Walpole and Chatham (1714-1760)

by Unknown

TREATY OF AIX-LA-CHAPELLE (1748).

I.
Lord Bolingbroke on the Preliminaries.

Source.—The Marchmont Papers, 1831. Vol. ii., pp. 314-319.

Our true interests require, that we should take few engagements on the Continent, and never those of making a land war, unless the conjuncture be such, that nothing less than the weight of Britain can prevent the scales of power from being quite overturned. This was the case surely, when we arrived in the Netherlands (1743) and when we marched into Germany. The first did some good, and as it was managed, some hurt. It divided the attention of France, and became a reason the more for recalling the army of Maillebois. But the fierce memorials, with which it was accompanied, and which breathed an immediate and direct war against France, frightened those, whom our arriving should have encouraged, and gave much advantage to the French in the Seven Provinces. The last, I mean our march to the Mayn [where the English encamped in May, 1744] and vast diversion we made by it, has had a full effect. The Bavarians are reduced to a neutrality, and the French, who threatened Vienna, to the defence of their own provinces. The defensive war the Queen of Hungary made on that side, is therefore at an end, strictly speaking; and your Lordship may think perhaps, that, this being so the case, wherein alone Great Britain ought to make war on the Continent, exists, no longer. It is, I own, very provoking to see, that the French are able at any time to invade their neighbours, to give law if they succeed, and not to receive it if they fail, but to retire behind their barrier, and defy from thence the just resentment of the enemies they have made; and yet we ought to consider very coolly, how far we suffer this provocation to have any share in determining our conduct in the present circumstances. I have seen the time, when the French would have given up the very barrier, that secures them now. We would not take it then. Can we force it now? I said once, that Bouchain had cost our nation above six millions; and they who were angry at the assertion [the Whigs] could not contradict it, since Bouchain was the sole conquest of 1711, and since the expence of that year's war amounted to little less. Are we able to purchase at such a rate? or do we hope to purchase at a cheaper, when my Lord Marlborough and Prince Eugene are no more?... We shall have a very nice game to play, for if our friends, the Austrians, would take advantage of too much facility to continue the war, our enemies, the Spaniards and the French, would certainly take advantage of too much haste to conclude it. This reflection becomes the more important, because the war we have with Spain, seems more likely to be determined in Italy than in America; and somewhere or other it must be determined to our advantage.... In all events, my dear Lord, and whatever peace we make, it will become an indispensable point of policy to be on our guard, after what has happened, against the joint ambition of the two branches of Bourbon, whom no acquisitions can satisfy, nor any treaties bind, and who have begun to act in late instances, as the two branches of Austria did in the last century. The treaty of quadruple alliance, and a long course of timid unmeaning negociations, unmeaning relatively to the interest of Great Britain, have encouraged this spirit. A contrary conduct must check it; and I will venture to say, that, the peace once made on terms less exorbitant, than some sanguine persons would expect, this may be done; and that vigor sufficient for this purpose will be found on the whole less expensive, with prudent management abroad, and honest economy at home, than the pusillanimity of that administration, which has made us despised by some of our neighbours, and distrusted by others, till France had a fair chance for giving the law to all Europe. But it is more than time that I should put an end to this political ramble. I mean it for you alone, and I am used to your indulgence. It is hardly possible, that you should write in answer to this letter, that is to come to me in France. It seemed to me, by the little conversation I had with some of your ministers when I was at London, that their way of thinking was not very distant from mine, about foreign affairs at least. Great Britain must have a peace, my Lord. Her ability to carry on this war, as little as it is, is greater, in my opinion, than that of France. But there are other invincible reasons against it. I repeat, therefore, we must have a peace as soon as possible. To have a good one, vigor in your measures, and moderation in your views, are, I suppose, equally necessary.

II.
The Articles of Peace.

Source.—Coxe's Pelham Administration. Vol. ii., p. 41, 42. The Treaty is to be found at length in Tindal's Continuation of Rapin's History of England. Vol. xxi., pp. 357-366.

The following is an abstract of the articles of the definitive treaty, in which the reader will recognize a general conformity with the preliminaries.

Article I. Renewal of peace between all the contracting powers.

Art. II. Restitution of all conquests, and the status quo ante bellum, with the exceptions herein mentioned.

Art. III. Renewal of the treaties of Westphalia, 1648; of Madrid, between England and Spain, 1667, 1678 and 1679; of Ryswick, 1697; of Utrecht, 1713; of Baden, 1714; of the triple alliance, 1717; of the quadruple alliance, 1718; and of the treaty of Vienna, 1738.

Art. IV. Mutual restoration of prisoners, six weeks after the ratification.

Art. V. Mutual restitution of conquests, and specification of the cessions assigned by Austria, to Don Philip, according to the preliminaries.

Art. VI. All the restitutions in Europe, specified in this treaty, to be made within the term of six weeks after the ratifications, and in particular all the Low Countries to be restored to the Empress Queen, and likewise those Barrier Towns, the sovereignty of which belonged to the House of Austria, to be evacuated, for the admission of the troops of the States-General.

Art. VII. Parma, Placentia, and Guastalla, to be delivered to Don Philip, at the time that Nice and Savoy are restored to the King of Sardinia.

Art. VIII. Measures to be adopted for insuring the restitutions, within the period appointed.

Art. IX. The King of England engages to send two hostages of rank to Paris, until Cape Breton, and all his conquests in the West and East Indies, shall be restored.

Art. X. The revenues and taxes of the conquered countries, to belong to the powers in possession, until the day of the ratification.

Art. XI. All archives to be restored within two months, or as soon afterwards as possible.

Art. XII. The king of Sardinia to retain possession of all the territories, conceded to him by the treaty of Worms, excepting Finalé and Placentia; namely, the Vigevenasco, part of the Pavesaeno, and the county of Anghiera.

Art. XIII. The Duke of Modena to be restored to all his dominions.

Art. XIV. Genoa to be reinstated in all her possessions and rights, and her subjects in the enjoyment of all the funds belonging to them, in the Austrian and Sardinian banks.

Art. XV. All things in Italy to remain as before the war, with the exceptions contained in the preceding articles.

Art. XVI. The Assiento Treaty, and the privilege of sending the annual ship to the Spanish colonies, confirmed for four years, according to the right possessed before the war.

Art. XVII. Dunkirk to remain fortified on the side of the land, in its existing condition; and, on that of the sea, to be left on the footing of antient treaties.

Art. XVIII. Certain claims of money, by the King of England, as elector of Hanover, on the crown of Spain; the differences concerning the abbey of St. Hubert, and the boundaries of Hainault; and the courts of justice recently established in the Low Countries, as also the pretensions of the elector-palatine, to be amicably adjusted by commissaries.

Art. XIX. Confirmation of the guaranty of the Protestant Succession of the House of Brunswick, in all its descendants, as fully stipulated in the fifth article of the quadruple alliance.

Art. XX. All the German territories of the King of England, as elector of Brunswick-Lunenberg guarantied.

Art. XXI. All the contracting powers, who guarantied the Pragmatic Sanction of the 19th of April, 1713, now guaranty the entire inheritance of Charles the Sixth, in favour of his daughter, Maria Theresa, and her descendants, excepting those cessions previously made by Charles the Sixth or by Maria Theresa herself, and those included in the present treaty.

Art. XXII. Silesia and Glataz guarantied to the King of Prussia.

Art. XXIII. All the powers interested in this treaty jointly guaranty its execution.

Art. XXIV. Exchange of the ratifications to be made at Aix la Chapelle, by all the contracting powers within a month after the signatures.

III.
A Contemporary View of the Peace.

Source.—Letters of Mary Lepel, Lady Hervey, 1821, p. 126.

May 31st, 1748.

... I am as glad of the peace, sir, as you can be, for without it we were certainly undone; for which reason I am, I confess, astonished that the French, who had the whole in their hands, should give it us. There are four people who have certainly had a narrow escape by it; for one campaign more, and the Duke of Cumberland, with his little army, would have been cut to pieces; the Prince of Orange would have been deposed, and the Duke of Newcastle and Lord Sandwich would, or should have been called to an account, which I fancy they could not have made up and balanced to their advantage.