32. 33, The Lancaster Road. 34, Mill creek. 35, Bridge. 36 [to 46], White Clay Creek. 37, New Castle. 38, The Road leading from N. Castle to Christiana Bridge. 39, Bridge [Christiana]. 40, Hamburgh. 41, [The Road] to the Red Lyon. 42, The Road leading from New Castle to the Elk River. 43, The Road leading from Christiana Bridge to Elk River. 44, Ogle Town. 45, The Road leading from Ogletown to the Head of Elk. 46, Mill of Capt. Black's. 47, 48, [Shaded space showing where the original is worn through]. 49, Newark. 50, The Road to Johnson Ferry on Susquehanna. 51, [Road to Nottingham]. 52, Iron Hill. 53, The Road leading from Red Lyon to Black Bird Creek. 54, St. George's Creek. 55, Mill Pond. 56, Trap [?] 57, Drawyer's Creek. 58, Appoquinimink Creek. 59, Cantwell's Bridge. 60, Witherspoon's. 61, Part of Bohemia. 62, The upper Road leading from Red Lyon to Blackbird Creek. 63, Clemon Mill. 64, Elk. 65, Part of Elk River. 66, Joseph Gilpin's. 67, Harris Inn. 68, The Road leading towards Bohemia.

Sullivan, with the charge of inefficiency for Brandywine still hanging over him, was the first to encounter the outposts of the British at Chestnut Hill, when he opened the day of Germantown. His letter (Oct. 25th) addressed to the president of New Hampshire was first printed by Sparks.[922]

Washington's letters to Congress and others are of the first importance.[923]

In Timothy Pickering's Life (i. 166) there is an account of the battle from his journal, which sustains the positions taken by Pickering in 1826,—though he does not refer to it at that time,—in the controversy which was waged by him and Sparks with Johnson, the author of the Life of Greene.[924]

BRANDYWINE.

Sketched from a large MS. Hessian map in the library of Congress, Plan générale des opérations de l'armée Britannique contre les Rebelles, etc. Key: "19, Marche de l'armée pour New Gardens. 22, Marche du général Knyphausen pour Kennet Square, 9 Sept. 24, Camp que l'armée occupa aux environs de Kennet Square. 26, Marche du général Cornwallis vers le Brandywine. 30, Première position du Gen. Cornwallis. 31, 2me position de ce général. 32, Attaque de ce général. 33, Position des enemis. 34, Retraite des enemis. 38, Marche du corps detaché à Wilmington. 57, Marche du corps detaché à Wilmington pour Philadelphia le 16 Oct." The lines (·–·–) represent roads.

The published plans of Brandywine are the following: In the Examination of Joseph Galloway and letters on the Conduct of the war. In Sparks's Washington, v. 58. Cf. also Duer's Stirling, ii.; Irving's Washington, iii. 190. In Marshall's Washington, vol. v. Sketch by J. S. Bowen and J. S. Futhey in Penna. Hist. Soc. Bull., i. no. 7 (1846). In Penna. Archives, 2d ser., x. 316; Carrington's Battles, p. 382; Hamilton's Grenadier Guards, ii.; Lowell's Hessians, 198; Lossing's Field-Book, ii. 377 (with views of the ground, 378, 379).

There are among the Faden maps (nos. 78, 79) in the library of Congress a careful topographical drawing of the battle of Brandywine, and a corrected proof of the map as published by Faden in 1778. There are among the Faden maps (nos. 80, 80½) plans, by the Hessian Wangenheim, of the camp at Wilmington to cover the British hospitals after the fight at Brandywine, and a map of the positions of the army in the action of Sept. 19th, as well as Cornwallis's march in November to Philadelphia.

Of the writers near the event, Gordon drew from original sources; Marshall was an actor in the scenes; and there are accounts in Wilkinson, i. 353, 359, 361. G. W. P. Custis's Recollections, ch. 4, and the later writers need to be consulted.[925]

On the English side, Howe's despatch to Germain is in Dawson (i. 330). The letter of a British officer, dated Philadelphia, Oct. 19, 1777 (London Chronicle, Jan. 3-6, 1778), is reprinted in Penna. Mag. of Hist., April, 1887, p. 112.[926]

TRUDRUFFRIN, OR PAOLI.

Sketched from a portion of a MS. Hessian map in the library of Congress, called Plan générale des opérations de l'armée Britannique contre les Rebelles, etc. The lines ·–·– represent roads.

Key: "41, marche du général Knyphausen et son camp le 18^me; 42, marche du général Cornwallis le même jour; 43, camp du corps près de Valley Forge; 44, corps des Rebelles surpris par le général Grey le 21^me; 45, camp et marche du général Knyphausen le 21^me; 46, marche de l'armée par le Schuylkill près de Valley Forge, et le camp qu'elle occupa le 23^me près de Norris Town House." The British are shown in solid black blocks, the Americans in black and white.

Note.—This map is a fac-simile from one of Faden's maps. There is among the copies of the Lafayette maps in the Sparks collection at Cornell University one of the British Camp at Trudruffrin, from the 13th to the 21st of September, with the attack made by Major-General Grey against the Rebels near White Horse tavern on the 20th of September. This is merely a transcript of the Faden map, of which there is a fac-simile in Penna. Mag. of Hist., i. 285. Cf. Penna. Archives, 2d ser., x. 316. The MS. of Faden's maps is among the Faden maps in the library of Congress (no. 81). There is a view of the Paoli monument in Scharf and Westcott's Philad., i. 349, and in Lossing's Field-Book, ii. 372.

From Pennsylvania Archives (2d ser., vol. xi. p. 191).

Cf. the maps in Scharf and Westcott's Philadelphia, i. 353, and in Penna. Mag. of Hist., i. 375.

The seaward defence of Philadelphia depended on the forts Mercer and Mifflin, on the chevaux-de-frise in the river, and on the Pennsylvania navy. Howe's first attempt, in October, to get his shipping up to support his army failed.[927]

MONTRESOR'S PLAN OF GERMANTOWN.

Note.—This map is sketched after an original in Harvard College library. There is a duplicate, evidently made by the same hand, among the Peter Force maps, in the library of Congress. The map was engraved and published in London. There is a map published by Faden in London, March 12, 1784, which is not trustworthy, however, as to roads, which was called Sketch of the Surprise of Germantown by the American forces commanded by General Washington, Oct. 4, 1777, by J[ohn] Hills, Lt. 23d Reg.

Other published maps are the following: in Johnson's Greene, i. 80 (showing three stages); Sparks's Washington, v. 86 (also in Duer's Stirling, ii. 177; Irving's illustrated Washington, iii. 286; Guizot's Atlas); Carrington's Battles, 392; Lossing's Field-Book, ii. 314; Scharf and Westcott's Philad., i. 354; Penna. Archives, 2d ser., xi. 188; Penna. Mag. of Hist., i. 368.

For views of the Chew House, see Day's Hist. Coll. of Penna., 492; Scharf and Westcott's Philad., i. 356; Egle's Penna., 178; Lossing's Field-Book, ii. 514; Mag. of Amer. Hist. (March, 1880), iv. 192.

The following are the main portions of Howe's despatch to Lord George Germain, dated at Germantown, Oct. 10, 1777: "The enemy marched at six o'clock in the evening of the third from their camp near Skippach Creek, about sixteen miles from Germantown. This village forms one continued street for two miles, which the line of the encampment, in the position the army then occupied, crossed at right angles, near a mile from the head of it, where the second battalion of light infantry and the fortieth regiment were posted. At three o'clock in the morning of the fourth, the patrols discovered the enemy's approach, and the army was immediately ordered under arms. Soon after the break of day the enemy began their attack upon the second light infantry, which they sustained for a considerable time, supported by the fortieth regiment; but at length being overpowered by increasing numbers, the light infantry and a part of the fortieth retired into the village, when Lieutenant-Colonel Mulgrave with six companies of the latter corps threw themselves into a large stone house [Chew's], which, though surrounded by a brigade, and attacked by four pieces of cannon, he most gallantly defended, until Major-General Grey, at the head of three battalions of the third brigade, turning his front to the village, and Brigadier-General Agnew, who covered Major-General Grey's left with the fourth brigade, by a vigorous attack repulsed the enemy with great slaughter. The fifth and fifty-fifth regiments from the right, engaging them at the same on the other side of the village, completed the defeat of the enemy in this quarter. The regiments of Du Corps and Donop being formed to support the left of the fourth brigade and one battalion of the Hessian grenadiers in the rear of the Chasseurs, were not engaged. The precipitate flight of the enemy preventing the two first corps from entering into action, and the success of the Chasseurs in repelling all efforts against them on that side, did not call for the support of the latter. The first light infantry and the pickets of the line in front of the right wing were engaged soon after the attack began upon the head of the village. The pickets were obliged to fall back, but the light infantry, being well supported by the fourth regiment, sustained the enemy's attack with such determined bravery that they could not make the least impression on them.

"Two columns of the enemy were opposite to the guards, twenty-seventh and twenty-eighth regiments, who formed the right of the line. Major-General Grant, who was upon the right, moved up the forty-ninth regiment about the time that Major-General Grey had forced the enemy in the village, and then advancing with the right wing, the enemy's left gave way, and was pursued through a strong country between four and five miles.

"Lord Cornwallis, being early apprised, at Philadelphia, of the enemy's approach, put in motion the two battalions of the British and one of the Hessian grenadiers, with a squadron of dragoons, and his lordship getting to Germantown just as the enemy had been forced out of the village, he joined Major-General Grey, when, placing himself at the head of the troops, he followed the enemy eight miles on the Skippach road; but such was the expedition with which they fled, he was not able to overtake them. The grenadiers from Philadelphia, who, full of ardor, had run most of the way to Germantown, could not arrive in time to join in the action."

GERMANTOWN AND VICINITY.

Sketched from a part of a large map in the library of Congress, evidently of Hessian origin,—Plan générale des opérations de l'armée Britannique contre les Rebelles, etc. (August, 1776 to 1779). From the Renvoy the interpretation of the following numbers is taken: "40, marche du général Cornwallis le 16^me; 47, marche du général de Knyphausen vers Germantown et le camp qu'il occupa le 23^me près de ce village; 48, marche du général Cornwallis vers Germantown et son camp près de village; 50, campment de l'armée aux environs de Germantown; 51, emplacement des enemies et leur attaque; 52, la maison deffendue par le Colonel Musgrave avec un partie du 40^me regiment; 54, retraite de l'enemie." The lines (·–·–) mark the roads.

The chevaux-de-frise at Billingsport was laid by Robert Whyte, who went subsequently over the enemy, and he is charged with placing it purposely in a defective manner. Wallace (p. 228, with plans, p. 134), who examines the evidence, seems to think the charge is proved. Respecting the share of the navy in the defence of the river, the principal sources are the minutes of the naval board, etc., in 2 Penna. Archives, vol. i., and other papers in iv. 748. An examination of this defence is made in Wallace, p. 130, etc.[928]

STENTON (JAMES LOGAN'S HOUSE).

This view of the house occupied by Howe and Washington as headquarters is taken from a painting in the Penna. Hist. Society. It is a rear view of the building. There is in the same collection a pen-and-ink sketch by Joseph Pennell. The position of the house can be seen in the map on another page, called "Approaches to Germantown." Howe occupied it at the time of the battle of Germantown. Cf. Scharf and Westcott, p. 871.

FADEN'S MAP OF THE OPERATIONS ON THE DELAWARE.

Sketched from an adaptation of Faden's Course of the Delaware river from Philadelphia to Chester, exhibiting the several works erected by the rebels to defend its passage, with the attacks made upon them by his majesty's land and sea forces, engraved by Wm. Faden, 1778, which is given in Wallace's Col. Wm. Bradford, p. 228.

Key: 1, Lord Howe in the "Eagle", with the "Apollo" and transports; 2, the "Camille" and "Zebra;" 3, the "Vigilant" and "Fury", which moved up by the dotted line to a position in the channel between Mud Island and Carpenter's Island, to attack Fort Mifflin, on Mud Island; 4, the "Experiment" and transports, below the "lower stackadoes" (shown by the zigzag line) through which there was a passage of seventeen feet near the fort at "Billingport", which was abandoned to Lt.-Col. Stirling, Oct. 1st; 5, camp on Nov. 18th; 6, wreck of "Merlin;" 7, the "Augusta" blown up; at these points (6 and 7) were the other British vessels, "Somerset", "Isis", "Roebuck", "Pearl", "Liverpool", "Cornwallis's galley",—some attacking Fort Mifflin, others engaging the American fleet at 8, others the battery of two 18-pounders and two 9-pounders at 10; the house of Tench Frances is between this battery and Manto Creek; 8, between the American fleet at this point and Mud Island is the "upper stackadoes" (shown by the zigzags); 9, the nearer of the two islands off Fort Mercer is Woodberry Island, and the other is Red Bank Island. These two islands have since disappeared. The rest of the American fleet was at this point. Beside the shore batteries on Carpenter's Island, there was a redoubt further inland, and another redoubt protected Webb's Ferry and the road to Philadelphia.

Upon the attack of Donop on Fort Mercer, at Red Bank (Oct. 22), the letter received by Washington from Major Ward, written at the desire of the commander of the fort, Col. Christopher Greene (cf. Greene's Nath. Greene, i. 489), is in Sparks's Washington, v. 112, and Dawson, i. 355, as is also Commodore Hazlewood's description of the naval part of the attack.[929]

LAFAYETTE'S VICTORY NEAR GLOUCESTER, N.J.

This sketch follows a colored map among the Lafayette maps in the Sparks collection at Cornell University, entitled Carte de l'action de Gloucester entre un parti Américain, sous le G^l. Lafayette et un parti des Troupes de Lord Cornwallis, commandé par ce G^l. après son fourage dans le Jersey, le 25 9^bre, 1777. While Lafayette's forces were at Haddonfield, the enemy at Gloucester were reconnoitred from Sand Point (1), and when the troops moved along the Haddonfield road the American riflemen (6), supported by the militia, attacked the Hessian outposts (9), when detachments were stationed on the cross-roads (7, 7) to protect the American right flank, while some chasseurs (8) threatened the Hessians' right flank. The enemy were driven back (10) till Cornwallis supported them with some English. They were still further pushed back till within a mile of Gloucester (11), when night closed the conflict. The legend on the map puts the English and Hessians (2, 3, 9) at 5,000 men, the boats (4) representing the withdrawal of part of them with their baggage across the river.

Lafayette's narrative, as given by him to Sparks, is in the Sparks MSS., no. xxxii.

Lafayette talked with Sparks of Donop (Sparks MSS., xxxii.). Knyphausen's report is in the archives at Marburg, and is used by Lowell (Hessians, 206). The despatches of the Howes are in Almon (v. 499), and Dawson (i. 356, 357).

(From a large map in the library of Congress.)

Of the attack (Nov. 10-16) on Fort Mifflin (Mud Island) and its evacuation, with the opening of the river to the British fleet, the best garner of contemporary accounts with comment, is in Wallace's Bradford (p. 194, etc.), but some of this material is found also elsewhere.[930]

There has been some dispute over the respective claims of Col. Samuel Smith[931] and Commodore Hazlewood for the defence of the fort (Wallace, App. 10).

FLEURY'S PLAN OF FORT MIFFLIN.

Note.—The annexed plan is a fac-simile, somewhat reduced, of a pen-and-ink sketch among the Sparks maps in the library of Cornell University. It is endorsed "Maj. Fleury's Plan of Fort Mifflin", and it bears also on the back in the author's hand these words:

"The engineer author of this imperfect draugh begg endulgence for it; considering that he has not paper, pen, rule, neither circel, and being disturbed by good many shells or cannon balls flying in the fort. Lewis Fleur."

The reverse also bears an "Explanation" in French in Fleury's hand, and beneath an English translation in another hand, seemingly made at the time. This last is as follows:—

"Explanation—All marked A are new works. A 1, 2, 3. Traverses to defend the battery from ricochet shot. A 4, 5. Ditches to close the left of the battery, which was open. A 6. A double iron chain which encloses the right of the battery. A 7. Pits with sharp upright stakes to defend the approaches to our enclosure. A 8. Banquet raised round the wall. A 9. Ditches and parapet of reunion between our barracks, which will make a second inclosure and be furnished with loop-holes. A 10. Last retreat in the middle of the Fort, made when we had only 120 men in garrison. A 11. Demilunes to flank the front, substituted to [sic] the block house, which was blown up. A 12, 13, 14. Fraisework.

"15. Enemy's battery of 2 mortars. 16. [Ditto] 5 pieces large cannon, 1 mortar. 17. [Ditto] 2 pieces cannon, 1 mortar. 18. Unfinished Redoubt at a mile and a third from the fort, near the road. 19. A pretty extensive work at about the same distance. 20. Epaulements for the guards."

ATTACK ON FORT MIFFLIN.

Note.—This map is reduced in fac-simile from one of Fleury's pen-and-ink sketches among the Sparks maps at Cornell University. It is endorsed "Mudd Island", but not by Washington, as the Sparks Catalogue (p. 207) says. There are noted in the same catalogue (p. 207) two other pen-and-ink drafts of the fort and its vicinity, both apparently the work of Fleury, also. One is smaller, covering much the same ground as the present fac-simile except that it does not show the ships and Hog Island. It is entitled: "Figuré aproximatif de fort island et des ouvrages des assiégeans. 16 octobre, 1777." It has an "Explanation" in French on the reverse, accompanied by a statement that it had been scrawled on a gun-carriage, without compasses, rule, or scale, and under difficulties arising from the bursting of one bomb which carried away his inkstand, and of another which ploughed the ground where he sat.

The other plan is larger, and has been folded like a letter, and is addressed on the outside, "His Excellency General Washington, Headquarters." It shows only the west edge of Mud Island, but marks particularly the distance, range, and armament of the attacking batteries, and is called, "Figuré aproximatif des ouvrages des assiégeans 14 9^bre, 1777." It marks the distance from the redoubt on the highland to Fort Mifflin as "1 mile 1-4 5 p." The wharf on the island is described as "où l'enemie déscendra, quoi que nous l'ayons detruite."

Other published maps of Mud Island (Fort Mifflin) are in Scharf and Westcott's Philadelphia, i. 363; Lossing's Field-Book, ii. 296; Wallace's William Bradford, p. 229.

Scharf and Westcott (p. 361) also give a plan made before the attack, by Col. Downman, of the British army.

Red Bank is particularly delineated in Smith's Delaware Co., 321; Penna. Archives, 2d ser., vol. v.; and Lossing, ii. 290, with views, etc.

On the British side we have the despatches of the Howes (Dawson, i. 364, 366), the journal of Montresor (Penna. Mag. of Hist., 1882, v. 393; vi. 34); the letters in Scull's Evelyns in America, 246, 253; and the account in Rivington's Gazette, cited by Wallace.

In addition to the references already made for the two attacks, the entire movements on the river are illustrated more generally in the letters of Washington, copied from the Penna. Archives, as well as in the diary of the Council of War in the Sparks MSS., no. 2. There are other contemporary accounts.[932]

Lafayette's attack on Gloucester soon followed. See plan on page 430.

The contrasts between the hilarities of the British in Philadelphia and the trials of the Americans at Valley Forge during the winter are abundantly illustrated.

The publication of the Penna. Evening Post was resumed in Philadelphia, Oct. 11, 1777, and continued during the British occupation of Philadelphia.[933]

Various diaries kept in and near Philadelphia have been preserved,[934] and the details of the life in the town have been worked up by modern writers.[935]

The complimentary festival given to General Howe on his departure, known as the Mischianza, took place May 18th, at the Wharton house.[936]

On the condition of Washington's camp at Valley Forge we have first the testimony of his own letters and those of his corespondents,[937] as well as that of sundry diaries and journals.[938]

The question of supplies as affecting the camp is considered in Stuart's Trumbull and Greene's Greene (ii. 48), this general being made quartermaster-general in March.

ATTACK ON MUD ISLAND.

From Galloway's Letters to a Nobleman, London, 1779. The leading published map of Delaware Bay and River at this time was one surveyed by Joshua Fisher, and published in London by Sayer and Bennett, 1775 and 1776. It was reproduced in Penna. Archives, 2d ser., vol. iii.; and maps based on them are in the Gent. Mag., July, 1779. There was a French edition issued in Paris by Le Rouge in 1777, which also made part of the Atlas Amériquain. Other charts are in the No. Amer. Pilot, 1776, and in the Neptune Américo-Septentrional, 1778.

There are plans for obstructing the river, in Penna. Archives, 2d ser., i. 749. Other maps of the river defences will be found in Sparks's Washington, v. 156; Irving's Washington (quarto), iii. 278; Smith's Delaware County, p. 321; Lossing's Field-Book, ii. 298; Carrington's Battles, p. 396.

There are preserved various orderly-books of the camp.[939]

There were efforts to reorganize the army during the winter. Congress had created a board of war in November, 1777 (Pickering, i. 187; Lossing, ii. 867). On Jan. 10, 1778, a committee of Congress was appointed to visit the camp and concert plans for the reorganization (Journals, ii. 401). A plan was drawn up by conference, and later adopted by Congress (Sparks, v. 525). Francis Dana wrote from the camp, Feb. 12th, to Congress, and the draft, found among the papers of Laurens, was printed in the Polit. Mag. (vol. i.,—1780), by which it was thought to appear that Howe could have destroyed the American army if he had had enterprise.[940]

A few days after the taking of Philadelphia, the Rev. Jacob Duché, of that city, who had been an approved supporter of the Americans, transmitted a letter to Washington, tempting him to desert the cause. Washington sent the letter to Congress; but Sparks could not find it in the Archives at Washington, and prints it from Rivington's Gazette (Corresp. of the Rev., i. 448). The letters which grew out of this act, including one of expostulation from Francis Hopkinson, the brother-in-law of Duché, and that of repentance sent to Washington by Duché in 1783, can be found in Sparks, v. 94, 476.[941]

MUD ISLAND, 1777-1778.

Sketched from a corner map of the large MS. map, called on another page, "The Defences of Philadelphia, 1777-1778."

The military movements during the autumn of 1777 were mainly to try the temper of the opposing forces and to secure forage, and the incessant watching of each other's motions made Pickering write to Elbridge Gerry (Nov. 2d,—Mag. Amer. Hist., Nov., 1884, p. 461) that "since Brandywine we have been in a constant state of hurry."[942]

ENCAMPMENT AT VALLEY FORGE, 1777-1778.

A sketch made by combining two in the Sparks collection at Cornell University. One is a French plan, from the Lafayette maps, which gives the main features of the topography to the present sketch. The other is one transmitted by General Armstrong to Mr. Sparks in 1833, embodying the recollections of a Mr. William Davis, "a remarkably active and intelligent man, who resided within the limits of the camp during its continuance there." General Armstrong cites the testimony of a son of General Wayne, that the recollections of Davis "of the most minute occurrences of the period were entirety unaffected by age." Upon this dependence has been put for the positions of the troops and the quarters of the general officers. The plan given by Sparks (Washington, v. 196) seems to have been made by a similar combination, though he omits the locations of the general's quarters. The plan of Sparks is essentially followed in Guizot's Washington, in Lossing's Field-Book (vol. ii. 334,—also see Harper's Monthly, xii. 307), and in Carrington's Battles, p. 402 (and in Mag. of Amer. Hist., Feb., 1882).

There is a view of Washington's headquarters in Scharf and Westcott's Philadelphia, i. 369; Egle's Pennsylvania, p. 182; Lossing's Field-Book, ii. 332, and in his Mary and Martha Washington, p. 168; and Mag. Amer. Hist., Feb., 1882.

The French alliance was celebrated in camp May 6, 1778 (Sparks, v. 355; Moore's Diary, ii.).

For landmarks, etc., of Valley Forge, see Lossing's Field-Book; Read's Geo. Read (p. 326), from the Ohio State Journal; Harper's Mag., lx., 660, April, 1880.

At the centennial celebration, June, 1878, there were addresses by Henry Armitt Brown (in his Memoir and Orations, edited by J. M. Hoppin), and one by Theodore W. Bean, printed in the Daily Local News, Westchester, Pa., June 20, 1878.

During this time, Oct.-Dec., Washington was kept informed of the British movements through the letters of Maj. Clark (Penna. Hist. Soc. Bull., vol. i.). There was in November a project discussed of taking Philadelphia by storm (Drake's Knox, 136). Congress was urging the States to renewed efforts (N. H. State Papers, viii. 728). Early in December Howe had tried to allure Washington to a battle near Chestnut Hill or Whitemarsh (Sparks, v. 180; Dawson, i. ch. 31). By the middle of December the American army had gone into winter-quarters at Valley Forge (Reed's Reed, i. 345), but not without having thought at the same time of an attack on New York (Ibid., 344).

Note.—This plan of the British works between the Delaware and the Schuylkill is sketched from the main portion of a drawing preserved in the Penna. Hist. Society, which bears the following indorsement: "The redoubts in the English lines are ten, beside two advanced ones. No. 1, which I took a plan of in the month of July, was then compleat, but the excessive heat of the weather and many avocations prevented our prosecuting the survey till October, by which time the wooden work of the other redoubts, as well as the abaties, were carried away, which rendered it uncertain how many platforms there were in each, but from what traces remained [I] believe I am right in nos. 2 & ten: the other seven [eight] varied so little from no. 2, that the plan of that may serve for the rest: I am equally uncertain whether the abatis ran in direct lines from redoubt to redoubt or formed angles, but know that each part terminated at about 20 feet from the counter-scarps of contiguous redoubts, these intervals being occasionally stopped up by chevaux-de-frize. All the 10 redoubts were well faced both within and without with strong planks, but the advanced redoubts and other small pieces were only faced with fascines. On the right of the line where small streams run through swampy ground an inundation was formed by sloping the arches of the bridges, and making dams were necessary, each furnished with a tumbling dam, well planked on the top and slopes of the main dam, to carry off superfluous water.

Lewis Nicola."

Enlarged plans and cross-sections of redoubts nos. 1, 2, and 10 are given in the margin, as well as of the western advanced redoubt, and other small works, including the "Barriers across Kensington and Germantown roads with a cremaillered work between them cut out of the bank between the roads." The stars near the lines denote the places of "houses destroyed by the English." Cf. description in Penna. Mag. of Hist., iv. 181.

DEFENCES OF PHILADELPHIA, 1777-1778.

Sketched from a large MS. map by John Montresor in the library of Congress, dedicated to Sir William Howe, and called Plan of the City of Philadelphia and its environs, shewing the defences during the years 1777-1778, together with the Siege of Mud Island. A similar map by Montresor is among the King's maps in the British Museum (Catal., ii. 176).

VICINITY OF PHILADELPHIA.

Sketched from a part of a MS. Hessian map in the library of Congress, called Plan générale des opérations de l'Armée Britannique contre les Rebelles, etc. The lines (·—·—) are roads. Key: "59, Attaque de mudden island le 15 Novembre. 60, Position du général Howe le 4 Dec. pour forcer le général Washington à quitter sa position sur les hauteurs de White Marsh. 61, Marche du général Howe pour fourages entre Derby et Chester. 62, Camp de l'armée près de Philadelphia. 63, Camp de l'armée après avoir evacué Philadelphia le 26^me Juin, 1778. 64, Corps detaché à Gloucester. 65, Marche du général Knyphausen le 18^me Juin et son camp à Haddenfield. 66, Marche et camp du général Cornwallis le 18^me Juin. 67, Marche du général Knyphausen le 20^me Juin et son camp à Moorfield."

The published maps of Philadelphia and its vicinity at this time are the following: N. Scull and G. Heap's, originally in 1750 (cf. Vol. V. 240), and reproduced by Faden in 1777, and reduced in the Gent. Mag., Dec., 1777. Kitchin's Philadelphia and Environs, in London Mag., Dec., 1777, and reproduced in the Penna. Archives, 2d series, vol. iii. A map surveyed by Eastburn in 1776, Philad., 1777; one surveyed by Hill, Philadelphia, 1777. Plan of Philadelphia in the Atlantic Neptune (1777), vol. i. Plan in the American Atlas (1777). Gegend und Stadt von Philadelphia, in Geschichte der Kriege in und ausser Europa, Nürnberg, 1778, Zehnter Theil. There was published by John Reed, in 1774, An Explanation of the Map of the City and Liberties of Philadelphia. A folding plan showing the British works is in Scharf and Westcott's Philadelphia, i. 360. Various MS. plans of Philadelphia and its neighborhood, with the river defences, are among the Faden maps (nos. 82-86) in the library of Congress. Among the Penn papers in the Hist. Soc. of Penna. is a MS. map showing the positions of the British at Germantown before the battle.

In January an attempt by the Americans to destroy the shipping at Philadelphia, by floating combustibles down the river from above, failed; but it gave rise to Hopkinson's humorous verses on the "Battle of the Kegs."[943]

In March Congress was urging young men of spirit and property to raise light cavalry troops (Journals, ii. 463), for Simcoe's British horsemen were raiding about the country for forage, meeting, however, now and then with resistance, as at Quintin's Bridge (March 18th) and Hancock's Bridge (March 21st).[944] At the beginning of May there was another conflict at Crooked Billet.[945] Three weeks later (May 20th) Lafayette skilfully extricated himself from an advanced position at Barren Hill, whither Washington had sent him towards the enemy, and Where the British commander sought to cut him off.[946]

BARREN HILL.

This map is sketched and reduced from a MS. map preserved in the Historical Society of Pennsylvania, signed "Major Capitaine, A. D. C. du Gen^l. Lafayette", and called Plan de la retraite de Barrenhill en Pensilvanie, où un detachement de 2,200 hommes sous le Général la Fayette, etoit entourré par l'armée Anglaise sous les G^x. Howe, Clinton, et Grant, le 28 May, 1778. It bears the following Key: (translation) a. Position of the American detachment on Barren Hill, eleven miles from Philadelphia and twelve miles from Valley Forge, on the right bank of the Schuylkill. b. Pickets of the Americans, which retired on the approach of the enemy. c. A French company under Captain M'Clean, with fifty Indians. e. Place where the militia were ordered to gather, but they failed to do so. f. March of Maj.-Gen. Grant at the head of grenadiers and chasseurs, and two brigades, making in all 8,000 men, with 15 pieces of cannon. g. Where the enemy were first discovered. h. Americans occupying the meeting-house and burial-ground, deploying to defend their left flank. i. March of the detachment on the second warning to reach Matson's Ford. k. Chasseurs detached to confront Gen. Grant. l. Body of English cavalry, followed by a body of grenadiers and chasseurs. m. March of Gen. Grant, always following the Americans. n. Matson's Ford, which the Americans gained and passed, when they occupied the highlands, o, while a small force was sent to Swede's Ford. p. Rich road by which Howe and Clinton advanced with the rest of the British army. q. Point where Howe and Grant formed, whence, seeing that their attempt had failed, they returned to Philadelphia. r. Road from Swede's Ford, by which the American detachment returned the next day to occupy Barren Hill.

There is among the Sparks maps at Cornell University a duplicate copy of this map, made from Lafayette's original. Cf. maps in Sparks, v. 378; Carrington's Battles, p. 408; Lossing, ii. 329; and the view of the church (p. 322).

Clinton, on relieving Howe from the command in Philadelphia, was instructed to evacuate the city (Sparks, v. 548). This materially changed the plans for the campaign, which had been determined upon prior to the announcement of the French alliance (Sparks MSS., xlv. and lviii.). Washington meanwhile was considering an alternative of plans, and getting the opinions of his general officers;[947] but the movements of the British to evacuate Philadelphia soon changed all.[948]

PLAN OF MONMOUTH BATTLE.

From a plan in Hilliard d'Auberteuil's Essais, i. p. 270. Key: The English had passed the night at a. Lee's advance showed itself at 3, when the British debouched from their position at 1, while their guns at 2 fired on the Americans. The Americans at 3 retired into the wood, and joined Lee's main body, which debouched from the wood at 4, their guns taking position at 6 and 7, while the British guns were at 5. The Americans (4, 8, and 10) retired and took position at 11; and while still further retreating, the British attacked at 12, and the Americans made a stand at 13, and before all could retire still farther the British again attacked at 14. The Americans again formed at 15, when Washington, coming up by way of the new Baptist meeting-house with the main body, formed at 16, Stirling and Greene in front, and Lafayette in the rear, while Lee's men at 15 passed to Washington's rear, a British reconnoitring force appearing meanwhile at 17, and Plessis-Mauduit's battery, supported by 500 men, taking position at 18. The British at 14 and 17, being repulsed, united at 19, whence they were further repulsed and took position at 20. They formed again at 21 after Washington's attack. They passed the night at 22.

This map was apparently engraved from an original, followed in two plans, differently drawn, but in effect the same, which are among the maps in the Sparks collection at Cornell University, and which were copied from Lafayette's own plan at Lagrange. It is called Carte de l'affaire de Montmouth, où le général Washington commandait l'armée Américaine et le général Clinton commandait l'armée Anglaise, le 28 Juin, 1778. The "legende" shows references from 1 to 22, with extra ones a and b, the latter (b) being at the junction of the two dotted lines in the rear of 16, and is explained as the "movement of the second line, commanded by General Lafayette, which, as soon as the column at 17 was perceived, was detached to occupy the wood west of the meeting-house, which the column 17 was approaching; but when this column 17 was repulsed the line was restored."

There is also among the Sparks maps (Lafayette copies) a pen-and-ink sketch-plan,—differing somewhat, giving more detail,—made on the American side, and this more nearly resembles the plan given by Sparks in his Washington (v. p. 430,—repeated in Duer's Stirling, ii. 196; and in Guizot's Washington. Cf. Irving's Washington, quarto ed.). The plan in Lossing's Field-Book (ii. 356) is based on the one here engraved, and he also gives a view of the Freehold meeting-house (p. 359) and of the field (p. 362). Carrington (ch. 56) gives an eclectic plan with more detail than any other.

A view of the monument commemorating the battle is in the U. S. Art Directory (1884).

MONMOUTH AND VICINITY.

Sketched from a part of a MS. Hessian map in the library of Congress, called Plan générale des opérations de l'armée Britannique contre les Rebelles, etc. The lines (·—·—) represent roads. Key: "79, Marche du général de Knyphausen de son camp devant Englishtown le 24 Juin. 80, Marche du général Cornwallis. 83, Retraite des enemis."

There is a copy of the map of the region of the march by Clinton's engineer in the library of the N. Y. Hist. Soc. (Mag. of Amer. Hist., Sept., 1878, p. 759).

The battle of Monmouth, though in the end a victory for Washington, secured for the British what they fought for, a further unimpeded march toward New York. Washington's letters are of the first importance.[949] We have also accounts by Hamilton;[950] by Lafayette,[951] as given to Sparks; and statements by several other witnesses.[952]

The trial of Lee, and the papers produced by it, furnish abundant contemporary evidence. The trial was published at Philadelphia, 1778, as Proceedings of Court-Martial held at Brunswick in New Jersey, July 4, 1778.[953]

On the British side, Clinton's despatch is in Lee Papers, (1872), p. 461; Dawson, i. 415. A British journal kept during the march is in the N. J. Hist. Soc. Proc., i. 15; an orderly-book picked up on the field is in a transcript in the Penna. Hist. Society.[954]

The British retreat is commended in Baron von Ochs's Betrachtungen über die neuere Kriegskunst (Cassel, 1817). Cf. Lowell's Hessians, p. 209.

Respecting the Conway Cabal, the best gathering of the documentary evidence is in an appendix to Sparks's Washington.[955] Sparks's conclusion is that the plot never developed into "a clear and fixed purpose", and that no one section of the country more than another specially promoted it. Mahon (vi. 243) thinks that Sparks glides over too gently the participation of the New Englanders, who have been defended from the charge of participation by Austin in his Life of Elbridge Gerry (ch. 16). Gordon implicates Samuel Adams, and J. C. Hamilton is severe on the Adamses (Repub. U. S., i. ch. 13, 14). Mrs. Warren found no cause to connect Sam. Adams with the plot, and Wells (Sam. Adams, ii. ch. 46) naturally dismisses the charge. It is not to be denied that among the New England members of Congress there were strong partisans of Gates, and the action of Congress for good in military matters was impaired by an unsettled estimate of the wisdom of keeping Washington at the head of the army, though it did not always manifest itself in assertion (Greene's Greene, i. 287, 403, 411). Nothing could be worse than John Adams's proposition to have Congress annually elect the generals (Works, i. 263); and he was not chary of his disgust with what was called Washington's Fabian policy. Sullivan, in one of his oily, fussy letters to Washington (Corresp. of the Rev., ii. 366) finds expression of a purpose to revive the plot in William Tudor's massacre oration in Boston in March, 1779. The expressions of Charles Lee, that "a certain great man is most damnably deficient" (Moore's Treason of Lee, p. 68), like utterances of others, are rather indicative of ordinary revulsions of feeling under misfortunes than of a purpose of combination among the disaffected. Gates's refusal to reinforce Washington, and Hamilton's vain efforts to persuade him, naturally fall among the indicative signs;[956] and this apathy of Gates very likely conduced immediately to the loss of Fort Mifflin at the time it was abandoned (Wallace's Bradford, App. 12). The attempt to gain over Lafayette by the attractions of a command in invading Canada, can be followed in Sparks's Washington.[957]

[THE TREASON OF ARNOLD.]

A CRITICAL STUDY OF THE AUTHORITIES BY THE EDITOR.

Just when and by what act Arnold was put in treasonable correspondence with the British is not clearly established. Bancroft[958] says it was towards the end of February, 1779,[959] but he gives no authority.

ARNOLD.

After the medallion, engraved by Adam, of a picture by Du Simitière, painted in Philadelphia from life. The original is in Marbois' Complot d'Arnold et de Sir Henry Clinton (Paris, 1816), where it is inscribed "Le Général Arnold, déserté de l'armée des Etats Unis, le 25 Sept^bre, 1780." The copy of Marbois in the Brinley sale (no. 3,961) had also the sepia drawing from which the engraver worked. The Du Simitière head had already appeared in the European Magazine (1783), vol. iii. 83, and in his Thirteen Heads, etc.

A familiar profile likeness, looking to the right, was engraved by H. B. Hall for the illustrated edition of Irving's Washington, and is also to be found in H. W. Smith's Andreana. Another profile, similar, but facing to the left, is in Arnold's Arnold, and was etched by H. B. Hall in 1879. Cf. Harris and Allyn's Battle of Groton Heights.

Lossing has given us views of Arnold's birthplace in Norwich (Harper's Mag., xxiii. 722; Field-Book, ii. 36), and of his house in New Haven (Harper, xvii. 13; Field-Book, i. 421), and of his Willow (Harper, xxiv. 735).

BENEDICT ARNOLD.

From the Geschichte der Kriege in und ausser Europa, Eilfter Theil, Nürnberg, 1778.

Clinton, in Oct., 1780,[960] says it was eighteen months before, which would place it about April, 1779, and this is the period adopted by Sparks[961] and Sargent.[962] The latter writer thinks Arnold made the advances; the former believes them to have come from the British.[963] It has also been believed that the mutual recognition was effected in some way through a Lieutenant Hele, a British spy, who was in Philadelphia after Arnold took command. There might arise a suspicion that the understanding was induced through the Tory family of Miss Peggy Shippen, whom Arnold had married in April, 1779. There are stories of her maintaining correspondence with her British friends in New York, but we do not know of any letters remaining as proof of it, except one from André to that lady after her marriage to Arnold, and after the British correspondence with him under feigned names had begun, in which letter the gambolling Major André commiserated his fair friend of the previous winter on the difficulty she might experience in buying gewgaws in Philadelphia, and offering to find them for her in New York. Whether this language, like the commercial phrases in which Arnold was at this time conducting his correspondence under the name of "Gustavus" with one "John Anderson", a British merchant in that city, was likewise a blind is not probably to be discovered, and it might or might not involve a doubt as to the privity of Peggy Arnold in the rather lagging negotiations;[964] but the probability is that André wrote the letter in his own name in order that Arnold might, by the similarity of the handwriting, identify his pseudo Anderson; for by this time the nature of information which inured to the advantage of the British, and which Gustavus communicated to Anderson from time to time, had pretty well convinced Clinton that the person with whom he was dealing was high in rank, and probably near headquarters in Philadelphia.

ARNOLD.

From Murray's Impartial Hist. of the present War, ii. p. 48.

Arnold had warm admirers; and those who trusted him for certain brilliant merits in the field included, among others, Washington himself; but Congress did not confide in him with so unquestioning a spirit. That body had raised over him in rank several of his juniors, much to Arnold's chagrin[965] and Washington's annoyance; and it was only after a renewed exhibition of his intrepidity at Danbury that it had tardily raised him to a major-generalship. Though his commission of May, 1777, gave him equal rank, it made him still, by its later date, the junior of those who had been his inferiors.[966] The Burgoyne campaign had been fought by him under a consequent vexation of mind, and his spirits chafed, not unreasonably, at the slight. The wound he then received incapacitating him for the field, had induced Washington, as has been shown, to put him in command of Philadelphia after the British evacuated it. It was now observed that he more willingly consorted with the Tory friends of his wife than with the tried adherents of the cause. His arrogance and impetuosity of manner always made him enemies. The Council of Pennsylvania by a resolution (Hist. Mag., Dec., 1870), as we have seen, brought Congress to the point of ordering a court-martial to decide upon the charges preferred against the general, and to Arnold's revulsion of feelings at this time has been traced, by some, the beginning of his defection.[967] Certain it is that he was kept in suspense too long to render him better proof against insidious thought, for it was not till December, 1779, that the trial came on. Meanwhile his debts pressed, his scrutinizers were vigilant, and there seems some reason to believe that he sought to get relief by selling himself to the French minister,—a project which, if we may believe the account, was repelled by that ambassador. To add to his irritation, Congress did not find the accounts which he had rendered of his expenditures in the Canada expedition well vouched, and Arnold resented their inquiries as an imputation upon his honesty.[968]

ARNOLD'S COMMISSION AS MAJOR-GENERAL.

Reduced from the fac-simile given in Smith and Watson's Hist. and Lit. Curios., 1st series, plate xlii.

WEST POINT.

Sketched from a colored drawing in the Moses Greenleaf Papers (Mass. Hist. Soc.).

The trial at last resulted in his acquittal on two of the more serious charges; but being judged censurable on two others, he was sentenced to a public reprimand from the commander-in-chief.[969]

A profile cut by himself for Miss Rebecca Redman, in 1778, and given in Smith and Watson's Hist. and Lit. Curiosities, 1st series, pl. xxv.

The burden of a public reproof, no matter how delicately imposed, was not calculated to arrest the defection of man already too far committed to retreat. If we may believe Marbois, not the best of guides, there was found among Arnold's papers, after his flight, a letter, undated and unsigned, in which he was urged to emulate the example of Gen. Monk, and save his country by an opportune desertion of what was no longer a prospering cause.[970] It soon became evident to Arnold that of himself, destitute of representative value, he was not a commodity that Clinton was eager to buy. Accordingly the recusant soldier sought to offer a better bargain to the purchaser by the makeweight of something that Clinton particularly longed for, and this was the possession of the Hudson Valley through its chief military posts.[971] To get a hold upon this, the time was opportune, for there was a change to be made in its commander. Arnold, however, did not get the coveted prize without some intrigue, for Washington, when he found that the wounded soldier professed eagerness for hotter work, proposed his taking the command of one of the wings of the main army. Arnold met the compliment by referring to his wounds as precluding work in the saddle, and induced Schuyler and R. R. Livingston to importune Washington to assign him to West Point.[972] The device succeeded, and Arnold reached West Point, as its commander, in the first week of August, and established his headquarters in the confiscated house which had belonged to Beverley Robinson, and which was situated on the east bank of the river, a little below West Point.[973] Clinton could have no longer any doubt of the identity of his correspondent, now that "Gustavus" wrote from the Robinson house.

The conspirators' first effort was to establish communications through Robinson, on business ostensibly having relations to this confiscated property; but Washington, to whom, for appearances, Arnold showed Robinson's application for an interview, told him that the civil, and not the military, powers should meet such proposals. Arnold could find at this time little difficulty in transmitting his clandestine letters, for there was constant occasion for the passage of flags from his own headquarters. To cover his proceedings from the officers of the American outposts, he only had to pretend that the expected messages or messengers were from his own spies in New York.[974]

From the Political Magazine, March, 1781, ii. 171. There is a modern reproduction of this engraving in the Minutes of a Court of Inquiry, etc., Albany, 1865. and in H. W. Smith's Andreana, Phila., 1865, who gives a full-length, of the origin of which we are left uninformed.

Clinton was apparently not willing to commit himself to any bargain, unless Arnold would give a personal interview as an evidence of his sincerity; while Arnold, in according, on his part insisted that his interviewer should be the convenient Anderson. André, since he had become the adjutant-general of the British army, was now fully understood to represent that fictitious New York merchant. Arnold named Robinson's house for the meeting, and would make arrangements by which any flag should pass the outposts. This was objected to, and the neutral ground near Dobbs Ferry was settled upon. Here Arnold went in his barge; but the officers of the British guard-boats were not in the secret, and the meeting failed by reason of their chasing Arnold's barge up the river. Another attempt was planned, but this failed in the beginning, apparently by André's going up to the "Vulture", sloop-of-war, which was lying in the river, instead of landing lower down, as was expected. André was provided with full instructions, which if obeyed would have saved him the ignominy of a felon's death. He was not to put off his uniform, was not to go within the American lines, and was not to receive any papers. His bargain with Arnold was to have no written expression, and it involved on Sir Henry's part the dispatch of an ample force in a flotilla from Sir George Rodney's fleet, then in New York, where the men were already embarked, ostensibly for the Chesapeake, and the attack was to be made on the 25th of September, when it was supposed that Washington would have left the Hudson to go to Connecticut for an interview with Rochambeau. There was further to be made by André a promise that Arnold should have a commission in the British army and a sum of money. The American general, on his part, was so to dispose the forces in the works about West Point that the attack would, beyond doubt, end in a surprise and a mastery that would give color to the necessity of a surrender, which he was promptly to make.

ANDRE.

This picture of André, by himself, was originally engraved in 1784 by J. K. Sherwin, and was reëngraved by Hopwood for J. H. Smith's Authentic Narrative, London, 1808, and from this second engraving the present cut is taken. It has of late years been engraved by H. B. Hall in Sparks's Washington, quarto ed., vol. iv.; H. W. Smith's Andreana; Sargent's André; Mag. of Amer. Hist., 1879, p. 745 (etched by H. B. Hall). What seems to be the same, but extended to include the thighs, is given in Lossing's Field-Book, ii. 197; Two Spies, 36. A picture by Reynolds (given in Harper's, lii. 822, and Cyclop. U. S. Hist., i. 46) is said to be preserved at Tunbridge Wells. A pen-and-ink sketch by himself, made during his confinement, is now preserved in the Trumbull gallery at New Haven. Sparks first engraved it, and it has since been reproduced by Lossing, in Harper's Mag., xxi. 4, in Smith's Andreana, and elsewhere.

It now became necessary that some device should be practised to let Arnold know that André had reached the "Vulture." There had just happened some firing upon a boat of the "Vulture", in going to meet what the British captain supposed or pretended to suppose a white flag displayed on the shore. This gave the opportunity of dispatching a flag to the commander in the Highlands, to remonstrate against such perfidy. The British captain accordingly sent such a message, and André wrote the letter in a hand which he knew Arnold would recognize, and moreover countersigned it with "John Anderson, Secretary."

Arnold at once bent to the occasion. He engaged one Joshua Hett Smith, who lived in the neighborhood, to go by night to the "Vulture" in a boat, and bring to the adjacent shore a gentleman whom he would find on board, from whom Arnold expected to get information. How far Smith was a dupe or a knave has never been satisfactorily determined. The business would seem to have had a plain significance to a quick-witted man; but a court was not able later to convict Smith of knowing precisely what it all meant. Smith had also with him two oarsmen, and it was not apparently believed that they were in a position to know enough to render their patriotism doubtful. It was then by night, in a boat steered by Smith, that André, dressed in his uniform, but with an overcoat wrapped about him, was rowed ashore. According to Smith, the darkness and the outer garment so concealed Andre's dress that his steersman never suspected him to be an officer. Arnold was found waiting in the bushes, a little remote from the landing. Here Smith left the two conspirators alone and returned to his boat; but when the signs of dawn began to appear he returned to warn them. Arnold, who had brought along with him an extra horse, mounted André on it, and the two started to go to Smith's house,[975] which was two or three miles away on the hill, and within the American lines.

HUDSON RIVER.

Reduced from a rough pen-and-ink sketch, three feet and eight inches long, preserved among the Sparks MS. maps in Cornell University library, and inscribed "To his Excellency George Clinton, Esq^r, Governor of the State of New York, this map of Hudson's River through the Highlands is humbly dedicated by his Excellency's most humble servant Thomas Machin, iv. January, MDCCLXXVIII."

If André is to be believed, he was not told that he was to go within the American outposts, and indeed there is no conclusive evidence to show why they went to Smith's house at all. Perhaps Smith or the boatmen refused, in the growing light, to take the risk of the return to the vessel. The general opinion has been that the conspirators had not concluded their negotiations, and needed more time. That Arnold had had a predetermined purpose to go to the house, if necessary, seems to be made clear from the fact that he had induced Smith to move his family away from their home temporarily, and on some pretext which Smith did not object to. André says that he first discovered Arnold's plan to get him within the American lines when, as they rode on their way, Arnold gave the countersign at the outposts. This was the first departure from Clinton's instructions. After they had reached the house the day broadened, and, the sound of cannon being heard, André went to a window, whence he could see the "Vulture" in the distance,[976] and saw that the Americans had dragged some cannon to a neighboring point, whence their fire became so annoying that the vessel raised her anchor and fell down the river. André became anxious lest this incident should preclude his return by water. The day had not far advanced when the bargain was completed, and Arnold prepared to leave for West Point to perfect the dispositions expected of him. He left behind sundry papers, mostly in his own handwriting, which André was to take to Clinton. Why another injunction of his superior was evaded by André in accepting the papers is not clear. They conveyed no information about the condition of the post which Clinton did not already possess or André could repeat to him. Possibly it was thought that, being in Arnold's autograph, the documents might serve as a pledge for what André was verbally to report to him.

Arnold seems to have made no certain provision for his fellow-conspirator's return to the "Vulture", but he left passes, which could be used either on the water or land passage, as circumstance might determine. André spent an anxious day after Arnold left. He was finally cheered by observing that the "Vulture", as if mindful of him, had returned to her previous moorings; but his hopes were futile. As night came on Smith showed no signs of arranging for a water passage to the ship, and made excuses.

HUDSON RIVER.

After the original draft by Major Villefranche (1780) as reproduced in Boynton's West Point, p. 45. Sargent, in his André, gives a map "engraved from a number of original drawings by Villefranche and other engineers, and preserved by Major Sargent, of the American army, who was stationed at West Point as aide to General [Robert] Howe until that officer was relieved by Arnold."

The fact probably was, that, after the cannonading of the morning, Smith had no desire to risk himself on the river in a boat. It was accordingly agreed that André should undertake to return to New York by land, and that Smith should accompany him beyond the American outposts, under the protection of Arnold's pass and of his own acquaintance with the officers of the lower posts. It now became necessary for André to disregard another of Clinton's directions, and exchange his uniform for common clothes.[977] This done, he put the papers which Arnold had given him under his soles and within his stockings. Thus arrayed, about dusk the two started, accompanied by Smith's negro servant. They crossed King's Ferry, and proceeding on their way were stopped once, but suffered to advance on showing Arnold's pass. After spending the night at a house, they had gone on some distance the next morning when Smith parted with André, and, going to Robinson's house, reported to Arnold that André had been conducted beyond the lines. André went on in better spirits than before, feeling sure now that he could encounter nothing more serious than some wandering cowboys, as the British marauders who infested the Neutral Ground between the two armies were called, and with whom he could easily parley to their satisfaction. The natural foes of the "Cowboys" were the "Skinners", who harried the unfortunate adherents of the British along the same roads, and wrestled with the Cowboys as opportunity offered.[978] As it happened, a party of the American prowlers were out to intercept some British marauders, and three of the number were ensconced close by a stream not far from Tarrytown, on the upper side. They were by name John Paulding, David Williams, and Isaac Van Wart. Paulding was by force of character the leader, and was dressed in a refugee's suit, which not many days before had been put upon him in exchange for his own better garments, when he had come out from confinement within the British lines. This suit, as well as Paulding's profession that he was "of the lower party", given to André's inquiry when, as he came along, he was stopped by the men, led to André's revealing himself as a British officer. When the traveller found he had made a mistake, he showed Arnold's pass, and tried to enforce it by threats of the American commander's displeasure if the captors dared to disregard it. This failing, he tried bribes, and it was André's opinion that if he could have made the payment sure he might have got off, as money seemed to be their object. The men, on the other hand, said that they could have resisted any offer of money when, on searching their prisoner, they found the papers in his boots.[979] Paulding, who alone could read, saw the purport of the documents, and pronounced André a spy.

COLONEL BENJAMIN TALLMADGE.

After a sketch taken by Colonel Trumbull, at the close of the war, and engraved in the Memoir of Col. Benjamin Tallmadge, prepared by himself at the request of his children, New York, 1858. A portrait in his later years, painted by E. Ames and engraved by G. Parker, is in the National Portrait Gallery, Philadelphia, 1836, vol. iii.

André was remounted and led under their combined guidance to the quarters[980] of Colonel Jameson, who commanded some dragoons at Northcastle. That officer recognized Arnold's handwriting in the papers found on the prisoner, but he seems to have been bewildered by the discovery, though it was afterwards urged that he thought the transaction was a plot of "John Anderson", whoever he might be, to implicate Arnold in some mischief. How far the prisoner himself may have prompted Jameson is not known, for it was clear enough to André that Arnold only could now extricate him from the gathering toils. Accordingly, events took a promising turn for him when Jameson dispatched the prisoner, under escort, to Arnold's headquarters, with a letter which informed his superior of what was apparent enough, that some dangerous papers had been found on Anderson, and that he had sent them to Washington. Major Benjamin Tallmadge, one of his officers, who was absent on a scout, returned before André had long been gone, and learning the particulars from Jameson saw at once the blunder, and persuaded Jameson to send a messenger to recall André and his escort. Jameson did so, but insisted that the letter to Arnold should go on, as it did.

The messenger with the papers sought to intercept Washington on the lower road from Hartford, which the commander-in-chief was supposed at that time to be traversing on his return from the interview with Rochambeau.

The next morning André was sent, for better security, in the charge of Tallmadge to Colonel Sheldon's quarters at New Salem. Here, getting permission to walk in the door-yard in the custody of an officer named King, André revealed his name and station, and being allowed pen and paper, he made the same avowal in a letter to Washington, which, when written, he handed to Tallmadge. Its contents confirmed that officer's suspicion that the prisoner was a military man, for he had shown a soldier's habit of turning on his heel as he paced his room.

Washington, returning by the upper road, had missed Jameson's messenger, who, retracing his steps, passed through New Salem, where he was entrusted also with the letter which André had just written, and then went on towards the Robinson house, where Washington was then supposed to be.

It was now the 25th, the very day when Rodney was to come up the river with his flotilla, and Arnold sat at breakfast at this same Robinson house,[981] not knowing what the day would develop. There were with him Mrs. Arnold, who had not long before (Sept. 15) come from Philadelphia, and two of Washington's aides, who had arrived a little in advance of their chief.

It was two days earlier than Washington had been expected back, and this was a serious perplexity in the mind of the conspirator. The suspense was soon ended, for Jameson's messenger to him shortly arrived, and the letter was put in Arnold's hands before the company. He read it, showed, as was remembered afterwards, a little agitation, but only a little, and in a few minutes left the table, saying that it was necessary for him to go to West Point. It seemed natural enough to his guests; but Mrs. Arnold observed his agitation more keenly, and followed him to their chamber, where all was revealed to her. She swooned; he kissed the infant lying there; descended the stairs;[982] stopped an instant to say to the breakfast party that Mrs. Arnold was not feeling well and would not come down again; mounted a horse which he had already ordered; hurried down the steep road to the river; entered his barge and seated himself in its prow; directed his men to row to mid-stream; and then priming his pistols, which he had taken from his holster, he ordered them to hurry down the river, as he had to go with a flag to the "Vulture", and must hasten back to meet Washington, who was shortly to reach his quarters. He tied a white handkerchief to a cane, and waved it as he passed Livingston's batteries at Verplanck's Point, and that officer recognizing the barge allowed it to pass on. In a few minutes more he was under the "Vulture's" guns, and then under her flag. His boatmen resisted his offers of recompense for desertion, and were not allowed to return to shore to spread the intelligence, which they now comprehended.[983]

WEST POINT.

Reproduced from the plan in Marbois' Complot d'Arnold et de Sir Henry Clinton, Paris, 1816. A plate in the Mag. of Amer. Hist., 1879, p. 756, showing the route of André, is a portion of a map among the Simeon de Witt's maps (i. no. 66) in the library of the New York Hist. Society, and was made by Robert Erskine, the topographical engineer of the army, 1778-1780, and was for the whole length of it, from Staten Island to Newburgh, engraved for the first time in Irving's Washington, quarto ed., ii. 276.

There are other maps of the scene of the conspiracy and its attendant events in Sparks's Washington, vii. 216; Guizot's Atlas to his Washington; Irving's Washington, quarto ed., vol. iv.; Carrington's Battles, 512; Lossing's Field-Book, ii. 148; and Boynton's West Point, 104.

Not long after Arnold left the Robinson house, Washington arrived, and, learning that Arnold had gone to West Point, he passed over unsuspicious to that post, where he was surprised not to find Arnold.[984] While Washington was gone, Jameson's messenger with the captured papers and André's letter arrived, and Hamilton, left behind by Washington, opened them as his confidential aide.[985] As soon as Washington's boat approached on his return from West Point, Hamilton went towards the dock to meet his chief, whispered a word, and both later entered the house and were closeted. The plot was revealed. Hamilton was dispatched to Livingston to head off Arnold in his escape if possible, but on reaching that officer's post it was found that Arnold's boat had already passed. Before Hamilton was ready to set out on his return, a flag from the "Vulture" brought ashore a letter from Arnold, addressed to Washington, framed in lofty expressions of his own rectitude, and avowing the innocence of Smith, of his own wife, and his aides.[986] Before Hamilton's return, Washington had dined with his officers without revealing the secret, but he shortly took Knox and Lafayette into his confidence. There was naturally great uncertainty as respects the extent of the conspiracy, and of what preparations the enemy had made for an immediate onset. The anxiety of the moment was soon evinced by the great activity of aides and orderlies. Word was sent in every direction for arrangements to be made for any emergency.[987]

André was brought to West Point, and Smith was arrested and held for examination. Special precautions were taken to keep them apart and to prevent escape. André was then conveyed down the river, still under Tallmadge's care, to headquarters at Tappan, where he was closely guarded in an old stone house, still standing.[988]

A board of general officers was at once summoned to consider the case and recommend what action should be taken. The papers taken from André were laid before them.[989] André himself was brought into their presence, when he made a written statement, and answered questions. He acknowledged everything, but said nothing to implicate others. He affirmed that he did not consider himself under the protection of a flag when he landed from the "Vulture." The report of the board was that André was a spy, and merited the death of a spy. Washington ordered the execution, and sent a record of the proceedings to Congress and recommended its publication. Congress printed the record.[990]

Clinton was meanwhile informed of what had happened by the return of the "Vulture" to New York, and wrote to Washington that Arnold's flag and pass should save André from the character of a spy. Beverley Robinson wrote to a similar purport, and so did Arnold; but the latter added a threat of retaliation in case André was executed, which was not calculated to further the purpose of André's friends, and it is rather surprising they allowed the letter to proceed. Washington replied in effect that a flag must be used in good faith to preserve its character, and that the concealment of dress and papers was the action of a spy.

Gen. Robertson was sent by Clinton to make further representations, and Washington put off the execution till Greene could confer with that general at an outpost. A repetition of the arguments on the British side made no change in the aspects of the case; and when Robertson quoted Arnold as saying André was under a flag, Greene told him they believed André rather than Arnold. Robertson wrote again to Washington, who had now definitely fixed mid-day of Oct. 2d for the execution. Washington thought it also best to leave unanswered a note of André requesting to be shot rather than hanged. Further letters, amplifying the British arguments, were prepared,[991] but before they could be sent to Washington word came that the execution had taken place.

During his confinement in Tappan, and after he became aware of his fate, André conducted himself with a cheerful dignity that much endeared him to the gentlemen who came in contact with him. His servant had brought from New York fresh linen and his uniform, which André put on with evident satisfaction. He practised his ready skill in pen-and-ink drawing, and made several sketches, which he gave to his attendants as souvenirs.[992] As his hour approached, he said graciously to his escort, "I am ready", and went to the place appointed, surrounded by guards and through a large concourse of people. Of the general officers of the army at the post only the commander-in-chief and staff were absent; and as the sad procession passed headquarters the blinds were drawn, and no one was seen. When the gibbet came in sight, André shrank a moment, but instantly recovered, for he had nourished hopes that his request as to the manner of his death would not be denied. He bandaged his eyes himself; lifted the cloth a moment to say that he wished all to bear witness to the firmness with which he met his death; and when the cart was withdrawn died instantly.[993] When his uniform was removed and placed in his servant's hands, the coffin which contained the body was buried near the spot.

His remains were disinterred in 1821 and taken to England,[994] where they were deposited in Westminster Abbey, beside the monument which had been erected there to his memory shortly after his death.[995] Many years after the removal, a rude boulder,[996] on which a simple record was chiselled, was placed on the spot of his burial; but this had disappeared when a few years since a plain monument, with an inscription by Dean Stanley of the Abbey, was made to perpetuate the record of his grave.[997]

Note.—A reduced sketch is placed opposite from a plan by Villefranche, made in 1780, and given in fac-simile in Boynton's West Point, p. 86. He also (p. 79) gives Villefranche's plan (1780) of Fort Arnold, built 1778 on the eastern limits of West Point. On Villefranche see Ibid., p. 160. Boynton also gives a long folding panoramic view of West Point in 1780 from the eastern bank of the river, which shows the batteries and camps on both banks. Cf. illustrated paper, by Lossing, in Scribner's Mag., v. 4.

Arnold received the price of his desertion,[998] was made a general in the British service, and turned his sword, both in Connecticut and Virginia, against his countrymen. Afterwards he went to England, was treated with an enforced respect in some places, and scorned in others.[999] He lived for a while in New Brunswick, but he never escaped the torments which the presence of honorable men inflicted upon him. His descendants live to-day in England and in Canada, and some of them have attained high rank in the British army; and no one of them, as far as known, has disgraced the good name of the old Rhode Island family, whence Benedict Arnold descended.[1000]

The report of the court respecting André, with its appendix (already referred to), and the trial of Smith were the first public sifting of the evidence about the conspiracy. Smith was acquitted by the military tribunal,[1001] and was then turned over to the civil authorities for a further trial; but, succeeding in escaping in women's clothes, he reached New York, and England, where several years later he published a narrative, which it is not easy to reconcile with all his evidence in his trial,—the supposition[1002] being that he was addressing injured Americans in the one case and disappointed Britons in the other.[1003] Marbois, the secretary of the French legation at Philadelphia at the time, wrote a Complot d'Arnold et Clinton, which was not published till 1816 at Paris. Sparks says, that what came under Marbois' personal observation is valuable; but otherwise the book, as most students think, should be used with caution.[1004]

The earliest comprehensive treatment of the subject—and it has hardly been surpassed since—was in Sparks's Life and Treason of Arnold (Boston), and he gives the principal documentary evidence in his Washington, vol. vii. App.[1005]

The next special examination of the conspiracy was made in Winthrop Sargent's[1006] Life and Career of Major John André (Boston, 1861),—an excellent book.[1007]

In 1864 the story necessarily made a part of Edward C. Boynton's History of West Point, who pointed out the military advantage of the Highlands of the Hudson.[1008] Not long after this, Henry B. Dawson, then editing the Yonkers Gazette, printed in its columns sixty-eight contemporary documents or narratives, and these, subsequently printed from the same type in book-form, constitute no. 1 of Dawson's Gazette Series, under the title of Papers concerning the capture and detention of Major John André (1866). It is the most complete gathering of authentic material which has been made.

The volume (x.) of Bancroft which contains his account of the conspiracy appeared in 1875, and was constructed "by following only contemporary documents, which are abundant and of the surest character, and which, taken collectively, solve every question.... The reminiscences of men who wrote in later days are so mixed up with errors of memory and fable that they offer no sure foothold."[1009]

The Life of Arnold, by Isaac N. Arnold, of Chicago, and the Two Spies of Benson J. Lossing, are the last considerable examinations of the subject.[1010]

The story of the culmination and collapse of the conspiracy is easily told with the abundant testimony of those who were observers and actors,—much of the record being made at the time, though some of it, put upon paper at varying intervals later, may need to be scrutinized closely, particularly as regards André's demeanor from the moment of his arrest to his execution.[1011]

For the English side we must mainly depend on the letters and statements of Clinton, which are elaborate, and may well be supplemented by contemporary and later English historians.[1012]

As respects the justice of André's execution, the military authorities were disagreed on the two sides at the time, and for a while the alleged offence of Washington was considered in England a conspicuous blot upon his character; but Lord Mahon has been the only prominent instance of continued belief in this view among English writers, who have generally conceded the right of the Americans to count André a spy, however they might wish that Washington had been more clement. The attractive manners and brilliant mental habit of André have blinded even American writers to the atrocious nature of his mission, and to the sinister purpose which a man of sensibility and elevated character should never have grasped, even amid the license which a state of war gives. The power to face death with a calm and graceful courage may indeed be mated with the moral lightness that belongs to an intellectual popinjay and a debased intriguer.[1013]

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