Morning Session
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has made an order with respect to further proceedings on the charge against organizations and the applications of members thereof. I do not propose to read that order, but the order will be posted on the Defense Counsel’s information board and will be communicated to them and to the Prosecution.
Dr. Jahrreiss, had you finished your examination?
DR. JAHRREISS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Does any other of the Defense Counsel wish to examine the witness?
[The witness Kesselring resumed the stand.]
DR. KAUFFMANN: Witness, have you any recollection when the Defendant Kaltenbrunner first came into the public eye?
KESSELRING: I have no knowledge of Kaltenbrunner’s becoming particularly prominent in the public eye. I heard the name Kaltenbrunner for the first time when he appeared as successor to General Canaris.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Have you any recollection of him being made the Chief of the Reich Security Main Office in January 1943?
KESSELRING: I may have heard of it, but I have no certain recollection of it.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Kaltenbrunner states that in April 1945 he tried to save the country of Austria from further acts of war. Have you by chance any recollection of that?
KESSELRING: I merely heard that Kaltenbrunner was one of those persons who were working for an independent Austria, but I have no definite, accurate knowledge of the situation.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Furthermore, Kaltenbrunner states that he, on the basis of an agreement with the Red Cross at Geneva, had arranged for the return of civilian internees to their homeland through the firing line. He had communicated a request to your office—not to you personally—to the effect that a gap should be created in the fighting line to let these civilian internees go home. Do you happen to remember that?
KESSELRING: It is quite possible that such a request was actually submitted. It did not come to my personal knowledge, because I was away from my office a great deal.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Witness, have you any recollection when concentration camps were first established in Germany?
KESSELRING: Yes. It was in 1933. I remember three concentration camps, but I do not know exactly when they were established: Oranienburg, which I often passed by and flew over; Dachau, which had been discussed vehemently in the newspapers; and Weimar-Nora, Weimar, a concentration camp which I flew over quite frequently on my official trips. I have no recollection of any other concentration camps; but perhaps I may add that, as a matter of principle, I kept aloof from rumors, which were particularly rife during those periods of crisis, in order to devote myself to my own duties which were particularly heavy.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Regarding the internees in the concentration camps, did you have any definite idea as to who would be brought to these concentration camps?
KESSELRING: I had an idea, without knowing where I got it from, which seemed plausible to me; namely, that the National Socialist Revolution should be achieved without the loss of life, and that political opponents should be detained until the founding of the new State had given sufficient security for them to return to public life. That is my knowledge of the situation, from which I conclude, in order to answer your question, that these people must, for the most part, have been persons who were opposed to the National Socialist ideology.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Have you ever thought what the treatment in these concentration camps would be like according to your idea? What was your conception of the treatment of the prisoners in the camps? There may perhaps be a difference according to whether you think of the earlier or the later years?
KESSELRING: I know nothing about the methods of treatment in the camps. During the earlier years, when I was still working in Germany, rumors were heard to the effect that treatment was normal. In the later years I was abroad, that is to say, in theaters of war outside Germany; and I was so far away that I knew nothing whatsoever of these incidents and did not ask for any information about them.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Is it right therefore to assume that as far as the atrocities were concerned which did actually occur, you had no positive knowledge?
KESSELRING: No, I did not have any positive knowledge, not even in March 1945, when I became Supreme Commander in the West. Even then the occurrences in the concentration camps were completely unknown to me. This I attributed to two reasons: First, the personal attitude which I expressed earlier, that on principle I concerned myself only with my own business—which in itself was sufficiently extensive, and secondly, that within the State a police state had developed which had hermetically sealed and closed itself off from the rest of the world.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Have you any proof that there was more knowledge in your officers’ circles than what you have just described with regard to yourself?
KESSELRING: I was in very close contact with my officers and I do not believe that there can have been a large number of officers who knew more about these things. Of course I cannot give information regarding individuals.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you know that Hitler had decided to eliminate the Jewish people physically?
KESSELRING: That was absolutely unknown to me.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you not have frequent opportunities to discuss ideological questions with Hitler?
KESSELRING: Whenever I was at headquarters only military and similar questions concerning my theater of war were discussed during the official part of the conversation. When I was invited to a meal, then historical matters or matters of general interest were usually discussed, but acute political problems or ideological questions never came up for discussion. I personally cannot remember any instance when Hitler influenced me, or any of the other generals, in any way whatsoever with regard to professing themselves active National Socialists.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you believe in Hitler’s personality in the sense that Hitler was determined to lead the German people to a better Germany, with consideration for personal freedom and respect for human dignity? What was your conception about that?
THE PRESIDENT: What is the relevancy of a witness’ belief upon a subject of that sort? What relevancy has it got to do with any part of the case of the Defendant Kaltenbrunner? The Tribunal considers this sort of question a waste of the Tribunal’s time.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Is it correct that in the absolute leadership state which existed in Germany any opposition by a human being to a superior order was impossible?
KESSELRING: In that form I would not deny that. One could certainly represent one’s own views against another view. But if one’s own views were rendered invalid by a decision, absolute obedience became necessary, and its execution was demanded and ensured under certain circumstances by the application of penal law. Resistance to that order, or an order, was, according to our knowledge of the personality and attitude of Adolf Hitler, out of the question and would have achieved nothing.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Would not a person attempting to resist a finally issued order have to consider whether he might not be risking his life?
KESSELRING: During the later years that was an absolute certainty.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you at any time think the war could not be won, and if so, when?
KESSELRING: In 1943, the possibility had to be considered that a victorious peace might not be achieved. I emphasize expressly that one had to consider that possibility, for by observing certain organizational or operational measures, the situation might still have been reversed.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you ever discuss this question with someone of importance—the misgivings which you may have had about the continuance of the war?
KESSELRING: At various times when I discussed my own military sector, I referred to certain difficulties which might influence the outcome of the war in general; however, as representative of one military sector, I considered myself in no way entitled to judge the entire military situation, since I could not, from my limited viewpoint, judge the situation regarding production and the organization of manpower reserves. And as I said before, I refused, as an amateur, to make any statement about a situation, which under certain circumstances might have been regarded as official as it would have had the signature of Field Marshal Kesselring.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you kindly explain to the Tribunal what relevancy the last two or three questions have to the case of Kaltenbrunner?
DR. KAUFFMANN: The same applies to Kaltenbrunner, that he could not, as he says, resist an order. It would have meant the loss of his life.
THE PRESIDENT: You asked the witness whether at any time during the war he thought how long the war would last. What has that got to do with Kaltenbrunner?
DR. KAUFFMANN: The Prosecution accuses several defendants of having continued the struggle in spite of the fact that they knew it was hopeless, and of having prolonged the war. That is the problem I wish to clarify in my last question.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think it was put specifically against Kaltenbrunner. If it is your last question you may put it.
DR. KAUFFMANN: If I understand you correctly, Witness, what you are trying to explain is that the leading motive of your continuing to fight was also your duty towards your country?
KESSELRING: That is a matter of course. I had other motives too. One was that the possibility of a political termination of the war was denied, at least officially; but that I believed in it, and I am still convinced of it today, may be proved by the fact that I personally, together with Obergruppenführer Wolff, undertook negotiations through Switzerland with an American, in order to prepare the ground for a political discussion to that end.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Any other Counsel for the Defense?
HERR PELCKMANN: Witness, Dr. Kauffmann asked you whether the officers’ corps had any knowledge of the conditions and the establishment of concentration camps. Do you know that within the Armed Forces so-called national-political instruction courses were held?
KESSELRING: Yes, I know of that.
HERR PELCKMANN: May I ask you whether you know that during one of the Armed Forces national-political courses of instruction, which were held from 15 to 23 January 1937, and I am referring now to Document Number 1992(a)-PS concerning the establishment of concentration camps, Himmler, the SS Leader, in the presence of the assembled officers, made a speech more or less to this effect:
“Naturally, we make a difference between inmates who may be there for a few months for educational purposes, and those who will be there for a long time.”
I skip a few sentences, and come to the ones I consider important:
“The order begins by insisting that these people live in clean barracks. This can, in fact, only be achieved by us Germans, for there is hardly any other nation which would act as humanely as we do. Linen is frequently changed. The people are instructed to wash twice a day, and the use of tooth brushes is advised, a thing which is unknown to most of them.”
Do you know that the Armed Forces were given instructions of this kind, which, as we know today, do not correspond to conditions as they really were?
KESSELRING: As I said earlier, we did not concern ourselves with such questions at all, and this lecture by Himmler is unknown to me.
HERR PELCKMANN: Unknown. Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other Defense Counsel wish to ask any questions? Then the Prosecution may cross-examine.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You understand, Witness, in giving your testimony, as to the definition of the High Command and the General Staff, as that definition is included in the Indictment, you are accused as a member of that group, do you not?
KESSELRING: I understand.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that you are testifying here virtually as one of the defendants?
KESSELRING: I understand.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You have spoken of the establishment in Germany of a police state by the National Socialist Party, and I want to ask you whether it is not a fact that the police state rested on two institutions very largely, first, the Secret State Police, and secondly, the concentration camps?
KESSELRING: The assistance by the police is an established fact to me. The concentration camp was, in my opinion, a final means to that end.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And both the secret police and the concentration camp were established by Hermann Göring, is that not a fact known to you?
KESSELRING: The Secret State Police was created by Hermann Göring. Whether it was formed by Himmler . . .
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Your lectures will be reserved for your own counsel, and I shall ask to have you so instructed. Just answer my questions. Was not the concentration camp also established by Hermann Göring?
KESSELRING: I do not know.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You do not know that. Did you favor the police state?
KESSELRING: I considered it as abnormal according to German conceptions that a state had been formed within a state thus keeping certain things away from public knowledge.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you ever do anything or can you point to anything that you did in public life to prevent that abnormal condition coming to Germany?
KESSELRING: I cannot remember anything, except that during conversations with my superiors I may have brought the point up for discussion. But I emphasize expressly that in general I confined myself to my own sphere and my own tasks.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Do you want this Tribunal to understand that you never knew that there was a campaign by this state to persecute the Jews in Germany? Is that the way you want your testimony to be understood?
KESSELRING: A persecution of the Jews as such was not known to me.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Is it not a fact that Jewish officers were excluded from your army and from your command?
KESSELRING: Jewish officers did not exist.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Is it not a fact that certain officers of your army, certain officers of the Luftwaffe, took steps to Aryanize themselves in order to escape the effect of Göring’s decrees? Did you know about that?
KESSELRING: I heard rumors to that effect.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Any Aryanizing, where the father was suspected of Jewish ancestry, consisted in showing that the normal father was not the actual father, did it not?
KESSELRING: I admit that. Naturally there are other cases as well.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes. It might be that the mother was suspected of Jewish ancestry?
KESSELRING: That in certain exceptional cases certain facts were overlooked.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes. Did you know anything about the Jewish riots, anti-Jewish riots of November 9th and 10th in Germany in 1938?
KESSELRING: Are you talking about the “Mirror Action” (Spiegelsache)? I am not sure which day you are talking about.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I am talking about the riots in which synagogues were burned, which made Göring so very angry. Did you not hear about that in 1938?
KESSELRING: No, I did not hear anything about it.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Where were you in 1938?
KESSELRING: In 1938 I was in Dresden.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In November?
KESSELRING: In November I was in Berlin as Chief of the Air Force.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In Berlin. And you never heard about the anti-Jewish riots of the 9th and 10th of November 1938?
KESSELRING: I only heard about the so-called “Mirror or Glass Campaign (Spiegel- oder Glas-Campagne).”
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What was that? You have me down. I do not know anything by that name.
KESSELRING: That was the smashing of shop windows and more, which assumed rather large proportions in Berlin.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You did hear, then, about the anti-Jewish riots?
KESSELRING: About those, yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And did you hear that Hermann Göring issued a decree confiscating the insurance that was to make reparations to those Jews who owned shops? Did you hear about Göring’s action in that respect?
KESSELRING: I did not quite understand. May I ask to have it repeated?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you hear about the decree passed by Hermann Göring a few days later, November 12th, to be exact, confiscating the insurance of the victims of those raids and fining the Jewish community a billion Reichsmark?
KESSELRING: It is possible that I heard about it at the time, but I now have no certain recollection.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But you did hear about it. You did not regard those things as persecution?
KESSELRING: Naturally I must regard this “Glass Campaign” as an excess against the Jews.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You have stated, as I understand you, based on your experience with Hitler, that it was permissible for officers to differ with him in opinion so long as they obeyed his orders. Is that what you want understood?
KESSELRING: I have to apologize, but I did not quite understand the last half of that sentence.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I have understood from your testimony this morning that you felt perfectly free to disagree with Hitler and to make suggestions to him and give him information, but that, after his mind was made up and an order issued, it had to be obeyed. That is to say . . .
KESSELRING: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is to say, an officer was at all times at liberty to go to Hitler and give him technical information, such as the state of the preparedness of his branch of the service?
KESSELRING: Generally speaking, no. For that purpose the commanders-in-chief of the branches of the Armed Forces concerned were the only people admitted.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So the only channel through which information as to the state of the Air Force would reach Hitler was through Hermann Göring, is that a fact?
KESSELRING: Hermann Göring and, from time to time, State Secretary Milch, deputy of the Reich Marshal.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: If Hitler was about to engage in a war for which the Luftwaffe was unprepared, based on your information of the situation, would it or would it not have been possible for the Luftwaffe officers to have advised Hitler of that fact?
KESSELRING: We had complete confidence in our Reich Marshal, and we knew that he was the only person who had a decisive influence upon Adolf Hitler. In that way we knew, since we also knew his peaceful attitude, that we were perfectly secure, and we relied on it.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: There came a time when you went into the East, did you not, as a commander? You went into Poland and you went into Soviet Russia, did you not?
KESSELRING: Poland and Russia, yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And was it not understood among the officers in those Polish and Russian campaigns that the Hague regulations would not be applied to Soviet Russia as to the treatment of prisoners of war?
KESSELRING: That was not known to me.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You have testified that the Luftwaffe was purely a weapon of defense, is that your testimony?
KESSELRING: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What was the German strength at the beginning of the Polish campaign in various types of planes?
KESSELRING: As I was not a member of the central board I can give you only an approximation on my own responsibility, without guaranteeing the historical certainty of these figures. All told, I would say we must have had approximately three thousand aircraft. All in all, so far as I can remember now, there were between thirty and forty bomber groups, the same number of fighters, and there were ten groups of dive-bombers, fighters . . .
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Will you give me the number of each group?
KESSELRING: About thirty aircraft, which would drop to seven, six or five aircraft during the course of the day. To continue, there were ten to twelve groups of dive-bombers, including ground “strafers” and twin-engine fighters. Also included in that figure were reconnaissance planes and a certain number of naval aircraft.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the proportion of bombers to fighters was approximately two to one, was it not?
KESSELRING: The proportion of bombers to fighters was about one to one or one point two, or one point three to one. I said thirty to forty and about thirty fighter groups. If I include the twin-engine fighters, then the figure would be about one to one.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is the way you make up the total of about three thousand units?
KESSELRING. The reason why I can give you that figure is because during these months of quiet reflection I made an estimate, without thereby revealing the historical truth.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, do you count as a weapon of defense the bomber, or do you treat that as an offensive weapon?
KESSELRING: I must speak of the bomber in the same way as the dive-bomber and the fighter, equally as a defensive and as an offensive weapon. I explained yesterday that no matter whether defensive or offensive warfare is concerned, the task of the air force must be carried out on the offensive and the targets are far and wide. I also explained that an air force which has only light aircraft is doomed to be destroyed, since it cannot attack the phases of the enemy’s aircraft production, his air assembly areas, nor his movements in various sectors.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In other words, the Luftwaffe was a defensive weapon if you were on the defensive, and an offensive weapon if you were on attack?
KESSELRING: I did not understand the last half of the sentence.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The Luftwaffe would serve as a defensive weapon if you were on the defensive, and as an offensive weapon if you were on attack, is that not true?
KESSELRING: One could put it like that. I would express it differently. As I said, the air force is essentially an offensive weapon, no matter whether it is used for defense or for attack.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think you have improved on my sentence. Now, in the Netherlands, in Poland . . .
KESSELRING: May I just say something else on the subject?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, yes.
KESSELRING: Namely, what I said yesterday at the very end, that the essential of an offensive air force is the long-distance four-engine heavy bombers, and Germany had none of these.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: How did it come that Germany had none of those?
KESSELRING: Firstly, because being actually in a period of danger, we were confining ourselves to the absolute essentials of a defensive air force only.
Secondly, we tried, in keeping with our characteristics, to achieve as much as possible by precision bombing, in other words, by dive-bombing, utilizing the minimum of war material, and I am here thinking of the Ju 88 as a typical example of that.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were examined by the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, were you not, on the 28th of June 1945? Do you recall that?
KESSELRING: Yes, of course.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, it is quite certain, is it not?
KESSELRING: I have often been interrogated.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, I ask you whether on the 28th of June 1945, you did not say to the officer examining you on behalf of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey this:
“Everything had been done to make the German Air Force from the point of view of airmanship, aircraft, flak, air corps, signals, and so forth, the most formidable in the world. This effort led to the fact that at the beginning of the war, or in 1940 at the latest, from a fighter viewpoint, from a dive-bomber viewpoint, from a combat viewpoint, we had particularly good aircraft, even if the standard was not uniform entirely.”
Did you not state that?
KESSELRING: That is still my view today, that as far as material, pursuit planes, dive-bombers, and fighters were concerned, we did in fact have a certain advantage over the other powers.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, as to the failure to have the number of four-engine bombers; that was because of your peaceful intentions, was it, or was it because of a mistake in judgment as to what the requirements of war would be?
KESSELRING: To that I must say the following: It would have been insanity on the part of the Air Force leaders to consider producing a complete air force within 3 to 4 years. It was in 1940, at the earliest, that the possibility existed of building up an effective air force which would comply with all requirements. For that reason, in my view, it was an amazing achievement of organization to have attained such effectiveness under the existing limitations.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I understood you to give as one of the indications of your unaggressive intentions the fact that you had not an adequate number of four-engine bombers at the outset of the war. Did I misunderstand you?
KESSELRING: That is an excerpt from the whole story. The strength of the Air Force was, particularly in comparison with the small states, to be regarded as sufficient; certainly not, however, in comparison with powerful opponents who were fully equipped in the air.
I have an example in mind. In a heated discussion with the Reich Marshal, before the beginning of the Russian campaign, I asked for reinforcements for fighters and dive-bombers. For certain reasons that was refused. The certain reasons were, firstly, shortage of material, and secondly, which I could also gather from the conversation, that the Reich Marshal did not agree with this campaign.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you not testify to the Bomber Investigating Commission of the United States that you intended to build a long-range heavy bomber but—and I quote your words:
“We had developed the He 111 and the Ju 88 and they were actually put into the fighting as long-range heavy bombers. The Ju 88 was then used in the French campaign and against England.
“Question: The Ju 88 is not really a long-range bomber?”
Your answer:
“It was considered a long-range bomber at that time, but unfortunately we had a low opinion of the four-engine aircraft, and an erroneous belief which proved to be a mistake in the course of later years.”
Is that true?
KESSELRING: That was my opinion.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the reason you did not build the four-engine aircraft was your low opinion of it?
KESSELRING: May I say the following: That was the conception of a service department; the decisions in all these questions were made in the highest service department.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The highest service department made a mistake about the utility of the four-engine bomber?
KESSELRING: Well, looking at the situation retrospectively, I must say that the absence of a four-engine bomber became extremely awkward.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that the highest authority in aircraft production was Hermann Göring. He was the head of the whole plan of aircraft production, was he not?
KESSELRING: Yes, that is correct but it did not exclude the fact that erroneous conceptions of certain measures for the conduct of war or organizational measures may exist temporarily.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were in the Polish campaign you have said?
KESSELRING: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Is it not a fact that the German Air Force made the decisive contribution to that campaign as regards the time taken to conquer Poland?
KESSELRING: From the point of view of the Air Force officers I must agree with that conception absolutely, but the army officers did not quite share it.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, you are testifying now as to your opinion. And in that campaign you developed the technique of low-level attacks by fighters, light bombers, and dive-bombers against marching columns, and the dive-bomber, the light bomber, and the fighters all contributed to the success of that movement.
KESSELRING: I must admit that. The foundations of the short-range bombing technique were certainly laid during the Polish campaign.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I turn now to the French campaign. You were in the air in the French campaign, were you not?
KESSELRING: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the Air Force contributed decisively to the success of that campaign, did it not?
KESSELRING: From the point of view of an Air Force officer, I must consider that view as correct.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you testified, did you not, that Dunkirk would not have been such a catastrophe if the Luftwaffe had not been there? That is true, is it not?
KESSELRING: Dunkirk, did you say? I did not quite understand.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, Dunkirk.
KESSELRING: Yes. In my opinion, that is certain, and it would have been even more so if bad weather had not considerably hindered our operations.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is, the catastrophe would have increased for the English except for bad weather. You had the air force to do a better job at Dunkirk than you did, from your point of view?
KESSELRING: We were grounded for about 2 days.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were one of the principal advocates of the plan to invade England, were you not?
KESSELRING: Personally I am of the opinion that, if the war against England was to be brought to a successful end, this end could only be achieved for certain by invasion.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you had an adequate Air Force after having defeated Poland, defeated Holland, defeated Belgium, and defeated France, so that you advocated proceeding with an invasion of England, did you not?
KESSELRING: I must give an explanation on that point.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: First tell me if that is true.
THE PRESIDENT: Witness, will you please understand that you must answer the question first, and give an explanation afterwards. Every question, or nearly every question, admits of either an affirmative or negative answer, and you will kindly give that answer and make your explanation afterwards.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you not advocate the invasion of England, and was not the Air Force ready to invade England?
KESSELRING: Subject to certain conditions, considering the existing air situation at that time the Air Force was ready to fulfill that task.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you recommended very strongly to the Reich Marshal that the invasion take place immediately after Dunkirk, did you not?
KESSELRING: Yes, and I still advocated that view later on too.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the preparations of the Luftwaffe for this invasion were complete, and the invasion was called off only because the procurement of sea-going craft was not sufficient, is that not true?
KESSELRING: Yes. I have to supplement the previous statement by saying that, of course, a certain interval between the French campaign and the English campaign would have had to elapse in order to effect the material replenishment of the air force.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you also told the Strategic Bombing Survey that Hitler had ordered not only the bombing of military targets, including industrial production, but also the bombing of political targets. Is that true?
KESSELRING: After a certain date, yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is, to paralyze the government of the enemy. That is what you meant by a political target, did you not?
KESSELRING: That is not what I mean by political targets. I answered the question differently; I understood it differently, namely, that this order became effective at a later date.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You attended the speech made by Hitler in August of 1939?
KESSELRING: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: At that time you were informed that the attack on Poland would commence immediately or very soon?
KESSELRING: During that conference, the final decision to commence the Polish campaign had not yet been reached. Negotiations were still in progress and we were all still hoping that they would bring favorable results.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were ordered on the 15th of August to get the Luftwaffe in readiness for an attack on Poland?
KESSELRING: This order as such is not known to me in detail, but I must admit that for months before we had made air preparations and erected bases in a general defensive direction, always thinking of a defensive situation.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You expected Poland to attack Germany in the air? Is that your point?
KESSELRING: At any rate, we took this possibility into consideration on our side. The whole political situation was too unknown for us to be able to form a pertinent, incontestable judgment on it.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You have said that you never held conferences with Party leaders or talked politics or had any contacts with politicians, in substance, have you not?
KESSELRING: Essentially, yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Was not your immediate superior the Number 2 politician of Germany? Did you not know that?
KESSELRING: I did, but I must emphasize that the conversations which I had with the Reich Marshal were 99 percent concerned with military and organizational problems.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But you knew that he, at all times, was one of the leading men in Nazi politics?
KESSELRING: Certainly.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You testified that you knew of the order to shoot Soviet Commissars?
KESSELRING: Certainly.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that you did not approve it and did not carry it out.
KESSELRING: I did not answer to that effect yesterday.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What did you answer?
KESSELRING: I answered as follows: That the Air Force, which was not fighting on the ground, was not concerned with this problem, and that an official notification of that order is no longer in my recollection.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Who executed that order? Who was expected to execute it?
KESSELRING: I was in Russia only until November 1941 and I can give you no information on it.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you ever hear of the SS?
KESSELRING: Yes, of course.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And is it not a fact that the execution of that order was committed to the SS?
KESSELRING: I knew nothing about that.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What did you think the SS existed for?
KESSELRING: In my opinion, the SS, as far as it was used in military operations, was a special section of the Army, indeed a sort of guard of the Army.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The SS was to guard the Army, or to guard whom?
KESSELRING: No, but the SS divisions were, purely from the point of view of men, numbers and material, well above the average Army division as far as equipment and readiness were concerned.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Who was commanding the SS?
KESSELRING: The SS was commanded by Himmler. As far as these divisions were used within the army, they were tactically under the army commanders, commanders of the army groups, or the corps headquarters staffs to which they were attached.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So far as they had special missions, they were under the command of Himmler, is that right?
KESSELRING: Yes, certainly; a very clear distinction.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You testified yesterday that you did not consider Hitler’s Commando Order binding on you, and that you did not carry out that order, is that right?
KESSELRING: In the Mediterranean theater, yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Was that because the order left discretion in your hands, or because you just took discretion into your hands?
KESSELRING: I made those reservations myself, firstly for ideological considerations, and secondly because in the Mediterranean I had, as I said yesterday, a twofold command, and the German orders could not be included in the general administration without modification.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well then, the extent to which an order of that kind was carried out depended somewhat on the character and courage of the officer who received it, did it not?
KESSELRING: I would like to express it somewhat differently. These orders could be interpreted in different ways—that Commando Order, for instance—insofar as it was certainly quite possible for the Commander-in-Chief to consider an operation either as a special task or as a tactical measure which was militarily justified.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were in command of the forces in Italy at this time, were you not, at the time of the Commando Order?
KESSELRING: With a difference. I did not have full powers until September 1943.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I will ask to have you shown Document Number 498-PS in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-501.
I call your attention to Paragraph Number 6 of that order which reads as follows:
“I will hold responsible, under military law, for failing to carry out this order, all commanders and officers who either have neglected their duty of instructing the troops about this order, or acted against this order where it was to be executed.”
You see that paragraph in the order?
KESSELRING: Yes, I have just read it.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, did you ever report that you were not carrying out this order or did you deceive your superior officers as to whether it was being carried out?
KESSELRING: In one special case that question was treated very decisively at headquarters. This concerned the Commando action “Pescara” where Adolf Hitler ordered the shooting of certain people in spite of the fact that we, my troops and I, wanted to spare them. I think particularly that the influence of Jodl here, as an intermediary, was decisive; namely, that this subject was forgotten and that consequently these people were kept alive, in hospitals and prisoner-of-war camps.
But I should not like to call it deception, the word you used just now, for I wish to emphasize that, in my military sector, I considered actions of this kind as guiding orders, and this Commando Order certainly allowed for several interpretations.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In other words, the extent to which one of these orders was carried out depended on the commanders in charge, is that right, that Hitler could not depend on it that an order as emphatic as this would be carried out by his commanders? Was that the state of the German Army?
KESSELRING: No, not that, but the situation can be explained as follows: If, on the part of an army, such an operation is reported to a superior as a Commando operation in the sense of that order, then the necessary measures would have to be carried out. That depended, however, on the way of reporting by the units concerned, and I already explained in detail yesterday that a unified conception had gradually set in, that men in uniform, who carried out a tactical move, were not Commandos within the meaning of this order.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You testified today, and another witness has testified here, that if an order of Adolf Hitler was resisted, it meant death. You are also testifying that an absolute order to execute Commandos, under threat of punishment if you failed, left you discretion to do it or not, and I want you once and for all to tell the Tribunal which is the fact, and then we will leave that subject.
KESSELRING: I must repeat what I said before, namely, that the Italian theater of war was not to be compared with the other theaters of war. Through the co-operation of Hitler and Mussolini there was always a very obliging attitude, therefore, these orders made by OKW could not easily be applied to the Italian theater of war.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: They were applied everywhere, so far as you know, except in the Italian theater, then?
KESSELRING: That I cannot say. I have repeatedly explained that I confined myself exclusively to my own sphere of operations, which was considerable.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You testified, as I understand you, that you punished looting on the part of your soldiers in Italy.
KESSELRING: As soon as I heard of these instances, I punished them, and I most strictly ordered the Army commanders and Air Force commanders to do the same.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, the punishment was very mild that you ever inflicted for any looting, was it not?
KESSELRING: I even went so far as to have culprits shot on the spot, and in that manner I succeeded in remedying the disorder which had arisen.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So a German general, dealing with a German soldier, considers shooting the proper penalty for looting?
KESSELRING: These far-reaching conclusions are something I cannot admit. On that subject I wish to make the following remarks: If an army—as was the case with the 14th Army at the time—fell into a certain disorder, the most severe measures were justified in the interests of the reputation of that army, and in the interests of the population, in order to bring about orderly conditions among the civilian population. I had heated discussion at headquarters on that particular subject.
Apart from that, I was of the opinion that all penalties eventually became useless, and therefore, for some time I considered penalties purely as an educational means and not really as punishment. Consequently for some time, penalties were rather mild.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You testified that you took vigorous steps to protect the art treasures of Italy.
KESSELRING: Insofar as I was informed of art treasures, yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What steps did you take, and against whom did you take them?
KESSELRING: Primarily they were preventive measures: First, by excluding places of art and culture from the field of battle; secondly, by having these places cleared if they were liable to air raids by the enemy; and thirdly, by co-operating with General Wolff and having these cultural and art treasures removed to secure places. I make mention of the art treasures of Cassino and Florence.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you know that any art treasure was removed from Mount Cassino, for instance, and taken to Berlin?
KESSELRING: Much later, at Mondorf, I heard about that. At the time all I could recollect was that they were handed over to the Vatican in Rome.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Oh. Did you know that art treasures were taken and delivered to Göring from Mount Cassino? Did you ever hear that?
KESSELRING: I once heard something about some statue of a saint, but I cannot really give you any more details.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And if Göring received such a thing from Mount Cassino, was it a violation of your orders?
KESSELRING: The Hermann Göring Division was stationed in that sector. It was commanded by the former adjutant of Hermann Göring, and it is clear that there was a certain connection here, but to what extent I cannot tell you.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I have a few more questions concerning your interrogations.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we had better break off for 10 minutes.
[A recess was taken.]
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think, Your Honors, that we will save some duplication—perhaps save time—if I now yield to Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, who is prepared on some of the subjects I was about to take up. I think he is in a better position to take up the examination.
THE PRESIDENT: Whatever you think, Mr. Justice Jackson.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the United Kingdom): Witness, you have been told why Dr. Stahmer wanted you to give evidence? Have you been told by Dr. Stahmer what to do to give evidence?
KESSELRING: The individual points were communicated to me, without all questions being directly defined.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want to read you one sentence, so that you will have it in mind, of Dr. Stahmer’s statement:
“When Rotterdam became a battle zone in May 1940, it became a military necessity to employ bombers, as the encircled fighting parachute troops, who had no support from the artillery, had urgently asked for help from bombers.”
Do you remember the incident? I wanted you to have it in your mind.
KESSELRING: Yes, certainly.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember being asked about this incident in the interrogation on the 28th of June, by the United States bombing survey? Remember?
KESSELRING: Certainly.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you say there at the question, “What about Rotterdam?”
“Answer: ‘First, Rotterdam had been defended in the parts which were later on attacked. Secondly, in this case one could notice that a firm attitude had to be taken. This one attack brought immediate peace to Holland. It was asked for by Model and was approved by the OKW. It was a very small part in the heart of Rotterdam.’ ”
Do you remember saying that?
KESSELRING: Approximately I did say that, yes, and I repeated those words yesterday.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want to deal first with the strategic aspects. I will come to the tactical aspects later. Your strategic purpose and real object was to take a firm attitude and secure immediate peace, was that not right?
KESSELRING: That far-reaching task had not been given to me but, as I said yesterday, General Wenninger reported the result of the attack to me in such a way that close on the attack the total surrender of Holland followed.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But I want you to think of your own words. This was approved by the OKW; a firm attitude had to be taken. Was not your purpose in this attack to secure a strategic advantage by terrorization of the people of Rotterdam?
KESSELRING: That I can deny with the clearest conscience. Neither did I say, when I was at Mondorf, that I had to adopt a firm attitude. I merely said that the support which was demanded by Student would have to be carried out. We only had the one task, and that was to furnish artillery support for Student’s troops.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What did you mean by saying that a firm attitude had to be taken, if you did not mean that the people of Holland had to be possibly terrorized into peace.
KESSELRING: May I repeat in that connection that the conception of the expression, “firm attitude,” is not in keeping with my accustomed wording. I cannot admit that this word was in the minutes, and it was not read out to me, either.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What do you think you said instead of firm attitude, if you did not say it?
KESSELRING: I remarked that severe measures would bring quick results.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is exactly what I am putting to you, Witness, “severe measures” . . .
KESSELRING: But only for the purpose of tactical results. May I once more emphasize that I am a soldier and not a politician, and did not act as a politician. At that time I was merely and solely complying with Student’s requirements.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just before I deal with the tactical position—which I do with great pleasure—have you had to work with the Defendant Raeder? Have you had to work with the Defendant Raeder at all?
KESSELRING: Admiral Raeder? Only in a general way, insofar as naval questions were concerned.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I just want you to listen to the views which the Defendant Raeder has expressed and tell the Tribunal whether you agree with them. This is United Kingdom Exhibit Number GB-224, Document Number C-157, and here is the transcript in Page 2735 (Volume V, Page 274). Now, just listen carefully, if you will be so kind:
“It is desirable to base all military measures taken on existing international law. However, measures which are considered necessary from a military point of view, provided a decisive success can be expected from them, will have to be carried out, even if they are not covered by existing international law.”
Do you agree with that?
KESSELRING: I cannot completely agree with that concept. As far as Rotterdam is concerned, conditions were exactly the opposite.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, just for the moment we will deal with the Defendant Raeder’s words. Do you agree with them?
KESSELRING: No.
DR. LATERNSER: I have an objection. I object to the earlier and to this present question put to the witness, because they are irrelevant, and secondly because they do not refer to facts but opinions. The witness is here to testify to facts.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the witness is here, as I pointed out carefully, to deal with what is military necessity.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, the Tribunal thinks that the question in the form in which you put it may be objectionable, by the introduction of the views of the Defendant Raeder.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Of course, I bow to the Tribunal, but this witness is called to say that the explanation for this is military necessity. I was asking whether he did not agree with the views of one of his colleagues on this point, what is military necessity. If the Tribunal has any doubt, I would rather pass it. But the question of military necessity is one which the Tribunal will have to consider in a number of fields, and I respectfully do not abandon that point, which will run through the questions I have to ask on other matters.
[Turning to the witness.] Now, I will come to the tactical position at Rotterdam: Will you just tell the Tribunal who were the officers involved? There was a Lieutenant General Schmidt and with him was Major General Student, who were in charge of the troops that were attacking Rotterdam. Do you remember that?
KESSELRING: Only General Student. General Schmidt is unknown to me.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, the evidence that is given in this case is that the negotiations, the terms of capitulation, were actually written out by Lieutenant General Schmidt in a creamery near Rotterdam. I suppose he would be General Student’s superior officer, would he not?
KESSELRING: General Student was the senior German officer in the Rotterdam sector and the responsible commander. General Schmidt is unknown to me.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that General Schmidt would be junior to General Student, would he?
KESSELRING: He may have been called in for the special purpose, but I do not know of him.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want you to have the times in mind: Do you know what time in the day the bombing of Rotterdam started?
KESSELRING: As far as I know, in the early afternoon, about 1400 hours, I believe.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I was going to put to you 1330.
KESSELRING: Yes, that is quite possible.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you know that negotiations for a capitulation had been in progress since 1030 in the morning?
KESSELRING: No; as I said yesterday, I have no knowledge of these facts.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And did you know that at 1215 a Dutch officer, Captain Backer, went to the German lines and saw General Schmidt and General Student, and that General Schmidt wrote out the suggested terms of capitulation at 1235?
KESSELRING: No, that is unknown to me.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That had never been told to you?
KESSELRING: It was not communicated to me. At least, I cannot remember it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, you see, Witness, it is 35 minutes before the bombing began and . . .
KESSELRING: The important factor would have been for Student to call off the attack as such, but that did not happen. The cancellation never reached me, and did not reach my unit either.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I just want you to have the facts in mind, and then I will ask you some questions. The terms that were discussed at 1235 were to expire; the answer was called for at 1620. After Captain Backer left with the terms, at 1322 and 1325 two red flares were put up by the German ground troops under General Student. Did you hear of that?
KESSELRING: I did not hear of that either. Moreover, two red flares would naturally not have sufficed for the purpose.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, but in addition to that your ground troops were in excellent wireless communication with your planes, were they not? Will you answer the question?
KESSELRING: I already said yesterday . . .
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Will you please answer the question?
KESSELRING: Yes, and no. So far as I know, there was no immediate communication between the ground station and the aircraft, but, as I said yesterday, from the tactical force, through the ground station, to the aircraft formation.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If it had been wanted to pass the communication to the aircraft and stop the bombing, it could quite easily have been done by wireless, apart from putting up these two red flares?
KESSELRING: In my opinion, yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, what I am suggesting is, you see, that everyone saw these bombers coming over. You know that. Student saw the bombers coming over. You know that do you not?
KESSELRING: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If that attack had any tactical significance about helping your troops, it could have been called off, could it not?
KESSELRING: I did not understand the final sentence.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If the object of this attack was merely tactical, to help in the attack on Rotterdam, it could easily have been called off by a wireless message from General Student to the planes, could it not?
KESSELRING: Yes, if the tactical situation had been communicated, or if the situation had been reported to the bombing units immediately, then there could have been no doubt.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But if in honest negotiations, Witness, terms of surrender have been given and are to expire 3 hours later, it is only demanded of a soldier that he will call off the attack, is it not?
KESSELRING: If no other conditions have been made, yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But if he can stop the attack, it would have been the easiest thing in the world to do so. I want to make my suggestion quite clear—that this tactical matter had nothing to do with the attack on Rotterdam; that the purpose of the attack on Rotterdam was, in your own words, to show a firm attitude and to terrorize the Dutch into surrender.
KESSELRING: May I repeat again, that I have said explicitly that this attack was only serving the tactical requirements, and that I disassociate myself completely from these political considerations.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, you know that General Student apologized afterwards for the attack; you know that? Apologized to the Dutch commander for the attack?
KESSELRING: I do not know it and, as I explained yesterday, I saw General Student when he was seriously injured, and I could not even talk to him.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not going to take more time. I have put my point, I hope, quite clearly. I want to ask you on one other point on which you spoke yesterday in regard to bombing. You said that the attack on Warsaw on 1 September 1939 was made because you considered Warsaw a defended fortress with air defense. Is that fair?
KESSELRING: Yes, certainly.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, you know that at the same time—at 5 o’clock on the morning of Friday, 1 September—the German Air Force attacked Augostów, Nowy Dwor, Ostrów Mazowiecki, Tczew, Puck, Zambrów, Radomsko, Toron, Kutno, Kraków, Grodno, Trzebinia, and Gdynia, which is in rather a different position. Just answer my question. The German Air Force attacked these towns?
KESSELRING: With my comrades—yes. Not the towns, I repeat, not the towns.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, all this attack was made at 5 o’clock on the morning of 1 September, was it not?
KESSELRING: The attack started in the morning, but not, as you put it, on the towns but on military targets; airfields, staff headquarters, and traffic centers were attacked. As I have already explained, very detailed instructions were published by the OKW that only these military targets should be bombed.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You are suggesting that all these towns I had read out were military targets?
KESSELRING: Insofar as they were in my sector, yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You had not had time for a single reconnaissance plane to fly over Poland before that attack was made, had you?
KESSELRING: That is correct. On the other hand, agents and others furnished sufficient intelligence on the situation and, apart from that, this whole plan was absolutely controlled by operational considerations of air warfare.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Of course, the whole plan had been worked out in April of 1939 under the Fall Weiss, had it not?
KESSELRING: At that time I did not even know that I was going to be concerned in it, or that war would be declared.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you not know, Witness, after you were appointed, that a Fall Weiss had been worked out in April 1939? You were never told that?
KESSELRING: That was not said, but, on the other hand, may I say, as a soldier, that a general plan made in April would undergo many alterations by September, and decisive alterations might still have to be made even at the very last minute.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just one other point I want you to have in mind. Do you remember that the German radio broadcast the last note to Poland at 9 o’clock the night before, on 31 August? Do you remember that?
KESSELRING: I believe I do.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was 8 hours before your attack, and you know, do you not, that the Defendant Göring had been at his secret headquarters for a week before that, considering this matter?
KESSELRING: That I can well imagine, if on the . . .
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, what I am putting to you is that this general attack on Polish towns was again a well-planned scheme to try and break down natural resistance for your attack?
KESSELRING: May I say the following on that subject? If my statements as Field Marshal and witness under oath are considered as little as you are considering them, Mr. Prosecutor, then further statements of mine do not serve any purpose. I have emphasized that it was not an attack against towns, but an attack on military targets, and you must finally believe me when I say that as a soldier.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The Tribunal will decide as to the value of the evidence. I am not going to discuss it. I am just going to ask you about one or two other matters, in order to get your view on it, what you consider to be of military necessity. You remember the orders with regard to partisans in Italy during the time of your command? The orders with regard to partisans?
KESSELRING: Certainly.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And I want to put it perfectly correctly, so tell me if I am wrong, but I understand this to be the position. The Defendant Keitel issued a general order as to partisans on 16 December 1942. A copy was found in your headquarters or your ex-headquarters, and your recollection is that it came to your attention later on, but you are not quite sure of the date. Is that right? You are not quite sure of the time?
KESSELRING: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I would like you to try, because you have had time to consider it; do you think that Keitel’s order of December 1942 had come to your attention before you issued your own order of 17 June 1944? Perhaps you would like to see your own order, would you?
KESSELRING: It was read out to me; but in November, then again in December, and subsequently in January, I requested that I should be heard once more on these questions and these orders, as I had certain doubts about the issuing of these orders, the distribution, the persons to whom they were sent, and the date.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I will pass you the orders, Witness, because you ought to see them and recall them to your recollection. I do not think they have been put in before. Let us take first Defendant Keitel’s order of 16 December 1942.
[The document was submitted to the witness.]
I hope I have passed you the right document. Does it read—I will read it very slowly.
“The Führer has therefore ordered that:
“1. The enemy employs, in partisan warfare, communist-trained fanatics who do not hesitate to commit any atrocity. It is more than ever a question of life and death. This fight has nothing to do with soldierly gallantry or principles of the Geneva Convention. If the fight against the partisans in the East, as well as in the Balkans, is not waged with the most brutal means, we will shortly reach the point where the available forces are insufficient to control this area.
“It is therefore not only justified, but it is the duty of the troops to use all means without restriction, even against women and children, as long as it insures success. Any consideration for the partisans is a crime against the German people.”
Do you remember that order?
KESSELRING: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you in turn issued an order on the 17th of June 1944 when you were commanding in Italy? Do you remember that? I will show you in one moment, if I can get the German copy out of the file. I will just read a short passage again so that the Tribunal will have it in mind; but Witness, please refer to any other passage because I want to give a fair effect of the order:
“1. The partisan situation in the Italian theater, particularly central Italy, has recently deteriorated to such an extent that it constitutes a serious danger to the fighting troops and their supply lines, as well as to the war industry and economic potential. The fight against the partisans must be carried on with all means at our disposal and with the utmost severity. I will protect any commander who exceeds our usual restraint in the choice of severity of the methods he adopts against partisans. In this connection the old principle holds good, that a mistake in the choice of methods in executing one’s orders is better than failure or neglect to act.”
Do you remember that, Witness?
KESSELRING: Yes, I remember that order.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you remember 3 days later, so that there will be no mistake as to what you meant, you issued this further one, another top-secret order. Reading the third line after saying, “The announcement does not represent an empty threat,” you say:
“It is the duty of all troops and police in my command to adopt the severest measures. Every act of violence committed by partisans must be punished immediately. Reports submitted must also give details of countermeasures taken. Wherever there is evidence of considerable numbers of partisan groups, a proportion of the male population of the area will be arrested; and in the event of an act of violence being committed, these men will be shot.”
Now, I just want only to take two examples, Witness, of the way that that was carried out. You remember when one of your officers, Colonel Von Gablenz, was captured by partisans; do you remember?
KESSELRING: General Von Gablenz?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think he was a colonel at this stage, it was the 26th of June, just after your order. You remember Colonel Von Gablenz being captured, do you?
KESSELRING: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: He was a colonel of the lines of communication; not a very important officer, but still a colonel.
KESSELRING: Yes, I remember.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, just look at these two documents. Is this right?—this is an extract from the daily situation report by the Commander-in-Chief of Southwest Italy for the 26th of June.
“Partisan situation. North of Arezzo, Colonel Von Gablenz, a member of the staff of the officer commanding lines of communication, area 10th Army, was captured by bandits. The entire male population of the villages on the stretch of road concerned was taken into custody.”
It was further announced that all these hostages would be shot if the captured colonel were not set free within 48 hours. Remember that?
KESSELRING: Not in detail, but in general . . .
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, no, but do you remember the incident?
KESSELRING: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Look at the next bit which is the 2-day situation report, the report for 2 days later, the 28th of June, the second paragraph: “As reprisal for the capture of Colonel Freiherr Von Gablenz, so far 560 persons, including 250 men, have been taken into custody.”
Is that your conception of what is meant by “steps necessary to deal with partisan warfare” that 410 women and children should be taken into custody?
KESSELRING: That was not necessary, but in connection with this I may . . .
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let us take one other example. You remember Civitella? You remember what was done with Civitella by your forces, do you not?
KESSELRING: At the moment, no.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, just let me remind you what was done at Civitella—that was on the 18th of June, one day after your order.
“Two German soldiers were killed and a third wounded in a fight with partisans in the village of Civitella. Fearing reprisals, the inhabitants evacuated the village, but when the Germans discovered this, punitive action was postponed. On June 29”—that, you will remember, Witness, was 9 days after your proclamation to reinforce your order—“when the local inhabitants were returned and when feeling secure once more, the Germans carried out a well-organized reprisal, combing the neighborhood. Innocent inhabitants were often shot on sight. During that day 212 men, women, and children in the immediate district were killed. Some of the dead women were found completely naked. In the course of investigations, a nominal roll of the dead has been compiled and is complete with the exception of a few names whose bodies could not be identified. Ages of the dead ranged from 1 year to 84 years. Approximately one hundred houses were destroyed by fire. Some of the victims were burned alive in their homes.”
That is the report of the United Nations War Crimes Commission on the incident. Now, Witness, do you really think that military necessity commands the killing of babies of 1 and people of 84?
KESSELRING: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, I just want to acquaint you with one subject which you have dealt with yourself, that is the position of the Hermann Göring Division. You mentioned one of the persons I have in mind, but let me just, in order to make it clear to the Tribunal, get clear who your officers were at that time.
Did General Vietinghoff—sorry, I think it was Von Vietinghoff—did he command the 10th Army?
KESSELRING: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: In 1944?
KESSELRING: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Was he directly under your orders?
KESSELRING: Yes, he was under my command.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then I take it he is a fairly senior and responsible general. I do not know his rank—full general or . . .
KESSELRING: Full general.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And under him was the 76th Corps, was it not, commanded by General Herr; is that correct?
KESSELRING: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And under General Herr was a Hermann Göring Division, commanded by General Schmalz, whom you mentioned this morning; is that right?
KESSELRING: General Von Schmalz commanded, but previously I mentioned another name.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think it was Schmalz at this time. Now, the Hermann Göring Division had been concerned in a number of three—I call them incidents; I would not say—what I mean by incidents is the sort of thing which I have been describing at Civitella. Let me remind you of one or two. Do you remember at Stia, on the 13th to the 18th of April, 137 civilians were killed, including 45 women and children; do you remember that incident? Civitella, that was on the 29th of June. And do you remember Buchini on the 7th and 9th of July; do you remember an incident at Buchini?
KESSELRING: It is possible, but I would have to study the details first.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Perhaps you will remember this. I will put it to you generally, Witness, because it is a perfectly general course of conduct, and there were a number of these incidents in which the Hermann Göring Division was engaged. Do you remember that?
KESSELRING: There were many incidents like that on both sides, and I would first have to study the exact details of the question.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, this is what I really want you to apply your mind to. Is it correct that the Hermann Göring Division was only under General Herr and General Von Vietinghoff for tactical purposes, and reported each day to Berlin to Reich Marshal Göring as to what they were doing?
KESSELRING: The Hermann Göring Division was under the General Command and the Army for tactical purposes, but I must assume that, in these questions, subordination to the General Command and the Army actually did exist. Whether there were any matters operating outside that, I do not know.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will put the words exactly, and you can see where I have the words from the way I put them:
“The 1st Airborne Division and the Hermann Göring Division came under the army commanders only as regards tactics; for all other questions, on the other hand, directly under the Reich Marshal, to whom they had to send daily reports. They were not permitted to receive orders from the army commanders concerning criminal proceedings, nor to report the results of such proceedings. Thus they carried on the war against guerrillas according to principles which to some extent deviated from those of the Army.”
Is that a correct statement?
KESSELRING: That conception is correct, but the question is, perhaps, that the word “tactics” can, of course, be understood in a somewhat wider or narrower sense.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The word what?
KESSELRING: Tactics. That this tactical subordination can be understood either in a wider or a narrower sense.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Witness, that is why I read the whole thing to you, because it is quite clear what the person’s statement I am reading means there, is it not? He says that they were not permitted to receive orders from the army commanders on criminal proceedings or to report the results, and that they carried on the war against guerrillas according to principles which deviated from those of General Von Vietinghoff, did they not?
KESSELRING: This is the first time that I have heard of this, but if another officer has said so then I must assume it is correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, are you sure it is the first time that you have heard about it? It is very difficult to remember every incident. Please, do not think that I want to be offensive, but I want you to try to remember. Did not General Herr make numerous complaints to you about this anomalous position with regard to the Hermann Göring Division, and did you never give any official reply to General Herr’s reports?
KESSELRING: Numerous reports certainly did not arrive from General Herr. There may have been verbal consultations . . .
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: In your command post?
KESSELRING: Yes. And may I add once more that such definitions of attitude were definitely in existence within the army group. With regard to the case concerned, I must say that I do not know whether this comes under the heading “tactics” or belongs to another function.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I am not really putting the point to you quite clearly. What I am suggesting is this: If you disagree with “numerous,” will you accept “some,” that on some occasions General Herr reported to you that he was in difficulties through this anomalous position of the Hermann Göring Division?
KESSELRING: That I can assume.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Your Chief of Staff at this time was General Roettiger, was he not?
KESSELRING: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: From the 10th of June onwards, just over this time, did not General Roettiger also talk to you about the position of the Hermann Göring Division being under the special protection of Reich Marshal Göring in Berlin?
KESSELRING: Yes. We discussed that subject quite a lot.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, as far as the particular incident, in which the Hermann Göring Division was involved, is concerned, they took their orders from the Defendant Göring, who is sitting at the dock, did they not, as to how they were to treat the partisans?
KESSELRING: I could not tell you that. Those channels bypassed me.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes; they bypassed you. They bypassed General Herr, they bypassed Vietinghoff, they bypassed you, and went straight to Berlin. That is right, is it not?
KESSELRING: Yes, certainly. That was the special channel for the SS and for the Hermann Göring Division.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. You see, at the moment the Tribunal is dealing with the case of the Defendant Göring. That is why I ask you these questions.
Now, just one or two short points. You remember Dr. Laternser asking you one or two questions about the High Command and the General Staff.
Do you remember Dr. Laternser asking you some questions?
KESSELRING: Yes, I am aware of that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I wanted just to clear one part out of the way altogether. You must have realized, Witness, that the body that is mentioned in this case has nothing to do with the Staff Corps of the German Army. I think you made that clear yourself yesterday.
KESSELRING: With what did you say?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: With the staff corps. You had, both in the Army and the Air Force, a corps of officers who had gone through the Military Academy and were staff officers of all ranks, I suppose down to captain, had you not?
KESSELRING: The question is not quite clear to me.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am sorry. You had in both the Army and the Luftwaffe a staff corps of officers who had been to Military Academy and were thereafter staff officers. And they had, I think, the right of reporting directly to the Chief of Staff if they wanted to? Is that not so? Is that right or wrong?
KESSELRING: That is not correct, except, as I said yesterday, as far as education was concerned. As far as the general attitude was concerned, the General Chief of Staff had the right to influence General Staff officers directly; but the other way around, no.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, that corps went right down, I suppose, to captain or lieutenant, did it not?
KESSELRING: No, captain.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I thought that was it. May I tell you, we are not interested in that corps at all. The Prosecution are not interested in that corps at all.
Now, with regard to the persons who are named in the Indictment, you know there are nine commander-in-chief or staff positions named, and then the Oberbefehlshaber, who commanded in certain areas or commanded certain fleets of the Luftwaffe. You have looked at that, I suppose, have you?
KESSELRING: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am trying to put it shortly, Witness, so that we would not take time. I just want you to consider this. Are not these people who are mentioned—that is, the heads of the OKW, OKH, OKM, OKL, and their deputies and the Oberbefehlshaber—the officers in the German Armed Forces who would have had most to do with the policy and planning of wars?
KESSELRING: The commanders-in-chief of the branches of the Armed Forces were of course the advisory organs of the Supreme Head of the State in all military-political questions. The commanders-in-chief of Army Groups had no influence whatever.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I would like you to take the case of two examples. I think you were present at both of these. Before the attack on Poland there was a meeting on the 22d of August, which has been mentioned here before. Did that consist of these higher officers that I mentioned, the heads of the various branches, and also of the Oberbefehlshaber?
KESSELRING: It consisted of the commanding officers of the war in that theater.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. Well, at that time the sector which was going to be the subject of war was Poland. At that time the main purpose was considering the Polish campaign, was it not? The main purpose of that meeting, I suppose, was to consider the Polish campaign with the possibility of a campaign against the Western Powers if they came in?
KESSELRING: About that I can give you no information. Generally speaking we discussed only Polish questions . . .
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, the Tribunal has heard about that meeting so often I am not going to ask about it. I am only getting from you the people who were there.
Now, let me remind you of another meeting. On the 9th of June 1941 there was a conference—Barbarossa—for the attack on the Soviet Union. Do you remember that? Berchtesgaden.
KESSELRING: Whether it was on the 9th of June, I do not know. But I did take part in one conference.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You were there, and again, before the Russian campaign, the people who were there were the holders of these supreme positions and the Oberbefehlshaber, were they not?
KESSELRING: That is correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Including those that had territorial commands, like, for example, General Von Falkenhorst, who was the Army High Commander in Norway at that time? He was there?
KESSELRING: General Von Falkenhorst?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes.
KESSELRING: It is quite possible.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: General Stumpf of Air Fleet 5, and, if I may, I do not know what the ranks were so I just give the names. Rundstedt, Reichenau, Stülpnagel, Schubert, Kleist, and of course Bock, Kluge, Guderian, Halder, Kesselring?
KESSELRING: The latter were certainly there. As for Stumpf and Falkenhorst, I cannot say.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that before a campaign it was customary for the holders of these high positions to meet, was it not—to meet the Führer?
KESSELRING: Certainly.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I just want you to help me on one other small point. Do you remember saying yesterday to Dr. Laternser that the members of this alleged group were far too concerned with high matters of strategy to have anything to do with Fifth Columnists? Do you remember saying that, words to that effect?
KESSELRING: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I do not know if you know, but outside Germany the name Quisling has become an ordinary word of use as an alternative to Fifth Columnist. Did you know that? You talk about a Quisling meaning a Fifth Columnist. You have not heard that?
KESSELRING: No, I did not know that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You know who Quisling was?
KESSELRING: Yes, indeed I do.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I would just like you to listen to this, because it concerns your service. The Defendant Rosenberg in January 1940 wrote to the Führer as follows:
“Assuming that his”—that is, Quisling—“statements would be of special interest to the Marshal of the Reich, Göring, for aero-strategical reasons, Quisling was referred to State Secretary Körner by the Foreign Affairs Office.”
Did he come to you at all for aero-strategical reasons?
KESSELRING: No, that is unknown to me.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, did you know that the Defendant Raeder introduced Quisling to Hitler in December 1939? Did you know that?
KESSELRING: No, that is unknown to me.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You agree that the head of the German Air Force and the head of the German Navy are important members of this group of commanders-in-chief, are they not?
KESSELRING: Supreme commanders, yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If they were dealing with the typical columnist, perhaps members of the group had more to do with Fifth Columnists than you knew.
KESSELRING: Yesterday I merely spoke from the point of view of the supreme commanders on the front and our tasks were in a different sphere.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I think I have finished, but perhaps your Lordship would allow me just over the adjournment to see if there is any small point.
My Lord, the other thing is this. I think we ought to put in these documents to which I have referred, because the Defense may want to deal with them later on.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, if they have not already been put in.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think some of the orders have not been put in. I have read part of them into the record, and I will put them in.
THE PRESIDENT: They must be put in and marked then.
[The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]