Afternoon Session
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember what you said about the relations between you and the Führer? May I repeat your words:
“The chief influence on the Führer, if I may mention influence on the Führer at all, was up to the end of 1941 or the beginning of 1942, and that influence was I. Then my influence gradually decreased until 1943, and from 1943 on it decreased speedily. All in all, apart from myself I do not believe anyone else had anywhere near the influence on the Führer that I had.”
That is your view on that matter?
GÖRING: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think you told the Tribunal that right up to the end your loyalty to the Führer was unshaken, is that right?
GÖRING: That is correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you still seek to justify and glorify Hitler after he had ordered the murder of these 50 young flying officers at Stalag Luft Number III?
GÖRING: I am here neither to justify the Führer Adolf Hitler nor to glorify him. I am here only to emphasize that I remained faithful to him, for I believe in keeping one’s oath not in good times only, but also in bad times when it is much more difficult.
As to your reference to the 50 airmen, I never opposed the Führer so clearly and strongly as in this matter, and I gave him my views about it. After that no conversation between the Führer and myself took place for months.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The Führer, at any rate, must have had full knowledge of what was happening with regard to concentration camps, the treatment of the Jews, and the treatment of the workers, must he not?
GÖRING: I already mentioned it as my opinion that the Führer did not know about details in concentration camps, about atrocities as described here. As far as I know him, I do not believe he was informed. But insofar as he . . .
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not asking about details; I am asking about the murder of four or five million people. Are you suggesting that nobody in power in Germany, except Himmler and perhaps Kaltenbrunner, knew about that?
GÖRING: I am still of the opinion that the Führer did not know about these figures.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, you remember how Mr. Dahlerus described the relations between you and Hitler on Page 53 of his book:
“From the very beginning of our conversation, I resented his manner towards Göring, his most intimate friend and comrade from the years of struggle. His desire to dominate was explicable, but to require such obsequious humility as Göring now exhibited, from his closest collaborator, seemed to me abhorrent and unprepossessing.”
Is that how you had to behave with Hitler?
GÖRING: I did not have to behave in that way, and I did not behave in that way. Those are journalistic statements by Dahlerus, made after the war. If Germany had won the war, this description would certainly have been very different.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Mr. Dahlerus was your witness, though.
GÖRING: Mr. Dahlerus was not asked to give a journalistic account. He was solely questioned about the matters with which he, as courier between myself and the British Government, had to deal.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, on Tuesday of last week, the defendant called General Bodenschatz, who gave general evidence as to his character and reputation. He, therefore, in my respectful submission, makes me entitled to put one document to him which is an account by the Defendant Raeder of his general character and reputation. In accordance with the English practice, I make my submission and ask the Court’s permission to put it in.
DR. STAHMER: I object to the reading of this document. It would be considerably easier to question Admiral Raeder, as witness, on his statements, since he is here with us. Then we shall be able to determine in cross-examination whether and to what extent he still maintains this alleged statement.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I have to put it in cross-examination to give the defendant the chance of answering it. The Defendant Raeder can give his explanations when he comes into the witness box.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to look at the document before it is put in.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is the English translation. I will show Dr. Stahmer the German.
DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, I should like to point out, that the document bears no date and we do not know when and where it was drawn up.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is signed by the Defendant Raeder.
DR. STAHMER: When and where was it drawn up? The signature of Raeder is unknown to me.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The date is in Raeder’s handwriting as is the signature; the 27th of July, I think it is 1945. Each page of the document is signed by the Defendant Raeder.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, you said the defendant has put his character in issue through Bodenschatz?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Your Lordship will remember he was asked by Doctor Stahmer: “Will you now tell me about the defendant’s social relations?” And then he proceeded to give an account of his character and his kindness and other qualities at that time; and I notice that Doctor Stahmer has just included as an exhibit still further evidence as to character in the form of a statement by one Hermann Winter.
THE PRESIDENT: Would it not have been appropriate, if the document was to have been put in evidence, to have put it to Bodenschatz, who was giving the evidence?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But, My Lord, the rule is that if the defendant puts his character in issue, he is entitled to be cross-examined on his character and his general reputation, and of course it is permissible to call a witness to speak as to his general reputation.
DR. STAHMER: May I make the following remark? I did not call Bodenschatz, neither did I question him as witness for Göring’s character. I questioned him about certain facts and happenings from which Bodenschatz subsequently drew certain conclusions. In my opinion, all these questions should have been put to Bodenschatz when he was here. These statements could then have been used to prove that it was Bodenschatz who was not telling the truth, not that Göring had told an untruth. To prove this the document should have been used during Bodensehatz’s interrogation. Then we would have been able to question Bodenschatz about it too.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: He may prefer that Bodenschatz be brought back and it be put to him, but I think I am entitled to put it to the defendant who called for the evidence as to his character and reputation.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
[A recess was taken.]
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal rules that at the present stage, this document cannot be used in cross-examination.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Honor pleases, I understand that Your Lordship leaves open the question for further argument, whether it can be used for the Defendant Raeder in the witness box.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am much obliged.
[Turning to the witness.] Now, Witness, you said before the Tribunal adjourned, that Hitler, in your opinion, did not know about—broadly—or was ignorant about, the question of concentration camps and the Jews. I would like you to look at Document Number D-736. That is an account of a discussion between the Führer and the Hungarian Regent Horthy on the 17th of April 1943, and if you would look at Page 4, you will see the passage just after “Nuremberg and Fürth.”
GÖRING: Just a moment. I should like to read through it very quickly to determine its authenticity.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly.
GÖRING: Page 4.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Page 4—Exhibit Number GB-283. You see, after the mention of Nuremberg and Fürth, Hitler goes on:
“The Jews did not even possess organizational value. In spite of the fears which he, the Führer, had heard repeatedly in Germany, everything continued to go its normal way without the Jews. Where the Jews were left to themselves, as for instance in Poland, the most terrible misery and decay prevailed. They are just pure parasites. In Poland, this state of affairs had been fundamentally cleared up. If the Jews there did not want to work, they were shot. If they could not work, they had to perish. They had to be treated like tuberculosis bacilli, with which a healthy body may become infected. This was not cruel—if one remembers that even innocent creatures of nature, such as hares and deer, have to be killed so that no harm is caused by them. Why should the beasts who wanted to bring us Bolshevism be more preserved? Nations which do not rid themselves of Jews perish. One of the most famous examples is the downfall of that people who were once so proud, the Persians, who now lead a pitiful existence as Armenians.”
And would you look at Exhibit USSR-170, Document Number USSR-170, which is a conference which you had on the 6th of August 1942.
THE PRESIDENT: Before you pass from this document, is there not a passage higher up that is important? It is about 10 lines down, I think, in the middle of the line . . .
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Your Honor is correct.
“To Admiral Horthy’s counterquestion as to what he should do with the Jews, now that they had been deprived of almost all possibility of earning their livelihood—he could not kill them off—the Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs declared that the Jews should be exterminated, or taken to concentration camps. There was no other possibility.”
GÖRING: I do not know this document.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, this is a conference which you had with a number of people, and on Page 143, if you will turn to it, you get on to the question of butter. If you will look where it says: “Reich Marshal Göring: How much butter do you deliver? 30,000 tons?”
Do you see that?
GÖRING: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And then Lohse, who is in the conference, says, “Yes,” and you say, “Do you also deliver to Wehrmacht units?” and then Lohse says, “I can answer that too. There are only a few Jews left alive. Tens of thousands have been disposed of, but I can tell you that the civilian population gets, on your orders, 15 percent less than the Germans.” I call your attention to the statement that “there are only a few Jews left alive, tens of thousands have been disposed of.” Do you still say, in the face of these two documents, that neither Hitler nor yourself knew that the Jews were being exterminated?
GÖRING: I beg that the remarks be rightly read. They are quite incorrectly reproduced. May I read the original text? “Lohse:”—thus not my remark, but the remark of Lohse—“I can also answer that. The Jews are left only in small numbers. Thousands have gone.” It does not say here that they were destroyed. From this remark you cannot conclude that they were killed. It could also mean that they had gone away—they were removed. There is nothing here . . .
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: About the preceding remark, I suggest that you make quite clear what you meant by “there are only a few Jews left alive, whereas tens of thousands have been disposed of.”
GÖRING: They were “still living there.” That is how you should understand that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You heard what I read to you about Hitler, what he said to Horthy and what Ribbentrop said, that the Jews must be exterminated or taken to concentration camps. Hitler said the Jews must either work or be shot. That was in April 1943. Do you still say that neither Hitler nor you knew of this policy to exterminate the Jews?
GÖRING: For the correctness of the document . . .
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Will you please answer my question. Do you still say neither Hitler nor you knew of the policy to exterminate the Jews?
GÖRING: As far as Hitler is concerned, I have said I do not think so. As far as I am concerned, I have said that I did not know, even approximately, to what extent these things were taking place.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You did not know to what degree, but you knew there was a policy that aimed at the extermination of the Jews?
GÖRING: No, a policy of emigration, not liquidation of the Jews. I knew only that there had been isolated cases of such perpetrations.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Thank you.
GEN. RUDENKO: If I understand you, Defendant Göring, you said that all the basic decisions concerning foreign, political, and military matters were taken by Hitler alone? Do I understand you rightly?
GÖRING: Yes, certainly. After all, he was the Führer.
GEN. RUDENKO: Am I to understand that Hitler took these decisions without listening to the opinions of the experts who studied the questions, and the intelligence reports on those matters?
GÖRING: It depended upon the circumstances. In certain cases he would ask for data to be submitted to him, without the experts knowing the exact reason. In other cases, he would explain to his advisers what he intended to do, and get from them the data and their opinion. Final decisions he took himself as Supreme Commander.
GEN. RUDENKO: In that case, do I understand you correctly when you say that when making important decisions, Hitler used the analysis and material given to him by his close collaborators, who advised him according to their speciality. Is that correct?
GÖRING: Given to him partly by his collaborators, partly as in the case of communication and intelligence, by other members of the departments concerned?
GEN. RUDENKO: Will you tell me then, who was the closest collaborator of Hitler as far as the Air Force was concerned?
GÖRING: I was, of course.
GEN. RUDENKO: And on the questions of economics?
GÖRING: In economic matters, it was also I.
GEN. RUDENKO: And on political matters?
GÖRING: It depended on what question came up for discussion, and on whether the Führer had consulted anybody or asked his opinion.
GEN. RUDENKO: Can you tell me, who were these collaborators and associates?
GÖRING: The close collaborators of the Führer as I said before were first I, myself. Another close associate—perhaps it is the wrong word—with whom he perhaps spoke more than with others was Dr. Goebbels. Then, of course, you must consider the different periods. It varied during the 20 years; towards the end, it was Bormann first and foremost. During the years 1933 and 1934, until shortly before the end, it was Himmler also, when certain questions were dealt with. And if the Führer was dealing with certain other specific questions, then he would, of course, as is the custom in every government, consult the person who knew most about the question and obtain the information from him.
GEN. RUDENKO: Can you also name which of his collaborators were associated with him in the field of foreign politics?
GÖRING: As far as foreign policy was concerned, Hitler only consulted his colleagues more on the, so to speak, purely technical side. The most important and far-reaching political decisions were taken by himself, and he then announced them to his collaborators and colleagues as ready-made conceptions. Only very few people were allowed to discuss them, myself for instance; and the technical execution of his decisions in the field of foreign policy, when it came to framing the diplomatic notes, was done by the Foreign Office and its minister.
GEN. RUDENKO: The Defendant Ribbentrop?
GÖRING: Yes, naturally, he was the foreign minister concerned, but he did not make foreign policy.
GEN. RUDENKO: And on questions of strategy, who advised Hitler?
GÖRING: There were several people. On purely departmental matters of strategic importance it was the three commanders-in-chief and their chiefs of general staff, and to some extent, the Supreme General Staff which was immediately attached to the Führer.
GEN. RUDENKO: Which of the defendants can be placed in the category of such consultants?
GÖRING: If he was asked by the Führer, then the adviser on strategic matters was the Chief of the Operations Staff, General Jodl; and as far as military administrative questions were concerned, the commanders-in-chief, that is myself, Admiral Raeder, and later Admiral Dönitz for the Navy. The other representatives of the Army did not take part.
GEN. RUDENKO: The next question. If we approach the subject, not theoretically but functionally, could we conclude that any recommendations which Hitler’s leading associates might make, would have had any considerable influence on Hitler’s final decisions?
GÖRING: If I disregard the purely formal point of view and presumably you are referring to the military sphere, then the position was . . .
GEN. RUDENKO: No, I mean all spheres. All aspects of questions such as economic questions, home policy, foreign policy, military, and strategic questions. I mean, if we approach the subject, not theoretically but functionally, did their recommendations have any considerable influence on Hitler’s final decisions? That is what I mean.
GÖRING: To a certain extent, yes. Their rejection depended on whether or not they appeared right to the Führer.
GEN. RUDENKO: You said to a certain extent, did you not?
GÖRING: Yes, of course, if a reasonable proposal was made, and he considered it to be reasonable, then he certainly made use of it.
GEN. RUDENKO: I should like to stress that all these consultants must have been closely associated with Hitler. Therefore, they had a certain influence on Hitler’s final decision. They did not stand quite aloof, did they?
GÖRING: They did not stand aloof. Their influence was only effective to the extent that their convictions concurred with those of the Führer.
GEN. RUDENKO: That is clear. Let us now pass to the next set of questions.
When exactly did you start the working out of the plan of action for the use of the German Luftwaffe against the Soviet Union in connection with Case Barbarossa?
GÖRING: The deployment of the Luftwaffe for Case Barbarossa was worked out by my general staff, after the first directive of the Führer’s, that is, after the November directive.
GEN. RUDENKO: In 1940?
GÖRING: In 1940. But I would add that I had already considered making preparations not only in anticipation of a possible threat from Russia, but from all those countries which were not already involved in the war, but which might eventually be drawn in.
GEN. RUDENKO: All right. It was in November 1940, when Germany was preparing to attack Russia? Plans were already being prepared for this attack with your participation?
GÖRING: The other day I explained exactly, that at the time a plan for dealing with the political situation and the potential threat from Russia had been worked out.
GEN. RUDENKO: I ask you to reply to this question briefly, “yes” or “no.” I think it is possible to reply to the question briefly.
Once more I say, in November 1940, more than half a year before the attack on the Soviet Union, plans were already prepared, with your participation, for the attack on the Soviet Union. Can you reply to this briefly?
GÖRING: Yes, but not in the sense in which you are presenting it.
GEN. RUDENKO: It seems to me that I have put the question quite clearly, and there is no ambiguity here at all. How much time did it take to prepare Case Barbarossa?
GÖRING: In which sector, air, land, or sea?
GEN. RUDENKO: If you are acquainted with all phases of the plan, that is concerning the Air Force, the Army and the Navy, then I would like you to answer for all phases of Case Barbarossa.
GÖRING: Generally speaking, I can only answer for the air, where it took a comparatively short time.
GEN. RUDENKO: If you please, just how long did it take to prepare Case Barbarossa?
GÖRING: After so many years I cannot give you the exact time without referring to the documents, but I answered your question when I told you that as far as the Air Force was concerned, it took a comparatively short time; as for the Army, it probably took longer.
GEN. RUDENKO: Thus, you admit that the attack on the Soviet Union was planned several months in advance of the attack itself, and that you, as chief of German Air Force and Reich Marshal, participated directly in the preparation of the attack.
GÖRING: May I divide your numerous questions. Firstly, that was not several months . . .
GEN. RUDENKO: There were not too many questions asked at once. It was only one question. You have admitted that in November 1940 Case Barbarossa was prepared and developed for the Air Force. I ask you in your capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the German Luftwaffe.
GÖRING: That is right.
GEN. RUDENKO: You have answered already the first part of my question. Now the following part: You admit that as chief of the German Air Force and Reich Marshal you participated in preparations for the attack on the Soviet Union?
GÖRING: I once more repeat that I prepared for the possibility of an attack, mainly because of Hitler’s assumption that Soviet Russia was adopting a dangerous attitude. In the beginning the certainty of an attack was not discussed, and that is stated clearly in the directive of November 1940.
Secondly, I want to emphasize that my position as Reich Marshal is of no importance here. That is a title and a rank.
GEN. RUDENKO: But you do not deny—rather, you agree—that the plan was already prepared in November 1940?
GÖRING: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: It appears to me that the question has already been covered in such detail before the Tribunal that we need not talk too much about Case Barbarossa, which is quite clear. I shall go on to the next question:
Do you admit that the objectives of the war against the Soviet Union consisted of invading and seizing Soviet territory up to the Ural Mountains and joining it to the German Reich, including the Baltic territories, the Crimea, the Caucasus; also the subjugation by Germany of the Ukraine, of Bielorussia, and of other regions of the Soviet Union? Do you admit that such were the objectives of that plan?
GÖRING: That I certainly do not admit.
GEN. RUDENKO: You do not admit that! Do you not remember that during the conference at Hitler’s headquarters on the 16th of June 1941, at which you were present, as well as Bormann, Keitel, Rosenberg, and others, Hitler stated the objectives of the attack against the Soviet Union exactly as I have stated them? This was shown by the document submitted to the Tribunal. Have you forgotten that document? Have you forgotten about that?
GÖRING: I can remember the document exactly, and I have a fair recollection of the discussion at the conference. I said the first time that this document, as recorded by Bormann, appears to me extremely exaggerated as far as the demands are concerned. At any rate, at the beginning of the war, such demands were not discussed; nor had they been discussed previously.
GEN. RUDENKO: But you do admit that there are minutes of such a conference?
GÖRING: I admit it because I have seen them. It was a document prepared by Bormann.
GEN. RUDENKO: You also admit that according to the minutes of this meeting, you participated in that conference.
GÖRING: I was present at that conference, and for that reason I question the record.
GEN. RUDENKO: Do you remember that in those minutes the tasks were formulated which were in connection with developing conditions? I shall remind you of various parts of the minutes. It is not necessary to read them in full.
GÖRING: May I ask to be shown a copy of that record.
GEN. RUDENKO: You would like a copy of the minutes of the meeting?
GÖRING: I ask to have it.
GEN. RUDENKO: If you please. Would you like to read the document?
GÖRING: No, only where you are going to quote it.
GEN. RUDENKO: Page 2, second paragraph, Point 2, about the Crimea: “We emphasize”—can you find the place? Do you have it?
GÖRING: Just a moment, I have not found it yet. Yes, I have it.
GEN. RUDENKO: “We emphasize”—states this Point 2—“that we are bringing freedom to the Crimea. The Crimea must be freed of all foreigners and populated by the Germans. Also, Austrian Galicia will become a province of the German Reich.”
Have you found the place?
GÖRING: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: “A province of the Reich,” it says.
GÖRING: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: I want to draw your attention to the end of the minutes. It says here: “The Führer stresses the fact that the whole of the Baltic States must become Reich territory.”
Have you found the place, “The Führer stresses the fact”?
GÖRING: You mean the very last bit?
GEN. RUDENKO: That is right.
GÖRING: “Finally, it is ordered . . .”?
GEN. RUDENKO: A little higher up.
GÖRING: “The Führer stresses . . .”?
GEN. RUDENKO: That is right.
“The Führer stresses the fact that the Baltic countries as well must become Reich territory.” Then it goes on—“Reich territory must also include the Crimea, with its adjoining regions. These adjoining regions must be as big as possible.”
The Führer then says something about the Ukrainians . . .
Go on further; skip one paragraph.
“The Führer, furthermore, stresses that the Volga region also must become Reich territory, as well as the Baku Province, which must become a military colony of the Reich. Eastern Karelia is claimed by the Finns.
“The peninsula Kola, however, because of the large supplies of nickel, should become German territory. Great caution must be exercised in the incorporation of Finland as a federal state. The Finns want the surrounding region of Leningrad. The Führer will level Leningrad to the ground and give it to the Finns afterwards.”
Have you not found the place where it mentions Leningrad and Finland?
GÖRING: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: These are the minutes of the conference at which you were present on the 16th of July 1941, 3 weeks after Germany attacked the Soviet Union. You do not deny that such minutes exist, do you?
It is Document Number L-221.
GÖRING: Just a moment, you are mistaken in the date. You said 3 days; that is not correct.
GEN. RUDENKO: Three weeks, not 3 days.
GÖRING: Oh, 3 weeks; I see.
GEN. RUDENKO: Three weeks after Germany attacked the Soviet Union on the 22d of June, and the conference took place at Hitler’s headquarters on the 16th of July at 1500 hours, I think.
Is it correct that such a conference took place?
GÖRING: That is quite right. I have said so all along, but the record of this is not right.
GEN. RUDENKO: And who took the minutes of the meeting?
GÖRING: Bormann.
GEN. RUDENKO: What was the point of Bormann’s taking the minutes incorrectly?
GÖRING: In this record Bormann has exaggerated. The Volga territory was not discussed. As far as the Crimea is concerned, it is correct, that the Führer . . .
GEN. RUDENKO: Well, let us be a little more precise. Germany wanted the Crimea to become a Reich territory, correct?
GÖRING: The Führer wanted the Crimea, yes, but that was an aim fixed before the war. The same applies to the three Baltic States, which had previously been taken by Russia. They, too, were to go back to Germany.
GEN. RUDENKO: Pardon me. You say that the question of the Crimea arose even before the war, that is, the question of acquiring the Crimea for the Reich. How long before the war was that?
GÖRING: No, before the war the Führer had not discussed territorial aims with us, or, rather which territories he had in mind. At that time, if you read the record, I myself considered the question premature, and I confined myself to more practical matters during that conference.
GEN. RUDENKO: I would like to be still more precise. You state that with regard to the Crimea, there was some question about making the Crimea Reich territory.
GÖRING: Yes, that was discussed during that conference.
GEN. RUDENKO: All right, with regard to the Baltic provinces, there was talk about those, too?
GÖRING: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: All right. With regard to the Caucasus, there was talk about annexing the Caucasus also?
GÖRING: It was never a question of its becoming German. We merely spoke about very strong German economic influence in that sphere.
GEN. RUDENKO: So the Caucasus was to become a concession of the Reich?
GÖRING: Just to what degree obviously could not be discussed until after a victorious war. You can see from the record what a mad thing it is to discuss a few days after a war has broken out the things recorded here by Bormann, when nobody knows what the outcome of that war will be and what the possibilities are.
GEN. RUDENKO: Therefore by exaggeration you mean that the Volga territory for instance was not discussed.
GÖRING: The exaggeration lies in the fact that at that time things were discussed which could not be usefully discussed at all. At the most one might have talked about territory which one occupied, and its administration.
GEN. RUDENKO: We are now trying to establish the facts, namely, that those questions had been discussed, and these questions came up at the conference. You do not deny that, do you?
GÖRING: There had been some discussion, yes, but not as recorded in these minutes.
GEN. RUDENKO: I would like to draw just one conclusion. The facts bear witness that even before this conference, aims to annex foreign territories had been fixed in accordance with the plan prepared months ago. That is correct, is it not?
GÖRING: Yes that is correct, but I would like to emphasize that in these minutes I steered away from these endless discussions, and here the text, reads:
“The Reich Marshal countered this, that is, the lengthy discussion of all these things, by stressing the main points which were of vital importance to us, such as, the securing of food supplies to the extent necessary for economy, securing of roads, et cetera.”
I just wanted to reduce the whole thing to a practical basis.
GEN. RUDENKO: Just so. You have contradicted yourself, inasmuch as in your opinion, the most important thing was the food supply. All the other things could follow later. It says so in the minutes. Your contradiction does not lie in your objection to the plan itself but in the sequence of its execution. First of all you wanted food and later territory. Is that correct?
GÖRING: No, it is exactly as I have read it out, and there is no sequence of aims. There is no secret.
GEN. RUDENKO: Please read it once more and tell me just where you disagreed.
GÖRING: “After the lengthy discussion about persons and matters concerning annexation, et cetera, opposing this, the Reich Marshal stressed the main points which might be the decisive factors for us: Securing of food supplies to the extent necessary for economy, securing of roads, et cetera—communications.”
At the time I mentioned railways, et cetera, that is, I wanted to bring this extravagant talk—such as might take place in the first flush of victory—back to the purely practical things which must be done.
GEN. RUDENKO: It is understandable that the securing of food supplies plays an important part. However, the objection you just gave does not mean that you objected to the annexation of the Crimea or the annexation of other regions, is that not correct?
GÖRING: If you spoke German, then, from the sentence which says, “opposing that, the Reich Marshal emphasized . . .” you would understand everything that is implied. In other words, I did not say here, “I protest against the annexation of the Crimea,” or, “I protest against the annexation of the Baltic States.” I had no reason to do so. Had we been victorious, then after the signing of peace we would in any case have decided how far annexation would serve our purpose. At the moment we had not finished the war, we had not won the war yet, and consequently I personally confined myself to practical problems.
GEN. RUDENKO: I understand you. In that case, you considered the annexation of these regions a step to come later. As you said yourself, after the war was won you would have seized these provinces and annexed them. In principle you have not protested.
GÖRING: Not in principle. As an old hunter, I acted according to the principle of not dividing the bear’s skin before the bear was shot.
GEN. RUDENKO: I understand. And the bear’s skin should be divided only when the territories were seized completely, is that correct?
GÖRING: Just what to do with the skin could be decided definitely only after the bear was shot.
GEN. RUDENKO: Luckily, this did not happen.
GÖRING: Luckily for you.
GEN. RUDENKO: And so, summing this up on the basis of the replies which you gave to my question, it has become quite clear, and I think you will agree, that the war aims were aggressive.
GÖRING: The one and only decisive war aim was to eliminate the danger which Russia represented to Germany.
GEN. RUDENKO: And to seize the Russian territories.
GÖRING: I have tried repeatedly to make this point clear, namely, that before the war started this was not discussed. The answer is that the Führer saw in the attitude of Russia, and in the lining up of troops on our frontier, a mortal threat to Germany, and he wanted to eliminate that threat. He felt that to be his duty. What might have been done in peace, after a victorious war, is quite another question, which at that time was not discussed in any way. But to reply to your question, by that I do not mean to say that after a victorious war in the East we would have had no thoughts of annexation.
GEN. RUDENKO: I do not wish to occupy the time of the Court in returning to the question of the so-called preventive war, but nevertheless, since you touched on the subject, I should like to ask you the following:
You remember the testimony of Field Marshal Milch, who stated that neither Göring nor he wanted war with Russia. Do you remember that testimony of your witness, Field Marshal Milch?
GÖRING: Yes, perfectly.
GEN. RUDENKO: You do remember. In that case why did you not want war with Russia, when you saw the so-called Russian threat?
GÖRING: Firstly, I have said already that it was the Führer who saw the danger to be so great and so imminent. Secondly, in connection with the question put by my counsel, I stated clearly and exactly the reasons why I believed that the danger had not yet become so imminent, and that we should take other preparatory measures first. That was my firm conviction.
GEN. RUDENKO: But you do not deny the testimony of your witness Milch?
GÖRING: Milch held a somewhat different opinion from mine. He considered it a serious danger to Germany because it would mean a war on two fronts. He was not so much of the opinion that Russia did not represent a danger, but he held that in spite of that danger one should take the risk and not use attack as a preventive measure against that danger. I too held the same opinion, but of course at a different time.
GEN. RUDENKO: On the basis of your replies to questions during several sessions, it appears there was no country on earth which you did not regard as a threat.
GÖRING: Most of the other countries did not represent a danger to Germany, but I personally, from 1933 on, always saw in Russia the greatest threat.
GEN. RUDENKO: Well, of course, by “the other countries” you mean your allies, is that right?
GÖRING: No, I am thinking of most of the other countries. If you ask me again I would say that the danger to Germany lay, in my opinion, in Russia’s drive towards the West. Naturally, I also saw a certain danger in the two western countries, England and France, and in this connection, in the event of Germany being involved in a war, I regarded the United States to be a threat as well. As far as the other countries were concerned, I did not consider them to be a direct threat to Germany. In the case of the small countries, they would only constitute a direct threat, if they were used by the large countries, as bases in a war against Germany.
GEN. RUDENKO: Naturally the small countries did not represent the same threat because Germany already occupied them. That has often enough been established by the Tribunal.
GÖRING: No, a small country as such does not represent a threat, but if another large country uses the small one against me, then the small country too can become a danger.
GEN. RUDENKO: I do not want to discuss the thing further as it does not relate to the question. The basic question here is Germany’s intentions with regard to the territory of the Soviet Union, and to that you have already answered quite affirmatively and decisively. So I will not ask you any more questions on this subject. I shall go on to the next question.
Do you admit that as the Delegate for the Four Year Plan you were in full charge of the working out of the plans for the economic exploitation of all the occupied territories, as well as the realization of these plans?
GÖRING: I have already admitted that I assumed responsibility for the economic policy in the occupied territories, and the directions which I had given for the exploitation of those territories.
GEN. RUDENKO: Can you tell me how many million tons of grain and other products were exported from the Soviet Union to Germany during the war?
GÖRING: I cannot give you the figures. How could I know that from memory? But I am sure it is by no means as large as it was stated here.
GEN. RUDENKO: On the basis of your own documents I have the figures, but we will pass on to that question later.
I would like to return to the same conference which has already been mentioned. You remember the document submitted by the Soviet Prosecution, concerning the conference of the 6th of August 1942, Exhibit Number USSR-170, Document Number USSR-170? On 6 August 1942, there was a conference of commissioners of the occupied regions and of the representatives of the military command. This conference took place under your direction. You spoke at this conference—and I would like to remind you of some of the things you said.
GÖRING: May I have a look at these minutes?
GEN. RUDENKO: You want to see the minutes of the meeting? Certainly. It is quite a long document. I do not intend to read the whole thing, but only the relevant passages. I will ask you to look only at Page 111 of this stenographic record—the place is marked with pencil—especially the citations which I am going to quote here. On Page 111, it states:
“Gentlemen: The Führer has given me general powers on a scale such as he has never given hitherto under the Four Year Plan. He has also empowered me . . .”
GÖRING: Just one moment. Are you not omitting “under the Four Year Plan”?
GEN. RUDENKO: Evidently the translation has not reached you. I mentioned the Four Year Plan.
“He has given me additional powers under the Four Year Plan reaching into every branch of our economic structure, whether within the State, the Party, or the Armed Forces.”
Is it correct you were given such exclusive rights and prerogatives as mentioned in the citation?
GÖRING: When the Four Year Plan was formulated I received extraordinary general powers. For the first time unlimited powers were given in the economic sphere, I received authority to issue directives and instructions to the highest Reich departments, to the higher offices of the Armed Forces and the Party. During the war these powers were extended to the economic structure of the occupied countries.
GEN. RUDENKO: In that case I have stated and interpreted, correctly, what you stated at the conference.
GÖRING: Absolutely, in spite of its being wrongly translated into German.
GEN. RUDENKO: With regard to your special prerogatives and rights, I am going to cite the instructions which you gave, as well as the orders you issued to some of the members who took part in a conference held on the 16th of August, and which were binding upon them.
GÖRING: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: In that case, when you used such expressions as “squeeze out,” “get everything possible out of the occupied territories,” such sentences in the directives issued became orders for your subordinates, is that not correct?
GÖRING: Naturally, they were then put into their proper form. These were the words used in direct speech, and the language was not so polite.
GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, I understand.
GÖRING: You are referring to the passage—may I repeat it:
“You certainly are not sent there to work for the welfare of the population . . .”
GEN. RUDENKO: Yes.
GÖRING: Do you mean that passage?
GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, Page 112. It states here, I shall read it:
“You are sent there not to work for the welfare of the population, but for the purpose of extracting everything possible out of these territories. That is what I expect from you.”
GÖRING: You have left out a sentence, “. . . so that the German nation may live . . .”
GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, that is right.
GÖRING: One minute—“. . . extracting everything, so that the German nation may live. That is what I expect from you.”
Before that it states, however, and this is the sentence I would like to read:
“In each of the occupied territories I see the people stuffed with food, while our own people starve.”
The sentence follows then.
GEN. RUDENKO: You do not deny that these are your own words:
“You are sent there not to work for the welfare of the population, but to extract everything possible . . .”
GÖRING: You have to read that in connection with the preceding part. I do not deny that I said that.
GEN. RUDENKO: Do you deny your own words as stated here?
GÖRING: No, I am telling you that I did say that. What I do object to is the way you pick out certain things, whereas they should be taken with their context.
GEN. RUDENKO: These phrases in the document are very expressive. They require no comment.
I draw your attention to the following extract on Page 113, which is also underlined. Here are some of your orders:
“One thing I will do. I will get what I demand of you, and if you cannot do it, I will set up agencies which will get it from you, whether you like it or not.”
Do you see that extract? Is it correct that this is what you said at the conference?
GÖRING: That quotation has not been translated by the interpreter as it is written down here in the original. The interpreter who is translating your words into German is using many strong expressions which are not contained in this document. Squeeze out . . .
GEN. RUDENKO: Please read your original.
GÖRING: It says here “to get from and obtain.” Between “to get from and obtain,” and “to squeeze out,” there is a vast difference in German.
GEN. RUDENKO: To “get out” and to “squeeze out” is about the same thing. And what about the phrase, “I will set up agencies, which will squeeze it out of you.” What have you got?
GÖRING: “Get from” and not “squeeze out of.”
GEN. RUDENKO: “Get from”? Did you have any cause not to trust the Reich commissioners? You refer to them as “special agencies.”
GÖRING: Not only were the Reich commissioners of the Eastern territories present, but also the commissioners of all territories. It was a question of the contribution in foodstuffs which the separate countries had to make, to enable us to deal with the whole food question in all those areas in Europe occupied by us. Before the conference I had been told that it was to be expected, as is always the case in such a situation, that everyone would hold back and get the other fellow to deliver first. In other words, I did not want these fellows to let me down. I knew they would offer me only half and I demanded 100 percent. We could then meet somewhere half way.
GEN. RUDENKO: I ask you—these demands which you made to those present at the conference, did they not mean a ruthless plundering of the occupied territories?
GÖRING: No, the main question at this conference was more food.
GEN. RUDENKO: But I am talking about plunder. Plunder can mean plundering of food from the occupied territories?
GÖRING: I have just said I was responsible for the feeding of practically the whole territory. Some of it was territory which had to be provided with food, and some had a surplus, and it had to be equalized.
At this meeting the contribution to be made by each Reich commissioner was for the most part fixed at 90 percent, and I in no way deny that in making my demands at the meeting I was worked up and used strong words. Later on the exact figures for the deliveries were laid down, and this was the net result of the meeting.
GEN. RUDENKO: I want to draw your attention to Page 118 Here it states as follows, I quote your words, Page 118, please; have you found the place?
GÖRING: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: Here it says:
“It seemed to me to be a relatively simple matter in former days. It used to be called plundering. It was up to the party in question to carry off what had been conquered. But today things have become more humane. In spite of that, I intend to plunder and to do it thoroughly.”
Have you found the sentence?
GÖRING: Yes, I have found it, and that was exactly what I said at that conference. I emphasize that again.
GEN. RUDENKO: I just wanted to ascertain that you really said that.
GÖRING: I did say that, and now I should like to give you the reason. In making that statement I meant that in former times war fed on war. Today you call it something different, but in practice it remains the same.
GEN. RUDENKO: All right. I draw your attention to Page 119. There, addressing those present at the meeting you state:
“Whenever you come across anything that may be needed by the German people, you must be after it like a bloodhound. It must be taken out of store and brought to Germany.”
Have you found that place?
GÖRING: Yes, I have found it.
GEN. RUDENKO: Did you say that?
GÖRING: I certainly assume that I did say it; yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: You did say that. This sentence is the natural logical conclusion of your directions “to plunder and do it thoroughly.”
GÖRING: No, it is not. Just after that I said that I had issued a decree authorizing the soldiers to buy up what they wanted, as much as they wanted, and as much as they could carry. Just buy up everything.
GEN. RUDENKO: You mention soldiers. I wanted to remind you of this too, and as you have quoted it, I will refer to that sentence again. You said, “Soldiers may purchase as much as they want, what they want, and what they can carry away.”
GÖRING: As much as they can carry away, yes, and that was necessary because the custom authorities had issued a restrictive order whereby a soldier could take only a small parcel. It seemed wrong to me, that a soldier, who had fought should benefit the least from victory.
GEN. RUDENKO: So that you do not deny that the extract which has just been read is what you really said in your speech of 6 August 1942.
GÖRING: I do not deny that at all.
GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. Let us go to the next question. Do you admit that as Delegate for the Four Year Plan you directed the deportation to forced labor of millions of citizens from the occupied territories, and that the Defendant Sauckel was your immediate subordinate in this activity? Do you admit that?
GÖRING: On paper he was my subordinate, but he was actually directly subordinate to the Führer. I have already emphasized that to the extent that I was informed, I will take my part of the responsibility; and of course I knew about these statements.
GEN. RUDENKO: I want to draw your attention to your other remarks at the same conference. You will find that on Pages 141 and 142.
GÖRING: That has already been read to the Tribunal.
GEN. RUDENKO: I would like to ask you now if you have found the place?
GÖRING: I have found it.
GEN. RUDENKO: You have found it. You said at this conference:
“I do not want to praise Gauleiter Sauckel, he does not need it. But what he has accomplished in such a short time and with such speed for the recruitment of manpower from all over Europe and setting them to work in our industries, is a unique achievement.”
Further, on Page 142, you say—you were speaking of Koch:
“Koch, they are not only Ukrainians. Your ridiculous 500,000 people! How many has he brought in? Nearly two million! Where did he get the others?”
Did you find the place?
GÖRING: Yes; it does not read quite like that here.
GEN. RUDENKO: It was not explicit. Make it more precise.
GÖRING: Koch is trying to assert that he alone supplied all these people for Sauckel. Whereupon, I replied that for the whole Sauckel program 2,000,000 workers had been supplied and that he, Koch, could lay claim to have supplied only 500,000, at most. In other words, Koch was claiming that he himself had supplied the total number.
GEN. RUDENKO: Did you think that 500,000 from the Ukraine was a small number?
GÖRING: No, that is not the point. I have just explained. Of these 2,000,000 which represent the total supplied by Sauckel in the past, 500,000 came from the whole of the Ukraine, so that Koch did not produce the whole number as he was trying to assert. That is the meaning of the quotation.
GEN. RUDENKO: But you do not deny the underlying meaning that you were speaking here of millions of people who were carried off forcibly to Germany for slave labor.
GÖRING: I do not deny that I was speaking of 2,000,000 workers who had been called up, but whether they were all brought to Germany I cannot say at the moment. At any rate, they were used for the German economy.
GEN. RUDENKO: You do not deny that this was forced labor, slavery?
GÖRING: Slavery, that I deny. Forced labor did of course partly come into it, and the reason for that I have already stated.
GEN. RUDENKO: But they were forcibly taken out of their countries and sent to Germany?
GÖRING: To a certain extent deported forcibly, and I have already explained why.
GEN. RUDENKO: You heard, Defendant Göring, that a series of German documents have been read which make it clear that these people from the occupied territories were sent forcibly to Germany; that they were rounded up, taken in the street, and from the cinemas, loaded into trains and sent to Germany under military guard. If they refused to go to Germany, or tried to evade mobilization, the peaceful inhabitants were shot and submitted to tortures of various nature. You have heard of these documents which describe these methods.
GÖRING: Yes, but may I ask you to look at those documents again. These show that recruitment was not ordered, but that registration even for forced labor was regulated by decrees and other orders. If I had been given an absolute guarantee, particularly in the East, that all these people would be peaceful and peace-loving people, that they would never take part in partisan activities or carry out sabotage, then I probably would have put a larger number to work on the spot. But for security reasons, both in the East and West—particularly in the West—where young age groups were reaching the age of military service—we were compelled to draft these men into labor and bring them to Germany.
GEN. RUDENKO: They were taken to Germany only in the interest of security and safety?
GÖRING: There were two reasons. I have already explained them in detail. Firstly, for security reasons. Secondly, because it was necessary to find labor.
GEN. RUDENKO: And for that reason—let us take the second, the necessity of finding labor—people were forcibly taken from their country and sent to slavery in Germany. Is that correct?
GÖRING: Not to slavery; they were sent to Germany to work, but I must repeat that not all of those who were taken away from the East and are missing there today, were brought in to work. For instance, in the case of Poland already 1,680,000 Poles and Ukrainians had been taken by the Soviet Union from the territory which the Russians occupied at that time, and transported to the East—the Far East.
GEN. RUDENKO: I do not think you had better touch on the question of the Soviet territories. Just answer the question which I am asking you, which concerns the deportation to Germany of the peaceful population from the occupied territories. I am asking you once more: You said in answer to Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe’s question that of the 5,000,000 persons who were sent to Germany, approximately 200,000 were volunteers, while the rest were taken to Germany forcibly. Is that not so?
GÖRING: First of all, I must correct that. I did not say that to Sir David at all, but he asked me.
GEN. RUDENKO: And you admitted it?
GÖRING: Just a moment. That is to say, he mentioned the figure 5,000,000 of which he said not more than 200,000 were volunteers. He questioned me on the strength of the minutes of the Central Planning Board, allegedly a statement by Sauckel. I did not agree and answered that the figure of volunteers was much higher, and that there must be a mistake in the figures.
GEN. RUDENKO: All right. You affirm that the number of volunteers was considerably larger, but you do not deny the fact that millions were sent to Germany against their will. You do not deny that.
GÖRING: Without wanting to tie myself down to a figure, the fact that workers were forcibly put to work is something I have never denied, and I answered accordingly.
GEN. RUDENKO: Let us go to another question: Tell me, what procedure was there for sending on the orders and directives of the OKW to various other government agencies and organs.
GÖRING: I did not understand the meaning of that question as it came through in translation.
GEN. RUDENKO: I would like you to describe the procedure which existed for sending the directives of the OKW to the various units and departments of the Air Force and other organs. How were they distributed?
GÖRING: If I have understood the question correctly, the procedure was as follows: If an order came from the OKW, addressed to the Air Force, it went through the following channels: If it was a direct order from the Führer and signed by the Führer, the order had to be sent directly to me, the Commander-in-Chief. If it was an order—not actually signed by the Führer, but beginning with the words, “By order of the Führer,” or “On the instructions of the Führer”—such an order, according to its importance, would go to the Chief of the General Staff of my Air Force, who, according to the purport and whether it was important, would report it to me verbally. If, however, it dealt with current and departmental matters the order would go immediately and directly to the lower departments concerned without passing through the High Command. It would have been impossible to work otherwise, owing to the very large number of such orders.
GEN. RUDENKO: I understand. In connection with this I would like to ask the following: In 1941 the OKW drew up a series of instructions and orders with regard to the conduct of the troops in the East and how they were to treat the Soviet population. These dealt specifically with military jurisdiction in the Barbarossa region—Document C-50, which has already been submitted to the Tribunal. According to these instructions, the German officers had the right to shoot any person suspected of a hostile attitude towards the Germans, without bringing that person to court. This directive also stated that the German soldiers could not be punished for crimes which they committed against the local population. Directives of this nature must have been submitted to you?
GÖRING: I would have to see that from the distribution chart. May I see the document please?
GEN. RUDENKO: You would like to see the exhibit?
GÖRING: I want to see whether that document went straight to me, or only to my departments.
GEN. RUDENKO: Please look at the date, 13 May 1941.
GÖRING: Actually it did not go straight to me. It says on the distribution chart, “Ob. d. L., Air Force Operations Staff, Senior General Staff officer.” Actually as far as my troops were concerned, I issued very severe disciplinary orders. That is the reason why I have asked for the senior Judge of the Air Force to be called as a witness, and have now sent him an interrogatory which deals with these very questions.
GEN. RUDENKO: You do know about this order, however?
GÖRING: I have seen it here, and consequently asked for the witnesses, since this order did not go directly to the Commander-in-Chief, but to the department which I have just mentioned. Nevertheless, if this department acted on this order, then I do of course formally share the responsibility. But we are here concerned with an order from the Führer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, which could not be questioned by the troops.
GEN. RUDENKO: But you do agree that you must have known about this document because of its importance?
GÖRING: No, if so, it would have come directly to me, the Commander-in-Chief, and not be sent to the Air Force Operations Staff, and the General Staff officers’ department. It depended then on whether this department considered the importance of the document to be such as to require my personal orders and directives. But this was not the case here, since the document did not affect us as much as it did the Army.
GEN. RUDENKO: But the document was sent to your department and circulated there.
GÖRING: I have just said it was sent to two offices.
GEN. RUDENKO: But this document should have been reported to you.
GÖRING: No, it did not have to be reported to me. I explained a little earlier that if every order and every instruction which came through in the shape of an order, but which did not require my intervention, would have had to be reported to me, I should have been drowned in a sea of papers; and that is the reason why only the most important matters were brought to me and reported to me.
I cannot swear upon my oath that this document was not reported to me verbally. It is possible. And I formally take responsibility also for my departments.
GEN. RUDENKO: I would like you to be more precise about it. You say that the most important things were usually reported to you; correct?
GÖRING: That is correct.
GEN. RUDENKO: I would like to draw your attention to the document before you, to the third and fourth paragraphs of the order. The third paragraph says:
“Actions of hostile civilians against the German troops or various troop units, as well as against service personnel, must be suppressed on the spot by the most severe measures, even the extermination of the attackers.”
Paragraph 4: “Thus, no time should be lost . . .”
GÖRING: Just a moment.
GEN. RUDENKO: The fourth paragraph . . .
GÖRING: You have sent me three documents, and I am trying to find out which one; I am trying to sort them out.
GEN. RUDENKO: All right, sort them out.
GÖRING: I shall repeat Paragraph 3 because it has been transmitted quite erroneously in the German.
“Also in the case of all other attacks by hostile civilians against the Armed Forces, their members and service personnel, extreme measures to suppress them must be taken by the troops on the spot, even to the extent of annihilating the attackers.”
GEN. RUDENKO: And Paragraph 4?
GÖRING: Then we come to Number 4, and it is, if I understand you correctly, the paragraph where it says: “Where measures of this kind have been omitted or were not practicable at the moment, the suspected elements will be taken at once to an officer who will decide whether they are to be shot.” That is probably what you meant, is it not?
GEN. RUDENKO: Yes. That is what I had in mind. Could it be assumed that this document, from your point of view, was important enough to have been reported to you?
GÖRING: Actually it was important, but it was not absolutely necessary for it to be reported, because the order of the Führer had made it so clear that a subordinate commander, and even a commander-in-chief of one of the services could not alter a clear and strict order of that kind.
GEN. RUDENKO: I draw your attention once more to the date in the right-hand corner. It states there, Führer headquarters, 13 May 1941.
GÖRING: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: Therefore, it means that this was a month before the German attack on the Soviet Union? Already, then, directives were formulated about military jurisdiction within the regions covered by Case Barbarossa, and you did not know about this document?
GÖRING: When a plan for mobilization is laid, provision must be made for certain eventualities. From his experience, the Führer believed that a serious threat would immediately arise in the East, and in this document measures are laid down for dealing with any action by the resistance, and fighting behind the lines. It was therefore a precautionary order in case of such happenings. Such measures have to be taken always and at all times.
GEN. RUDENKO: And the officers were given the right to shoot civilians without bringing them to trial?
GÖRING: An officer could hold a court martial on the spot, but, according to this paragraph, he could also, if he thought fit and had evidence that the opponent was making attacks from the rear, have him shot on the spot. That has always been done.
GEN. RUDENKO: You think that the officer can hold a court martial on the spot?
GÖRING: That is laid down in the articles of war. Every officer commanding an independent unit can hold a court martial at any time.
GEN. RUDENKO: But you do agree that there is no question of any court here? It states that he alone can decide what to do with the civilian.
GÖRING: He could act alone or through a court martial, which was on the spot. All he needed to do was to call just two more people, and he could reach a decision, in 2 or 5 minutes if evidence of the attack was given.
GEN. RUDENKO: In 5 minutes or 2 minutes, you say, and then he could shoot the person?
GÖRING: If I catch a man in the act of shooting at my troops from a house in the rear, then the matter can be settled very swiftly by a court martial. But where there is no evidence at all, you cannot do that. Here, however, we are dealing with an immediate attack and with the means of putting an end to it.
GEN. RUDENKO: Defendant Göring, let us leave this question. I would only like to point out once more that this directive was issued by the High Command of the Armed Forces on 13 May 1941, and that this order gives an officer the right to shoot a man without a trial. I suppose you will not deny this. Let us go on.
GÖRING: Yes, but I deny that emphatically. There is nothing here which says that an officer has the right to shoot a man right away. Let us get this right. It says here—and I repeat it—“Attacks by hostile civilians against the Armed Forces,” and then it says, “Where measures of this kind are not practicable at the moment, the suspected elements . . .”—and here is meant “suspected elements” only—are to be brought before the highest officer of the formation there present and he will decide the matter. In other words, it does not say that every officer can decide the fate of any civilian.
GEN. RUDENKO: But the resolution is to shoot. It is quite clear. The second document which I would like to submit now and question you about is that dated 16 September 1941. It has been submitted to the Court as Exhibit Number R-98.
GÖRING: Just a moment. What was the date you mentioned?
GEN. RUDENKO: 16 September 1941 is the date of the document. Point B of the document. I will not quote it. I am merely calling it to your mind. It states that as a general rule the death of one German soldier must be paid for by the lives of 50 to 100 Communists. That means that this rule was to serve as a deterrent. I am not going to question you about the main purport of the document. That is quite clear and needs no clarification. What I am interested in is whether this document was likewise unknown to you.
GÖRING: It was not directed to me. Here again it merely went to some office. The Air Force had very little to do with such matters.
GEN. RUDENKO: And these offices did not report to you about such documents?
GÖRING: In a general way I knew about these reprisals, but not to this extent. I learned only later—I mean during the war, not here—that the order originally mentioned 5 to 10 and that the Führer personally made it 50 to a 100. The question is whether you have any evidence that the Air Force really made use of the order anywhere, and they did not. That is all I can tell you.
GEN. RUDENKO: Do not put questions to me. I am asking you. Did your administrative office ever report to you about this document?
GÖRING: No, but later on I heard about this document. At a later date.
GEN. RUDENKO: What do you mean by a “later date”? Please be more precise.
GÖRING: I cannot tell you at the moment. It was sometime during the war that I heard that a figure which originally stood at from 5 to 10 had been altered by the Führer personally to 50 to 100. That is what I heard.
GEN. RUDENKO: For one German?
GÖRING: I have just explained to you. That is what I heard. The number was originally 5 to 10 and the Führer personally added on a zero. It was through that fact being once discussed that I learned about the whole matter.
GEN. RUDENKO: You mean the Führer added the zeros?
THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, do you think it is really necessary to go through these documents in such detail? The documents, after all, speak for themselves, and they have already been presented to the Tribunal.
GEN. RUDENKO: I am finishing with this document, Mr. President.
Do you know anything about the directives of the OKW with regard to the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war?
GÖRING: I shall have to see them.
GEN. RUDENKO: If you please, Mr. President, the document has already been submitted to the Tribunal, as 338-PS.
Please look at Point A, Paragraph 3, which states that there is a broad directive concerning the use of arms against Soviet prisoners of war. The use of weapons must be considered permissible and in any incidents involved the guards are not bound to report on the matter.
This document also speaks for itself. I do not want . . .
GÖRING: Just a moment, I must read it first; there is some ambiguity in here.
GEN. RUDENKO: I should like to refresh your memory with still another subject, that is, a short comment. It is taken from an order concerning the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war. Here it is said that prisoners of war who are trying to escape should be shot without warning. The same subject is also mentioned in the memorandum concerning the treatment of the Russian prisoners of war.
GÖRING: The trouble here was the language difficulty; hence the guards were instructed to use their arms immediately against persons attempting escape. That is more or less the meaning of it, and that errors might occur in this connection can be understood.
GEN. RUDENKO: I am not talking about the purport of the document which speaks for itself. I want to know whether you knew about this document.
GÖRING: This is a document dealing with the treatment of prisoners of war, and it was passed directly to my department which was concerned with prisoners of war. I did not know of this document, neither did I know of the one which contains the opinion of the Foreign Intelligence Department on the matter.
GEN. RUDENKO: You did not know about this document? Very well. Now one other, Number 884-PS, already submitted. It deals with the extermination of political leaders and other political personalities. This is a document . . .
GÖRING: In explanation of this, I should like to point out that the Air Force did not have any camps for Soviet prisoners of war. The Air Force had only six camps in which the air force personnel of other powers were confined; but it had no camps under it with Soviet prisoners of war.
GEN. RUDENKO: I have asked you these questions and shown you these documents because as the second man in Germany, you could not possibly have been unaware of these things.
GÖRING: I apologize if I contradict you. The higher the office I held, the less would I be concerned with orders dealing with prisoners of war. From their very nature, these were departmental orders and not orders of the highest political or military significance. If I had held a much lower rank, then I might have had more knowledge of these orders. I am now looking at the document which you submitted to me—Department of Home Defense. It says on the left, “Reference: Treatment of Captured Political and Military Russian Functionaries.” That is the document I am looking at.
GEN. RUDENKO: Please look at the date of the document—12 May 1941, Führer’s Headquarters.
GÖRING: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: Look at Paragraph 3 of the document.
“Political leaders among the troops are not to be considered prisoners of war and must be exterminated at the latest in the transit camps. They must never be transported to the rear.”
Did you know about this directive?
GÖRING: May I point out that this is in no way a directive, but that it bears the heading, “Memorandum,” and is signed Warlimont. Also the distribution chart does not show any other department than the Home Defense Department, which I have mentioned. In other words, this is a memorandum.
GEN. RUDENKO: You mean to say then that you did not know about this document?
GÖRING: I say once more, this is a memorandum from the Operations Staff of the OKW; and it is not an order or a directive, but a memorandum.
THE PRESIDENT: That is not an answer to the question. You are telling us what it was, not whether you knew of it.
GÖRING: No; I did not. It had been put before me as an order, and I wanted to point out that it is not an order.
GEN. RUDENKO: Let us go on. The directives regarding the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war must have been executed also by the units of the Luftwaffe?
GÖRING: If ordered by the Führer, yes; or if ordered by me, also.
GEN. RUDENKO: Do you remember your own directives with regard to the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war?
GÖRING: No.
GEN. RUDENKO: You do not remember them?
GÖRING: The Air Force had no camps with Soviet prisoners of war.
GEN. RUDENKO: Tell me, the majority of these criminal orders and directives of the OKW, were they not issued even before the beginning of the war against the Soviet Union and as part of the preparations for that war? Does this not show that the German Government and the OKW already had a prepared plan for exterminating the Soviet population?
GÖRING: No. It does not prove it at all. It only shows that we considered a struggle with the Soviet Union would be an extremely bitter one, and that it would be conducted according to other rules as there were no conventions.
GEN. RUDENKO: These rules of warfare are well known to us. Please tell me, do you know about Himmler’s directives given in 1941 about the extermination of 30 million Slavs? You heard about it from the witness Von dem Bach-Zelewski here in court. Do you remember that?
GÖRING: Yes. First of all it was not an order but a speech. Secondly, it was an assertion by Zelewski. And thirdly, in all speeches that Himmler made to subordinate leaders, he insisted on the strictest secrecy. In other words, this is a statement from a witness about what he had heard, and not an order. Consequently, I have no knowledge of this nonsense.
GEN. RUDENKO: You did not know about it. Very well. Tell me, in the German totalitarian state was there not a governing center, which meant Hitler and his immediate entourage, in which you acted as deputy? These directives must have concerned Keitel and Himmler also. Could Himmler of his own volition have issued directives for the extermination of 30 million Slavs without being empowered by Hitler or by you?
GÖRING: Himmler gave no order for the extermination of 30 million Slavs. The witness said that he made a speech in which he said that 30 million Slavs must be exterminated. Had Himmler issued such an order de facto, if he kept to regulations, he would have had to ask the Führer—not me, but the Führer—and the latter would probably have told him at once that it was impossible.
GEN. RUDENKO: I did not say it was an order; I said it was a directive from Himmler. You therefore admit, or you state rather, that Himmler could have issued instructions without discussing them with Hitler?
GÖRING: I emphasize that such instructions could not have been given by Himmler, and I know of no instructions; also no directive has been mentioned here.
GEN. RUDENKO: I shall repeat the question once more: Is it not true that the directives and the orders of the OKW with regard to the treatment of the civilian population and prisoners of war in the occupied Soviet territories were part of the general directives for the extermination of the Slavs? That is what I want to know.
GÖRING: Not at all. At no time has there been a directive from the Führer, or anybody I know of, concerning the extermination of the Slavs.
GEN. RUDENKO: You must have known about the mass extermination of the Soviet citizens from the occupied territories of the Soviet Union with the help of the SD and the Security Police. Is it not true that the Einsatz Kommandos and their activities were the result of the plan prepared in advance for the extermination of Jews and other groups of Soviet citizens?
GÖRING: No. Einsatz Kommandos were an internal organ which was kept very secret.
GEN. RUDENKO: I shall have several other questions. Perhaps it is better to adjourn now.
THE PRESIDENT: How long do you think it will take, General Rudenko?
GEN. RUDENKO: I think not more than another hour.
THE PRESIDENT: All these documents which you have been putting to the witness, as I have pointed out to you, are documents which have already been put in evidence and documents which seem to me to speak for themselves. I hope, therefore, that you will make your cross-examination as short as you can. The Tribunal will now adjourn.
[The Tribunal adjourned until 22 March 1946 at 1000 hours.]