RAYMOND TEMPORISES
On hearing this, Raymond suddenly quitted Tizzano, passed the lofty range of Monte Albano, and by night-fall had joined his detachment and invested the fortified bridge and fortress of Cappiano. This was an unexpected stroke for the Lucchese general, who believed himself safe in that quarter, and would appear to have doubted the possibility of so sudden a passage of the Gusciana by any soldiers; so that this operation increased the fame of Cardona, the confidence of the league, and the spirit of the Florentines. His frontier line being thus broken, Castruccio immediately quitted Pistoia, and entering the Val di Nievole threw his army in position amongst the hills above Vivinaia, which he endeavoured to strengthen while he pressed for the co-operation of all his friends; Pisa disregarded this summons in consequence of his recent treachery; but from Lucca, Arezzo, La Marca, Romagna, and the Maremma he assembled thirteen hundred men-at-arms and a numerous infantry, with which he reinforced all his positions from Vivinaia to Porcari, strengthening the latter with additional works and troops to secure his communications with Lucca; and finally cut a trench from the hills to the marsh of Bientina which was guarded with the utmost solicitude.
The bridge of Cappiano was taken by Cardona on the 13th of July; the town itself next fell; two days after, Montefalcone was summoned and reduced in eight days, and thus the whole line of the Gusciana was cleared of the enemy. This rapid success brought numerous reinforcements from Siena, Perugia, Bologna, Agubbio, Grosseto, Montepulciano, Chiusi, Colle, San Gimignano, Volterra, San Miniato, Faenza, Imola, Count Battifolle, and the exiles from Lucca and Pistoia; all eager to assist in overwhelming this formidable chieftain; so that the army had already swelled to 3454 men-at-arms and a proportionate number of infantry. With this immense force Cardona advanced, and on the 3rd of August invested the strong fortress of Altopascio, which crowns a hill rising from the marshes north of the Bientina Lake; the place, although impregnable to an assault, was so damaged by the battering engines and so poisoned by heat, sickness, and the horrid stench of filthy matter which it was then usual to cast into besieged towns, that on hearing of the discomfiture of a Lucchese detachment sent from Pistoia to make a diversion towards Florence it immediately surrendered.
The capture of this place was succeeded by doubts, discussion, and delay; the troops had become sickly from heats and malaria, and the army proportionably reduced; discontent and intrigues were plentiful, and Castruccio, quick in the use of corruption, seized the favourable moment to bribe two Frenchmen of high rank, but was detected and baffled. Cardona himself, although proof against Castruccio’s temptations, was false and ambitious; he had seen Florence in periods of distress repeatedly surrender her liberties, and determined by getting her into difficulties to try if he also could not become her master; the fall of Altopascio elated him, his pockets were filled and his camp emptied by the bribes of rich citizens who, tired of a long campaign and alarmed at increasing sickness, cheerfully exchanged their money for leave of absence and the pleasures of the capital. The cavalry, being generally composed of these, was reduced along with the rest of the army to almost half its original number, and Cardona wished this; for his thoughts ran high, and hence his delays, discussions, and repeated demands to be invested with the same power in the city that he already exercised in the army; in order, as he said, to insure the necessary obedience. But finding that the government would not listen to his request, he lay idle amongst the Bientina marshes while Castruccio, with the eyes and activity of a lynx, strained every nerve to catch him in his toils, and succeeded; so that he who at first neglected the means of victory through bad faith, was at last through incapacity unable to save himself from destruction. Dissension arose both in the camp and city about the propriety of withdrawing the army to a more healthy quarter or boldly pushing on to Lucca; the most cautious advised the former course from a suspicion of the general’s views and the state of the troops; but their opponents prevailed both in camp and council, some of them even favouring Cardona’s wildest speculations. It was therefore resolved to advance towards Lucca; but instead of cutting through the enemy’s position while he was weak, by a direct movement, as might have been effected, a bad unhealthy post was occupied on the edge of the Sesto marsh, which decimated the troops while it still more augmented the gains of the general.