[Contents Volume I.] (In certain versions of this etext [in certain browsers] clicking on this symbol , or directly on the image, will bring up a larger version of the illustration.) (etext transcriber's note)

MICHELIN ILLUSTRATED GUIDES
TO THE BATTLEFIELDS (1914-1918)

THE AMERICANS
IN THE
GREAT WAR

VOLUME I.
THE SECOND BATTLE OF THE MARNE
(CHÂTEAU-THIERRY, SOISSONS, FISMES.)
MICHELIN & Cie., CLERMONT=FERRAND
MICHELIN TYRE Co. Ltd., 81 Fulham Road, LONDON, S. W.
MICHELIN TIRE Co., MILLTOWN, N. J., U. S. A.



The Michelin Wheel

BEST of all detachable wheels
because the least complicated



Elegant

It embellishes even the finest coachwork.

Simple

It is detachable at the hub and fixed by six bolts only.

Strong

The only wheel which held out on all fronts during the war.

Practical

Can be replaced in 3 minutes by anybody and cleaned still quicker.

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AND THE CHEAPEST

THE “TOURING CLUB DE FRANCE”

———

WHAT IS IT? WHAT ARE ITS USES?

The “Touring Club de France” (founded in 1890), is at the present time the largest Touring Association in the whole world. Its principal aim is to introduce France—admirable country and one of the loveliest on earth—to French people themselves and to foreigners.

It seeks to develop travel in all its forms, on foot, on horseback, on bicycle, in carriage, motor, yacht, or railway, and soon in aeroplane.

Every member of the Association receives a badge and an identity ticket free of charge, as also the “Revue Mensuelle” every month.

Members have also the benefit of special prices in a certain number of affiliated hotels; and this holds good for the purchase of guide-books and Staff (Etat-major) maps, as well as those of the “Ministère de l’Intérieur,” the T. C. F., etc. They may insert notices regarding the sale or purchase of traveling requisites, in the “Revue” (1 fr. per line). The “Comité des Contentieux” is ready to give them counsel with regard to traveling, and 3,000 delegates in all the principal towns are able to give them advice and information about the curiosities of art or of nature in the neighborhood, as well as concerning the roads, hotels, motor-agents, garages, etc.

Members are accorded free passage across the frontier for a bicycle or motor-bicycle. For a motor-car the Association gives a “Triptyque” ensuring free passage through the “douane,” etc.

ONE TRAVELS BEST IN FRANCE WHEN A MEMBER
OF THE “TOURING CLUB DE FRANCE”

IN MEMORY
OF THE MICHELIN WORKMEN AND EMPLOYEES WHO
DIED GLORIOUSLY FOR THEIR COUNTRY

THE AMERICANS
IN THE
GREAT WAR

VOLUME I.
The Second Battle of The Marne
(CHÂTEAU-THIERRY, SOISSONS, FISMES)
Published by
Michelin & Cie, Clermont-Ferrand, (France)
—————
Copyright, 1920, by Michelin & Cie
All rights of translation, adaptation or reproduction (in part or whole), reserved
in all countries.

FOREWORD

When the United States of America declared war on Germany, it was not known exactly what shape their intervention would take—i.e., if their help would be limited to aiding the Allies financially and industrially and tightening the blockade, or if they would take an active part in the military operations. Opinions on this point were much divided, and if many were in favour of an unrestricted participation in the war, others were for a more moderate programme.

When, at the beginning of April, 1917, President Wilson announced that America’s help was to be unrestricted, the army of the United States comprised some 9,000 officers and 200,000 men—a mere “drop in the ocean,” as numbers go in modern warfare.

Marshal Joffre’s visit to the United States aroused great enthusiasm; the Conscription Bill was promptly passed, and the American War Minister, Mr. Baker, and Marshal Joffre studied the organization and transportation to France of a powerful expeditionary force.

With wonderful rapidity recruits were raised, regiments formed, and training camps built. French and British instructors co-operated heartily, and, pending the creation of national war factories, France equipped the first American army with her famous 75mm. guns, 155mm. howitzers, machine-guns, etc.

By March, 1918, the American Army had grown to more than 110,000 officers and 1,400,000 men, with sixteen immense training camps, besides special technical schools and up-to-date aviation camps.

When, on March 28, in the name of the American people, General Pershing offered to place the whole of the forces under his command at the disposal of Marshal Foch, who had just been made “Generalissimo of the Allied Armies,” part of the new American army had already landed in France, and several divisions were facing the enemy on the Lorraine front.

Meanwhile, the American Army continued to grow apace. In August, thirty-two divisions of fighting troops, besides the staffs of the non-combatant services—in all, more than 1,300,000 men—had landed in France. In October this number had swelled to 1,700,000, while more than 2,000,000 men were training in American camps.

The German U-boats failed to check America’s gigantic effort for the “New Crusade,” and each month 250,000 American soldiers reached France, with their arms, equipment, and baggage. It was estimated that in 1919 the American forces in the field would be numerically equal to the entire German army.

The victorious termination of the war prevented this formidable American army from demonstrating its full strength, but that portion which took part in the fighting gave ample proof of its mettle.

Long before the United States declared war, American Red Cross and aviation volunteers had proved the fine qualities of the American soldier. The expectations of the Allies were fulfilled; wherever they fought the American expeditionary forces gave a good account of themselves. “We have come to kill and be killed, so let’s go ahead,” declared Generals Pershing and Bliss when, on March 28, they gallantly offered to lead their troops into battle. And it is a fact that their men did “go ahead” with a fine contempt for death.

THE SECOND BATTLE OF THE MARNE
(May-August, 1918)

The Causes of the German Offensive of May, 1918.

The two great German offensives of March and April both failed, despite their extreme violence and the fact that the Allies were taken by surprise. Neither Amiens on the Somme, nor Béthune and Ypres in the north had fallen. Although in the course of these two offensives not less than 152 German divisions had been thrown into battle, the enemy failed to pierce the Allies’ front or break down their resistance.

During the offensive against the British front, French reinforcements were brought up much sooner than the Germans expected. Moreover, the battles of March and April gave the Allies the decisive advantage of unity of command. To Marshal Foch was entrusted the co-ordination of the Allied forces in the last act of the great drama, which was to see the downfall of Ludendorff and Hindenburg.

To calm public opinion at home, where the people were clamouring ever louder for that victorious peace so often promised, the Germans were forced to make another attempt, and it was considered necessary to act promptly while they still had numerical superiority—owing to Russia’s defection—and win the final decision before the American intervention could make itself fully felt.

Before attacking the British again, Ludendorff attempted to draw the French reserves southwards, his plan being to wear them down and then settle with the British alone. Hence the attack of May 27 on the Aisne front, which was powerfully organised on the German side owing to the great advantage they possessed in being able to bring up rapidly their heavy artillery from the Somme. Moreover, the ground was familiar to the enemy, who likewise knew that this part of the Allies’ front was only weakly held. The Allies’ reserves being insufficient to cover the entire front, and considering that the German offensive might be launched against either the Lys, the Somme, the Oise, or the Aisne fronts, Foch had concentrated his forces at the vitally important points covering Paris, the channel ports, and other positions less easy to defend than the Chemin-des-Dames.

THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE OF MAY 27, 1918.
The Plan of Attack.

On May 19, the enemy began their concentration, taking every conceivable care and precaution. Most of their divisions reached the front by night marches. The wheels of the gun-carriages and other vehicles, as also the hoofs of the horses, were muffled.

Forty-two divisions under Generals von Boehn (7th Army) and Von Below (1st Army) were concentrated between Pontoise and Berry-au-Bac and between Berry-au-Bac and Rheims. In the centre, where their principal effort was to be made, the Germans massed twenty-eight divisions of picked storm-troops trained in the new methods of attack. Of these twenty-eight divisions twenty-three previously formed part of General Von Hutier’s famous “Army of Attack” which, in March, had broken through the front of the Fifth British Army on the Somme. Since the middle of April, all the picked divisions, except two, had been sent to the rear and intensively trained in view of the coming attack. All the first-line divisions, fifteen in number, knew the ground of the sector of attack, having fought there in 1917. The objective of some of them was the same as in the Battle of the Chemin-des-Dames in 1917.



THE OPPOSING FORCES DURING THE GERMAN ATTACK OF MAY 27, 1918.

From June 5, five more divisions were engaged, making a total of forty-seven divisions, or the equivalent of about sixty French divisions (German regiments having three more companies than French regiments, and divisions one more regiment). The enemy order of battle between the Oise and Rheims on May 27, extended along three zones of attack—a central zone, from Leuilly to Berry-au-Bac, which was the principal sector of attack, and two secondary zones on the wings—between Pontoise and Leuilly to the west and between Berry-au-Bac and Rheims to the east.

The plan of attack was similar to that adopted in the Battle of the Somme. Each division had two regiments in the first line and one in reserve. Each leading regiment had two battalions side by side in deep echelon formation, with one supporting battalion. Battalions of storm-troops, liquid-fire companies, independent detachments of machine-gunners, companies of cyclists and mountain battalions were added to each division.

Each regiment was provided with numerous heavy and light machine-guns, mine-throwers, and accompanying guns. An idea of the huge numbers of the latter may be gained from the fact that sixty-eight batteries of four guns each were counted in two regiments.

The infantry attack was prepared and supported by a formidable concentration of guns of all calibres. The artillery of the 7th German Army on the Leuilly—Berry-au-Bac front was estimated at 1,450 batteries—i.e. fifty batteries per mile, of which twenty supported the infantry. This artillery concentration greatly exceeded that of the preceding German offensives of 1917 and 1918.



THE GERMAN ADVANCE ON MAY 27 AND 28.

The Break-through.

The opposing Allied forces were much smaller. From Pinon to Craonnelle the front was held by the 30th and 11th French Corps (6th Army, General Duchesne) with head-quarters at Tartiers and Braine respectively. The sector from Craonnelle to the outskirts of Rheims was held by the Ninth British Corps which had been placed at the disposal of General Micheler, commanding the French 5th Army. Rheims was held by the 1st French Colonials, in liaison on the left with the French 45th Division forming the British right wing. Most of these troops had already been engaged in the big battles of March and April.

After a terrifically intense artillery preparation which began at midnight and included great quantities of gas-shells, the German infantry rushed forward between 3.30 and 4 a.m., preceded by a powerful creeping barrage and, in places, by tanks. The surprise was complete. The French stood the bombardment heroically and made a desperate resistance. Near Laffaux, the 21st (Territorial) Regiment fought to the last man rather than fall back. However, in spite of heroic resistance and heavy sacrifices, the German onrush bore down the Allies by sheer weight of numbers.

To the west, a German corps with a division of reserves outflanked Pinon Wood and converged towards Laffaux Plateau, but were unable to reach the Aisne, whilst another corps gained a footing on the Chemin-des-Dames and advanced slowly towards Vailly. In the centre, where the attack was more furious and powerful, the enemy advanced rapidly, reaching the Aisne before 11 a.m., between Chavonne and Concevreux. Another corps reached the river in the morning, between Concevreux and Berry-au-Bac. To the east, a third corps attacked from north to south and maintained its positions level with those of the neighbouring corps on the right.

In the afternoon, the advance continued south of the Aisne, being more rapid in the centre than on the wings. The River Vesle was reached towards 7.30 p.m. in the neighbourhood of Bazoches and Magneux, Fismes, and Braine fell into the hands of the enemy.

By the evening of the 27th it was known that German first-line divisions alone had been engaged and that they had advanced from nine to twelve miles in the centre without excessive casualties, driving back the 11th French and 9th British Corps, which had fought with the greatest courage and determination in an endeavour to make up for their deficiency in numbers by superhuman bravery and endurance. The 64th Infantry Regiment in particular covered itself with glory.

On the 28th, at day-break, the Germans resumed their attacks with increased vigour, especially on the wings, where their success on the previous day had been less marked. To the west, the 30th French Corps, which had suffered heavily on the 27th, was reinforced by fresh divisions, with orders to cover Soissons, which was in danger of being encircled. This corps succeeded in checking the enemy to the north, on the Cuffiès-Crouy-Bucy-le-Long line, but on the right the Germans crossed the Vesle during the night, driving a wedge into the Murton Valley and advancing eastwards towards Soissons. Some of their advanced detachments reached the town, but were immediately driven out.



GENERAL DEGOUTTE.

In the centre, the 11th Corps was again compelled to fall back; Mont-Notre-Dame, Bruys and Dôle Woods were taken by the enemy, who reached Loupeigne.

To the east, the fighting was also bitter. The British 9th Corps lost the Saint-Thierry Hills and fell back, especially on the left, where the Germans, advancing beyond the Ardre, got a footing on the tablelands to the north of Arcis-le-Ponsart.

However, the French 21st Corps (General Degoutte) came to the rescue and on the extreme right, Colonials and Algerian troops of the 45th Division prevented the enemy crossing the Vesle, west of Rheims.

The Germans, whose casualties were heavy, had been compelled to engage their second-line divisions.


THE GERMAN ADVANCE FROM MAY 29 TO 31.

The Attack on the Wings.—The Race to the Marne.

The Kaiser, the Crown Prince, Hindenburg and Ludendorff held a war council on the evening of the 28th, and in view of the results obtained, altered the original plans. The battle, which was to have been merely a diversion, previous to a general attack on the British front, was now to form the principal offensive. Ludendorff accordingly ordered the attack to be pushed vigorously on the wings and to exploit to the full the success in the centre, in order to reach the Marne as rapidly as possible and cut the Paris-Châlons-Nancy Railway.

From the 29th onwards, the battle developed. On the right wing, the French divisions, which defended Soissons from the north, were overwhelmed and compelled to fall back westwards without, however, abandoning Cuffiès. Soissons, unprotected and in flames, was entered by the enemy after fierce street fighting, in which they sustained heavy losses. The Moroccan Division, which had arrived in the neighbourhood of Chaudun at noon, was immediately sent to the western outskirts of Soissons and along the Crise, in support of what remained of the first-lines. Fresh divisions were also brought up to the south-east of the town, with orders to check the German push at all cost, which they did to the last man. The 9th Battalion of Chasseurs (4th Division, to quote one example only) resisted heroically at Hartennes and Taux, in which region the Germans were unable to make appreciable progress. In the centre, the enemy’s effort southwards enabled two of their corps to reach Fère-en-Tardenois and advance beyond that town.

Further to the east, they continued to advance along the Valley of the Ardre. Driving back the 45th Division and the Colonials who were defending the Vesle, they reached the Gueux-Tramery front-line in the evening. Rheims was still covered by the impregnable “La Neuvillette” lines.

Early in the morning of May 30, the enemy, supported by masses of artillery, attacked to the west and south of Soissons towards Villers-Cotterets Wood. North of the Aisne, where the 170th Division, astride of the river, resisted the enemy’s furious assaults, progress was insignificant.

On their right, the Moroccan Division on the Mercin-Lechelle front resisted stubbornly, as usual. On the Montagne-de-Paris Hill, the Foreign Legion stood firm. Zouaves and Algerian Tirailleurs, after desperate indecisive fighting, which lasted until nightfall, succeeded in checking the enemy on the Chaudun-Chazelle-Vierzy line.

Further to the south, at Plessier-Huleu, the Chasseurs of the 4th Division stubbornly opposed the German advance which was very slow in this region, thanks to the bravery and self-sacrifice of this division. It was only with the greatest difficulty that the enemy advanced between Parcy-Tigny and Grand-Rozoy, occupying Oulchy-le-Château after very hard fighting.

In the centre, the Germans who had just been reinforced, were racing towards the Marne. The first division to reach the river arrived at about 2 p.m., the next at about 6 p.m., then pushed on towards Château-Thierry, where the 10th Colonials (General Marchand) were just organising the defence of the town. To the east of the salient thus formed, the French front extended along the Verneuil-Ville-en-Tardenois line, whence it linked up with the Janvry and Gueux positions.

The resistance of the French stiffened and became increasingly effective. Ever on the watch, General Pétain, with that shrewd discernment of which he had given numberless proofs since the Battle of Verdun, realised that this was not a mere enemy feint, and brought up reinforcements. Meanwhile, the Germans continued to engage their reserves in the battle.



GENERAL BERTHELOT.

North of the Aisne the Germans succeeded in clearing the approaches to Soissons as far as Courtil. On the south of the river, the Moroccan Division held their ground until noon without flinching, and took part in the counter-offensive by the 35th and 51st Divisions, which re-occupied Courmelles and the banks of the Crise. However, at night-fall, the Germans counter-attacked violently and forced them slightly back westwards.

Lower down, the enemy progressed along the Ourcq Valley beyond Neuilly-Saint-Front and approached Villers-Cotterets Wood, the outskirts of which were stubbornly defended by the 2nd Cavalry Corps, fighting on foot with the infantry.

To the south, the Germans made a dash for Château-Thierry, where they were decimated by the 33rd Colonials fighting in the streets. Reaching the Marne at Dormans and Vincelles, they approached Verneuil.

The enemy progressed slightly in the immediate vicinity of Rheims and reached the line Saint-Brice-Ormes-Bligny. Fighting took place in the suburbs near Tinqueux.



THE GERMAN ADVANCE FROM JUNE 1 TO 5 (between the two continuous black lines).

The Westward Push.

On the evening of May 31, the German High Command held a new war council, at which the Kaiser and Hindenburg declared in favour of the continuance of the offensive. The push towards the Marne having absorbed all the reserves of the corps engaged in the centre and to the east, the enemy were unable to increase their efforts in the region of Château-Thierry, where the French reserves were arriving in great numbers. They therefore decided to push westwards.

Attacking at midnight, the enemy met with but little success in the region of Soissons, but to the south-west of the town, where they still had large reserves, they reached the Savières Stream and the Dammard-Hautevesnes-Bussiares-Etrepilly line on the evening of June 1. The 7th and 11th French Corps and the 2nd Cavalry Corps counter-attacked, and made the enemy pay dearly for their advance in this region.

On the same day, the Germans carried the northern side of Château-Thierry, defended to the last by the French Colonial Division (General Marchand) and the motorised machine-gun battalion of the 3rd American Division which, later, prevented them from crossing the Marne.

On the east, the fighting was less fierce, but the 120th Division (General Mordacq), in defending the wooded slopes in front of Cuchery, sustained very bitter fighting. At the end of the line the Colonials prevented any enemy advance in the direction of Rheims.

On June 2 the enemy’s plan was made clear. While their principal efforts were directed westwards, south of the Aisne they reached Missy-aux-Bois, and lower down heavy fighting took place in the afternoon on both banks of the Ourcq. French cavalry, fighting on foot, drove back the enemy with fine dash to the south of Dammard, but were compelled to fall back in the evening, the enemy having received reinforcements.

On the 3rd the Germans launched a general attack against the Villers-Cotterets Wood, between the Aisne and the Ourcq. All their available reserves (three divisions of fresh troops) attacked with the first-line divisions. To the north, they carried Missy-aux-Bois and progressed beyond it, and after sustaining very heavy casualties reached Amblény and Dommiers, where they were checked by French reinforcements. Lower down, they reached Longpont, and advancing along the Ourcq, south of the wood, progressed towards La Ferté-Milon via Troësnes. In the evening, after heavy losses, they were held up on the Montaigu-Dommiers-Longpont line, thus leaving Villers-Cotterets Woods still intact.



GENERAL FOCH (on the left) AND
GENERAL FAYOLLE (on the right).

On June 4, the fighting was less fierce. Combats still took place, but they had neither the scope nor the strategical importance of those of the preceding days.

The Crown Prince’s Army was now exhausted. On June 5, this army from the Oise to La Pompelle numbered thirty-four first-line divisions. All its reserves had been engaged, with the exception of seven divisions, of which two were inferior troops and two fairly good. Eight divisions had been withdrawn from the battle.

From June 5 onwards, enemy action was purely local, the Germans being often compelled to defend themselves against French counter-attacks. To the north, the Moroccan Division recaptured the Amblény positions by night. Hard fighting continued all along the Savières Stream, from Troësnes to Longpont, where the French recovered part of the lost ground, and to the north-west of Château-Thierry on the Dammard-Veuilly-la-Poterie-Belleau-Bouresches line, where the American troops, co-operating with French divisions, gave signal proofs of their courage and determination. On June 10, the 2nd American Division recaptured Belleau Wood. Furious combats took place on the Mountain of Rheims and in the neighbourhood of Bligny, Champlat, Sainte-Euphraise and Vrigny, where French, British and Italian troops vigorously resisted the German push.

American Units Engaged from June 1 to 10, 1918.

2nd Division Major-General Omar Bundy.

comprising:

3rd Infantry BrigadeBrig.-Gen. E. M. Lewis
4th““ (Marines) ““ James G. Harbord
2nd Artillery““Chamberlaine

This division was engaged west of Château-Thierry and opposite Belleau Wood.

Mentioned in the French Army Order
of the Day.



MAJOR-GENERAL OMAR BUNDY.

Commanding the 2nd Division.

4th Infantry Brigade (Marines): “Thrown into the thick of the battle in a sector violently attacked by the enemy, gave immediate proof of first-class fighting qualities. In liaison with French troops, this Brigade broke up a powerful German attack at a very important point of the position and afterwards carried out a series of attacks. Thanks to the bravery, fighting spirit and tenacity of the men, who stoically bore fatigue and losses, thanks also to the activity and energy of the officers, as also to the personal influence of its commander, General J. Harbord, the efforts of the 4th Brigade were entirely successful. Acting in close co-operation, the two regiments and machine-gun battalion of the Brigade advanced from 1,500 to 2,000 yards on a 2-1/2-mile front, after twelve days of incessant fighting (from June 2 to 13, 1918), over very difficult ground, capturing a large quantity of material and 500 prisoners, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy, and carrying two very important positions, the village of Bouresches and the fortified Belleau Wood.”

3rd Division Major-General Joseph T. Dickman.

comprising:

5th Infantry Brigade Brig.-Gen.Fred W. Sladen
6th ““““ C. Crawford
3rd Artillery“ColonelWm. M. Cruikshank

This division was engaged south of the Marne from Château-Thierry to Dormans.

Mentioned in the French Army Order of the Day.

7th American Machine-Gun Battalion: “Prevented the enemy from crossing the Marne. In the course of violent combats, particularly on May 31 and June 1, this battalion disputed the northern suburbs of Château-Thierry foot by foot, inflicted severe losses on the enemy, and covered itself with glory by its bravery and ability.”



MAJOR-GENERAL JOSEPH T. DICKMAN.

Commanding the 3rd Division.

The German Offensive of June 12 and 18, against the
Villers-Cotterets and Rheims Salients.

The two flanks of the “pocket” which the German Offensive of May 27 had made, i.e. the Aisne salient around the Woods of Laigue, Compiègne, and Villers-Cotterets; and the Rheims salient backed by the Rheims Mountain, formed both an obstacle and a menace to the Germans, who accordingly decided to take them at all cost.

The Aisne salient was attacked first. From June 9 to 11, Von Hutier’s Army tried to break through from the north, but failed after endeavouring in vain to take Compiègne.

On June 12, an attack was made against the other side of the Aisne salient. After an exceedingly intense artillery preparation, which began at 2.30 a.m. and levelled the French lines, the enemy attacked in great force to the north and north-east of the Villers-Cotterets Wood along the Retz Stream.



FROM JUNE 9 (9/6) TO JUNE 18 (18/6) THE GERMANS UNSUCCESSFULLY ATTACKED THE AISNE AND RHEIMS SALIENTS.

The Aisne Salient covered Compiègne and the road to Paris. The Rheims Salient covered the left wing of the Army of Champagne.

To the north, along the Aisne, in the neighbourhood of Amblény, the Germans, despite very heavy losses, were unable to make progress, being held in check by the Moroccan Division. To the south, in the region of Longpont and Corey, they advanced only 400 to 500 yards. In the centre, where the principal effort was being made, they succeeded, by means of violent bombardments, in driving the French from the plateau, west of Retz Ravine and, after capturing Cœuvres, St. Pierre-Aigle, and Vertes-Feuilles Farm, progressed in the direction of Montgobert. On the 13th, they entered Laversine, but could neither debouch from Cœuvres nor advance west of Vertes-Feuilles Farm. Once again they had failed.

On the 15th, a spirited French counter-attack cleared the Retz stream, recaptured Cœuvres, and advanced the French line to the east of Montgobert, the outskirts of Chaffosse and to the west of Chavigny.

The enemy unsuccessfully attacked the Rheims salient on June 18, from Vrigny to La Pompelle (see the Michelin Guide: “Rheims and the Battles for its possession”).

The German Peace Offensive (“Friedensturm”) of July 15.

The Germans, desirous of an early decision and hypnotised once again by the vision of Paris—threatened on the north from the Oise Valley and on the east from the Ourcq and Marne Valleys—decided on a new and still more powerful offensive, which they named the “Friedensturm” or “Peace Battle.”

The collapse of this offensive—final turning point of the war—was all the more striking in that it was conceived and executed on truly “kolossal” lines. The enemy attacked on a front still wider than that of the Marne, extending from Château-Thierry to Massiges on the outskirts of Argonne, and measuring fifty-four miles in length. (For particulars of the Battle of Champagne, see the Michelin Guide: “Champagne and Argonne.” French edition.)

By a frontal attack, Ludendorff aimed at separating the Allied Armies of the north from those of the east, by outflanking Verdun (via St. Menehould and the upper Aisne Valley) on the one hand, and Rheims and the Mountain of Rheims (via the Marne Valley) on the other hand.



WHAT THE GERMANS EXPECTED FROM THEIR “FRIEDENSTURM.”

Once this result obtained, the Germans would then march on Paris, which would be unable to make a prolonged resistance. It was a re-staging of Von Moltke’s dream, four years after the first Battle of the Marne!

To carry out this ambitious scheme, the enemy concentrated all the means at their disposal in a supreme effort to snatch the victory. For a month formidable quantities of tanks, storm-troops and batteries of heavy and light artillery were concentrated. Ammunition depots were accumulated right up to the first lines, and huge quantities of bridge-building material collected. All these preparations were made at night, the minutest care and every possible precaution being taken to ensure secrecy.

Between Château-Thierry and Rheims the German aim was two-fold; firstly, to cross the Marne and march southwards towards Montmirail and the Petit Morin Valley, and secondly, to follow the river eastwards and attack Epernay. The objectives for the first day were Epernay and points five to six miles south of the Marne.

Before July 15, the enemy had seven divisions on the front of attack, to which seven others were now added. On the Mountain of Rheims and on the Marne, in the first line and in reserve, he had about thirty divisions all told, including several of the most famous, e.g. the 1st and 2nd Guards, 200th Chasseurs, etc.

On the Marne front the line of attack extended from Chartèves to Vrigny.

Despite the enemy’s minute precautions, the French were not taken unawares. Thanks to their Intelligence Department and Aerial Reconnoitring Service, the exact time and extent of the coming offensive were known.

The artillery preparation began about midnight, the hour of attack varying, from west to east, from 1.20 a.m., south of the Marne, to 4.20 a.m. at Chaumuzy.



GENERAL DE MITRY (in the centre).

During the night, the Germans had thrown bridges and pontoons across the river, the two largest (25 to 30 feet in width) between Treloup and Dormans, others in front of Courthiézy, Reuilly, Soilly, Chartèves, Mézy and Jaulgonne. In spite of the dense smoke screens, these bridges were promptly discovered by the Allied aviators who, bombing from a low altitude, destroyed several of them, men and convoys being thrown into the river. They also raked with machine-gun fire the German troops which debouched on the southern bank of the river. In one day (the 15th) French, British and American air-squadrons dropped over forty-four tons of explosives on the bridges, inflicting severe losses on the enemy. “Rarely has a river been so ably defended,” wrote the Berliner Tageblatt on July 17, and the defenders fully deserved this enemy admission.

Crossing the river before dawn, the Germans attacked the first-line divisions holding the southern bank, from Chartèves to Mareuil-le-Port. The American 3rd Division gallantly withstood the onslaught in the region of Chartèves, Jaulgonne and Fossoy and, after fierce fighting, forced the enemy back over the river, thereby helping to make the German offensive a failure. The French defended the positions of Courthiézy, Soilly, Chavenay, Nesle-le-Repons and Troissy with great stubbornness, disputing the German advance foot by foot.

Among the numerous feats of arms performed in this region, that of the 33rd Colonial Regiment, which defended Mareuil-le-Port and stood firm in Nesle-le-Repons Woods, was one of the most glorious. The enemy was finally checked on the line: Celle-les-Condé, La Chapelle-Monthodon, Comblizy (where the French reserves were already counter-attacking), Oeuilly and Reuil.

North of the Marne, the enemy was held up on the first position throughout the morning by two French divisions, and two Italian corps, but succeeded, in the evening, in advancing as far as the second position, where they were checked.

On the 16th, south of the Marne, French reinforcements continued the counter-attacks begun on the previous evening in the direction of La Chapelle-Monthodon, Chézy and Le Clos-Milon. Checked at this point, the Germans attacked vigorously in the direction of Epernay. At about 4 p. m., they launched a powerful attack to the east of Leuvrigny, and succeeded in reaching the Chêne-la-Reine-Villesaint front. French and Italian counter-attacks between the Marne and the Ardre were unsuccessful, the attacking forces being thrown back on the Belval-Venteuil line.



THE GERMAN ADVANCE TOWARDS EPERNAY ON JULY 16.

Although Ludendorff had obtained slight tactical advantages to the south-west of Rheims and on the Marne, he had entirely failed in Champagne (see the Michelin Guide: “Champagne and Argonne,” French edition). Abandoning his plan of outflanking Rheims from the east, he now sought to turn the Mountain of Rheims from the south. A striking success at all cost was considered necessary. Partly through temerity, partly through an underestimation of the French strength, he resorted to the dangerous manœuvre of concentrating his efforts against Epernay. Recklessly throwing masses of men into the battle in an attempt to reach his objective quickly by sheer weight of numbers, he launched five powerful attacks in five different places. Considered in the whole, these attacks were unsuccessful, while in the Ardre Valley the enemy was vigorously counter-attacked. Meanwhile, four French divisions began an offensive in the region of Dormans.

In spite of protecting smoke screens, the bridges across the Marne were unceasingly bombarded by the Allied aviators and artillery, and sometimes destroyed. The Germans accordingly reduced the number of these bridges, and increased that of the less vulnerable foot-bridges. In this way, thirty foot-bridges were built between Treloup and Reuil-sur-Marne.

The Allies’ resistance, so far from abating, stiffened, while each attempt of the enemy to advance was checked with heavy loss. The Germans were already beginning to show signs of exhaustion when on July 18 the Allies’ great counter-offensive, which the German press had declared to be impossible, was launched against the right flank and in the rear of the German divisions, who were struggling desperately to reach Epernay.



THE ATTACKS AND COUNTER-ATTACKS OF JULY 17.

AMERICAN UNITS ENGAGED FROM THE END OF JUNE TO JULY 18, 1918.

2nd Division (see composition, p. 12).

Relieved on July 10 by the 26th Division, after fighting a month without intermission. Lost 1,250 killed, 8,500 wounded, captured Bouresches, Belleau Wood, Vaux, and 1,400 prisoners belonging to five German divisions.

Mentioned in the French Army Order of the Day.

3rd Infantry Brigade: “During the operations south of the Marne from June 1 to July 2, 1918, under the energetic impulse of its commander, General Lewis, and brilliantly led by its officers, this brigade carried Vaux village and La Roche Wood, set a fine example of attacking spirit, abnegation and self-sacrifice, thereby playing an important part in the victorious offensive, which resulted in the evacuation of French territory and forced the enemy to sue for an armistice.”



MAJOR-GENERAL JAMES G. HARBORD.

Commanding the 4th Brigade (Marines) in June, and the 2nd Division during the offensive of July 18.

3rd Division (see composition, p. 13).

Repulsed the “Friedensturm” on the Marne.

Mentioned in the French Army Order of the Day.

38th Infantry Regiment: “This crack regiment, under the able and energetic command of Colonel Mc. Alexander, displayed indomitable tenacity during the German attacks of July 15, 1918. Although attacked in front and outflanked on both sides, succeeded in holding its positions on the banks of the Marne, driving back an enemy numerically superior and capturing 200 prisoners.”

30th Infantry Regiment: “Under the energetic and able command of Colonel E. L. Buth, this old American regiment proved worthy of its glorious traditions by withstanding the principal onslaught of the German attack of July 15, 1918, on the front of the Army Corps to which it was attached. In spite of a very fierce bombardment and heavy losses, this regiment checked the German thrust and succeeded in recovering the whole of its positions, capturing over 200 prisoners.”

26th Division Major-General Clarence R. Edwards.

comprising:

51st Infantry Brigade Brig.-Gen.Peter E. Traub
52nd““““Chas. H. Cole
51st Artillery“““Dwight E. Altman



MAJOR-GENERAL CLARENCE R. EDWARDS.

Commanding the 26th Division.

The Allies’ Counter-Offensive of July 18.

It has been seen that, from the end of June to July 15, the French, by a series of local operations, had secured excellent positions of attack, by clearing the Villers-Cotterets Wood and re-occupying the eastern bank of the Savières. Moreover, the crisis due to the shortage of men had been overcome. In a prodigious effort Great Britain had re-constituted her armies; from eight to ten thousand American soldiers had been landing daily in France since March; the victory on the Piave enabled the Allies to retain a number of excellent Italian divisions in France, so that Marshal Foch was at last in a position to assume the initiative of manœuvre and offensive which until then had been impossible.

The French armies, representing 80 per cent. of the Allied forces engaged in the battle, were as high-mettled as ever, the enemy’s push having been powerless either to wear them down or to break their spirit. They were, moreover, fully equipped with up-to-date armament, including large numbers of the all-important tank, by now a supreme weapon of attack. Their use on a large scale in support of the infantry counter-balanced the effect of the enemy’s asphyxiating gas and storm battalions.

Signs of apprehension began to manifest themselves in the enemy camp, where several commanders of divisions on the Ourcq front in vain called attention to the precursory signs of the coming big attack. The German High Command, repeating Von Klück’s blunder of 1914 with regard to General Maunoury’s Army, misjudged the Allies’ strength and, so far from re-inforcing this sector, withdrew a number of reserve divisions in favour of the Marne and Champagne fronts.

On July 12, Foch ordered a counter-attack to be made on the western flank of the Château-Thierry salient. Leaving to General Gouraud in Champagne, and to General Berthelot between the Marne and Rheims, the heavy task of holding up the enemy “peace offensive,” Pétain organised the concentration of the armies of Generals Mangin and Degoutte, which were placed under the orders of General Fayolle. Thus, at the time the Germans were concentrating towards the eastern flank of the salient, the Allies were executing a similar manœuvre in the direction of the western flank. These two moves explain the whole battle, for while every enemy move was being closely observed and the bare minimum of troops used to hold up their attack, the Allies’ powerful concentration in the Villers-Cotterets Woods entirely escaped the enemy’s notice.

This admirably camouflaged concentration was completed in three nights. To make the surprise still more effective, it was decided to attack without artillery preparation, it being left to the tanks to make good the deficiency.



GENERAL MANGIN.

The objective was the Fére-en-Tardenois Railway, the only line of communication of the hundreds of thousands of Germans massed in the Château-Thierry “pocket.” Should this railway be captured or cut by gun-fire, the German armies would no longer be able to maintain themselves south of the Vesle.

From the Aisne to the Marne, the German front was held by part of the 7th Army (Von Boehn), i.e. twelve divisions in echelons and eight divisions in reserve.

Opposing these forces, from north to south, were:—

The 10th Army (General Mangin), from the Aisne to the Ourcq, comprising the 1st, 20th, 30th, and 11th French Corps, 1st and 2nd American Divisions, and the 15th Scottish Division.



THE OPPOSING FORCES DURING THE ALLIES’ COUNTER-OFFENSIVE OF JULY 18.

The 6th Army (General Degoutte), from the Ourcq to Château-Thierry, comprising the 2nd and 7th French Corps, and the 14th and 26th American Divisions.

This gave, in all, the equivalent of about twenty-one divisions (one American division being numerically equal to about two French divisions).

At dawn, on July 18, without preliminary bombardment, and preceded by hundreds of tanks and a formidable creeping barrage, the attack was loosed along a twenty-seven-mile front. The surprise was complete and the effect crushing. The enemy front was pierced, strongholds reduced and organised woods and farms captured, their garrisons surrendering in hundreds, while the agricultural detachments were taken at work in the fields.



THE ALLIES’ ADVANCE ON JULY 18 AND 19 (18/7 AND 19/7).

North of the Ourcq, General Mangin’s Army progressed rapidly on the great Soissonnais Plateaux, the average advance being more than four miles, and at the end of the day the line reached was as follows: The high ground north of Fontenoy, Mercin, western outskirts of the Montagne-de-Paris, the heights west of the Crise Valley, Vierzy, Villers-Hélon, Louâtre, Ancienville, and Noroy-sur-Ourcq. Its left was less than two miles from Soissons, while mounted patrols pushed forward to the outskirts of that city.

South of the Ourcq, over rough, difficult ground, General Degoutte’s Army advanced, on an average, three miles, and reached the following line: East of Marizy-St.-Mard, the western outskirts of Neuilly-St.-Front, Cointicourt, Courchamps, Licy-Ceignon, Givry and Belleau.

Along the whole front, more than 10,000 prisoners, numerous batteries of artillery, and huge quantities of material had been captured. The unexpectedness of the attack prevented the enemy from organising serious resistance, although they engaged four fresh divisions in the centre and, towards 6 p.m., succeeded in retaking Vierzy, which, however, they were unable to hold.

In the meantime, French and Italian forces continued their counter-attacks on the other side of the “pocket” without, however, making appreciable progress.

At 4 a.m. on the 19th the infantry and tanks attacked again. The enemy was in a critical position as, were Soissons to fall and Mangin’s Army to slip in along the Aisne, Von Boehn’s communications would be cut and his army taken in the rear. The Germans engaged their last available reserves (four divisions), and, clinging desperately to their positions on the River Crise in front of Soissons, counter-attacked furiously. They succeeded in advancing slightly along the Soissons-Villers-Cotterets Road to a point east of Chaudun (the Moroccan Division was heavily engaged there, and also at Chazelles), but were driven back everywhere else, in spite of their frantic efforts to push forward. Mangin’s Army reached Courmelles, the western outskirts of Villemontoire, Parcy-Tigny, the western outskirts of Plessier Huleu and Rozet-St.-Albin.



COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF JOHN J. PERSHING.

Degoutte’s Army captured Neuilly-St.-Front, the plateau east of Monnes, and the heights north-east of Courchamps, progressing beyond the Priez-Givry line. In two days about 17,000 prisoners and 360 guns were captured.

The situation of the German Army was becoming more and more critical. In the neighbourhood of Parcy-Tigny, the Allies were only about a mile from the Soissons-Château-Thierry Road, and within nine miles of the Fére-en-Tardenois Railway Station. The Germans were consequently no longer able to use their main north-south road of communication, and their only railway was within range of the Allies’ guns.

On the other hand, the activity of General Berthelot’s Army on the Marne, which had recaptured Montvoisin, gained a footing in Oeuilly south of the river, and advanced a kilometre northwards in the Roi and Courton Woods, was causing the enemy great anxiety. The situation of the Germans south of the Marne appeared particularly precarious.

AMERICAN UNITS ENGAGED IN THE COUNTER-OFFENSIVE OF
JULY 18, 1918.
WITH GENERAL MANGIN’S ARMY.

3rd Corps, Major-General Robert L. Bullard.

1st DivisionMajor-General C. P. Summerall.
comprising:
1st Infantry Brigade Brig.-Gen.Geo. B. Duncan
2nd““““B. B. Buck
1st Artillery“

Mentioned in the French Army Order of the Day.

18th Infantry Regiment: “This splendid attacking regiment, imbued with an ardent fighting spirit on July 18, 1918, under the energetic impulse of its commander, Colonel Frank Parker, aroused the admiration of the neighbouring units by carrying with fine dash all the objectives assigned to it. In spite of heavy losses, continuing the attack on the following days, with the same dash and determination. In October, 1918, under the able command of Colonel Charles A. Hunt, assisted by picked officers, endowed with the same spirit of self-sacrifice made a series of energetic attacks against powerfully-fortified positions, driving back the enemy unceasingly by their indomitable will to victory.”

2nd Division Major-General James G. Harbord.

(see composition, p. 12.)

Was withdrawn on July 20, after having taken 3,300 prisoners and 71 guns.

Mentioned in the French Army Order of the Day.

5th and 6th Infantry Regiments (Marines)
9th and 23rd Infantry Regiments
2nd Regiment of Engineers 		—“Unexpectedly engaged in
the offensive of July 18th,
1918, in the middle of
night, on unknown and very difficult ground, displayed remarkable ardour and
tenacity, in spite of exhaustion and revictualling difficulties both for food and
water, advanced 6-1/2 miles, capturing 2,700 prisoners, 12 guns and several
shundred machine-guns.”



MAJOR-GENERAL C. P. SUMMERALL.

Commanding the 1st Division.

12th Artillery Regiment: “Supported the attack by the 2nd Division on July 18, S.W. of Soissons, with great audacity and ability. The guns were boldly advanced, closely following the French infantry and inflicting heavy losses on the enemy. After the relief of the infantry of the 2nd Division on July 20, they bravely fought with the 58th and 12th French divisions, supporting the infantry during the unceasing attacks by these divisions, and particularly during the attack against Hartennes on July 21. The officers and men of this regiment displayed a fine spirit of self-sacrifice, and by their bravery proved themselves worthy of their Army’s finest traditions.”

15th Artillery Regiment: “This regiment gave proof of remarkable ability and audacity in supporting the infantry of the 2nd Division S.W. of Soissons, on July 18, 1918. Boldly bringing up their guns immediately behind the infantry, they inflicted very severe losses on the enemy. The 2nd Division having been relieved on July 20, this regiment successively supported the French 58th and 12th Divisions, with which they fought most gallantly. During the incessant attacks by these two divisions and particularly in the attack on Hartennes on July 21. The officers and men of this regiment displayed indomitable courage and devotion, proving themselves worthy of the finest traditions of the American Army.”

17th Artillery Regiment: “With indefatigable energy and courage this regiment gallantly supported the 2nd Division in the attack of July 18, S.W. of Soissons. Always eager to push forward their guns, in spite of heavy enemy bombardment, it constantly overwhelmed the enemy by the violent destructive fire of its 6-in. guns. After the relief of the 2nd Division, this regiment, on July 20, remained in the line and gallantly fought with the French 58th and 12th Divisions. Officers and men displayed magnificent courage and energy in accomplishing all the missions entrusted to them during the unceasing attacks by the French divisions, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy. In spite of dangers and privations of all sorts, they always showed remarkable tenacity and valour.”

4th and 5th Machine-Gun Battalions: “On the evening of July 18, 1918, near Vierzy, this battalion displayed exceptional courage and bravery in withstanding the attack by the enemy’s 3rd Brigade. Advancing with the attacking infantry waves the battalion, by adroit firing, crushed the German resistance and destroyed strongly defended nests of machine-guns, thereby giving effectual assistance to the infantry in the course of its brilliant attack. By consolidating and tenaciously holding the conquered objectives, in spite of strong German counter-attacks, the 4th Machine-Gun Battalion greatly contributed to the day’s success.”

6th Machine Gun Battalion: “Although greatly fatigued by a long journey in motor-lorries and by a night march over bad roads, this battalion rushed to the attack on July 18, 1918, near Vierzy and greatly helped in consolidating and maintaining the positions reached that day. On the morning of July 19 the battalion went gallantly forward over open ground, under violent artillery and machine-gun fire, resolutely supporting the attack on the reinforced enemy positions. Against strong enemy resistance and unceasing counter-attacks, the battalion displayed the finest courage in quickly consolidating and resolutely holding the important position just conquered by the infantry.”

WITH GENERAL DEGOUTTE’S ARMY.
1st CorpsMajor-General Hunter Liggett.
comprising:
167th French Division.
26th American“(see composition, p. 21).
4th DivisionMajor-General George H. Cameron.
comprising:
7th Infantry BrigadeBrig.-Gen. B. A. Poore.
8th““““E. E. Booth.



THE ALLIES’ ADVANCE FROM JULY 20 (20/7) TO JULY 25 (25/7).

The German Retreat.

The German High Command now realised that the battle could not be continued in the Château-Thierry “pocket,” where their communications were in danger, and where they were compelled to engage fresh divisions each day. Four days only had elapsed since the Germans were the attacking party, yet they were now compelled to retreat. Although unceasingly harassed by the Allies, their withdrawal was effected methodically, in order to save as much as possible of the formidable quantities of guns and material which had been accumulated in the “pocket” since June. They fired many of their dumps and the villages they had to evacuate were also destroyed after a systematic pillage. Fires and explosions followed one another in quick succession inside the German lines.

On the 20th the enemy withdrew a number of divisions from the neighbouring armies and threw their 5th Guards Division against Degoutte’s Army, and two other divisions reinforced by units from the Marne against Mangin’s Army, in an endeavour to stop the latter’s advance and drive it back further west of the Soissons-Château-Thierry road. However, these repeated attacks, although supported by a powerful artillery, broke down before the courage and tenacity of the Allied troops, who everywhere progressed except to the west of Vauxbuin, where some little ground was lost.

In the evening the front was as follows: Mercin, western outskirts of Vauxbuin, Ploisy, Aconin, western outskirts of Villemontoire, of Tigny and of Plessier-Huleu, Rozet-St.-Albin, Nanteuil, Sommelans, Monthiers, and Bouresches.

South of the Marne the newly-formed 9th Army (General de Mitry), attacked at 6 a.m. The enemy, fully occupied elsewhere, did not offer serious resistance, and De Mitry’s Army reached the Marne in the middle of the afternoon with comparatively little difficulty.

North of the Marne the 5th Army attacked on the St. Euphraise-Belval front, with a British corps astride of the Ardre, and in spite of vigorous enemy resistance and several counter-attacks, had advanced by evening to the line: St. Euphraise, the western outskirts of Courmas, eastern outskirts of Courton and Marfaux, Nappes, the northern and north-eastern outskirts of Courton Wood, the eastern outskirts of La Neuville and Belval, and to the south-east of Reuil.

On the 21st, the Germans made another powerful effort with four fresh divisions. North of the Ourcq they counter-attacked Mangin’s Army with three divisions supported by tanks, in spite of which, the French continued to advance, occupying Berzy-le-Sec and reaching Chaudun.

North of the Marne the enemy energetically opposed the Allies’ advance and counter-attacked on both banks of the Ardre, but were unable to prevent the French, British and Italian troops from taking St. Euphraise and Bouilly and progressing in the Courton Woods.

The situation of the enemy was still critical, as their divisions engaged in the bottom of the Château-Thierry “pocket,” where the pressure from Degoutte’s and De Mitry’s Armies was increasing, were in danger of being cut off. A further retreat was therefore ordered. Overcoming all difficulties, Franco-American battalions crossed the Marne near Château-Thierry, now re-occupied by the 39th Division. Harrying the retreating enemy and advancing in places as much as six miles, they reached by evening the region of Brény-Chartèves.

On the 22nd, the front was quiet between the Aisne and the Ourcq, but between the Ourcq and the Marne violent enemy counter-attacks temporarily drove back the Allies. However, at the end of the day the Allies had progressed beyond the Château-Thierry-Soissons road. On the Marne, French troops, moving eastwards under enemy artillery and machine-gun fire, enlarged their bridgehead on both banks. The slopes of Rozay, Passy and Marcilly and the Courcelles Signal were carried at the point of the bayonet, while several detachments pushed forward to Port-á-Binson and to the south of Vandières.

On the 23rd, from the Aisne to the Ourcq, the enemy resisted obstinately, and the Allies made but little progress; numerous enemy machine-gun nests were encountered at Villemontoire and Tigny, while their artillery had also been reinforced.

From the Ourcq to the Marne the German resistance stiffened and occasionally counter-attacks were made, notwithstanding which the Franco-American troops progressed in the Fère and Ris Woods, and along the narrow passage which separates them. An advance was also made higher up the river near Reuil, but the attack by the 77th Division at this point failed to drive back the enemy. Some progress was made in the Ardre valley, in spite of enemy reinforcements.

On the 24th, between the Ourcq and the Marne, the Allies advanced three and a half miles in the centre and about two miles on the wings, the front in the evening, being: Nanteuil, the eastern outskirts of La Tournelle Wood, Beuvardes, Le Charmel and Chassins.

On the 25th, north of the Ourcq, hard fighting took place around Villemontoire, which was finally carried by the 12th Division. Elsewhere the 11th Corps, forming the right of the 10th Army, recaptured Oulchy-le-Château, Oulchy-la-Ville and Cugny after desperate combats, the enemy having been reinforced by three fresh divisions. South of the river progress was also made between Coincy and Le Charmel, while Beuvardes was recaptured.

During the night and on the following day the French advanced along the northern bank of the Marne and occupied Reuil, Anthay Mill, Jour Mill, and Villers-sous-Châtillon.

From the Marne to Rheims the Allies’ advance continued slowly, being retarded by enemy counter-attacks.

AMERICAN UNITS ENGAGED FROM JULY 20 TO 25, 1918.
WITH GENERAL MANGIN’S ARMY.
1st Division (see composition p. 26).
Left the front on the 24th after having taken 2,950 prisoners and 75 guns.
WITH GENERAL DEGOUTTE’S ARMY.
1st Corps (see composition, p. 27).
4th Division (see composition, p. 27).
Advanced 9 miles to the N.E. of Château-Thierry.
WITH GENERAL DE MITRY’S ARMY.
3rd Division (see composition, p. 13).
Crossed the Marne on July 20 and pursued the retreating Germans.



MAJOR-GENERAL HUNTER LIGGETT.

Commanding the 1st Corps.

Vols. II. and III. of “The Americans in the Great War” complete the present volume. They are entitled: Vol. II. “The Battle of Saint Mihiel” (Metz, St. Mihiel, Pont-â-Mousson); Vol. III. “The Meuse-Argonne Battle” (St. Menehould, Montfaucon, Clermont).



FROM JULY 27 TO 29 (27/7 TO 29/7) THE GERMANS RETREATED AGAIN,
THEN MADE A STAND UNTIL JULY 31.

From July 26 to 29.

On the evening of the 26th and on the 27th, in consequence of the Franco-American push threatening, from the east and south, Fère-en-Tardenois, with its vital network of roads and railways, the Germans again retreated, this time on a larger scale, to the south of the Ourcq and north of the Marne. They were pursued by the Allies who, on the evening of the 27th, lined the Ourcq as far as Fère and, to the north of the Marne, occupied the line: Champvoisy, Passy-Grigny, Cuisles, La Neuville-aux-Larris, Chaumuzy; the British capturing Bligny. French mounted patrols pushed forward to the line Villers-Agron, Romigny, Ville-en-Tardenois, where the enemy trenches, lined with machine-guns, seemed to indicate that a stand was to be made.

On the 28th, the 62nd Division, in liaison on its right with the 42nd American Division, entered Fère-en-Tardenois. Meanwhile, north of the Marne, Franco-American forces made good progress in the region of St. Croix and near Neuville Castle. On the extreme right the Germans were driven across the Vesle.

Withdrawing their exhausted divisions, the enemy, from the 28th to the 30th, engaging six fresh divisions, supported by numerous machine-guns, made vigorous counter-attacks which retarded the Franco-American advance. Only little progress was made on the 29th between Le Plessier-Huleu and the Ourcq, the extreme points reached being Saponay and Seringes. However, in the centre, the Ourcq was crossed from Fère to Ronchères.

From Ronchères to Vrigny progress was again very slow. On the 30th and 31st the Germans counter-attacked north of Fère and in the valley of the Ardre, where they burnt Poilly Village. However, the Americans captured Cierges, while the French made progress towards Nesles Wood and in Meunière Wood.

AMERICAN UNITS ENGAGED FROM JULY 26 TO 29, 1918.
WITH GENERAL DEGOUTTE’S ARMY.

1st Corps (see composition, p. 27).

The 26th Division was relieved by the:

42nd DivisionMajor-General Chas. T. Menoher.
comprising:
83rd Infantry Brigade Brig.-Gen. M. J. Lenihan
84th“ ““ “Robert A. Brown
67th Artillery““ “ C. McKinstry

4th Division (see composition, p. 27).

Crossed the Ourcq on July 28 and fought desperate combats to the north of that river.

WITH GENERAL DE MITRY’S ARMY.
32nd DivisionMajor-General William G. Haan.
comprising:
63rd Infantry Brigade Brig.-Gen.W. D. Connor
64th“ ““ “Ed. B. Winans
57th Artillery““ “Le Roy G. Irwin
28th DivisionMajor-General Charles H. Muir.
comprising:
55th Infantry Brigade Brig.-Gen.T. W. Darrah
56th“ “ “ “Wm. Weigel
53rd Artillery“ “ “Wm. G. Price

The forces continued the pursuit of the retreating enemy.



MAJOR-GENERAL ROBERT L. BULLARD.

Commanding the 3rd Corps.



BY AUGUST 4 (4/8) THE SALIENT HAD BEEN ENTIRELY FLATTENED OUT.

The Offensive of August 1.

Having established themselves on high dominating positions forming a strong line of resistance, the Germans believed they would now be able to check the Allies, who, after fifteen days of hard fighting, would, no doubt, be exhausted. In a semi-official communiqué addressed to the German people, Hinderburg explained and justified his “strategical retreat” and again promised victory, adding that the “decisive blow” had only been “temporarily postponed.”

He was soon undeceived, however, supposing him to have been sincere. On August 1, the battle began again, north of the Ourcq and at the gates of Soissons. The Armies of Generals Mangin and Degoutte, so far from being exhausted, attacked again between Tigny and the Ourcq, their objective being to outflank and carry the wooded Hartennes Plateau, which formed the key to the defences of Soissons in front of the Crise Stream. In the Tigny-Hartennes region violent barrage and machine-gun fire somewhat retarded the Allies’ advance. Between Plessier-Huleu Wood and Saponay the enemy resisted and counter-attacked violently. However, progress was made as far as the line: Grand-Rozoy, Cramaille, south-west of Saponay, and, further to the east, Cierges, Meunière Wood, Goussancourt and Romigny. On the right the Armies of Generals de Mitry and Berthelot, continuing their advance, progressed beyond the Dormans-Rheims road, encircled Ville-en-Tardenois, and advanced along the Valley of the Ardre.

Hartennes fell on August 2, and Mangin pressed forward towards the Crise. Von Boehn’s army fell back for the fourth time, the retreat now being general. Soissons was evacuated, and in spite of enemy detachments of machine-gunners left behind to retard the Allies’ advance, the Chasseurs of the 2nd Division entered the city at 6 p.m. The Crise was crossed throughout its length before nightfall, Ville-en-Tardenois captured, and in the evening the following line reached: Soissons, Branges, Tramery, Romigny, Gueux and Thillois.

The Germans hurriedly fell back on the Vesle, but the Allies harried them vigorously and threw their rear-guard into disorder. On the evening of the 3rd the pursuing armies reached the River Aisne as far as Sermoise, the southern bank of the Vesle from Ciry-Salsogne to Villesavoye, the southern outskirts of Fismes, the Villages of Branscourt, Sapicourt, Courcelles, Rosnay and Gueux-Thillois, and the Aisne Canal north of Courcelles.

On August 4 detachments crossed to the north bank of the Vesle at various points, on which river the enemy was apparently determined to make a firm stand, especially between Unchair and Fismes which, however, the Americans and the French (32nd Division) captured. On the 5th the Germans had only two bridgeheads south of the Vesle, one at Courlandon and the other to the east of Muizon, but they stubbornly resisted the Allies’ attempts to cross the river, re-engaging several of their best divisions. Nevertheless the Allies succeeded on the 7th in gaining a footing on the north bank, east of Braine and Bazoches, and strongly occupied both banks of the river.

The counter-offensive was over. On August 6th Foch was made Marshal of France, Pétain received the Military Medal (the second highest recompense for French commanders), while the Grand Croix de la Légion d’Honneur was conferred on General Pershing.



MAJOR-GENERAL CHARLES H. MUIR.

Commanding the 28th Division.

AMERICAN UNITS ENGAGED FROM AUGUST 1
TO SEPTEMBER 7, 1918.
WITH GENERAL DEGOUTTE’S ARMY.

1st Corps (see composition, p. 27).

The 42nd Division was relieved by the 4th (see composition, p. 27) on August 3.

The 4th was relieved by the 77th Division:

77th DivisionMajor-General George B. Duncan.
comprising:
153rd Infantry Brigade Brig.-Gen.E. Wittenmeyer
154th“ ““ “E. M. Johnson
152nd ArtilleryColonelManus McCloskey

The 1st Corps, which crossed the Vesle on August 6, was withdrawn from the front on August 13. In twenty days it had advanced twenty miles and combated twelve different enemy divisions.



MAJOR-GENERAL WILLIAM G. HAAN.

Commanding the 32nd Division.

WITH GENERAL DE MITRY’S ARMY.
3rd CorpsMajor-General Robert L. Bullard.
comprising:
28thDivision (see composition,p. 32.)
32nd““ “p. 32.
3rd“““p. 13.
77th“““p. 35.

After establishing bridge-heads north of the Vesle, the 3rd Corps was withdrawn from the front on September 8.

Mentioned in the French Army Order of the Day.

302nd Regiment of Engineers: “Under the command of Colonel Sherill this regiment, on September 6, 1918, built a bridge in three hours across the Vesle under artillery fire, thus allowing the French artillery to cross the river at the beginning of the operations, contributing thereby to the success of the offensive."

The Results of the Allies’ Counter-Offensive.

In three weeks the Germans had lost all their gains of May 27th to July 15th, the Crown Prince’s salient made at terrible cost was flattened out, while the Allies’ captures included more than 18,000 German prisoners and 700 guns.

The French reserves, so far from being entirely used to make good the losses in the ranks of the line troops, as the German High Command believed, had taken the counter-offensive. Only a very small portion (two divisions) of the British reserves had taken part in the battle. Conversely, the Bavarian reserves had been rushed up from the region of Lille to the Aisne. Finally, whilst Ludendorff was compelled to give up his projected offensive in Flanders, Foch began a new battle between the Oise and the sea. The second battle of the Marne had thus far-reaching consequences. From that time until the Armistice, when they capitulated, the Germans were everywhere out-manœuvred and beaten.

In the course of the battle the aeroplanes and tanks vied with the infantry in valour and intrepidity. From July 15 to 20, French, British and American aviators attacked the enemy unceasingly, flying in all weathers, sometimes in violent storms, as on July 17. In less than a week, in addition to the losses inflicted on the enemy infantry and artillery, the Allied aviation services destroyed or drove down out of control 137 German aeroplanes and 23 observation balloons, besides dropping 222 tons of bombs on enemy objectives.

The French tanks, on their side, performed wonders, causing great havoc and spreading demoralisation in the enemy ranks.

One disabled tank-driver (Corporal Chevrel) surrounded by Germans held out for thirty-six hours, while another (Corporal Cellier), with the help of fifteen Americans, captured 700 Germans, including fourteen officers and a colonel, and two guns.



MAJOR-GENERAL CHAS. T. MENOHER.

Commanding the 42nd Division.



MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE H. CAMERON. Commanding the 4th Division.

The Allied troops, fighting shoulder to shoulder with the French “poilus,” had a brilliant share in the victory. The British distinguished themselves by their splendid resistance on the St. Thierry Heights, the 15th Scottish Division covering itself with glory by storming and capturing Buzancy, south of Soissons.

The Italian 2nd Corps successfully defended the approaches of the Mountain of Rheims and distinguished itself in the defence of Bligny Hill.

America’s young troops, who were the last to join in the battle, fought admirably, eight of their divisions co-operating with the armies of Generals Mangin, Degoutte and De Mitry in the battle and pursuit.

In paying this just tribute to the valour of all the Allies, it should not be forgotten that the second victory of the Marne, like the first, was a glorious manifestation of French genius and heroism.



AMERICAN TROOPS ARRIVING.

TRIBUTE TO THREE CHIEFS.



PERSHING.

Awarded the Grand’ Croix de la Légion d’Honneur August 6, 1918.

“ ... you arrived on the battlefield at the decisive hour....”



FOCH.

Promoted Maréchal de France August 6, 1918.

“ ... the confidence placed in the victor at the Marshes of Saint-Gond and the glorious commander on the Yser and Somme, was fully justified....”



PÉTAIN.

Awarded the Médaille Militaire August 6, 1918.

“ ... breaking and driving back the German onrush, he acquired imperishable right to the nation’s gratitude....”