Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremburg, 14 November 1945-1 October 1946, Volume 09

by Various

Morning Session

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Witness, do you remember telling me last night that the only prisoners of war handed over to the police were those guilty of crimes or misdemeanors?

GÖRING: I did not express myself that way. I said if the police apprehended prisoners of war, those who had committed a crime during the escape, as far as I know, were detained by the police and were not returned to the camp. To what extent the police kept prisoners of war, without returning them to a camp, I was able to gather from interrogations and explanations here.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you look at Document D-569? Would you look first at the top left-hand corner, which shows that it is a document published by the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht?

GÖRING: The document which I have before me has the following heading at the top left-hand corner: “The Reichsführer SS,” and the subheading: “Inspector of Concentration Camps.”

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is a document dated the 22d of November 1941. Have you got it?

GÖRING: Yes, I have it now.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, look at the left-hand bottom corner, as to distribution. The second person to whom it is distributed is the Air Ministry and Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force on 22 November 1941. That would be you.

GÖRING: That’s correct. I would like to make the following statement in connection with this . . .

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just for a moment. I would like you to appreciate the document and then make your statement upon it. I shall not stop you. I want you to look at the third sentence in Paragraph 1. This deals with Soviet prisoners of war, you understand. The third sentence says:

“If escaped Soviet prisoners of war are returned to the camp in accordance with this order, they have to be handed over to the nearest post of the Secret State Police, in any case.”

And then Paragraph 2 deals with the special position—if they commit crimes, owing to the fact that:

“. . . at present these misdemeanors on the part of Soviet prisoners of war are particularly frequent, due most likely to living conditions still being somewhat unsettled, the following temporary regulations come into force. They may be amended later. If a Soviet prisoner of war commits any other punishable offense then the commandant of the camp must hand the guilty man over to the head of the Security Police.”

Do I understand this document to say that a man who escapes will be handed over to the Security Police? You understand this document says a man who escapes will be handed over to the Secret Police, a man who commits a crime, as you mentioned, will be handed over to the Security Police. Wasn’t that the condition that obtained from 1941 up to the date we are dealing with in March 1944?

GÖRING: I would like to read the few preceding paragraphs so that no sentences are separated from their context.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, while the witness is reading the document, might I go over the technical matter of the arrangement of exhibits? When I cross-examined Field Marshal Kesselring I put in three documents, UK-66, which becomes Exhibit GB-274; D-39, which becomes GB-275; TC-91, which becomes GB-276; so this document will become GB-277.

[Turning to the witness.] Have you had an opportunity of reading it, Witness?

GÖRING: Yes, I have.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then I am right, am I not, that the Soviet prisoners of war who escaped were to be, after their return to the camp, handed over to the Secret State Police. If they committed a crime, they were to be handed over to the Security Police, isn’t that right?

GÖRING: Not exactly correct. I would like to point to the third sentence in the first paragraph. There it says, “If a prisoner-of-war camp is in the vicinity, then the man who is recaptured is to be transported there.”

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But read the next sentence, “If a Soviet prisoner of war is returned to the camp”—that is in accordance with this order which you have just read—“he has to be handed to the nearest service station of the Secret State Police.” Your own sentence.

GÖRING: Yes, but the second paragraph which follows gives an explanation of frequent criminal acts of Soviet prisoners of war, et cetera, committed at that time. You read that yourself; that is also connected with this Paragraph Number 1. But this order was given by itself and it was distributed to the Army, the Air Force and the Navy. And I would like to give the explanation of its distribution. In this war there were not only hundreds, but thousands of current orders which were issued by superiors to subordinate officers and were transmitted to various departments. That does not mean that each of these thousands of orders was submitted to the Commander-in-Chief; only the most decisive and most important were shown to him. The others went from department to department. Thus it is that this order from the Chief of the High Command was signed by a subordinate department, and not by the Chief of the High Command himself.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: This order would be dealt with by your prisoner-of-war department in your ministry, wouldn’t it?

GÖRING: This department, according to the procedure adopted for these orders, received the order, but no other department received it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think the answer to my question must be “yes.” It would be dealt with by the prisoner-of-war department—your ministry. Isn’t that so?

GÖRING: I would say yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is quicker, you see, if you say “yes” in the beginning; do you understand?

GÖRING: No; it depends upon whether I personally have read the order or not, and I will then determine as to my responsibility.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, the escape . . .

THE PRESIDENT: You were not asked about responsibility; you were asked whether it would be dealt with by your prisoner-of-war department.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, the escape about which I am asking you took place on the night of the 24th to the 25th of March. I want you to have that date in mind. The decision to murder these young officers must have been taken very quickly, because the first murder which actually took place was on the 26th of March. Do you agree with that? It must have been taken quickly?

GÖRING: I assume that this order, as I was informed later, was given immediately, but it had no connection with this document.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, no; we are finished with that document; we are going into the murder of these young men. The Grossfahndung—a general hue and cry, I think, would be the British translation—was also issued at once in order that these men should be arrested; isn’t that so?

GÖRING: That is correct. Whenever there was an escape, and such a large number of prisoners escaped, automatically in the whole Reich, a hue and cry was raised, that is, all authorities had to be on the lookout to recapture the prisoners.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that in order to give this order to murder these men, and for the Grossfahndung, there must have been a meeting of Hitler, at any rate with Himmler or Kaltenbrunner, in order that that order would be put into effect; isn’t that so?

GÖRING: That is correct. According to what I heard, Himmler was the first to report this escape to the Führer.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, General Westhoff, who was in Defendant Keitel’s Kriegsgefangenenwesen, in his prisoner-of-war set-up, says this, that

“On a date, which I think was the 26th, Keitel said to him, ‘This morning Göring reproached me in the presence of Himmler for having let some more prisoners of war escape. It was unheard of.’ ”

Do you say that General Westhoff is wrong?

GÖRING: Yes. This is not in accordance with the facts. General Westhoff is referring to a statement of Field Marshal Keitel. This utterance in itself is illogical, for I could not accuse Keitel because he would not draw my attention to it, as the guarding was his responsibility and not mine.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: One of the Defendant Keitel’s officers dealing with this matter was a general inspector, General Röttich. I do not know if you know him.

GÖRING: No.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, General Westhoff, as one could understand, is very anxious to assure everyone that his senior officer had nothing to do with it, and he goes on to say this about General Röttich:

“He was completely excluded from it by the fact that these matters were taken out of his hands. Apparently at that conference with the Führer in the morning, that is to say, the conference between Himmler, Field Marshal Keitel, and Göring, which took place in the Führer’s presence, the Führer himself always took a hand in these affairs when officers escaped.”

You say that is wrong? You were at no such conference?

GÖRING: I was not present at this conference, neither was General Westhoff; he is giving a purely subjective view, not the facts of the case.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that we find that—you think that—Westhoff is wrong? You see, Westhoff, he was a colonel at this time, I think, and now he finishes as a major general, and he asks that the senior officers be asked about it; he says this: “It should be possible to find out that Himmler made the suggestion to the Führer—to find that out from Göring who was present at the conference.” Again and again Westhoff, who after all is a comparatively junior officer, is saying that the truth about this matter can be discovered from his seniors. You say that it cannot.

GÖRING: I would not say that. I would like just to say that General Westhoff was never present for even a moment, therefore he cannot say, I know or I saw that Reich Marshal Göring was present. He is assuming it is so, or he may have heard it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What he says is, you know, that Keitel blamed him, as I have read to you; that Keitel went on to say to him at General Von Graevenitz’, “Gentlemen, the escapes must stop. We must set an example. We shall take very severe measures. I am only telling you that, that the men who have escaped will be shot; probably the majority of them are dead already.” You never heard anything of that?

GÖRING: I was neither present at the Keitel-Westhoff-Graevenitz conversation nor at the Führer-Himmler conversation. As far as I know General Westhoff will be testifying here. Moreover, Field Marshal Keitel will be able to say whether I was there or not.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well then, I am bound to put this to you. I come on to your own ministry. I suppose in general you take responsibility for the actions of the officers of your ministry from the rank of field officer and above—colonels and major generals and lieutenant generals?

GÖRING: If they acted according to my directives and my instructions, yes; if they acted against my directives and instructions, no.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, just let us see what happened in your own ministry. You know that—do you know, that Colonel Walde made a personal investigation of this matter at the camp? Did you know that?

GÖRING: The particulars about this investigation, as I explained yesterday, are unknown to me; I know only that investigations did take place.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, on the 27th of March, that was a Monday, did you know that there was a meeting in Berlin about this matter? Just let me tell you who were there before you apply your mind to it, so you will know. Your ministry was represented by Colonel Walde, because Lieutenant General Grosch had another meeting, so he ordered his deputy to attend; the Defendant Keitel’s organization was represented by Colonel Von Reurmont; the Gestapo was represented by Gruppenführer Müller; the Kripo was represented by Gruppenführer Nebe. Now, all these officers were of course not on the policy level, but they were high executive officers who had to deal with the actual facts that were carried out, were they not?

GÖRING: They were not executive officers, insofar as it has not been definitely established that executive powers are within an officer’s province. To the first question, whether I knew about this meeting, I would say no. Colonel Walde I do not even know personally.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You mean to say, you are telling the Tribunal, that you were never told about this meeting at any time?

GÖRING: Yes, I am saying that.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I just want you to look at—let him have Walde’s statement—I want you to look at the statement of one of the officers of your own ministry on this point. This is a statement made by Colonel Ernst Walde, and—I am sorry I have not another German copy, but I will get one in due course—and in my copy, Witness, it is at the foot of Page 2, the beginning of the paragraph which I want you to look at, is: “As recaptured prisoners were not to be taken back to their camp, according to an order issued several weeks previously . . .”—can you find it?

GÖRING: Where is it?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, in the English version it is at the middle of the second page, and I want to ask you about the—the middle of that paragraph; I do not know if you see a name—it stands out in my copy—Major Dr. Hühnemörder; do you see that?

GÖRING: Yes, I have found it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, it is the sentence after the name Major Dr. Hühnemörder appears: “On this Monday”—have you got this?

GÖRING: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Thank you.

“On this Monday a conference took place at the Reich Security Main Office at Berlin, Albrechtstrasse. As far as I remember this conference had been called by the Chief of the Prisoner-of-War Organization OKW, and I attended as representative of Luftwaffe Inspektion 17, since General Grosch was unable to attend in person, for reasons which I cannot remember; the Chief of the Prisoner-of-War Organization, as far as I know, was represented by Colonel Von Reurmont, while the Security Office was represented by Gruppenführer Müller and Gruppenführer Nebe, the Chief of the Criminal Police at that time. I find it impossible to give a verbatim account of the conversation or to state what was said by every single person. But I remember this much: That we were informed about a conference which had taken place on the previous day, that is Sunday, at the Führer’s headquarters in connection with the mass escape from Sagan, in the course of which heated discussions had taken place between the participants. In this connection the names of Himmler, Göring, and Keitel were mentioned. Whether Ribbentrop’s name was also mentioned I do not remember. The Führer was not mentioned. At this conference appropriate measures were said to have been discussed, or taken, to check any such mass escapes in the future. The nature of these measures was not disclosed. Later, and more or less in conclusion, Gruppenführer Müller declared that requisite orders had already been given and put into effect the previous morning. Regarding the search for escaped prisoners, he could or would not make any statement; he merely declared that according to reports so far received, shootings had taken place at some points for attempted escapes. I think he said that the number was 10 or 15.

“After these remarks by Gruppenführer Müller, which unmistakably caused a shattering effect, it became clear to me that a decision had been made by the highest authority, and that therefore any intervention by subordinate departments was impossible and pointless.”

Now, this was announced at a meeting of persons that I would call executives, that the shooting had already begun. Are you telling this Tribunal that this matter was made clear to these executives, including one of your own officers, and was never told to you? Are you still saying that?

GÖRING: I am still saying that. Firstly, that I have never heard anything about this conference. Secondly, that the officer in question is only surmising when he mentions the names, he makes no assertion. And thirdly, I would like to ask you also to mention the beginning of this statement, which begins as follows:

“In this matter of the mass escape of British Air Force officers from Prisoner-of-War Camp Number III, at Sagan on 24 or 25 March 1944, I make the following statement:

“I have to point out that in view of the absence of any documents, I am forced to reconstruct completely from memory events which happened almost a year and 9 months ago; I therefore ask that this fact and the possibility thus arising of my making a mistake be taken into consideration, and that due allowances be made.”

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is a perfectly fair point, and the answer to it is that I will show you what this officer reported at the time to his general.

Give the witness General Grosch’s statement.

[The document was submitted to the witness.] We are getting reasonably high up. This officer, General Grosch, signs it as a Lieutenant General. Now, would you like, if you can, to help me again—you were most helpful last time—to try to find the place? This is a statement by Lieutenant General Grosch.

GÖRING: I request to have permission to read this document first, to see whether similar modifications apply here also.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Will you read the first sentence? I do not want to take up time to read an account of the general matter. It says: “During my interrogation on 7 December 1945 I was told to write down all I knew about the Sagan case.” And then he wrote it down. But I would like you to look at Number 1, the first page. Do you see at the foot of the page an account of the pyramid in your ministry of administration? Do you see that at the foot of Page 1?

[There was no response.]

SIR DAVID. MAXWELL-FYFE: Witness, do you see at the foot of Page 1 the pyramid?

GÖRING: I see it but—I am now at the place.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It comes in about the fourth paragraph.

GÖRING: I can see it, but I should like to read the other first.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then, if you will look about four small paragraphs on, it begins: “A few days after the day of the escape—I cannot remember the date any more—Colonel Walde informed me that OKW had called a conference in Berlin.”

Do you see that?

I do not mind you running through it quickly, but you may take it that the first two pages are what I said were there, the pyramid of your ministry.

GÖRING: Yes, I have found it. Which paragraph, please?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is Part C, the fourth paragraph, the Sagan case. “A few days after the escape. . . .” Do you find that?

GÖRING: Yes, I have the place.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Thank you.

“A few days after the day of the escape—I cannot remember the date any more—Colonel Walde informed me that the OKW had called a conference in Berlin—I believe on the premises of a high SS and police authority, and that the Inspectorate Number 17 was to send representatives. I should have liked to have gone myself, but had to attend another conference in Berlin, and asked Colonel Walde to attend as representative. After his return Colonel Walde informed me that the spokesman of the OKW had informed them that there was a decision by the Führer to the effect that, on recapture, the escaped British airmen were not to be handed back to the Luftwaffe but were to be shot.”

Then missing a paragraph and taking the last line of the next paragraph:

“It is, however, certain that the danger of their being shot was even then clearly recognizable. I asked Colonel Walde whether such a far-reaching decision would be notified in writing to the High Command of the Luftwaffe or the Reich Air Ministry or whether he had been given anything in writing. Colonel Walde gave me to understand that the assembly were told by the spokesman of the OKW, that they would receive nothing in writing, nor was there to be any correspondence on this subject. The circle of those in the know was to be kept as small as possible. I asked Colonel Walde whether the spokesman of the OKW had said anything to the effect that the Reich Marshal or the High Command of the Luftwaffe had been informed about the matter. Colonel Walde assured me that the OKW spokesman had told them that the Reich Marshal was informed.”

I will not ask you about that for the moment. I want you to look at what your general did. It says:

“Up to the time of Colonel Walde’s report I had not received even so much as a hint anywhere that escaped prisoners of war should be treated in any other way than according to the provisions of the Geneva Convention.

“The same afternoon I rang up my superior officer, the Chief of Air Defense, to ask time for an interview with General der Flieger Förster. This was fixed for the next morning.

“When I came there to report I found General Förster together with his chief of staff. I asked General Förster for permission to speak to him alone and put the facts before him. In conclusion, I expressed the opinion that if the British airmen were to be shot, (a) there would be a breach of the Geneva Convention, (b) reprisal measures endangering the lives of German airmen held by the British as prisoners of war would have to be expected. I asked General Förster to bring the matter to the notice of the Reich Marshal even at this very late stage, and to stress those two points.

“General Förster was immediately prepared to do this. When it came to the choice of the way in which the matter could be brought to the attention of the Reich Marshal, it was decided to report to State Secretary Field Marshal Milch.

“In my presence General Förster rang up the office of the state secretary and obtained the interview at once. General Förster left the room, and while doing so he instructed me to wait for his return in his study. After some time General Förster came back and told me that he had reported the matter to the state secretary and that Field Marshal Milch had made the necessary notes.”

Look at the last paragraph:

“I gave Colonel Walde the order, despite the ban by the OKW, to incorporate a detailed written statement about the conference in our records. So far as I know, this was done.”

DR. STAHMER: Counsel Stahmer on behalf of the Defendant Göring.

We have had submitted here a series of affidavits given by witnesses who are in Nuremberg and who, in my opinion, could be brought as witnesses in person. Because of the importance of this matter, not only for Göring but for other defendants, I object to this procedure, on the assumption that the same rules apply for cross-examination as examination in chief. By that I mean that we should not be satisfied with an affidavit and depend on an affidavit, if the Prosecution can, without difficulty, summon the witness in order to have him testify before the Tribunal, so that the Defense may be in position to cross-examine these witnesses.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, what you have said is entirely inaccurate. The rules with reference to cross-examination are not the same as rules with reference to examination in chief, and what is being done at the present moment is that the Defendant Göring is being cross-examined as to his credit. He has said that he knew nothing about this matter, and he has been cross-examined to prove that he has lied when he said that.

DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, according to my opinion the procedure should be that the witness be brought here in person. The fact remains that, in our estimation, a reference to an affidavit is a less desirable means than the personal testimony of a witness, which affords the Defense the possibility of adducing evidence.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, as I have already pointed out to you, you are quite in error in thinking that the rules for cross-examination are the same as for examination in chief. The witness at the present moment is being cross-examined and is being cross-examined as to credit; that is to say, to prove whether or not he is telling the truth.

As to the calling of this witness—I think his name is Grosch—you can apply to call him if you want to do so. That is an entirely different matter.

DR. STAHMER: Yes. I quite understand, Mr. President; but I had to have the possibility of calling the people who are mentioned in this affidavit, in case I consider it necessary.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, you can apply to do that.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: [Turning to the witness.] You understand, what I am suggesting to you is that here was a matter which was not only known in the OKW, not only known in the Gestapo and the Kripo, but was known to your own director of operations, General Förster, who told General Grosch that he had informed Field Marshal Milch. I am suggesting to you, that it is absolutely impossible and untrue that in these circumstances you knew nothing about it.

GÖRING: I would like first to establish an entirely different point. In the German interpretation regarding the first objection by Dr. Stahmer, the following came through:

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The Tribunal does not want you to discuss legal objections.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you please answer the question that is put to you? You have already been told that you must answer a question directly and make any explanation afterwards, and shorten it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you still say, in view of that evidence, in view of these statements from the officers of your own ministry, that you knew nothing about this?

GÖRING: Precisely these statements confirm this, and I would like to make a short explanation. You determined a date. You said it was the 27th. But in this statement by Grosch this date is not determined. It says: “A few days after the escape, I do not recall the date, Colonel Walde informed me.”

Secondly, it says here that General Förster, who was not chief of my operational branch but chief of another branch of the ministry, mentioned this matter to State Secretary Field Marshal Milch, without referring to the date. General Field Marshal Milch was here as a witness, but unfortunately, he was never questioned as to whether he gave me this report, and at what time, and whether to me direct.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Oh yes, he was, and General Field Marshal Milch took the same line as you, that he knew nothing about it, that Förster had never spoken to him. It was asked by my friend, Mr. Roberts, “Didn’t General Förster speak to you about it?”.

What I am suggesting is that both you and Field Marshal Milch are saying you knew nothing about it, when you did, and are leaving the responsibility on the shoulders of your junior officers. That is what I am suggesting and I want you to understand it.

GÖRING: No, I do not wish to push responsibility on to the shoulders of my subordinates, and I want to make it clear—that is the only thing that is important to me—that Field Marshal Milch did not say that he reported this matter to me. And, secondly, that the date when Förster told Milch about this is not established. It could have been quite possible that on the date when this actually happened, the Chief of the General Staff of the Luftwaffe might already have conferred with me about it. The important factor is—and I want to maintain it—that I was not present at the time when the command was given by the Führer. When I heard about it, I vehemently opposed it. But at the time I heard of it, it was already too late. That a few were shot later, was not yet known at the time, neither was the exact time of the event. Most of them had been shot already.

Thirdly, those who escaped, and were captured in the direct vicinity of the camp by our guards were returned to the camp and were not handed over. Those prisoners who were captured by the police and the Grossfahndung, and returned to the camp before the Führer had issued the decree, were likewise not handed over and shot.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You know that, according to Wielen, who is going to give evidence, the selection of the officers to be shot—a list as regards the selection of officers to be shot—a list had been prepared by the camp authorities at the request of Department 5, that is of the RSHA Kripo Department, in which those officers were regarded as disturbing elements—plotters and escape leaders, having been specifically mentioned. The names were selected either by the commandant or by one of these officers. Thereupon, the shooting of the officers mentioned by name was accordingly ordered by Department 4 of the RSHA and corresponding instructions sent to the Staatspolizei.

Are you telling the Tribunal you did not know that your own officers were selecting the men to be shot on the ground that they were plotters and escape leaders? In any other service in the world, attempt to escape is regarded as a duty of an officer, isn’t it, when he is a prisoner of war? Isn’t that so?

GÖRING: That is correct, and I have emphasized that. To your first question, I would like to put on record very definitely that we are dealing with the utterances of a man who will be testifying as a witness. As to whether he actually asked for a list and saw a list, his utterance is illogical. There was no selection made for shooting. Those who were captured by the police were shot without exception, and those who had not been returned to the camp. No officers were selected as representing disturbing elements, but those who had returned to the camp were not shot. Those who were recaptured by the police outside the camp were shot without exception, on the orders of the Führer. Therefore, the utterance is entirely illogical and not in accordance with the facts.

I know nothing about such a list being asked for, nor about the carrying out of such a wish. I personally pointed out to the Führer repeatedly that it is the duty of these officers to escape, and that on their return after the war, they would have to give an account of such attempts, which as far as I can remember should be repeated three times, according to English rules.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You remember that the Government of Germany sent an official note about this matter, saying that they had been shot while resisting arrest while trying to escape? Do you remember that?

GÖRING: I heard for the first time that there had been a note to this effect when the reply to it was sent. I had no part in the drawing up of the note. I know of its contents only through the reply, for I happened to be there when the reply came in.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not at the moment on the point that everyone now admits that the note was a complete and utter lie. I am on the point of the seriousness of this matter. Do you know that General Westhoff says in his statement: “Then, when we read this note to England in the newspaper, we were all absolutely taken aback. We all clutched our heads, mad.” According to Mr. Wielen, who will be here, it was a contributory cause for General Nebe of the Kripo, for nights on end, not going to bed but passing the night on his office settee. You will agree, won’t you, Witness, that this was a serious and difficult matter? All these officers that had to deal with it found it a serious and difficult matter, isn’t that so?

GÖRING: Not only these officers found this matter serious and difficult, but I myself considered it the most serious incident of the whole war and expressed myself unequivocally and clearly on this point, and later, when I learned the contents of the note, I knew that this note was not in accordance with the truth. I gave expression to my indignation, inasmuch as I immediately told my Quartermaster General to direct a letter to the OKW to the effect that we wished to give up the camps for prisoners of war, because under these circumstances, we no longer wished to have anything to do with them.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And according to your evidence in chief, what you did was to turn to Himmler, asking him if he had received the order, and then you said,

“I told him what excitement would result in my branch, because we could not understand such measures; and if he had received such orders, he would please inform me before carrying them through so that I would have the possibility to prevent such orders from being carried out, if possible”—and then you said that you—“talked to the Führer and that he confirmed that he had given the order and told me why.”

You, according to that evidence, still had enough influence in Germany, in your opinion, to stop even Himmler issuing such orders or carrying—I am sorry, I said “issuing”—carrying out such orders.

GÖRING: You are giving my statement a completely wrong meaning. I told Himmler plainly that it was his duty to telephone me before the execution of this matter, to give me the possibility, even at this period of my much diminished influence, to prevent the Führer from carrying out this decree. I did not mean to say that I would have been completely successful, but it was a matter of course that I, as Chief of the Luftwaffe, should make it clear to Himmler that it was his duty to telephone me first of all, because it was I who was most concerned with this matter. I told the Führer in very clear terms just how I felt, and I saw from his answers that, even if I had known of it before, I could not have prevented this decree, and we must keep in mind that two different methods of procedure are in question. The order was not given to the Luftwaffe, that these people were to be shot by the Luftwaffe personnel, but to the police. If the Führer had said to me, “I will persist in this decree which I gave the police,” I would not have been able to order the police not to carry through the Führer’s decree. Only if this decree had had to be carried out by my men, would it have been possible for me perhaps to circumvent the decree, and I would like to emphasize this point strongly.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, that may be your view that you could not have got anywhere with the Führer; but I suggested to you that when all these officers that I mentioned knew about it, you knew about it, and that you did nothing to prevent these men from being shot, but co-operated in this foul series of murders.

THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, are you passing from that now?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: You are putting in evidence these two documents?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am putting them in. I put them to the witness. D-731 will be GB-278, and D-730 will be GB-279.

THE PRESIDENT: And should you not refer perhaps to the second paragraph in 731?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: It shows that apparently, in the early hours of the 25th of March the matter was communicated to the office of the adjutant of the Reich Marshal—the second paragraph beginning with “the escape.”

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes.

“The escape of about 30 to 40 prisoners, the exact number having to be ascertained by roll call, was reported by telephone from the Sagan Camp to the inspectorate in the early hours of the 25th of March, Saturday morning, and duly passed on in the same way by this office to the higher authorities which were to be informed in case of mass escapes. These were: 1.) the Office of the Adjutant of the Reich Marshal; 2.) the OKW, for directors of these prisoners of war; 3.) the Inspector General of Prisoners of War; and 4.) Director of Operations, Air Ministry.”

I am much obliged. You must remember that the witness did not admit yesterday afternoon that the news of the escape had been given to the office of his adjutant.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am much obliged to you.

GÖRING: The escape was communicated to us every time relatively quickly. I should now like to give my view of the statement made by you before that—it concerns assertions made by you—but I still maintain that I did not hear about this incident until after it had occurred.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I have put my questions on the incident. I pass to another point. I want to ask you two or three questions about the evidence that you gave 2 days ago, dealing with the evidence of your own witness, Herr Dahlerus, who made his first visit to London on the 25th of August 1939, after an interview and a telephone conversation with you on the 24th. I just want you to fix the date because it is sometimes difficult to remember what these dates are. At that time, you were anxious that he should persuade the British Government to arrange a meeting of plenipotentiaries who would deal with the questions of Danzig and the Corridor. Is that right?

GÖRING: That is correct.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You knew perfectly well, did you not, that as far as the Führer was concerned, Danzig and the Corridor was not the real matter that was operating in his mind at all. Will you let me remind you what he said on the 23rd of May:

“Danzig is not the subject of the dispute at all; it is a question of expanding our living space in the East, of securing our food supplies, and of the settlement of the Baltic problem.”

You knew that, didn’t you?

GÖRING: I knew that he had said these things at that time, but I have already pointed out repeatedly that such discussions can only be assessed, if considered in conjunction with the whole political situation. At the moment of these negotiations with England, we were solely concerned with Danzig and the Corridor.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, you say that despite what Hitler said on the 23rd of May, that at that moment Hitler was only concerned with Danzig and the Corridor? Do you say that seriously?

GÖRING: I maintain in all seriousness that, in the situation as it was at that time, this was really the case. Otherwise it would be impossible to understand any of Hitler’s acts. You might just as well take his book Mein Kampf as a basis and explain all his acts by it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am interested in the last week of August at the moment. I want you now just to remember two points on what you said, with regard to Dahlerus, during the morning of the 25th. Do you remember, you had a telephone conversation with him at 11:30 on the 24th? On the 25th, were you sufficiently in Hitler’s confidence to know that he was going to proffer the note verbale to Sir Nevile Henderson, the British Ambassador, on the 25th? Did you know that?

GÖRING: Yes, of course.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: At that time, when you were sending Dahlerus, and the note verbale was being given to the British Ambassador, the arrangement and order was that you were going to attack Poland on the morning of the 26th, wasn’t it?

GÖRING: There seems to be a disturbance on the line.

THE PRESIDENT: I think there is some mechanical difficulty. Perhaps it would be a good thing to adjourn for a few minutes.

[A recess was taken.]

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You told me, Witness, that the arrangements to attack Poland on the morning of the 26th were changed on the evening of the 25th. Before I come to that, I will ask you one or two questions about that.

GÖRING: No, I did not say that.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Wait a minute. I am sorry, but that is what I understood you to say.

GÖRING: No. I said explicitly that already on the 25th the attack for the morning of the 26th was cancelled. It is a technical and military impossibility to cancel a large-scale attack of a whole army the evening before an attack. The shortest time required would be from 24 hours to 48 hours.

I expressly mentioned that on the 25th the situation was clear.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: At the time, you had asked Dahlerus to go to England on the 24th. It was still the plan that the attack would take place on the 26th. Was not your object in sending Dahlerus to have the British Government discussing their next move when the attack took place, in order to make it more difficult for the British Government?

GÖRING: No, I want to emphasize that—and perhaps I should have the documents for the date—that when I sent Dahlerus at that time, and when at that moment Sir Nevile had been handed a note on behalf of the Führer, the attack for the 26th had been cancelled and postponed.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let me remind you of what you said yourself on the 29th of August:

“On the day when England gave her official guarantee to Poland, it was 5:30 on 25 August, the Führer called me on the telephone and told me he had stopped the planned invasion of Poland. I asked him then whether it was just temporary or for good. He said, ‘No, I will have to see whether we can eliminate British intervention.’ I asked him, ‘Do you think that it will be definite within 4 or 5 days?’ ”

Isn’t that right?

GÖRING: That was what I said, but I did not say that this occurred on the 25th, but when the Führer was clear about the guarantee that was given. I emphasize that once more . . .

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was what I was quoting to you. When the official guarantee was given, the treaty was signed at 5:30 on the evening of the 25th of August. I am putting your own words to you. It was after that that the Führer telephoned you and told you the invasion was off. Do you wish to withdraw your statement that it was after the official guarantee was given to Poland?

GÖRING: I emphasized once more—after we knew that the guarantee would be given. It must be clear to you too that if the signing took place at 5:30 p.m. on the 25th, the Führer could know about it only shortly afterwards. Not till then would the Führer have called a conference, and in that case an attack for the 26th could have been called off only during the night of the 25th to 26th. Every military expert must know that that is an absolute impossibility. I meant to say in my statement, “. . . when it was clear to the Führer that a guarantee was given.”

I emphasize once more that I have not seen this record nor sworn to it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I admit that I do not know anything about that. I do not know whether you were still in Hitler’s confidence at the time or not. But, wasn’t it a fact that Signor Attolico came on the 25th and told Hitler that the Italian Army and Air Force were not ready for a campaign? Were you told that?

GÖRING: Yes, of course I was told that.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was why the orders for the attack were cancelled on the 26th, wasn’t it?

GÖRING: No, that is absolutely wrong, because when the question of Italian assistance came up, the fact was that its value was doubted in many quarters. During the tension of the preceding days it became evident that the demands made by the Italians which could not be fulfilled by us were formulated in order to keep Italy out of the war. The Führer was convinced that England had only given such a clear-cut guarantee to Poland, because in the meantime the British Government had learned that it was not the intention of Italy to come into the war as a partner of the Axis.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will put to you your own account of what the Führer said. “I will have to see whether we can eliminate British intervention.” Isn’t it correct that you tried, through Mr. Dahlerus, in every way, to try and eliminate British intervention?

GÖRING: I have never denied that. It was my whole endeavor to avoid war with England. If it had been possible to avoid this war by coming to an agreement with Poland, then that would have been accepted. If the war with England could have been avoided in spite of a war with Poland, then that was my task also. This is clear from the fact that, even after the Polish campaign had started on 1 September 1939 I still made every attempt to avoid a war with England and to keep the war from spreading.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: In other words, what you were trying to do from the 25th onwards was to get England to try and agree and help the Reich in the return of Danzig and the Polish Corridor, wasn’t that right?

GÖRING: That, of course, is quite clearly expressed.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, you remember the interview with Mr. Dahlerus. It was the interview in which you colored the portions on the map. I only want you to have it in your mind. If I say 11:30 on the 29th of August it will not mean anything to you. I want you to see it so that I can ask you one or two questions about it.

You remember, at that time, that you were upset at the interview which had taken place when Hitler handed Henderson the German reply, and there had been the remark about the ultimatum. Do you remember that?

GÖRING: Yes, of course I was upset, since that had suddenly completely disturbed my whole position.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And is this correct? Mr. Dahlerus says on Page 72 of his book that you came out with a tirade, strong words against the Poles. Do you remember that he quotes you as saying: “Wir kennen die Polen”? Do you remember that?

GÖRING: Yes, of course. You must consider the situation at the time. I had heard about the excesses and I would not go and tell Dahlerus, a neutral, that I considered Germany wholly guilty and the Poles completely innocent. It is correct that I did say that, but it arose out of a situation.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you still an admirer of Bismarck?

GÖRING: I admire Bismarck absolutely, but I have never said that I am a Bismarck.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, I am not suggesting that. I thought you might have in mind his remark about the Poles. Do you remember: “Haut doch die Polen, dass sie am Leben verzagen”? (Let us strike the Poles until they lose the courage to live.) Is that what was in your mind at the time?

GÖRING: No, I had no such thoughts, still less because for years I had genuinely sought friendship with Poland.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You have been quite frank about your general intention, and I am not going to take time on it, but I just want to put one or two subsidiary points.

You remember the passage that I read from Mr. Dahlerus’ book about the airplane and the sabotage, that he said that you had said to him, mentioning the Defendant Ribbentrop—you remember that passage? You have given your explanation and I just want to . . .

GÖRING: Yes, yes, I gave that explanation and I made it quite clear.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, your explanation was that Herr Dahlerus was confusing your concern that his airplane should not be shot down in making his journey. That is putting your explanation fairly, isn’t it? You are saying that Herr Dahlerus was confused. What you were saying was your concern that his airplane should not be shot down. Isn’t that right? That is as I understood it.

GÖRING: No, I think I have expressed it very clearly. Would you like me to give it again? I will repeat it.

Dahlerus, who stood in the witness box here, used the words, “I must correct myself,” when he was asked about Ribbentrop. I am quoting Dahlerus. He said, “I connected it with Ribbentrop, since shortly beforehand the name was mentioned in some other connection.”

Thereupon I explained I was really anxious lest something might happen. I explained that very clearly and I need not repeat it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The question I put to you, Witness—I think we are agreed on it—was that your anxiety was about his plane, and the point that I want to make clear to you now is that that incident did not occur on this day when Dahlerus was preparing for his third visit, but occurred when he was in England and rang you up during his second visit. He rang you up on the evening of the 27th of August, and on Page 59 of his book he says:

“Before leaving the Foreign Office, I telephoned Göring to confirm that I was leaving for Berlin by plane at 7:00 p.m. He seemed to think this was rather late. It would be dark and he was worried lest my plane be shot at by the British, or over German territory. He asked me to hold the line, and a minute later came back and gave me a concise description of the route the plane must follow over Germany to avoid being shot at. He also assured me that the anti-aircraft stations along our course would be informed that we were coming.”

What I am suggesting to you is that your explanation is wrong, that you have confused it with this earlier incident of which Mr. Dahlerus speaks, and that Mr. Dahlerus is perfectly accurate when he speaks about the second incident which occurred 2 days later.

GÖRING: That is not at all contradictory. In regard to the first flight the position was that it was already dark, which means that the danger was considerably greater; and I again point out that, in connection with the second journey, preparedness for war in all countries had reached such a degree that flying was hazardous.

I emphasize once more that I had to correct Dahlerus when he was questioned by my counsel, that I did not tell him that Ribbentrop had planned an attack against him. I emphasize for the last time that Von Ribbentrop knew nothing about my negotiations with Dahlerus.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you really say that? Do you remember that on the 29th of August—first of all, on the 28th of August, at 10:30 p.m., when Henderson and Hitler had an interview. That was before the difficulties arose. It was the interview when Hitler was considering direct negotiations with the Poles. He said, “We must summon Field Marshal Göring to discuss it with him.” That is in our Blue Book, and as far as I know it has never been denied. You were summoned to the interview that Hitler and Ribbentrop were having with Sir Nevile Henderson.

GÖRING: No, I must interrupt you. The Führer said, “We will have to fetch him,” but I was not fetched and that is not said in the Blue Book either.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But according to Mr. Dahlerus, he says:

“During our conversation Göring described how he had been summoned to Hitler immediately after Henderson’s departure, how Hitler, Göring, and Ribbentrop had discussed the conference that had taken place with Henderson, and how satisfied all three of them were with the result. In this connection Hitler had turned to Ribbentrop and said mockingly, ‘Do you still believe that Dahlerus is a British agent?’ Somewhat acidly Ribbentrop replied that perhaps it was not the case.”

You say that is not true, either?

GÖRING: Herr Dahlerus is describing the events without having been present. From that description, too, it becomes clear that I arrived after Henderson had already left. The description is a little colorful. Ribbentrop had no idea what I was negotiating with Dahlerus about, and the Führer did not inform him about these negotiations either. He merely knew that I used Dahlerus as a negotiator, and he was of course, opposed to him, because he, as Foreign Minister, was against any other channels being used.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was exactly the point, you know, that I put to you about 7 minutes ago, that Ribbentrop did know you were using Dahlerus, with which you disagreed. You now agree that he knew you were using Dahlerus, so I will leave it.

GÖRING: No, I beg your pardon. I still say—please do not distort my words—that Ribbentrop did not know what I was negotiating with Dahlerus about, and that he had not even heard of it through the Führer.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You said “distort my words.” I especially did not say to you that he knew what you were negotiating about. I said to you that he knew you were using Dahlerus, and that, you agree, is right. I limited it to that, didn’t I? And that is right, isn’t it?

GÖRING: He did not know either that I was carrying on negotiations with England through Dahlerus at that time. He did not know about the flights either.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, I want you just to help me on one or two other matters.

You remember that in January of 1937, and in October of 1937, the German Government gave the strongest assurances as to the inviolability and neutrality of Belgium and Holland. Do you remember that?

GÖRING: I do not remember it in detail, but it has been mentioned here in Court.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And do you remember that on the 25th of August 1938 the Air Staff put in a memorandum on the assumption that France and Great Britain—oh no, that France would declare war during the case of Fall Grün, and that Great Britain would come in? Do you remember that? It is Document Number 375-PS, Exhibit Number USA-84. I want you to have it generally in mind because I am going to put a passage to you.

GÖRING: May I ask whether the signature is Wolter? W-o-l-t-e-r?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I shall let you know. Yes, that is right.

GÖRING: In that case I remember the document exactly. It has been given to me here.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is right. I only want to recall your recollection to one sentence:

“Belgium and the Netherlands in German hands represent an extraordinary advantage in the prosecution of the air war against Great Britain as well as against France. Therefore, it is held to be essential to obtain the opinion of the Army as to the conditions under which an occupation of this area could be carried out, and how long it would take.”

Do you remember that? It is pretty obvious air strategy, but you remember it?

GÖRING: That is absolutely correct. That was the principal work of a captain of the General Staff, 5th Department, who, naturally, when making his report, must propound the best arguments.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then, after that, on the 28th of April 1939, you remember that Hitler said that he had given binding declarations to a number of states, and this applied to Holland and Belgium? I think that was the time when he made a speech in the Reichstag and mentioned a number of small states as well as that; but he said it included Holland and Belgium.

GÖRING: Yes. It has, of course been mentioned repeatedly here.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. Now, do you remember that on the 23rd of May, in the document that I have already put to you, at the meeting at the Reich Chancellery, Hitler said this: “The Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied by armed force. Declarations of neutrality must be ignored.”

Do you remember his saying that?

GÖRING: It says so in the document, yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And, on the 22d of August 1939, in the speech to the commanders-in-chief, which is Document Number 798-PS, Exhibit Number USA-29, he said:

“Another possibility is the violation of Dutch, Belgian, and Swiss neutrality. I have no doubt that all these states, as well as Scandinavia, will defend their neutrality by all available means. England and France will not violate the neutrality of these countries.”

Do you remember his saying that?

GÖRING: You can see for yourself from those words how often the Führer changed his ideas, so that even the plan he had in May was not at all final.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: They are perfectly consistent in my estimation. He is saying that they must be occupied; that declarations of neutrality must be ignored, and he is emphasizing that by saying that England and France will not violate the neutrality, so it is perfectly easy for Germany to do it.

GÖRING: No, what he means to say is that we on our part would not find it necessary to do so either. I merely want to point out that political situations always turn out to be different, and that at these interrogations and this Trial we must regard the political background of the world as a whole.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was on the 22d. You have agreed as to what was said. Immediately after that, on the 26th, 4 days later, Hitler gave another assurance. Do you remember that, just before the war he gave another assurance?

GÖRING: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And on the 6th of October, 1939, he gave a further assurance, and on the 7th of October, the day after that last assurance, the order, which is Document Number 2329-PS, Exhibit GB-105, was issued.

“Army Group B has to make all preparations according to special orders for immediate invasion of Dutch and Belgian territory, if the political situation so demands.”

And on the 9th of October, there is a directive from Hitler:

“Preparations should be made for offensive action on the northern flank of the Western Front crossing the area of Luxembourg, Belgium, and Holland. This attack must be carried out as soon and as forcibly as possible.”

Isn’t it quite clear from that, that all along you knew, as Hitler stated on the 22d of August, that England and France would not violate the neutrality of the low countries, and you were prepared to violate them whenever it suited your strategical and tactical interests? Isn’t that quite clear?

GÖRING: Not entirely. Only if the political situation made it necessary. And in the meantime the British air penetration of the neutrality of Holland and Belgium had taken place, up to October.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You say not entirely. That is as near agreement with me as you are probably prepared to go.

Now I want to ask you quite shortly again about Yugoslavia. You remember that you have told us in your evidence in chief that Germany before the war, before the beginning of the war, had the very best relations with the Yugoslav people, and that you yourself had contributed to it. I am putting it quite shortly.

GÖRING: That is correct.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And that was emphasized, if you will remember, on the first of June 1939 by a speech of Hitler at a dinner with Prince Paul.

GÖRING: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, 80 days after that, on the 12th of August 1939, the Defendant Ribbentrop, Hitler, and Ciano had a meeting, and just let me recall to you what Hitler said at that meeting to Count Ciano.

“Generally speaking . . .”

GÖRING: I beg your pardon, what is the number of the document?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am sorry, it was my fault—Document Number TC-77, Exhibit Number GB-48. It is the memorandum of a conversation between Hitler, Ribbentrop, and Ciano at Obersalzberg on the 12th of August.

GÖRING: I merely wanted to know if this was from Ciano’s diary? That is important for me.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Oh no, not from Ciano’s diary, it is a memorandum. This is the official report.

“Generally speaking, the best thing to happen would be for uncertain neutrals to be liquidated one after the other. This process could be carried out more easily if on every occasion one partner of the Axis covered the other while it was dealing with an uncertain neutral. Italy might well regard Yugoslavia as a neutral of this kind.”

That was rather inconsistent with your statement as to the good intentions towards Yugoslavia, and the Führer’s statement to Prince Paul, wasn’t it?

GÖRING: I should like to read that through carefully once more and see in what connection that statement was made. As it is presented now it certainly would not fit in with that.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You know I do not want to stop you unnecessarily in any way, but that document has been read at least twice during the Trial and any further matter perhaps you will consider. But you will agree, unless I have wrenched it out of its context—and I hope I have not—that is quite inconsistent with friendly intentions, is it not?

GÖRING: As I said, it does not fit in with that.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, it was 56 days after that, on the 6th of October, Hitler gave an assurance to Yugoslavia and he said:

“Immediately after the completion of the Anschluss I informed Yugoslavia that from now on the frontier with this country would also be an unalterable one and that we only desired to live in peace and friendship with her.”

And then again in March 1941, on the entry of the Tripartite Pact, the German Government announced that it confirmed its determination to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia at all times.

Now, after that of course, as I have always said when you dealt with this, there was the Simovic Putsch in Yugoslavia. But I think you said quite frankly in your evidence, that Hitler and yourself never took the trouble, or thought of taking the trouble, of inquiring whether the Simovic Government would preserve its neutrality or not. That is right, is it not?

GÖRING: I did not say that. We were convinced that they were using these declarations to mislead. We knew that this Putsch was first of all directed from Moscow, and, as we learned later, that it had been financially supported to a considerable extent by Britain. From that we recognized the hostile intentions as shown by the mobilization of the Yugoslav Army, which made the matter quite clear, and we did not want to be deceived by the Simovic declarations.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I would like to say one word about the mobilization in a moment. But on the 27th of March, that was 2 days after the signing of the pact I have just referred to, there was a conference in Berlin of Hitler with the German High Command, at which you were present, and do you remember the Führer saying:

“The Führer is determined, without waiting for possible loyalty declarations of the new government, to make all preparations to destroy Yugoslavia militarily and as a national unit. No diplomatic inquiries will be made nor ultimatums presented. Assurances of the Yugoslav Government, which cannot be trusted anyhow in the future, will be taken note of. The attack will start as soon as means and troops suitable for it are ready. Politically it is especially important that the blow against Yugoslavia is carried out with unmerciful harshness and that the military destruction is effected in a lightning-like undertaking. The plan is on the assumption that we speed up schedules of all preparations and use such strong forces that the Yugoslav collapse will take place within the shortest possible time.”

It was not a very friendly intention toward Yugoslavia to have no diplomatic negotiations, not give them the chance of assurance or coming to terms with you, and to strike with unmerciful harshness, was it?

GÖRING: I have just said that after the Simovic Putsch the situation was completely clear to us, and declarations of neutrality on the part of Yugoslavia could be regarded as only camouflage and deception in order to gain time. After the Putsch, Yugoslavia definitely formed part of the enemy front, and it was therefore for us also to carry out deceptive moves and attack as quickly as possible, since our forces at that time were relatively weak.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You realized, of course, that you said that General Simovic was inspired by Moscow. I am not going to argue that point with you at all. But I do point out to you that this was 3 months before you were at war with the Soviet Union. You realize that, do you?

GÖRING: Yes, that is correct. It was precisely the Simovic Putsch which removed the Führer’s last doubts that Russia’s attitude towards Germany had become hostile. This Putsch was the very reason which caused him to decide to take quickest possible counter measures against this danger. Secondly . . .

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just one moment. Do you know that it appears in the documents quite clearly, that the attack on the Soviet Union was postponed for 6 weeks because of this trouble in the Balkans? That is quite inconsistent with what you are saying now, isn’t it?

GÖRING: No. If you will read again my statement on that point, you will see I said that a number of moves on the part of Russia caused the Führer to order preparations for invasion, but that he still withheld the final decision on invasion, and that after the Simovic Putsch this decision was made. From the strategic situation it follows that the military execution of this political decision was delayed by the Yugoslavian campaign.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want to ask you one other point about Yugoslavia.

You remember your evidence that the attack on Belgrade was due to the fact that the war office and a number of other important military organizations were located there. I am trying to summarize it, but that was the effect of your evidence, was it not?

GÖRING: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, do you remember how it was put in Hitler’s order which I have just been reading to you:

“The main task of the Air Force is to start as early as possible with the destruction of the Yugoslavian Air Force ground installations . . .”

Now, I ask you to note the next word “and”:

“. . . and to destroy the capital of Belgrade in attacks by waves. Besides the Air Force has to support the Army.”

I put it to you that that order makes it clear that the attack on Belgrade was just another of your exhibitions of terror attacks in order to attempt to subdue a population that would have difficulty in resisting them.

GÖRING: No, that is not correct. The population of Belgrade did defend itself. Belgrade was far more a center of military installations than the capital of any other country; and I would like to draw your attention to this.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, I am going to pass from that matter to one or two points on which you gave evidence—I think at the instance of counsel for the organizations. You remember you gave evidence in answer to Dr. Babel about the Waffen-SS? Do you remember that—a few days ago?

GÖRING: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I would just like you to look at a document which has not got a number, but it is the Führer’s ideas about the Waffen-SS, and to see if you agree. It is Document Number D-665, and it will be Exhibit Number GB-280. It is a document from the High Command of the Army, General Staff of the Army—statements of the Führer regarding the future state military police—and the covering letter of the document says, “After the Führer’s proposals for the Waffen-SS had been passed on, doubts arose as to whether it was intended that they should be given wider distribution.” If you will pass to the documents, perhaps you will follow it while I read it. I do not think it has been introduced before:

“On 6 August 1940 when the order for the organization of the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler”—Adolf Hitler Bodyguard—“was issued, the Führer stated the principles regarding the necessity for the Waffen-SS as summed up below:

“The Greater German Reich in its final form will not include within its frontiers only those national groups which from the very beginning will be well disposed towards the Reich. It is therefore necessary to maintain outside the Reich proper a state military police capable in any situation of representing and imposing the authority of the Reich.

“This task can be carried out only by a state police composed of men of best German blood and wholeheartedly pledged to the ideology on which the Greater German Reich is founded. Only such a formation will resist subversive influences, even in critical times. Such a formation, proud of its purity, will never fraternize with the proletariat and with the underworld which undermines the fundamental idea. In our future Greater German Reich, a police corps will have the necessary authority over the other members of the community only if it is trained along military lines. Our people are so military-minded as a result of glorious achievements in war and training by the National Socialist Party that a ‘sock-knitting’ police, as in 1848, or a bureaucratic police, as in 1918, would no longer have any authority.

“It is therefore necessary that this state police proves its worth and sacrifices its blood at the front, in close formations, in the same way as every unit of the armed forces. Having returned home, after having proved themselves in the field in the ranks of the Army, the units of the Waffen-SS will possess the authority to execute their tasks as state police.

“This employment of the Waffen-SS for internal purposes is just as much in the interests of the Wehrmacht itself. We must never again allow the conscripted German Wehrmacht to be used against its fellow countrymen, weapon in hand, in critical situations at home. Such action is the beginning of the end. A state which has to resort to such methods is no longer in a position to use its armed forces against an enemy from without, and thereby gives itself up.

“There are deplorable examples of this in our history. In future the Wehrmacht is to be used solely against the foreign enemies of the Reich.

“In order to ensure that the men in the units of the Waffen-SS are always of high quality, the recruitment into the units must be limited. The Führer’s idea of this limitation is that the units of the Waffen-SS should generally not exceed 5 to 10 percent of the peacetime strength of the Army.”

Do you agree with that? Is that a correct description of the purpose of the Waffen-SS?

GÖRING: I am absolutely convinced that he did say that, but that does not contradict my statement.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I just want you, while we are on the SS, to look at a note which is Document D-729 and will be Exhibit Number GB-281. It is on the conversation between you and the Duce in the Palazzo Venezia on 23 October 1942. At that time you were still in good odor with the Führer and still retained your power; is that right?

I will read it: It is Page 35, Paragraph 1.

“The Reich Marshal then described Germany’s method in fighting the partisans. To begin with, all livestock and foodstuffs were taken away from the areas concerned, so as to deny the partisans all sources of supply.”

GÖRING: Just a second please. Where is this?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is Page 35, Paragraph 1, but I will find it for you if you have any difficulty. I think it is marked, and it begins “The Reich Marshal . . .” Can you find it?

GÖRING: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will start again if I may.

“The Reich Marshal then described Germany’s method in fighting the partisans. To begin with, all livestock and foodstuffs were taken away from the areas concerned, so as to deny the partisans all sources of supply. Men and women were taken away to labor camps, the children to children’s camps, and the villages burned down. It was by the use of these methods that the railways in the vast wooded areas of Bialowiza had been safeguarded. Whenever attacks occurred, the entire male population of the villages were lined up on one side and the women on the other. The women were told that all the men would be shot, unless they—the women—pointed out which men did not belong to the village. In order to save their men, the women always pointed out the nonresidents. Germany had found that, generally speaking, it was not easy to get soldiers to carry out such measures. Members of the Party discharged this task much more harshly and efficiently. For the same reason armies trained ideologically, such as the German—or the Russian—fought better than others. The SS, the nucleus of the old Party fighters, who have personal ties with the Führer and who form a special elite, confirm this principle.”

Now, is that a correct description?

GÖRING: Yes, certainly.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And this expresses correctly your views on how war against partisans should be carried out?

GÖRING: I have transmitted this.

Just a second, please. May I ask what the number of this document is?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, I will give it again: Document Number D-729, and it becomes Exhibit Number GB-281.

Now, I just want you to help me on one other matter on these organizations. You will remember that in answer, I think, to Dr. Servatius, you made some remarks about the Leadership Corps. Do you remember that? I just want you to have them in mind.

GÖRING: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, will you look at the document which will be presented to you, Document Number D-728, Exhibit Number GB-282. This is a document from the Office of the Gau Leadership for Hessen-Nassau. I am sorry; there is a reference to an order of the Party Chancellery dated 10 February 1945, its subject is, “Action by the Party to be taken for keeping the German population in check until the end of the war.” It is signed by Sprenger, Gauleiter and Commissioner for Reich Defense.

GÖRING: The date is 15 March 1945, is that right?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am grateful to you. I knew it was just after 10 March. I have not got it in my copy, but if you say it, I will take it.

GÖRING: 1945.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes.

[Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe then read from the document excerpts which were withdrawn and stricken from the record on 16 August 1946.]

DR. STAHMER: I must object to the use of this document, since I cannot recognize that it is genuine. I have not yet seen the original, and the doubts as to its being genuine are due to the fact that expressions are used which are most unusual in the German language.

GÖRING: I was going to raise the same objection. It is not an original as it says at the top, “copy,” and there is no original signature, but only the typewritten words “Sprenger, Gauleiter” at the bottom.

DR. STAHMER: For instance the expression “Gerichtlichkeiten” is used. This is an expression completely unusual and unknown in the German language, and I cannot imagine that an official document originating from a Gauleiter could contain such a word.

GÖRING: I can draw your attention to yet another point showing that this is evidently not an original document. If there had been an increase in meat or fat rations, I would have heard something about it. Not a single word of these two documents is known to me. It does not bear a rubber stamp either, the whole thing is typewritten, including the signatures. Therefore, I cannot accept this document.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: This is a file copy which, to the best of my knowledge, was captured at the office of the Gau Leader. It was sent to us by the British Army of the Rhine. I shall make inquiries about it, but it purports to be a file copy and I have put the original document which we have, which is a file copy, to the witness.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, I have the original document in my hands now, together with the certificate of an officer of the British Army stating that the document was delivered to him in the above capacity, in the ordinary course of official business, as the original of a document found in German records of files captured by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander. Under these circumstances it is in exactly the same position as all the other captured documents. The defense, of course, can bring any evidence which it thinks right, to criticize the authenticity of the document. The document stands on exactly the same footing as the other captured documents, subject to any criticism to support which you may be able to bring evidence.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Witness, I want you to deal with the sentence in paragraph 6.

Now, this paragraph is certainly directed to all administrative levels down to the Kreisleiter, county leaders of the Nazi Party, and it assumes they knew all about the running of concentration camps. Are you telling the Tribunal that you, who up to 1943 were the second man in the Reich, knew nothing about concentration camps?

GÖRING: First of all, I want to say once more that I do not accept this document, and that its whole wording is unknown to me, and that this paragraph appears unusual to me. I did not know anything about what took place and what methods were used in the concentration camps later, when I was no longer in charge.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let me remind you of the evidence that has been given before this Court, that as far as Auschwitz alone is concerned, 4,000,000 people were exterminated. Do you remember that?

GÖRING: This I have heard as a statement here, but I consider it in no way proved—that figure, I mean.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If you do not consider it proved, let me remind you of the affidavit of Hoettl, who was Deputy Group Leader of the Foreign Section, of the Security Section of Amt IV of the RSHA. He says that approximately 4,000,000 Jews have been killed in the concentration camps, while an additional 2,000,000 met death in other ways. Assume that these figures—one is a Russian figure, the other a German—assume they are even 50 percent correct, assume it was 2,000,000 and 1,000,000, are you telling this Tribunal that a Minister with your power in the Reich could remain ignorant that that was going on?

GÖRING: This I maintain, and the reason for this is that these things were kept secret from me. I might add that in my opinion not even the Führer knew the extent of what was going on.

This is also explained by the fact that Himmler kept all these matters very secret. We were never given figures or any other details.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But, Witness, haven’t you access to the foreign press, the press department in your ministry, to foreign broadcasts? You see, there is evidence that altogether, when you take the Jews and other people, something like 10,000,000 people have been done to death in cold blood, apart from those killed in battle. Something like 10,000,000 people. Do you say that you never saw or heard from the foreign press, in broadcasts, that this was going on?

GÖRING: First of all, the figure 10,000,000 is not established in any way. Secondly, throughout the war I did not read the foreign press, because I considered it nothing but propaganda. Thirdly, though I had the right to listen to foreign broadcasts, I never did so, simply because I did not want to listen to propaganda. Neither did I listen to home propaganda.

Only during the last 4 days of the war did I—and this I could prove—listen to a foreign broadcasting station for the first time.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You told Mr. Justice Jackson yesterday that there were various representatives in Eastern territories, and you have seen the films of the concentration camps, haven’t you, since this Trial started? You knew that there were millions of garments, millions of shoes, 20,952 kilograms of gold wedding rings, 35 wagons of furs—all that stuff which these people who were exterminated at Maidanek or Auschwitz left behind them. Did nobody ever tell you, under the development of the Four Year Plan, or anyone else, that they were getting all these amounts of human material? Do you remember we heard from the Polish Jewish gentleman, who gave evidence, that all he got back from his family, of his wife and mother and daughter, I think, were their identity cards? His work was to gather up clothes. He told us that so thorough were the henchmen of your friend Himmler that it took 5 minutes extra to kill the women because they had to have their hair cut off as it was to be used for making mattresses. Was nothing ever told you about this accretion to German material, which came from the effects of these people who were murdered?

GÖRING: No, and how can you imagine this? I was laying down the broad outlines for the German economy, and that certainly did not include the manufacture of mattresses from women’s hair or the utilization of old shoes and clothes. I leave the figure open. But, also I do want to object to your reference to my “friend Himmler.”

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I will say, “your enemy Himmler,” or simply “Himmler” whichever you like. You know whom I mean, don’t you?

GÖRING: Yes, indeed.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I just want to remind you of one other point: Exhibit Number USA-228, Document Number 407(V)-PS, “. . . I have the honor to report to you that it was possible to add 3,638,056 new foreign workers to the German war economy between April 1st of last year and March 31st of this year. . . . In addition to the foreign civilian workers 1,622,929 prisoners of war are employed in the German economy.” Now, just listen to this, “out of the 5,000,000 foreign workers who have arrived in Germany, not even 200,000 came voluntarily.” That is from the minutes of the Central Planning Board on the 1st of March. Do you say that you, in your position in the State and as the great architect of German economy, did not know that you were getting for your economy 4,800,000 foreign workers who were forced to come? Do you tell the Tribunal that?

GÖRING: I never told the Tribunal that. I said that I knew quite well that these workers were brought in and not always voluntarily, but whether the figure of 200,000 is correct, that I do not know, and I do not believe it either. The number of volunteers was greater, but this does not alter the fact that workers were forced to come to the Reich. That I have never denied, and have even admitted it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You admit—and I want to put it quite fairly—that a large number of workers were forced to come to the Reich and work there?

GÖRING: Yes, certainly.

THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, would you like to adjourn now?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, sir.

[The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]

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