Narrative and Critical History of America, Vol. 6 (of 8) / The United States of North America, Part I

by Unknown

CHAPTER VI.

THE WAR IN THE SOUTHERN DEPARTMENT.

BY EDWARD CHANNING,

Instructor in History in Harvard College.

IN the autumn of 1778 the British commander-in-chief, Sir Henry Clinton, determined to attempt for the second time the subjugation of the Southern colonies, and Savannah was selected as the first point of attack. On November 27, 1778, Lieutenant-Colonel Archibald Campbell, with thirty-five hundred men of all arms, sailed from Sandy Hook, and anchored off Tybee Entrance December 23d. Meantime a deserter from an advance transport had given the Americans warning. Their commander was General Robert Howe, a good but unsuccessful officer, who had not been fortunate in securing the confidence of the authorities of Georgia. Ascertaining these facts, Campbell pressed on without awaiting the arrival of Brigadier-General Augustine Prevost with a reinforcement from Florida. On the 28th, late in the afternoon, the British fleet assembled in the Savannah River, off Giradeau's house on Brewton Hill, which is about two miles from Savannah in a straight line, though double that distance by road. A causeway, nearly half a mile in length, ran from the river to the bluff through a rice-field which in ordinary times could have been flooded, but over which the bluff was now accessible from all points.

On the morning of the 29th the Highlanders carried the position with trifling loss, when Campbell, advancing toward Savannah, found the Americans most advantageously posted across the highroad. Through no fault of Howe, his rear was attained, while he awaited an attack in front. The Americans suffered a severe loss, and only a small part of them succeeded in joining Lincoln beyond the Savannah River. Campbell pushed up the Savannah, and in ten days the frontier of Georgia was secured, and this was the condition when Prevost arrived and took command.

Although Lincoln had arrived at Charleston on December 6th, he was not able to reach Purisburgh before the 5th of January, 1779. His army, composed almost entirely of militia, refused under him, as it had under Howe, to be governed by the Continental rules of war.[1014]

At first it seemed to the enemy that the occupation of Georgia could be easily maintained, but the neighboring militia rallied under Pickens, and drove the British back. The American success, however, was brief, for Colonel Prevost, a brother of the general, turned upon General Ashe, who with a detachment from Lincoln's army was following the British retreat. The Americans were surprised and suffered a defeat, which cost Lincoln one third of his army and restored to Prevost his superiority in Georgia.[1015]

The scale again turned. Lincoln, reinforced, once more severed the British communications with the up-country Tories, when Prevost, to disconcert his adversary, at first sought to get between him and Charleston, and then suddenly advanced on the city itself. Here Moultrie, who had been watching the British advance, threw up some defences. Negotiations for a surrender followed, and Governor Rutledge, who was in the town, even proposed a scheme of neutrality for the State during the war, to which Prevost would not listen. The British now intercepted a messenger from Lincoln, and finding that general closing in upon him, Prevost suddenly decamped and marched toward Savannah.

The summer was uneventful; but in the early autumn D'Estaing, who after leaving Newport had been cruising with some success in the West Indies, now turned northerly, and on September 3 (1779) his advance ships arrived off the mouth of the Savannah River. A landing, however, was not effected until the 12th, when the troops landed at Beaulieu, on Ossabaw Sound, fourteen to sixteen miles from Savannah. They did not reach that town until the 16th, so that Prevost had time to call in his scattered detachments, and all but those from Beaufort had arrived when, on the evening of that day, D'Estaing, in the name of the king of France, summoned him to surrender. A correspondence followed, which was prolonged till the defences were strengthened and Maitland got up from Beaufort with eight hundred men, when Prevost refused to surrender.

D'Estaing had been all the more willing to grant the truce as Lincoln, who was looked for from Charleston, had not arrived on the 16th. By the 23d a considerable part of the Americans had joined the French, and siege operations were begun. Guns were brought up from the French ships and trenches pushed to within three hundred yards of the besieged lines. On September 24th a sortie was made by the garrison for the purpose of developing the strength of the besiegers. The sortie was repulsed with ease, but the French, following the assailants back to their lines, were exposed to a murderous fire, and incurred a heavy loss in killed and wounded. The bombardment was then begun with vigor, but with little effect. At last, on October 8th, D'Estaing declared that he could not keep his vessels longer exposed to the Atlantic gales. An assault was determined on. In the night the sergeant-major of one of the Charleston militia regiments deserted to the enemy and gave full information of the intended movement, and further declared that the attack on the British left would be only a feint, the real attack being directed against the Spring Hill redoubt, on the right.[1016]

The assault took place, and failed as much by a lack of coöperation between the columns as by the treachery. This disaster so dispirited the allies that Lincoln crossed the river on the 19th, and when he was safe on the other side the French withdrew to their ships and sailed away,—their last frigate leaving the river on the 2d of November.

VIEW OF CHARLESTOWN, S. C.

Sketched from a marginal view on a chart of The Harbour of Charlestown, from the surveys of Sir Jas. Wallace, Captain in his Majesty's navy and others, published in London by Des Barres, Nov. 1, 1777, and making part of the Atlantic Neptune. Cf. Mag. of Amer. Hist. (1883), p. 830. The Catal. of the king's maps (Brit. Mus.) shows an engraved view of 1739, and other early views are noted in Vol. V., p. 331. There is a view by Leitch, in 1776. In a paper, "Up the Ashley and Cooper", by C. F. Woolson, in Harper's Magazine, lii. p. 1, there is a view of Drayton house, occupied by Cornwallis as headquarters.—Ed.

GENERAL MOULTRIE'S ORDER, March 25, 1780.

From the Commodore Tucker Papers in Harvard College library.—Ed.

The sailing of the French left the coast again exposed, and Clinton, coming from New York, now prepared to attack Charleston. On the 11th of February, 1780, a landing was made on Simmons' Island, just to the north of the North Edisto River. Thence by John's Island, Stono Ferry, Wappoo Cut and River, the Ashley was reached, and a lodgment was effected on the neck of land at the seaward end of which Charleston stands. Clinton advanced with caution. On the 1st of April the first parallel was opened about eight hundred yards from the American works.

From the Tucker Papers in Harvard College library.

On the 21st of March the British fleet, commanded by Admiral Mariot Arbuthnot in person, had crossed the bar unopposed. Some time was spent in taking on board their provisions and guns. Then on the afternoon of the 7th, 8th, or 9th of April—for there is a hopeless confusion as to the exact date—in the midst of a furious thunder-shower the fleet ran by Fort Moultrie without material damage, except to the store-ship "Eolus", which was abandoned. The greater portion of the garrison of Moultrie, commanded by Colonel C. C. Pinckney, was then withdrawn,—the feeble remnant surrendering on the 6th of May, with scarcely a show of resistance.

On the 8th of April guns were mounted in battery in the first British parallel. On the 11th, Lincoln having refused to surrender, fire was opened. The second parallel was completed on the 19th, bringing the British to within four hundred and fifty yards of the opposing line.

After a picture by Col. Sargent, owned by the Mass. Hist. Society (Proc., Jan., 1807, vol. i. p. 192; Catal. Cabinet, no. 13). A copy by Herring was engraved by T. Illman. Cf. Jones's Georgia, vol. ii. (bust only); Irving's Washington, quarto ed., vol. iii.; Harper's Mag., lxiii. 341. A rude contemporary copperplate print, by Norman, appeared in the Boston ed. of An Impartial Hist. of the War (1784), vol. iii. 64.—Ed.

On the morning of the 13th Tarleton and Ferguson, by a sudden push, dispersed the force at Monk's Corner, which had guarded Lincoln's supplies. On the 18th a reinforcement of three thousand men arrived from New York, and enabled Clinton to complete the investment of the town, the command on the eastern side of the Cooper being given to Cornwallis. There was during the next few days a sortie, some desultory fighting, and an unsuccessful correspondence for a surrender. On May 8th the third parallel was completed, bringing the besiegers to within forty yards of the works, while the canal in front of the lines was partly drained and the batteries were ready to open fire. Clinton again summoned the garrison, but again Lincoln declined to surrender,—this time because Clinton refused to regard the citizens as anything but prisoners on parole. On the 11th the British reached the ditch and advanced to within twenty-five yards of the works. Resistance was no longer to be thought of, especially as the citizens themselves now petitioned to have the terms offered by Clinton accepted. The articles were accordingly drawn up and signed on the 12th, and the English took possession.

CORNWALLIS.

From Andrews' Hist. of the War, London, 1785, vol. ii. There is an engraving after an original drawing by T. Prattent in the European Mag., Aug., 1786. There are engravings of him later in life in Lee's Memoir of the War in the Southern Department (Philadelphia, 1872), vol. ii., and in the Cornwallis Correspondence. Cf. Harper's Mag., lxiii. p. 325; Irving's Washington, ii. 282; Boyle's Official Baronage, i. 459. Reynolds painted him in 1780, having already painted him in 1761. The former picture was engraved by Chas. Knight in 1780. Cf. Hamilton's Engraved Works of Reynolds, pp. 19, 169. There is a mezzotint by D. Gardiner. Cf. John C. Smith's Brit. Mez. Port., ii. 745; and in Ibid., iv. 1,444, an engraving by Ward after a picture by Buckley is noted. There is a contemporary account of Cornwallis in the Polit. Mag., ii. 450.—Ed.

On that day the Continentals to the number of perhaps fifteen hundred—there were about five hundred in the hospital at the time—marched out, with colors cased and drums beating the "Turk's March", and laid down their arms. By regarding every adult capable of bearing arms as a militiaman, Clinton reckoned his prisoners at five thousand. Lincoln has been severely censured for this defence, but if the Carolinians had rallied as expected, he might have held out until the heats of the summer and the arrival of De Ternay would have compelled Clinton's retirement.

Clinton now sent out three expeditions to the up-country, the most important of which was destined to secure the region north of the Santee and Wateree.[1017] Cornwallis, commanding this expedition, detached Tarleton against Buford, who had with him the remnants of the American cavalry and some Continentals from Virginia. Tarleton overtook him at Waxhaw Creek on the 29th of May. Of the five hundred Americans who entered the fight, one hundred and thirteen were killed, while one hundred and fifty were wounded. The slaughter was vindictive, and "Tarleton's Quarters" will never be forgotten in the upper regions of South Carolina.

Clinton and Arbuthnot, judging their conquest of the province permanent, now proclaimed as rebels all who refused the oath of allegiance, and then sailed for New York, leaving Cornwallis in command.

CORNWALLIS.

From the London Mag., June, 1781 (p. 251).—Ed.

The new commander's proclamations, following upon those of Clinton and Arbuthnot, were enough at variance with them to create discontent among those inclined toward the British side. The spirits of the patriots began to revive, especially in the back regions, where Colonels Locke and Williams and Generals Rutherford and Sumter gathered strong bands around their standards. The fights at Ramsour Mills, Rocky Mount, Hanging Rock, and Musgrove Mills, which these partisans conducted, were in the main successful, but all were lost to sight in the great disaster which soon overtook the American arms near Camden.

Early in the spring of 1780, it had been decided to send a reinforcement under De Kalb to Lincoln, at Charleston. With about fourteen hundred men of the Maryland and Delaware lines, that general left Morristown on the 16th of April, 1780, and on the 1st of June, in Petersburg, he learned of the fall of Charleston. He decided to push on with the utmost speed, in the hope that his coming might still save the interior of the State. But delay after delay occurred, and De Kalb did not reach the Deep River before the 6th of July, when he found nothing prepared for his reception; and what was still more inexcusable, the North Carolina militia, under Caswell, were holding aloof. On the 25th a new commander of the Southern armies arrived in Horatio Gates, the popular hero of Saratoga. His appointment had been made by Congress against the wishes of Washington, but in obedience to a general popular consent. De Kalb received Gates with genuine pleasure, and took his place at the head of the regulars, then forming the whole army.

Against the advice of his ablest officer, Otho H. Williams, Gates determined to join the North Carolinians in their camp near Lynch's Creek, since they would not join him, and with them he hoped to seize Camden. Two days after his arrival, on July 27th, the march began, and after the most acute suffering from hunger the regulars joined the militia. So lax was the discipline among Caswell's men, that Williams and a party of officers rode through their lines and camp without being once challenged. Approaching the general's tent, they were informed that it was an unseasonable hour for gentlemen to call. Yet Caswell was within striking distance of a disciplined army, commanded by an enterprising general, Lord Rawdon. Marching a little farther, the British were found in a strong position on the southern bank of Little Lynch's Creek.

HORATIO GATES.

From Du Simitière's Thirteen Portraits (London, 1783).—Ed.

By a march up the creek, Gates might have placed his superior force on Rawdon's flank and rear. This was what Rawdon feared, and what De Kalb is said to have advised. Instead he passed two days in idleness, and then, inclining to the right, marched to Clermont or Rugeley's Mill, on the road from Charlotte to Camden, and not more than thirteen miles from the latter. There, seven hundred militia from Virginia joined him. From that place, too, he sent four hundred men, including some regulars, to assist Sumter in a contemplated attack on the enemy's communications. It was now determined to seek a more defensible position on the banks of a creek seven miles nearer Camden. This position could be turned only by marching a considerable distance either up or down the creek. Exactly what Gates had in view by this movement can not now be ascertained.[1018]

Cornwallis arrived at the front on the morning of August 14th, and decided to surprise Gates; but the two armies started on respective marches at precisely the same hour, ten o'clock of the evening of August 15, 1780. Their advanced guards met at about half past two the next morning. Armand, a French adventurer, with his "legion" forming the American van, retired panic-stricken, and the two armies deployed across the road. The position in which the opposing generals now found themselves was singularly favorable to the smaller numbers of the British, as the front was necessarily very short, owing to a marsh which protected while limiting either flank. This advantage Cornwallis was not slow to perceive. A hurried council was held on the American side, and it was decided that there was no alternative but to fight. At dawn the enemy was observed getting into position on the extreme left. Stevens, with the Virginia militia, already in line, was ordered to charge before the enemy's formation was complete. It so happened that Cornwallis, thinking the Virginians were making some change in their dispositions, ordered his right forward. Led by the gallant Webster, the British came on with such a rush that the men of Virginia threw down their loaded guns with bayonets set, broke and dispersed to the rear. Nor did the North Carolinians do better. Seeing the Virginians break, they did not await the onset, but threw away their arms and fled. One regiment indeed, inspired by the example of the regulars, fired several rounds before it broke. Deserted by those whom they had marched so many weary miles to succor, the men of Maryland and Delaware fought till to fight longer was criminal. Then the under-officers, on their own responsibility, brought off all they could, for their commander, De Kalb, overwhelmed by eleven wounds, had fallen into the hands of the enemy,—"a fate", says Williams, "which probably was avoided by other generals only by an opportune retreat." That night Gates found himself at Charlotte, sixty miles from the scene of conflict. Caswell was with him, and they were soon joined by Smallwood and Gist. In fact, excepting the one order issued to the Virginians at the outset, the leaders seem to have left the conduct of the fight to De Kalb and the subordinate officers. From Charlotte Gates retired to Hillsborough, where the legislature was then sitting.

Cornwallis seems to have been satisfied with the havoc wrought on the field of battle, for he pursued without vigor, and soon returned to Camden and gave his attention to Sumter. That enterprising but negligent chieftain had captured the redoubt at the ferry over the Wateree, and had ensnared a convoy destined for Cornwallis. On the night of the 17th, hearing of Gates's overthrow, Sumter left his camp, and moved with such celerity that a corps which Cornwallis sent against him failed to strike him. Shortly after, Tarleton found him less vigilant, and came upon him so unexpectedly that resistance was hardly attempted, and Sumter escaped with scarcely half his force.

Gates has been severely blamed for this defeat; too severely, it seems to me. The march of the regulars from Buffalo Ford to Lynch's Creek was undoubtedly full of hardship, but it was well planned and executed. Nor do the troops who made it seem to have been demoralized by it. On the contrary, seldom have men fought more gallantly than De Kalb's division fought on the morning of August 16, 1780. The Virginians, whose flight made defeat probable, followed the Continentals in the march across the "desert", and did not suffer nearly as much as the leading division. The North Carolina militia, whose panic turned a probable defeat into a rout, had no part whatever in that painful march. The disaster was due to the over-confidence which Gates felt in his men. Had the militia stood firm, the event of the campaign might have been different. There was no defect in Gates as a strategist or tactician. He had a larger number of men in line than his opponent. His dispositions were as perfect as the time and place permitted. The defeat Was "brought on", to use the emphatic words of Stevens, the gallant leader of the Virginians, "by the damned cowardly behavior of the militia."

From Camden Cornwallis advanced to Charlotte, overcoming all obstacles which the militia under Davie interposed. Other militia, meanwhile, under Clarke, advanced on Augusta, but British reinforcements from Ninety-Six, under Cruger, forced Clarke to abandon the attack, and, burdened with the families of some leading Whigs, he retired towards the mountains. Cornwallis, hearing of this, ordered Ferguson, who had been beating up recruits in the upper country, to endeavor to cut Clarke off. Now it happened that at this very time the sturdy frontiersmen, under the leadership of Colonel William Campbell, Colonel Isaac Shelby, Lieutenant-Colonel John Sevier, and Colonel Charles McDowell, had assembled at Watauga, bent on the destruction of Ferguson and his little army.[1019] To the number of one thousand and forty they left their place of meeting on September 26th and marched for Gilberton, where Ferguson was supposed to be. On the 30th they were joined by Colonel Cleveland, with three hundred and fifty men from North Carolina. The senior officer was McDowell, but from his slowness he was not deemed the best man to conduct such an arduous enterprise, and while he was sent to Gates to name a leader they chose Campbell for their chief. Pressing on, they reached the Cowpens, where they were joined by Williams and Lacy, with about four hundred men from the Carolinas.

Meantime Ferguson, not ignorant of the approach of this formidable force, which appeared to have sprung from the earth, had begun his retreat towards Charlotte. Anxious to intercept Clarke, he had delayed his march longer than was prudent, and had taken post on the top of a spur of King's Mountain, where he probably hoped to be reinforced before the enemy should come up with him. While at the Cowpens, on October 6th, the Americans received certain information of Ferguson's position. They resolved to select the best mounted of their little army, and, leaving the poorly mounted and the footmen to follow, to go in pursuit of Ferguson and fight him wherever found. In the evening, therefore, they broke up from the Cowpens, and, marching all night, reached, without being discovered, the foot of King's Mountain on the afternoon of the next day. The spot on which the British were found was singularly well suited to the mode of fighting in which the backwoodsmen were adepts. King's Mountain proper is sixteen miles long, and in some places is high and steep. The southern end, however, where Ferguson was encamped, rises only about sixty feet. It was wooded, except on the summit, which partook of the nature of a plateau. The Americans, under their respective leaders, so timed their movements that Ferguson was surrounded almost before he knew it. The band led by Campbell seems to have made the first attack from the south. It was speedily driven back at the point of the bayonet, but re-formed at the foot of the hill and returned to the charge. Meantime Shelby was pressing on from the north. He, too, was driven back, when, re-forming his men, he also returned to the fight. These charges and countercharges were three times repeated. Cleveland, Sevier, and the rest did their work splendidly in their respective positions. The British, inspired by the example of their heroic leader, fought bravely and well; but their position was so perilous that their loss was double that of the assailants. Ferguson, while leading a charge, or perhaps while endeavoring to cut his way out, was killed. De Peyster, the second in command, showed the white flag, as was his duty, resistance being useless, but the firing did not cease for some time, even though the beaten Tories were suing for quarter. At that moment an attack was made from the rear by another band of British, who were probably returning from a foraging expedition. This new and sudden attack led to a renewal of the slaughter of the unresisting foe on the hill.

The neighborhood was bare of provisions, and the next morning the now half famished victors, with their no less hungry prisoners, made a hurried retreat towards the mountains. On the 13th the Americans arrived at a place then called Bickerstaff's Old Fields, about nine miles from the present hamlet of Rutherfordton. There they improvised a court, and sentenced thirty to forty of their prisoners to death. But after nine had been hanged, the remainder were reprieved or pardoned.

Such was the famous battle of King's Mountain in South Carolina. It changed to a great extent the whole course of the war in the Southern department, as it deprived Cornwallis of the only corps that he could afford to hazard for a long time out of supporting distance. As for Cornwallis, as soon as he heard of the disaster, instead of sending Tarleton in pursuit, he broke up from Charlotte, and retired as fast as he could to Wynnesborough, in South Carolina, midway between Camden and Ninety-Six, where he would be within supporting distance of either in case they were attacked. He was followed by Gates, who encamped at Charlotte, his light parties advancing even to Rugeley's.

Not long after his arrival at Wynnesborough, Cornwallis detached Tarleton, with a portion of the Legion, to disperse the band with which Marion awed the country between the Santee and Pedee rivers. Tarleton had now to deal with a soldier both bold and discreet. All his artifices were unavailing to entrap Marion, and he was recalled to go in pursuit of Sumter, who had encamped at Fishdam Ford, not far from the British headquarters. Meanwhile, Major Wemyss had attacked Sumter just before daybreak on the morning of November 11th. He approached the camp unchallenged at first, but he soon encountered a picket, which fired five shots before retiring. Two shots disabled Wemyss. His second in command, continuing the attack without a proper knowledge of the ground, was repulsed. Sumter, hearing of the approach of Tarleton, prudently withdrew from such a dangerous neighborhood, and had reached the ford of the Tyger, near Blackstocks, when Tarleton appeared. Unable to cross, he drew up his men on the side of a hill. Tarleton, rashly attacking with his advance, was beaten off with great loss. The British leader withdrew to his main body, and prepared to storm the hill the following morning; but in the night Sumter crossed the river, and once over his men dispersed in every direction. The American loss at these two actions was small, though a wound received at the Blackstocks kept Sumter from the field for several months.

From this time on the war in the Southern department assumed a new and brighter aspect, for on December 2, 1780, less than a month after the affair at the Blackstocks, Nathanael Greene arrived at Charlotte, and took command of the remnants of the gallant Continentals who had fought so splendidly at Camden. He was respectfully received by Gates, who retired to his Virginia farm.[1020]

The task that Greene had before him might well have appalled the boldest. Without food, without money or credit, almost without an army, he was expected to face the most enterprising commanders—Cornwallis, Rawdon, and Tarleton—that the British had on this continent, while they were at the head of a large and well-appointed army. But Greene was not the man to be easily disheartened. With the possible exception of Washington, the best soldier of high rank in the American army, he resembled his chief in being a careful observer of men. His judgment, too, with regard to all matters connected with war was excellent, and has seldom been surpassed. As a strategist he had no equal in the opposing army, while he possessed the rare power of being able to adapt his tactics to the army and to the country, although it has been claimed that credit has been given him for what really was the product of another mind.

Gates handed over to his successor an army which numbered on paper twenty-three hundred and seven men, including nine hundred and forty-nine Continentals. But so many were insufficiently clad and equipped that, to use the new commander's own words, "not more than eight hundred were present and fit for duty." Food was scarce, and the morale of the army was low. Greene sought a new camp on the eastern bank of the Pedee, opposite Cheraw Hill, where food was more abundant. There he subjected his men to a discipline to which they had long been strangers, while Morgan, with a strong detachment, threatened Cornwallis's other flank.

Morgan took with him four hundred of the Maryland line, under Lieutenant-Colonel J. E. Howard, two companies of Virginia militia, and about one hundred dragoons led by William Washington. To these were afterwards added more than five hundred militia from the Carolinas. Morgan advanced to Grindall's Ford on the Pacolet, near its confluence with Broad River. In this position he seriously menaced Ninety-Six and even Augusta itself. Cornwallis needed to dislodge him before he could advance far in his projected invasion of North Carolina. He therefore detached Tarleton, with his Legion and a strong infantry support, against Morgan, while he himself advanced with the main body along the upper road to North Carolina, thus placing himself on Morgan's line of retreat whenever that commander should be driven back. Learning of these movements, Morgan retired from Grindall's Ford, and moving with commendable speed on the night of January 16, 1781, encamped at the Cowpens. Tarleton was now close upon him, and, marching the greater part of the night, he discovered the Americans drawn up in line of battle on the morning of the 17th. The position which Morgan had chosen was in many respects a weak one. The country was well fitted for the use of cavalry, in which the British excelled, while the Broad River, flowing parallel to his rear, made retreat difficult if not impossible. Nor were the flanks protected in any manner.[1021] Hardly waiting for his line to be formed, and with his reserve too far in the rear, Tarleton dashed forward.[1022] A militia skirmish line was easily brushed aside, and the main body of militia, after firing a few rounds with terrible precision, also retreated. The Continentals, however, under their gallant leader, stood firm. But Howard's flank soon became enveloped. He ordered his flank company to change its front. Mistaking the order, the company fell back, and the whole line was ordered to retire upon the cavalry. The British, who had been joined by the reserve, thinking that the Americans were retreating, came on like a mob. Seeing this, Howard ordered the 1st Maryland to face about. They obeyed, and poured such an unexpected and murderous fire into the advancing foe that the British line paused, became panic-stricken, turned, and fled. In vain did Tarleton call upon his dragoons for a charge. His order was either not delivered or was misunderstood. Colonel Washington, on the other hand, advanced with a rush, and the day was won. Almost to a man the British infantry was either killed or captured. But they had fought well, and their loss, especially in officers, bears testimony to their splendid conduct on the field.[1023]

King's Mountain lost to Cornwallis his best corps of scouts. This disaster deprived him of his light infantry, whose presence during the forced marches now to come would have been of incalculable service. For this reason the affair at the Cowpens, while in reality only a fight between two small bodies of troops, in importance of results deserves to be ranked among the most important conflicts of the war. It was indeed, as has so often been said, "the Bennington of the South."

Cornwallis, when he had detached Tarleton to the defence of Ninety-Six, and later, when he had ordered him to push Morgan to the utmost, had expected to be able to get on Morgan's line of retreat, and thus drive him into the mountains, or at least prevent his rejoining Greene. But with Greene on his flank at the Cheraws, he had been afraid to move far from Camden before Leslie with the reinforcements could get out of Greene's reach. He was, therefore, no further advanced than Turkey Creek, twenty-five miles away, when the news of the disaster at the Cowpens reached him. On the 18th, Leslie, with two battalions of the Guards under O'Hara and the Hessian regiment of Bose, arrived. On the 19th the pursuit was begun, and on the 24th Cornwallis reached the crossing of the Little Catawba at Ramsour's Mill, only to learn that Morgan had crossed at the same place two days before. In fact, that enterprising leader, instead of being dazzled by the victory at the Cowpens, passed the Broad River on the evening of the day of action, and, pursuing his route toward the mountains, passed Ramsour's Mill on the 21st. With the bulk of his detachment he then sought a junction with the main body under Greene. Turning to the east, he crossed the Catawba at Sherrald's Ford on the 23d, and took post on the eastern bank. At this place he finally rid himself of his prisoners, sending them to Virginia under an escort of militia.

There can be little doubt of the chagrin Cornwallis experienced at the escape of Morgan. It prompted him to destroy what he thought was useless baggage, and to make another attempt to overtake the Americans. This burning of his train occupied two days, and, necessary as it may have seemed, the consequent lack of supplies led to the fearful suffering of his army after Guilford, and made his retreat to Wilmington a necessity. It was his first grave error in his struggle with Greene. On the 27th he put his troops in motion for the Catawba, but before he reached the fords a sudden rise of the river made the crossing an impossibility, and gave Morgan two days' respite. The delay was still more important in giving Greene time to reach the post of danger and take command of the detachment. The news of the victory at Cowpens had not reached the camp at the Cheraws until the 25th. Instantly divining the course that Cornwallis would pursue, Greene sent an express to Lee, who, as soon as he had joined, had been dispatched to coöperate with Marion in an attack on Georgetown, next to Charleston then the most important seaport in South Carolina. The attack failed for some reason that is not quite apparent; but Lee brought off his troops in safety, and rejoined Greene in time to render most important service. On the 29th, the main army, under command of General Huger, left the camp for Salisbury, where Greene hoped to be able to concentrate his entire force. On the 31st the Catawba began to subside. Putting their troops in motion, Greene and Morgan directed their steps toward Salisbury, where they arrived on February 2d. The Yadkin was crossed in safety the next day, though rising rapidly all the time; then sending orders to Huger to join him at Guilford Court-House, and not at Salisbury as formerly ordered, Greene once more breathed freely.

On the afternoon of the 1st, Cornwallis had also put his troops in motion. His design was to make a feint of crossing at Beattie's Ford while with the Guards he should pass the river at the less known Cowan's Ford. By some means, Davidson, who commanded the militia in that region, became cognizant of the design, and stationed himself at Cowan's with about four hundred men, where he expected to hold Cornwallis in check long enough to be of real service to the retiring Americans.

Shortly before daybreak Cornwallis reached the river, and saw the watch-fires on the opposite bank. Without a moment's hesitation the Guards rushed into the rapid stream. When about halfway across they were discovered, and a fire was opened upon them by the militia. But now occurred one of those accidents that so often in war defeat the best-laid plans. The ford, turning in mid-stream at an angle with the direct line, ran under a bank where the militia were waiting for the British; but when they arrived at the turning-point, instead of inclining to the right, the Guards—their guide having deserted through fear—kept straight on, and gained the bank with a loss of only sixty in killed, wounded, and missing. The militia retired, and although Tarleton was sent after them, they made good their retreat with a loss which would have been trifling but for a mortal wound under which the gallant Davidson fell. There were many hair-breadth escapes during this splendid charge. Cornwallis's horse was shot under him, but reached the bank before he fell. Leslie was carried down stream, and O'Hara's horse rolled over with his rider while in the water.

Pushing on with all speed possible in the wretched condition of the roads, Cornwallis's van, under O'Hara, reached the Yadkin at the Trading Ford a few hours after the Americans had crossed; but O'Hara, though he missed the soldiers, captured a train of wagons belonging to the country people who were flying with the army. Here again the forces of nature came to the assistance of the Americans, for the Yadkin rose so rapidly that it could not be forded, and Greene had carefully secured all the boats on the eastern bank.

Cornwallis now gave up all idea of preventing the union of the two wings of the opposing army, which, indeed, was effected soon after at Martinsville, near Guilford. The British commander decided to place himself between his opponents and the fords of the Dan, hoping thereby to prevent the Americans taking refuge in Virginia. Accordingly, on the 7th he crossed the Yadkin at the Shallow Ford. It was now a serious question with Greene to escape the new danger. The militia failing to come to his aid, he was obliged to protect his Continentals by a flight into Virginia. He determined to cross the Dan at Irwin's Ferry, and sent orders to have boats ready at that point. On the 10th the march was renewed. The light troops, united in one division, were placed under the command of O. H. Williams, with orders to delay the enemy as much as possible. By rapid marching the main army reached Irwin's Ferry and crossed on the 13th and 14th, before Williams and the rear-guard came in sight. The experience of this light division has been well told by Lee, whose Legion first measured sabres with Tarleton's men on the 12th. From that time the rear of the Americans and the advance of O'Hara were almost constantly in sight of each other. At every crossing or other suitable place Williams would draw his men out and thus compel the British to deploy; then, his object being accomplished, and the British delayed for a few minutes, the march would be resumed, and the two armies would soon be marching as one again. Cornwallis, conscious finally that his prey had escaped, turned back to Hillsborough, and, erecting the Royal Standard, called upon all loyal North Carolinians to rally to the aid of their royal master.

On the 18th, only four days after his escape, recruits had come in so rapidly that Greene detached Lee across the Dan to seek information, and to show the Tories that the Americans were by no means beaten. Lee had, in addition to his legion, two companies of the Maryland line. He was joined on the southern side of the river by Pickens with a considerable body of Carolina militia.

On the 23d Greene himself crossed the Dan with the main army, and sought the difficult country on the head-waters of the Haw, as the Cape Fear River is called in its upper course. Here again, as during the retreat, the light troops were put into the hands of Williams. The two divisions manœuvred with such precision that Cornwallis was held at arm's length, while militia and Continentals came into the American camp from all directions. The American commander saw that the time had now come to give way no more. He stationed himself on a hillside near Guilford, and awaited the approach of the British. The position which had attracted his attention during the retreat possessed a combination of rising ground, cleared spaces, and woods which could hardly be surpassed for the irregular formation that Greene, following the example set by Morgan at the Cowpens, deemed best suited to his troops.

To Cornwallis, the presence of Greene had been most disastrous. Strategy had failed to annihilate his opponent, and the offered battle, even on ground of the American general's own selection, was welcome to the British commander; and on the morning of the 15th of March, 1781, the trial came.

In his front line Greene put the North Carolina militia, their flanks resting in the woods, the centre being protected in some measure by a rail fence. Three hundred yards behind were posted the Virginia militia under Stevens and Lawson. Though militia in name, some of those under Stevens were veterans in reality. But, taught by his bitter experience at Camden, Stevens posted riflemen behind his line, with orders to shoot any who should run. The Virginians were entirely in the woods. Three to four hundred yards behind them, on the brow of a declivity, with open fields in their front, were the regulars. On the right was the Virginia brigade under Huger. Then, after an interval for the artillery under Singleton, came the Maryland brigade, commanded by Williams. The first regiment was led by Gunby, with Howard as lieutenant-colonel. This was the regiment which had aroused universal admiration by its splendid conduct at Camden and its wonderful subordination at the Cowpens, when a gallant charge converted a bloody check into a crushing disaster. The second Maryland regiment, commanded by Ford, was new to the service. It held the extreme left of the line. The regulars presented a convex front. Lee with the "Legion" and Campbell's riflemen from the backwoods acted as a corps of observation on the left, while Washington, with the regular cavalry and the remnant of the Delaware regiment under the heroic Kirkwood and Lynch's riflemen, protected the right flank.

As soon as Cornwallis found himself in the presence of his enemy, he deployed without reserves, except the British dragoons under Tarleton. The "Hessian" regiment of Bose and the 71st under Leslie, with the 1st battalion of the Guards in support, held the right; next came the 23d and 33d regiments under Webster, with the Grenadiers and the 2d battalion of the Guards under O'Hara in support; while the extreme left was occupied by the light infantry of the Guards and the Jägers. The artillery was on the road with Tarleton. As the line moved forward it first encountered the North Carolinians, who fired a volley, and perhaps more, before they broke. On the extreme right, however, Lee with his light troops held the regiment of Bose and the 1st battalion of the Guards in check. But the defection of the North Carolinians separated him from the rest of the army. The first line being broken, Webster rushed upon the Virginians. But the woods were so thick, and the defence of the Virginians so stout, that his loss at this point was very considerable. At length, Stevens having been wounded in the thigh, the Virginians retired and Webster advanced upon the Continentals. On his right was Leslie with the 71st. When the advancing line reached the front of the 1st Maryland, it was received with such a murderous fire that it stopped. The Marylanders then advanced with the bayonet, and the British gave way and retreated. It has been said by writers on both sides, that had Greene thrown forward another regiment at this moment the day would have been won. But this is by no means certain, as the events of the next few minutes were to show. For Leslie with the 71st and O'Hara with the Guards now came up and assailed the 2d Maryland with such fierceness that it broke and fled. But the 1st Maryland was not far off. Wheeling into line, it opposed the Guards until Washington charged and broke the British line. J. E. Howard—now in command, Gunby having been dismounted—then followed with the bayonet, and pressed the enemy so hard that re-formation was for the moment impossible. Cornwallis, seeing that the flight must be stopped at all hazards, ordered his artillery—posted on an eminence in the centre of the field—to open on the Marylanders through the ranks of his own men. In this way the pursuit was checked, though at terrible loss to the British.

Greene's hopes were soon dashed. The shattered lines of the enemy re-formed and returned to the conflict. Pressing heavily on the Virginia regulars, and reinforced by the 1st battalion of the Guards, which had disengaged itself from Lee, the whole American line was endangered. Greene, who wished to run no chances, and who probably did not know that Lee had once more connected himself with the main line, ordered a retreat. The artillery, the horses having been killed, was left on the ground, but otherwise the withdrawal was easily and skilfully effected.

Such was the battle of Guilford. Numerically, Greene was superior; but of good troops he had only a handful. When the two leaders summed up their losses, it became evident that a decisive blow had been struck at Cornwallis. The Americans lost seventy-nine killed and one hundred and eighty-four wounded, together with one thousand and forty-six missing. Of these last some may have been wounded, but by far the greater part were militiamen, who had returned to their homes. Cornwallis reported his own loss at ninety-three killed, and four hundred and thirteen wounded, and twenty-six missing—a most serious diminution of his force.

Cornwallis in his proclamation and letters maintained, however, that he had achieved a great triumph. It was his despatch to Germain which occasioned the well-known assertion of Charles James Fox that "another such victory would destroy the British army." Even before the fight it had been almost a necessity to open communications with the sea, as the army was suffering for want of the stores that had been destroyed at Ramsour's Mill. Believing the Cape Fear River navigable as far as Cross Creek, Cornwallis had sent Major Craig to seize Wilmington and to open navigation as far as possible, which he succeeded in doing to a point at a short distance above Wilmington. Leaving his wounded at the New Garden Quaker Meeting-house, near the battlefield, Cornwallis set out on the morning of the 18th for Wilmington, arriving there on April 7, 1781. Greene had pursued as soon as possible. But his ammunition, never very abundant, was now almost exhausted. Besides, food was very scarce in the district to be traversed, and Greene arrived at Ramsey's Mill only to find that Cornwallis had built a bridge over Deep River at that point and escaped, although Lee had pressed so hard on his rear that the bridge could not be destroyed. Here the pursuit ended; for the Virginia militia, now that their time was up, refused to serve longer. Though Cornwallis escaped, and though Greene had lost one of the best contested battles of the war, he had won the campaign. He was free once more to turn his attention toward relieving South Carolina of her military rulers. On April 6th, one day before Cornwallis arrived at Wilmington, the southward march began, Lee being detached to operate on the line of Rawdon's communications with Charleston.

Lee soon joined Marion, who was skulking in swamps between the Pedee and Santee, and, uniting forces, the two captured a fortified depot of Watson, the British officer scouring this region, and then endeavored to prevent his rejoining Rawdon.

On the 7th of April Greene had broken up from Ramsey's, and, taking the direct road, had encamped on Hobkirk's Hill, to the north of Camden, and about a mile and a half from the British works at that place. As Rawdon did not come out from his intrenchments, Greene on the 23d moved nearer. Anxious for Marion and Lee, and desirous of supporting some artillery which he detached to them, Greene moved to a position south of Camden. It appears, however, that on the 23d or 24th he decided to fall back. Accordingly, on the afternoon of the 24th he reëncamped on Hobkirk's Hill. During that night a renegade drummer-boy informed Rawdon of the position and number of the American force. He also said that Greene had neither artillery nor trains near at hand, although both were on the march to join him. It was a most propitious time to strike, and Rawdon determined to attempt a surprise the next morning.

Making a considerable detour to the right, he struck the American left almost unperceived. Greene had thrown out a strong picket in that direction, but the superiority of the British was so great that they drove in the guards and were upon the Americans before the formation was complete. That the attack was not a disaster was due to the prudence of Greene, who had encamped in order of battle. Perceiving that Rawdon's line was very short, Greene ordered Ford with the 2d Maryland to flank it on the right, and Campbell was told to do the same on the left. Gunby with the 1st Maryland, and Hawes with the Virginia regulars, were ordered to attack with the bayonet in front, while Washington with the cavalry was to get into the rear and take advantage of any opening that might offer. Unfortunately, neither Ford nor Campbell were able to put in their men before Rawdon, seeing his danger, brought up his reserves and extended his flank. This was owing partly to Ford being struck down in the beginning of the movement.

The defeat of Greene, however, was due to one of those accidents against which no foresight can provide. It seems that as the 1st Maryland was getting into position to charge, or perhaps as it was moving forward, Beattie, the captain of one of the leading companies, was shot. His men began firing, and fell into confusion. Then Gunby, instead of pushing his rear companies forward, as Greene always declared he should have done, ordered the regiment to form on the rear companies. The men retiring were seized with a panic, and the heroes of three battles broke. They were rallied soon after, but it was then too late. The whole line was compromised, and Greene ordered a retreat.

Though Greene was not surprised, the attack was most unexpected. This was owing in a great measure to the woods in his front, which permitted Rawdon to reach the picket line without discovery. Even then Greene fully expected victory, and had his men done their duty, as he had a perfect right to expect, this adventurous attempt of the young British commander would have resulted in his complete overthrow. Such was Greene's opinion, and such is the opinion of most American writers.[1024] Retiring first to Sanders Creek or Gum Swamp, the very spot Gates was trying to reach when he met Cornwallis, and later to Rugeley's Mill, Greene brought up his provisions and recruited the strength of his men. Though not beaten at Hobkirk's Hill, Greene was greatly discouraged. Especially distressing was the non-arrival of expected reinforcements. The terms of service of his best men were expiring, and he could see no source from which to draw recruits. His losses in the recent engagement had not been so great as those of his opponent; but Marion and Lee had been unable to prevent Watson from rejoining his chief. Still Greene did not lose heart. As soon as his men had recovered from fatigue he crossed the Wateree and posted himself at Twenty-five-Mile Creek, on the road from Camden to Fishing Creek and the Catawba settlements.

Watson reached Camden on May 7th. On the evening of the same day Rawdon moved out from his fortifications, and, crossing the Wateree, turned on Greene, intending to pass his flank and attack him from the rear. But Greene was too vigilant, for, learning of Rawdon's departure from Camden, he retired still higher up the river, first to Sandy's Creek and later to Colonel's Creek, the latter being nine miles from his former position. The position on the further bank of Colonel's Creek was very favorable to the party attacked. The light troops had been left in the front, as at Hobkirk's Hill. Coming upon them at Sandy's Creek, Rawdon mistook them for the main body, and their position seemed so strong that he did not feel willing to risk an attack. It was impossible for him to remain longer in Camden with Greene in such threatening attitude, especially as his line of communication with Charleston was in the hands of Lee and Marion. On the 10th, leaving his wounded who were unable to be moved at Camden, Rawdon evacuated that place, and marching to the east of the Santee, he crossed at Nelson's Ferry and took post at Monk's Corner, not more than thirty miles from Charleston.

RAWDON.

From Doyle's Official Baronage, ii. 151. The likeness by Reynolds was painted in 1789, and is at Windsor Castle, and is engraved in the European Mag., June, 1791; it was also engraved in mezzotint by John Jones. Cf. Hamilton's Engraved Works of Reynolds, pp. 56, 183, and J. C. Smith's Brit. Mezzotint Portraits, ii. 767. Cf. Irving's Washington, 4^o ed., iv. 331.—Ed.] There is an account of Rawdon's career to date in Pol. Mag., ii. 339, and Lossing has given a sketch of his life in Harper's Monthly, xlvii. 15. He is better known by his later title of Marquis of Hastings, which he bore as governor-general of India. Cf. note to p. 49 of Cornwallis Corresp. It is to be noted that both he and his chief, Cornwallis, showed a humanity in after life which did not grace their careers in America.

One of the motives which had induced Rawdon to make this precipitate retreat was the hope of saving the garrison of Fort Motte, an important post on the Congaree, near its confluence with the Wateree. Lee and Marion had appeared before the place on the 8th. They had pushed the siege with vigor, but were so destitute of artillery and siege tools that it seemed the siege might be prolonged until the coming of Rawdon should enforce its abandonment. Happily it occurred to some one that the roof of Mrs. Motte's house, which stood in the middle of the inclosure, could be set on fire. It is related that Mrs. Motte herself furnished the bow and arrows with which this was accomplished. At any rate, soon after Rawdon's watch-fires were seen in the distance the house was on fire, the stockade untenable, and the garrison prisoners of war. Marion then separated from Lee, and, turning toward Charleston, compelled the enemy to look well to his communications.

When Rawdon evacuated Camden he sent orders to the commander at Fort Granby to retire to Charleston, and directed Cruger, at Ninety-Six, to join Brown at Augusta. Neither of these orders reached its destination. As soon as the post at Motte's had surrendered, Lee was ordered to Fort Granby. Proceeding with his usual celerity, he arrived before the place in the night of the 14th. His single piece of artillery opened on the fort as soon as the morning fog had dispersed. The garrison was completely taken by surprise. Time being of the utmost importance to Lee, the besieged were promised their baggage—in reality the property of plundered patriots—if they would immediately surrender. The terms were accepted, and Lee joined Pickens at Augusta.[1025]

Lee reached this place on the evening of the 21st of May. On his way he had captured a small stockade, containing, under a strong guard, valuable stores for the Indians. Augusta is, or rather was, situated on the southern bank of the Savannah River. Its defences consisted of a strong work, Fort Cornwallis, in the centre of the town. It was garrisoned by a force of regulars under Lieutenant-Colonel Brown, who had already once successfully defended the place. Not far from Fort Cornwallis was a smaller work, named after its defender Fort Grierson. While Lee watched the garrison of the larger fort, Pickens and Clarke advanced to the attack of Fort Grierson. Its defenders soon were compelled to leave their stronghold for the main fort. Their attempt to reach it was a vain one, as most of the garrison were captured or killed.[1026]

The attack on Fort Cornwallis was now pressed with vigor. As at Fort Watson, use was here made of an expedient, already tried in the campaign, of advancing a log pen or Mahem tower, on the top of which was mounted the besiegers' only piece of artillery, whence it was used with great effect. The defence was most gallant, the garrison often sallying, and even attempting to blow up a house in which a covering party of riflemen were to have been placed; but the explosion was premature. Everything being ready for an assault, the garrison capitulated after one of the most splendid defences of the war. Lee then went to the assistance of Greene, who was now conducting the siege of Ninety-Six.

The village of Ninety-Six was then situated near the Saluda River, about twenty-five miles from Augusta. For many years a post had been established there as a protection against the Indians. When the British overran the State, it was selected as a proper position for one of the exterior line of posts of which Camden was the most important, though the possession of Augusta gave to the British the command of upper Georgia. When Camden was evacuated, Ninety-Six became useless and should have been abandoned; but the messengers bearing Rawdon's orders to that effect were stopped by the Americans. When, therefore, Greene arrived before the place, on the 22d of May, he found it defended by Lieutenant-Colonel Cruger, with about 500 men, mainly New York loyalists. A stockade protected the rivulet which supplied the garrison with water, and their main fort, the "Star", had sixteen salient and reëntering angles. Greene was not strong enough completely to invest this fort, and he contented himself with an attempt to carry it by regular approaches.

This was Greene's first siege, and, unfortunately, he had no engineer of the requisite ability. Acting on the advice of Kosciusko, ground was broken at a distance of seventy paces from the "Star." The besieged soon sallied, destroyed the uncompleted works, and retired with trifling loss, taking with them the intrenching tools. The British were surprised at the temerity of the Americans in opening their trenches so near. The sally taught Greene a lesson, for he next opened a trench at a distance of four hundred paces, under the protection of a ravine. The work was now pushed with vigor, and, notwithstanding numerous sallies on the part of the garrison, by the morning of June 18th the third parallel was completed. The assailants were now within six feet of the ditch, while riflemen in a Mahem tower kept the besieged from their guns during the day.

Note on Portrait of Kosciuszko.—After an engraving by Anton Oleszeynski. Cf. Dr. Theodor Flathe's Geschichte der neuesten Zeit (Berlin, 1887), i. p. 205. Cf. A. W. W. Evans's Memoir of Kosciusko, privately printed for the Cincinnati Society, 1883. There was a model made in wax from life by C. Andras, from which an engraving was made by W. Sharp (W. S. Baker's William Sharp, Engraver, Philad., 1875, p. 66).

There are some notes on Kosciusko by Gen. Armstrong in the Sparks MSS. Cf. Greene's Hist. View, 297, and B. P. Poore's Index, for his claims on the United States (p. 131).—Ed.

Lee with the "Legion" had arrived from Augusta on the 3d, and had conducted operations against the stockade covering the watering-place with such vigor that it had been evacuated on the 17th. Four days more would have placed the garrison in the power of the besiegers. But it was not so to be. Rawdon, in Charleston, had received considerable reinforcements direct from Ireland, and early in June he pushed forward through the heat, and eluded Sumter.[1027] With Rawdon within a day's march, Greene must either take the fort by storm or abandon the siege. He decided on an assault,—probably more to satisfy the desires of his men than because he thought it was the best thing to be done. On the 18th, at noon, the attack was made in two columns, Greene not being willing to hazard his whole force in a general storm. On the extreme right, Lee, with "Legion" infantry and the remains of the gallant Delaware regiment, directed his efforts against the stockaded fort, which had already been abandoned, according to the British account of the siege. At all events, Lee had no trouble in carrying out his part of the work. But on the other flank the assault was not so successful. Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell, with his Virginia regiment and with the 1st Maryland, formed the storming column. They advanced with great gallantry, but, though they gained the ditch, they could not effect a lodgment on the parapet. They were driven back with considerable loss by two parties of the besieged, which attacked them in the ditch on both flanks in such a way that the artillery and riflemen in the tower could not fire without injuring friend and foe alike. Greene called off his men, and Rawdon being within a few miles, he retired on the next morning to a safe place of retreat. In the end he retreated as far as Timm's Ordinary, between the Broad and Catawba rivers. Rawdon, his men worn down with their long march, could not overtake him, and finally halting on the banks of the Enroree, he turned back to Ninety-Six. That place being untenable with the means at his disposal, he divided his men into two parties. With one he regained the low country, resigning the command to Stuart on account of ill-health.[1028] Gathering the Tories of the neighborhood, Cruger escorted them to Charleston, while Greene led his army to the High Hills of the Santee, where he passed the heats of the summer.

At length, toward the end of August, Greene learned that Stuart was proposing to establish a fortified post at a strong and healthful position called Eutaw Springs. Greene determined to prevent this, and descending from his camp he made a wide detour to get across the river which separated the two armies; for although he was distant from Stuart only sixteen miles as a bird flies, the most practicable route was nearly seventy miles long. He crossed the Wateree at Camden, and, marching parallel to the river, crossed its affluent, the Congaree, at Howell's Ferry on the 28th and 29th. Proceeding by slow and easy marches, he reached Burden's plantation on the 7th of September. At that place Marion joined him, and preparations were made for an advance on the enemy the next day. Stuart at Eutaw seems to have been singularly negligent. He sent out but one patrol, which was captured by Lee. He would have been surprised had not two men deserted from the North Carolina regiment and given him warning. As it was, he had barely time to call in his foraging parties before Greene was upon him.

Stuart had with him about 2,300 men of all arms, Greene rather less. The British commander ranged his men in one line, the right being protected by Eutaw Creek, while the left was in the air, as the military term is. Greene advanced in two lines, the militia, under Marion, Pickens, and Malmady, being in the front. The right of the second line was held by Sumner with the North Carolina regulars. In the centre were the Virginia Continentals under Campbell, while on the left J. E. Howard and Hardman led the two Maryland regiments. To Lee, who had the advance during the march, was assigned the protection of the right flank, Henderson with a South Carolina brigade covering the left. The cavalry under Washington and the brave remnant of the Delaware regiment brought up the rear, and acted as a reserve.

Here at last there was no wavering among the militia, excepting those from North Carolina, who nevertheless fired several rounds before breaking. Under Marion and Pickens the rest fought splendidly. It is said that some of them fired no less than seventeen rounds before giving way; then Sumner advanced with the North Carolina regulars. At length they, too, were forced back; but the British following them with too great impetuosity, their own line became deranged. This was the opportunity for the men of Maryland and Virginia to retrieve the reputation lost at Guilford and Hobkirk's Hill, and splendidly they responded to the call. Rushing forward,—the Virginians alone disobeying orders so far as to fire,—the whole burst upon the enemy in front and swept him from the field. Unfortunately, their course led through the British camp, and they dispersed to plunder the abandoned tents. Now it happened that when the British fell back a party threw themselves into a strong brick house and an adjoining picketed garden; thence they delivered a withering fire upon the victors of a moment before. And more unfortunate still, when the "Legion" was ordered to charge the retiring foe, Lee could not be found, and the charge, being made without vigor, was a failure. On the right, too, the British had not retreated: they still occupied a flanking position, from which they could not be dislodged, even though Washington and all but two of his officers were killed or wounded in the attempt. All these things, coupled with the heat, compelled Greene to sound the retreat. Leaving such of the wounded as were within range of the brick house on the field, he retired to his camp at Burdell's, seven miles distant, that being the nearest point where a supply of good water could be obtained. Both commanders claimed the victory. It would be not unfair, perhaps, to call it a drawn battle. Neither party can be said to have retained possession of the field, as Stuart retreated with great precipitation from the vicinity on the night of the next day. Greene acknowledged a loss in Continentals alone of 408 in killed and wounded. The loss in militia has never been stated. It must have been considerable, as a portion of the militia fought with great obstinacy. According to the American accounts, the enemy lost in prisoners 500 men, including 70 wounded. But Stuart reported only 257 missing; his killed and wounded he gives at 433.

As soon as Greene ascertained the retreat of the enemy he followed with all speed; but Marion and Lee were too weak to prevent Stuart's receiving a reinforcement. Stuart finally halted at Monk's Corner, while Greene passed the Santee at Nelson's Ferry and retired to the High Hills.

Cornwallis at Wilmington had a difficult problem to solve. Should he go south to the relief of Rawdon, or north to the conquest of Virginia? Another campaign in North Carolina was plainly out of the question. The distances were so great and the country was so sparsely settled that it was a matter of great difficulty to move any considerable force there, even when unopposed. The recent campaign had fully demonstrated that a bold and enterprising leader with a handful of trained troops could seriously impair the usefulness of a royal army, even though he could not destroy it. The best base of operations for another campaign in South Carolina was Charleston, and the best way to get there was by water; but any such movement looked too much like a retreat to be seriously considered. Besides, Cornwallis did not believe that he could get to Camden in time to relieve Rawdon, as the place was not provisioned for a siege. On the other hand, a movement into Virginia offered many advantages. There the army would always be within easy march of the sea, and reinforcements could be brought from New York or sent thither with great ease. Then, too, it seemed to Cornwallis—and his supposition was probably correct—that with Virginia, the great storehouse of the Southern armies, once in his hands, the complete conquest of the Carolinas would be easy and certain. So impressed was he with this idea that he endeavored to induce Clinton to shift the headquarters of the army from the Hudson to the Chesapeake; but Clinton had other views, and New York remained the base of operations. Clinton even went further, and avowed his dislike of the whole plan of operations; but Cornwallis had the approval of Germain, and the northern movement was undertaken.

Clinton, however, had always looked with favor on desultory expeditions to Virginia, as they drew the attention of that State to her own defence, and therefore away from the defence of the Carolinas. As early as the spring of 1779, he had sent Matthews and Collier to the Chesapeake, with instructions to do as much damage to the Americans as possible; but beyond plundering Portsmouth and burning Suffolk they accomplished little, and returned to New York. The next year Leslie was detached in the same direction to effect a diversion in favor of Cornwallis's invasion of North Carolina. King's Mountain not only put an end to that invasion, but compelled Cornwallis to call Leslie to his aid. Leaving Portsmouth, which he had fortified, Leslie sailed for Charleston, and reached the front in season to take part in the campaign against Greene. On Leslie's withdrawal Clinton sent another expedition to Virginia to destroy military stores which had been collected for the supply of Greene. The command this time was given to Arnold, though, to guard against a new treason, dormant commissions were given to his chief officers, Lieutenant-Colonels Dundas and Simcoe. Arnold penetrated to Richmond without encountering much opposition. He destroyed nearly everything of value at that place, and then endeavored to seize some arms which had at one time been deposited at Westham. Failing in this, he descended the river to Portsmouth. The militia had now collected in considerable numbers. For this or for some other reason, Arnold kept within the fortifications of that place.

About this time Rochambeau had sent a few vessels to annoy the British in the Chesapeake; but, besides capturing the "Romulus",—a 44-gun ship,—they did little, and returned to Newport. Washington now proposed that the two armies should unite in an attempt to capture the traitor. To this end he detached Lafayette with the light infantry,—a picked corps of about twelve hundred men from the New England and New Jersey lines,—to act in unison with a force of the same size which Rochambeau detached from his army. Lafayette, for a time concealing his destination by a feigned attack on Staten Island, reached Annapolis in safety. Leaving his troops there, to be brought the rest of the way by the French fleet when it should arrive, Lafayette proceeded to Suffolk. He found Muhlenberg, with the militia, at that place, guarding the approaches to Portsmouth. But the French were not fortunate, since their departure from Newport was so long delayed that the fleet arrived off the Capes of the Chesapeake only to find Arbuthnot guarding the entrance. In the fight which followed, both sides claimed the victory. But all the advantages of victory were on the side of the British, as Destouches' ships were so badly cut up that he was obliged to return to Newport. Success now being improbable, Lafayette returned to his troops, and the march to the North was begun. At the Head of Elk new orders were found, directing him to return to the South and place himself under the orders of Greene. The cause of this radical change in plan was the reinforcement of two thousand men under Phillips which Clinton had sent to Virginia.

Phillips arrived on March 25, and took command. Towards the end of April, the British to the number of twenty-five hundred landed at City Point on the James River. Steuben, who was then at Petersburg, took up a strong position at Blandford, where the enemy found him on the morning of April 25. He was soon obliged to retreat. The enemy then marched to Petersburg, and destroyed a large amount of tobacco and other valuable property. The 27th saw them at Osborn's, where they captured, after some show of resistance, a fleet of merchant vessels.

When Phillips and Arnold arrived at Richmond they found that Lafayette was before them. The young Frenchman had reached Baltimore on the 17th of April. Purchasing on his own credit shoes and clothes suited to a Virginia summer, he made a forced march, and threw himself into Richmond twenty-four hours in advance of the British. Not wishing to attack him in such a strong position, Phillips retired down the river, followed by the Americans. On the 7th of the next month (May, 1781), the British commander received word from Cornwallis that he would join him at Petersburg. Suddenly ascending the river, he reoccupied that town on the night of the 9th. On the 13th Phillips died, and a week later Cornwallis arrived and assumed command, Arnold returning to New York.

Then followed a series of marches, the design of the British commander being to cut Lafayette off from Wayne, who was marching to his support. But Lafayette moved with too great celerity. Early in June the desired junction of the Americans was made near Raccoon Ford, on the Rapidan. Meantime, while Lafayette was out of reach, Cornwallis sent out two expeditions. The first, under Simcoe, operated against Steuben, at that time guarding the stores at the Point of Fork. The Prussian veteran, mistaking Simcoe's detachment for the main army, abandoned the stores and retired with great precipitation. The second expedition, led by Tarleton, was designed for the capture of the civil rulers of Virginia, but a Virginia Paul Revere warned them of their danger in time, and they made good their escape,—though it is said that Jefferson, then resting from the fatigues of the session at Monticello, had but five minutes to spare. But the raid, successful, or not, had no importance, although popular writers are wont to dwell upon it.

STEUBEN.

From Du Simitière's Thirteen Portraits, London, 1783. Cf. Harper's Mag., lxiii p. 336, and the lives of Steuben.—Ed.

With Wayne and his Pennsylvanians, in addition to his own Light Infantry, Lafayette felt strong enough again to oppose the enemy in the field. By a well-executed movement through an unknown and long-disused road, the young marquis placed himself between Cornwallis and Albemarle Old Court House, whither the stores had been removed from Richmond. Cornwallis, instead of attacking him, retired down the James, Lafayette following at a distance of about twenty miles. On the 25th of June the British were at Williamsburg, the Americans being not far off, at Bottom's Bridge. While at Williamsburg, Cornwallis sent Simcoe to destroy some boats and stores which had been collected on the Chickahominy. Lafayette, on his part, detached Butler of the Pennsylvania line, with orders to attack Simcoe on his return. A partial engagement ensued at Spencer's Ordinary, which ended in Simcoe's being able to continue his retreat.

It can hardly be said that this retrograde movement on the part of the British was due to the presence of Lafayette, although his presence undoubtedly contributed toward making Cornwallis desirous of getting into communication with Clinton. It is probable, too, that Cornwallis hoped to be so strongly reinforced that the conquest of the State during the coming autumn would be assured. But Clinton, believing, from intercepted despatches, and from the movements of the Americans, that Washington was meditating an attack on New York, instead of complying with Cornwallis's desires, ordered him to send a portion of his own troops to New York.

After a sketch supposed to be by Fersen, aide of Rochambeau, and following a reproduction given in Balch's Les Français en Amérique, p. 174. Cf. Irving's Washington, quarto ed., and E. M. Stone's Our French Allies, p. 281; Harper's Mag., lxiii. 329.—Ed.

The latter, therefore, retired to Portsmouth, where the embarkation could be easily effected. To Lafayette, the crossing of the James seemed to offer the chance of at least picking off a rear guard; but Cornwallis was attacked too soon, owing in part to the impetuosity of Wayne, and the onset came near being a disaster. In the end, however, Wayne succeeded in bringing off his men, though he lost two pieces of artillery. Cornwallis, fearing an ambuscade, did not push the pursuit. He then made his way to Portsmouth unmolested, while the Americans sought a healthy summer camp on Malvern Hill. Just at this moment, owing to the arrival of reinforcements in New York, Clinton decided to leave Cornwallis's force intact. Furthermore, he determined to establish a permanent base in the Chesapeake, and ordered Cornwallis to fortify a place, mentioning Old Point Comfort, where the navy could be sheltered. He also authorized him to take possession of some other post, as Yorktown, if he thought it necessary. Now Cornwallis seems to have regarded the fortifying of Yorktown as the only alternative, and the engineers and naval officers declaring Old Point Comfort unsuitable for a naval station, he seized York and Gloucester, and began the erection of the proper works. Clinton always asserted that he had no intention of ordering anything of the kind. But the weight of evidence seems to be in favor of Cornwallis. At all events, he took possession of Yorktown. As soon as his movements were discovered, Lafayette left his summer camp, and, taking a strong position in the fork of the Pamunkey and Mattapony rivers, sent out parties to watch the further movements of the enemy, Wayne being ordered toward the south, as if to the assistance of Greene. Such was the situation in Virginia when the French came to the aid of the Americans, and began the operations leading to the siege of Yorktown.

On the 1st and 2d of May, 1780, the Marquis of Rochambeau, with about five thousand men, left the roadstead of Brest. The transports were convoyed by a small fleet of seven ships of the line, under the command of the Chevalier de Ternay. Their progress was slow, and it was not until July 12th that the fleet anchored in Newport harbor.[1029] Batteries were immediately erected on shore to protect the shipping from the English fleet, which was under Arbuthnot. This admiral, hastening from Charleston, in company with Clinton, now bent his whole energy toward the destruction of the French fleet. But the British commanders, always on bad terms, quarrelled, and Washington threatening New York, while the New England militia rallied to the defence of their newly arrived allies, the attempt on Newport was abandoned. A naval blockade was kept up, however, and the French army was neutralized by a few ships of war. Thus they passed the remainder of 1780 and the first part of 1781.

On the 8th of May (1781) M. de Barras, successor to De Ternay, who had died in the preceding year,[1030] arrived at Boston. He brought news of the departure from Brest of a powerful fleet commanded by M. de Grasse. This French admiral had with him a small convoy with six hundred recruits for Rochambeau; but the bulk of his fleet was destined primarily for the West Indies. De Grasse had been directed, however, to come on the American coast in July or August, relieve the fleet at Newport, and for a limited period act in conjunction with the American and French armies. On May 21st a conference between Washington and the French commanders was held at Weathersfield, in Connecticut. It was there determined to make a united attack upon New York, provided De Grasse could coöperate. This was Washington's plan, though an expedition against the British in Virginia seems even then to have been proposed. Later a note from De Grasse arrived, asking where he should strike the American coast. Rochambeau replied that it would be best for him to look into the Chesapeake, and then, should no employment be found there, to proceed to New York. Rochambeau also inclosed the articles of the Weathersfield conference, hinting at the same time that De Grasse must be his own judge as to the practicability of crossing the New York bar with his ships. Finally he asked him to borrow for three months the brigade under St. Simon, which was destined to act in conjunction with the Spaniards.

On the 18th the advance of the French left Providence for the Hudson. Washington at this time was encamped at Peekskill. Ten days later, on June 28th, he determined to seize by surprise, if possible, the forts on the northern end of New York Island. The night of July 2d was selected for the enterprise, and the command of the advance was given to Lincoln; Lauzun, with the French Legion, making a forced march to his aid. But the scheme failed. The enemy attacked Lincoln, and Lauzun reached the scene of conflict too late to be of assistance. The troops were drawn off in safety, however, and retired to Dobbs Ferry, where they were joined by the French infantry on July 6th. While awaiting the arrival of the fleet, nothing was attempted beyond a reconnoissance in force of the northern defences of the island. It was this movement which induced Clinton to send for the Virginia troops.

On August 14th a letter from De Grasse arrived which put a new face on the whole war; for the French admiral announced that he should sail for the Chesapeake, with a view to carry out the scheme of Rochambeau for a united movement against Cornwallis. He added that his stay on the American coast would be short, and that he hoped the land forces would be ready to act with him.

FRENCH OFFICERS.

There was now nothing to be done but to abandon the cherished project against New York, and to move all of the allied armies that could be spared from the vicinity of New York to the Chesapeake. Leaving Heath with four thousand men to garrison the forts on the Hudson, and suitable parties to guard against an irruption from Canada, Washington set out with the rest of the land forces for Williamsburg, by the way of Philadelphia, Head of Elk, and the Chesapeake. On the 19th the army crossed the Hudson at King's Ferry, and moved as though to attack Staten Island. This feint was so well managed that Clinton was completely deceived. On September 2d the Americans marched through Philadelphia, the French following on the 3d, 4th, and 5th. By the 8th the allied army was again united at the Head of Elk. The news of the arrival of De Grasse at the Capes of the Chesapeake had reached Washington on the 5th, and had been communicated to the troops on the following morning.[1031]

De Grasse, on his arrival at Lynnhaven Bay, just inside Cape Henry, had found an aide of Lafayette's, and soon the marquis arrived in person. As soon as possible the troops under St. Simon were landed at Jamestown Island, and Wayne was recalled from his southward march. These corps, with the light infantry and the Virginia militia, took up a strong position at Williamsburg, not more than twelve miles from Yorktown. Cornwallis reconnoitred the lines; but they were too strong to be attacked except at great risk. Confident in being relieved by Clinton and Graves, he retired to his fortifications.

Had Rodney done his full duty he would have followed De Grasse in his northward cruise. But pleading illness, he sent fourteen ships of the line, under Hood, to the assistance of Graves, and sailed himself for Europe.[1032] The event was most fortunate for the American cause, as the control of the sea for a brief period passed away from the British. It should be said that Rodney had written to Graves, warning him of his danger; but through a fortunate accident the letter never reached Graves, and the first he heard of the coming of De Grasse was on the arrival of Hood. That admiral on August 25th had looked into the Chesapeake on his way north; but the French had not yet arrived. Graves had already discovered that Barras had sailed from Newport with a siege train and tools, and the two admirals, conjecturing, therefore, that the destination of Barras was the Chesapeake, determined to seek him there and destroy him before the arrival of the main fleet. They reached Cape Henry on the 5th of September, and there they found, not Barras, as he had purposely taken a long, roundabout route to avoid them, but De Grasse. The English fleet numbered nineteen sail of the line, the French twenty-four, but fifteen hundred men were absent, engaged in landing the troops of St. Simon. Nevertheless, De Grasse slipped his cables and stood out to sea. The ensuing action was indecisive, but De Grasse accomplished his purpose, as the British were obliged to seek New York to refit. On his arrival back at Lynnhaven Bay he found Barras. There was now abundant transportation, and by the 26th of September the allied troops—Washington's, Rochambeau's, Lafayette's, and St. Simon's—were concentrated at Williamsburg.

Two days later, on the 28th, the allied army marched to Yorktown, and found Cornwallis occupying an intrenched camp outside the immediate defences of the town. On the 29th the lines were extended so as to envelop the place, the Americans taking the right, with their right flank resting on Wormley Creek. Cornwallis, seeing that he would be outflanked, withdrew to the inner defences, and on the morning of the 30th the besiegers took possession of the abandoned works.[1033]

COUNT DE GRASSE.

From Andrews's Hist. of the War, Lond., 1785, vol. ii. Cf. European Mag., ii. 83; Hennequin's Biographie maritime, iii. 297; E. M. Stone's French Allies, 396, 398; Mag. of Amer. Hist., vi. p. 1; Harper's Mag., lxiii. 330.

The Operations of the French feet under the Count de Grasse in 1781-82, as described in two Contemporary Journals (New York, 1864, for the Bradford Club, 150 copies), edited by John G. Shea, gives two narratives, of which one purports to have been written by a certain Chevalier de Goussencourt, who is hostile and cannot be identified, while the other is anonymous and friendly. This last had been printed at Amsterdam in 1782, and it is suspected was written by De Grasse himself. A sketch of De Grasse's life, for which his family gave material, is prefixed. It also contains (p. 192) the account, abridged from the Gazette de France, Nov. 20th, in the Remembrancer, xiii. 46. A Notice Biographique of De Grasse, by his son, was published in Paris in 1840.—Ed.

COMTE DE GRASSE.

From the London Mag., Aug., 1782, p. 355. There is a profile head in The Operations of the French fleet under the Count De Grasse (N. Y. 1864).—Ed.

On the night of the 5th and 6th of October the first parallel was opened, at a distance of between five and six hundred yards from the enemy's works. It extended from the river bank below the town to a deep ravine nearly opposite the centre of the besieged lines. A battery on the bank above the town opposed a battery of the enemy in that quarter, and also prevented the British fleet from enfilading the works. Guns were mounted and fire opened from this parallel on the afternoon of the 9th. The ground was singularly favorable to the construction of the approaches, and by the night of the 11th and 12th the works were in such a state of forwardness that the second parallel was begun, not more than three hundred yards from the British lines. On the extreme right, however, there were two redoubts, commanding this parallel, which on the night of the 14th and 15th were carried by storm,—the smaller one, on the right, by Lafayette's division, the advance being commanded by Alexander Hamilton; while the one further away from the river was stormed by a party of French infantry commanded by Colonel G. de Deux-Ponts, the Baron de Viomenil having command of the division. The loss on the American side was inconsiderable, but that of the French was severe, the redoubt carried by them being larger and much more strongly garrisoned. Before morning the two redoubts were included in the second parallel. Cornwallis, hoping for relief, determined to prolong the defence as long as possible. To this end, on the morning of the 16th, Lieutenant-Colonel Abercrombie led a determined but useless assault on two batteries at the French end of the trenches. Cornwallis next tried, on the night of the same day, to cut his way out by passing his men over to Gloucester Point; but a storm arose in the midst of the ferrying, and the enterprise, hazardous at best, was abandoned.

An assault becoming practicable, at ten o'clock of the morning of the 17th, four years since Burgoyne's surrender, a drummer-boy appeared on the parapet and beat a parley. Negotiations were begun, but, though pushed with the greatest energy by Washington, the final articles were not signed in the trenches until two days later, on the 19th. On that day, at noon, two redoubts were taken possession of by detachments from the French and American forces. At two in the afternoon the British army, with colors cased and drums beating "The World turned upside down", marched out and laid down their arms; O'Hara, in the absence of Cornwallis, making the formal surrender to Lincoln, Washington's representative.

At the beginning of the siege the British numbered not far from seven thousand men of all arms,—perhaps a few more. On the day of the capitulation, according to Cornwallis, little more than thirty-eight hundred were fit for duty, including the garrison at Gloucester Point. The allied army is usually given at sixteen thousand men,—nine thousand Americans, including thirty-five hundred militia. The French numbered probably more than seven thousand. The total British loss during the siege was five hundred and forty-one, including the missing. The allied loss, excluding the missing, was seventy-six Americans and one hundred and eighty French. It has been stated that, at the time of the surrender, there were about fourteen hundred unfit for duty in the allied camp. This great victory, due even more than most victories to chance, virtually ended the war. It remains only to describe the closing scenes in the South.

CAPITULATION OF YORKTOWN.

From a fac-simile of the articles in Smith and Watson's Hist. and Lit. Curios., 1st ser., 6th ed., pl. xxxiv. Cf. Lossing's Field-Book, ii. 523. The articles are given in Shea's Operations of the French fleet, p. 78; R. E. Lee's ed. of Lee's Memoirs, 509; Tarleton, 438; Polit. Mag., ii. 67; Sparks's Washington, viii. App. 8; Cornwallis Corresp., App.—Ed.

NELSON HOUSE, YORKTOWN.

After a drawing given in Meade's Churches and Families of Virginia, i. 204. It was here that Cornwallis had his headquarters.

See other views and accounts in Balch's Les Français en Amérique, 1; Mag. of Amer. Hist. (1881), vii. 47 (by R. A. Brock); x. 458, July, 1881; Brotherhead's Signers of the Declaration of Independence (1861), p. 61; E. M. Stone's Our French Allies, p. 428; G. W. P. Custis's Recoll. of Washington, p. 337. A journal of Mr. Samuel Vaughan in 1787, owned by Dr. Charles Deane, describes the havoc made in this house by the bombardment.

The Moore house, at which the terms of surrender were arranged, is depicted in Appleton's Journal, xii. 705; Mag. of Amer. Hist., vi. 16 (etching); E. M. Stone's French Allies, 466; Lossing's Field-Book, ii. 530. Washington's headquarters at Williamsburg is shown in the Mag. of Amer. Hist., vii. 270. A view of the field where the arms were laid down is in Paulding's Washington, vol. ii. The so-called Cornwallis Cave is drawn in Scribner's Mag., v. 141. For other landmarks, see Lossing's Field-Book, ii. 509; Cycl. U. S. Hist., 155-157; Porte Crayon's "Shrines of Old Virginia" in Lippincott's Mag., April, 1879. In the Mag. of Amer. Hist. (1881), pp. 270, 275, are views of Washington's headquarters at Williamsburg; and of those, earlier occupied by Cornwallis, the president's house of William and Mary College.

For the Yorktown and Saratoga medal, see Loubat's Medallic Hist. U. S.; Amer. Jl. of Numismatics, xv. 76; Coin Collectors' Journal, vi. 173; Sparks's Franklin, ix. 173.

The best known picture of the surrender is Trumbull's painting, which is engraved in Harper's Mag., lxiii. 344, and elsewhere. Cf. early engravings of the scene in Barnard's Hist. of England; in Godefroy's Recueil d'Estamps (Paris, 1784).—Ed.

Greene's army had been so roughly handled at the Eutaws that it was the first of November before he felt strong enough again to take the field. He advanced first to Dorchester and the Round O. Then, reinforcements arriving from the troops set free by the surrender at Yorktown, he assumed a more vigorous offensive. He advanced to the eastern bank of the Edisto, between Jacksonborough, where the legislature was then assembling, and Charleston, still in the hands of the British. But if the Pennsylvanians were a welcome addition on account of their strength, they brought also a spirit of discontent. A plot was discovered to betray the army into the power of the enemy. A few examples were made and the attempted treason stamped out.

Greene now detached Wayne, with about five hundred men, to do what he could toward the recovery of the Georgia seaboard. On his approach the British retired to Savannah, burning everything that could not be removed. Wayne was too weak to attempt more than the blockade of the town. But on the 21st of May Lieutenant-Colonel Brown left the fortifications as if to attack the Americans. Placing himself between this party and the garrison, Wayne surprised Brown by a night attack, killing or dispersing the whole party. About a month later he was himself surprised by a large body of Creek Indians led by a British officer. Successful at first, the savages were finally beaten off, with the loss of their chief Escomaligo and a dozen braves. On the 11th of the next month, July, 1782, Savannah was evacuated, and the whole State once more came into the hands of the Americans.

The British government had decided upon the abandonment of all posts in America with the exception of New York. On August 7th, Leslie, then commanding in the South, announced in "after orders" that the evacuation of Charleston had been determined on. He also wrote to Greene, proposing a cessation of hostilities. The proposal was declined, Greene having no instructions on the point. Later Leslie again wrote, offering to pay for all rice and other provisions that might be brought into Charleston; but Greene, fearing that the rice was intended for use during a campaign against the French in the West Indies, again refused. Leslie then endeavored to seize the coveted articles by force. One of his foraging parties, commanded by Lieutenant Benjamin Thompson,—better known by his later title of Count Rumford,—surprised and dispersed Marion's brigade while its commander was absent attending a meeting of the legislature. The most serious loss through these desultory expeditions was in the death of the younger Laurens, who was killed during a useless skirmish at Combahee Ferry. This was the last action of the war in the South. On the 14th of December the British left Charleston, and three days later their last ship passed the bar and went to sea. The South was free.

[CRITICAL ESSAY ON THE SOURCES OF INFORMATION.]

THE most complete contemporary account of the Southern campaign is David Ramsay's Revolution of South Carolina.[1034] This author, by birth a Pennsylvanian, removed to Charleston in 1773, and at once took a leading part in the management of the affairs of that town. During the stormy years of 1779-1780 he was a member of the governor's council, but went with the Charleston artillery company to the siege of Savannah. When Rutledge, with a portion of his council, left Charleston during the siege, Ramsay remained behind with Gadsden. He was, therefore, a prisoner during the greater portion of Gates's and Greene's campaigns. Ramsay was thus a prominent actor in many of the scenes described in his volumes, while his facilities for obtaining accurate information as to the rest were so excellent that his book may be regarded as an authority of the first importance. He retold the story in a condensed form in several other publications.

NATHANAEL GREENE. (Norman's print.)

Moultrie[1035] was a prominent actor in the defence of his native State before the capitulation of Charleston. After that he resided with the other officers at Haddrell's Point until his exchange in 1781. At a later day he was present at the entry of the victorious army into Charleston. Whenever he speaks from his own observation, Moultrie may be trusted[1036]. But he seems to have been too ready to listen to exaggerated stories, and though we must believe that there was a foundation for his account of the sufferings of the Charleston prisoners, it should always be remembered that the charges were indignantly denied by the British officers in charge.

GENERAL GREENE. (From Andrews' History of the War.)

Portraits of General Greene.—One of the earliest of the contemporary prints is the rude copperplate, made by the Boston engraver Norman, which appeared in the Boston edition (1781, vol. ii. p. 229) of An Impartial History of the War in America. A fac-simile is annexed. In 1785, Andrews' History of the War, published in London (vol. i.), had a youthful picture, a reproduction of which is also given herewith. The next year the Columbian Magazine (Sept., 1786), published in Philadelphia, gave an engraving after R. Peale's likeness of Greene, of which a better engraving by Robert Whitechurch can be found in Irving's Washington (ii. p. 8) and in E. M. Stone's French Allies (p. 496). In 1794 the New York Magazine (May) gave as from an original painting a copperplate engraving, of which a fac-simile is given on another page. It is evidently a rendering of the canvas of which, after a photograph given in George W. Greene's Life of Greene, the woodcut on the page opposite to the other is a more adequate representation. There is also a print in the Monthly Military Repository, N. Y., 1796-1797. A portrait by C. W. Peale was engraved, while in the Philadelphia Museum, by Edwin, and appeared in Lee's Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department (vol. i., Philadelphia, 1812). It was again engraved by James Neagle in 1819 for Charles Caldwell's Memoirs of the life and character of the Honorable Nathanael Greene (Philadelphia, 1819); and in 1822 it furnished the head and shoulders, turned in the opposite direction, for the full-length figure, engraved by J. B. Longacre, after a drawing by H. Bounetheau, which is in the first volume of William Johnson's Sketches of the life and correspondence of Nathaniel Greene (Charleston, 1822). One of the pleasantest of the likenesses of Greene is that painted by Col. John Trumbull, which was engraved by J. B. Forrest for the National Portrait Gallery (New York, 1834). The same picture is selected by W. G. Simms for his Life of Greene, and it is given in R. E. Lee's ed. of Henry Lee's Memoirs of the War (N. Y. 1869), and H. B. Anthony's Memorial Address (Providence, 1875) on presenting the statue of Greene to Congress. This statue, modelled by Henry K. Brown, was offered in 1870, and a cut of it is given in the Presentation of the Statue of Major-General Greene in the Senate, Jane 20, 1870 (Washington, 1870), an account of which, under the title of Proceedings in Congress attending the reception of the statue of Maj.-Gen. Greene, was reprinted (twenty copies) in Providence the same year. For congressional documents pertaining, see B. P. Poore's Descriptive Catal. of U. S. Gov't publications, pp. 896, 901, 1221. Congress voted a medal to Greene after the battle of Eutaw, and on one side it bears a profile likeness of Greene. It is engraved in Lossing's Field-Book, ii. 704; and in Ibid. p. 720, is a view of the monument erected to the memories of Greene and Pulaski. The Polish hero has since, however, been commemorated in a separate monument, so that the shaft first erected is now called a memorial of Greene alone. Greene died in 1786 of a sunstroke, at a plantation near Savannah, which had been given to him by the State of Georgia,—it being the confiscated estate of the late royal lieutenant-governor,—and he was buried in Savannah; but when the monument was built, the search to discover his remains was unsuccessful. Cf. The Sepulture of Greene and Pulaski, by C. C. Jones, Jr. (Augusta, 1885)—Ed.

Henry Lee, of Virginia,—"Light-Horse" or "Legion Harry", as he was often called,—though not in the South prior to the days of the Cowpens, was so intimate with all the actors in the operations after the fall of Charleston, and enjoyed such advantages for acquiring information of earlier events, that as a source of information his book[1037] is of considerable value. As the work of an outspoken and generally impartial military critic of these campaigns, it has no equal. It should be borne in mind, however, that as to dates and minor details it needs the confirmation of contemporary documents.[1038] Like so many of the Revolutionary heroes, Lee in his later years became involved in unfortunate speculations, and a painful disease increased the distress of his last days.[1039] As an orator he fashioned phrases which have not yet lost their hold on the popular mind. As a writer he avoided the stilted sentences of his contemporaries, and his book may still be read with pleasure. Probably no one enjoyed the confidence of Greene to such an extent as Henry Lee.[1040]

Nathanael Greene came of good Rhode Island stock,[1041] and, like other prominent Rhode Islanders of his day, was a self-educated man. Fortunately for posterity, though not always for himself, Greene was a copious and candid letter-writer. His letters and fragments of letters, so far as they have been printed, are his best biography.[1042] He has not lacked biographers, however. First, in point of time, was Charles Caldwell, who put forth a worthless volume as early as 1819.[1043] William Gilmore Simms, the Carolina novelist, also tried his hand at the alluring theme, and his book, while possessing no claim to originality, has at least the merit of being interesting. The most formidable of these early biographies was the work of Judge Johnson, of Charleston. He enjoyed the best facilities, as the Greenes placed the family papers at his disposal. Many of these documents he printed at length, and as a repository his work has a value.[1044] In other respects it is worth very little. This is due mainly to the fact that in order to glorify his hero he belittled every other prominent character—with the exception of Marion.[1045] A formidable antagonist of Johnson was soon found in the person of Henry Lee, the son of Light-Horse Harry. He resented the slurs of Johnson, and even wrote a book[1046] to show the small reliance to be placed on the learned judge's military criticisms. As a review, the work of the younger Lee is interesting, but it is so one-sided as to be of little importance.

It is, however, to the labors of a descendant that the great leader owes much of the honor in which he is held. In various publications, from the little seven-page sketch in the Pennsylvania Magazine of History (vol. ii. p. 84) to the large three-volume biography,[1047] the grandson sought to spread the fame of the grandsire. Unfortunately, through these family works of love there runs the same spirit of adulation that so disfigured Johnson. A still greater drawback to the value of the largest work is the hesitation of the author in printing letters and documents not elsewhere in print.

In this respect the biographer of Greene's able lieutenant, Daniel Morgan, set a good example. In fact, Graham's Morgan[1048] is an excellent and generally trustworthy book. It is to be noted that Graham has cleared Morgan from the charge that he retired from the army after the Cowpens, through a treasonable fear that the Revolution would not be successful. Nor does the assertion that Morgan was chagrined at the treatment accorded him by Greene appear to be well founded.

GENERAL GREENE. (New York Magazine, 1794.)

But of all the Southern leaders, Marion was most fortunate in his biographers.[1049] It is true that Horry's work was largely written by Mason L. Weems, notorious for his so-called Life of Washington. Both Horry and James had a foundation for their narratives. The confidence reposed by Greene in his ablest leader of irregular troops is best seen in their letters printed by Gibbes in his Documentary History,[1050] which is composed mainly of the "Horry Papers", already used in Horry's memoir. Another partisan worthy of mention was Pickens. But of him only slight and unworthy sketches have been printed.[1051]

The only extended notice of Benjamin Lincoln is the biography by Francis Bowen in Sparks's collection.[1052] This book was not written in the calm judicial spirit that should characterize an historical work. Many of Lincoln's order-books have been preserved, and have been of material service in preparing the foregoing narrative. Though Lincoln's career was marked by no brilliant successes, his work was always well done, and demands a fuller recognition.[1053]

GENERAL GREENE. (After a Photograph of a Painting.)

Little original material concerning the operations in Georgia has come to light. It is fortunate, therefore, that Hugh McCall overcame his physical infirmities to such an extent as to enable him to finish the second volume of his History of Georgia. This writer was an active cavalry leader in the defence of his native State. He also fought well on other fields. It should he said, however, that what he wrote of actions in which he did not take part should be received with caution. His work is the basis of all subsequent accounts of the war in Georgia.

Anthony Wayne and his Pennsylvanians did good service in Virginia, and later in Georgia. But the life of Wayne remains to be written.[1054] His letters and reports are scattered here and there through the books. The best account of his career is the one printed by his son in the Casket, a magazine not to be found in every library.

The second volume of Wheeler's Sketches of North Carolina contains many articles by actors in the struggle. But they were mostly written long after the event, as, too, were those in the North Carolina University Magazine. They should not be relied upon unless confirmed.[1055] This is the more regrettable as there is very little original material in print relating to these North Carolina campaigns from a North Carolina point of view. The most labored defence of the "Old North State" is Caruthers' Incidents.[1056] Much of this work seems to be based on good material; but one should be especially careful to separate such portions from those founded on tradition, which must have misled Caruthers in several instances. Of the same general character are Johnson's Traditions;[1057] Logan's Upper Country of South Carolina; Foote's Sketches of Western North Carolina; and C. L. Hunter's Sketches of Western North Carolina (Raleigh, 1877). Such are the main sources of information from the American side so far as the campaigns in the Carolinas and Georgia are concerned. Let us now turn to Virginia.

On his way South, Greene left Steuben[1058] in Virginia to organize and push forward recruits as fast as possible. The gallant Prussian seems to have been ill-suited to the command of raw republican militia; but the American leaders in the State, Muhlenberg, Lawson, and Stevens, aided him as well as they could. It was not until the arrival of Lafayette with his Continentals from the Eastern States that much was done to oppose the enemy. The governor of Virginia, Thomas Jefferson, showed a lamentable lack of energy during Arnold's and Cornwallis's invasions, though the word "imbecility", applied to his conduct by Howison, would seem to be undeserved.[1059] Of course, Jefferson's biographers have defended their hero from these charges,[1060] but Giradin's Continuation of Burk's Virginia,[1061] written in the neighborhood of Monticello, and apparently under Jeffersonian auspices, is the most extensive account of Jefferson's administration from his side.

It was not, however, until the publication of the Virginia State Papers[1062] that the truth concerning the campaigns preliminary to Yorktown could be ascertained. But these two volumes taken in connection with the Nelson Papers have thrown a new light on all these transactions.[1063]

Washington's Writings and Sparks's Correspondence of the Revolution contain much relating to all these operations, though Washington's Journal and his order-books are even more valuable for the Yorktown campaign. Of the commander of the auxiliary troops, the Marquis of Rochambeau, I have found little outside of his well-known Mémoires.[1064] For much of what we know concerning the movements of the French we are indebted to John Austin Stevens, a former editor of the Magazine of American History. His articles, as well as those by other hands, will be mentioned in the Notes.

The papers of the British commanders have been much better preserved. All official documents of popular interest and conducing to the glory of the nation were published, sometimes in full, sometimes in extract, in the governmental organ known as The London Gazette. Thence they were copied, in whole or in part, into the Remembrancer, Gentleman's Magazine, Scot's Magazine, Political Magazine, and often into that portion of the Annual Register known as "Principal Occurrences." Many of them, and many other papers of the greatest importance, were printed in the Parliamentary Register, or Debrett's Debates, as it is often called.

The Sackville Papers, forming the third appendix to the Ninth Report of the Royal Commission on Historical Manuscripts,[1065] contain much of very great value; but many of the most important papers therein printed have been accessible in other forms. Soon after the surrender at Yorktown, the House of Lords appointed a committee to inquire into the conduct of the Yorktown campaign. Later, upon their order, many of the letters and papers bearing on this event were printed. They may be found in the Parliamentary Register,[1066] while many were translated into French, and published in a small volume under the title of Correspondance du Lord G. Germain avec les Généraux Clinton, Cornwallis, etc. (Berne, 1782). Most of these documents, however, had been already printed in other places. The surrender induced Cornwallis[1067] and Clinton to lay upon the shoulders of each other the responsibility.[1068] The truth seems to be that neither was responsible, since the disaster was due, above all, to the arrival of De Grasse and the consequent transference of the control of the sea from the British to the Allies. For this neither Clinton nor Cornwallis was to blame. The quarrel led to the publication, however, of so many papers of the greatest importance that the historical student can hardly regret its occurrence.

Nor was Clinton on good terms with Mariot Arbuthnot, who had accused Clinton of permitting thievery to go on under his very eyes.[1069] Naturally this want of cordiality made coöperation very difficult. After Clinton's departure Cornwallis was the commander-in-chief in the South; but Colonel Nesbit Balfour, who commanded in the city of Charleston, made separate reports to Germain. He does not seem to have been possessed with a very sanguine disposition, and his reports therefore present a more accurate picture of affairs than do the despatches of Cornwallis himself.

Several of the British officers wrote formal accounts of their doings, the most notable of which is Tarleton's Campaigns.[1070] Portions of it are trustworthy, but in general the author placed his own services in such a favorable light that the true course of history is almost unrecognisable. Nevertheless, the book contains so many documents not elsewhere to be obtained, except at great labor, that it has a value. Tarleton's unjust discriminations and criticisms brought forth a most caustic review from the pen of Mackenzie,[1071] a Scotch officer, who served in a regiment which often accompanied the "Legion." Cornwallis, who had also been attacked by Tarleton, never replied to his criticisms in print; but he wrote to a "friend" (cf. letter dated Calcutta, Dec. 12, 1787, in the Cornwallis Corres., i. 59, note) that "Tarleton's is a most malicious and false attack; he knew and approved the reasons for several of the measures which he now blames. My not sending relief to Colonel Ferguson, although he was positively ordered to retire, was entirely owing to Tarleton himself: he pleaded weakness from the remains of a fever, and refused to make the attempt, although I used the most earnest entreaties." It should be noted, however, that this alleged refusal on Tarleton's part created no coolness at the time. Simcoe's narrative[1072] is even more egotistical than Tarleton's. But his details may be relied upon if one constantly remembers that events are related without any regard to their real importance. Captain, afterwards General, Graham served with Cornwallis in the 76th Highlanders through the most important portions of his North Carolina and Virginia campaigns. His Memoirs,[1073] therefore, though execrably edited so far as the American portion is concerned, should be consulted. Another book which partakes of the nature of an original source is the so-called Journal[1074] of R. Lamb, who served through the war, and his statements have a value. The only regimental history of much interest is Hamilton's Grenadier Guards,[1075] a corps which after Cowpens rendered good service, and this account of their achievements bears all the marks of originality. There are but few manuscripts of importance, written by British officers, accessible on this side of the ocean.[1076]

The most valuable history of the Revolution from a British pen is Gordon's well-known work. This author was assisted by Gates and Greene so far as the Southern campaigns were concerned. The volumes contain, moreover, many fragments of letters that have never seen the light in their entirety. Taken altogether, this work ranks with Ramsay as an authority of the very first importance. The only other important History of the American War from the English side is the work which bears the name of Charles Stedman on the title-page. Whoever the author of the text may have been, the writer of many of the notes in the part devoted to the war in the South was undoubtedly an on-looker. Still another work worthy of mention in this place, though mainly as the repository of documents, is Beatson's Memoirs. In addition there are numerous diaries, journals, etc. They relate mainly to but one battle or campaign, and will be mentioned in the following "Notes."

NOTES.

Savannah, 1778.[1077]—Campbell's formal report to Germain was first printed in The London Gazette for Feb. 20-23, 1779,—reprinted in Remembrancer, vii. 235; Hough's Siege of Savannah, Introduction, p. 7; Gentleman's Magazine, 1779, p. 177; and Dawson's Battles, i. 477. Major-General Augustine Prevost's report is in the Gazette for Feb. 23, 1779, and Remembrancer, vii. 243. It deals especially with his march from St. Augustine and capture of Sunbury.[1078] An American account of this latter event is in McCall's Georgia, ii. 176. Captain Hyde Parker[1079] reported to the Admiralty through the customary channel, and his report usually follows that of Prevost, as above. Howe seems to have presented no formal report, but Lincoln wrote to Washington (Corresp. Rev., ii. 244) early in the next year, describing the disaster. Howe's own side of the case, however, is fully set forth in the Proceedings of a General Court-Martial held at Philadelphia in the State of Penna. by order of his Excellency General Washington, Phila., 1782; reprinted in the New York Historical Society's Collections (1879, pp. 213-311), where will be found Howe's orders (Dec. 29th,[1080] p. 282) and statement (pp. 285-310). The court, presided over by Steuben, acquitted Howe on all the charges "with the highest honor." Nevertheless, the majority of writers have been unfavorable to Howe. See especially Moultrie's Memoirs, i. 244; Lee's Memoirs (2d edition), p. 40; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. 4. This last is a fairer view, and is followed by Gordon (American Revolution, iii. 212). See also Stedman, American War, ii. 66; McCall's Georgia, ii. 164, and C. C. Jones's Georgia, ii. 314. In this, the most recent history of Georgia, all the old statements are repeated.[1081]

An American description from a different point of view is the Account of the Capture of Mordecai Sheftall, Deputy Commissary of Issues to the Continental Troops for the State of Georgia, in White's Historical Collections of Georgia, p. 340. Sheftall also testified at the court-martial.[1082]

Minor Actions, 1779.—There is not much to be found as to Lincoln's doings before the siege of Savannah except his manuscript "order-books." Moultrie made an elaborate report of his encounter near Beaufort.[1083]

McCall was present at Kettle Creek, and his account[1084] of Boyd's overthrow has been generally followed by later writers. No official report of the affair has been found. The disaster at Brier Creek was much better chronicled. First comes Ashe's report to Lincoln (Moultrie, Memoirs, i. 323, and abridged in Dawson, Battles, i. 492). Lincoln wrote a good account of the affair (an extract of his letter in Dawson, as above), and the evidence given at the court-martial[1085] which tried Ashe is as full as can be desired.[1086] The British accounts do not differ essentially from these.[1087]

There is no lack of original material as to Prevost's unsuccessful attempt on Charleston,[1088] and Lincoln's attack on Stono. Moultrie made no formal report, but the documents and bits of journals scattered through his Memoirs (i. 412-506) may well take its place. Prevost's report of his attempt was dated June 12, 1779 (London Gazette, Sept. 21-25, 1779, reprinted in Remembrancer, viii. 302). His report as to Stono is in the Gazette, as above, and also in Remembrancer viii. 300. Lincoln's version of the latter affair is contained in a letter to Moultrie (Memoirs, i. 490, and Dawson, i. 501). Moultrie also printed other letters (cf. especially one from Colonel Grimkie in Memoirs, i. 495), and an interesting journal by an unknown hand is in Remembrancer (viii. 349). Capt. John Henry, who succeeded Parker, in his reports corroborated Prevost as to the offer of neutrality on the part of some one in Charleston (London Gazette, July 10-13, 1779, and Remembrancer viii. 183). Clinton also has something to say on the campaign in general in a report to Germain (Remembrancer, viii. 297).[1089]

Lincoln has been criticised for his march into Georgia, but the movement had the unanimous support of his generals. Cf. report of the council of war in Moultrie, i. 374. He supposed rightly, as we now know (cf. Prevost's report in Remembrancer, viii. 302), that the British commander's only object was to compel his return to South Carolina. Moultrie could have offered sufficient resistance if one half of his men had not deserted. Nevertheless, Lincoln was assailed in the Charleston papers, and complained bitterly of their unfairness. Cf. letter to Moultrie in Memoirs, i. 477. With regard to Rutledge's offer of neutrality, Professor Bowen has undoubtedly gone too far in describing it as "little short of treason."[1090] Still, if, as Rutledge's friends claim, the proposition was made merely to gain time, it was not made in good faith, and was therefore highly discreditable to the governor. But there is no evidence that the proposition was made in any such spirit, except the statement in Ramsay, which was copied by Gordon. The truth seems to be that Rutledge, greatly overestimating the numbers of the enemy, sought to save his native State from pillage. He yielded too easily to his fears. Moultrie takes no pains to conceal his disgust at the offer. The younger Laurens refused to have anything to do with the matter, while Gadsden and Ferguson, two members of the Council, voted against the proposal, and Edwards, another member, wept at the thought. Unfortunately, the minutes of the Council have been lost. Cf. Johnson, Reply to Bentalou and Sparks.[1091]

SIEGE OF SAVANNAH, September-October, 1779.

Sketched from a MS. map belonging to Dr. Samuel A. Green, of Boston, found in Paris, and giving the French view.

The plans of the siege are mainly English ones. That made by Colonel Moncrieff and published by Faden is used in Stedman's American War, ii. 79, and is reduced in Lossing's Field-Book, ii. 736. Cf. also C. C. Jones's Two Journals for a fac-simile (reduced in Hist. of Georgia, vol. ii.) of a Plan of the French and American Siege of Savannah in Georgia in South America [sic] under Command of the French general Count d'Estaing. The British commander in the town was General August Prevost, 1779. It is from Hessian sources, and resembles Faden's. Also see Moore's Diary of the Amer. Rev., 1st ed., ii. 221. Carrington (p. 483) gives an eclectic map. Two contemporary MS. French maps (one measuring 28 × 16 and the other 22 × 22 inches) are in the Boston Public Library (Dufossé, Americana, no. 5,495). There are various MS. plans of Savannah and the siege among the Peter Force maps, and one in the Faden collection in the library of Congress. A good map of this region is The Coasts, Rivers, and Inlets of the Province of Georgia; surveyed by Joseph Avery and others, and published by command of Gov't by J. F. W. Des Barres, 1st Feb., 1780. Parker did not find his charts correct. Remembrancer, vii. 246.—Ed.

It is to be noted that, although there is no record of the actual presence of Indians at this siege, their absence was not due to any remissness on the part of Rutledge, who made every effort to persuade a band of "eighty Catawbas" to act with Moultrie. (Cf. the latter's Memoirs, i. pp. 397, 419, and 453.)

Siege of Savannah, 1779.—The best account of this disastrous siege is the Journal, by an unknown hand, which Col. C. C. Jones has translated, with copious notes, in his Siege of Savannah in 1779 as described in two contemporaneous journals of French officers in the fleet of Count D'Estaing, Albany, 1874, pp. 9-52. The other journal, of which he there gives a partial translation, is the well-known Extrait du Journal d'un Officier de la Marine de l'escadre de M. le Comte D'Estaing, 1782.[1092] Still another French account is in the form of an official report,[1093] and may have been the report of the commander himself. This is by no means certain, though Soulés (Troublés, iii. 217), in speaking of the numbers given in this report, says: "Le Comte d'Estaing dit dans sa relation", etc. This was first printed in the Paris Gazette, and was reprinted in the English and American papers of the time.

Prevost made an elaborate report to Germain, under date of Savannah, Nov. 1, 1779. It was accompanied by translations of the correspondence between the commanders, and was first printed in The London Gazette, Dec. 21-25, 1779.[1094] Captain John Henry also reported through the usual channel. He viewed the siege from a point different from Prevost's, and his report is therefore of interest.[1095] Hough has also reprinted in his Savannah two "journals" from English sources.[1096] Mention must also be made of a valuable Memorandum of a very critical period in the Province of South Carolina, inclosed in a letter from J. H. Cruger to H. Cruger, etc., dated Savannah, Nov. 8, 1779, in Magazine of American History, 1878, p. 489.[1097]

Lincoln's report is very meagre (Hough, Savannah, 149). It should be supplemented by An Account of the Siege of Savannah furnished by an Officer engaged in the attack, Major Thomas Pinckney.[1098] Stevens, the Georgia historian, had access to Prevost's order-book, and he has printed in his Georgia (ii. 200, etc.) a few documents not otherwise accessible. Lincoln's order-book is still in existence, and his papers were used by Lee in his valuable account of the affair (Memoirs, i. 99). The orders for the assault have been printed.[1099]

Moultrie was not present during the siege, but he gives a graphic account of the assault (Memoirs, 33-43). It is curious to note his attempt to defend the militia from the charge of luke-warmness on the ground that they joined the army to witness the surrender of the British, not to take part in a bloody storm. Ramsay was present at the siege, and his account is good (Rev. in S. C., ii. 34. See also Gordon, iii. 325, and Stedman, ii. 121). Captain McCall was there, too, and his account (Georgia, ii. 240-283) may be regarded as an original authority. The local histories[1100] are sufficiently detailed for the general reader, and there are at least two good French accounts,[1101] while the German historians[1102] should not be neglected, as there was a "Hessian" regiment in the town.

D'Estaing has usually been represented as hurrying on board and sailing away just in time to avoid a predicted storm. So far was this from being the case, that, although the assault was made on the 9th of October, the French were in front of the town on the 19th and 29th of the same month. The bulk of the fleet was blown from the anchorage on the 26th, though the last frigates did not leave until the 2d of November.[1103] Historians ignoring these facts have too often praised the prescience of D'Estaing. The truth seems to be, that, being conscious of exceeding his instructions and impatient of delay, the French commander hazarded everything on an assault, and lost. The delay in getting away was due for the most part to the bad discipline which prevailed in the fleet.[1104]

This gallant defence made Prevost a major-general, though he enjoyed his honors for but a short time, as he died in 1786. Maitland, to whose timely succor so much was due, died on the 26th of October from a fever contracted, it was supposed, during his gallant march to the aid of the beleaguered town. Cf. Hough, Savannah, p. 110. The success of the defence was due mainly to the talents and energy of the engineer officer, Moncrieff, attached to Prevost's expedition. No one was more conscious of this than Prevost, who wrote of him in the warmest terms in his report to Germain.[1105]

The charge of Oct. 9th was fatal to two of the most romantic characters in our Revolutionary history, Jasper and Pulaski.[1106]

Charleston, 1780.—Lincoln presented no detailed report of his unsuccessful defence of Charleston, though a short note announcing the capitulation is in print. Lincoln asked for a court of inquiry into his conduct.[1107] But as no one doubted his integrity or capacity, no court was ever held. As to the siege itself, Moultrie has been the main reliance. His Memoirs (ii. pp. 65 et seq.) contain the official correspondence between the opposing commanders, and a diary or journal running from March 28th to May 12th, which bears all the marks of a contemporaneous document. Ramsay, too, was present at the defence, but his account (Rev. in S. C., ii. 45-62,—followed by Gordon, iii. 346) is very meagre.[1108]

On the British side, the descriptions in Tarleton (Campaigns, 4-23) and Stedman (American War, ii. 176-192) are interesting and detailed. So far as they relate to events outside of the immediate vicinity of the city, they are trustworthy; but neither of these officers was present at the siege itself.[1109] Of more importance than any contemporary account, with the possible exception of Moultrie's journal, is the report of Clinton to Germain. It is also in the form of a journal, and runs from March 29th to May 12th, and is printed as a part of The London Gazette Extra, issued on the 15th of June, 1780.[1110]

CHARLESTON, 1780.

"Key: A, landing of the king's troops at Edisto inlet on the 11th Feb., 1780. B, march of the army on landing from James island. C, the king's ships in the offing, waiting for the spring tides to cross the bar, which being effected the 20th March, they anchored in Five Fathom hole, whence having [passed] through a heavy fire from Fort Moultrie and the batteries of Sullivan island, [they] dropped anchor before the town on the 9th of April. E, redoubts to protect the transports in Stono river. F, strong redoubt erected near Fort Johnson. G, battery to remove the enemy's ships at d in Ashley river. H, bridge made over Wapoo. I, march of the army from Linning's to Drayton's, 29th March, whence having crossed Ashley river, [it] halted the same night at X. K, encampment of the army, 30th March, on Charlestown Neck. L, march of a strong reinforcement to Col. Webster's corps, under the command of Earl Cornwallis, to cut off the enemy's communication by Cooper river. a, Fort Moultrie and works on Sullivan island, with the enemy's ships to enfilade the channel (surrendered on terms the 4th of May to the seamen and marines of the fleet). d, strong post on Lempries. e, ships in Cooper river, and Boom to obstruct the navigation. f, post on Mount Pleasant. g, Gibbs' Landing. h, redoubts and batteries to establish the first parallel begun the 1st of April. i, second parallel finished the 19th April. k, third parallel completed the 6th of May, whence having by sap drained and passed the enemy's canal works, [it] was carried on towards the ditch of the place, and the garrison, consisting of upwards of 6,000 men, [were] surrendered to his Majesty's arms, under the command of Lt.-Gen. Sir Hen. Clinton, K. B., etc., and Vice-Admiral Mariot Arbuthnot, on the 10th of May, 1780. The king's army and works are colored red, the enemy's yellow."—Ed.

The correspondence between Clinton and Germain with regard to the planning of this campaign is in the Ninth Report of the Hist. MSS. Commission, App. iii. pp. 95, 98, etc.[1111] In this same appendix are three letters from Arbuthnot to Germain, giving interesting details. His official report was made to Mr. Stevens, secretary of the Admiralty, and was printed with Clinton's report. It is especially valuable with regard to the operations of the fleet. There is a critical account of the siege in Lee's Memoirs, i. 115-142, and the more popular descriptions are unusually good, especially those from German sources.[1112]

Minor Actions, 1780.—It is to be regretted that we have no official account of the disaster at the Waxhaws from the American commander. Tarleton's official report to Cornwallis was originally printed in The London Gazette Extra, July 5, 1780.[1113] The description of the affair in Dawson's Battles, i. 582, is based upon Adj. Bowyer's Particular Account of Colonel Buford's defeat. It differs materially from the account of the British commander.[1114]

Lee says that most of the wounded died of their wounds. This can hardly be true, as Muhlenberg in a letter to Washington (Muhlenberg's Muhlenberg, 368) says that the prisoners taken at the Waxhaws have nearly all returned. There are no plans of the battle, and it has been found impossible to make any estimate of the numbers engaged.[1115]

SIEGE OF CHARLESTON.

Reduced from the plan in Johnson's Traditions and Reminiscences of the Amer. Rev. (Charleston, 1851), p. 247.—Key (American works): A, Wilkins, 16 guns; B, Gibbs, 9 guns; C, Ferguson, 5 guns; D, Sugar House, 6 guns; E, old magazine, 5 guns; F, Cummings, 5 guns; G, northwest point, 4 guns; H, horn-work (citadel) and lines, 66 guns, beside mortars; K, Gadsden's wharf, 7 guns; L, Old Indian, 5 guns; M, Governor's bridge, 3 guns; N, Exchange, 7 guns; O, end of the bay, Littleton's bastion, 4 guns; P, Darrell's, 7 guns; Q, boom, eight vessels, secured by chains and spars.

(British works). 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, redoubts begun April 1st; o, second parallel, finished April 19th; p, third parallel, completed May 6th; q, gun batteries; r, mortar batteries.—Ed.

There is a contemporary English map: Environs of Charleston, S. C. Published June 1, 1780. By Capt. George Sproule, Assistant Engineer on the spot; and a MS. Sketch of the coast from South Edisto to Charlestown, 1 March, 1780,—showing, among other things, "the rebel redoubt" at Stono. The best plan of the siege itself is A Sketch of the operations before Charleston, the Capital of South Carolina. Published 17th of June, 1780, according to Act of Parliament, by I. F. W. Des Barres, Eng. It will be noticed that this was put forth two days after Clinton's despatch of May 14th was published in London. It is a large map, showing the positions in colors. There are two copies in the Harvard College library. It has been reprinted by Mayor Courtenay in the Charleston Year-Book for 1882, P. 360, as "Sir Henry Clinton's Map, 1780", with a description (p. 371). Some one has apparently attempted to remove the inscription referred to above, and only the words "of June, 1780" are legible. In other respects it is identical with the Des Barres map. In his Year-Book (1880, p. 264) Mayor Courtenay has reproduced an interesting Plan of Charlestown. With its Entrenchments and those made by the English, 1780. It relates only to the lines themselves, and was probably the work of an American. There is a good map, with lines in colors, in Faden's Plans of Battles, which is reproduced in Tarleton, p. 32, and Stedman, ii. 184, Ramsay (Rev. S. C., ii. 59) gives an excellent map of a later date, as does Gordon (iii. 358). See also Lossing, Field-Book, ii. 765; Marshall's Washington, atlas no. 10; Moore's Diary, ii. 258; Carrington's Battles, p. 498; Mag. of Amer. Hist., 1883, p. 827; and R. E. Lee's edition of Lee's Memoirs, p. 146. Mention should also be made of a MS. plan in the Faden coll., and of a map, apparently of French origin, the property of Daniel Ravenal, of Charleston (Charleston Year-Book, 1884, p. 295), which Mr. De Saussure regards as a copy of "Brigadier-General Du Portail's engineer's map;" but there seems to be no evidence of this in print. There is a good chart of Charleston harbor in the corner of Des Barres's map, and in the so-called Mouzon Map (1775), while Ramsay (Rev. S. C., ii. 52) has a Sketch of Charleston Harbour, showing the disposition of the British fleet under the command of Vice-Admiral Mariot Arbuthnot in the attack on Fort Moultrie on Sullivan's Island in 1780.

Attempts at the identification of localities have been made by W. G. De Saussure in Charleston Year-Book (1884, pp. 282-308), and in an Historical Map of Charleston, 1670-1883, in the Year-Book for 1883. A plan of Fort Johnson on James' Island is in Ibid. (p. 473). These latter maps are also in a reprint of a portion of this Year-Book, issued under the title of 1670-1783: The Centennial of Incorporation, 1883 (Charleston, 1884).

There are other charts of the harbor in the No. Amer. Pilot; in the Neptune Americo-Septentrional. A chart of the harbor and bars by R. Cowley is sometimes noted as published in London in 1780.

There are other maps of Charleston in Bellin's Petit Atlas Maritime, vol. i. 37; in Castiglione's Viaggio p. 309, etc. There are among the Rochambeau maps in the library of Congress (no. 19) Vues de la rade de Charleston et du fort Sullivan, 1780, and a colored plan (no. 46), measuring 20 X 18 inches, called Plan de la ville de Charlestown, de les retrenchments et du siège fait par les Anglais en 1780.—Ed.

For the period between the Waxhaws and the disaster near Camden, the reports of Cornwallis are of value (Remembrancer, x. 261; Pol. Mag., i. 261, etc.); Ramsay, Rev. in S. C., ii. 128-145, has a fair account. The affair at Ramsour's Mill has not been given due prominence in the general histories. There is a good account of it in Caldwell's Greene, 123. But the description which has generally been followed is the one which General Joseph Graham—who was not present at the fight—printed in the Catawba Journal for Feb. 1, 1825.[1116]

Colonel Williams transmitted a report of the action at Musgrove's Mill to Gates (Remembrancer, xi. 87). But the best account of the affair is in Draper's King's Mountain, who (p. 122) gives a list of his authorities. See especially MCCall, Georgia, ii. 304-317; Jones, Georgia, ii. 452; and Amer. Whig Rev., new series, ii. 578.

Gates's Defeat near Camden, 1780.—The defeated general dated his official report at Hillsborough, Aug. 20, 1780 (Remembrancer, x. 335; Tarleton, 145; Sparks's Correspondence of the Revolution, iii. 66 and 76; Mag. Amer. Hist., v. 502, etc.). Cornwallis presented two reports bearing on the campaign. In the first—sometimes dated Aug. 20th, and sometimes Aug. 21st—he follows his movement to his arrival at Camden. The second—always dated the 21st—takes up the story at that point. They are both in the London Gazette Extra for October 9th, 1780.[1117]

I have found nothing official from Rawdon; but on Sept. 19th, 1780, he wrote to his mother, the Countess of Moira, describing the events preceding the battle. He speaks of the course taken by Gates as "the ruinous part which they, the Americans, actually did embrace", adding that De Kalb had advised Gates to cross Lynch's Creek and attack him there. This Rawdon learned from an aide to De Kalb[1118]—probably Du Buysson—who was taken with his chief.[1119]

Tarleton, too, was a participator in the action, and his account (Campaigns, 85-110), though written long after the event, is valuable. It begins with Cornwallis's arrival at Camden.

But the description of the campaign and battle which far outweighs all others, is the Narrative of the Campaign of 1780, by Colonel Otho Holland Williams, Adjutant-general,—printed as "Appendix B" to Johnson's Greene, vol. i. pp. 465-510, and copied thence into Simms's Greene, Appendix. There is no reason to doubt the general accuracy of the story, though no one knows when Williams wrote it. Two of the American commander's aides wrote accounts. The more important is the letter from Thomas Pinckney to William Johnson, the biographer of Greene, dated Clermont, July, 1822, and therefore written long after the battle; but the author's recollections so exactly agree with the facts as now known that it is an account of the greatest value.[1120]

The other is Major McGill's letter to his father, written within eight miles of the scene of action.[1121]

McGill carried Gates's despatches to Jefferson, then governor of Virginia, and gave him an account of the battle, which formed part of a statement "of this unlucky affair, taken from letters from General Gates, General Stevens, and Governor Nash, and, as to some circumstances, from an officer [McGill] who was in the action."[1122]

Still another excellent narrative of the campaign is in A Journal of the Southern Expedition, 1780-83. By William Seymour (Penna. Mag. of Hist., vii. 286, 377), who was sergeant-major of the Delaware regiment. The journal begins at Petersburg, May 26, 1780, thus describing the whole movement.

CAMDEN, August 16, 1780.

Faden's map, dated March 1, 1787,—the same used in Tarleton (p. 108) and in Stedman (ii. 210) and in the latter dated Jan. 20, 1794. Key: 1. Three companies light infantry. 2. Twenty-third regiment. 3. Thirty-third regiment. 4. Volunteers of Ireland. 5. Infantry of the British Legion. 6. Hamilton's corps. 7. Bryan's corps. 8, 8. Two battalions, seventy-first regiment. 9. Dragoons, British Legion.

This same plan is re-engraved in the Mag. of Amer. Hist., v. 275, and in R. E. Lee's ed. of Henry Lee's Memoir of the War, etc., p. 182. The original MS. of the plan is among the Faden maps (no. 51) in the library of Congress. There is an eclectic plan in Carrington's Battles, p. 533; but the best of the modern maps is that by H. P. Johnston in Mag. of Amer. Hist., viii. 496. Cf. Lossing's Field-Book, ii. 466. The Political Mag., i. 731, has a map of the roads about Camden.—Ed.

There are numerous descriptions by persons who, though not actually present at the disaster, yet enjoyed exceptionally good advantages for obtaining correct information.[1123]

Of the earlier historians, Gordon (History, iii. 391 and 429) enjoyed the best advantages. He visited Gates in 1781 and used his papers. These MSS. had disappeared until a few years ago, when Dr. T. A. Emmet, whose grandfather was Gates's counsellor, found them in a garret. (Cf. Mag. Amer. Hist., v. 241.) A portion of this collection was printed in Ibid. v. 281; as to the value of those reserved I have been able to learn nothing. A large part of the papers printed consists merely of the orders issued during the campaign. The most important of these—technically termed "after-orders", giving the order for the movement which brought on the action—have been printed over and over again.[1124]

We have no detailed account of Sumter's attempt to injure the enemy, nor of his overthrow at Fishdam Ford, except that in Tarleton's Campaigns, 110-116. As may be imagined, Tarleton gave his own side of the case more than due prominence. Lee, in his Memoirs (i. 187), gives a good account. He adds that "Tarleton evinced a temerity which could not, if pursued, long escape exemplary chastisement." There is something in Stedman, ii. 211, and in Ramsay, Rev. in S. C., ii. 152. The accounts in the more popular books are so inaccurate that no mention of them is required.[1125]

Treatment of the Southern People by the British.—The well-known letters from Rawdon to Rugely have been widely printed.[1126]

GATES'S DEFEAT AT CAMDEN.

The movements as detailed in a plan by Colonel Senff, preserved among the Steuben Papers (N. Y. Hist. Soc.), are shown in this sketch after a cut in the Mag. of Amer. Hist. (1880), vol. v. p. 275. The plan and accompanying journal, taken from the Steuben Papers, are in the Sparks MSS., no. xv. A marsh and the river were on the American right and the British left. The road to Camden is marked by parallel lines. The American right, 400 Marylanders under General Gist, were between the road and the low ground at 1, with two cannon on their right at 2, and two others on the left in the road at 3. Beyond the road were three brigades of North Carolina militia (4, 4, 4), under Brigadiers Rutherford, Graigery, and Butler, with two field-pieces at 5, on their left. Beyond this the American line was completed by 700 Virginia militia under Brigadier Stevens (6), and 300 light infantry under Colonel Potterfield (7). Colonel Armand, with 60 horse, was in the rear (8) of this part of the line, and as a reserve Smallwood with the first Maryland brigade of about 400 men, was across the road at 9. [The names are given as in the sketch.]

On the British side the first troops to appear were at 10 with a field-piece, and their main body formed at 11. The American troops at 6 and 7 advanced to 12, and were met by the British (11) moving by their right flank and then advancing to 13. The American reserve (9) then moved to 12 to support the left wing, while the right wing (1) advanced to 12 and engaged the British left (13). The Americans at 4, 4, 4, and 12 (opposite 6 and 7) now broke and fled. At this opportune moment the British cavalry (14) charged along the line shown by small crosses, and turning to the right and left took in reverse the Americans at 1, and the reserve (9) in their new position at 12. The whole American army scattered in retreat before the British advance.—Ed.]

With regard to the treatment of those captured at Savannah and Charleston, Southern writers do not seem to have strictly adhered to the truth. Those captured by Campbell were protected by no treaty of capitulation; and as to those taken at Charleston, the charges of Moultrie and others were always denied.[1127]

Isaac Hayne, at the time of the surrender of Charleston, was a colonel in a militia regiment, but, being in the country, he was not included in the capitulation. His wife and two children were ill with the small-pox, and it was impossible to take them to a place of refuge. He went to Charleston and offered to give his parole as a prisoner of war. He was told that he must take the oath of allegiance or be confined as a rebel. It was a hard position, and, thinking of his wife dying at home, he took the oath; not, however, until he had called Ramsay (Rev. in S. C.) to bear witness that he was forced to it by necessity. He retired to his farm, and lived there unmolested until the success of the American arms once more brought his friends around him. Then he was told by the British leaders that he must arm on the king's side or go to prison. He regarded this as a violation of his agreement, and enlisted under Pickens. He commanded a regiment of militia drawn from the neighborhood, and composed of men who believed with him that when protection was withdrawn the duty of allegiance went with it. Soon after this he captured, not many miles from Charleston, Williamson, a noted renegade, who was regarded by his former friends as the "Arnold of the South." On his way back Hayne was captured, taken to Charleston, and hanged.[1128] The fact that Greene and Marion (Gibbes, Doc. Hist., i. 125) both regarded it as calling for retaliation[1129] goes a great way towards showing that Rawdon and Balfour acted harshly and precipitately in the matter; but the case is an admirable example of the light in which Cornwallis—for Balfour tried to justify his conduct by a reference to the letter or order issued by Cornwallis after Camden—persisted in regarding those who fought for their country and their rights. It seems to me, however, that Cornwallis's position was a false one; and to assert, as Balfour asserted, that South Carolina was completely conquered in 1780, was to assert what was not true. Rawdon sailed for home soon after this affair. He was captured by the French, and did not reach London until after Yorktown. He was immediately assailed in the House of Peers by the Duke of Richmond for his share in this business. In reply he challenged the noble duke, and the upshot was that Richmond apologized.[1130] Many years later, Lee sent Rawdon a copy of his Memoirs, in which Hayne is warmly defended. Rawdon, then Earl of Moira, wrote a long letter (June 24, 1813) in reply, but his defence does not appear to be sound.[1131] It should be said, in justification of the light in which Hayne was regarded by the British officers at the time, that they believed he had taken a second oath to the king just before his capture in arms; but this does not appear to have been the case.[1132]

The most aggravated case of murder on the American side was the shooting of the Tory Col. Grierson after his surrender, near Augusta. The murder was committed in broad day, yet Pickens declared that the murderer was not known.[1133]

King's Mountain.—There is very little original material in print bearing on Clarke's siege of Augusta. McCall's narrative (Georgia, ii. 321) has been very generally followed. An anonymous account from a British source is in the Remembrancer, xi. 28.

Lyman C. Draper,[1134] in his King's Mountain and its Heroes, gives nearly all the important documents relating to that action. Unfortunately, as its title indicates, there is too much hero worship[1135] in the volume, and Draper's own account is based too largely on tradition to be wholly trustworthy, and is too diffuse and intricate. As a repository of documents, however, the volume is of the first importance. I shall attempt only a summary of the documents bearing on the movement.

Shelby wrote to his father five days after the fight (Draper, 302), and later, on October 26th, to Col. Arthur Campbell (Draper, 524). The statements in the first letter as to losses, etc., are strangely at variance with those contained in an official report signed by Campbell, Shelby, and Cleveland on October 20th.[1136] Col. William Campbell also wrote to Arthur Campbell on the same day (Draper, 526; Gibbes, p. 140, and elsewhere). Draper gives several other accounts, the most important being "Battle of King's Mountain", probably written by Robert Campbell, "an ensign in Dysart's corps" (Draper, 537, from MS. in possession of the Tenn. Hist. Soc.). Gen. Joseph Graham, who had no part in the fight, being still confined in the hospital from the wound received at the defence of Charlotte, wrote a description.[1137] David Campbell, in a letter (Foote's Sketches of Virginia, 2d series, p. 126) dated Montcalm, Dec. 1, 1851,[1138] defended his ancestor. Still other accounts are in Draper, many of them reprints; and a letter from Iredell to his wife, dated Granville, Oct. 8, 1780 (McRee's Iredell, i. 463), should not be overlooked.

The most interesting description of the campaign from the British side is in the Diary of Anthony Allaire, of Ferguson's corps.[1139] The chronology is useful in fixing dates, and his narrative of his treatment while in captivity and during his successful attempt to escape is very interesting. He is also supposed to have been the author of a letter written by "an officer from Charleston, Jan. 30", which is printed in Rivington's Royal Gazette of Feb. 14, 1781, and reprinted in Draper, 516.[1140]

There are two interesting letters from Rawdon, showing the extent of the disaffection to the royalist cause in the Carolinas.[1141]

Cornwallis seems to have presented no detailed report; at least, none has been printed, to my knowledge. There are allusions to the affair which show how deeply he was impressed by the coming of the men from beyond the mountains. The effect it had upon the plans of the British can be learned from a letter from Germain to Clinton, dated Jan. 3, 1781, in which he regrets that Ferguson's defeat compelled Cornwallis to require Leslie to quit the Chesapeake.[1142]

There is also an anonymous memoir of A Carolina Loyalist in the Revolutionary War in Chesney's Essays in Modern Military Biography (London, 1874, pp. 461-468), which contains something of interest.

[The latest contribution to the story of the parts played by John Sevier, Isaac Shelby, and James Robertson in helping to work the discomfiture of the British in the Southern colonies is the Rear Guard of the Revolution by Edmund Kirke [J. R. Gilmore], N. Y., 1886. The author says "his materials were principally gathered from old settlers in East Tennessee and Western North Carolina, one of whom was the son of a trusted friend of Sevier, Dr. J. G. M. Ramsey of Knoxville, the author of the Annals of Tennessee, who in his youth had known Sevier and Robertson, and who was nearly ninety years old when he was questioned by Gilmore."—Ed.]

Minor Actions, 1780.—The library of the Massachusetts Historical Society contains an original account of Weemys's unfortunate night attack on Sumter's camp at Fishdam Ford, from the pen of the British commander. It should not be followed too closely, as it was not written until many years of peace and poverty had clouded Weemys's judgment and memory. A more trustworthy description is in a letter from Sumter to Smallwood, written on the field of battle, Nov. 9, 1780 (Maryland Papers, p. 122). It is to be regretted that no letter of his relating to the affair at the Blackstocks has been preserved; for the British accounts are very confusing, Tarleton even claiming the victory (Campaigns, p. 178). This he did on the strength of a despatch from Cornwallis to Clinton, dated at Wynnesborough, Dec. 3, 1781.[1143] This, in its turn, as Mackenzie points out (Strictures, p. 71), was based—so far as it relates to the affair at the Blackstocks—on Tarleton's own report. In fact, Tarleton was beaten at that time. Mackenzie does not seem to have been present in person, but his account was based on the declarations of witnesses. It is the best description of the fight that we have, and has been followed by later writers, notably by Stedman (ii. 226-231). The only account that we have from an American source was written by Col. Samuel Hammond, who was present, as he was at the Cowpens (Johnson's Traditions, pp. 507, 522). It should not be too closely followed. There are a few reports and letters written by Cornwallis, and by Rawdon during his chief's illness, relating to this period, that should not be overlooked.[1144]

Greene's Campaign in General.—The standard authorities relating to Greene's campaign have already been mentioned.[1145] Lee was Greene's most trusted adviser, but there were others also deep in his confidence, such as Morgan, O. H. Williams,[1146] William Washington,[1147] Carrington,[1148] Howard,[1149] and W. R. Davie.[1150] Greene also utilized the services of the partisans Marion, Sumter, Pickens, and the rest. There is a noted passage bearing on the proper method of treating these men in one of Greene's letters to Morgan before the affair at the Cowpens. It seems that Morgan had complained of Sumter's order to his subordinates to obey no commands unless conveyed through him. Greene replied to Morgan: "As it is better to conciliate than aggravate matters, where everything depends so much upon voluntary principles, I wish you to take no notice of the matter, but endeavor to influence his conduct to give you all the aid in his power." It was by pursuing such a course that Greene secured the coöperation of all men in the South.

A good knowledge of the scene of operations is indispensable to a thorough understanding of Greene's remarkable campaigns. The general direction of the rivers should be especially noted, as upon it the success of a particular movement often turned.[1151]

The Cowpens.—Morgan's official report (Jan. 19) to Greene and Greene's instructions to Morgan (Charlotte, December 16, 1780) are in Graham, pp. 260, 467, while from that point and date the whole campaign can be traced by the letters printed by Graham.[1152]

A letter from Tarleton to Morgan dated on the 19th, two days after the battle, and relating to prisoners and wounded, is in The Charleston News and Courier. I have nowhere found a formal report by Tarleton. His description of the fight, at the time, is undoubtedly embodied in Cornwallis's report to Germain, dated Turkey Creek, Broad River, Jan. 18, 1781.[1153]

At a later day Tarleton wrote out an account (Campaigns, pp. 213-223). Seldom has a commander written a more unfair account of his defeat. Not merely that he is unjust to Morgan, but he is also very unjust to his own men. A much better description, by a British eye-witness, is Mackenzie's (Strictures, 95, followed by Stedman, Amer. War, ii. 316-325). Indeed, this last is in some respects the best account that we have. A narrative from "Colonel Samuel Hammond" (Johnson's Traditions, pp. 526-530) is not trustworthy.[1154]

The Retreat.—Our knowledge of the period from the Cowpens to the crossing of the Dan is based to a great extent upon the letters of the American leaders.[1155]

Cornwallis made a formal report to Germain, dated Guilford, March 17, 1781.[1156] Balfour in an independent report to Clinton (Remembrancer, xi. 330, and Polit. Mag., ii. 328), gave a somewhat similar account of the operations; but the most important document that has yet been printed is Cornwallis's Order-book, covering this period. It opens with an order of January 18, 1781, and runs with scarcely a break to March 20th. It was used by Graham in his preparation of the Life of Morgan, but was not generally accessible until some years later, when Caruthers printed it as the appendix to the second volume of his Incidents. Caruthers' own account of the movement (Incidents, pp. 13-67), although weighted with personal reminiscences, is still the best single narrative.[1157]

Tarleton's description (Campaigns, 222) of the march is far from satisfactory, and should be supplemented by that of the less partial Stedman (Amer. War, ii. 325) and Gordon (iv. 37).[1158]

The only action of this retreat that deserves special mention is the very gallant charge of the Guards at Cowan's Ford over the Catawba. It was especially creditable to the Grenadiers, and has received far less attention at the hands of American writers than it deserves. A good account is in Hamilton's Grenadier Guards, ii. 243,[1159] and Stedman has devoted considerable space to it. On the other hand, it should be said that the description in Tarleton cannot be reconciled with known facts, and deserves no credit.

The Guilford Campaign.—Lee's description of the overthrow of Pyle and his companions has been generally followed by historians. It is not entirely satisfactory (Memoirs, i. 306).[1160] Lee says that the action was begun by the Tories, and that he acted merely on the defensive. General Joseph Graham, who was on the field as a captain of militia, asserts the contrary.[1161]

GUILDFORD, March 15, 1781.

Sketched from Faden's map (March 1, 1787), which is the same as the map in Tarleton (p. 108), with the same date, and in Stedman, ii. 342, with slight changes, dated Jan. 20, 1794. It is followed in the maps in Mag. of Amer. Hist. (1881), p. 44; in R. E. Lee's Lee's Memoir, etc., p. 276; in Caruthers' Incidents (Philadelphia, 1808), p. 108; in Lossing's Field-Book, ii. 608. There are among the Faden maps (nos. 52, 53) in the library of Congress two MS. drafts of the battle,—one showing the changes in the position of the forces. Johnson (Greene, ii. 5) gives five different stages of the fight, and G. W. Greene (iii. 176) copies them. His lines vary from the descriptions of Cornwallis. Cf. Carrington's Battles, p. 565; Hamilton's Grenadier Guards (ii. 245); Harper's Monthly, xv. 162, etc.—Ed.

As to the other operations leading up to the final action at Guilford Court-House, and as to that combat itself, the reports and other letters of the opposing commanders, Greene[1162] and Cornwallis,[1163] are all that can he desired.

The narratives of Lee (Memoirs, i. 338-376) and Tarleton (Campaigns, 269) are interesting, though neither saw much of the battle,—Tarleton being in reserve, and Lee's attention being fully occupied by the regiment of Bose. Wounds received at the Cowpens unfortunately prevented Mackenzie from speaking with authority of Tarleton's account of this battle.[1164]

The best account by a later writer is that in Caruthers (Incidents, 2d series, pp. 103-180); but, like all North Carolinians, he endeavors to excuse the early flight of the militia of that State, and his narrative is too largely founded on tradition.[1165]

Hobkirk's Hill.—The official reports serve us first: Greene's, full and precise,[1166] on the American side; and on the British, Rawdon's and those of the intermediate officers, till the accounts reached Germain.[1167]

Col. O. H. Williams also wrote an interesting account of the fight in a letter to "Elie" (his wife), dated Camp before Camden, April 27, 1781 (Potter's American Monthly, iv. 101, and Tiffany's Williams, p. 19). Still another of Greene's officers—Major William Pierce—in a letter (August 20) devoted considerable space to this indecisive engagement (Mag. Amer. Hist., vii. 431-435). A somewhat different description by a looker-on was written many years afterwards by Samuel Matthis, an inhabitant of the district. It is entitled: Account of the battle of Hobkirk's Hill as some call it, or Battle of Camden as called by others, tho' the ground on which it was fought is now (1810) called the Big Sand Hill above Camden (American Historical Record, ii. 103).

From the Political Magazine (vol. ii p. 117).

There is a chart of Cape Fear River, 1776, in the No. Amer. Pilot, no. 28.—Ed.

Whether Greene was or was not surprised is the only point about which there has been much dispute in recent years. Johnson (Greene, ii. 72) has effectually disposed of this question in Greene's favor; but it must be admitted that he was "very suddenly attacked", to use the words of Lee, who was not present at the battle, and who seems to have forgotten the exact relation of events of this campaign. The account of this affair in the lives of Greene by Johnson and Greene (iii. 241), as well as that in Marshall's Washington (iv. 510), is based upon an unpublished narrative by Colonel Davie, which is among the "Greene MSS."[1168]

HOBKIRK'S HILL.
(Sometimes called the Second Battle of Camden.)

Sketch of the battle of Hobkirk's Hill, near Camden, on the 25th April, 1781, drawn by C. Vallancey, Capt. of the Vols. of Ireland. [The cross-swords show] where the enemy's piquets were attacked. Faden, Aug. 1, 1783. It is the same plate, with slight changes, used in Stedman (ii. 358), where it is dated Feb. 6, 1794. It is reëngraved in R. E. Lee's ed. of Henry Lee's Memoirs of the War, p. 336. Johnson's plan (Greene, ii. 76) is reproduced in G. W. Greene's Greene, iii. 241. Carrington (p. 576) gives an eclectic plan, and there is a small plan in Lossing's Field-Book, ii. 679.—Ed.

The Capture of the Posts.—For the account of the capture of Fort Watson, Marion's report (April 23) to Greene has been the main reliance (Simms, Marion, p. 231; Pol. Mag., ii. 548; Remembrancer, xii. 127, etc.). Lee's narrative of this period (Memoirs, ii. 50) is detailed, but it was written too long after the war to be accurate. This is unfortunate, as we have no other account of the taking of Fort Motte (Memoirs, ii. 73) by an on-looker, unless we accept the letter sent by Greene to Congress as an original source. It is not known when Greene arrived at Fort Motte, which was at some time before the surrender.[1169]

At this time Marion became discouraged, and wrote to Greene that he contemplated retiring. These letters are in Gibbes, p. 67-69. Rawdon presented a report covering this period.[1170]

The siege of Augusta was much better chronicled, as with it McCall (Georgia, ii. 321) again becomes useful.[1171] Another description, though from what source is not stated, is in Johnson's Traditions, 354. Lee's account is in his Memoirs, ii. 81-95 and 100-118. The first part refers more especially to the capture of Fort Granby and of Fort Galphin, an outpost of Augusta. The official correspondence between Lee and Pickens on one side and Brown on the other has been printed over and over again.[1172]

Siege of Ninety-Six.—Cruger[1173] presented no formal report of his defence—so far as I know; but there is a good account of the siege in Mackenzie's Strictures, pp. 139-164, written by Lieutenant Hatton, of the New Jersey Loyalist Volunteers: cf. p. 129. Mackenzie himself is very severe on Tarleton's account (Campaigns, 495). Greene's very meagre report is dated Little River, June 20, 1781 (Caldwell's Greene; Pol. Mag., Tarleton, 498, etc.).[1174]

Rawdon's report of his successful attempt to relieve the garrison is in Remembrancer, xv. 9.[1175]

Neither Greene nor Lee (Memoirs, ii. 119) intimate that the stockaded fort was abandoned before Lee's assault, though the English authorities assert it. Nor does Greene allude to the gallant sally of the defenders of the "Star", which compelled the assailants to retire from the ditch, with great loss to themselves.[1176]

Eutaws.—I should place first Greene's official report, though it is not as full as could be desired.[1177]

Williams has left two accounts: the first is a letter, dated Fort Motte, Sept., 1781 (Tiffany's Williams, p. 22). The important paper, however, is entitled: Account furnished by Colonel Otho Williams, with additions by Cols. W. Hampton, Polk, Howard, and Watt (when written is not stated), in Gibbes (pp. 144-157). It is a long and detailed description of the battle by men who actually took part, but as it may have been written long after the event, too much reliance should not be placed upon it. Still another description of the campaign, though not of the battle, is contained in two letters from Major William Pierce to St. George Tucker (Mag. Amer. Hist., vii. 435). Lieutenant-Colonel Stuart presented a report to Cornwallis, which has been widely reprinted.[1178]

It differs from the American accounts in many particulars, especially as to the disorganization of his own troops, which very likely has been described in too glowing colors by American writers. Lee was present at the battle, but his description (Memoirs, ii. 276-301) of the contest is sometimes hard to reconcile with the accounts of his fellow-soldiers. Greene, according to Williams, was hardly satisfied with the conduct of that partisan leader, and Lee soon after retired from the army, ostensibly for other reasons. Neither Johnson (Greene, ii. 219) nor G. W. Greene (Greene, iii. 384) have added much to our knowledge of this action, and the same may be said of the other writers on the war.[1179]

Greene's Later Campaigns.—There are many letters of this period in the third volume of Sparks's Correspondence of the Revolution, and in Gibbes's Documentary History (1781-1782). Many of those in the latter are of merely local interest, a large number of them relating more especially to a quarrel between Horry and Mahem, Marion's two subordinates. Lee, too, after his return from Yorktown became discontented, and many letters which passed between him and his commander are printed by Gibbes. Much of Lee's uneasiness was doubtless due to the prominence which Greene awarded to Laurens. Leslie's letter proposing a cessation of hostilities was enclosed by Greene in a letter to the President of Congress (Remembrancer, xiv. 324). A truce not being acceded to, he demanded provisions (Remembrancer, xv. 28). This too being refused, he endeavored to seize them. One of the expeditions resulted in the death of Laurens.[1180] Gist made a report of this action, and there is a note from Greene to Washington.[1181] Benjamin Thomson,—afterwards Count Rumford,—at this time lieutenant-colonel in a regiment stationed near Charleston, wrote many letters in Jan., 1782, which have been printed by the Royal Commission on Hist. MSS. in their Ninth Report, Appendix, iii. p. 118.[1182]

An account of the march of the reinforcements sent south under St. Clair is in Harmer's Journal, while the "Journal" of Major Denny in Penna. Hist. Soc. Memoirs, vii. pp. 249 et seq., contains much of interest relating to the operations around Charleston.[1183] Mention should also be made of a series of letters from Major Pierce to St. George Tucker, bearing on this period, in Mag. Am. Hist. (1881), pp. 431-445, while there is an original account by Seymour in Penna. Mag., vii. 377. A British narrative of the same operations is in Political Mag., iv. 36-44.[1184]

There are several descriptions of the triumphant entry of the Americans into Charleston on the 14th of December, 1782; that by Horry in Charleston Year Book (1883) is perhaps the best.[1185] Of the contemporary historians, Gordon (vol. iv. 173-177, 298-305) has given the best account of this time.[1186] In the library of the Mass. Hist. Soc. there is a manuscript giving details of the emigration at the evacuations of Savannah and Charleston.[1187] It appears from this that no less than 13,271 of the former inhabitants of those States, including 8,676 blacks, left with the British army when it finally retired from the South.

The British in Virginia, 1779 and 1780.—Besides the documents mentioned in the Virginia Calendar of State Papers, there are full and detailed accounts by Mathews and Collier of their doings at Portsmouth and Suffolk.[1188] There is some account also of the naval portion of this expedition in Town's Detail of Some Particular Services performed in America, compiled from journals ... kept aboard the Ship Rainbow, New York, 1835, pp. 77-88.[1189]

Clinton's instructions to Leslie are in Clinton's Observations on Cornwallis, App., pp. 25, 27. There is little else bearing on this movement except a few letters from Steuben in Historical Mag., iv. 301, and Corres. of the Rev., iii. 203.[1190]

Arnold and Phillips in Virginia, 1781.—With regard to the first part of Arnold's raid into Virginia, we have several letters from him to Clinton.[1191] On the American side there are many interesting letters in the Maryland Papers (134-144), and in Muhlenberg's Muhlenberg, 404, etc. See also Ibid. 216-253, for a description of Gen. Muhlenberg's share in resisting these incursions. Steuben, as Greene's lieutenant, had the chief command in Virginia at the time, and Kapp in his Steuben (Amer. ed., p. 371 et seq.) has not failed to give him full credit for his courageous endeavors.[1192]

Lafayette and Cornwallis in Virginia.—Lafayette, during his campaign against Phillips, and afterwards against Cornwallis, was considered as under the command of Greene. He reported to Greene, and his reports may be found in the Remembrancer, (vol. xii.).[1193] He also kept up an incessant correspondence with Washington, and Sparks's Corres. of the Rev.[1194] should therefore be compared with the papers in Lafayette's Memoirs.[1195] A few reports and letters from Cornwallis at this time will be found in his Correspondence (i. 105 et seq.). Tarleton (Campaigns, 279) gives a good account of the march from Guilford to Wilmington and thence to Petersburg, from his point of view. Gen. Graham was at that time a captain in the 76th regiment, which, with the 80th, bore the brunt of the action at the crossing of the James. The account of the affair in his Memoirs (pp. 53-55) is one of the best we have. Simcoe, in his Journal (ed. 1787, pp. 146-177; Am. ed., pp. 209-250), has given a detailed description of the campaign. He has exaggerated his own services, but has atoned, in part, for this by giving a set of good plans of the rencounters which he tried to dignify into battles.[1196] Giradin (Continuation of Burk, iv. 490) has given the Jeffersonian version of the period.[1197]

This gallant struggle of Lafayette against great odds was very creditable to him and to his soldiers; but it had little or no influence on the final result. Nevertheless, it has attracted the attention of recent writers, and has brought out two good articles: one from the pen of Carrington (Mag. Am. Hist., vi. 340, with map), the other from a less known writer, Mr. Coleman (Ibid. vii. 201).[1198]

The Yorktown Campaign.—Clinton and Cornwallis, in their pamphlets on the conduct of the campaign, printed most of the important documents which passed between them and their superiors and subordinates. Others will be found in the documents printed by order of the Lords, and still others in the biographies of the different commanders. I shall point out only the most important. In a letter (Wilmington, April 18, 1781) Cornwallis explained the reasons for the Guilford campaign, gave an account of his later movements, and advocated a march into Virginia. On the 24th he wrote to Phillips that his situation at Wilmington was very distressing (Parl. Reg., xxv. 155, etc.). On the preceding day he had announced his determination to Germain to go north (Parl. Reg., xxv. 145; extracts in numerous places, among others in Tarleton, 325). But more valuable than these are two letters to Clinton written April 24th (Parl. Reg., xxv. 156; extracts in Cornwallis's Correspondence, i. 94; Cornwallis's Answer, p. 55; and in many other places). Clinton disapproved this movement from the outset. (Cf. letter, May 29th, in Clinton's Observations on Cornwallis, App. p. 99.) Cornwallis tried to justify his conduct in a letter dated Portsmouth, July 24th (Parl. Reg., xxv. 207, etc.). On the other hand, Germain was "well pleased to find Cornwallis's opinion entirely coincided" with his (Parl. Reg., xxv. 135). Cornwallis therefore went north without any misgivings.[1199]

DE GRASSE'S VICTORY.

A contemporary type-sketch from the London Magazine. The Political Mag., 1784, p. 20, has a folding plan. The most detailed plan is in Stedman (ii. ch. 44), The position of the English and French fleets immediately previous to the Action on the 5th of Sept., 1781, which is reproduced in Mag. of Amer. Hist., Nov., 1881, p. 367. For the operations in and about the bay, see Carrington's plan in his Battles, p. 596. Contemporary charts of the bay are in the No. Amer. Pilot, nos. 26 and 27; the Neptune Americo-Septentrional, no. 20; and Des Barres's Atlantic Neptune. Graves's despatch on his failure, dated at sea, Sept. 14, is in the Political Mag., ii. 605, with other accounts (p. 620); with further explanations from Clinton and Graves (p. 668). Cf. Ibid. iii. 153. John G. Shea edited in 1864 two contemporary journals as Operations of the French Fleet, etc., with a plan. One of these journals was printed at Amsterdam in 1783 (Murphy Catal., no. 1,386). Cf. Stedman, ii. ch. 44; Chevalier's Hist. de la marine française (Paris, 1877), ch. vii.; Léon Chotteau's Les Français en Amérique, p. 248; Moore's Diary, ii. 476.—Ed.

On June 11th Clinton ordered Cornwallis to seek some defensive position (Parl. Reg., xxv. 160). Four days later he wrote that he should need some of Cornwallis's troops (Parl. Reg., xxv. 175, and Cornwallis's Answer, App. p. 112). This request he repeated on the 19th, and again on the 26th (Parl. Reg., xxv. 177, and Germain Corresp., 187). In this last he announced his purpose of marching on Philadelphia. On the 30th Cornwallis wrote one or two letters questioning the utility of the defensive post he was ordered to occupy (Parl. Reg., xxv. 169, and at greater length in Cornwallis's Answer, App. p. 118). In another letter, dated July 8th, he again questioned the utility of a defensive post. Clinton on his part, in two letters of July 8th and 11th, censured the Virginia commander for repassing the James, and ordered him to occupy Old Point Comfort (Parl. Reg., xxv. 171). Again, in another letter of the same date as the second of these, he reiterates his order to fortify a station in the Chesapeake for the protection of large ships. Admiral Graves also wrote to Cornwallis, urging him to seize and fortify Old Point Comfort (Cornwallis's Answer, App. p. 180). A board of officers was now sent to report on the practicability of holding Old Point Comfort as a station for line-of-battle ships. They reported (Parl. Reg., xxv. 182) that the proposed site was not suitable, and this decision Cornwallis communicated to Graves (Aug. 26th, in the App. to his Answer). He also wrote to Clinton on the next day somewhat bitterly in regard to his criticisms and orders (Corn. Corresp., i. 107). Thinking that his orders required him to fortify Yorktown, he repaired thither, though writing to O'Hara that the position was a bad one on account of the heat, etc. (Corn. Corresp., i. III.). Clinton also wrote three letters at about this time, which Cornwallis did not receive until after his surrender. The first and important one is in Parl. Reg., xxv. 182, while all three are in the Appendix to Cornwallis's Answer, pp. 237, 251, 257. Such are the most important documents bearing on the responsibility[1200] for the disaster at Yorktown.

Cornwallis's official report to Clinton (Yorktown, Oct. 20, 1781) was forwarded by Clinton to Germain on Nov. 15, 1781.[1201] The two commanders kept up a constant correspondence during the siege, and from their letters the details may be gathered. These are all printed in the Appendix to the Parliamentary Register and in numerous other places.

As soon as it was known at New York that Cornwallis was besieged by such superior numbers, every effort was made to relieve him.[1202] The fleet had been so badly cut up during the recent encounter with De Grasse that Graves refused to venture again to sea before extensive repairs had been completed. Consequently, when the relieving fleet arrived off the capes of the Chesapeake the capitulation of Yorktown had been signed. The letters and reports relating to this abortive endeavor will be found in the Parl. Reg., xxv. pp. 190-200. There seems to be no reason to blame Clinton or Graves for this delay.[1203]

The correspondence between the opposing commanders as to the surrender has been often printed, as have the articles.[1204] As late as Oct. 19th Clinton wrote to some one in England giving an account of the operations leading to the siege.[1205] On Oct. 29th Clinton wrote to Germain the first official news concerning the surrender. This letter (London Gazette, Nov. 24-27, 1781, and Remembrancer, xiii. 33) is marked as received on Nov. 27th; but Wraxall, in a well-known passage, says that the first official news of the surrender was received on the 25th.[1206]

The Ninth Rep. of the Hist. MSS. Commission (App. iii. pp. 112-114) contains four letters from "G. Damer" to Lord George Germain, relating to the Virginia campaigns from Phillips's expedition to the end. These letters are of exceeding value and interest. They bear out the assertion so often made in the preceding narrative as to the great want of harmony which prevailed in the higher ranks of the British forces in this country.

Washington's official report[1207] announcing the surrender (Remembrancer, xiii. 60, and innumerable other places) is of far less importance than his order-book and his journal (May to Nov., 1781), which last is in the State Department at Washington (T. F. Dwight in Mag. Am. Hist., vi. 81). The portion on this campaign is in Ibid. (vol. vi. pp. 108-125; vii. 122-133).

YORKTOWN CAMPAIGN.

From the Political Mag., ii. 624, being the westerly half of the map there given, originally published in London, Nov. 30, 1781, by J. Bew. Faden published in 1781 A Plan of the Entrance of Chesapeake Bay, with James and York Rivers, by an officer, which shows the condition in the beginning of October.—Ed.

SIEGE OF YORKTOWN, 1781. (Ramsay.)

Note on the Maps of the Yorktown Campaign.—There is among the Rochambeau maps the original sketch, done with a pen and a wash, 40×12 inches, showing the different encampments of the French army between Boston and Yorktown, which is etched in Soulés' Histoire des Troubles de l'Amérique Anglaise, and reproduced in Balch's Les Français en Amérique, and in Mag. of Amer. Hist., v. p. 1, and vii. pp. 8, 12, 17.

The route of the allies from Chatham to Head of Elk, by Lieutenant Hills, a British map, is in Mag. of Amer. Hist., v. 16. Cf., for a general view, Harper's Mag., lxiii. p. 328. The best account of this march and the return to Boston is by J. A. Stevens in Mag. Amer. Hist., iii. 393; iv. 1; v. 1; vii. 1.

The earliest American map of the siege is one by Sebastian Bauman, an officer of German extraction attached to Lamb's artillery, whose draft was engraved in Philadelphia in 1782. There are copies in the N. Y. and Penna. Hist. Societies, and, reduced one half, it is given in the Mag. of Amer. Hist. (vol. vi. 57), and it is also in Johnston's Yorktown, p. 198. There is among the Rochambeau maps in the library of Congress (no. 63) a Plan of the investment of York and Gloucester by Sebastian Bauman; the French in yellow, the Americans in blue, and the English in red.

The earliest American maps issued to accompany narratives were Ramsay's in his Rev. in So. Carolina, ii. 545 (reproduced herewith, and followed in Harper's Mag., lxiii. 333, and Lowell's Hessians, 278); Gordon's, in his vol. iv. 196, also follows Bauman; Marshall's, in his Atlas to his Washington (reproduced herewith). Later published are the maps in Sparks's Washington, viii. 186; in Atlas to Guizot's Washington; in Irving's Washington, quarto ed., iv. 356; E. M. Stone's Our French Allies, 424; Carrington's Battles, 646; Lossing's Field-Book, ii. 518; Ridpath's United States; J. A. Stevens's Yorktown Centennial Handbook; Johnston's Yorktown (pp. 133, 144).

The leading British map of the siege is A Plan of Yorktown and Gloucester ... from an actual survey in the possession of Jno. Hills, late lieut. in the 23d Regiment (Faden, London, Oct. 7, 1785). There is another dated March 1, 1787, and, though a different plate, it corresponds nearly to the one in Stedman, ii. 412, which is reproduced in the Mag. of Amer. Hist., vi. p. 8; Tarleton's Campaigns, ch. vii.; R. E. Lee's ed. of Henry Lee's Memoirs, etc., p. 300; Hamilton, Repub. of the U. S., ii. 263. Other early English maps are: A Plan of the Posts of York and Gloucester in the Province of Virginia, established by his Majesty's Army, etc., which terminated in the Surrender ... on the 17th Oct., 1781. Surveyed by Capt. Fage of the Royal Artillery, which contains a small plan showing the position of the army between the ravines. What appears to be an original map is the Plan of York Town shewing the Batteries and Approaches of the French and Americans, 1781, on p. 61 of the Memoir of General Graham. A large map in colors is: Plan of York Town in Virginia and adjacent country exhibiting the operations of the American, French, and English armies during the siege of that place in Oct. 1781, by J. F. Renault. Leake's Lamb, p. 278, contains a fair map, with contours shown, although incorrectly.

There are MS. maps of the siege in the British Museum. Other MS. maps of Yorktown and the neighboring waters, including the drawn plan made for Faden's engraved map, are among the Faden maps (nos. 90, 91, 92) in the library of Congress.

There are among the Rochambeau maps in the library of Congress several illustrating the siege of Yorktown and attendant movements in Virginia:—

No. 50, Carte des environs d'Hampton, 1781, measuring 36 x 24 inches, and colored faintly.

No. 52, a pen-and-ink Plan de Portsmouth, Va., 15 x 12 inches.

No. 53, Plan des ouvrages de Portsmouth en Virginie, colored, 15 x 12 inches.

No. 54, Carte detaillé de West Point sur la rivière de York au confluent des rivières de Pamunky et Matapony, a colored sketch.

No. 55, a pen-and-ink sketch, Batteries de West Point de la rivière York, 15 x 12 inches.

No. 56, a pen-and-ink sketch, Plan des environs de Williamsburg, York, Hampton and Portsmouth, measuring 12 x 12 inches.

No. 57, a colored plan, 3 x 4 inches, showing the French army in camp, Sept., 1781, called Carte des environs de Williamsburg en Virginie.

No. 58, Plan d'York en Virginie, avec les attaques faits par les armées français et Américain en Oct. 1781, a colored sketch.

No. 59, Siége d'York, 1781, a colored plan, 23 x 24 inches.

No. 60, Plan des ouvrages faits à Yorktown en Virginie, a tracing, 24 x 20 inches.

No. 61, a sketch in ink and water-colors, with an elaborate key, Notes sur les environs de York, 24 x 12 inches.

Balch refers to a MS. map by Soulés, preserved in the Archives de la Guerre at Paris, and another attached to the MS. Journal de mon séjour en Amérique, which he attributes to Cromot-Dubourg. Soulés' map, Plan d'York en Virginie avec les attaques et les campemens de l'Armée combiné de France et d'Amérique, is given in his Troubles, etc., vol. iv., reduced in Mag. of Amer. Hist. (June, 1880).

Another published French map is a Plan de l'armée de Cornwallis, attaquée et faitte prisoniere dans Yorktown, le 19 8^bre par l'armée combinée Française et Américaine. Dessiné sur les lieux par les Ingenieurs de l'armée à Paris. Chez Le Rouge, X^bre, 1781. Another good French map has no clew to its authorship except the words "M. fecit." It is entitled Plan de l'Attaque des villes de Yorck et Gloucester dans lesquelles etoit fortifié le Général Cornwallis fait prisonnier le 19 Octobre, 1781 (a copy in Harvard College library). Two anonymous French maps are: Plan d'York en Virginia avec les attaques et les Campemens de l'armée de France et de l'Amérique (fac-simile in Mag. of Amer. Hist., 1880, p. 440), and Carte de la partie de la Virginie ... avec le plan de l'Attaque d'Yorktown et de Gloucester. There is also a Paris map of Virginia, published by Esnauts and Rapilly, giving the Baie de Chesapeake avec plan de l'attaque.

There is a German map by Sotzman.

All these maps were based on more or less imperfect surveys. A map giving correct topography, Yorktown, Virginia, and the Ground Occupied in the Siege of 1781; a topographical survey by direction of Brev.-Maj.-Gen. G. W. Getty, U. S. A., commanding Artillery School, Fort Monroe, 1880, was drawn by Lieut. Caziare. A reduced fac-simile is given in Mag. of Amer. Hist. (vii. 408,—described, p. 339). Caziare also drew the plan, embodying the lines of Faden and Renault, which is given in Patton's Yorktown, p. 34, and Mag. of Amer. Hist., vii. 288. A section of another and earlier government survey, by Major Kearney, showing the roads as they were in 1818, is in Johnston's Yorktown, p. 103. Cf. his list of maps in Ibid., p. 198.—Ed.

YORKTOWN, 1781. (Marshall's Washington.)

Portions of his orderly-books, extending, with breaks, from June 19, 1781, to April 30, 1782, were printed in the Amer. Hist. Record (iii.; on the siege itself, pp. 403, 457-462). The orderly-books were reprinted at Philadelphia in 1865,[1208] while two orders of Sept. 15th and 25th, not included, are in the Penna. Hist. Mag. (1881), and in Johnston's Yorktown, 199. Many other important journals and orderly-books on the American side are preserved.[1209]

On the French side we have several contemporary accounts. First of all I should place an anonymous journal which has been attributed to Rochambeau.[1210] The Diary of a French Officer, 1781 (March 26 to Nov. 18, 1781), presumed to be the work of Baron Cromot-Dubourg, an aide to Rochambeau, was brought to light by Mr. Balch (Mag. Am. Hist., vii. 295), and is printed in Ibid. iv. 205, from an unpublished MS. then in the possession of Mr. C. Fiske Harris,[1211] of Providence, R. I.[1212] In some respects this is the most valuable paper of this class that we have. Still another important diary is the Journal of Claude Blanchard, Commissary of the French Auxiliary Army sent to the United States during the American Revolution, 1780-1783. Translated from the French MS. by William Duane, and edited by Thomas Balch (Albany, 1876, pp. 92-184 especially including the march back to Boston).[1213]

In 1879 Mr. J. A. Stevens printed in the Mag. of Amer. Hist. a series of letters from Count Fersen to his father, occasionally inclosing a bit of journal, a great deal of which relates to the operations before and after Yorktown, and it is in all respects a very valuable contribution. The greater part of Deux-Pont's Campaigns[1214] relates to this period, while the Journal of an Officer (pp. 148-164) and portions of the diaries kept by the naval officers refer to the same campaign.

The French accounts of the assaults on the redoubts are in the above. Hamilton's report to Lafayette is in Remembrancer, xiii. 61, while Lafayette's report to Washington is in Corresp. of the Rev., iii. 425.[1215]

There are good accounts of this campaign in the standard books.[1216] Of the more recent works, Henry P. Johnston's Yorktown[1217] stands first, though it was written with an evident bias. J. H. Patton[1218] also produced a small volume. Giradin's Continuation of Burk (iv. 519) contains a one-sided description; and the lives of any of the Revolutionary worthies[1219] devote a considerable space to the campaign. Among these is the Life of Muhlenberg by his son (268-276), in which an unfounded claim is advanced for the sire that he commanded the storming party led by Hamilton. The more popular books also have detailed accounts,[1220] while the subject has been repeatedly treated by orators, notably by Robert C. Winthrop.[1221]

[EDITORIAL NOTES ON EVENTS IN THE NORTH, 1779-1781.]

While the events followed in the preceding chapter were all tending, both by Washington's victory and Greene's defeats, to a discouragement of the English necessary to induce the British government to desire a peace, the succession of events in the North had hardly any interdependence, and of themselves conduced but little to the same end. The campaigns of Sullivan in 1778 and 1779, the dismal failure of the Massachusetts expedition to Penobscot in 1779, and the plot of Arnold, are considered in other chapters. A brief commentary upon the other transactions of this period here follows. The spring of 1779 was not an encouraging one for the cause. Washington had kept his main army during the winter at Middlebrook (Irving, iii.; Greene's Greene, ii. 160), and he was now resolved on a defensive campaign (Bancroft, x. ch. 9). He gave his views to Congress (Sparks, vi. 158); but that body inspired little confidence. It did something to increase the efficiency of the army in creating an inspector-general (Journals, iii. 202); but its internal bickerings were sadly discouraging (Greene's Hist. View; Bancroft, x. 208; Greene's Greene, ii. 170, 175; John Adams's Works, i. 292). The legislators were powerless to regulate prices as they wished, and riots were in progress at their very doors (Reed's Reed, ii. ch. 6). They sent A circular letter to their constituents, and urged enlistments in an address (May 26th; Niles's Principles, etc., 1876, p. 405); while Gouverneur Morris prepared for them some Observations on the American Revolution, published according to a Resolution of Congress, by their Committee for the Consideration of those who are desirous of comparing the Conduct of the Opposed Parties, and the several Consequences which have flowed from it (Phila., 1779). (Cf. Sparks's Gouv. Morris, and the letter of Thomas Paine, Hist. Mag., i. 20.)

HESSIAN MAP OF THE HUDSON HIGHLANDS.

The British in New York were as inactive as Washington was. We get pictures of the life of the fortified town in the Memoirs of the Baroness Riedesel; Duncan's Royal Artillery, ii. ch. 28; Montresor's account in N. Y. City Manual, 1870, p. 884,—also see that for 1863; Gen. Pattison's letters in N. Y. Hist. Soc. Coll., 1875; Memoirs of General Samuel Graham.

Heath was commanding east of the Hudson (Memoirs), and Gen. McDougall at West Point, which had been fortified the previous year (Sparks, v. 224, 282, 311; Ruttenber, Obstructions, 115; Lossing, Field-Book, ii. 132; Journal of Capt. Page in Essex Inst. Hist. Coll., iv., v.) There is among the Moses Greenleaf MSS. (Mass. Hist. Soc.) an orderly-book beginning at West Point, Jan. 1, 1779, and ending at Morristown, Dec. 12, 1779.

STONY POINT.

There is annexed a sketch from the Hessian Plan des opérations dans l'Amérique septentrionale depuis 12 Aoûst, 1776, jusqu'à 1779. The broken lines mark the roads. Cf. The Country west of the Hudson, occupied by the American army under Washington, from a MS. map drawn for Lord Stirling in 1779, given in Evans's Memoir of Kosciuszko (1883), etc.

Early in July (2d) there was an affair between Tarleton and Col. Sheldon at Poundridge in Westchester (Tarleton's Memoirs; Mag. Amer. Hist., iii. 685). Washington, as the season advanced, kept to the Highlands, and an attempt to draw him down was made by Clinton in dispatching Tryon with a marauding force to invade Connecticut by water. Tryon's instructions, July 2d, are in Charles H. Townshend's British Invasion of New Haven and Connecticut, with some account of the burning of Fairfield and Norwalk. They did not contemplate the destruction of houses; and Johnston, in his Observations on Judge Jones (p. 59), controverts that Tory chronicler who charged such intent upon Clinton. Cf. Hinman, Hist. Coll. of Conn., 607; Stuart's Jona. Trumbull, ch. 37; Chauncey Goodrich in New Haven Hist. Soc. Coll., ii. 27; Moore's Diary, ii. 180; Ithiel Town's Particular Services, etc., p. 90; Gen. Parsons's letters in Hildreth's Pioneer Settlers of Ohio, 537; Dawson, i. 507; Hist. Mag., ii. 88; Lossing, i. 424; Sparks, Corresp. of Rev. i. 315; Leonard Bacon's oration on the Centennial; and addresses of E. E. Rankin and Samuel Osgood in the Centennial Commemoration of the burning of Fairfield (New York, 1879). Cf. Mass. Hist. Soc. Coll., iii. 103; Diplom. Corresp., ii. 253; iii. 99.

There is an address of Admiral Collier and Gen. Tryon, July 4th, to the inhabitants of Connecticut. Tryon subsequently published an Address of Maj.-Gen. Tryon, written in consequence of his late expedition into Connecticut (Sabin, xiii. 53, 495). Trumbull feared another invasion in the autumn (Hist. Mag. ii. 10).

VERPLANCK'S POINT.

The posts at Stony Point and Verplanck's had been begun as outposts of West Point, and to protect King's Ferry, the crossing below the Highlands. Before the works were finished the British had captured them, in June (Sparks's Washington, vi. 292). Washington planned a surprise of the British garrison, and the two annexed sketches, furnished to him by Gen. Heath, seem to have been prepared in anticipation of the movement.

The first, "Stoney Point", is from a pen-and-ink sketch, indorsed "From Genl. Heath, letter 3d July, 1779", which is among the Sparks maps in Cornell University library, and carries the following Key: 1, the capital work on the highest part of the point, commanding the out-flêches, which is conformed to the broken eminence it is built on; 2, 3, 4, 5, flêches built on so many little eminences, each with one embrasure; but in the principal work (1) the number of embrasures is uncertain, being covered by the works and the declivity of the hill. Two rows of abatis (× × ×) cross the point from water to water. The other plan, marked "Verplanck's Point", is sketched from a pen-and-ink drawing in the same collection, also indorsed "From Gen^l. Heath, letter 3d July, 1779", and bears this Key: 1, Fort de la Fayette, with block-house and barbette battery; 2, board huts in form of tents; 3, American barbette; 4, British tents, about one regiment; 5, 6, two new flêches by the Britons; 7, block-house on a stony hill, with a redoubt. The abatis is marked × × ×.

FADEN'S STONY POINT, 1779.

The lead of the movement was entrusted to Wayne. His instructions, in Washington's handwriting, are given in Dawson, in fac-simile (p. 18). His orders are dated July 15 (Niles, Principles, 1876, p. 495; Essex Inst. Hist. Coll., v. 7). Wayne's first report of his successful attack to Washington is given in fac-simile in Armstrong's Wayne, Dawson, and Lossing (ii. 179); and his longer account of the next day is in Sparks's Washington, vi. 537; and in Ibid. vi. 298, is Washington's report to Congress. H. B. Dawson's Assault on Stony Point (Morrisania, 1863) is an elaborate monograph. H. P. Johnston has a special paper in Harper's Monthly lix. 233 (July, 1879), and J. W. De Peyster another in the N. Y. Mail, July 15, 1879, while a controversy of Johnston and De Peyster is in the Monmouth Inquirer. "Who led the forlorn hope at Stony Point?" is discussed in the Penna. Mag. of Hist., Oct., 1885, p. 357. Cf. Armstrong's Wayne; Dawson's Battles; Moore's Diary, ii. 192; Penna. Archives, vii.; Marshall's Washington, iv. ch. 2; Irving's Washington, iii. 465; Hull's Rev. Services, ch. 16; Reed's Reed, ii. 110; Kapp's Steuben, ch. 11; Hamilton's Republic, i. 443; acc. of Col. Febiger in Mag. Amer. Hist., March, 1881; Duncan's Royal Artillery, 3d ed., ii. 353; Pattison in N. Y. Hist. Soc. Coll., 1875, p. 95; and Gen. Joseph Hawley's Centennial Address, July 16, 1879. The British later reoccupied the post (Sparks's Corresp. of Rev., ii. 328).

The chief map of the attack is a Plan of the Surprise of Stoney Point, 15 July, 1779, from surveys of Wm. Simpson, Lt. 17th Regt. and D. Campbell, Lt. 42d Regt., by John Hills, Lt. 23d Regt., London, Faden, March 1, 1784. There is a fac-simile in the N. Y. Calendar of Hist. MSS., p. 347, and in Dawson. It needs the following Key: 1, Two companies of the 17th regiment. 2, Ditto. 3, Sixty of the loyal Americans. 4, Two grenadier companies of the 17th regiment. 5, A detachment of the royal artillery. A, Ruins of a block-house erected and destroyed by the Americans. B, A temporary magazine. C, One 24 and one 18 pounder, ship guns. D, Ditto. E, One iron 12-pounder. F, One 8-inch-howitzer. G, One brass 12-pounder. H, One short brass 12-pounder. I, One long brass 12-pounder. Cf. plans in Hull's Revolutionary Services, ch. 16; Sparks's Washington, vi. 304; Guizot's Washington, Atlas; Lossing's Field-Book, ii. 175. The medals given to Wayne, De Fleury, and Stewart are described in Loubat. (Cf. Lossing, ii. 180, 181.) A rude view of the capture in Bickerstaff's (Boston) Almanac, 1780, is reproduced in Mag. Amer. Hist., xvi. 592.

A few weeks later (Aug. 19), Major Henry Lee emulated Wayne in a sudden attack on Paulus Hook (Jersey City). We have reports on both sides. That of the British, General Pattison's, is in Duncan's Royal Artillery, ii. 355, and his letter to Townshend in N. Y. Hist. Coll., 1875, p. 79. On the American side we have accounts in Sparks's Washington, vi. 317, 326, 332-336, 376; Lowell (Hessians, 228) says that R. E. Lee's statement (in H. Lee's Memoirs) that Paulus Hook was captured by a stratagem is not borne out by Marshall (Washington, iv. 87) or by the German accounts (Ewald, ii. 295). Cf. Moore's Diary, ii. 206; Irving's Washington, iii. 475; Dawson's Battles; Quincy's Shaw, 65; Reed's Reed, ii. 125; Duer's Stirling, 204; Bancroft, x. 229; J. W. De Peyster in N. Y. Mail, Aug. 18, 1879; and S. A. Green in Hist. Mag., Dec., 1868 (2d ser., iv. 264). George H. Farrier prepared a Memorial of the centennial celebration of the battle of Paulus Hook, Aug. 19th, 1879 (Jersey City, 1879), which has an appendix of documents.

Loubat and Farrier give an account of the medal presented to Lee.

The annexed sketch, "Paulus Hook", is from a draft of an original Hessian map in the library at Cassel, furnished by Mr. Edward J. Lowell (cf. his Hessians, p. 228), with the following Key: A, Covering force of the attacking Americans. B, Line of attack on the block-houses (1, 2, 3) and fort (C), which mounted seven six-pounders, which were not used. D, Barracks in which one hundred and ten prisoners were taken. E, Work occupied by a Hessian captain, one officer and twenty-five men, possessed at the time the Americans retired, at daybreak. (Cf. plan in Lossing, ii. 828.) Farrier gives a plan from an original in the library of Congress.

The winter of 1779-80 was an exceptionally severe one in the North (Jones's N. Y., i. 320; Greene's Greene, ii. 184; Leake's Lamb; Almon's Remembrancer, ix.) After Clinton had gone South to attack Charleston, Knyphausen was left in command in New York (Eld's journal in Mass. Hist. Soc. Proc., xviii. 73; Eugene Lawrence on life in N. Y. in Hist. Mag., i. 37; Jones's N. Y. during the Rev., vol. ii.).

October 18-19, 1779.

Washington was encamped at Morristown, New Jersey. Views of his headquarters are in Lamb's Homes of America; Appleton's Journal, xii. 129; Lossing's Field-Book, i. 309, and his M. and M. Washington, 191. (Cf. Poole's Index, p. 873; Harper's Mag., xviii. 289; Mag. of Amer. Hist., iii. 89, 118.) Letters of Washington, while in Morristown, in addition to those given in Sparks, are in Mag. Amer. Hist., iii. 496. Orderly-books are in N. Y. Hist. Soc. cabinet and in Mass. Hist. Soc. Proc., xvii. 48.

The trials and deprivations of the army were so great that Washington did not dare take advantage of an ice-bridge formed across the Hudson, for an attack on New York, though the British feared that he might. There were varying councils on this point in the American camp (Duer's Stirling, ch. viii.). The British apprehension (Feb., 1780) is shown in Duncan's Royal Artillery, ii. 359; N. Y. Hist. Soc. Coll., 1875, pp. 147, 152. The difficulties in the American camp are followed in Irving's Washington, iv. ch. 1 and 4; Thacher's Mil. Journal; J. F. Tuttle in Hist. Mag., June, 1871, and Harper's Mag., Feb., 1859. A lack of money in the paymasters' chests caused dissatisfaction, which grew into an insurrection. The British, seeking to increase the trouble, marched into New Jersey, under General Matthews, but they were driven back, and waited on the coast till Clinton, returning from Carolina, reinforced them, when they again advanced. Washington, meanwhile, suspecting an incursion up the Hudson, had gone thither with a large part of his troops, leaving Greene at Morristown. Greene met the British and defeated them at Springfield, when they returned to New York. The progress of these events can be followed. On the American side, Greene's Greene, ii., and his letters in Sparks's Washington, vii. 75, 506; Gordon, iii. 368; Marshall's Washington; Sedgwick's Livingston; Bancroft, x. ch. 18; Irving's Washington, iv. 6; Carrington, 502; Lossing, i. 322; in histories of N. Jersey; Atkinson's Newark, 104; Hatfield's Elizabeth, ch. 22; Mag. Amer. Hist., iii. 211, 490. On the British side, Moore's Diary, ii. 285; Simcoe's Queen's Rangers; in letters in N. Y. Hist. Soc. Coll., 1875, p. 458. George Mathew, of the Coldstream Guards, wrote an account (Hist. Mag., i. 103,—App., 1857), and some details are in the Court Martial of Col. Cosmo Gordon (London, 1783). For maps, John Hill's, published by Faden, 1784, is the principal one. Cf. Carrington; Lossing's Field-Book, i. 322; and the map of Elizabethport Point (1775-1783) by E. L. Meyer, published in 1879.

What is known as the affair of Bull's Ferry (July 21, 1780) was an unsuccessful attempt by Wayne upon a block-house garrisoned by Tories. (Cf. Mag. Amer. Hist., v. 161; Armstrong's Wayne; Sparks's Washington, vii. 116; and his Corresp. of Rev., iii. 34, 37; Sargent's André, 234.) André wrote on this misadventure of Wayne the well-known doggerel verses called The Cow-Chace, part of Wayne's project having been to gather cattle. The verses appeared in three numbers of Rivington's Gazette (New York, Aug. 16, 30, Sept. 23, 1780; Menzies, $23), and were republished by Rivington separately, 1780 (J. A. Rice's sale, $265), and also in Philadelphia, 1780. The book was reprinted at London with notes in 1781; at New York in 1789 (Morrell's Catal., $36); at London in 1799, with Dunlap's tragedy of André (Menzies, 61, $23); at Albany in 1866, edited by F. B. Hough; at Cincinnati in 1869. André seems to have made several copies of the MS. Sargent prints it from one of these. Another belonged to Dr. W. B. Sprague, and Lossing printed from this (Field-Book, ii. 878; Two Spies, 68). It will also be found in Moore's Songs and Ballads, 299; J. A. Spencer's United States, vol. ii. etc.

The summer was barren of military interest. Steuben was trying to reorganize the army (Kapp's Steuben, ch. 12-15). The low condition of the army is shown in Washington's letters (Sparks, vii. 156; Corresp. of Rev., iii. 15; Mag. Amer. Hist., Aug., 1879). Washington issued a circular letter on the army's distress (New Hampshire State Papers, viii. 870; cf. Journals of Congress, iii. 469). The British intercepted some mournful letters, and printed them (Political Mag., ii. 73).

In August there was a gathering of delegates from the New England States at Boston, "to advise the most vigorous prosecution of the war, and provide for the reception of our French allies." The Proceedings of this meeting have been edited from the original MS. by F. B. Hough (Albany, 1867). In November a convention of the Northern States at Hartford sought methods of furnishing men and supplies (Mag. Amer. Hist., Oct., 1882, viii. 688; and Clinton's knowledge of it in Ibid. x. 411).

Hope revived with the prospect of the arrival of Rochambeau and the French, in July, 1780 (Heath's Memoirs, 243; Corresp. of Rev., iii. 12). The first communications of Washington and Rochambeau are in Sparks's Washington, vii. 110, and App. 4, with an account of Lafayette's conference with the French. Rochambeau's instructions are in Ibid. vii. 493. The letters of Rochambeau and Lafayette are in the Sparks MSS., lxxxv.

The English fleet blockaded the French in Newport harbor. The Political Mag., 1780, has a map showing the blockade of the French admiral Ternay by Arbuthnot. Letters of the English admiral are in the Hist. MSS. Com. Report IX., App. iii. p. 106.

On the occupation of Newport by the French, see Mason's Newport; Newport Hist. Mag., ii. 41; iii. 177; Stone's French Allies, 256; Lippincott's Mag., xxvi. 351; Drake's Nooks and Corners of the N. E. Coast; Harper's Mag., lix. 497. The correspondence of Rochambeau and the Rhode Island authorities is in the R. I. Col. Rec., ix. There is a diary of a French officer in Mag. Amer. Hist., iv. 209; and Fersen's letters are in Ibid. iii. 300, 369, 437.

Several maps of Newport and vicinity are given in the Mag. Amer. Hist., like the plan of the town by Blaskowitz; the Defences of Newport, 1781, from a MS. French chart; and the Scene of Operations before Newport, 1781, from a MS. survey by Robert Erskine, geographer to the American army, of which the original is in the cabinet of the N. Y. Hist. Society.

There are among the Rochambeau maps several plans of Newport and its neighborhood, including no. 38, Plan de Rhodes Isle et position de l'armée française à Newport, measuring 5 x 3 inches, colored and showing roads, fences, forts, and the fleet in the harbor; no. 39, Plan de la ville, port, et rade de Newport, avec une partie de Rhode Island, occupée par l'armée française, evidently by the same draftsman as the preceding, dated 1780, colored, measuring 24 x 30 inches, showing forts, Gen. Sullivan's old camp, the old line of the English, etc.; no. 41, a plan, 8 x 15 inches, called Quatre positions de la flotte française et position de la flotte anglaise; no. 42, evidently by Montresor, colored, measuring 4 x 3 inches, dated 1780, called Plan de la position de l'armée française au tour de Newport, et du mouillage de l'escadre dans la rade de cette ville. Le Rouge published a map of this title in Paris, in 1783. Cf. map in Political Mag., i. 692.

On the French participation in the war we have Rochambeau, Mémoires, with an English translation by Wright, and the Troubles of Soulés, which is supposed to have been inspired by Rochambeau. Cf. Walsh's Amer. Register, ii. The other French contemporary accounts are the Mémoires of Count Ségur and the Duc de Lauzun; the Travels of Abbé Robin and of Chastellux, of which there is an English translation by George Greive (Mass. Hist. Soc. Proc., April, 1869); the Journals of Deux-Ponts, edited by S. A. Green, and of Claude Blanchard. (Cf. Revue militaire française, and Tuckerman's America and her Commentators.) The later French accounts in general are Leboucher's Hist. de la guerre de l'indépendance des Etats-Unis; Balch's Les français en Amérique (1872), Chotteau's Les français, etc. A comprehensive later American account is E. M. Stone's Our French Allies. Cf. Lossing in Harper's Mag., xlii. 753.

Counter attacks of Clinton on Newport and of Washington and Rochambeau on New York were prevented by untoward circumstances (Sparks's Washington, vii. 130, 137, 171, with App. 6; Jones's New York during the Rev., i. 358; Mémoires of Rochambeau).

In September, 1780, Washington had an interview with Rochambeau at Hartford to devise further operations, but the plot of Arnold disconcerted all measures (E. M. Stone, 281; Irving's Washington; J. C. Hamilton's Republic, ii. 49). Alexander Hamilton had drawn up a plan of combined operations.

In October there was an unsuccessful expedition to Staten Island (Life of Pickering, i. ch. 17; R. I. Hist. Soc. Coll., ii. 257; Hist. Mag., i. 104).

Washington was now in camp at Totowa and Preakness, in New Jersey. There are a map and view of his headquarters in Mag. Amer. Hist., Aug., 1879. Cf. orderly-book in 2 Penna. Archives, xi., and Journal of Capt. Joseph McClellan in Ibid.

The Pennsylvania line was at Morristown, under Wayne, and in January, being without pay and supplies, they revolted, and marched towards Philadelphia to claim redress of Congress. The New Jersey line was similarly affected. Prompt and judicious measures quelled the mutiny, but not till some emissaries, whom Clinton had sent to increase the trouble, had been hanged by the insurrectionists. Original sources: Wayne's letters to Washington, in the Corresp. of Rev., iii. 192; Sparks's Washington, vii. 348, with App. x.; proposal of a Committee of Sergeants, with Wayne's comments, in the Sparks MSS., xxxix. p. 100 (also no. liv. 5); documents in Penna. Archives, viii. 698, 701, 704, and ix.; second series, xi.; Colonial Records, xii. 624; Hazard's Register, ii. 160; St. Clair Papers, i. 108, 532; Bland Papers, ii. Cf. also Marshall's Washington, iv. 393; Irving's, iv. 195; Hamilton's Hamilton, i. 323, and Works, ii. 147; Amory's Sullivan, 181; Madison Papers, i. 77; Reed's Reed, ii. ch. 14. Clinton's report is in Almon's Remembrancer, xi. 148. The information reaching the British camp is in Clinton's Secret intelligence, in Mag. Amer. Hist., x. 328, 331, 418, 497; an account of the hanging of the British emissaries is in the Hist. of First Troop of Philad. City Cavalry, p. 28.

Washington and Rochambeau had held a conference at Weathersfield, Conn. (May 22, 1781), to arrange for a plan of combined action (Sparks's Washington, viii. 517, for their views respecting the safety of Newport, meanwhile). The conference was held at the Webb House (Mag. Amer. Hist., June, 1880). The French army then moved by way of Providence to the Hudson, and there is among the Rochambeau maps in the library of Congress a plan of their route, with key, giving their twelve encampments on the way (nos. 42 (bis), 43, 44). Marche de l'armée française de Providence à la Rivière du Nord, 1782. In the Mag. Amer. Hist. (iv. 299) there is a map of the Route of the French from Providence to King's Ferry, following a MS. attached to a diary of a French officer.

Rochambeau established his headquarters at the Odell House, in Westchester (Stone, French Allies, 394; C. A. Campbell in Mag. Amer. Hist., iv. 46). On June 12th, the two commanders held a council of war at New Windsor (Mag. Amer. Hist., iii. 102). Clinton's secret journal shows how well the British commander was informed of what was going on (Ibid. xii. 73, etc., 162, etc.). Beside the correspondence of Washington at this time, in Sparks, there are other letters in Ibid. iv. and v. Washington's first attempt to act in union with the French was in the proposed attack on the forts on New York Island. (Cf. Washington's journal in Ibid. vi. 117; xi. 535.) There is among the Lincoln Papers (Sparks MSS., xii.) a "memorandum to regulate the movements of the allied army on the night of the 31st of July, 1781." J. A. Stevens follows the operations of the combined armies at this time (Mag. Amer. Hist., iv., Jan., 1880). He gives a map of the attempt at King's Bridge, July 3, 1781. There is among the Rochambeau maps an excellent draft, about thirty inches wide by fifteen high, showing New York with Long Island, with the French camp as high up as Tarrytown, called Position du camp de l'armée combinée de Phillipsbourg du 6 Juillet au 19 Août, 1781. Stevens gives a fac-simile of this, and also a map of the environs of New York between the Sound and the Hudson, called Surveys in New York and Connecticut States for his Excellency, Gen. Washington, by Robert Erskine, Anno 1778, W. Scull delin.,—a MS. plan in the New York Hist. Soc. library (Proc., 1845, p. 56), where is also a MS. Chart of the Harbour of New York, with a map of the Country bordering upon the Sound, and extending to the Connecticut, with the names of the principal places laid down thereon, by Robert Erskine, 1779 (N. Y. Hist. Soc. Proc., 1848, p. 188). The Rochambeau maps contain other evidences of the activity at this time of the French topographical engineers; as, for instance, a plan (no. 29) done in ink and color, measuring ten inches wide by twelve high, and not very exact, called Reconnaisance Juillet, 1781, ouvrages [de] Morrisania, Isle de New York, by Montresor and Buchanan, and a second (12 x 15 inches) which gives the works at Frog's Point (no. 30), and adds to the title "Plan d'une batterie de Long Island." Another (no. 32), called Reconnaisance des ouvrages du nord de l'Isle New York, 22-23 Juillet, 1781, measures twelve inches wide by fifteen high, apparently the work of Montresor, and shows Fort Washington, Laurel Hill, etc. It was Washington's purpose at this time to make Clinton expect an attack on New York (Sparks's Washington, viii. 54, 130, 517; Amer. Antiq. Soc. Proc., 2d series, i. 327). Clinton has recorded his reason why he did not venture to attack Washington in July and August, while the Americans were encamped at King's Bridge (New York City during the Rev., New York, 1861, pp. 177-184). By August 14th, the coöperation of the French fleet being assured, Washington decided to march to Virginia (Mag. Amer. Hist., vii.; also xi. 343; Diplom. Corresp., xi. 417). He said the main cause of his coming to this decision was the failure of the New England States to supply men (Mag. Amer. Hist., vi. 125). Washington's headquarters at this time were in the Livingston mansion (Lossing, ii. 195).

The question of Washington having been made a marshal of France has caused some discussion. Hist. Mag., ii., iii.; E. M. Stone's French Allies, 373; Balch, Les Français en Amérique, 122.

While Washington marched towards Virginia, the marauding expedition which Clinton had sent under Arnold, along the Connecticut coast, failed to divert him from his purpose, as the British commander had hoped it would. The attack fell upon New London and Groton, early in September. Trumbull's letter to Washington is in the Corresp. of Rev., iii. 403. Cf. Stuart's Trumbull, ch. 45; Arnold's account in the Polit. Mag., ii. 666; Sparks's Arnold, and Arnold's Arnold; "Sir Henry Clinton and the burning of New London", in Mag. Amer. Hist., March, 1883, p. 187. There are contemporary accounts in N. E. Hist. and Gen. Reg., x. 127 (1856); Niles's Principles (1876), p. 143; Moore's Diary, ii. 479; and in the Narrative of Jonathan Rathbun, with accurate accounts of the capture of Groton fort, the massacre that followed, and the sacking and burning of New London, Sept. 6, 1781, by the British forces, by Rufus Avery and Stephen Hempstead, with an appendix (1810).

The principal monograph is William W. Harris's Battle of Groton heights: a collection of narratives, official reports, records, etc., of the storming of Fort Griswold, the massacre of its garrison and the burning of New London by British troops. With introd. and notes; rev. and enl. with additional notes, by Charles Allyn (New London, 1882). The original issue was in 1870. The perfected edition is enriched with many documentary proofs.

There have been other anniversary addresses: Tuttle's at Fort Griswold (1821); W. F. Brainerd's (1825); Griswold's in commemoration of Col. Ledyard (1826), who was run through by his own sword after he had surrendered it; R. C. Winthrop's (1853) in his Addresses (1852-1867, p. 84); Leonard W. Bacon's, with an historical sketch by J. J. Copp, in the Battle of Groton Heights (1879).

The local authorities are Hollister's and other histories of Connecticut; Caulkins' New London, ch. 32; Hinman's Hist. Collections; L. W Champney's "Memories of New London" in Harper's Mag., lx. (Dec., 1879), p. 62, with views in Lossing's Field-Book, ii. 43, 46.

A paper by C. B. Todd on the massacre (Mag. Amer. Hist., vii. 161) has an account of Ledyard and his family, with views of his house in Hartford and the monument on Groton Heights (cf. Harris and Allyn, p. 179), and a list of the slain. Gov. Trumbull made a report on the losses inflicted at New London and Groton, Sept. 6, 1781, which, with affidavits respecting the conduct of the enemy, are in the State Dept. at Washington.

There are critical accounts in Dawson's Battles and in Carrington's Battles. The latter has a plan. A map of Mass., Rhode Island, and Connecticut, showing the geographical relations, is in Polit. Mag., iii. 171.

A MS. "Sketch of New London and Groton, with the attacks made on Forts Trumbull and Griswold by the British troops, under the command of Brig.-Gen. Arnold, Sept. 6, 1781", is among the Faden maps (no. 98) in the library of Congress, together with a separate ink drawing of Fort Griswold (no. 99),—both of which are engraved in Harris and Allyn.

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