CAPT. ALBERT H. TRAPMANN
I doubt if history can show a more brilliant or dramatic campaign than that which the Greeks commenced on the first of July and ended on the last day of the same month; certainly no country has ever been drenched with so much blood in so short a space of time as was Macedonia, and never in the history of the human race have such enormities been committed upon the helpless civilian inhabitants of a war-stricken land.
Bulgaria felt herself amply strong enough to crush the Servian and Greek armies single-handed, provided peace with Turkey could be assured, and the Bulgarian troops at Tchataldja set free. Thus, while Bulgaria talked loudly about the conference at St. Petersburg, she was making feverish haste to persuade the Allies to join with her in concluding peace with Turkey. But the Allies were quite alive to the dangers they ran. As peace with Turkey became daily more assured, the Bulgarian army at Tchataldja was gradually withdrawn and transported to face the Greek and Servian armies in Macedonia.
But meanwhile Bulgaria had got one more preparation to make. Her plan was to attack the Allies suddenly, but to do it in such a way that the Czar and Europe might believe that the attack was mutual and unpremeditated. She therefore set herself to accustom the world to frontier incidents between the rival armies. On no fewer than four occasions various Bulgarian generals acting under secret instructions attacked the Greek or Servian troops in their vicinity. The last of these incidents, which was by far the most serious, took place on the 24th of May in the Pangheion region, when the sudden attack at sunset of 25,000 Bulgarians drove the Greek defenders back some six miles upon their supports. On each occasion the Bulgarian Government disclaimed all responsibility, and attributed the bloodshed to the personal initiative of individual soldiers acting under (imaginary) provocation.
The incident of the 24th of May cost the Bulgarians some 1,500 casualties, while the Greeks lost about 800 men, sixteen of whom were prisoners; two of these subsequently died from ill-treatment. In connection with this last "incident" a circumstance arose which demonstrates more vividly than mere adjectives the underhand methods employed by the Sofia authorities. It was announced that the Bulgarians had captured six Greek guns, and these were duly displayed at Sofia and inspected by King Ferdinand. I myself was at Salonica at the time, and, knowing that this was not true, I protested through the Daily Telegraph against the misleading rumor. A controversy arose, but it was subsequently proved by two artillery experts who inspected the guns in question that they were really Bulgarian guns painted gray, with their telltale breech-blocks removed.
On the morning of the 29th of June we at Salonica received the news that during the night Bulgarian troops in force had attacked the Greek outposts in the Pangheion region and driven them in. All through the day came in fresh news of further attacks all along the line. At Guevgheli, where the Greek and Servian armies met, the Bulgarians had attacked fiercely, occupied the town, and cut the railway line. The two armies were separated from each other by an interposing Bulgarian force. On the morning of the 30th of June it was learned that all along the line the Bulgarians had crossed the neutral line and were advancing, while at Nigrita they had driven back a Greek detachment and pressed some fifteen miles southward, thus threatening entirely to cut off the Greek troops remaining in the Pangheion district. The situation was critical and demanded prompt attention. King Constantine was away at Athens, but he sent his instructions by wireless and hastened hotfoot back to Salonica to place himself at the head of the army.
At noon General Hessaptchieff (brother-in-law of M. Daneff), the Bulgarian plenipotentiary accredited to Greek Army Headquarters, drove to the station and with his staff left by the last train for Bulgarian Headquarters at Serres. Orders were immediately given for all Bulgarian troops to be confined to barracks, and the Cretan gendarmerie duly arrested any found about the streets. Gradually as the afternoon wore on, the civilian element retired behind closed doors and shuttered windows; all shops were shut, and pickets of Greek soldiery were alone to be seen in the deserted streets. At 4.30 P.M. the Bulgarian battalion commander was invited to surrender the arms of his men, when they would be conveyed in two special trains to Serres or anywhere else they liked. He was given an hour to decide. Owing to the intervention of the French Consul the time limit was extended, but the offer was refused, and at 6.50 P.M. on the 30th of June the Greeks applied force. Around every house occupied by Bulgarian soldiery Greek troops had been introduced into neighboring houses, machine guns had been installed on rooftops, companies of infantry were picketed at street corners. Suddenly throughout the town all this hell was let loose. The streets gave back the echo a thousandfold. The crackle of musketry and din of machine guns was positively infernal. As evening came and darkened into night, one after another of the Bulgarian forts Chabrol surrendered, sometimes persuaded thereto by the deadly effect of a field-gun at thirty yards' range, but the sun had risen ere the chief stronghold containing five hundred Bulgarians gave up the hopeless struggle. By nine o'clock the Bulgarian garrison of Salonica, deprived of its arms, was safely stowed in the holds of Greek ships bound for Crete. The casualty list was as follows: Bulgarians—prisoners: 11 officers, 1,241 men; 11 men wounded; 51 men killed; comitadjis, 4 wounded, 11 killed. Greeks: 11 soldiers killed; 4 Cretan gendarmes killed; 4 officers wounded; 6 soldiers wounded; while 6 Bulgarian officers who had deserted their men and escaped in women's clothing were not captured until later in the day.
All the morning of the 1st of July the Greek troops were busy rounding up Bulgarian comitadjis and collecting hidden explosives, but at 4 P.M. the Second Division marched out of the town. King Constantine, who had arrived in the small hours of the morning, had given the order for a general advance of his army. Greek patience was expended, and no wonder.
Meanwhile, let us consider the Bulgarian intentions as revealed by the captured dispatch-box of the General commanding the 3d Bulgarian Division, which contained documents likely to become historic. On the 28th of June the Bulgarian Divisional Commanders received orders from the Commander-in-Chief to undertake a general attack upon the Allies on the 2d of July. Unfortunately for the Bulgarians, General Ivanoff, Commanding-in-Chief against the Greeks, could not restrain his impatience, and instead of waiting for a sudden and general attack on the 2d of July his troops attacked piecemeal during the nights of the 29th and 30th of June as described; thus the Greek general forward movement on the 1st and 2d of July found the bulk of his troops unprepared, while the 14th Bulgarian Division, scheduled to arrive at Kilkis on the 2d of July from Tchataldja, was not available during that day to oppose the Greek initiative, though they saved the situation on the 3d of July by detraining partly at Kilkis and partly at Doiran.
The two weak points of the Allies were at Guevgheli and in the Pangheion region, and it was precisely at these points that the Bulgarians struck. As regards numbers, on the 2d of July the respective forces numbered: Bulgarians, 80,000; Greeks, 60,000; on the 3d of July (not deducting losses)—Bulgarians, 115,000; Greeks, 80,000; in both cases the troops on lines of communication are not reckoned with; these probably amounted to—Bulgarians, 25,000; Greeks, 12,000.
Almost immediately and at all points the opposing armies came into contact. The Bulgarian gunners had very carefully taken all ranges on the ground over which the Greeks had to advance, and at first their shrapnel fire was extremely damaging. The Greeks, however, did not wait to fight the battle out according to the usual rules of warfare—by endeavoring to silence the enemy's artillery before launching their infantry forward. Phenomenal rapidity characterized the Greek tactics from the moment their troops first came under fire. Their artillery immediately swept into action and plied the Bulgarian batteries with shell and shrapnel, the while Greek infantry deployed into lines of attack and pushed forward. At Kilkis so rapid was the advance of the Greek infantry that the Bulgarian gunners could hardly alter their ranges sufficiently fast, and every time that the Greek infantry had made good five hundred yards the Greek artillery would gallop forward and come into action on a new alinement. It was a running fight. By leaps and bounds the incredible élan of the Greek troops drove the Bulgarians back toward Kilkis itself, which position had been heavily entrenched. By 4 P.M. on the 2d of July, the Greek main army was within three miles of the town, while the 10th Division, helped by two battalions of Servian infantry, gradually fought its way up the Vardar toward Guevgheli. At 4.30 P.M. (at Kilkis) the Bulgarians delivered a furious counter-attack in which some 20,000 bayonets took part, but it was repulsed with heavy slaughter, and the weary Greek soldiers, who had fought their way over twenty miles of disputed country, rolled over on their sides and slept. Toward Guevgheli the Evzone battalions had for two hours to advance through waist-deep marshes under a heavy artillery fire, but they struggled along through muddy waters singing their own melancholy songs and without paying the least attention to the heavy losses they were sustaining. On the 3d of July the Greeks reoccupied Guevgheli, and toward evening the Bulgarian trenches at Kilkis were taken at the bayonet's point, the town being entirely destroyed, partly by Greek shell fire (for the Bulgarian batteries had been located in the streets) and partly by the Bulgarians, who fired the town as they retired. On the 3d and 4th the Bulgarians retired sullenly northward toward Doiran, contesting every yard and putting in the units of the 14th Division as quickly as they could be detrained; but the Greeks never flagged for one moment in the pursuit. The 10th and 3d Divisions, marching at tremendous speed, came up on the left, menacing the line of retreat on Strumnitza. It was in the pass ten miles south of this town that remnants of the Bulgarian 3d and 14th Divisions made their last stand upon the 8th of July. Throughout the week they had been fighting and retreating incessantly, had lost at least 10,000 in killed and wounded, some 4,500 prisoners, and about forty guns, while the Greeks lost about 4,500 and 5,000 men in front of Kilkis and another 3,000 between Doiran and Strumnitza.
Meanwhile at Lakhanas an equally sanguinary two days' conflict had been in progress. The Greeks attacked and finally captured the Bulgarian entrenched positions. Time after time their charges failed to reach, but eventually their persistent courage and inimitable élan won home, and the Bulgarians fled in utter rout and panic, leaving everything, even many of their uniforms, behind them.
King Constantine, speaking in Germany recently, attributed the success of the Greek armies to the courage of his men, the excellence of the artillery, and to the soundness of the strategy, but I think he overlooked the chief factor that made for victory—the unspeakable horror, loathing, and rage aroused by the atrocities committed upon the Greek wounded whenever a temporary local reverse left a few of the gallant fellows at the mercy of the Bulgarians. I have seen an officer and a dozen men who had had their eyes put out, and their ears, tongues, and noses cut off, upon the field of battle during the lull between two Greek charges. And there were other worse, but nameless, barbarities both upon the wounded and the dead who for a brief moment fell into Bulgarian hands.
This was during the very first days of the war; later, when the news of the wholesale massacres of Greek peaceable inhabitants at Nigrita, Serres, Drama, Doxat, etc., became known to the army, it raised a spirit which no pen can describe. The men "saw red," they were drunk with lust for honorable revenge, from which nothing but death could stop them. Wounds, mortal wounds, were unheeded so long as the man still had strength to stagger on; I have seen a sergeant with a great fragment of common shell through his lungs run forward for several hundred yards vomiting blood, but still encouraging his men, who, truth to tell, were as eager as he. It is impossible to describe or even conceive the purposeful and aching desire to get to close quarters regardless of all losses and of all consequences. The Bulgarians, in committing those obscene atrocities, not only damned themselves forever in the eyes of humanity, but they doubled, nay, quadrupled, the strength of the Greek army. Nothing short of extermination could have prevented the Greek army from victory; there was not a man who would not have a million times rather died than have hesitated for a moment to go forward.
The days of those first battles were steaming hot with a pitiless Macedonian sun. The Greek troops were in far too high a state of spiritual excitation to require food, even if food had been able to keep pace with their lightning advance. All that the men wanted, all they ever asked for, was water and ammunition; and here the greatest self-sacrifice of all to the cause was frequently seen; for a wounded man, unable to struggle forward another yard, would, as he fell to the ground, hastily unbuckle water-bottle and cartridge-cases and hand them to an advancing comrade with a cheery word, "Go on and good luck, my lad," and then as often as not he would lay him down to die with parched lips and cleaving tongue.
I was myself, at the pressing and personal invitation of King Constantine, the first to visit Nigrita, where the Bulgarian General, before leaving, had the inhabitants locked into their houses, and then with guncotton and petroleum burned the place to the ground. Here 470 victims were burned alive, mostly old folk, women, and children. Serres, Drama, Kilkis, and Demir Hissar (all important towns) have similar tales to tell, only the death-roll is longer. Small wonder that these stories of ferocity are not given credence, for they are incredible, and it is only when one studies the Bulgarian character that one can understand how such orgies of carnage were possible.
The scope of this article does not permit me to describe in detail the minor battles and operations between the 6th of July and the 25th of July; suffice it to say that the rapidity of the Greek advance upon Strumnitza and up the valley of the Struma forced the Bulgarians to beat in full retreat toward their frontier, leaving behind them all that impeded their flight. Military stores, guns, carts, and even uniforms strewed the line of their march, and they were only saved from annihilation because the mountains which guarded their flanks were impassable for the Greek artillery. By blowing up the bridges over the Struma the impetuosity of the Greek pursuit was delayed, and it was in the Kresna Pass that the Bulgarian rear-guard first turned at bay. The pass is a twenty-mile gorge cut through mountains 7,000 feet high, but the Greeks turned the Bulgarian positions by marching across the mountains, and it was near Semitli, five miles north of the pass, that the Bulgarians offered their last serious resistance. It was a wonderful battle. The Greeks, at the urgent request of the Servian General Staff, had detailed two divisions to help the Servians. On the west bank of the Struma they pushed the 2d and 4th Divisions gently northward, while in the narrow Struma valley (it is little better than a gorge in most places) they had the 1st Division on the main road with the 5th behind it in reserve; on the right, perched on the summit of well-nigh inaccessible mountains, was the Greek 6th Division, with the 7th Division on its right, somewhat drawn back.
It came to the knowledge of Greek headquarters that the Bulgarians contemplated an attack upon Mehomia, a village six miles on the extreme right and rear of the 7th Division, only held by a small detachment of that Division; reenforcements were immediately dispatched to relieve the pressure, and the 6th Division was called upon to reenforce the positions of the 7th during the absence of the relief column, with the result that on the 25th of July the 6th Division only had some 6,000 men available.
Meanwhile, the Bulgarians had secretly transferred the 40,000 men of their 1st Division from facing the Servians at Kustendil to Djumaia; 20,000 of these were sent in a column to strike at the junction of the Greek and Servian armies, where they were held by the 3d and 10th Greek divisions after a bloody battle which lasted three days; 5,000 marched on Mehomia and were annihilated by the Greek 7th Division; the remaining 15,000 reenforced the troops facing the Greek 6th Division. It was a most dramatic fight. On the 25th of July the Greeks, unconscious of the Bulgarian reenforcements, pushed northward, and all day long their 1st, 5th, and 6th Divisions gradually drove the enemy in front of them. The fighting was of the most desperate nature, and at one moment, the ammunition on both sides having given out, the troops pelted each other with fragments of rock. At last, toward 5 P.M., the Greek 6th Division found the enemy in front of them retiring; they pushed onward fighting for every yard. The men were dead-weary; they had slept for days upon bleak and waterless mountain summits—frozen at night, they were grilled at noon, but they pushed ever onward. At last, when victory seemed within their grasp, when their foe was seen to run, a general advance was ordered. The men sprang forward with a last effort of physical endurance—the Bulgars were running! They gave chase. Suddenly, in one solid wall, 15,000 entirely new Bulgarian troops of the 1st Division rose, as if from the ground, and delivered a counter-attack. It was a crucial moment: some 4,000 Greeks chasing a similar number of Bulgarians suddenly had to face 15,000 new troops. The impact was terrible. The Greek line broke up into fragments, around which the Bulgarians clustered and pecked like vultures at a feast. For ten minutes it was anybody's battle. The remnants of each Greek company formed itself into a ring and defended itself as best it could. These rings gradually grew smaller as bullet and bayonet claimed their victims; many of them were wiped out altogether, and when the battle was over it was possible to find the places where these companies had made their last stands, for there was not a single survivor—the wounded were killed by the victors.
But the victory was short-lived. True, the right of the 6th Division had crumpled up, but a regiment of the 1st Division came up at the critical moment and stiffened up the left and center, and again the tide of battle swayed irresolute; then, ten minutes later perhaps, a regiment from the 5th Division came up at the double on the right rear of the Bulgarians, taking them in reverse and enfilade. The Bulgarian right and center crumpled like a rotten egg, while their left fell hastily back. The Bulgars had thrown their last hazard and had lost. The carnage was appalling on both sides. The Greek 6th Division had commenced the day with about 6,000 men; at sunset barely 2,000 remained. Opposite the Greek positions nearly 10,000 Bulgarians were buried next day, which speaks well for the fighting power of the Greek when he is making his last stand.
The holocaust of wounded beggars description, but that eminent French painter, George Scott, told me an incident which came to his own notice. He was riding up to the front the day after Semitli, and was just emerging from the awesome Kresna Pass, when he and his companion came upon a Greek dressing station. The narrow space between cliff and river was entirely occupied by some hundreds of Greek wounded, some of them already dead, many dying, and others fainting. They were lying about awaiting their turn for the surgeon's knife. In the center stood the surgeon, with the sleeves of his operating-coat turned up, his arms red to the elbow in blood, all about him blood-stained bandages and wads of cotton-wool. They reined in their horses and surveyed the scene; as one patient was being removed from the packing-case that served as operating-table, the surgeon raised his weary eyes and saw them, the only unwounded men in all that vast and silent gathering. "You are newspaper correspondents?" he asked. "Well, tell me, tell me when this butchery will cease! For seventy-two hours I have been plying my knife, and look at those who have yet to come"—he swept the circle of wounded with an outstretched bloody hand. "O God! If you know how to write, write to your papers and tell Europe she must stop this gruesome war." Then, tired out and enervated, he swooned into the arms of the medical orderly. As he came to to be apologized. "That," he said, "is the third time I have fainted; I suppose I must waste precious time in eating something to sustain me!"
The battle of Semitli was fought almost contemporaneously with that of the 3d and 10th Greek Divisions on the extreme Greek left flank, which latter action resulted in a Bulgarian repulse after a temporary success, and these were the last great battles of the shortest and bloodiest campaign on record. On the 29th and 30th of July there were some skirmishes three miles south of Djumaia. On the 31st of July the armistice was conceded. During the month of July the Greek army had practically wiped out the 1st, 3d, 4th, and 14th Bulgarian Divisions, some 160,000 strong; they had marched 200 miles over terrible mountains; they had taken 12,000 prisoners, 120 guns; and had cheerfully sustained 27,000 casualties out of a total number of 120,000 troops engaged.
It is difficult to do justice to such an exploit within the scope of a single article. The privations suffered by the troops, their uncomplaining endurance, the fight with cholera, the appalling atrocities perpetrated by the Bulgarians upon those who fell within their power, furnish matter for a monumental volume.