THE TURKISH CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES.
In a despatch, bearing the date of June 2nd, and addressed to the Earl of Derby, Mr. Layard gives an account of his visit to the Turkish Chamber of Deputies. He says,—
"At the time of my visit the Chamber was discussing a bill concerning municipal taxation. I may state, with confidence, and with some experience of the House of Commons, that I never saw a debate carried on with more order and propriety. Members may either speak from their seats or from a tribune, after the French fashion. With the exception of one individual, a Greek, they addressed the speaker or president from their places. Their speeches were short and to the point. Each article of the bill before them was discussed, explanations were demanded of the representatives of the department of the Government that had submitted the law to the Parliament, and were at once given. It was then put to the vote, and was passed without a division. Each deputy had a copy of the bill before him, and followed with the greatest interest and attention the discussion. I did not observe one exception. Once, during my presence, there was a little expression of dissatisfaction in the house. The exceptional Greek, to whom I have alluded, went into the tribune with a bundle of papers, and began to read a speech which threatened to last for an indefinite time. It related to the history of Turkey in general, and especially to the grievances of the Christians. The president once or twice represented to him that, although his speech might properly be delivered on a suitable occasion, it had nothing to do with the question in discussion, which referred to a matter of detail of local administration. The deputy, however, persisted, and at last the house, becoming impatient, called upon him to comply with the regulations, to obey the president, and to come down. This he was at last obliged to do. In the English House of Commons the speaker would certainly not have allowed him to go on as long as he did. No public assembly of the kind in Europe could perhaps show a more respectable, intelligent, and dignified body of men than the present Turkish Parliament. Christians and Mussulmans from all parts of the empire, even an Arab with his half-Bedouin dress, are seated without distinction together. Among the Mohammedans there are many mollahs, or teachers of the Koran, in their white turbans. The Christian speakers, who predominated the day that I was present, were listened to without any sign of impatience. They spoke with the most complete freedom, and without any restraint. The president rarely interfered, except to point out to a deputy that he was wandering from the question in debate. It must be borne in mind that this was the first attempt to bring together in a popular assembly men from all parts of the empire, Mussulmans and Christians, who were entirely ignorant of the duties they had to perform, and of the way to perform them. Had they not been directed and controlled at first by a strong hand there would have been general confusion, and the experiment would probably have failed. I know no man in Turkey so competent to be their president as Achmet Vefyk Pasha, from his knowledge, his honesty, and his determination and vigour of character. It is surprising, considering the materials with which he had to deal, that he has succeeded so soon in bringing the house into an orderly and business-like assembly. For some months there have been no complaints, even on the part of those who have done their best to discredit the Turkish Parliament, that the president has unnecessarily interfered in its discussions, or has in any way restrained the perfect freedom of debate. If there be any cause of complaint it is perhaps in the opposite direction."
APPENDIX V.
STABBING UNDER THE GUISE OF FRIENDSHIP.
Russian Government Officials encouraging the insurgents against the Porte, whilst General Ignatieff was the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople, and Turkey and Russia were at peace together.
The following is a despatch from Sir H. Elliott to the Earl of Derby on this subject:—
Constantinople, February 14th, 1876.
My Lord,—The account of the encouragement and countenance given to the insurgents at Ragusa greatly exceeds all that I was prepared for.
THE RUSSIAN CONSULATE IS THE OPEN RESORT OF THE INSURGENT CHIEFS. Their correspondence is sent to the CONSUL, who is a PARTY to all their PROJECTS, and ASSOCIATES HIMSELF INTIMATELY WITH THEM.
He does not appear to make an attempt to conceal the part he is playing, for on the occasion of the death of the Chief Maxime, in one of the late encounters, the Russian flag at the consulate was hoisted at half mast, and M. Jonine himself joined the funeral procession.
With such acts as these it is not surprising that the insurgents should suppose their attempt to be fully APPROVED BY THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT, for they can hardly be expected to believe that an ACCREDITED AGENT would venture upon them without knowing that it meets with the APPROVAL OF HIS SUPERIOR AUTHORITIES.
Some of the wounded, when asked why they continue to struggle when the Porte is ready to grant all their demands, have answered plainly that THEY ARE BOUND TO GO ON AS LONG AS THEY ARE TOLD BY RUSSIA TO DO SO.
The assurances given at St. Petersburg of the wish of the Imperial Government that the insurgents would lay down their arms must naturally go for nothing as long as its OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVE, with whom they are in communication, ENCOURAGES THEM TO GO ON.
I have, &c.,
(Signed) Henry Elliott.
APPENDIX VI.
THE RUSSIAN WAY OF CHRISTIANIZING THE TURKS.
(Official.)
Consul Reade to Mr. Layard.
Shumla, July 23rd, 1877.
Sir,—Having on my arrival here heard that a number of Mussulman men, women, and children, said to have been attacked and wounded by Russian troops, were lying here, I obtained permission to see them.
I have the honour to inclose a list of those whom I saw, and who were lying in a "teke," a Dervish mosque, and apparently well cared for. I saw most of their wounds, and spoke to them.
Several of the elder ones gave very clear accounts of what had occurred to them (as they all said) by horsemen carrying lances, and many of them stated that they were attacked in the long grass where they were hiding themselves. One poor infant, of about nine months, had two frightful gashes on the head and had one toe cut off.
Most of them had lance-thrusts about their bodies; some, sabre-cuts. I saw them one by one, and a more sickening spectacle I seldom witnessed, not only from the nature of the wounds, but also from the youth and simplicity of the younger ones.
As regards the rumour that any of these attacks were committed by Bulgarians, I am able to state that, according to those I saw, not one such case has occurred. I asked all the sufferers one by one, separately, if they had been maltreated by any Bulgarian Christian, or if they had heard of any such case: they one and all said not.
From what all asserted, these cruelties can only be attributed to Cossacks, as the perpetrators were all described as "horsemen with lances."
The number of these victims is increasing, as others are brought in daily; and from what those I saw said, a considerable number must have been killed on the spot.
I have, &c.,
(Signed) R. Reade.
List of Wounded Women and Children lying in the Teké, or Dervish Mosque, at Shumla, and visited by Consul Reade.
1. Habibe: a woman aged 25 years. Wounded in the back by a lance.
2. Mehamed: a boy aged 7 years. Wounded in the left thigh by a lance. Son of No. 1.
3. Ibrahim: a boy aged 5 years. Wounded on the right thigh by a lance: also son of No. 1.
4. Hava: a woman aged 25 years. Lance-wound on the head.
5. Aishé: a woman aged 30 years. Arm and head wound by a sabre; a lance-wound on the breast.
6. Mehemet: a boy aged 6 years. Stomach pierced by a lance. Son of No. 5.
7. Anfe: a woman aged 24. Four sabre-cuts on the head, three lance-thrusts on left leg, one on right shoulder, and one on right thigh. Sabre-cut on right hand.
8. Nazifé: a girl aged 15. Sabre-cuts on breast and back; lance-thrust on right foot and right thigh.
9. Mustapha: an infant of about 9 months of age. Top of head frightfully lacerated by a sabre. Toe of right foot cut off. This was a sickening spectacle.
10. Féridé: a woman aged 55 years. Right shoulder wounded by lance. Right hand cut off. Lance-wound on back.
11. Eminé: a girl aged 9 years. Three sabre-cuts on head and one on back.
12. Muzcié: a girl aged 12 years. Trampled upon by a horse and severely wounded.
13. Féridé: a woman aged 40 years. Lance-wound on back.
14. Mustafa: a boy aged 9 years. Lance-wound on left leg. Son of No. 13.
15. Fatmé: a girl aged 12 years. Right thigh wounded by lance. Daughter of No. 13.
16. Gursun: a woman aged 32 years. Lance-wound on back.
17. Aishé: a girl aged 7 years. Lance-wound on head.
18. Abrahim: a boy aged 9 years. Sabre-cut on head. Lance-wounds on forehead and thigh.
(Signed) R. Reade.
Shumla, July 22nd, 1877.
APPENDIX VII.
THE SCHOOLMASTERS IN MASSACRE.
Consul Dickson to Earl Russell.—(Received May 17th.)
(Extract.)
Soukoum Kalé, March 17th, 1864.
I feel it a painful duty to report a deed that has come to my knowledge, which has so exasperated the Circassians as to excite them to further resistance, however desperate their case may be.
A Russian detachment having captured the village of Toobeh on the Soobashi River, inhabited by about 100 Abadzekhs, and after these had surrendered themselves prisoners, they were all massacred by the Russian troops. AMONG THE VICTIMS WERE TWO WOMEN IN AN ADVANCED STATE OF PREGNANCY, AND FIVE CHILDREN. The detachment in question belongs to Count Evdokimoff's army, and is said to have advanced from the Pshish valley.
As the Russian troops gain ground on the coast, the natives are not allowed to remain there on any terms, but are compelled either to transfer themselves to the plains of the Kouban, or emigrate to Turkey.
APPENDIX VIII.
OUGHT WE TO HAVE SAVED THE CIRCASSIANS?
Sir H. Bulwer to Earl Russell.—(Received May 20th.)
(Extract.)
Constantinople, May 3rd, 1864.
You are aware of the large and sudden immigration of Circassians into the Ottoman dominions.
The Russian Government has now acquired the territory of that brave and devoted race, who have only prized one thing more than country—liberty, or at least the life which is free from the domination of a foreign foe. They are flying the shores immortalized by their defence and seeking an asylum in a neighbouring Empire. In short, Circassia is gone; what yet remains to SAVE IS THE CIRCASSIANS.
APPENDIX IX.
LESSONS IN MASSACRE.
A Petition from the Circassians forwarded to Earl Russell by Sir H. Bulwer, dated Constantinople, April 12th, 1864.
(Translation.)
Our most humble Petition to Her Magnificent Majesty the Queen and Emperor of England is to the effect that—
It is now more than eighty years since the Russian Government is unlawfully striving to subdue and annex to its dominions Circassia, which since the creation of the world has been our home and our country. It slaughters like sheep the children, helpless women, and old men that fall into its hands. It rolls about their heads with the bayonet like melons, and there is no act of oppression or cruelty which is beyond the pale of civilization and humanity, and which defies description, that it has not committed. We have not, from father to son, at the cost of our lives and properties, refrained from opposing the tyrannical acts of that Government in defence of our country, which is dearer to us than our lives. But during the last year or two it has taken advantage of a famine caused by a drought with which the Almighty visited us, as well as by its own ravages, and it has occasioned us great distress by its severe attacks by sea and land. Many are the lives which have been lost in battle, from hunger in the mountains, from destitution on the sea-coast, and from want of skill at sea.
WE THEREFORE INVOKE THE MEDIATION AND PRECIOUS ASSISTANCE OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE—THE GUARDIAN OF HUMANITY AND CENTRE OF JUSTICE—IN ORDER TO REPEL THE BRUTAL ATTACKS OF THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT ON OUR COUNTRY, AND SAVE OUR COUNTRY AND OUR NATION TOGETHER.
But if it is not possible to afford this help for the preservation of our country and race, then we pray to be afforded facilities for removing to a place of safety our helpless and miserable children and women that are perishing by the brutal attacks of the enemy as well as by the effects of famine; and if neither of these two requests are taken into consideration, and if in our helpless condition we are utterly annihilated notwithstanding our appeals to the mercy and grace of the Governments, then we shall not cease to invoke our right in the presence of the Lord of the Universe, of Him who has confided to your Majesty sovereignty, strength, and power for the purpose of protecting the weak.
We beg your Excellency to be the medium of making known to the great British Government and to the glorious British nation our condition of helplessness and misery, and we have therefore ventured to present to your Excellency our most humble petition. A copy of it has been submitted to the Sultan's Government and to the Embassies of the other Powers.
Signed by the people of Circassia.
29 Sheval, 1280.
April 9th, 1864.
APPENDIX X.
STATEMENT OF THE CIRCASSIAN DEPUTIES IN REFERENCE TO THE CRIMEAN WAR.
We, the undersigned, having been sent from the people of the Nectouage and Abaseck, and further commissioned on their behalf by the Deputies of the other tribes of Circassia assembled at Constantinople, to carry to the Sovereigns and to the people of England and France the appeal of our nation, and to speak for our nation, and after that appeal has been rejected by the Governments of France and of England, and we have presented ourselves before various assemblies of the English people, from whom we have heard kind words, it has then been told to us that there are, among the English people, some who say that we are subjects of the Emperor of Russia, and others who say that in the time of the war in the Crimea the generals of England and France sent to us to require troops to aid them in the war, and that we refused to give such troops, and therefore it is not proper now for England to help us in our distress, or to resist Russia in her violence and aggressions. Therefore, we now say that the words so spoken against us are not true words, but false ones, and we further declare that any one who charges us with such things privately, and who does not bring them forward in such a manner that all shall hear and all shall judge, commits an act not worthy of an honest man, and ought not to be listened to by honest men.
It is easy for us to declare that we are a free people, over whom no king or emperor, or government, has had any power or authority since the world began, or as far back as the memory of man can reach, but we do not do so; we only ask what proof those can adduce who say to the contrary? Let those persons show who the king is who has conquered our country; let him tell what taxes the Circassian people has paid, or what troops have been raised amongst our tribes for the service of a foreign master. This is what no man can tell.
So also let our accusers bring forth the letters, or repeat the words, by which any request for aid was made to us in the time of the war in the Crimea, and then let him produce the answer given by us, refusing that aid or succour, and when he has done so then he may say that we did refuse to join the Allies, but not till then; but no such letter can be produced, and if such demand and such answer would be produced, it would not on that account follow that the injustice of Russia should become justice, that the danger from Russia should become security, or that the taking possession of the Black Sea by the cruisers of Russia, to interrupt all communication and all traffic, and so to make a war with England as well as Circassia, should become honourable and safe to the British nation.
The Circassians are a very small and weak people; they have no money, they pay no taxes, they have no government, they have no newspapers, they are ignorant; but this they do know, that many years Russia has been fighting against them, and that the thousands of men she loses in fighting every year, and the great treasure she expends every year, is not for the sake of Circassia. All our mountains, from the Black Sea to the Caspian, would not be worth to Russia, if she possessed them, so much as she expends on trying to conquer them in one year of the forty years she has been endeavouring to conquer them.
We therefore know that she is expending her army and her treasure, not because she wants Circassia, but because she wants India and the Ottoman Empire; and, therefore, do we say to ourselves, it is because of Turkey and England that we have to fight night and day, that our cattle are carried off, that our houses are burnt, and that our young men have to die, and our old ones and children and women to perish. Why do the Turks and the English not help us; why are they the friends of the Russians?
We will now tell that which happened in the Crimean War.
It was in the year of your era 1854 that you drew your sword against Russia; before then that sword was in the scabbard, but our sword has never been in the scabbard; peace there never had been between the Circassians and Russians, and for thirty-three years there had been fierce wars. It was at the end of that time that the great nations of Europe went to make war. When we heard this we were very happy, and thought that the time was come when we might take breath: for we have not only to fight but also to live; but it is very hard for us to live when we have always to fight. We said to ourselves, The great nations in whose hands Russia is nothing, are going to stop her and give peace. Now we can plough our fields, and pasture our flocks, and rest from our long sufferings. Yet many amongst us got ready to help, and when the Russian troops that lay all along from Anapa to Soukum Kaleh withdrew and collected together, and retired north, we also on our part followed them; but when they crossed the Kouban they did not retire further, but stopped there, and they were in great force, being tens of thousands on one bank of the river and we on the other, so that neither ventured across to attack. We could not go across whilst they were so posted, but when they saw us ready, neither could they retire so as to go to the Crimea.
Now, every day we expected that some of the Allies would appear behind them and enable us to do something to destroy them; but none came, nor did they send us any succour by the sea; and then we saw there was no aid for us. So it was at the end as at the beginning, and the Allies went away, and, as before, we remained the only enemies of Russia. But it was not by sending our horsemen into the steppes of Russia or into the Crimea that anything could be done to make Russia less powerful or give to us security after the peace.
The Lesghians on the east held a body of 50,000 men ready to fall on Tiflis, so soon as word should be sent by the generals of the English or French, or from Constantinople. The people of our coast knew very well that what they had to do was to crush the Russian armies in the south of the Caucasus, and to restore the people of Georgia, Gouriel, and Imerettia to independence. This was the help they looked for in the war which England and France was making against Russia.
At various times, to the number of seven or eight, on news arriving of envoys sent to us, assemblies were called among the Shapsug and Nectouage to be ready to hear without delay their proposals, so that if any such envoy had come to concert measures with us, such as that above described, and which should be within our power to attempt and for our benefit to achieve, 25,000 horsemen from these tribes alone would have been ready to take the field in a week. Our assemblies met and waited in vain; no envoys came; and they dispersed with heavy hearts.
Then it was that we considered what we ourselves could do, and as the Turkish commander in Kars sent no word to us, we determined to send word to him; and thereupon an envoy was sent, namely, one of the two undersigned now present in London, Hadji Hassan by name, to offer to Selim Pasha the co-operation of the forces of the Circassians, so that whilst we descended from the north they might march from the south, and thus crush the Russian power in Georgia, rescuing a Christian people from a barbarous yoke.
This envoy could only reach the Turkish camp by passing through the Black Sea in a boat with four oars, and had great difficulty in escaping the Russian cruisers. He reached Batun, and then proceeded to the Turkish quarters at Uzurget, twenty hours from Kars. The Turkish commander was glad to hear his tidings, and the plans were being prepared for the campaign, when a messenger arrived from Constantinople. The Pasha read the despatch which he had received; he did not say what it contained, but with tears in his eyes exclaimed, "We are betrayed!" The Circassian envoy understood that the Governments of France and England would not allow the Russians to be attacked where they could be really injured, so he returned to his own country. After the Russian army had been thus saved from destruction, Kars itself became their prey.
Whilst the war was going on in the Crimea, various Turks came from Constantinople; they called themselves envoys, and every one had a different story; but they never came amongst the Circassians, they all stayed at Anapa and Soukum Kaleh, the posts abandoned by the Russians.
There also came from the English and French, consuls and envoys, and captains of ships, and they also said one one thing and another another; one saying that he had authority, and another saying he had authority; and then they talked to the Turks, and the Turks talked to them, but never came to the Circassians, but, like the Turks, remained at Anapa and Soukum Kaleh; whilst we were looking for men to propose to our tribes measures of war, and to bring from their countless hosts troops, artillery, and ammunition, to help in the war we were waging against Russia, and had been waging for generations past.
We have since heard that at Anapa and Soukum Kaleh many conversations took place; we have heard that between the Europeans and the Turks, and some Circassians, men who have no authority to act on behalf of the people, that it was said that the European generals wanted a large army of Circassians to leave their country to embark on the sea, and fight in the Crimea. Such things could never have been spoken in an assembly of Circassians, for the long time which they have resisted Russia shows that they are men who know how war is to be made. If such things had been proposed in an assembly of Circassians, our people would have answered, "That is not the way to injure Russia, that is not the way to protect Circassia, that is the way only to destroy your own armies." But such proposals were never made to us, for we are a free people, and nothing is done in secret. We have no Minister as the people of England have. Our warriors fight, not because they are paid, but because they have hearts, and when anything is proposed to us then a meeting must be held. Messengers go forth, and many thousand people are collected together, sometimes 5000 and sometimes 20,000, and they give ear to what is said to them, and when they have understood it, they appoint twenty or thirty of the wise men and elders who consult apart, and after that tell the people, and it is only when the people say Yes to what is consulted that the answer is given. Then all are willing to do what all have understood and all consented to. But amongst our people there is not one who would have consented to go to the Crimea, while every man would have been ready to march on Tiflis and save Kars. So that it appears to us that no message came from the French and English commanders to attack Tiflis for the same reason that the Russians remained on the Kouban instead of retiring into the Crimea. If our troops had not been detained on the Kouban we ourselves would have attacked Tiflis without the aid of the Allies or the co-operation of the Turks.
We have also learnt that when the envoys of England and France at Anapa and Soukum Kaleh said that we should send our forces to the Crimea, the Turkish envoys and other persons replied to them that such proposals could not be made unless the Allies engaged to secure our independence at a peace, and that this was the first word that had to be spoken on the matter; but these envoys would not allow such a word to be spoken either first or last.
Now what advantage have we gained from this war in the Crimea? That war is over seven years ago, and we have been fighting ever since!
YOU MAKE A TREATY OF PEACE TO OPEN THE SEA. THE SEA IS NOT OPEN. Had the undersigned been taken by the Russian vessels in coming to England, we should have been sent to the mines of Siberia, and we know that we the undersigned, are in all cases devoted to death because we have come here.
YOUR ARMIES HAVE BEEN IN THE CRIMEA, WHAT BENEFIT HAS COME TO THE CRIMEAN TARTARS? DID YOU RESTORE TO THEM THEIR COUNTRY? NO, YOU GAVE IT BACK TO RUSSIA.
WHAT BENEFIT DID THE TURKS GET FROM YOUR WAR? You made your enemy pay none of the expenses, and YOU ONLY DEPRIVED THE TURKS OF THEIR VICTORIES.
THE POLES did go to the Crimea, and WHAT BENEFIT did THEY GET FROM THAT WAR?
Did we too not help you? Did we not keep in check 100,000 men? Is Russia not sore and weak by the many years she has been fighting with us? If we did not prefer independence to slavery, would not 100,000 of our men be in her ranks? If we were not engaged in defending our country, would not the Russian frontiers be at Batun?
WHY DO WE SUFFER FROM THIS WAR? Is it not because RUSSIA WANTS TO BE MISTRESS OF INDIA and MISTRESS OF CONSTANTINOPLE? If you wait till her ends are gained it will be too late to get aid from us. If you do not give us to-day a favourable reply, we must go back to our people and tell them that the English people are joined with Russia, so that what Russia could not effect by her arms some people in England will have effected by their calumnies.
All these things we tell you. If you wish to be sure of the truth, make an assembly, as we do, and we will prove them. If you make no such assembly, you have no right to say them. From Europe or from England no help has come to us. We have heard that if there was justice to be found it was in England; we came then to England, weak and poor, expecting to find justice from you.
(Signed) Hadji Hayden Hassan.
Kustar Ogli Ismael.
APPENDIX XI.
HOLY RUSSIA AND THE CURSED CRESCENT.
By A. Cleveland Coxe,[33]
Bishop of the Western Diocese of New York.
Trump of the Lord, I hear it blow;
Forward the cross; the world shall know
Jehovah's arm's against the foe.
Down shall the cursed crescent go.
To arms! To arms!
God wills it so.
God help the Russians—God bless the Czar,
Shame on the swords that trade can mar,
Shame on the laggards, faint and far,
That rise not to the holy war.
To arms! To arms!
The Cross and Czar.
How long, O Lord, for Thou art just,
Vengeance is Thine, in Thee we trust
Wake, arm of God, and dash to dust
Those hordes of rapine and of lust.
To arms! To arms!
Forward the Cross. Break, clouds of Ire,
Break with the thunder and the fire,
To new Crusades let Faith inspire,
Down with the crescent to the mire.
To arms! To arms!
To vengeance dire.
The Bishop answered by Mr. W. Croffut.
Thou Man of God, who thus implore
Thy brother's sacred blood to pour
In hateful tides of turbid gore,
From Dardanelles to Danube's shore.
Be still! Be still!
Blaspheme no more.
God help the babes, God bless the wives;
Shame on the priests that whet the knives,
Shame on the Church whose altar thrives
By wrecking peaceful peasants' lives.
Be still! Be still!
'Tis hell that drives.
How long, O Lord, before Thy shrine
Shall men pray Vengeance, God, is Thine,
Then worship Moloch as divine,
And drink the battle's bloody wine?
Be still! Be still!
O heart of mine.
APPENDIX XII.
THE CORRUPTION OF ARMENIAN OFFICIALS.
Report of Mr. Taylor to her Majesty's Government with reference to the Corruption of Armenian Officials in his (the Erzeroum) District.
(Extract.)
Christians.—The different sects into which the Christians are divided in the Erzeroum Vilayet are:—
| Souls. | |
| Gregorian Armenians | 287,700 |
| Nestorians | 110,000 |
| Armenian Catholics | 8,000 |
| Orthodox Greeks | 4,000 |
| Protestants (natives) | 1,300 |
| Total | 411,000 |
Armenians.—The advice and ostentatious leaning towards Russia of the Armenian clergy in my district, headed by the Catholicas residing at Etchmiazin in Russia, and his bishops in these parts, have naturally enough inclined the more ignorant members of their flocks—rich and poor—to adopt the same views; and considering also that a whole Christian house of ten souls in Russia pays only, for all taxes, 9 roubles (1l. 10s.) annually as against three times the sum here, if there has not been a general emigration, it is simply owing to the fact that disposable arable lands in Russian Armenia are scarce, while the reverse prevails in Turkey.
Everywhere throughout these districts I found the Armenians bitter in their complaints against the Turkish Government, at the same time that they were unreserved in their praises of Russia, openly avowing their determination to emigrate. This bias is owing, as already stated, to the constant hostile teaching of their clergy; at the same time, ample cause for discontent, as has already been shown further back, is afforded by the really wretched system of Turkish provincial administration, the unequal imposition of taxes, scandalous method of levying them and the tithes, persistent denial or miscarriage of justice, and practical disavowal of the Christians' claim to be treated with the same consideration and respect as their equals among Moslems. But experience has taught me that which candour and strict impartiality compel me to state, that the subordinate officers of the local Government are aided and abetted in their disgraceful proceedings or encouraged in persistent indifference to crying wrongs, as well by the criminal assistance as wilful apathy or silence of the Armenian Medjliss members, ostensibly elected by the suffrages of their co-religionists to guard their interests. Unfortunately, then, as the evil lies as much with the Christians as the Turks, under existing regulations there is no remedy for it, and there can be none till the local authorities really see for themselves that the Porte's orders are really carried out and to open the way for the introduction of a higher class of people for such employments. As it is, no man of wealth, influence, or character will accept a seat in any one of the Councils; he will not waste time in attending to official duties in a place where he has to put up with the contumely and impertinent insults of the Moslem members, all which are patiently borne by the fawning and obsequious Christians whose living depends upon this appointment. And even were a man of character and ability to accept a nomination at the hands of his community, the Pasha, with whom in fact the fate of such elections lie, as he has the power of rejection, would always prefer a needy, pliant member to one whose riches and position would place him beyond the reach of his menaces or influence. The interests of the community are consequently entrusted to speculators accustomed to the atmosphere of the Serai in their capacity of revenue farmers or Seraffs, who in such positions have, in addition to their own disgusting servility, all the chicanery and vices of Turkish officials—acquired a dangerous influence, either as the partners or creditors of the chief provincial officers. Such an influence might be meritorious and useful if exercised in the interests of justice and duty, but it becomes a downright evil when practised, as it always is, for their own benefit or that of their partners in corruption, and scarcely ever for their brethren. The claims of the poor are either neglected or betrayed, and those of the rich depend upon the amount of their presents or degree of their sycophancy. The Armenian clergy and head men, on their part, purposely ignoring the villanous conduct of their Medjliss members representing the repeated failures of justice that inevitably result as due to the fanaticism or imbecility of a Government determined to ignore all just claims, exaggerate actual facts; the more readily to induce their dependents to adopt the disloyal views they propagate. As they pursue such intrigues, apparently unchecked and with the secret approval of Russian agents, wavering members, formerly content with or resigned to their lot, openly express disaffection and traitorous ideas.
APPENDIX XIII.
FEMALE BRIGANDAGE.
Millingen remarks in "Wild Life amongst the Koords"—Amongst the many acts of brigandage of which the Koords are guilty—a peculiar kind of highway robbery must here be stated, which is probably unparalleled. The culprits, the brigands, are in this case young women, who set out on plundering pursuits in order to turn a dishonest penny. A troop of fair bandits take up a station at the side of a road, there patiently to await for the arrival of the doomed traveller. As soon as the vedettes announce his approach, the fair troop starts off to meet him, welcoming him with dances and with fiery glances of irresistible power. He is compelled to stop, as a matter of course, and the fair maids then politely request him to alight. No sooner has the bewildered victim put his feet on the ground than he finds himself at close quarters with the whole troop. Immediately he is stripped of all he has on his back, and is left in that primitive state in which Adam was at one time. Then begins a series of dances and fascinating gestures in the style of those performed by the maids at the Lupercalian games, the object of which is to make the unfortunate victim lose his self-control. An attempt, however, on the part of the victim to reciprocate the advances of his alluring tyrants, becomes instantly fatal. The troop get hold of him in a summary way, declare him to have made attempts on the virtue of the fair maids, and condemn him to be pricked with thorns upon a very sensitive part of his person. These dances and the flagellations, which serve as entractes, are repeated several times over, till the sufferer, exhausted and bleeding, is nearly in a fainting condition. Then the female troop of bandits drag the wretched traveller before a court of matrons, which holds its sittings somewhere in the neighbourhood. There a charge of attempting a criminal assault is brought against the pretended culprit, who not only receives a good dose of upbraiding, but is also condemned to pay a fine.
APPENDIX XIV.
THE ROUTES WHICH TRAVERSE ASIA MINOR, AND THE EUPHRATES AND TIGRIS.
The routes which traverse Asia Minor and cross the Euphrates and Tigris commence at Constantinople on the Bosphorus, or at Smyrna on the Ægean sea, and meet upon the plateau of Asia Minor.
Of these routes the chief are—The Erzeroum and Tabriz; the Diarbekir and Mosul; the Aleppo and Bagdad. On leaving Constantinople, the Bosphorus is crossed; the road then leads along the coast of the Propontus from Scutari to Gebiseh, the ancient Lybissa, and where the tomb of Hannibal can be seen; then beside the Astacenian Gulf, from Gebiseh to Nicomedia (Ismid). Here the three routes separate.
The Erzeroum road leads eastward, and parallel to the coast of the Black Sea.
The Diarbekir route cuts Asia Minor longitudinally, and descends into the valley of the Euphrates towards Malatia. The Aleppo road cuts it obliquely, and descends upon the shores of the Mediterranean near Tarsus.
The Erzeroum route crosses the Sakaria towards its mouth, between Sabanja and Khanda, leads by the villages of Dusdscheh or Muderli to the town of Boli, situated near the ruins of Hadrianopolis; beyond Boli the road is very hilly; it then traverses the towns of Gerideh and Hamanli, and descends with the waters of the Parthenius to the little town of Tcherkis. Tcherkis is at the junction of the Trebizond and Tokat route. The Trebizond route ascends more to the north, crosses the mountains which separate the basin of the Parthenius from that of the Halys, and descends with an affluent of the Halys to Kastamuni, and from there, by Tach-kupri, to the town of Voyavat.
Tach-kupri is built on the site of Pompeiopolis, and Voyavat in a fertile plain, at the foot of a height crowned by an old citadel. Voyavat is an important position, because it is at the intersection of the Sinope and Trebizond route.
The Sinope route turns to the north, and leads through a very rich and undulating country. This is one of the most fertile districts in Asia Minor.
The Trebizond route leads eastward, passes the Halys near Vizir Kupri, and, after numerous ascents and descents, issues beside a watercourse in a bay surrounded by olive-trees. Here is the town of Samsoun. It then leads along the coast of the Black Sea, crosses the Iris near Tcharchembeh, and the Thermadon near Thermeh; and leaving the little town of Unieh to the left and on the sea-shore, it goes by Fatsa, Ordau, and Kerasun to Tripoli; from there, after turning the bay of Platana, it leads to Trebizond.
The Tokat road bends more to the south after leaving Tcherkis; it crosses the mountains which border the basin of the Parthenius near Karadjcur, and descends by Kodja Hissar to the town of Tusia upon the Halys. It next traverses the river near Hadji Hamzeh or Osmanjik, and, after passing Marsivan, crosses the western affluent of the Iris at Amasia; from here it goes by Turkhal to Tokat. The direct route from Tokat to Erzeroum eastward goes from Tokat or from Turkhal to Niksar, on the Lycus, the eastern affluent of the Iris; and continuing by this affluent to Kara Hissar, it ascends near the villages of Kerkif or Lorri, the mountains which separate the waters of the Black Sea from the Euphrates, and descends into the plain of Erzeroum near Vijan.
There is another road from Constantinople to Sivas. This is the regular Angora track; it leaves the Trebizond route at Nicomedia, crosses the Sakaria near Geiweh; and following the chord of the arc which this river describes as it descends from the plateau of Asia Minor, leads by the little towns of Terekli and Torbali to Nalihan, near the ruins of Gordium; after which it ascends by the little town of Bei Bazar on to the Angora plateau. This plateau is one of the points which dominate Asia Minor; hence the reason why formerly so much importance was attached to the fortress of Gordium. The road then leads by the village of Bei Bazar, or by Tabadji, on to a ridge of mountains which separate the basin of the Sakaria from that of the Halys, and descends by the village of Akserai to the latter of these rivers. The stream is crossed either at a ford or on a raft, and the route goes by the villages of Sangor and Osman Koi to the town of Yuzgat; the chief seat of the family Tchapan-Oglou,[34] formerly one of the most powerful in Asia Minor. Yuzgat is an important position, because it is at the junction of the two routes from Tokat and Cæsarea. The first leads to the east; and crossing the mountains which separate the basin of the Halys from that of the Iris, it debouches through a deep ravine on to the lofty plateau of Zela, celebrated for Cæsar's victory over Pharnaces; from here it descends and slopes gently down to the Western Iris, near Tokat. The Cæsarea route turns to the south after leaving Yuzgat, and leading by the villages of Ingourli, Kislan, and Boghazlayan, recrosses the Halys near Emlar; after which it goes by Erkelet (Hiklar) to Cæsarea.
Another route leads by Angora to Cæsarea, and from Cæsarea to Malatia in the valley of the Euphrates. It is the route from Constantinople to Diarbekir and to Mosul. After leaving Nicomedia (Ismid) it turns south, ascends the mountains which separate the Astacenian from the Cianean Gulf, and descends to Lake Ascanius, near Nicea; then turning eastward, and passing alongside Mount Olympus, it crosses the Gallus at Lefke (Louka) near its junction with the Sakaria; then ascending this river along its left bank as far as Zugud (Soghat), it crosses the Thymbrius near Eski-Shehr, the ancient Doryleum, situated in the middle of a vast and bare plain. The road now rises insensibly by Sidi Ghazi and Sever Hissar to the Angora plateau. This is the easiest route to go from Nicomedia to the plateau of Asia Minor. It follows the watercourses.
Two routes lead from Angora to Cæsarea. One crosses the Halys near the village of Kara Keni, from whence it ascends the river along its right bank to the little town of Mandjour, where its two principal affluents unite. Then crossing the eastern affluent, between the villages of Tchalik and Ambar, the route leads to the foot of Mount Argea towards Cæsarea. The other road borders the eastern plateau of Asia Minor; and ascending the Halys along its right bank, passes the eastern affluent of this river above Mandjour; from here the route goes to Cæsarea, across a vast plain destitute of trees. It is the easiest road, but there are no habitations, and provisions are very scarce in this direction.
Cæsarea is a branching point for all the routes which cross the Euphrates, or which descend from the plateau of Asia Minor to the littoral of Cilicia. One of these routes leads to Sivas, another to Diarbekir, a third to Aintab, and a fourth to Adana and Tarsus. The first leads in a north-easterly direction, and ascends the eastern affluent of the Halys from Emlar to Sivas; this is the easiest route by which to ascend to the plateau of Armenia. The road from Angora by Tokat to Sivas is the shortest. It is best provided with provisions; but the route by Cæsarea is less broken and more accessible for artillery. The route from Cæsarea to Diarbekir leads eastward along the Melas till that river joins the Euphrates below Malatia. The river is then crossed in a ferry-boat at the village of Teis Oglan, and the road continues by the little town of Kharput to a chain of mountains which unite Mount Taurus to Mount Niphates. It descends with the principal affluent of the Tigris to Maïden, and from Maïden goes to the town of Arghana; from here it leads alongside this river to Diarbekir, and from Diarbekir goes by Djesire to Mosul.
The road from Cæsarea to Aintab leads in a south-easterly direction, traverses one of the chains which unite Mount Argea to the southern branch of Mount Taurus, and descends by the village of Garrin into the valley of El Bostan, towards the sources of the Sarus. The valley of El Bostan, although very high, is fertile, and planted with fruit-trees. El Bostan is the branching point of three routes which lead—one to Samozate, another to Aintab, and the third to Marash. The first route turns to the east of Mount Amanus and descends with an affluent of the Euphrates to Samozate; the second crosses the mountain, descends by a profound ravine to Aintab, and leads from Aintab to Aleppo alongside the Chalus. The third turns Mount Amanus on the west, and descends with the Pyramus to the little town of Marash, and from Marash goes to the village of Messis, on the gulf of Alexandretta.
The most frequented route from Cæsarea to Alexandretta is viâ Adana or Tarsus. This route leads to the south, turns Mount Argea towards the west, and goes by Endjazou, the ancient Castabale, and by Kara Hissar, the ancient Cybistra, to Yenji Bar, probably the ancient Nora; from here it ascends to the high plain of Nigdeh, which is watered, like El Bostan, by an affluent of the Sarus. It descends from Nigdeh to Ketch Hissar, called Dana by Xenophon, an important position, because it is at the intersection of the two routes of Cæsarea and Koniah; from there the road leads by the village of Tchikisla into a deep and winding gorge, hollowed out in the slopes of Mount Taurus, and where the different affluents of the Sarus unite together. From here the route debouches by the village of Abi Cheik into the great plain of Cilicia, on one side of which is Tarsus, and on the other Adana. In leaving the defile above mentioned, the road branches to the right for Tarsus, and to the left to Adana, and from Adana goes to Alexandretta. The best-known route from Constantinople to Syria is that of Koniah. It traverses the western border of the plateau of Asia Minor, and cuts the peninsula obliquely from the north-west to the south-east. This route, leaving the road to Angora, at Nicea, and ascending those branches of Mount Olympus which bound Lake Ascanius on the south, descends to the little town of Yeni Cheer, where the two routes from Brusa and Kiutayah cross. The first turns to the west and leads to Brusa; it passes by Mount Olympus, on the north. The second turns southward, and passing by Mount Olympus on the east, goes to the town of Ainegol (Yeni Ghoul), towards the sources of the Gallus, and from Ainegol leads by the village of Turbah to the town of Kiutayah upon the Thymbrius. It then ascends by the Thymbrius to its sources towards the village of Altyn Tash, and finally reaches the plateau of Afiun Kara Hissar, bounded on the west by the western chain of the Taurus, and on the east by a range of little lakes which almost touch each other, and which extend towards the south to the environs of Koniah. This plateau is very high. It is separated from the central plateau of Asia Minor by a series of hills, which are crowned towards the south by the Baba Dagh (mountain). The route passes between two chains of mountains, and leads by Bulwadin, built upon the site of Dynia, and by Izaklou to Ak-Shehr. This little town is situated in a well-watered plain, at the foot of a mountain covered with vegetation, and about six miles from a lake which bounds the plain on the east. The route leaves all the lakes to the left, and goes by Ilgyn and Kadoun Khan to the village of Hi Ladik, built upon the ruins of Laodicea Combusta; from here it is a ten hours' march to Koniah, the road leading there at the foot of the mountains which bound the plateau of Asia Minor on the south, and which rise gradually to the southern chain of Mount Taurus.
The most frequented route from Koniah is that which leads by Tarsus or by Adana to Alexandretta. It is the route from Smyrna and Constantinople to Aleppo and Bagdad. It is the route of Antioch, Palmyra, and Babylon. It is the route of all the conquerors.
This route, when it leaves the plain of Koniah, turns the Kara Dagh (mountain) towards the north, goes by the villages of Ismil, of Geiweh, and Hartan to Erekli; and after joining with the Cæsarea route and below Ketch Hissar descends with the river Sarus towards the village of Tchikisla, and issues from a deep gorge of Mount Taurus into the great plain of Cilicia.
The Alexandretta route cuts the plain obliquely; leaving Tarsus to the right, it passes the Sarus at Adana, the Pyramus at the village of Messis, three miles from this village enters a cleft in the mountains which border the gulf of Alexandretta; from here it debouches into a fertile but desert plain, nine miles long, from three to four wide, and surrounded on all sides by arid mountains. There is an exit towards the east, and after a difficult march for an hour, the route descends to the ruined town of Kartanleh, which is now inhabited in the winter by some Turkoman tribes. Kartanleh is situated at the edge of a plateau, or rather a terrace, about three miles long, and bordered on its eastern extremity by some black rocks. They approach each other very closely. The passage is excessively narrow. The defile gradually becomes wider, and a mile farther it debouches on to a little plain about two miles long and one mile broad, bounded on the south by the Gulf of Alexandretta, on the east by a vast marsh, and on the north by a chain of heights, which rise gradually to Mount Amanus. Ayas is at the foot of these heights, and about one mile from the sea. The road now turns south, leads for some time along a sandy shore, and then crosses a little mountain torrent which flows into the marsh, and which some travellers have taken, to be the Carsus of Xenophon; others, the Pinarus of Arrien. After having passed the torrent and rounded the gulf, the road leaves the shore and rises gradually to Pias, situated like Ayas a little distance from the sea, and at the foot of some heights which keep on ascending till they culminate in Mount Amanus. Pias is twenty-six miles from Ayas, sixteen from Alexandretta, and at the south-eastern angle of a bay. Its shore is more easily approached than that of Ayas; troops could be easily disembarked here. It is the most vulnerable point of the coast. From Pias, as from Alexandretta, it is only three marches to the plateau of Antioch, a dominating point and the key to Syria.
The Aleppo route leaves the sea at Alexandretta, and turning south-east ascends through a deep gorge to Beylan. From here it leads over some mountains which bound the gulf on the east, and which unite the Taurus to the Syrian chain. The route then descends to the plain of Antioch. The road here branches. One branch leads by some mountains, which are on the north, to Killis and Aintab; it then crosses the Euphrates at Kum Kaleh, the ancient Zeugma. The other branch cuts the plain of Antioch from the north to the south, passes the Orontes beneath the walls of the town, and, turning to the east, crosses the Chalus beneath Aleppo.
Aleppo is at the junction of two roads which cross the Euphrates—the one at Bir, in taking a north-eastern course, the other at Kerkisieh or Anah, in leading towards the south-east. The first is the Mosul, and the second the Bagdad route through Babylonia and the desert. The Mosul route, after leaving Aleppo, ascends to a bare plain, traversed by two affluents of the Sadjour, which fall into the Euphrates near the ruins of Hierapolis. The first station is at the village of Hardaran. The road then leads across two affluents of the Sadjour, and goes through olive-gardens to the Euphrates, which is crossed at a ferry near Bir. It would be very difficult to ford the river at this point. After leaving Bir, the road passes over two chains of calcareous hills, between which is a pretty valley, covered with fruit-trees. It descends from the second chain by a steep path, which is paved with big stones, and is cut in several places out of the rock.
Urfa, the ancient Edessa, is situated in a valley between two hills, which are separated from the Tauric chain and united to a series of other hills which cut like a curtain the vast plain of Mesopotamia.
From Urfa to Mosul there are two routes; one, more to the north than the other, joins the Samozate road towards Severek, and, crossing one of the heights of Mount Masius, descends with an affluent of the Tigris to Diarbekir. It goes from here by Djesireh to Mosul. It is a difficult route, but the only one where provisions can be met with. The other route ascends in the direction of the sources of the Khaboras, follows the chord of the arc which forms the Tauric chain from Severek to Mardin, leads from Mardin to Nisibin through a cultivated plain watered by the Mygdonius, and goes from Nisibe to Mosul through an uncultivated district, which extends from the foot of the Tauric chain to the mountain of Singare. There is nothing to stop an army marching along this route save the scarcity of provisions. It is the best road for cavalry. The other one would be more convenient for infantry. Two roads lead from Mosul to Bagdad. One passes along the right bank of the Tigris, and the other the left. The first passes by Tekrit and across the desert—the second by Arbeles and through ancient Assyria. This last route is the longest. It leaves the river, to avoid some hills which border the left bank; but it is the only road where cultivated lands and provisions can be found. Leaving Mosul, it crosses the Tigris upon a bridge of boats, and passes in succession the Bumadus and the Zabus, six miles apart the one from the other. The plain between the two rivers is elevated, and is undulating towards the north-east; but it sinks and becomes flat towards the south-west, in the direction of the angle where the two rivers meet. From the ford where the road crosses the Zabus, it is only twenty-seven miles to Arbeles, which rises like an island in the midst of the most beautiful plain of Assyria. The road undulates slightly, and the position is a favourable one for manœuvring an army. On leaving Arbeles, the route descends beside a small watercourse to Altyn-Kupri. Here the Caprus is crossed upon a stone bridge. The little town of Scherzour, at the foot of the Median chain, is on the left of the route, and it continues by Kerkut and Daour towards the villages of Kifri and Kara Tepe in the plain of Bagdad.
The direct route from Aleppo to Bagdad leads in a south-easterly direction. After leaving the plain of Aleppo, it passes through a long valley closely bordered by two hills. In the middle of the plain is the town of Taib. The road now debouches upon the Euphrates—on one side towards Racca, the ancient Nicephorium, and on the other towards the ruins of Tapsaque, at the beginning of a bend which the great river makes in its course towards Kerkisieh, the ancient Circesium. It appears that the ancients crossed the Euphrates sometimes at one and sometimes at the other of these points. At the present time the route leads along the right bank to Ana, the ancient Anatho, and to Hit, the ancient Æiopolis. Here the river is crossed in a ferry-boat. The road continues along the left bank to Ambar, the ancient Perisabour, and to Felujah, which is the point where the Euphrates in its windings nearest approaches the Tigris. The Babylon and Bagdad routes now separate. The first leads to the south, along the Euphrates. Fifteen hours' march brings you to Hillah, which is built on the site of Babylon. The other road leads eastward; and, after crossing a bare plain which divides the two rivers, you arrive in eleven hours at Bagdad. To enter this town the river has to be crossed on a bridge of boats. As the crow flies, it is only fifty-four miles from Babylon to Bagdad. The route leads from south to north. It is a difficult one. There are fissures in the ground. They become filled with water during the inundations caused by the two rivers. Caravans going from one town to the other generally go round by Feludjah; this lengthens the road by about twenty-one miles.
The route from Aleppo to Bagdad by the desert and by Babylon has this advantage over the Mosul road. It is shorter, because it follows the cord, the other following the circumference of the bow; but as the ground between Aleppo and Tapsaque is no longer cultivated, and as troops can no longer be accompanied by a flotilla of vessels, it is not practicable for an army. It is only suited for a division of cavalry and for caravans with camels; even then there would be a risk of the force perishing from hunger or thirst. The long zone which the road traverses, and which loses itself in the Arabian desert, is a plain with slight undulations, but they are so slight that a man on horseback could scarcely conceal himself. There are few plants: you find some wells of petroleum, hardly any animals. There are no birds; everywhere you see a white soil impregnated with gypsum or salt.
A few palm and fruit trees announce to the traveller that he has arrived at the environs of Bagdad.
Bagdad is the starting-point of two important roads: they lead, one to the south of Persia, the other to the north. The first leads to the south-east, and passing alongside the foot of the Median chain, crosses the Kerah or river of Kirmanchah, the ancient Eulee, near the ruins of Suza, and the two branches of the Karoon, the ancient Orontes, the one at Dizful, the other at Shuster; from whence the route ascends to the plateau of Media, and to Lourkian. It then passes the Persian Pyles towards the sources of the Bendemir, or of the Persian Araxes, and descends with this river upon the plateau of Persia towards Ispahan.
The second road goes to the north-east, ascends the Diala to Sheraban or Apollonia, from whence it rises by Zar-Zil upon the plateau of Media towards Karmanshah. It then passes the defiles of Mount Orontes towards Kangawar, and descends to Hamadan. This is the ancient route from Ecbatana, the great route from Turkey to Persia, Hamadan is at the intersection of two roads which lead—the one to Ispahan in turning south-east, the other to Teheran in leading north-east.
Such are the different routes, remarks Baron Beaujour, which lead from Asia Minor across the Euphrates and Tigris into Asia proper. From what has been said, it will be seen that they are reduced to three principal ones—to the Erzeroum and Tabriz, which turns the two rivers towards their sources; to the Urfa and Mosul, which crosses the rivers in the middle of their course; and to the Aleppo and Bagdad, which leads along the Euphrates to Babylon, and which passes the Tigris near Bagdad. The first route is impracticable for artillery, the last for infantry. The centre road is the only one available for a large army; for whilst cavalry and artillery could pass by Merdin and Nisibin, infantry penetrating from Urfa through the defiles of Severek, into the valley of the Tigris, could descend with this river from Diarbekir to Mosul, and from Mosul to Bagdad; from here, ascending the Diala, the army might continue by the defiles of Mount Zagros on to the plateau of Media towards Karmanshah, and from the plateau of Media by the defiles of Mount Orontes upon the Persian plateau towards Hamadan. Master of the Persian plateau an army could march towards Teheran as far as the foot of the Tauric chain, continue along this chain to Mount Paropamisus, and descend by Kandahar or Cabul into the valley of the Indus towards Attok.
Although this is a long and difficult route, it is not an impracticable one for an army which has previously conquered the Turks and the Persians.
Means of subsistence can be found everywhere along this road. Troops would only meet with opposition from wandering hordes, or from people like the Afghans. However, the hordes are mere robbers. The Afghans would have no chance of victory unless they were united amongst themselves. To conquer the Afghans, all that would be required would be to fight them in detail.
Alexander formerly marched along this route. In our own times, Napoleon and Paul the First, the two most powerful monarchs in Europe, wished to follow it, to attack the English in India. This project, the boldest which has been conceived in modern times, could only be executed by generous princes, who would like to conquer India, not to keep it, but to civilize the country. In the present state of Europe, India could only be conquered by the Russians, who are very little exposed to attacks from other nations. Masters of Georgia and of the line of the Araxes, the Russians can turn the western side of the Caspian Sea, and penetrate by Casbin upon the plateau of Persia, or penetrate by the east and by Bokhara across the Oxus and Jaxartes, which are by no means insurmountable obstacles.
Baron Beaujour concludes his remarks upon the subject by saying,—
"This enterprise would be justifiable provided that the attacking force had some glorious object in view, such as that of civilizing India. The English, who are already masters of the peninsula, can do this last better than the Russians. THE LATTER OUGHT TO CIVILIZE THEMSELVES BEFORE THEY THINK OF CIVILIZING OTHER NATIONS."
APPENDIX XV.
THE MILITARY IMPORTANCE OF SYRIA.
Baron Beaujour, in his "Voyage Militaire dans l'Empire Ottoman," published in 1829, remarks about the military importance of Syria as follows:—
Syria has a great military importance. It is on the route from Asia to Africa. If the Isthmus of Suez were cut through, Syria would acquire a still greater importance. This country is now open, art has not defended it on any side; but Nature has defended it on the east and south by deserts; on the west by the sea, and on the north by a chain of mountains which surround it like a rampart. Mount Amanus, which forms this rampart, and which extends from the Mediterranean to the Euphrates, dominates Syria; this is the reason why the masters of Aleppo and Antioch have always been the masters of the rest of the country. All the routes were open to them. They could not be arrested on any particular road, because each route could be turned by the others. The road from Antioch to Jerusalem ascends the Orontes, and traverses the two chains. It descends by the Leontes into Cœle Syria, by the Jordan into Judea; and by the Chrysorrhoas into the plain of Damascus. This route is the only one which opens out all the interior of the country. The others only open out the littoral. An army can always be stopped by a foe who occupies the first-mentioned route. The road from Gaza to Laodicea along the coast is only suitable for an army which is accompanied by a fleet. The transversal routes of Caifa or Acre to Damascus by Nazareth, of Tyre or Sidon to Emesa by Cœle Syria—from Tripoli to Hamah by Akka, and from Laodicea to Schogr by Abdama can only conveniently be used by an army which is mistress of the sea.
Syria can be attacked from two sides—either through Asia Minor or through Egypt. TO ATTACK SYRIA FROM ASIA MINOR, MOUNT AMANUS MUST BE PASSED EITHER AT ITS CENTRE NEAR AINTAB, OR AT ITS TWO EXTREMITIES BY ZEUGMA OR BY ISSUS. THE PASS BY ZEUGMA IS THE EASIEST—TO HOLD THIS PASS IT IS NECESSARY TO BE THE MASTER OF THE EUPHRATES. The passage by Aintab is more difficult, but it can be turned. An army can descend by several roads from Mount Amanus along the watercourses into the plain of Antioch as into the plain of Aleppo.
An attack by the gulf of Alexandretta is more difficult. This gulf is closed by a cordon of mountains which is bent on the seaside like a bow. Even if this bow were pierced from one side, it would be necessary to pierce it from the other and penetrate into Syria by the defile of Beilan, after having entered by that of Issus. Syria is defended on the Egyptian side by a desert—here there is neither water nor grass; but so soon as an army has crossed this desert and taken Gaza, it can ascend the coast to Carmel, and if it is mistress of the sea, can ascend at pleasure by the transversal valley of Esdrelon upon the plain of Damascus, or by the transversal valley of Balbek upon the plain of Emesa which commands the entire valley of the Orontes. An army could even ascend the coast to Laodicea, its right supported on the Lebanon, its left on the sea, and sweep before it the Turks dispersed amidst the towns of the littoral, as the wind drives before it the dust. If the Turks were to rally in the valley of Cœle Syria, or in the plain of Damascus, a defeat here would drive them into the desert. The Mutualis, Druses, Maronites, Ansares are not united—to conquer them it is sufficient to sow dissension in their ranks; even if they were to fight beneath the same standards they could never arrest an army in its march. These people know nothing about tactics, they are only acquainted with mountain warfare. They would never dare to risk themselves in the plain or to sustain the shock of a European battalion. All these people are like Arabs; they are only fit to rob caravans or to follow an army with the object of pillage.
An attack upon Syria by the littoral of Palestine and Phœnicia could only succeed so long as you were mistress of the sea. It would be better to attack Syria by sea than from Egypt; but to attack Syria by sea, one must begin by establishing oneself in the island of Cyprus. Cyprus is to Syria what Zante is to the Morea; it would serve as a depôt for the army and a harbour for the fleet. Larnaca and Famagusta are the most favourable points for naval stations. The Syrian coast is too straight, it possesses no good port, nor even any good roads. The ports of Laodicea, Tripoli, Beyrout, and Sidon are too small. The anchoring roads of Acre, Jaffa, and Gaza are too exposed. Alexandretta and Tyre are the sole points where an army can be disembarked without danger. This is the reason why these two places have always been considered the two keys of Syria, on the side of the sea. An attack by Alexandretta has this advantage, it separates Syria at once from the rest of Turkey. It also has its disadvantages. Depôts must be formed on a very unhealthy shore. The defiles of Mount Rhosus must be passed; here there are difficult gorges where a handful of soldiers could resist an army.
An attack by Tyre would be the easiest and the least dangerous. The peninsula on which this town is built is now no longer defended. This peninsula facilitates a descent upon the neighbouring coast. The surrounding plain is fertile. An army would be thoroughly protected by guarding on one side the defile of Cape Blanc, and on the other, that of the valley of the Leontes or of Cœle Syria. From this valley an army could ascend by Balbek to the highest point of the Syrian chain. It could dominate the whole country as if from the summit of an enormous citadel. This point surmounts all the passes, and an army could descend by the Jordan to Jerusalem by the Chrysorrhoas to Damascus, and by the Orontes to Antioch.
Tyre and Alexandretta are the two most vulnerable points in Syria. If history does not recall to the Turks the importance of these two towns, Europeans have not forgotten it. Acre and Laodicea are the next most important points. In summer an army could easily disembark there, and, like Tyre and Alexandretta, they give access to the entire country. The Turks, then, ought to fortify these places better, and especially Alexandretta and Tyre, so as to make them the principal fortresses in Syria; and not to think so much of Aleppo and Damascus, which can be easily defended against the Arabs of the desert.
If Syria is easy to attack—she is equally difficult to conquer. Her territory is mountainous. A small army could defend itself for a long time against a large force. In Mesopotamia and in Egypt a single battle won would be sufficient to reduce the entire country. In Syria it would only enable the foe to occupy a more advanced position, and to march from one valley to another, as from the valley of the Orontes to the valley of the Jordan, or from the littoral of Phœnicia to Palestine; but to march from one of these positions to the other, it is necessary to pass defiles. If the defenders were masters of the transversal valleys which unite the littoral with the interior of the country—and in particular of the valley of Balbek—no enemy could advance a step without encountering obstacles. This would protract the war and give the defenders a great advantage. Syria, then, is difficult to conquer, but, once conquered, is easy to defend. This is the reason why it is so important from a military point of view.
APPENDIX B. (XVI.)
SIR JOHN BURGOYNE ON THE DEFENCES OF CONSTANTINOPLE.
The following remarks made by Sir John Burgoyne in his work, "Military Opinions," and published in 1859, may not be uninteresting to the reader. Alluding to the events preceding the Crimean War, the author observes:
There can be but little doubt that the Turkish force on the frontier will be numerically very inferior to that of the Russians. It may be stated at about 120,000, while their enemy must be able to dispose of at least 200,000 serviceable forces. Under such a state of things it is manifest that the best policy for Russia would be to use every effort to strike a heavy blow at once, to force the Danube in mass, and by rapid and vigorous movements to cut off, or thoroughly defeat the divided hordes of the Turks. In the event of success they would push on so far as their arrangements would allow, towards the Balkan.
When once the Russians are firmly established on the right bank of the Danube, the Turks must necessarily retire to Shumla and the Balkan, and it is to be hoped that this will be effected before the detached corps or the flanks shall be too much compromised. The first real defence, then, that it would appear could be prudently made, would be on the Balkan passes. On the Balkan it is to be hoped that the Turkish armies would, by due arrangements, be under such great advantages of position as to enable them to make an obstinate stand.
Still, the line is long, the passes must be many, and the enemy, still numerous, would probably at length establish himself across it; but by this time, feeling the effects of the campaign and forward movement in such a country, he would find a difficulty in keeping together such large bodies, in maintaining their efficiency, and obtaining supplies for them. These difficulties would increase as he prolonged the advance.
It may be considered that at such a period a well prepared field of battle along the line of the Carasu river—from its mouth in the Lake of Bujuk Checkmedge, on the Sea of Marmora, to Kara Bournu on the Black Sea. The length of this line, from sea to sea, is twenty-four or twenty-five miles; but each flank being covered by lakes and rivers, would be easily watched and secured, and the extent of the real fighting-ground would be, by these features, reduced to nine or ten miles of plain; but with favourable undulations affording a good command over the front, and which might be improved in strength in a most powerful degree by a great development of respectable field-works. One most important advantage to be obtained from the occupation of this position would be that it covers the entire Bosphorus, and would therefore enable our fleets to remain masters of the Black Sea to the last, and preclude the enemy from the use of it.
To apply the resources of this position with effect, two ingredients must be available; first, early and energetic measures for entrenching so great an extent, so as to give it the greatest possible strength: and the other, that an adequate force should remain available for its occupation and defence. The first would require the application of several thousand workmen for several months, and could only be effected by the employment of troops, but with an understanding that a degree of benefit would be derived from their very first labours, which could be progressively improved to the very last moment. The second would require 50,000 good troops, or a proportionate increase in number of such as might be inferior.
These may appear to be heavy demands, but can scarcely be considered so, as the main and last stand to prevent the fall of an empire. The situation of the Dardanelles is detached, but presents far greater facilities for its protection, though still requiring considerable means. This is to be effected by occupying powerfully the neck of land which connects the great European Peninsula (the old Chersonese of Thrace) with the main land. At about seven miles in front of Gallipoli, and near the village of Boulaher, this neck is only three miles wide, being the narrowest part, and presents at that identical part a position that, duly fortified and garrisoned, may be given enormous strength. The whole extent of coast round the peninsula in rear of that line would be protected by the naval forces. Large means would be required to be applied to the preparation of this position within a short time; 4000 workmen would do it in three months, and a garrison of 12,000 good troops would be necessary for its defence if properly attached.
The use of this position however, would not be solely confined to securing the retreat of the fleet, but would be very threatening for offensive measures also; it would cover a very extensive district, within which might be rapidly collected by sea any force that it might be thought advisable at any time to advance, either to the front or flank of the invader, with a comparatively short communication and secure depôts and retreats. It is, in fact, the point that would form the best line of operations for any forces acting in alliance with Turkey, excepting those which would be applied to the immediate protection of Constantinople; although the water communication would be open to the Gulf of Enos, and perhaps up the Maritza, the depôts, hospitals, reserves, &c., should be established on this peninsula.
To return to the consideration of the defences for Constantinople. A second line has been designed round the city, at only a mile or two in advance; the ground is extremely favourable. It would cover the whole space from the Sea of Marmora to the Bosphorus and, well entrenched, would be capable of considerable resistance, but it has several defects. 1. It can hardly be deemed sufficiently extensive and influential for the last resort of a great army. 2. It would be too near to the city, and the proceedings and feelings of the forces would be greatly influenced by the tumults, panics, insurrections, treacheries, and confusion of the place; so much so, that no vigorous defence could be expected from it. 3. It would be considered as a last hold, and merely as a point for surrender. 4. It would not cover the whole of the Bosphorus, and consequently it would necessitate the evacuation of the Black Sea by our fleet.
On these accounts I attach no value to it, provided the Carasu frontier be taken up. If the disposable force was only from 5000 to 12,000 strong, I would recommend its services being exclusively engaged to secure the Dardanelles, an additional force of 25,000 might form a valuable nucleus for the preparation and defence of the frontier of the Carasu. If a larger army could be collected it would join and act in conjunction with the Turkish forces in the Balkan, for which purpose their best landing-place would be the Gulf of Enos, proceeding to Adrianople up the Maritza river; or they might act elsewhere, according to the circumstances of the times. An idea is suggested that the Russians, on the understanding of the preparation by the allies, may content themselves with remaining in quiet possession of the Principalities, and thus gain an absolute advantage. It is not for me, taking in view military operations only, to judge of the effect of such a course, further than to give an opinion that I am not aware of any military measures that it would be desirable to attempt to drive them out without the co-operation of Austria.
The question is rather political than military, but it would appear to me that by so doing they would certainly abandon their cause for war, and would suffer more in prestige than they would gain in substance.
APPENDIX B. (XVII.)
THE CHEKMAGEE LINES.
Major-General Macintosh in his work, "A Military Tour in European Turkey," remarks on the possibility of a winter campaign, and on the defences of Constantinople as follows:—
"About the time that I visited the Dardanelles I made an excursion from Constantinople into Bulgaria, noting as I rode along all that appeared of professional interest in the country through which I passed. It was the beginning of November when I set out, but I found the passes of the Balkan quite practicable as regarded snow, though this is not always the case at that season. Excepting an occasional rainy day, I travelled agreeably enough over the plains on both sides of the mountains. On leaving Constantinople, the Adrianople road carried me over a bleak track of undulating country resembling our downs, but deeply furrowed in many places with steep ravines, and showing few vestiges of habitation beyond an occasional farm-yard enclosed by a solid wall, and generally containing several dwellings and sheds for cattle. These enclosures might often serve for posts, but they could hardly resist artillery; although there is a method employed in the East of digging outside the wall a deep ditch, and throwing the earth up to a certain height against it, which would in some degree deaden the fire, at the same time that the ditch formed by the excavation adds an obstacle compensating for the facility which the earth thrown up within would otherwise give to an escalade.
"The road passes at no great distance from the shore of the Sea of Marmora, about ten miles from the city walls. I reached the crest of one of the elevated downs commanding a view of an extensive lake, about seven miles in length, and two in breadth, bordered with marshy land, and stretching from the sea into the country, and in the direction of the ridge called the Lesser Balkan, which lies to the north. The lake is separated from the sea at its south-western extremity by a low ledge, not many yards in breadth, traversed by the ancient highway, now in a ruinous state, and supported in some places on low arches, through which the brackish water passes and repasses, according to the direction of the wind between the sea and the lake. The causeway could be easily closed artificially, when seven miles of country would be rendered unassailable by an enemy; for, although boats might navigate these lakes to a certain extent, its marshy shores must always render navigation difficult, even if such vessels were at hand, which, hitherto, has not been the case.
"The spot which the Turks call Kuchuk Chekmagee is designated by the Franks Ponte Piccolo, to distinguish it from the greater bridge crossing the isthmus at Buyuk Chekmagee, or Ponte Grande, the second lake, about six miles and a half further on towards Adrianople.
"The ledge at Ponte Piccolo is about three quarters of a mile in length, but the lake expands very considerably further up, and at the distance of four miles is broken into a fork, each branch being fed by a stream which flows from the highlands to the north. Proceeding over the ledge, a country of heights and valleys becoming bolder to the northward extends for about six or seven miles, when the second lake of equal length, but somewhat narrower than the first, presents itself, divided like the other from the sea by a narrow ledge, supporting a bad causeway, the centre of which rests on the large bridge above mentioned. From the brow or crest of the heights above, which are lower than those at Kuchuk Chekmagee, but which command the ledge at a very short distance; a zigzag path leads down to the village of Buyuk Chekmagee. Standing at this point, the spectator is immediately impressed with the conviction of the great strength of such a pass, and of its immense utility to Turkey, if turned to proper account; being, as it were, the abutment on which the left flank of a fine position rests, covering the capital from an enemy in this direction, a capital which, once attained by an hostile army, would mark, most probably, in its own ruin, the fall of the Ottoman Empire in Europe.
"A recent writer has described the locality as 'that formidable position about twenty miles from the capital so celebrated in history, where, owing to the nature of the ground, Attila was stayed in his march to conquer the Eastern Empire, and where at a later period the Huns[35] were signally defeated by Belisarius.' In reference to this statement, however, it must be observed that, as regards the advance of Attila, Gibbon especially mentions that he was only arrested by the city walls of Constantinople, without alluding to any position whatever. The following is the passage from Gibbon. 'The armies of the Eastern Empire were vanquished in three successive engagements, and the progress of Attila may be traced by the fields of battle. The two first on the banks of the Utus, and under the walls of Marcianopolis, were fought on the extensive plains between the Danube and Mount Hæmus. As the Romans were pressed by a victorious enemy, they gradually and unskilfully retired towards the Chersonesus of Thrace (the peninsula of the Dardanelles), and that narrow peninsula, the last extremity of the land, was marked by their third and irreparable defeat. By the destruction of their army, Attila acquired the indisputable possession of the field. From the Hellespont to Thermopylæ and the suburbs of Constantinople he ravaged without resistance and without mercy the provinces of Thrace and Macedonia. Heraclia[36] and Constantinople might perhaps escape this dreadful irruption of the Huns.'... Belisarius is said by the historian to have intrenched himself at Melanthius, about twenty miles from Constantinople, and there repulsed seven thousand Bulgarians, by whom he was attacked."
Major-General Macintosh, after having described the shore road from Constantinople to the lakes, describes the inland road as follows:—
"Quitting the city by the gate of Adrianople, and leaving on the right the River Sydaris, vulgarly called the Ali-bey, which flows through a ravine into the Golden Horn, not far from where it receives the Barbysis (now called the Kheat-Khaneh-soo), the road passes between the two great barracks of Ramish Chiflik and Daoud Pasha, situated about two miles from the walls where the Turks, looking much too near the city for its strongest defences, formerly erected field-works, which, though fallen into decay, might, if repaired, serve as the scene of a last struggle with the enemy. This neighbourhood is intersected by the subterranean conduits and lofty aqueducts which convey water from Kalfas, Kavas-Kioi, and other great reservoirs to Constantinople; and though when I visited them they were quite undefended, the Chekmagee lines if erected would effectually protect these works. The vast importance of preserving them will be understood when it is recollected that Constantinople is situated on the extremity of a wedge of land ill supplied with springs or running streams, and in a climate where, at certain seasons, there is but little rain for months. Leaving the aqueducts behind, a country is now traversed resembling that on the parallel route already described, but in which the heights are bolder, and the valleys more abrupt, while small towns and farm-houses are of more frequent occurrence, and the supply of water near the road is, by means of copious artificial fountains and occasional rivers by which it is crossed, considerably more abundant. This highly defensible track extends as far as the Chekmagee lines, which may be said to run from the two lakes on the Sea of Marmora, nearly to the fort of Kara-bornoo, on the Black Sea, where it has in its front the salt lake of Derkos, and the narrow ledge dividing it from the sea, which, no doubt, might be easily cut through so as to admit the waters of the Euxine. Our approach to the first of these lines, or that nearest Constantinople, is marked, after passing a khan and fountain, by the summit of a bold position on the Constantinople side of a river flowing through a deep ravine towards the lesser lake, and hence a view is obtained of Kuchuk Chekmagee and the neighbouring sea. Descending into the ravine, the road, which is generally good, crosses the river by a substantial stone bridge, close to which is a fountain, and ascending the steep bank on the opposite side passes a large walled farm, where another position commences.
"From this point we come on a succession of inferior slopes, dipping towards the lakes and marshes, each affording a position.
"One of these about two miles from the Chatsalda marsh in its front, to which it extends, has, in its course, a little to the west of the road, a small isolated height, well suited for a fort or telegraph. From this eminence there is an extensive view, embracing the second lake, with its town and isthmus; and several villages occur on both sides of the road. This locality is well suited for the encampment of troops, being elevated above the marshes, and at the same time not far distant from water.
"Descending the height the road commences the passage of the marsh, by a narrow ancient causeway composed of square blocks of stone, often much displaced, and frequently intersected by the Kara-soo and other streams, over which long stone slabs are placed, forming a species of bridge removable at pleasure, thus adding to the other means available here for preventing the advance of an enemy. A similar road leads also from Chatsalda towards Derkos, on the Black Sea, a distance of about ten miles, where the right of the lines described would rest near the Cape and Fort of Kara-bornoo. Chatsalda is also about ten miles from the greater bridge, and fifteen or sixteen from the lesser; and, unfortunately, is in front of the lines, or it would have formed a good station for a depôt, or might have been the head-quarters of a force during the healthy season of the year.... The country extending from the Sea of Marmora to the right of the Chatsalda road is very well secured. Thence to the Black Sea the heights become still bolder, and the valley deeper, till the road crosses the Lesser Balkan. The course of the River Kara-soo lies through one of the ravines peculiar to the country, which look like abrupt cracks across the mountain ranges, and of this peculiar formation the Bosphorus itself affords the most striking example.
"A third pass to the right leads through the lines by the village of Kastana-Kioi, and a fourth across the heights of the Lesser Balkan transversely by a road which leads from it along the shore to Midia, joining one from the mouth of the Bosphorus. The three last-mentioned roads, as well as the Chekmagees, could, if strengthened by defensive works, be included in a position comparable with any existing."
END OF VOL. II.
LONDON:
GILBERT AND RIVINGTON, PRINTERS,
ST. JOHN'S SQUARE.