PROF. STEPHEN P. DUGGAN
When the secret treaty of alliance of March, 1912, between Bulgaria and Servia against Turkey was signed, a division of the territory that might possibly fall to the allies was agreed upon. Neither Bulgaria nor Servia has ever published the treaty in full, but from the denunciations and recriminations indulged in by the parliaments of both, we know in general what the division was to be. The river Maritza, it was hoped, would become the western boundary of Turkey, and a line running from a point just east of Kumanova to the head of Lake Ochrida was to divide the conquered territory between Servia and Bulgaria. This would give Monastir, Prilip, Ochrida, and Veles to the Bulgarians—a great concession on the part of Servia. Certain other disputed towns were to be left to the arbitrament of the Czar of Russia. The chief aim to be attained by this division was that Servia should obtain a seaboard upon the Adriatic Sea, and Bulgaria upon the Aegean. Incidentally Bulgaria would obtain western Thrace and the greater part of Macedonia, and Servia would secure the greater part of Albania.
These calculations had been entirely upset by the course of events. Bulgaria's share had been considerably increased by the unexpected conquest of eastern Thrace, including Adrianople, whereas Servia's portion had been greatly diminished by the creation of an independent Albania out of her share. Moreover, M. Pashitch, the Servian prime minister, maintained that whereas by the preliminary treaty Bulgaria was to send detachments to assist the Servian armies operating in the Vardar valley, the reverse had been found necessary and Adrianople had only been taken with the help of 60,000 Servians and by means of the Servian siege guns. Equity demanded that the new conditions which had arisen and which had entirely altered the situation should be given consideration and that Bulgaria should not expect the preliminary agreement to be carried out. Now, from the outbreak of hostilities Bulgaria's foreign affairs, in which King Ferdinand was supposed to be supreme, were really controlled by the prime minister, Dr. Daneff. He proved to be the evil genius of his country; for his arrogant, unyielding attitude upon every disputed point, not only with the enemy, but with the allies and with the Powers, destroyed all kindly feeling for Bulgaria, and left her friendless in her hour of need. Dr. Daneff's answer to the Servian contention was that Bulgaria bore the brunt of the fight; that, had she not kept the main Turkish force occupied, Servia and Greece would have been crushed; that a treaty is a treaty, and that the additional gain of eastern Thrace in no way invalidated the old agreement.
The recriminations between Greeks and Bulgarians were quite as bitter. There had been no preliminary agreement as to the division of conquered territory between them, and this permitted each to indulge in the most extravagant claims. The great bone of contention was the possession of the fine port of Salonika. As soon as the war against Turkey broke out, both states pushed forward troops to occupy that city. The Greeks arrived first and were still in possession. Moreover, they maintained that, except for the Jews, the population is chiefly Greek. So are the trade and the schools. M. Venezelos, the Greek prime minister, insisted also that the erection of an independent Albania deprived Greece of a large part of northern Epirus, as it had deprived Servia of a great part of Old Servia, and Montenegro of Scutari. In fact, he asserted that Bulgaria alone would retain everything she hoped for, securing nearly three-fifths of the conquered territory, and leaving only two-fifths to be divided among her three allies; and this, despite the fact that but for the activity of the Greek navy in preventing the convoy of Turkey's best troops from Asia, Bulgaria would never have had her rapid success at the beginning of the war. Finally, he strenuously objected to the whole seaboard of Macedonia going to Bulgaria, as the population where it was not Moslem was chiefly Greek. All the parties to the dispute made much of ethnical and historical claims—"A thousand years are as a day" in their sight. The answer of Dr. Daneff to the Greek demands was to the effect that Greece already had one good port on the Mediterranean, while Bulgaria had none, and that Bulgaria would have to spend immense sums on either Kavala or Dedeagatch to make them of any great value. Moreover, as a result of the war, Greece would get Crete, the Aegean islands, and a good slice of the mainland. She had suffered least in the war and was really being overpaid for her services.
Behind all these formal contentions were the conflicting ambitions and the racial hatreds which no discussion could effectually resolve. Bulgaria was determined to secure the hegemony of the Balkan peninsula. She believed that her role was that of a Balkan Prussia, and her great victories made her confident of her ability to play the role successfully. To this Servia would never consent. The Servians far outnumber the Bulgarians. Were they united under one scepter they would be the strongest nation in the Balkans. Their policy is to maintain an equilibrium in the peninsula until the hoped-for annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina will give them the preponderance. This alone would incline Servia to make common cause with Greece. In addition, she had the powerful motive of direct self-interest. Since she did not secure the coveted territory on the Adriatic, Salonika would be more than ever the natural outlet for her products. Should Bulgaria wedge in behind Greece at Salonika, Servia would have two Powers to deal with, each of which could pursue the policy of destroying her commerce by a prohibitory tariff, a policy so often adopted toward her by Austria-Hungary. M. Pashitch, therefore, was determined to have the new southern boundary of Servia coterminous with the northern boundary of Greece. Moreover, Greeks and Servians were aware of the relative weakness of the Bulgarians due to their great losses and to the wide territory occupied by their troops. The war party was in the ascendant in each country. The Servians were anxious to avenge Slivnitza, and the Greeks still further to redeem themselves from the reputation of 1897. Had peace been signed in January, there is little doubt that a greater spirit of conciliation would have prevailed. The Young Turks were universally condemned at that time for refusing to yield; but had they deliberately adopted Abdul Hamid's policy of playing off one people against another, they could not have succeeded better than by their determination to fight.
Even before the fall of Adrianople, on March 26th, military conflicts had taken place between Bulgarians and Servians and between Bulgarians and Greeks. On March 12th a pitched battle occurred between the latter at Nigrita; and though a mixed commission at once drew up a code of regulations for use in towns occupied by joint armies, not the slightest attention was subsequently paid to it. The Servians shortly afterward expelled the manager of the branch of the National Bulgarian Bank at Monastir, a step which drew forth emphatic protests from Sofia against the policy of Serbizing districts in anticipation of the final settlement. On April 17th, M. Pashitch informed Bulgaria that the Government would refuse to be bound by the terms of the preliminary treaty of March, 1912. From that date until the signing of the treaty of peace with Turkey on May 31st, the recent allies carried on an unofficial war, which consisted of combats of extermination marked by inhuman rage. After that event each of the combatants strained every nerve to push forward its armies and to possess new territories, while each continued to accuse the other of violating every principle of international law.
The ambassadors of the great Powers at the capitals of the Balkan States made urgent representations to the Balkan Governments to restrain their armies, but without effect. On June 10th the Servian Government dispatched a note to Sofia demanding a categorical answer to the Servian demand for a revision of the preliminary treaty. On July 11th the Czar telegraphed to King Peter and King Ferdinand appealing to them to avoid a fratricidal war, reminding them of his position as arbitrator under the preliminary treaty and warning them that he would hold responsible whichever state appealed to force. "The state which begins war will be responsible before the Slav cause." This well-meant action had an effect the opposite of that hoped for. In Vienna it was looked upon as an indirect assertion of moral guardianship by Russia over the Slav world. The Austrian press insisted that the Balkan states were of age and could take care of themselves. If not, it was for Europe, not for Russia, to control them. The political horizon grew still darker when one week later Dr. Daneff answered the Servian note in the negative. This resulted in the Servian Minister withdrawing from Sofia on June 22d.
What was the plan of campaign and the degree of preparedness of the principal belligerent in the second Balkan war which was about to commence? The plan of the Bulgarians was the only one whereby they could hope to secure victory. It depended for success upon surprizing the Servians by sending masses of Bulgarian troops into the home territory of Servia by way of the passes leading directly from Sofia westward through the mountains. This would cut off the Servian armies operating in Macedonia from their base of supplies and require their immediate recall for the defense of the home territory. It was an operation attended by almost insurmountable obstacles. The major part of the Bulgarian army was in eastern Thrace and would have to be brought across a country unprovided with either railroads or sufficient highways. Moreover, the army would have to rely for the transport of provisions and equipment upon slow-moving bullock wagons. Nevertheless, given time, secrecy, and freedom from interference, the aim might be attained. The necessary divisions of the army were set in motion in the beginning of May. So successful were the Bulgarians in keeping secret the route and the progress of the army, that by the middle of June they confidently looked forward to success. Their high hopes were destroyed by the evil diplomacy of Dr. Daneff in his relations with Roumania.
Russia rewarded Roumania for her splendid assistance in the Russo-Turkish war of 1877 by depriving her of her fertile province of Bessarabia and compelling her to take in exchange the Dobrudja, a low, marshy district inhabited chiefly by Bulgarians and Moslems. And that was not all. Through Russian influence the commission appointed to delimit the boundary between Roumania and the new principality of Bulgaria put the town of Silistria upon the Bulgarian side of the boundary. Now the heights of Silistria command absolutely the Roumanian territory opposite to it and the Dobrudja. The Danube directly in front of Silistria spreads out in a marsh several miles wide, so that it is impossible to approach Silistria from the Roumanian side by bridge. As a result Roumania has always felt that her southern border was at the mercy of Bulgaria and has always, as one of the chief aims of her national existence, looked forward to the rectification of her southern boundary. The unfriendly attitude of Russia threw Roumania into the arms of Austria, so that from the days of the Berlin treaty to the Balkan war, Roumania has been considered a true friend of the Triple Alliance. She viewed with jealousy and fear the rapid growth of Bulgaria in power and in strength. Crowded in between the two military empires of Russia and Austria-Hungary, Roumania naturally looked upon the development of another military state upon her southern border as a menace to her national existence. Hence when the Macedonian question became very acute in 1903, and it seemed that action would be undertaken by Bulgaria and Servia against Turkey, Roumania had declared that she would not tolerate an alteration of the status quo. She did not move, however, when the allies undertook the war of liberation in October, 1912. But when a month's campaign changed the war from one of liberation to one of conquest, Roumania demanded from Bulgaria as the price of neutrality Silistria and a small slice of the Black Sea coast sufficient to satisfy strategic military demands.
It was in his relations with Roumania that Daneff's diplomacy was most stupid. M. Take Jonescu, one of Roumanians ablest statesmen, was sent by the Government to the first Peace Conference at London to secure pledges from Dr. Daneff in regard to the Roumanian demand. He could get no answer. Daneff used every device to gain time in the hope that a settlement with Turkey would relieve Bulgaria from the necessity of giving anything. When the peace negotiations failed and the war between the allies and Turkey recommenced, the relations between Roumania and Bulgaria became very critical. However, at the Czar's suggestion, both countries agreed to refer the dispute to a conference of the ambassadors of the great Powers at St. Petersburg. Dr. Daneff, who represented Bulgaria, adopted a most truculent attitude and refused to yield on any point. As a result of the skilful diplomacy of the French ambassador, M. Delcassé, in reconciling the divergent views of the great Powers, Roumania was awarded, on April 19th, the town of Silistria and a three-mile zone around it, but was refused an increase on the seaboard. The award was very unpopular in Roumania, but M. Jonescu risked his official life by successfully urging the Roumanian Government to accept it. But when it became perfectly evident, after the signing of the Treaty of London on May 30th, that the former allies were now to be enemies, the Roumanian government notified Bulgaria that she could not rely upon its neutrality without compensation in the interests of the equilibrium of the Balkans.
Such was the diplomatic situation when the Czar's telegram of June 11th was received by King Ferdinand. Nothing could have been more inopportune for the Bulgarian cause. Though the government had no intention of changing its plan, sufficient deference had to be paid to the Czar's request to suspend the forward movement of troops. The delay was fatal. The Servians, who were already aware that the Bulgarians were in motion, now learned their direction and their actual positions. The Servian Government hastened to fortify the passes of the Balkans between Bulgaria and the home territory, and the Servian army in Macedonia effected a junction with the Greek army from Salonika. There was nothing left for the Bulgarians but to direct their offensive movements against the southern Servian divisions in Macedonia. The great coup had failed. Instead of attacking first the Servians and then the Greeks and overwhelming them separately, it was necessary to fight their combined forces.
Every element in the situation demanded the utmost caution on the part of Bulgaria. Elementary prudence dictated that she yield to Roumanians demand for a slice of the seaboard to Baltchik in order to prevent Roumania from joining Servia and Greece. No doubt, had Daneff yielded he would have been voted out of office by the opposition, for the military party was in the ascendant at Sofia also. But a real statesman would not have flinched. Seldom has the influence of home politics upon the foreign affairs of a State operated so disastrously upon both. It was determined to carry out that part of the original plan of campaign which called for a surprise attack upon the Servians. It must be remembered that all the engagements that had hitherto taken place between the former allies had been unofficial, Daneff all the while insisting that there existed no war, but "only military action to enforce the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty." Nevertheless, on June 29th the word went forth from Bulgarian headquarters for a general attack upon the Servian line which, taken by surprise, yielded.
In the mean time public opinion at Bucharest became almost uncontrollable in its demand for the mobilization of the troops, and the government was outraged at the continued prohibition by Russia of a forward movement. The Roumanian Government had already appealed to Count Berchtold for Austro-Hungarian support against Russian interference, but Austria-Hungary, like every other great power, expected Bulgaria to win, and she intended that Bulgaria should take the place vacated by Turkey as a counterpoise to Russia in the Balkans. Hence Count Berchtold informed Roumania that she could not rely upon Austro-Hungarian support, were she to ignore the Russian veto. But in the mean time an exaggerated report of the Servian defeat had reached St. Petersburg on July 1st, and to save Servia, Russia lifted the embargo on Roumanian action.
Forty-eight hours later Europe knew that the Greeks had fought the fearful battle of Kilchis, resulting in the utter rout of the Bulgarians, who were in full retreat to defend the Balkan passes into their home territory. Russia at once recalled her permission for Roumanian mobilization, but it was too late. The army was on the march.
The situation of Bulgaria was now truly desperate. Not only had her coup against the Servians failed, but her troops were fleeing before the victorious Greeks up the Struma valley. On July 5th war was officially recognized by the withdrawal of the representatives of Greece, Montenegro, and Roumania, from Sofia. On the same day Turkey requested the withdrawal of all Bulgarian troops east of the Enos-Midia line. In the bloody battles which continued to be fought against Greeks and Servians, the Bulgarians were nearly everywhere defeated, and on July 10th Bulgaria placed herself unreservedly in the hands of Russia with a view to a cessation of hostilities.
This did not, however, prevent the forward movement of all her enemies. On July 15th, Turkey, "moved by the unnatural war" existing in the Balkan Peninsula, dispatched Enver Bey with an army to Adrianople, which he reoccupied July 20th. By that time the Roumanians were within twenty miles of Sofia, and the guns of the Servians and Greeks could be heard in the Bulgarian capital. The next day King Ferdinand telegraphed to King Charles of Roumania, asking him to intercede with the kings of Greece, Servia, and Montenegro. He did so, and all the belligerents agreed to send peace delegates to Bucharest. They assembled there on July 29th and at once concluded an armistice.
Each of the belligerent States sent its best man to the peace conference. Greece was represented by M. Venezelos, Servia by M. Pashitch, Roumania by M. Jonescu, Montenegro by M. Melanovitch, and Bulgaria chiefly by General Fitcheff, who had opposed the surprise attack upon the Servians. The policy of Bulgaria at the conference was to satisfy the demands of Roumania at once, sign a separate treaty which would rid her territory of Roumanian troops, and then treat with Greece and Servia. But M. Jonescu, who controlled the situation, insisted that peace must be restored by one treaty, not by several. At the same time he let it be known that Roumania would not uphold extravagant claims on the part of Greece and Servia which they could never have advanced were her troops not at the gates of Sofia. The moderate Roumanian demands were easily settled. Her southern boundary was to run from Turtukai via Dobritch to Baltchik on the Black Sea. She also secured cultural privileges for the Kutzovlachs in Bulgaria. The Servians, who before the second Balkan war would have been satisfied with the Vardar river as a boundary, now insisted upon the possession of the important towns of Kotchana, Ishtib, Radovishta, and Strumnitza, to the east of the Vardar. With the assistance of Roumania, Bulgaria was permitted to retain Strumnitza. The Greeks were the most unyielding. Before the war they would have been perfectly satisfied to have secured the Struma river as their eastern boundary. Now they demanded much more of the Aegean seacoast, including the important port of Kavala. The Bulgarian representatives refused to sign without the possession of Kavala, but under pressure from Roumania they had to consent. But they would yield on nothing else. The money indemnity demanded by Greece and Servia and the all-around grant of religious privileges suggested by Roumania had to be dropped. The treaty was signed August 6, 1913.
In the mean time the Powers had not been passive onlookers. Austria-Hungary insisted that Balkan affairs are European affairs and that the Treaty of Bucharest should be considered as merely provisional, to be made definitive by the great Powers. On this proposition the members of both the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente divided. Austria and Italy in the one, and Russia in the other, favored a revision. Austria fears a strong Servia, and Italy dislikes the growth of Greek influence in the eastern Mediterranean. These two States and Russia favored a whittling-down of the gains of Greece and Servia and insisted upon Kavala and a bigger slice of the Aegean seaboard for Bulgaria. But France, England, and Germany insisted upon letting well-enough alone. King Charles of Roumania, who demanded that the peace should be considered definitive, sent a telegram to Emperor William containing the following sentence: "Peace is assured, and thanks to you, will remain definitive." This gave great umbrage at Vienna; but in the divided condition of the European Concert, no State wanted to act alone. So the treaty stands.
The condition of Bulgaria was indeed pitiable, but her cup was not yet full. Immediately after occupying Adrianople on July 20th, the Turks had made advances to the Bulgarian government looking to the settlement of a new boundary. But Bulgaria, relying upon the intervention of the Powers, had refused to treat at all. On August 7th the representatives of the great Powers at Constantinople called collectively upon the Porte to demand that it respect the Treaty of London. But the Porte had seen Europe so frequently flouted by the little Balkan States during the previous year, that it had slight respect for Europe as a collective entity. In fact, Europe's prestige at Constantinople had disappeared. J'y suis, j'y reste was the answer of the Turks to the demand to evacuate Adrianople. The recapture of that city had been a godsend to the Young Turk party. The Treaty of London had destroyed what little influence it had retained after the defeat of the armies, and it grasped at the seizure of Adrianople as a means of awakening enthusiasm and keeping office. As the days passed by, it became evident that further delay would cost Bulgaria dear. On August 15th the Turkish troops crossed the Maritza river and occupied western Thrace, though the Porte had hitherto been willing to accept the Maritza as the boundary. The Bulgarian hope of a European intervention began to fade. The Turks were soon able to convince the Bulgarian Government that most of the great Powers were willing to acquiesce in the retention of Adrianople by the Turks in return for economic and political concessions to themselves. There was nothing for Bulgaria to do but yield, and on September 3d General Savoff and M. Tontcheff started for Constantinople to treat with the Turkish government for a new boundary line. They pleaded for the Maritza as the boundary between the two States, the possession of the west bank being essential for railway connection between Bulgaria and Dedeagatch, her only port on the Aegean. But this plea came in conflict with the determination of the Turks to keep a sufficient strategic area around Adrianople. Hence the Turks demanded and secured a considerable district on the west bank, including the important town of Dimotika. By the preliminary agreement signed on September 18th the boundary starts at the mouth of the Maritza river, goes up the river to Mandra, then west around Dimotika almost to Mustafa Pasha. On the north the line starts at Sveti Stefan and runs west so that Kirk Kilesseh is retained by Turkey.
While the Balkan belligerents were settling upon terms of peace among themselves, the conference of ambassadors at London was trying to bring the settlement of the Albanian problem to a conclusion. On August 11th the conference agreed that an international commission of control, consisting of a representative of each of the great Powers, should administer the affairs of Albania until the Powers should select a prince as ruler of the autonomous State. The conference also decided to establish a gendarmerie under the command of military officers selected from one of the small neutral States of Europe. At the same time the conference agreed upon the southern boundary of Albania. This line was a compromise between that demanded by Greece and that demanded by Austria-Hungary and Italy. Unfortunately it was agreed that the international boundary commission which was to be appointed should in drawing the line be guided mainly by the nationality of the inhabitants of the districts through which it would pass. At once Greeks and Albanians began a campaign of nationalization in the disputed territory, which resulted in sanguinary conflicts. Unrest soon spread throughout the whole of Albania. On August 17th a committee of Malissori chiefs visited Admiral Burney, who was in command, at Scutari, of the marines from the international fleet, to notify him that the Malissori would never agree to incorporation in Montenegro. They proceeded to make good their threat by capturing the important town of Dibra and driving the Servians from the neighborhood of Djakova and Prizrend. Since then the greater part of northern and southern Albania has been practically in a state of anarchy.
The settlement of the Balkans described in this article will probably last for at least a generation, not because all the parties to the settlement are content, but because it will take at least a generation for the dissatisfied States to recuperate. Bulgaria is in far worse condition than she was before the war with Turkey. The second Balkan war, caused by her policy of greed and arrogance, destroyed 100,000 of the flower of her manhood, lost her all of Macedonia and eastern Thrace, and increased her expenses enormously. Her total gains, whether from Turkey or from her former allies, were but eighty miles of seaboard on the Aegean, with a Thracian hinterland wofully depopulated. Even railway communication with her one new port of Dedeagatch has been denied her. Bulgaria is in despair, but full of hate. However, with a reduced population and a bankrupt treasury, she will need many years to recuperate before she can hope to upset the new arrangement. And it will be hard even to attempt that; for the status quo is founded upon the principle of a balance of power in the Balkan peninsula; and Roumania has definitely announced herself as a Balkan power. Servia, and more particularly Greece, have made acquisitions beyond their wildest dreams at the beginning of the war and have now become strong adherents of the policy of equilibrium.
The future of the Turks is in Asia, and Turkey in Asia just now is in a most unhappy condition. Syria, Armenia, and Arabia are demanding autonomy; and the former respect of the other Moslems for the governing race, i.e., the Turks, has received a severe blow. Whether Turkey can pull itself together, consolidate its resources, and develop the immense possibilities of its Asiatic possessions remains, of course, to be seen. But it will have no power, and probably no desire, to upset the new arrangement in the Balkans.
The settlement is probably a landmark in Balkan history in that it brings to a close the period of tutelage exercised by the great Powers over the Christian States of the Balkans. Neither Austria-Hungary nor Russia emerges from the ordeal with prestige. The pan-Slavic idea has received a distinct rebuff. To Roumania and Greece, another non-Slavic State, i.e., Albania, has been added; and in no part of the peninsula is Russia so detested as in Bulgaria which unreasonably protests that Russia betrayed her. "Call us Huns, Turks, or Tatars, but not Slavs." Twice the Austro-Hungarians, in their anxiety to maintain the balance of power in the Balkans, made the mistake of backing the wrong combatant. In the first war, they upheld Turkey; and in the second, they favored Bulgaria. In encouraging Bulgarian aggression they estranged Roumania, the faithful friend of a generation, and Bulgaria won only debt and disgrace. Yet Austria-Hungary must now continue to support Bulgaria as a counterpoise to a stronger Servia which they consider a menace to their security because of Servian influence on their southern Slavs. The Balkan states will manage their own affairs in the future, but they will still offer abundant opportunity for the play of Russian and Austro-Hungarian rivalry. It had been hoped that the Balkan peninsula, when freed from the incubus of Turkish misrule, would settle down to a period of general tranquillity. Instead of this, the ejectment of the Turk has resulted in increased bitterness and more dangerous hate.