Morning Session
DR. HORN: In accordance with the request of the Tribunal, I am now presenting in groups the documents not yet named, as follows:
First of all, the group concerning the Polish question. In my document book, you will find a document, Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 200 (Document Number Ribbentrop-200) which I am submitting to the Tribunal for judicial notice. In this document, Prime Minister Chamberlain, in a letter to Hitler dated 22 August 1939, defines his attitude regarding the basis for conflict between Germany and Poland. In this connection he emphasizes the question of minorities as one of the main causes of the conflict. As proof of the fact that this minority question already played an important part when the Polish State came into being, I refer to the document, Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 72 (Document Number Ribbentrop-72), which I submit to the Tribunal for judicial notice. This contains observations by the German Peace Delegation on the peace conditions.
In a further document—Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 74 (Document Number Ribbentrop-74), which I submit to the Tribunal for judicial notice—the President of the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers, Clemenceau, once again draws the attention of the Polish Prime Minister, Paderewski, to this problem. May I offer as proof...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I want to explain the position of the Prosecution.
We have not yet received these documents, and therefore we are in the position that we have been able to make only a tentative selection of those to which we object. All this book of documents has been objected to as far as we know. I want only to make it clear that we are admitting, without protest, the course taken by Dr. Horn on the basis which Your Lordship announced yesterday, that he is putting them in en bloc, subject to our right to object formally when we have the documents.
Therefore it is only right that we must preserve our position, because I have arranged, and all my colleagues agree, that there should be objections to a number of these documents on our present state of knowledge.
DR. HORN: May I ask Your Lordship to hear me for a moment?
THE PRESIDENT: Do you want to say something? Were you going to add something to what Sir David had said?
DR. HORN: In view of the objections raised by the Prosecution I request that a general ruling be made now as to whether the Defense have to submit to disadvantages arising out of technical deficiencies and for which they are not responsible, and whether our already limited presentation of evidence shall be made practically impossible by our being unable to discuss even in a general way, documentary material with the Prosecution and the Tribunal.
May I ask, therefore, that the presentation of documents in their shortened form, as requested by the Tribunal yesterday, be postponed until the document books are available.
THE PRESIDENT: The difficulty seems entirely to arise from the fact that your document books are not ready. That is what causes the difficulty. If the document books had been ready and had been submitted to the Prosecution, the Prosecution would be in a position to object to them. That is the reason why Sir David is objecting in this provisional form. But if you have witnesses whom you are going to call, why do you not call them while your books are being got ready? That seems to the Tribunal to be the obvious course.
Call your witnesses and then we can have the documents introduced at a later stage, when we can see them. That is the only reasonable course and why you do not adopt it I do not know.
DR. HORN: An officer of the Translation Division informed me recently, that he is not in a position, with the personnel at his disposal, to catch up with translations. That is the cause of the trouble and it is beyond my control. I submitted the documents in good time for translation.
THE PRESIDENT: That was not the point I was dealing with. Perhaps the interpretation did not come through correctly.
What I said was that if you have witnesses whom you propose to call, why do you not call them now?
DR. HORN: I had intended to call the witnesses in the course of my presentation of documents and in accordance with the groups of questions on which witnesses could make statements.
THE PRESIDENT: No doubt you had, but as your documents are not here to be presented to the Court, then you must get on, and the only way to get on with your case is to call your witnesses.
DR. HORN: In that case, may I ask for 5 minutes so that I can have a short conversation with a woman witness and then I shall call her?
THE PRESIDENT: Certainly. Wait one moment.
Yes, Mr. Dodd?
MR. DODD: If Your Honor pleases, I would not begrudge any counsel 5 minutes. This woman witness has been here for a long time. She stood outside all day yesterday. I think Dr. Horn has talked to her before. He has had ample opportunity to confer with her. He knew he was going to call her; he asked this Court for permission to call her. I think we are faced here with almost a one-man filibuster at this time.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal rules that the witness must be called at once.
DR. HORN: In that case I wish to have Fräulein Blank called as a witness.
[The witness Blank took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you tell me your name?
MARGARETE BLANK (Witness): My name is Margarete Blank.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.
[The witness repeated the oath in German.]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down if you wish.
DR. HORN: When did you first meet Herr Von Ribbentrop?
FRÄULEIN BLANK: I met him at the beginning of November 1934 in Berlin, when he was delegate for disarmament questions.
DR. HORN: When did you become secretary of the former Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop?
FRÄULEIN BLANK: On 1 November 1934 I was engaged as secretary in the Ribbentrop office. His personal secretary gave notice and, as her successor did not turn up, Von Ribbentrop asked me whether I was willing to take the post. I said “yes” and became his personal secretary on 1 February 1935.
DR. HORN: What was Von Ribbentrop’s attitude towards Hitler?
FRÄULEIN BLANK: As far as I can judge Herr Von Ribbentrop always showed the greatest admiration and veneration for Adolf Hitler. To enjoy the Führer’s confidence, to justify it by his conduct and work was his chief aim, to which he devoted all his efforts. To achieve this aim no sacrifice was too great. In carrying out the tasks set him by the Führer he showed utter disregard for his own person. When speaking of Hitler to his subordinates he did so with the greatest admiration. Appreciation of his services by the Führer, as for instance the award of the Golden Party Badge of Honor, the recognition of his accomplishments in a Reichstag speech, a letter on the occasion of his fiftieth birthday, full of appreciation and praise, meant to him the highest recompense for his unlimited devotion.
DR. HORN: Is it true that Ribbentrop adhered to Hitler’s views even if he himself was of a different opinion?
FRÄULEIN BLANK: What I just said shows that in cases of differences of opinion between himself and the Führer, Herr Von Ribbentrop subordinated his own opinion to that of the Führer. Once a decision had been made by Adolf Hitler there was no more criticism afterwards. Before his subordinates Herr Von Ribbentrop presented the Führer’s views as if they were his own. If the Führer expressed his will, it was always equivalent to a military order.
DR. HORN: To what do you attribute this attitude?
FRÄULEIN BLANK: I attribute it first of all to Ribbentrop’s view that the Führer was the only person capable of making the right political decisions.
Secondly, I attribute it to the fact that Herr Von Ribbentrop, as the son of an officer and as a former officer himself, having taken the oath of allegiance to the Führer, felt himself bound in loyalty and considered himself a soldier, so to say, who had to carry out orders given him, and not to criticize or change them.
DR. HORN: Do you know anything about Ribbentrop having tendered his resignation several times?
FRÄULEIN BLANK: Yes, that happened several times. But about such personal matters Ribbentrop would not speak to his subordinates. I remember only the resignation handed in by him in 1941. I assume that this resignation, as well as the later ones, was tendered by a handwritten letter. The reason for this resignation lay in differences with other departments as to competency; in view of their encroachments upon the competence of the Foreign Office, Herr Von Ribbentrop felt he could no longer take responsibility for the Reich’s foreign policy.
DR. HORN: What was the result of these offers to resign?
FRÄULEIN BLANK: They were turned down.
DR. HORN: Were you with Von Ribbentrop while he was Ambassador in England?
FRÄULEIN BLANK: Yes.
DR. HORN: Is it true that Ribbentrop over a number of years worked for close alliance between Germany and England?
FRÄULEIN BLANK: Yes. For this reason Von Ribbentrop, in the summer of 1936, asked the Führer to send him as ambassador to England. The Naval Agreement of 1935 was only a first step. Subsequently an air pact was contemplated, but, for reasons unknown to me, was not concluded.
DR. HORN: Do you know anything about Von Ribbentrop’s views on the British theory of balance of power on the continent?
FRÄULEIN BLANK: From numerous statements by Ribbentrop I know he was of the opinion that England still adhered to her traditional balance of power policy. In this his ideas were opposed to those of the Führer, who was of the opinion that with the development of Russia a factor had arisen in the East which necessitated a revision of the old balance of power policy—in other words, that England had a vital interest in the steadily increasing strength of Germany. From Ribbentrop’s attitude it could be inferred that he expected that in the Polish crisis the English guarantee for Poland would be honored.
DR. HORN: What political aims did Von Ribbentrop want to achieve by the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact?
FRÄULEIN BLANK: The Tripartite Pact was to be a pact for the limitation of war.
DR. HORN: Do you know whether Ribbentrop endeavored to keep America out of the war?
FRÄULEIN BLANK: Yes, the Tripartite Pact was signed with this end in view.
DR. HORN: And now another set of questions. What was Herr Von Ribbentrop’s attitude in church questions?
FRÄULEIN BLANK: As far as I can judge, his attitude in church questions was very tolerant.
To my knowledge, he left the Church already in the twenties, but in this respect he exercised no pressure or influence on his personnel or, rather, he did not bother about it at all. His tolerance went even so far that in 1935 he let his two eldest children have their wish and rejoin the Church. His tolerance in personal questions of religion was in line with his political attitude towards the Church. In this connection I remember Von Ribbentrop’s sending the Führer a fundamental memorandum in which he advocated a tolerant church policy. In the winter of 1944 he received Bishop Heckel to discuss church matters with him. On the occasion of a journey to Rome in 1941 or 1942, he paid a long visit to the Pope.
DR. HORN: Was Ribbentrop of an introspective and secluded character, or was he not?
FRÄULEIN BLANK: Yes, although I was his personal secretary for 10 years, I hardly ever saw him in a communicative mood. His time and thoughts were so completely occupied by his work, to which he devoted himself wholeheartedly, that there was no room for anything private. Apart from his wife and children there was nobody with whom Von Ribbentrop was on terms of close friendship. This, however, did not prevent him from having the welfare of his subordinates at heart and from showing them generosity, particularly in time of need.
DR. HORN: Is it true that you often felt that there were certain differences of opinion between Ribbentrop and Hitler?
FRÄULEIN BLANK: Yes. True to his attitude, which I mentioned before, Von Ribbentrop never discussed such differences with his subordinates, but I do remember distinctly that there were times when such differences surely did exist. At such times the Führer refused for weeks to receive Herr Von Ribbentrop. Ribbentrop suffered physically and mentally under such a state of affairs.
DR. HORN: Was Ribbentrop independent in the attainment of the goals of his foreign policy, or was he bound by orders and directives of the Führer?
FRÄULEIN BLANK: Ribbentrop often used the phrase that he was only the minister responsible for carrying out the Führer’s foreign policy. By this he meant that, in formulating his policy, he was not independent. In addition, even in carrying out the directives given him by the Führer, he was to a large extent bound by instructions from Hitler. Thus, for instance, the daily reports of a purely informative nature transmitted by the liaison officer, Ambassador Hewel, between the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Führer were often accompanied by requests for the Führer’s decision on individual questions and by draft telegrams containing instructions to the heads of missions abroad.
DR. HORN: Did Ribbentrop suffer by the fact that, although he was responsible for foreign policy, he was not allowed to direct it?
FRÄULEIN BLANK: He never complained about it in my presence, but I had the feeling that he did suffer.
DR. HORN: What was Hitler’s attitude toward the Foreign Office?
FRÄULEIN BLANK: The Führer saw in the Foreign Office a body of ossified red-tape civil servants, more or less untouched by National Socialism. I gathered from men of his entourage, that he often made fun of the Foreign Office. He considered it to be the home of reaction and defeatism.
DR. HORN: In what way did Ribbentrop try to bring the Foreign Office closer to Hitler?
FRÄULEIN BLANK: When taking over the Foreign Office in February 1938, Herr Von Ribbentrop intended to carry out a thorough reshuffle of the entire German diplomatic service. He also intended to make basic changes in the training of young diplomats. These plans did not go beyond the initial stage because of the war. In the course of the war they were taken up again when the question of new blood for the Foreign Office became acute. Ribbentrop’s anxiety to counteract the Führer’s animosity towards the Foreign Office led him to fill some of the posts of heads of missions abroad, not with professional diplomats, but with tried SA and SS leaders.
DR. HORN: What were Ribbentrop’s views and intentions regarding Russia?
FRÄULEIN BLANK: His intentions regarding Russia were shown by the Non-aggression Pact of August 1939, and the Trade Agreement of September 1939.
DR. HORN: Do you know that, in addition to the Non-aggression Pact and the Trade Agreement, a further agreement was concluded in Moscow?
FRÄULEIN BLANK: Yes, there was an additional secret agreement.
GEN. RUDENKO: Your Honors! It appears to me that the witness who has been called to attend the present sitting of the Tribunal is, by the very nature of her position as secretary to the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ribbentrop, able to testify only to the personality of the defendant, to his way of life, to the reticence or frankness of his character, and so forth. But the witness is quite incompetent to pass an opinion on matters pertaining to agreements, foreign policy, et cetera. In this sense I consider the questions of the Defense absolutely inadmissible and request that they be withdrawn.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, that is the same matter that is raised, is it not, upon the affidavit of Dr. Gaus? I mean, you said that you were going to produce an affidavit of Dr. Gaus which dealt with a secret agreement between—can’t you hear me? I beg your pardon. I ought to have said that Dr. Seidl was going to produce an affidavit of Dr. Gaus with reference to this alleged agreement. That is right, is it not?
DR. HORN: I assume so, yes.
THE PRESIDENT: The Soviet Prosecutor objected to that agreement being referred to until the affidavit should be admitted, until it had been seen. Well, now, is the agreement in writing?
DR. HORN: No.
THE PRESIDENT: Is the alleged agreement between the Soviet Government and Germany in writing?
DR. HORN: Yes. It was put down in writing, but I am not in possession of a copy of the agreement, and I should therefore like to ask the Tribunal, in case the decision depends on the affidavit of Ambassador Gaus, to allow me to obtain, at the appropriate time, an affidavit from Fräulein Blank who saw the original. Would Your Lordship be agreeable to that?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, have you a copy of the agreement itself?
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, there are only two copies of this agreement. One copy was left in Moscow on 23 August 1939. The other copy was taken to Berlin by Von Ribbentrop. According to an announcement in the press all the archives of the Foreign Office were confiscated by the Soviet troops. May I, therefore, request that the Soviet Government or the Soviet Delegation be asked to submit to the Tribunal the original of the agreement?
THE PRESIDENT: I asked you a question, Dr. Seidl. I did not ask you for an argument. I asked you whether you have a copy of that agreement available.
DR. SEIDL: I, myself, am not in possession of a copy of the agreement. The affidavit of Ambassador Gaus only states the contents of the secret agreement. He was able to give the contents of the secret agreement because he drafted it. The secret agreement, as drafted by Ambassador Gaus, was signed by Foreign Commissar Molotov and Herr Von Ribbentrop. That is all I have to say.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, General Rudenko?
GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, I wish to make the following statement: With regard to what was mentioned here by Defense Counsel Seidl, about the agreement allegedly seized by Soviet troops in connection with the capture of the archives of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs—that is, the agreement concluded in Moscow in August 1939—I would draw the attention of the Defense Counsel, to the newspaper in which this agreement, the German-Soviet Non-aggression Pact of 23 August 1939, was published. That is a known fact.
Insofar as other agreements are concerned, the Soviet Prosecution considers that Dr. Seidl’s application for the incorporation into the record of affidavits by Friedrich Gaus should be denied, and for the following reasons:
Gaus’ testimony on this pact and on the history immediately preceding the conclusion of the German-Soviet pact is irrelevant. The presentation of such affidavits, which, moreover, do not shed a true light on events, can be looked upon only as an act of provocation. This is clearly borne out by the fact that Ribbentrop himself repudiated this witness even though his affidavits describe Ribbentrop’s activities, even though Defense Counsel for Hess has accepted testimonies from this witness and applied for their incorporation into the record, despite the fact that they contain no reference to Hess. On the strength of these considerations, of these circumstances, I request the Tribunal to reject the request made by Defense Counsel Seidl and to consider the question submitted by Defense Counsel Horn as being irrelevant to the matter under our consideration.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Seidl? Do you want to say something?
DR. SEIDL: May I add something? The translation of what the Soviet Prosecutor has just said has come through incompletely. I could not make out whether General Rudenko wanted to deny altogether that such an agreement was concluded or whether he wanted only to state that the contents of this secret agreement are not relevant.
In the first case, I repeat my application that the Soviet Foreign Commissar Molotov be called and interrogated before this Tribunal; in the latter case, I ask to be given the opportunity here and now to submit to the Tribunal my points regarding the relevance of this secret agreement.
THE PRESIDENT: At the moment we are considering an objection to the evidence of this witness, so we won’t trouble with that.
The Tribunal will adjourn for a few moments.
[A recess was taken.]
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal desires to point out to Counsel for the Defense, that there was no mention of this alleged treaty in his application for evidence to be given by the witness now in the witness box, but as the matter has now been raised the Tribunal rules that the witness may be questioned upon the matter.
DR. HORN: [To the witness.] You were speaking about the secret agreement. How did you come to know about the conclusion of this agreement?
THE PRESIDENT: I am told that what I said was wrongly translated into the Russian language. At any rate, I don’t know whether it was rightly translated into the German language; but what I said was that the witness may be questioned, not that the witness may not be questioned. Is that clear to you?
DR. HORN: Thank you. I understood the question correctly.
[Turning to the witness.] Taking up your previous statement about the secret agreement I should like to ask you how you came to know about the conclusion of this agreement?
FRÄULEIN BLANK: Owing to illness, I could not accompany Von Ribbentrop on his two trips to Russia. I was also absent when the preparatory work for the agreements was being done. I learned of the existence of this secret agreement through a special sealed envelope which, according to instructions, was filed separately and bore an inscription something like “German-Russian secret or additional agreement.”
DR. HORN: You were also responsible for filing separately these secret matters? Is this correct?
FRÄULEIN BLANK: Yes.
DR. HORN: I should like to turn now to another group of questions. Did Von Ribbentrop endeavor to keep the pact with Russia in any case?
FRÄULEIN BLANK: Having signed the German-Russian pacts, Von Ribbentrop was, of course, interested in their being kept. Moreover, he realized fully the great danger a German-Russian war would mean for Germany; accordingly he informed and warned the Führer. For this very purpose, as far as I recall, Embassy Counsellor Hilger from Moscow and Ambassador Schnurre were called to Berchtesgaden to report. Also, in the spring of 1941 Ambassador Count von der Schulenburg was again ordered to report, to back up and to corroborate and reinforce Herr Von Ribbentrop’s warnings to the Führer.
DR. HORN: Do you know whether Von Ribbentrop was informed beforehand of Hitler’s intent to attach Austria to the Reich?
FRÄULEIN BLANK: At the time of the German march into Austria, Ambassador Von Ribbentrop, who in February had been appointed Foreign Minister, was in London on his farewell visit. There he heard to his surprise of the Anschluss of Austria. He himself had had a different idea of a solution of the Austria question, namely an economic union.
DR. HORN: Do you know whether Von Ribbentrop made repeated efforts to end the war by diplomatic methods?
FRÄULEIN BLANK: Yes. One of his moves was to send Minister Professor Berber to Switzerland in the winter of 1943-1944. Later on these moves were intensified by sending Herr Von Schmieden to Bern and Dr. Hesse to Stockholm. As the Führer had not given official authority to initiate negotiations, it was possible only to try to find out on what conditions discussions might be opened between Germany and the Allies. Similar missions were entrusted to the German Chargé d’Affaires in Madrid, Minister Von Bibra, Consul General Möllhausen in Lisbon, and the Ambassador to the Vatican, Von Weizsäcker. A former member of the Office Ribbentrop living in Madrid was instructed to make a similar attempt with the British Government.
On 20 April Von Ribbentrop dictated to me a detailed memorandum for the Führer in which he asked for official authorization to initiate negotiations. I do not know the outcome of this request because I left Berlin.
DR. HORN: In the course of your duties did you get to know what Hitler’s basic attitude to this question was?
FRÄULEIN BLANK: From what I heard from men of his entourage I know that the Führer did not expect much of it, or that he would have been in favor of initiating negotiations only at a time of military successes. If and when, however, there were military successes, he was likewise against diplomatic initiative. As to the mission of Dr. Hesse—after its failure, he, it was disclosed by an indiscretion, remarked that he had not expected much of it anyway.
DR. HORN: Just one more question: Is it correct that Von Ribbentrop was notified of the impending invasion of Norway and Denmark only a very short time before this action?
FRÄULEIN BLANK: Yes, just a few days previously.
DR. HORN: Have you heard anything to the effect that Von Ribbentrop was of the opinion England would fight for Poland?
FRÄULEIN BLANK: Yes. In line with his view that England would adhere to the old balance of power policy, he was of the opinion that England would honor her guarantee to Poland.
DR. HORN: I have no further questions to put to this witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants’ counsel wish to ask any questions of this witness? [There was no response.] Do the Prosecution?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the Prosecution have very carefully considered this matter. They hope that the Tribunal will not hold it against them that they accept everything that this witness says, but they feel that all the matters could be more conveniently put to the defendant himself, and therefore they do not intend to cross-examine.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness may retire.
[The witness left the stand.]
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, the Tribunal has permitted the question concerning the secret agreement to be put to the witness. The witness knew only of the existence of this agreement, not its contents.
May I please be told whether the admission of this question to the witness is to be considered as implying the decision by the Tribunal on the admissibility of Ambassador Gaus’ affidavit, and whether I might now be given the opportunity of reading an excerpt from this affidavit?
THE PRESIDENT: Has the affidavit been submitted to the Prosecution?
DR. SEIDL: Last Monday—that is, 3 days ago—I submitted six copies of the affidavit to the Translation Division or to Lieutenant Schrader of the Defendants’ Information Center. I assume that in the meantime, since 3 days have elapsed, the Prosecution have received a copy.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the Prosecution have not received the copies. I have not seen the affidavit yet. Neither has my friend Mr. Dodd, nor have my other colleagues, General Rudenko, or M. Champetier de Ribes.
THE PRESIDENT: Then I think we had better wait until the document is in the hands of the Prosecution, then it can be considered.
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, I believe that I did everything in my power to furnish the Prosecution with the affidavit. I have no influence on the General Secretary’s business, and I should be obliged if the Tribunal would assist in this matter.
THE PRESIDENT: Nobody has said that you have done anything wrong about it, Dr. Seidl.
Yes, Dr. Horn.
DR. HORN: As my next witness I should like to call Minister Paul Schmidt.
[The witness Schmidt took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you tell me your name?
DR. PAUL OTTO SCHMIDT (Witness): Schmidt is my name.
THE PRESIDENT: Your full name?
SCHMIDT: Dr. Paul Otto Schmidt.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.
[The witness repeated the oath in German.]
DR. HORN: Witness, you took part in some of the decisive discussions between the British Ambassador, Sir Nevile Henderson, and members of the Reich Government before the outbreak of war. Is it correct that you were present at the conference on 30 August 1939 between the Defendant Von Ribbentrop and the British Ambassador?
[There was a pause in proceedings.]
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn until a quarter to 2.