Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremburg, 14 November 1945-1 October 1946, Volume 09

by Various

Afternoon Session

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Will you direct your attention to the text after the bomb plot in Rome on 23 March 1944. Do you remember what I have in mind—the bomb plot in Rome? Remember? At that time your Chief of Staff was General Westphal, and he reported the plot directly to General Buettler? Perhaps you will help me as to the pronunciation?

KESSELRING: Winter.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: General what?

KESSELRING: General Winter.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Didn’t he report to a General Buettler, spelled B-u-e-t-t-l-e-r?

KESSELRING: Von Buttlar.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: General Von Buttlar?

KESSELRING: That was his predecessor.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: General Von Buttlar informed your Chief of Staff that he would have to report the matter to the Führer, is that right?

KESSELRING: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And he got in touch with the Defendant Jodl, and the Defendant Jodl and the Defendant Keitel reported the matter to the Führer?

KESSELRING: That is probably correct.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The Führer gave an order that either 20 or 10—you aren’t quite sure which, but you rather think 20—Italians should be killed?

KESSELRING: I believe that that is a report from Westphal, which I must assume is correct.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Can you remember, Witness, whether it was 20 or 10 now?

KESSELRING: I assume 10, I do not know the exact number.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You do not know the exact number?

KESSELRING: I assume 10.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We will take it as 10 for the moment.

The competent authority for Rome was General Von Mackensen, was it not?

KESSELRING: General Mackensen was Commander-in-Chief of the 14th Army, and the commander of Rome was subordinate to him.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And the person, to use your words, who advised him on this matter was a man called Kappler, wasn’t he?

KESSELRING: Kappler, of the Security Service.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What was he? An Obergruppenführer or something like that?

KESSELRING: Obersturmbannführer.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You remember, after some comments in the Osservatore Romano you had an inquiry directed into the incident by your intelligence officer whose name was Zolling, don’t you?

KESSELRING: Yes, that is correct.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you also got a report from Kappler himself, did you not?

KESSELRING: Kappler merely had a brief report relayed to me by telephone to the effect that he had a corresponding number of condemned men available.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Didn’t Kappler tell you that he had executed 382 people?

KESSELRING: The execution lay in the hands of the 14th Army and I finally received merely the news of its being carried out without any further explanation, and had no direct conversation with Kappler.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you sure of that?

KESSELRING: At the end—I expressly emphasize this once more—I conversed with him briefly by telephone, after I had arrived at my command post and this report had been given me, as I said earlier. Otherwise I can recall no further direct communication. I do remember that perhaps 8 or 10 days later I met him and I told him that I was to a certain extent grateful to him that this very distasteful matter had been settled in a way which was legally and morally above reproach.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let us see what you had to be grateful for. You were interrogated about this on the 8th of January. Do you remember being asked this question? “Then Zolling didn’t tell you that all this number that was executed had previously been convicted of some crime punishable by death?” And you answered, “Yes, I said that already. Yes, he did that. Even Kappler had told me that.”

KESSELRING: Yes, that is correct.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So the explanation which you say was given to you was that they took a number of people, 382 I suggest, who had been guilty of other crimes and executed them as a reprisal for the bomb plot, isn’t that right?

KESSELRING: That is correct, on the assumption that these people had been sentenced to death.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: This has already been put to you. This is Kappler’s account—that of the 382, 176 had committed acts punishable by death; 22 were people whose cases were marked “closed”; 17 had been sentenced to terms of labor; 4 had actually been condemned to death; 4 had been arrested near the scene of the crime. That made 223.

Didn’t Kappler say to you, “Later the number of victims rose to 325 and I decided to add 57 Jews?” Didn’t Kappler give you these figures?

KESSELRING: No.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But you agree with this, that a large number of persons were executed in consequence of the order to kill 10 Italians, or maybe 20 Italians, for one German who had been killed?

KESSELRING: I admit that, on the assumption, as I have already stated, that these were people who had already been convicted.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But it didn’t make any difference to you whether they had been convicted for the bomb outrage or for any other offense?

KESSELRING: The situation was as follows: The Garigliano battle had begun to rage on the Southern Front. At that time a bomb attack was made on a police company by people of Rome, who had been treated with unparalleled mildness until then. The excitement on the German side was such that I, as well as the officers under my command, including Embassy Counsellor Moellhausen, had to do anything we could to calm the agitation. Therefore on the one side, and on the other, something had to be done—something which seemed to me the most expedient measure for preventing such incidents, namely a public humiliation, a notification that nothing could be undertaken against the German Army without consequences being faced. For me that was the essential point; whether X or Y was involved in this outrage was for me a question of small importance. This alone was of primary importance—that public opinion should be quieted in the shortest possible time, on the Roman as well as on the German side.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Your prior point was to take a third attitude, or some people might say, “terrorize” the population, so that they would not repeat or do anything against the German Army.

KESSELRING: I do not know—this expression comes from the Rotterdam examination. As far as I know and believe I did not use this expression. I have to repeat that I stood, if I may say so, on ideally friendly terms with the Italians—for this very reason I was called to Italy—and that I had the most compelling reason to win friendship and not to sow enmity; and I intervened there, and certainly in a decisive way, only because it was a matter of cutting off the root of this evil growth within a short time.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I asked you various questions about your acts of friendship to the Italians this morning and I am not going back to them. I only want to ask you one other point about which perhaps you will be able to relieve my mind. On the 2d of November 1943 were you the commanding general in Italy, that is, after you became . . .

KESSELRING: May I add something to the first point?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You must come on to this point, and I want you to tell whether you were the commanding general in Italy on the 2d of November 1943? Were you?

KESSELRING: Since November, since 2 November 1943?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember sending a telegram to the OKW that three British Commandos taken prisoner near Pescara were to be given special treatment? That means murder, “special treatment”; it means that they were killed by the SS.

KESSELRING: No. I beg your pardon . . .

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What do you mean by “special treatment”?

KESSELRING: That these people at Pescara, as I have already mentioned once today, were not shot, but rather the wounded were taken to a hospital and, as far as I recall, the unwounded to a prisoner-of-war camp.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: There were nine others who were taken to a hospital and three, according to your telegram got “special treatment” and nine others were taken to hospitals. I was going to ask you about those taken to hospitals. What did you do with people who came under the Commando Order who were taken to hospitals?

KESSELRING: As I have already stated before, they were treated according to the principles of the Hague Convention as generally practiced.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I am not going to argue with you whether the Commando Order was in accordance with the Hague Convention. We know what the Commando Order was, that people taking in Commandos were to be shot. What I am asking you is, supposing some Commandos had the misfortune to be wounded, what happened to them?

KESSELRING: According to the text of this order they would have to be shot. I stated before that this order in this case—I assume with the collaboration of General Jodl—was carried out in the normal fashion.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: There is heard evidence in this Court that in Vilna it was the practice of the SS to kill offhand newborn Jewish babies in hospitals. Can you give me your assurance that Commando troops who were wounded and taken to hospitals were not killed offhand.

KESSELRING: I assure you that I was not informed of any execution of this sort and would also not have tolerated it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is all.

THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution wish any further cross-examination? Then, Dr. Stahmer, do you wish to re-examine?

DR. STAHMER: The British Prosecution has just submitted new facts which were not known until now, especially about the shooting of hostages, which was carried out in Italy by the Hermann Göring Division in connection with the combating of partisans and for which the Defendant Göring apparently is to be made responsible. In this connection new documents were submitted. At the moment I am not in the position to answer these facts and these serious charges, and to put pertinent questions to the witness.

After a careful examination of the material, I shall submit the appropriate motions and I ask for the opportunity to make a statement as to whether I need further witnesses and have to recall the witness Kesselring.

I shall of course limit myself to submitting only absolutely necessary requests for evidence within the framework of the accusations just made, in order to prevent an unnecessary prolongation of the trial.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, the Tribunal thinks that you must re-examine the witness now and that if you wish to make an application hereafter to recall the witness you will have to show very strong grounds for doing it. You may make written application to recall the witness at a later stage, but I would point out to you that the cross-examination of this witness has not been relevant solely to the case of the Defendant Göring. He is a member of the General Staff and, as it was pointed out to him at the opening of one part of the cross-examination, he is one of the accused persons as such, and the evidence, therefore, may be relevant to Göring, or it may have been relevant to the General Staff. Is that clear to you?

DR. STAHMER: Yes, I quite follow; but I can naturally put questions to a witness only if I am in possession of the facts. I am not in such a position today because documents were referred to which are completely unknown to me, and, as far as I know, the Prosecution has the intention of making this material available to us.

THE PRESIDENT: Documents were put to the witness and, as I say, the Tribunal will consider any application which you make hereafter to have this witness recalled, but you may continue now with your re-examination and finish with the witness.

DR. STAHMER: At present I have no further questions to address to the witness.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Then the witness can retire.

[The witness left the stand.]

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, this morning I have noted that the witness has been called a defendant twice, once by a member of the Prosecution and now in your statement. First of all, the witness has appeared here as a witness, and moreover not the individual member of the group but rather the group itself is indicted, so that it cannot be correct to call the witness a defendant.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, possibly it was inaccurate to call him an accused person, but he is a member of the General Staff. I rather think that Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe made it clear that he meant only a member of the group which the Indictment asked the Tribunal to declare criminal. That is all that is meant, and I was only pointing out to Dr. Stahmer that the questions which have been asked were not necessarily relevant to the Defendant Göring, but might be relevant and relevant alone to the case of the General Staff.

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I fully understand the position of the individual generals. I just wished to prevent the generals being called defendants now, which they are not. For that I wanted to have evidence.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

DR. STAHMER: If the High Tribunal agree, I wish to call the former Reich Marshal, Defendant Hermann Göring, to the witness stand.

[The Defendant Göring took the stand.]

THE PRESIDENT: Will you give your name please?

HERMANN WILHELM GÖRING (Defendant): Hermann Göring.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.

[The witness repeated the oath in German.]

THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down if you wish.

DR. STAHMER: When were you born and where?

GÖRING: I was born on 12 January 1893 in Rosenheim, Bavaria.

DR. STAHMER: Give the Tribunal a short account of your life up to the outbreak of the first World War, but briefly, please.

GÖRING: Normal education, first a tutor at home; then cadet corps, then an active officer. A few points which are significant with relation to my later development: The position of my father as first Governor of Southwest Africa; his connections at that time, especially with two British statesmen, Cecil Rhodes and the elder Chamberlain. Then the strong attachment of my father to Bismarck; the experiences of my youth, half of which was spent in Austria to which I already felt a close attachment, as to a kindred people. At the beginning of the first World War I was a lieutenant in an infantry regiment.

DR. STAHMER: With what rank did you participate in the first World War?

GÖRING: As I just mentioned, at first as a lieutenant in an infantry regiment in the so-called border battles. From October 1914 on I was an aircraft observer. In June 1915 I became a pilot, at first with a reconnaissance plane, then for a short time with a bomber and in the autumn of 1915 I became a fighter pilot. I was seriously wounded in aerial combat. After recovery I became the leader of a fighter squadron, and after Richthofen was killed I became the commander of the then well-known “Richthofen Squadron.”

DR. STAHMER: What war decorations did you receive?

GÖRING: First the Iron Cross Second Class, then Iron Cross First Class, then the Zähring Lion with Swords, the Karl Friedrich Order, the Hohenzollern with Swords Third Class, and finally the Order Pour le Mérite, which was the highest decoration possible.

DR. STAHMER: Tell the Tribunal when and under what circumstances you came to know Hitler.

GÖRING: I should like to mention one basic fact in advance. After the collapse in the first World War I had to demobilize my squadron. I rejected the invitation to enter the Reichswehr because from the very beginning I was opposed in every way to the republic which had come to power through the revolution; I could not bring it into harmony with my convictions. Shortly afterwards I went abroad to find a position there. But after a few years I longed to get back to my own country. First, I spent quite some time at a hunting lodge in the mountains and studied there. In some way I wanted to participate in the fate of my country. Since I could not and would not do that as an officer for the reasons mentioned above, I had first of all to build up the necessary foundation, and I attended the University of Munich in order to study history and political science. I settled down in the neighborhood of Munich and bought a house there for my wife. Then one day, on a Sunday in November or October of 1922, the demand having been made again by the Entente for the extradition of our military leaders, at a protest demonstration in Munich—I went to this protest demonstration as a spectator, without having any connection with it. Various speakers from parties and organizations spoke there. At the end Hitler, too, was called for. I had heard his name once before briefly and wanted to hear what he had to say. He declined to speak and it was pure coincidence that I stood nearby and heard the reasons for his refusal. He did not want to disturb the unanimity of the demonstration; he could not see himself speaking, as he put it, to these tame, bourgeois pirates. He considered it senseless to launch protests with no weight behind them. This made a deep impression on me; I was of the same opinion.

I inquired and found that on the following Monday evening I could hear Hitler speak, as he held a meeting every Monday evening. I went there, and there Hitler spoke in connection with that demonstration, about Versailles, the treaty of Versailles, and the repudiation of Versailles.

He said that such empty protests as that of Sunday had no sense at all—one would just pass on from it to the agenda—that a protest is successful only if backed by power to give it weight. Until Germany had become strong, this kind of thing was of no purpose.

This conviction was spoken word for word as if from my own soul. On one of the following days I went to the office of the NSDAP. At that time I knew nothing of the program of the NSDAP, and nothing further than that it was a small party. I had also investigated other parties. When the National Assembly was elected, with a then completely unpolitical attitude I had even voted democratic. Then, when I saw whom I had elected, I avoided politics for some time. Now, finally I saw a man here who had a clear and definite aim. I just wanted to speak to him at first to see if I could assist him in any way. He received me at once and after I had introduced myself he said it was an extraordinary turn of fate that we should meet. We spoke at once about the things which were close to our hearts—the defeat of the fatherland, and that one could not let it rest with that.

The chief theme of this conversation was again Versailles. I told him that I myself to the fullest extent, and all I was, and all I possessed, were completely at his disposal for this, in my opinion, most essential and decisive matter: the fight against the Treaty of Versailles.

The second point which impressed me very strongly at the time and which I felt very deeply and really considered to be a basic condition, was the fact that he explained to me at length that it was not possible under the conditions then prevailing to bring about, in co-operation with only that element which at that time considered itself national—whether it be the political so-called nationalist parties or those which still called themselves national, or the then existing clubs, fighter organizations, the Free Corps, et cetera—with these people alone it was not possible to bring about a reconstruction with the aim of creating a strong national will among the German people, as long as the masses of German labor opposed this idea. One could only rebuild Germany again if one could enlist the masses of German labor. This could be achieved only if the will to become free from the unbearable shackles of the Treaty of Versailles were really felt by the broad masses of the people, and that would be possible only by combining the national conception with a social goal.

He gave me on that occasion for the first time a very wonderful and profound explanation of the concept of National Socialism; the unity of the two concepts of nationalism on the one hand and socialism on the other, which should prove themselves the absolute supporters of nationalism as well as of socialism—the nationalism, if I may say so, of the bourgeois world and the socialism of the Marxist world. We must clarify these concepts again and through this union of the two ideas create a new vehicle for these new thoughts.

Then we proceeded to the practical side, in regard to which he asked me above all to support him in one point. Within the Party, as small as it was, he had made a special selection of these people who were convinced followers, and who were ready at any moment to devote themselves completely and unreservedly to the dissemination of our idea.

He said that I knew myself how strong Marxism and communism were everywhere at the time, and that actually he had been able to make himself heard at meetings only after he had opposed one physical force disturbing the meeting with another physical force protecting the meeting; for this purpose he had created the SA. The leaders at that time were too young, and he had long been on the lookout for a leader who had distinguished himself in some way in the last war, which was only a few years ago, so that there would be the necessary authority. He had always tried to find a “Pour le Mérite” aviator or a “Pour le Mérite” submarine man for this purpose, and now it seemed to him especially fortunate that I in particular, the last commander of the “Richthofen Squadron,” should place myself at his disposal.

I told him that in itself it would not be very pleasant for me to have a leading part from the very beginning, since it might appear that I had come merely because of this position. We finally reached an agreement that for 1 to 2 months I was to remain officially in the background and take over leadership only after that, but actually I was to make my influence felt immediately. I agreed to this, and in that way I came together with Adolf Hitler.

DR. STAHMER: And when was that?

GÖRING: The end of October or the beginning of November 1922.

DR. STAHMER: The end of October?

GÖRING: Either the end of October or the beginning of November 1922.

DR. STAHMER: And then you officially entered the Party?

GÖRING: Yes, that was the same date. Just a few days after that I signed up.

DR. STAHMER: What tasks did Hitler then give you, that is, say, until November 1923?

GÖRING: The tasks arose from my position, which at that time had the title “Commander of the SA.” At first it was important to weld the SA into a stable organization, to discipline it, and to make of it a completely reliable unit which had to carry out the orders which I or Adolf Hitler should give it. Up to that point it had been just a club which had been very active, but which still lacked the necessary construction and discipline.

I strove from the beginning to bring into the SA those members of the Party who were young and idealistic enough to devote their free time and their entire energies to it. For at that time things were very difficult for these good men. We were very small in number and our opponents were far more numerous. Even in those days these men were exposed to very considerable annoyances and had to suffer all sorts of things.

In the second place I tried to find recruits among workmen, for I knew that among workmen particularly I should enroll many members for the SA.

At the same time we had naturally to see to it that the meetings of the Party, which generally were limited at that time to Munich, Upper Bavaria and Franconia, could actually be carried through in a satisfactory manner, and disturbances prevented. In most cases we succeeded. But sometimes we had a strong party of our opponents present. One side or the other still had weapons from the war and sometimes critical situations arose, and in some cases we had to send the SA as reinforcements to other localities.

In the course of the year 1923 the contrast between Bavaria and the Reich became even stronger. One could see that the Bavarian Government of that time wanted to go a different way to that of the Reich Government. The Reich Government was influenced strongly by Marxism, but the Bavarian Government was free from that, it was bourgeois.

Then suddenly the Bavarian Government was completely transformed when a governor general—I believe he was called that—or something of the sort, was appointed for Bavaria. It was Von Kahr, to whom the Bavarian Government was subordinate and to whom the Bavarian Government delegated all authority. Shortly after that the Reichswehr conflict developed. The 7th Reichswehr Division, which was stationed in Bavaria, was released from its oath to the Reich, which it had sworn to the Reich Constitution—I do not know its name any longer—that is to Von Kahr. This led to the conflict of the Generals Von Seeckt and Lossow. The same thing happened with the Bavarian police.

The Bavarian Government at the same time curried favor with the so-called national associations which were in part organized along military or semi-military lines and also possessed weapons. The whole thing was directed against Berlin and, as we expressed it, against the “November Republic.” We could agree up to that point.

On the Sunday, before the 9th of November, there was a large parade in Munich. The whole Bavarian Government was there. The Reichswehr, the police and the fatherland associations, and we too, marched past. Suddenly, on that occasion, we saw that the figure in the foreground was no longer Herr Von Kahr but the Bavarian Crown Prince Rupprecht. We were very much taken aback by that. The suspicion arose among us that Bavaria wished to follow a course which would possibly lead to a considerable disintegration, and Bavaria might secede from the body of the Reich. But nothing was farther from our intentions than to permit that. We wanted a strong Reich, a unified Reich; and we wanted to have it cleansed of certain parties and authorities which were now ruling it.

We had become distrustful of the so-called “March on Berlin.” When this became a certainty and Herr Von Kahr had called the well-known meeting in the Bürgerbräukeller, it was high time to frustrate such plans and to guide the whole undertaking in the direction of the “Greater Germany” idea. Thus the events of 9 November 1923 materialized in very short time. But as far as I personally am concerned, I was—and I never made a secret of this—ready from the beginning to take part in every revolution against the so-called November Republic, no matter where and with whom it originated, unless it originated with the Left, and for these tasks I had always offered my services.

Then I was severely wounded at the Feldherrnhalle—the events are well known—and with this incident I close this first chapter.

DR. STAHMER: When, after that time, did you come together with Hitler again?

GÖRING: At first I was in a hospital in Austria. There was a trial before the Bavarian People’s Court regarding the 9th of November.

DR. STAHMER: Who was indicted?

GÖRING: Hitler was indicted first of all, and naturally all those who had been present and were apprehended. I had been in Upper Bavaria for several days in a seriously wounded state and was then brought to the border, was arrested there, and then the Bavarian police brought me back to a different place. I asked Hitler at that time, whether I should appear at the trial. He begged me urgently not to do that, and that was a good thing. In this way the proceedings could not be held behind closed doors, because I had made the statement that if that was done I, for my part, would make an appropriate public statement with regard to the trial.

Then, after my recuperation, I spent about a year in Italy; then elsewhere abroad. In the year 1926 or 1927 there was a general amnesty for all the people involved in the different illegal—if I should call them that—incidents which had occurred up to then, not only for us but also for the Leftists and the peasants, and I could return to Germany.

I met Hitler again for the first time in 1927 at a rather brief conference in Berlin, where he was present. I was not active in the Party then, rather I wanted first to provide myself with an independent position once more. Then for months I was not in touch with Hitler again. Shortly before the May elections of the Reichstag in 1928 Hitler called me and told me he wanted to put me up as one of the first of the Reichstag candidates for the National Socialist Party and asked me whether I were willing and I said “yes,” and also whether my activity in the Party to a still greater extent . . .

DR. STAHMER: One question. Had you meanwhile joined the SA?

GÖRING: No; at that time I had nothing more to do with the SA. In the meantime there were new appointments in the SA and the new leader of the SA, Von Pfeffer, naturally wanted to keep his position and would not have liked to see me in close touch with the SA.

DR. STAHMER: Then after 1923 you had no office or position in the SA?

GÖRING: After 1923 my active position in the SA ceased. Not until after the seizure of power, at a later date, when the so-called honorary offices were created, did I receive, as an honorary post, the highest rank in the SA. But to come back, in 1928 I was elected to the Reichstag and from that time on I toured the country as a speaker for the Party.

The SA, I do not recall in what year, had been re-established and was now no longer limited to Bavaria, but had been extended to the whole Reich.

DR. STAHMER: Was it prohibited after 1923?

GÖRING: After 1923, it was prohibited for the time being.

DR. STAHMER: When was this prohibition rescinded?

GÖRING: I cannot say exactly, at any rate at a time when I had not yet returned to Germany. But in any case it had spread over all Germany and was now urgently necessary. The parties at that time, the larger ones, all had their so-called fighting units. Especially active, I remember, was the Red Front, a collection of the fighting units of the Communists, our greatest opponents, with whom we had repeated clashes and who very often tried to break up our meetings. In addition, there was the Reichsbanner, the organization of the Social Democrats, the Democratic Party. Then there was the Stahlhelm; that was a nationalist organization of the Right. And then there was our SA, which is to be mentioned in the same connection.

I should like to emphasize that at that time the SA often had to suffer heavily. Most of the SA men came from the broad masses; they were minor employees, workmen, men who took part only for idealistic reasons and who had to give their services nights and evenings without receiving anything in payment, and who did so only out of their real faith in the fatherland. They were often most severely wounded and many of them were shot in the clashes. They were persecuted by the government. They could not be officials; an official could not join the SA. They had to endure terrific pressure. I should like to emphasize that I had the highest respect and affection for these men, these SA men, who were not determined as has been pictured here, simply to do something cruel, but who were rather men who really exposed themselves voluntarily to the most difficult trials and vexations because of their idealism and their aims, and renounced many things in order to realize their ideals.

DR. STAHMER: What was your position in the Party during the period from 1928 until the seizure of power?

GÖRING: I had no office in the Party. I was never a political leader in the Party—that is perhaps strange—either in the Reich Party Directorate or elsewhere. I was first of all, as I said, a member of the Reichstag and thereby a member of the Reichstag faction of the Party. At the same time I was the Party speaker, that is, I travelled from city to city and tried to do whatever I could to extend the Party, to strengthen it, to recruit and convince new members, and especially to win over to our side Communist and Marxist adherents in order to create a broad base among the people and not to have Rightist circles only, which were nationalist of themselves.

From the middle of 1932 on, after we had weathered countless elections and for all of these elections had had to participate in the campaigns by holding speeches, for example, often three in one evening, often the whole night long; I, as a member of the Party, or better said, because our Party had the strongest representation in the Reichstag, was chosen President of the Reichstag and thereby took over a generally political task.

Shortly before, at the end of 1931, when I saw that the Party had grown to an extraordinary extent and was gaining, the Führer said to me that he would very much like to have a direct representative who was independent of a Party office and who could carry out political negotiations. This person was not to be tied down to any particular Party office. He asked me whether I would take over this function, especially as I was living in the capital of the Reich anyway.

I took over this commission—it was not an office, but rather a commission of a general nature. In a few sentences he gave me the liberty to negotiate with all parties from the Communists to the extreme Rightists, in order, let us say, to undertake specific joint action in the Reichstag, or other suitable political steps. Naturally also I was given in this connection, the task of effecting the dissemination and the penetration of our ideals in all circles. To these circles belonged, as has already been mentioned, the industrial and intellectual groups. Since I had connections with and access to all these circles, it was quite natural that the Führer considered me specially suited for this task, as he could depend upon me absolutely in this respect and knew that I would use all my powers to advance our ideas. When I became President of the Reichstag my task in this capacity was greatly eased, for now I was, so to speak, legally authorized and even obliged to participate in political events. If, for instance, a government resigned in the Reichstag or fell through a vote of no confidence, it was my duty as President of the Reichstag, to suggest to the Reich President, after having negotiated with the parties, what the possibilities were in my opinion for a new coalition government. Thus the Reich President was always bound to receive me in this capacity with regard to these matters. So I was able to create a rather close connection between the Reich President and myself. But I should like to emphasize that this connection had already existed before; it was a matter of course that Field Marshal Von Hindenburg, if I requested it, would always receive me, because he had known me in the first World War.

DR. STAHMER: What part did you play in the appointment of Hitler as Reich Chancellor?

GÖRING: I should just like to explain first that when I said that I held no office in the Party, no political office, my position had nevertheless naturally become stronger and stronger, especially since the end of 1931, from which time on I worked more and more closely with the Führer and was considered his special exponent—but only on the basis of normal and natural authority which increased greatly after the seizure of power.

As to my part in the appointment of Hitler: If I am to explain this to the Tribunal I must first describe the situation briefly. The balance among the parliamentary parties had been disturbed as early as the end of 1931 or the beginning of 1932. Things were going badly in Germany and no proper enduring parliamentary majority could actually be procured, and already the Enabling Act then in force had come into play to the exclusion, in part, of the Constitution. I call to mind the Brüning cabinet which had to work to a large extent with the Enabling Act and which at the time was also greatly concerned with Article 48 of the Reich Constitution. Then there followed the Cabinet of Von Papen, which also could not put itself on a parliamentary basis, on a more lasting or firmer basis. Herr Von Papen at that time tried to make that possible and, in order to get a parliamentary basis, he asked the National Socialists, the strongest party at that time, to establish such a basis together with the other parties. There was some talk—Von Papen’s name had been given to the President as a nominee for Reich Chancellor—that Hitler should become the Vice Chancellor in this Cabinet. I remember that I told Herr Von Papen at that time that Hitler could become any number of things, but never Vice. If he were to be made anything, he would naturally have to be in the highest position and it would be completely unbearable and unthinkable to place our Führer in any sort of second position. We would then have had to play the role of governing, but possibly not all according to our lights, and Hitler as a representative of the strongest party would have had to be responsible for these things. This we declined categorically. I do not emphasize that because Herr Von Papen is in the dock with me. He knows that we always respected him personally, but I told him then, after this gesture had come to nought, that we would not only not support him, but would also oppose his Cabinet in the Reichstag to the utmost, just as we would consistently fight every succeeding cabinet which did not give us a leading influence in the Chancellery.

There came then—I do not remember exactly for how many months Herr Von Papen held the reins—the well-known clash between him and me, he as Reich Chancellor, I as the President of the Reichstag, in which it was my intention to bring about the fall of his government, and I knew there was to be a motion of “no confidence” by the Communists, in which practically everybody would participate. It was necessary for this vote of “no confidence” to be expressed under all circumstances in order to show the Reich President that one could not govern with such cabinets without some sort of strong reserve. I saw the “red portfolio” and knew that the order for dissolution was in it, but let the voting be carried through first. Thirty-two votes were for Von Papen and about five hundred were against him. The Cabinet of Von Papen resigned.

Up to that point all the parties had drawn up cabinets, apart from the few small fragmentary parties. All men who were available had already been presented to the people at some time. Towards the end, Reich Defense Minister Von Schleicher, the political figure behind the scenes, had played an increasingly important part. There were therefore only two possibilities: Either the actual proportion of power would be taken into account and the leader of the strongest party, as is generally customary, would be brought into conferences and entrusted with the power, or else the man who was operating behind the scenes, the only possibility that was left, would be brought forward. And this happened. Herr Von Schleicher himself took over the chancellorship in conjunction with—and this is important—the office of Reich Defense Minister. It was clear to us, not only to us but also to the other parties, that as Herr Von Schleicher had far fewer personal sympathizers than Herr Von Papen and could not bring about a majority, a military dictatorship was finally aimed at by Von Schleicher. I had discussions with Herr Von Schleicher and told him that at this moment it was even possible to form a parliamentary majority. Through conferences I had succeeded in bringing together the German Nationals, National Socialists, Center, German People’s Party and smaller supporting groups, to form a majority. It was clear to me that such a majority could be only temporary because the conflicting interests were too great. But it was a matter of indifference to me whether I brought our Party to power this way or that—if by means of parliamentary negotiations, very good; if by the Reich President’s summons, all the better.

These negotiations were turned down by Herr Von Schleicher because he knew that he would then not be able to remain chancellor. Then again there were Emergency Laws and Enabling Acts. Parliament had thus been more or less excluded even before our seizure of power.

I immediately issued the same challenge to Herr Von Schleicher in the Reichstag, much more emphatically than previously to Herr Von Papen. In the meantime the presidential election had taken place and after that a Reichstag election, in which, after the dissolution of Von Papen’s Cabinet we lost several seats. We were reduced from 232 to 196 seats. Then in January there were further elections, which showed an extraordinary rise in favor of our Party and proved that the short crisis had been surmounted and that the Party was on the upgrade more strongly than ever before.

On Sunday, the 22nd of January 1933—the 30th was a Monday—I was in Dresden at a large political meeting, when I was summoned in the morning by the Führer to motor to Berlin immediately. I arrived that afternoon, and he told me, which I already knew, that the Reich President was no longer satisfied with Von Schleicher and saw that political matters could not continue in this way; nothing was ever accomplished; the Reich President had independently arrived at the conclusion that somehow some responsibility must now be given to the strongest Party. Before that time, in a very clever way, a wrong personal impression of the Führer had been created in the old gentleman’s mind and he was prejudiced—he probably took offense at the word socialism, because he understood that in a different way.

Briefly, Hitler revealed to me that day, that that evening I was to speak to the Field Marshal’s son at the home of Herr Von Ribbentrop. I believe Herr Von Papen was to be present also and—I am not sure about this—Meissner, who was the State Secretary of the Reich President. The Field Marshal’s son wanted to inquire on behalf of his father what the possibilities were of Hitler as chancellor and the inclusion of the Party in responsibility. In a rather lengthy conversation I declared to the son that he should tell his father that, one way or another, Von Schleicher would lead to shipwreck. I explained to him the new basic conditions for forming a new government, and how I had heard now of the Field Marshal’s willingness to entrust Hitler with the chancellorship, thereby regarding the Party as a main basis for a future government majority if Adolf Hitler were also able to succeed on this occasion in drawing in the German Nationals and the Stahlhelm—for he wanted to see a definite national basis. The Stahlhelm was not a parliamentary party but it had many followers. The German Nationals under Hugenberg were a parliamentary party.

We did not discuss very much more that evening. I told Von Hindenburg’s son that he could tell his father that I would undoubtedly bring that about, and the Führer gave me orders to undertake negotiations during the coming week with these parties on the one hand and with the Reich President on the other. There were difficulties here and there. I found that our conceding . . .

THE PRESIDENT: I think we will break off now.

[A recess was taken.]

DR. STAHMER: You were dealing with the question of your participation in the appointment of Hitler as Reich Chancellor. Would you continue?

GÖRING: I had arrived at the last decisive period. The negotiations had become somewhat difficult. The Field Marshal, Reich President Von Hindenburg, who, until then, had come to know the Führer personally only through two conversations and who had not yet overcome his distrust of him—a distrust which had been instilled and nourished for many years by a variety of influences, simply because he did not know him—had at that time demanded some severe restrictions, so that we, the strongest and now the leading party, which would have to be responsible to the nation for future measures, would be relatively very restricted and, in comparison with our strength, weakly represented in the government.

One must not forget that at this moment Germany had arrived at the lowest point of her downward trend. There were 8 million unemployed; all programs had failed; confidence in the parties existed no more; there was a very strong rise on the part of the revolutionary Leftist side; and political insecurity. Therefore those measures were necessary which the people would expect of us, if we were in the government, and for which we had to stand. So it was a very heavy burden to take over such a responsibility with such severe political conditions imposed.

First condition: The Reich President wanted, under all circumstances, that Herr Von Papen should become Vice Chancellor in this Cabinet. Apart from his sympathetic personality Herr Von Papen did not bring us anything, because there was no party behind him. But the Reich President demanded, beyond that, that Herr Von Papen should attend the presentation of the reports which the Führer, after being appointed Reich Chancellor, would have to make to the Reich President. But this was abandoned very quickly, and by the Reich President himself.

Secondly, the Reich President desired that the Foreign Office, independent of all parties, should be in the hands of Herr Von Neurath. Herr Von Neurath also brought us nothing in the way of political power, apart from his knowledge and ability.

Thirdly, the position of Prussian Prime Minister which, next to that of the Reich Chancellor was always the most important in Germany during the period after the World War, was likewise to be filled by the person of Herr Von Papen. Before the World War, as it is known, the offices of Reich Chancellor and Prussian Prime Minister were for these reasons always combined in one person.

Fourthly, the Reich President demanded that the office of Reich Defense Minister should also be in the hands of an independent person, a soldier; and he himself chose him, without our having anything to do with it, namely, General Von Blomberg, who at that time was at the Disarmament Conference in Geneva. Herr Von Blomberg was not known personally either to the Führer or to me at that time.

Even though the essential and definitely most important posts in the Cabinet were thus already filled by persons in whose choice we had had no influence, still further demands developed in the course of the week. It was demanded that the Finance Ministry should be in the hands of Count Schwerin von Krosigk, again a man backed by no political party. The Ministry of Transportation was to be under Herr Von Eltz, to whom the same applied. The leader of the Stahlhelm, Seldte, was to be taken into the Cabinet. Certainly the Stahlhelm was a large and extensive movement, but not politically, and it was not represented by a single delegate in the Reichstag.

There was left, as a really political party, only the German National Party, with 36 seats—our only parliamentary ally, so to speak. Here too, extraordinary demands were made, which were in no correct proportion to the smallness of that party.

In the end we, as the strongest party at that time with 232 seats, were given only the following, as far as I remember: The office of Reich Chancellor of course; then Dr. Frick as Reich Minister of the Interior, in the Cabinet; and I third in the Reich Cabinet, with an assignment as Reich Commissioner for Aviation, a very small subordinate division, an insignificant branch of a small Aviation Department in the Ministry of Transport, but no department otherwise. But then I succeeded in becoming, without conditions attached, Prussian Minister of the Interior and thereby a political minister of the largest German state, for in the end Prussia was actually the place where the rise to internal power started.

It was so far an extraordinarily difficult affair. At the last moment the forming of the Cabinet threatened to fail because of two factors. The Führer had made the unconditional demand that shortly after the appointment of the new Cabinet a new Reichstag election should take place, knowing correctly that the Party would be greatly strengthened thereby and possibly could represent a majority by itself, and thus be in a position to form the government platform by parliamentary means.

Hugenberg, as leader of the German National Party, absolutely opposed this, knowing that his party would probably disappear more or less in this election. Even 5 minutes before the meeting of the Cabinet there was still danger that it would break up because of this. It was pure chance that at this moment the Reich President undertook to administer the oath to the new ministers; and so the Cabinet was formed.

The second danger threatened from Schleicher who, through his confidant, on the Sunday made the following offer to the Führer and me: He wanted to emphasize that the Reich President was not a sure factor as far as the new government was concerned; it would serve the purpose better if he—even though he had withdrawn the day before—were to join us to form a government now quite definitely not on a parliamentary basis of any kind, but rather on the basis of an entirely new situation, a coalition of the Reichswehr and the NSDAP.

The Führer refused, recognizing that this would be impossible and that the intentions were not honest.

When Herr Von Blomberg arrived at the railroad station from Geneva on the Monday morning, he was given two orders, one from Herr Von Hammerstein, Chief of the Army Command and his superior, to come to him immediately; the other from Hindenburg, his commander-in-chief, to come to him immediately. There was at that time, known only to a few, the threat of a Putsch by Schleicher and Hammerstein with the Potsdam Garrison.

On the Sunday evening I mentioned that to Reich President Von Hindenburg, and that is the reason why, 2 hours before the rest of the Cabinet, Herr Von Blomberg was appointed Minister of War, or at that time Reich Defense Minister, in order to prevent any wrong move by the Reichswehr.

At 11 o’clock on the morning of the 30th the Cabinet was formed and Hitler appointed Reich Chancellor.

DR. STAHMER: Had the Party come to power in a legal way, in your opinion?

GÖRING: Of course the Party had come to power in an entirely legal way, because the Party had been called upon by the Reich President according to the Constitution, and according to the principles in force the Party should have been called upon much earlier than that. The Party gained strength and came to power only by way of normal elections and the franchise law then valid.

DR. STAHMER: What measures were now taken to strengthen this power after Hitler’s appointment?

GÖRING: It was a matter of course for us that once we had come into power we were determined to keep that power under all circumstances. We did not want power and governmental authority for power’s sake, but we needed power and governmental authority in order to make Germany free and great. We did not want to leave this any longer to chance, to elections, and parliamentary majorities, but we wanted to carry out the task to which we considered ourselves called.

In order to consolidate this power now, it was necessary to reorganize the political relationship of power. That was carried out in such a manner that, shortly after the seizure of governmental authority in the Reich and in Prussia, the other states followed automatically and more or less strong National Socialist governments were formed everywhere.

Secondly, the so-called political officials who according to the Reich Constitution could be recalled at any time, or could be dismissed, would naturally have to be replaced now, according to custom, by people from the strongest party.

As far as legality, that is, the opinion that we came to power legally, is concerned, I should like to emphasize two considerations in particular.

Firstly: in the years 1925 to 1932 no fewer than 30 Reichstag, Landtag, and presidential elections took place in Germany. The very fact that 37 parties had candidates in one Reichstag election alone gives a clear picture of how it happened that one strong coalition formed the so-called government majority, and another strong grouping formed the opposition, each with an entirely different point of view. Just think of an opposition formed in common by Communists and National Socialists for example, and the fact that one small party which had eight representatives altogether was now the decisive factor, and in two readings of a law, especially of a decisive law—every law had to have three readings—voted against the government and then secured sufficient political and material advantages to force the law through for the government at its third, final reading. This may give a picture of the conditions.

The second point which I want to emphasize especially in regard to the legality of our coming to power, is the following:

Had the democratic election system of England or the United States of America existed in Germany, then the National Socialist German Workers Party would, at the end of 1931 already, have legally possessed all seats in the Reichstag, without exception. For in every electoral district in Germany at that time, or at the beginning of 1932 at the latest, in every one—I emphasize this once more—the NSDAP was the strongest party; that is to say, given an electoral system as it is in Great Britain or in the United States all these weaker parties would have failed to gain any seats and from this time on we would have had only National Socialists in the Reich, in a perfectly legal way according to the democratic principles of these two great democracies.

For the further seizure of power the main political offices were now filled by new holders, as is the case in other lands when there has been a change-over of power among the political parties. Besides the ministers there were first of all—taking Prussia as an example—the administrative heads of the provinces, the official heads of administrative districts, the police commissioners, county heads (Landräte). In addition there was a certain further grade—I believe down to ministerial directors—who were considered political officials. District attorneys were considered political officials. This on the whole describes the range of offices which were filled anew when a shift in political power took place and had previously been bargained out among the parties having the majority. It did not go so far as in other countries—all the way down to the letter carrier. There was a change of office holders, but only of the most important posts.

In spite of that we did very little in this direction at first. First of all, I requested Herr Von Papen to relinquish to me the position of Prussian Prime Minister, as he, having no party behind him, could not very well undertake this reshuffling, but rather I, that is, one of us, should undertake it. We agreed at once. Thereupon I filled some, a relatively small part, of the highest administrative Prussian offices with National Socialists. At the same time I generously allowed Social Democrats to remain in these posts for many weeks. I filled a few important provincial offices with leading Catholic persons who were much closer to the Center Party than to us. But slowly, by degrees, in the course of time these offices, to the extent that they were key administrative positions, were, of course, filled with National Socialists—it could hardly be otherwise in the further course of the change-over, since these offices at the same time corresponded to the political districts. Even until the very end district heads remained in part National Socialists, in part, however, simply officials. The same was true of the Landräte. In the case of police commissioners, I should like to emphasize for the information of the Tribunal that the police commissioners at first had nothing to do with the Gestapo. A police commissioner in the bigger cities had the same function as a Landrat in the country, in part at least. These police commissioner posts had always been filled by the largest political parties until the seizure of power. Thus I found Social Democrats in these positions who could not, with the best of intentions, remain, as they had always been our opponents up to that date. That would have been absurd. I filled these police commissioner posts partly with National Socialists but partly, however, with people who had nothing to do with the Party. I remember that to the most important police commissioner post in the whole German Reich, the one in Berlin, I appointed Admiral Von Levetzow, retired, who was not a member of the Party. In some of these offices I put former SA leaders.

For the purpose of consolidation of power, which seemed very important not only to me but all of us because that was to form the basic condition for our further work, a still stronger influence came into the Reich Cabinet. New National Socialists received positions as ministers. New ministries were created. In addition came a number of new basic laws.

It was indeed clear to everyone who had concerned himself with German conditions, either abroad or especially in Germany, that we would put an end to the Communist Party as quickly as possible. It was an absolutely necessary consequence that it should be prohibited. We were convinced that if the Communist Party, which was the strongest next to us, had succeeded in coming to power, it would certainly not have taken any National Socialists into its cabinet or tolerated them elsewhere. We were aware that we would have been eliminated in an entirely different manner.

A further point in the consolidation of power was to eliminate to a certain extent the Reichstag as a parliament, at least for a period of time during the reorganization, because its influence was increasing until then. That, however, had happened owing to the fact that we had an absolute majority in the Reichstag after the new election. In some cases we suggested to the former parties that they should dissolve themselves, because they no longer had any purpose, and those which could not dissolve themselves were dissolved by us. I was speaking of the Communist Party and the Social Democratic Party. Beyond that, we wanted finally to fulfill an old, old longing of the German people and now not only appear to have the structure of a Reich, but at last, really become a unified German Reich. This purpose was served by firmly establishing the Reich idea and the Reich’s power throughout the countless states and provinces. If it had been difficult for a fervent German patriot before the first World War to get along with a heap of petty princes, it was even worse with those who took their places, for in the place of one small will there now appeared the most various, party-bound officials.

In the Reich there was a majority based on one thing; in Prussia, on another; in Bavaria, on yet another; and in Hesse, on something quite different. It was impossible in this manner to establish Reich sovereignty and a Reich which could be great again.

Therefore I suggested to the Führer that the state parliaments should be dissolved and done away with as a matter of principle. In Prussia I began with the elimination of state parliaments, which I considered entirely superfluous, for the simple reason that the principle “Reich dominion, not state authority” was already in force. I saw no reason why so many different authorities should exist which, with their unnecessary frictions and discussions merely hindered constructive work. Yet, however much I wanted to see and make the Reich structurally unified, I, and the Führer above all, always supported the idea that within the German states and provinces cultural life should remain many-sided and bound to local traditions; that is to say, all the old centers of culture, which, as is well known, had formed around Munich, Dresden, Weimar, and so on, should continue to exist in that way and be supported.

For the further consolidation of power those laws were created which would first of all eliminate any further obstacle to progress, that is to say, on the basis of Paragraph 48, the law did away with the so-called freedoms. The conception of these freedoms is a matter of controversy. The “Law for the Protection of People and State” was created, a law which was most urgently needed. In the past years much had been prohibited which could have stimulated patriotic activity, yet a senseless defamation had been allowed of the German people, its history, the German State, and those symbols and objects which are, after all, very holy things to a patriot; and they were not protected in any way.

It is a matter of course that in connection with the concept of “conformity” which arose at this time, very many unnecessary and excessive things were done, for after the seizure of power the whole movement developed along revolutionary lines, although not in the way of revolutions as they had been known in history until then, such as the French Revolution, or the great Bolshevist Revolution—that is to say, not by way of great conflicts and cruel changes, revolutionary tribunals that executed people by hundreds of thousands—but still with a strong revolutionary aim in the direction of unity of State, Party, and National Socialism as the basis of leadership and of ideology.

This “conformity” which I have just mentioned was then effected in detail; but, as I have said, on the occasion of such drastic political transformations people will always overstep the mark here and there. Personally I did not consider it necessary that every organization should now become National Socialist or that—if I am to express myself quite drastically—every club or similar organization should absolutely have to have a National Socialist chairman. But in decisive political matters, and in matters of principle, our ideas and our ideology had to be recognized more and more; for that was the basic condition for the rebuilding, establishing, and strengthening of the Reich.

An additional strengthening, which occurred only after the death of Reich President Von Hindenburg in 1934, was the confirmation of the head of the state and the Reich Chancellor in one person. To this I should like to add that on this occasion I had a long conversation with the Führer. Right from the beginning we had discussed whether Hitler would and should take over the position of head of the State, and whether I should take over the chancellorship. In view of the Führer’s temperament and attitude it was unthinkable that the Führer, sitting on a throne above the political clouds, so to speak, should appear only as head of the State. He was definitely a political leader and hence a leader of the government. Also the thought of putting in some other person as a puppet head of the State we considered unworthy of the situation.

The Führer told me then that the simplest thing to do would be to take as example the United States of America, where the head of the state is at the same time also the head of the government. Thus, following the example of the United States, we combined the position of the head of the State with the head of the government, and he called himself “Führer of the German People and Reich Chancellor of the German Reich.”

That he thereby automatically became also the Commander-in-Chief of the German Armed Forces followed as a matter of course, according to the Constitution, and also according to the previous Constitution, just as is the case in other countries also.

That was the position, broadly speaking, apart from a number of other developments which probably will have to be mentioned later in my testimony—as, for instance, the establishment of police power, the basic element of the consolidation of power, and so on.

In conclusion I wish to say: 1) It is correct that I—and I can speak only for myself—have done everything which was at all within my personal power to strengthen the National Socialist movement, to increase it, and have worked unceasingly to bring it to power under all circumstances and as the one and only authority. 2) I have done everything to secure for the Führer the place as Reich Chancellor which rightfully belonged to him. 3) When I look back, I believe I have not failed to do anything to consolidate our power to such an extent that it would not have to yield to the chances of the political game or to violent actions, but would rather in the further course of reconstruction, become the only factor of power, which would lead the Reich and lead it—as we hoped—to a great development.

DR. STAHMER: What offices did you hold after the seizure of power?

GÖRING: First I was President of the Reichstag, as before, and I remained that until the end. In the Reich Cabinet I was given at first the post of Reich Minister and Reich Commissioner for Aviation, not the Air Force. In parentheses I should like to say that from the very beginning it was clear to me that we had to establish an air force.

In Prussia I was given the position of the Prussian Minister of the Interior, then on 20 April 1933, in addition, the post of Prime Minister of Prussia.

The Reich Commissariat for Aviation had become before this, I believe already in March 1933, a Reich Ministry for Aviation.

Then there were still several not very important offices, President of the State Council, and so on.

Important at that time, however, were the two offices of Prime Minister of Prussia on the one hand and Minister of Aviation on the other. The office of Prussian Minister of the Interior I handed over to the Reich Minister of the Interior at the beginning of 1934, for it was part of the consolidation of power and above all, of the clarification necessary for proper governing authority in the Reich, that the Prussian ministries should be combined with those of the Reich. Only in this way was it possible for the Reich ministries to receive practical information about the political work of the day and about the work of the departments. Only through this combination was that possible.

DR. STAHMER: Did you in your capacity as Prussian Minister of the Interior create the Gestapo and the concentration camps which have so often been mentioned here? When and for what purpose were they established?

GÖRING: I mentioned before that for the consolidation of power the first prerequisite was to create along new lines that instrument which at all times and in all nations is always the inner political instrument of power, namely, the police. There was no Reich police, only provincial police. The most important was the Prussian police. This had already been filled by our predecessors, the former parties, with their own people, according to their political attitude. I have mentioned the filling of the posts of police commissioners and those of the chiefs of the main police offices within the Prussian Ministry of the Interior. Thus it was that our opponents, our most bitter opponents, who up to then had always opposed us most vigorously with this police power, were still in the regional offices.

A slight loosening up had taken place before I took charge, during the time when the Social Democratic Braun-Severing government was replaced by the government of Herr Von Papen. At that time the bitterest opponents were also removed from the police. Nevertheless the most important positions were still in the hands of definite political opponents. I could not very well expect that those who until yesterday were ready to employ the police with particular severity against us, would today show the same loyalty to the new state.

Before our time there was also a political police in Prussia. That was Police Department Ia, and its task was first of all the supervision of and the fight against the National Socialists, and also, in part, against the Communists.

Now, I could have simply put new people into this political police and let it continue along the old lines. But the situation had changed because of our seizure of power, for at this time, as I have mentioned before, the Communist Party was extraordinarily strong. It had over 6 million voters, and in its Red Front Organization it had a thoroughly revolutionary instrument of power. It was quite obvious to the Communist Party that if we were to stay in power for any length of time, it would ultimately lose its power.

Looking back, the danger positively existed at that time of political tension, and with [an] atmosphere of conflict, that revolutionary acts might have taken place on the part of the Communists, particularly as, even after we came to power political murders and political shootings of National Socialists and policemen by that party did not stop, but at times even increased. Also the information which I received was such that I was made extremely fearful of a sudden swing in that direction. Therefore with this department as it was, I could not ward off that danger. I needed reliable political police not only in the main office, but also in the branch offices. I therefore had to enlarge this instrument.

In order to make clear from the outset that the task of this police was to make the State secure I called it the Secret State Police, and at the same time I established branch offices of this police. I took in a great number of political officials who were experienced, and at the beginning took fewer people from the Party circles because for the time being I had to attach importance to professional ability.

I also wanted this police to be concerned exclusively with protecting the State, first of all against its enemies. And the leader whom I selected for this police force was not from the Party but came from the former police. He, Diels, was already there at that time as Oberregierungsrat and later as Ministerialrat, and likewise the main chiefs of the Gestapo were officials who were not from the Party. Later the Party element appeared in the police more and more. Their mission was first of all to create as quickly as possible all assurance of security against any action from the left.

I know—as was afterwards proved—that the headquarters of the Communists in Berlin, the Liebknecht House, was strongly fortified and contained very many arms; we had also at that time brought to light very strong connections between the Russian Trade Delegation and the German Communist Party. Even if I arrested, as I did, thousands of communist functionaries at one blow, so that an immediate danger was averted at the outset, the danger as such was by no means eliminated. It was now necessary to disclose the secret connections, the network of these secret connections, and to keep them constantly under observation. For that purpose a police leadership would have to crystallize. The Social Democratic Party on the whole seemed to me not nearly so dangerous, especially as far as its members were concerned. But of course they were also absolute opponents of our new State. A part of their functionaries were radical, another part less radical. The more radical I likewise placed under observation, while a whole number of former Social Democratic ministers, heads of Prussian provinces and higher officials, as I said before, were quietly discharged and received their pensions, and nothing further was undertaken against them. Of course there were also other functionaries of the Social Democratic Party whom we definitely had to watch carefully. Thus the Secret State Police was created by me for these tasks, first of all in Prussia, because I had nothing to do with the other states at that time. The organization of the rest of the police is not of such importance here.

DR. STAHMER: The concentration camps?

GÖRING: When the need became evident for creating order first of all, and removing the most dangerous element of disorder directed against us, I decided to have the communist functionaries and leaders arrested all at once. I therefore had a list made for that purpose, and it was clear to me that even if I arrested only the most important and most dangerous of these functionaries it still would involve several thousands, for it was necessary to arrest not only the party functionaries but also those from the Red Front Organization, as the Communists also had affiliated organizations. These arrests were in accordance with reasons of State security and State necessity. It was a question of removing a danger. Only one possibility was available here, that of protective custody—that is, whether or not one could prove that these people were involved in a traitorous act or an act hostile to the State, whether or not one could expect such an act from them, such an act must be prevented and the possibility eliminated by means of protective custody. That was nothing new and it was not a National Socialist invention. Already before this such protective custody measures had been carried out, partly against the Communists, and chiefly against us, the National Socialists. The prisons were not available for this purpose, and also I want to stress from the very beginning that this was a political act for the defense of the State. Therefore, I said that these men should first of all be gathered into camps—one to two camps were proposed at that time—because I could not tell them how long the internment of these people would be necessary nor how the number would be increased by the further exposure of the entire communist movement. When we occupied the Karl Liebknecht House we found so many arms, material, and preparations for a civil war, that, as I said, one could not gain a general view of its extent. I have already indicated, as is obvious, that in view of such great political tension as existed between the extreme wings of these political opponents and in view of the bitterness of the opposition caused by the continuous fighting in the streets, the mutual tension, et cetera, resulting from the political struggle, the situation would conceivably not be a very pleasant one for the inmates. For this reason I gave instructions that the guard, if possible to a large extent, should consist of police forces; only where these were not adequate should auxiliary forces be called. I have stated my opinion with regard to the question of concentration camps and I should like to point out that this name was not created by us, but that it appeared in the foreign press and was then adopted. Where the name originated, is rather an historical matter. At the end of 1933 in a book, which at first appeared in English, at the request of an English publisher, and which has already been presented by the Prosecution as evidence, I stated my views on this matter quite openly—that was at the end of 1933. I point out again that it was for foreign countries, for English-speaking countries. At that time I openly stated the following: Of course, in the beginning there were excesses; of course, the innocent were also hurt here or there; of course, there were beatings here and there and acts of brutality were committed; but compared to all that has happened in the past and to the greatness of the events, this German revolution of freedom is the least bloody and the most disciplined of all revolutions known to history.

DR. STAHMER: Did you supervise the treatment of the prisoners?

GÖRING: I naturally gave instructions that such things should not happen. That they did happen and happened everywhere to a smaller or greater extent I have just stated. I always pointed out that these things ought not to happen, because it was important to me to win over some of these people for our side and to re-educate them.

DR. STAHMER: Did you do anything about abuses of which you heard?

GÖRING: I took a personal interest in the concentration camps up to the spring of 1934. At that time there were two or three camps in Prussia.

Witness Körner has already mentioned the case of Thälmann. I would like to speak about it briefly, because it was the most striking case, as Thälmann was the leader of the Communist Party. I could not say today who it was who hinted to me that Thälmann had been beaten.

I had him called to me in my room directly, without informing the higher authorities and questioned him very closely. He told me that he had been beaten during, and especially at the beginning, of the interrogations. Thereupon, as the witness who was present has said already, I told Thälmann that I regretted that. At the same time I told him, “Dear Thälmann, if you had come to power, I probably would not have been beaten, but you would have chopped my head off immediately.” And he agreed. Then I told him that in the future he must feel free to let me know if anything of this sort should happen to him or to others. I could not always be there, but it was not my wish that any act of brutality should be committed against them.

Just to demonstrate this case, which was not an unimportant one, I want to stress that later Thälmann’s wife turned to me for help and that I answered her letter immediately.

At that time I also—this I can prove by evidence—helped the families of the inmates financially so far as that was necessary.

At this opportunity I should also like to speak about the unauthorized concentration camps which have been mentioned, the purpose of which came under the heading of abolition of abuses. At first I did not know anything about them, but then I found out about one such camp near Stettin. It had been established by Karpfenstein, at that time Gauleiter of Pomerania. I had this camp closed at once—my Defense Counsel will remember that he, independently of me, received information about this during the Trial, from an inmate whom I do not know at all—and I had the guilty persons, who had committed acts of brutality there, brought before a court and prosecuted by the state attorney, which can likewise be proved. Karpfenstein was expelled from the Party.

A second camp of that kind was found in Breslau, which Heines had established. I do not remember today what happened there. At any rate, it was a camp not authorized by me. This one I likewise closed down and did away with immediately. Heines was one of the closest of Röhm’s collaborators, about whom I shall speak later.

As far as I can remember—I cannot name the place exactly anymore—close to Berlin another unauthorized concentration camp had been secretly established by Ernst, the SA leader in Berlin, whom I had always suspected of acts of brutality. That also was closed. Ernst belonged to those evil figures who were eliminated in the Röhm Putsch. It is possible to question persons who were inmates of these camps at that time, 1933 and the beginning of 1934, as to whether during that time anything happened which even approached that which happened later.

DR. STAHMER: Did you, after a consolidation of power had taken place, ever free inmates to any great extent and at what time did you do so?

GÖRING: At Christmas of 1933 I gave orders for the release of the lighter cases, that is the less dangerous cases, and those cases of which one had the impression the people had resigned themselves to the situation; that was about 5,000 people. I repeated that once more in November 1934 for 2,000 inmates. I stress again that that refers only to Prussia. At that time, as far as I remember—I cannot say exactly—one camp was dissolved or at least closed temporarily. That was at a time when nobody thought that it would ever be the subject of an investigation before an international tribunal.

DR. STAHMER: How long were you in charge of the Gestapo and the concentration camps and until what date?

GÖRING: Actually I was in charge until the beginning of 1934, that is, at the beginning of 1934 Diels was the head and he gave me frequent reports about the Gestapo and about the concentration camps. Meanwhile, outside Prussia a re-grouping of police had taken place with the result that Himmler was in charge of the police in all the provinces of Germany with the exception of Prussia only. Probably following the example of my measures, he had installed the Secret State Police there, because the police at that time was still a matter of the states. There were the police of Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, Hesse, Saxony, et cetera.

He had become the leader of all these police forces, and of course he now sought to get the leadership of the police in Prussia as well. I was very satisfied with Diels at that time, and from my point of view I saw no reason for letting any change take place.

These efforts, I believe, started as early as in the late summer of 1933. Shortly after I had transferred the Prussian Ministry of the Interior to the Reich Ministry of the Interior, in the spring of 1934, and so was no longer a departmental minister, Himmler, I assume, probably urged the Führer more strongly to put him in charge of the Prussian police as well. At that time I did not expressly oppose it. It was not agreeable to me; I wanted to handle my police myself. When, however, the Führer asked me to do this and said that it would be the correct thing and the expedient thing, and that it was proved necessary for the enemy of the State to be fought throughout the Reich in a uniform way, I actually handed the police over to Himmler, who put Heydrich in charge. But legally I still retained it, because there was still no Reich police in existence.

The rest of the police, the state police—that is the uniformed police—I did not turn over to him, because, as I shall explain later, I had to a large extent organized this police in Prussia along military lines, in order to be able to fit it into the future rearmament program. For this reason I could not and did not want to give him the uniformed police, because it had been trained for purely military purposes—by me, at my instigation, and on my responsibility—and had nothing to do with the actual police. It was turned over to the Armed Forces by me in 1935.

In 1936 the Reich Police Law was issued, and thereby the office of the Chief of the German Police was created. By virtue of this law the police was then legally and formally turned over to the Reichsführer SS, or, as he was called, the Chief of the German Police.

DR. STAHMER: You mentioned before the Röhm Putsch. Who was Röhm, and with what event was this Putsch connected?

GÖRING: Röhm had become leader of the SA, Chief of Staff of the SA.

THE PRESIDENT: I think we had better adjourn. It is 5 o’clock now.

[The Tribunal adjourned until 14 March 1946 at 1000 hours.]

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EIGHTY-FIRST DAY
Thursday, 14 March 1946