Afternoon Session
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I do not know if Your Lordship wanted the words for which these short collections of letters stand. I have them if Your Lordship wants them—on the last document, 1201-PS.
THE PRESIDENT: Oh, thank you very much; yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I think all that Your Lordship need look at is where the name Dr. Grotius appears.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The Wi. Rü Amt is the Wirtschaftsrüstungsamt, the Economic and Armament Office, which is, Your Lordship will remember, General Thomas’ department of the OKW.
My Lord, the other letters “KVR” are Kriegsverwaltungsrat, War Administration Counsellor.
My Lord, I do not think there could be any dispute that the document comes from General Thomas’ department of the OKW.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, may I say something in regard to this document. I want only to point out certain considerations. It must be ascertained from where the heading comes, that is, the first line. The second line, which Sir David just referred to, begins with the letters “AZ.” AZ (Aktenzeichen) means “file number,” in other words, a reference to a letter from the Economic and Armament Office. It does not explain however, the author of this document, which can only be ascertained when we find out what the heading, or the first line, means.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, do you understand it?
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, I understand it.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. LATERNSER: The author of this writing can be ascertained only if we find out what the first line means; because the second line is only the document file number, which is to be seen from the first two letters, “AZ,” which means Aktenzeichen; and in this letter, reference seems to be made to a letter from the Economic and Armament Office.
That is all I have to say in regard to this.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I do not know if Your Lordship wants any further information. It seems to me quite clear. That is, it is from the file of the department I mentioned, the Wirtschaftsrüstungsamt.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. You mean it goes back to the same letters.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The same letters, yes.
THE PRESIDENT: It has just been explained to me that what Dr. Laternser was saying is that the letters “AZ i. K. 32/510” only mean that it is from the file of that department.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord. Then, to find the office whose file it is, you get Wi. Rü again, which is the Wirtschaftsrüstungsamt, which is the Economic and Armament Office, and it is the Armament Department, Number III.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
Sir David, the Tribunal thought that the best way would be to put this witness in the box and then to leave him to Counsel for the Prosecution and the Defense.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship please, my friend, Mr. Roberts, is going to deal with this witness, and, My Lord, he has selected the passages quite shortly from the statements which will be read.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
[The witness Wielen took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Witness, will you stand up please?
MAX WIELEN (Witness): Yes, certainly.
THE PRESIDENT: What is your name?
WIELEN: Max Wielen.
THE PRESIDENT: Your full name?
WIELEN: Max Wielen.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me:
I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.
[The witness repeated the oath.]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
MR. G. D. ROBERTS (Leading Counsel for the United Kingdom): Max Wielen, you made two statements in London through Colonel Hinchley Cook.
WIELEN: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: And are these photostats of the two statements—the first one dated 26 August 1945, and the second dated 6 September 1945?
[The documents were submitted to the witness.]
Are those the photographs of your true statements? Do you identify them? Do you see your signature at the end of each?
WIELEN: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: And in those two statements did you tell the truth?
WIELEN: Yes, I told the truth.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, perhaps I should now read some passages so that they may go into the record.
[Turning to the witness.] If you take the first statement first—the statement begins with your name and the positions which you held in the SS and in the Criminal Police. That is right, is it not?
WIELEN: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: And now, will you just follow the beginning of this statement.
WIELEN: Of which declaration, 6 September?
MR. ROBERTS: I said the first one.
WIELEN: The first one? I see.
MR. ROBERTS: Just follow it while I read. I will read the whole of the first page:
“Oberregierungsrat and Kriminalrat, SS Obersturmbannführer...”
WIELEN: Oberregierungsrat and Kriminalrat of the Criminal Police, not of the SS...
MR. ROBERTS: I do not want you to read it, just listen to me.
“...formerly officer in charge of the Criminal Police at Breslau.
“I have to state in answer to the question, whether I know anything about the shooting of English prisoners of war, Air Force officers of the prison camp at Sagan, that I have knowledge of this matter and wish to make the following statement without reserve.
“The shooting took place on the express personal orders of the former Führer, Adolf Hitler, and was carried out by the officials of the Geheime Staatspolizei.
“The officer in charge of the Staatspolizeileitstelle at Breslau was Oberregierungsrat, SS Obersturmbannführer Dr. Scharpwinkel. His immediate superiors were the Chief of the Sipo, SS Obergruppenführer Dr. Kaltenbrunner, and the Chief of Amt IV of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt, SS Gruppenführer Müller. I am unable to give the names of the officers in charge of other districts of the Geheime Staatspolizei who carried out shootings in their districts.
“I insert here a small chart showing the organization of the Sicherheitspolizei....”
I now go to the bottom of Page 3 in the English copy, and it is at the bottom of Page 3 in the copy in German, which the witness has in his hands:
“During the course of time”—and this is talking about Stalag Luft III—“99 escape tunnels had been dug. All of them had been discovered by the military. The hundredth tunnel, dug in March 1944, proved successful to the extent that 80 officers were able to escape.
“On receipt of a telephone message from the camp headquarters to the Kriminalpolizeileitstelle, I gave the order for ‘Kriegsfahndung,’ in accordance with the emergency instructions laid down. At Dr. Absalon’s suggestion, and having regard for the time lag, ‘Grossfahndung’ was ordered. Moreover, the officer in charge of the Reichskriminalpolizeiamt had to be informed, who approved and confirmed the order for ‘Grossalarm.’
“Gradually the search, which was carried out in all parts of Germany led to the re-arrest of practically all the escaped English officer prisoners, with the exception of three, I believe. Most of them were recaptured while still in Silesia. A few had got as far as Kiel, Strasbourg, and the Allgäu.
“It was then that one day at noon I received a telegraphic instruction from General Nebe to proceed at once to Berlin to be informed of a secret order. When I arrived in Berlin that evening, I saw General Nebe in his office Am Werdierschen Markt 5/7. I gave him a short, concise report on the whole matter as it stood at the time. He then showed me a teleprint order signed by Dr. Kaltenbrunner, in which was stated that, on the express personal orders of the Führer, over half of the officers escaped from Sagan were to be shot after their recapture. The officers in charge of Department IV, Gruppenführer Müller, had received corresponding orders and would give instructions to the Staatspolizei. Military offices had been informed.
“General Nebe himself appeared shocked at this order. He was very distressed. I was afterwards told that for nights on end he had not gone to bed but had passed the night on his office settee.
“I, too, was appalled at the horrible step to be taken and opposed its execution. I said that it was against the laws of war; and that it was bound to lead to reprisals against our own officers who were prisoners of war in English camps, and that I absolutely refused to take any responsibility. General Nebe replied that in this particular case I had indeed no responsibility whatever, because the Staatspolizei would act completely independently, and that, after all the Führer’s orders had to be carried out without demur. I want to point out that when I first refused I acted on impulse and feeling, well knowing that I could not hope to prevail in view of the conditions that had recently arisen within the Sicherheitspolizei.
“Nebe then added that I, on my part, was, of course, under an obligation to preserve absolute secrecy, and that I had been shown the original order so that I should not make any difficulties vis-à-vis the Staatspolizei. My own duties as regards the transport of some of the prisoners would be transferred to the Staatspolizei.
“In this connection I want to explain that until then the bringing back of prisoners to the camp had been the responsibility of the Kriminalpolizei; either they had to take them back to the camp themselves, or they had to hold them until they were fetched by the camp staff. In answer to a question, I declare that Oberregierungsrat Dr. Schulze was present at the discussion with General Nebe. He nodded his head in agreement when I raised my objection, but otherwise took no part in it.
“On my return to Breslau, I learned from Dr. Scharpwinkel that the Geheime Staatspolizei had been duly informed by Gruppenführer Müller. I was not apprised of the actual instructions. I also do not know whether a similar order was issued to every officer in charge of the Staatspolizeileitstellen, or whether orders were only given to those in whose areas arrests had been made and executions were to be carried out.
“According to instructions the police in the districts where arrests had been made had to inform the Reichskriminalpolizeiamt (Kriegsfahndungszentrale) by telegram or telephone that officer prisoners of war had been taken into custody. The Kriminalpolizeileitstelle Breslau was also to be informed.
“How the shooting was carried out, I do not know; but I presume that after the Staatspolizei had collected the officers concerned from the prisons, they were shot in some remote spot—forests, et cetera—with pistols, service pistols of the Stapo.
“In answer to the question whether the officers were possibly beaten to death, I state that I do not believe this, because the Führer’s order specifically mentioned ‘shooting.’
“The Staatspolizei had, in accordance with instructions received from RSHA, Department IV, described the shooting as if it had occurred in transit for the purpose of self-defense or to prevent re-escape. This I afterwards learned from Dr. Scharpwinkel.
“Later the Kriminalpolizeileitstelle Breslau received a letter from the RSHA, Department V, which had to be communicated to the camp commandant with the request that its text should be made known to the English officer prisoners of war in order to frighten them. The letter explained that the shooting had occurred for the above-mentioned reason. The text of the letter was communicated to Oberst Lindeiner or one of the camp staff officers.
“As regards the selection of the officers to be shot, a list had been prepared by the camp authorities, at the request of Department V, in which those officers who were regarded as disturbing elements—plotters and escape leaders—had been specifically mentioned. The names were selected either by the commandant or by one of his officers. Thereupon the shooting of officers mentioned by name was accordingly ordered by Department IV and corresponding instructions sent to the Staatspolizei of the district concerned.”
I omit the next paragraph, and I go to the bottom of the English copy, Page 4; at the bottom of the witness’ copy, Page 7. Witness, would you turn to Page 7, please. You will find the passage marked in pencil at the bottom of Page 7. Have you got the page? I carefully numbered the pages.
WIELEN: There is nothing marked in this.
MR. ROBERTS: I know, but if you turn over the page you will get something which is marked.
WIELEN: Nothing is marked on Page 7, but on Page 8...
MR. ROBERTS: You will find something marked at the very bottom of Page 7. At any rate, just follow these words—follow these words, will you:
“To revert to the shooting...”
WIELEN: Yes, I have found it now.
MR. ROBERTS: “...approximately 40 English officers who had not been arrested by the Staatspolizei but by the Kriminalpolizei had meanwhile been taken back to camp.”
When you said that—you just answer this question, Witness; you said approximately 40 officers—you didn’t know the actual numbers, did you?
WIELEN: The number is not correct. It was not 40. I did not know at that time.
MR. ROBERTS: That’s right, because it isn’t the correct number. I think, 50.
WIELEN: I made a mistake at that time.
MR. ROBERTS: That’s right.
“They had come to no harm whatsoever; I must assume that...”
WIELEN: Fifteen additional were brought back.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes, yes. I just want you now to listen to it, if you will be kind enough:
“...I must assume that their treatment was perfectly correct. It had been impossible to avoid putting them into police prisons due to the general conditions then prevailing.
“I do not know who interrogated the officers in the police prisons. I assume this was done by the local police authorities, as an interrogation must necessarily follow every notification of arrest. I do not know the names of the officials of the Staatspolizei or the Gemeindepolizei (small local police force) who co-operated in this matter, but Dr. Absalon should be able to supply the answer to this question.”
I go on to the paragraph beginning, “The urns...” if Your Lordship please:
“The urns containing the ashes of the officers who had been shot were transmitted by the Staatspolizei to the Kriminalpolizei. Which crematoria had been used by the Staatspolizei, I am unable to say. The urns were handed over to the camp commandant by order of the RSHA for a military funeral. By this means the return of the urns through the Kripo—the fact that the Staatspolizei was connected with the matter was to be camouflaged.”
Then I miss the next paragraph. Then I read one sentence, the next line:
“I do not know why five officers were interrogated in Berlin.”
And then, My Lord, I turn to Page 6.
And, Witness, would you go to the bottom of your Page 10—the bottom of your Page 10—you just turn over the page in the ordinary way. My Lord, I take the middle paragraph. Just two paragraphs out of Page 6:
“In a general way it may be of interest that, even before my departure for Berlin, Kriminalkommissar Dr. Absalon had told me that he had heard in Camp Sagan—he was told this in a very secretive way—that shootings were to take place in order to deter the officers. From this may be deduced the fact that the camp had already been informed through military channels of the order to shoot issued by Dr. Kaltenbrunner.
“It would be useful to ascertain what Göring knows about the whole affair, because the Führer must surely have informed him of the order, since it concerned a camp of the Luftwaffe.” (Document Number UK-48.)
My Lord, that is all of that statement that I think I need to read. My Lord, I am anxious to avoid reading as much of the second statement as I possibly can, because there is a good deal of repetition.
Will you take the second statement now, Witness? That one, I am afraid, has not been marked.
The third paragraph, My Lord, the third and fourth paragraphs on the first page of the statement:
“As to when the Staatspolizei had begun with the shootings, I am not in a position to say; but I imagine it happened when only very few prisoners were still at large and their recapture could no longer be reckoned with.
“As regards the lapse of time between the order for ‘Grossfahndung’ and being shown the order for the shootings, this could only have been a matter of a few days. I can no longer recall exact dates. I do know however, for certain, that no shootings had taken place anywhere at the time when the order was shown to me.”
Then, perhaps, I could read the last paragraph but one on that page:
“Before the last mass escape had taken place, I had heard nothing about the prospect of more drastic measures to be taken against the prisoners. I heard of it only after the final escape, but before I had been shown in Berlin the order for the shootings. It was then that Dr. Absalon had told me that he had heard in Sagan Camp—from whom I do not know, although I believe it was from Colonel Lindeiner—that in future shootings would take place. When this particular order was shown to me in Berlin, it appeared to me to be merely a proof that the military were behind this brutal measure or at least had had knowledge of it before the RSHA.
“As regards the expression ‘more than half’ in the order of Kaltenbrunner, this is how the wording is now fixed in my mind. It is, however, quite possible that a specific number was given, and that I, in quickly glancing through the order, interpreted it thus in my mind, ‘but that is more than half,’ and this is what has now stuck in my memory.”
My Lord, perhaps I might read—omitting the first several paragraphs which are really repetitions—a paragraph just a little more than halfway down the page. It begins:
“I do not know how the Geheime Staatspolizei took over from the local police prisons those officers who were to be shot. It is, however, possible that the Stapo got into touch with the local offices of the Kriminalpolizei.
“In Lower Silesia, the firing squads were detailed by the officer in charge of the Staatspolizei, Dr. Scharpwinkel, or by his orders. I never heard who belonged to these squads.”
Then the last paragraph on that page:
“I declare, in answer to the question as to why the Kripo did not carry out the shootings, that in the execution of its duties the Kriminalpolizei feel themselves bound by the provisions of the Staatsprozessordnung and the Reichsstrafgesetzbuch, and that their personnel were trained in accordance with these standards. On the other hand, during the war, the Staatspolizei had, incited by Himmler, become less scrupulous. They carried out executions on the orders of the RSHA, or with the approval of that department, whenever required. That is the reason why the German citizens’ general detestation of the Staatspolizei did not extend to the Kriminalpolizei.
“The urns were obviously returned to the Kriminalpolizei for the sole reason that the intervention of the Staatspolizei should not become publicly known; that is, the English officers in the camp should not become aware of it.”
My Lord, I think that is all I need read.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the Defense Counsel want to ask any questions of the witness?
DR. NELTE: Witness, during your activities and during this terrible matter, were you in touch with the OKW or the defendant, Field Marshal Keitel, in any way?
WIELEN: No, neither with the OKW nor with Field Marshal Keitel, nor with any of the other high officers.
DR. NELTE: Did I understand you correctly when you stated that the order that we are talking about here, so far as you know, went through the following channels: From Hitler to Himmler, to the Reich Security Main Office, and then the lower offices?
WIELEN: Yes, that is the correct organizational path.
DR. NELTE: By whom was the list of which you spoke demanded, the list that was to contain the names of those who were the disturbing element?
WIELEN: That was asked for by the Reich Security Main Office.
DR. NELTE: In the second half of what was read just now, a sentence is contained that reads: “The camp commander must have been informed through military officers of the intended shooting ahead of time.”
Would you, with regard to this sentence...
WIELEN: Well, I should not like to repeat that here so strongly. It is possible, since shootings might have been discussed in the camp, or the fact that more ready use of firearms in general would be taken towards English officers if escapes continued; but in this connection I know nothing more specific, namely, in the connection in which this remark was made.
DR. NELTE: Then you do not want to insist on the fact that we are here dealing with remarks that were made before the escape?
WIELEN: Well, at least not so far as these shootings are concerned; at least not in direct relationship to this particular escape.
DR. NELTE: But it is not possible to know ahead of time if someone is going to escape. For that reason I ask you whether this remark is related to some discussion that took place subsequent to the flight of these officers and which perhaps was directed toward the future prevention of escapes?
WIELEN: That is altogether possible because at Sagan attempts to escape were made daily.
DR. NELTE: Then would you like to clarify the statement, according to which Colonel Lindeiner is said to have stated that military officers stood behind these measures and had been previously informed of them? That is how...
WIELEN: I do not believe that I expressed myself just that way. Could you please repeat that?
DR. NELTE: According to my notes, you said that Colonel Lindeiner stated that military officers stood behind this measure and had been informed of it ahead of time.
WIELEN: I do not think that I could have made such a statement.
DR. NELTE: Then do you want to say that you cannot state that Colonel Lindeiner made such an assertion?
WIELEN: I never had the impression that Lindeiner was personally informed in this matter. At any rate, I have not the slightest reason to believe so.
DR. NELTE: No further questions, thank you.
DR. STAHMER: Witness, according to the minutes, you stated that the Criminal Commissioner Absalon had informed you even before your departure for Berlin that he had heard in Camp Sagan that shootings were to take place.
WIELEN: I just spoke in connection with this same matter, yes.
DR. STAHMER: Is that what you just...
WIELEN: That is the same matter.
DR. STAHMER: Another question: During the discussion that you had with General Nebe in Berlin, General Nebe said to you that the military offices were informed, and stated more precisely what military offices were concerned?
WIELEN: No, that was not told to me. Nor do I know whether this intention was at all realized, because the military offices were actually not to be informed, and this whole matter was to be regarded as secret and was to be kept secret.
DR. STAHMER: In your testimony here, you mentioned Reich Marshal Göring. Have you any documentary proof that Reich Marshal Göring knew of these shootings, or is that merely conjecture on your part?
WIELEN: No, please consider from what was said and the way it was said, that I wanted to leave that question entirely open. Therefore, I also said that I did not know it positively, and had no evidence for it; but since it concerned a Luftwaffe camp I ask or propose that the Reich Marshal be heard, since he should be able to give information about it.
DR. STAHMER: In other words, it was only a suggestion on your part to interrogate the Reich Marshal as to whether he was informed?
WIELEN: Because I had to leave this matter open, I made the suggestion only in order to proceed further in the matter at all.
DR. STAHMER: That is all.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Witness, you stated that the order had been given by Kaltenbrunner and Müller. Now I ask you, was this order in the form of a teletype or a telegraphic communication, or did you see the order with the original signature?
WIELEN: I believe I can state definitely that it was a teletype communication.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you know for sure it was not an original signature?
WIELEN: It was not an original signature. In fact I felt doubts about this later. You can very well imagine that I thought about it hundreds of times, wondering whether it were not entirely possible...
DR. KAUFFMANN: Speak more slowly.
WIELEN: ...that it was Himmler’s signature; but from the organizational point of view it would have had to be Kaltenbrunner who signed it.
DR. KAUFFMANN: So, if I understood you correctly, you can also not state definitely that the teletype really had Kaltenbrunner’s signature under it, but rather you simply assume that from your knowledge of the organization.
WIELEN: I was so impressed by the contents of the communication, by the results, and by the necessity to prepare the working out of the whole affair that I paid little attention to the mechanical matters, that is, the externals involved. As a result, they did not imprint themselves on my memory in such a way that I could make a statement about them with definite reliability.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Thank you.
MR. ROBERTS: No further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.
Dr. Nelte, does that close the case for the Defendant Keitel?
DR. NELTE: As far as witnesses are concerned, that closes the case for Keitel. I have a few further remarks to make with regard to the presentation of evidence.
The Tribunal have approved an affidavit by Krieger by its ruling of 6 April 1946. I ask the Tribunal to permit me to put this affidavit in evidence as Document Keitel-15. I have the German original here and I should like to read only that part of the affidavit that describes the relations between Hitler and Keitel. This involves three short paragraphs:
“The relations between Hitler and former Field Marshal Keitel were officially correct and, on Hitler’s part, appeared confiding as a whole, springing from appreciation of or respect for a zealous co-worker. Keitel’s attitude was upright and soldierly. There was, however, no further friendly or confidential note between them. Apart from official receptions, and so forth, Keitel, as far as could be ascertained, hardly took part with Hitler in informal conversations nor shared any meals with him. Also, summons to discussions with Hitler outside the official conferences, when there were no stenographers present, were not observed.
“In preparing decisions or in formulating orders, Keitel gave expression to his own opinions, even if they happened to differ, in an unbiased, clear, soldierly manner. He apparently knew exactly, from many years of collaboration with Hitler, the limits of possibility as far as influencing his opinions or decisions or changing his mind was concerned. For that reason he generally accepted Hitler’s decisions as orders in a soldierly manner. In individual cases he tried and succeeded by emphatic reasoning in changing decisions, or at least in delaying them in order to have them further examined.
“That Hitler, at least at times, did not trust Keitel completely I believe I can conclude from one of Hitler’s remarks...”
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, it appears to the Tribunal that it is not really necessary to read this. Keitel has already said it, it is cumulative to him, and the document itself is in evidence so we can read it ourselves.
DR. NELTE: It is not necessary, but it simply corroborates what has been testified to here. Therefore, I can...
THE PRESIDENT: It is sufficient that you tell us that.
DR. NELTE: I have further received the answers to several interrogatories that were permitted by the Tribunal.
First, there is the answer to the interrogatory by Herr Romilly. I can put this sworn interrogatory in evidence before the Tribunal and can forego any reading of it.
The same is true of the answers to the interrogatory submitted to the witness Rotraud Roemer as to the question of the branding of Russian prisoners of war.
The interrogatories of Professor Naville and Ambassador Scarpini are not yet at hand. I shall submit them as soon as they arrive. There remains...
THE PRESIDENT: Have the Prosecution had these documents?
DR. NELTE: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you given numbers to these? You gave Document Keitel-15 to the last affidavit. You ought to number the others.
DR. NELTE: Romilly is Document Keitel-16, and Roemer is Document Keitel-17.
I have now only the affidavit of the late Field Marshal Von Blomberg. As ruled by the Tribunal on 26 February, it was allowed that he be interrogated. I have sent the original to the Prosecution and I ask to be allowed to put in evidence the sworn answers of Von Blomberg. It is in Document Book 1 and is known both to the Tribunal and to the Prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. NELTE: That concludes my case.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you—Now, Dr. Horn, I think—Dr. Nelte, you are lodging these original documents that are numbered Keitel-16, 17, and 18, you are lodging them with the General Secretary?
DR. NELTE: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Have they been translated?
DR. NELTE: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
Dr. Nelte, we have not seen a translation of Keitel-16, but you are sure that it has been translated, are you?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I have seen an English translation of it.
THE PRESIDENT: You have?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It was shown to me when it came in. I am quite sure I remember reading it.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, perhaps the General Secretary’s department will see that we are furnished copies of it.
Yes, I think that is the one. That is Keitel-16.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly, I think Romilly is Keitel-16. I have seen it.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
Dr. Horn, do you remember that we read these documents at the time that we approved of their admissibility?
DR. MARTIN HORN (Counsel for Defendant Von Ribbentrop): Yes, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: So perhaps it won’t take you long to introduce them in evidence?
DR. HORN: I shall limit myself to a minimum, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
DR. HORN: I should like to ask the Tribunal first to take judicial notice of Document Ribbentrop-75, contained in Volume III, on Page 191, of Ribbentrop’s document book. It is a question here of an agreement between the Allied and Associated Powers and Poland of the year 1919. This agreement defines the rights of the German minority in Poland. In Article 12 of this Treaty, which is on Page 3 of this document, it is said that Poland agrees that insofar as the provisions of the above article apply to persons of racial, religious, or linguistic minorities, these provisions form the basis for obligations of international interest and are placed under the supervision of the League of Nations.
In subsequent years Poland repeatedly violated this Treaty. That can be seen from the two following documents, Document Ribbentrop-82, on Page 208 of Document Book Number 4.
This is a legal judgment by the Permanent International Court. It is of 10 September 1923. In order to save time I might just read the conclusion, where it is said:
“The Court is of the opinion that the attitude of the Polish Government defined under Points ‘a’ and ‘b’ does not stand in accord with Poland’s international obligations.”
I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document, as well as the next document, Document Ribbentrop-84, which is on Pages 212 and 212-a of the Ribbentrop Document Book Number 4. This, too, is a statement on the part of a judicial committee of the League of Nations on minority questions. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this report.
Immediately after the Government had been taken over by Hitler, this Government attempted to establish a good relationship with Poland. As evidence for this, I refer to Document Ribbentrop-85, which is on Page 213 of the document book. I am reading from Page 2 of that document.
THE PRESIDENT: One moment. Is that Ribbentrop Document Book 4?
DR. HORN: It is Ribbentrop Document Book 4, Mr. President, Page 213. I am reading from Page 214, center of the last paragraph, as follows:
“He, the Chancellor, wished only that the pending political questions existing between Germany and Poland could be examined and treated without passion by the statesmen of both countries. He was convinced that some way out of the present untenable position could be found. Germany desired peace. The forceful expropriation of Polish territory was not his intention, but he was reserving for himself those rights to which he was entitled according to the pact, and he would insist upon them at any time and whenever he thought fit.”
Concerning this conference, two official communiqués were issued by request of the Polish Ambassador. This is Document Ribbentrop-86, which is the German communiqué, and I request the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it and also the next document, Document Ribbentrop-87, on Page 216 of the document book, which is the Polish communiqué. So as to save time, I do not propose to read these communiqués.
On 15 July 1937 considerable parts of the German-Polish pact which was signed in Geneva in 1922, regarding Upper Silesia, expired. The necessity arose, therefore, to create a new pact between the two countries, particularly since difficulties again arose due to the question of minorities and the treatment of German minorities. As evidence for this I refer to Document Ribbentrop-117, on Page 257 of the document book, and I should like to read the second paragraph where it says:
“The Reich Minister also pointed out to the Polish Ambassador that the rigorous Polish point of view regarding the expulsion of those who had indicated a preference for Germany could not be accepted by us.”
THE PRESIDENT: I could not see that on Page 254.
DR. HORN: Page 257, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I see it.
DR. HORN: The result of those conferences between Poland and Germany is the pact which has been submitted as Document Ribbentrop-123, on Page 263 of the document book. This is a co-ordinated declaration by the Polish and German Governments regarding the protection of their respective minorities, which was published on 5 November 1937. So as to save time, I can point out that the German minorities were given those rights which are usual between civilized states in similar cases. May I also point out that this agreement does not contain anything which can be considered the sanctioning of any wrong previously committed in this field, a point of view which was recently presented by the Prosecution.
So as to remove the difficulties between the Free City of Danzig and the Polish Government which had arisen with regard to minorities and economic matters, an agreement was reached on 5 August 1933, which is Document Ribbentrop-127 and found on Page 270 of the document book. May I request the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document, too?
Since, in spite of these treaty agreements on the question of minorities and the problem of the Free City of Danzig, difficulties between the two nations continued to arise, Hitler gave the order to the Defendant Ribbentrop, after the solution of the Sudeten-German question in October 1938, to commence negotiations regarding the Danzig and Corridor questions as well as the question of minorities. For this reason the then Polish Foreign Minister, Colonel Beck, was invited to come to Berchtesgaden. The discussions which took place on that occasion between Hitler and the Polish Foreign Minister are contained in Document Ribbentrop-149, on Page 301 of Ribbentrop Document Book Number 5. May I quote from Page 2 of the document to explain what the main features of this conference were? On Page 6, it says:
“For Germany there was not only the Memel question, which would be settled in a manner consonant with German views—for it looked as if the Lithuanians would be willing to co-operate in finding a reasonable solution—but within the direct German-Polish relationship there was also the problem of Danzig and the Corridor to be solved, which, from the point of view of sentiment, was very serious for Germany.”
On Page 3 of the same document, last line of the next to the last paragraph, it says Foreign Minister Beck promised that “he would, however, be glad to give calm consideration to the problem.”
With that Germany considered that negotiations regarding this problem had begun.
On 24 January, that is to say the following day, the then Reich Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop had another discussion with the Polish Foreign Minister Beck during which the question of minorities was once more touched on. That discussion is contained in Document Ribbentrop-150, on Page 304. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document.
By invitation of the then Foreign Minister Beck, Reich Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop went to Warsaw on 24 January 1939. Once more the entire problem was discussed there.
On 21 March, after the Czech question had been settled, a reorganization in the East became necessary. The then Reich Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop, therefore, asked the Polish Ambassador on 21 March 1939 to come to visit him. The account of that conference is contained in Document Ribbentrop-154, on Page 310 of the document book. May I quote the third paragraph, Page 2, which is the leading point regarding that conference:
“Generally, the decision on the Corridor was considered the heaviest burden put on Germany by the Versailles Treaty.”
A few lines later the Reich Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop explained:
“A prerequisite for this was, however, that the purely German city of Danzig should return to the Reich, and that an extraterritorial motor road and railway connection be established between the Reich and East Prussia.
“He promised that Germany would in exchange guarantee the Corridor.
“Ambassador Lipski promised to inform M. Beck accordingly and then to give an answer.”
May I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document as well?
Although the German Government at that time expected that on the strength of these discussions the question of the minorities and the question of Danzig and the Corridor would find some solution, these discussions had the opposite effect.
It appears from Document Ribbentrop-155, on Page 313, and Document Ribbentrop-156, on Page 314 of the document book, that Poland at that time ordered partial mobilization. That partial mobilization could have been directed only against Germany.
Moreover, the settling of the Czechoslovakian question on 15 March 1939 had led to a change of attitude on the part of Britain. The then Prime Minister, Chamberlain, under pressure from the opposition, had opened consultations with various European states. As evidence of this fact, I refer to Document Ribbentrop 159, which is Page 317 of the document book. This is a conversation of the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs, Von Ribbentrop, with the Polish Ambassador, Lipski, in Berlin on 26 March 1939. May I quote the beginning, which is as follows:
“On 21 March the British Government proposed first in Warsaw, as well as in Paris and Moscow, that a ‘formal declaration’ by the British, French, Russian, and Polish Governments shall be made.”
I shall then skip a few lines and quote further as follows—Line 7 from bottom:
“The Polish Government, which ordered partial mobilization on 23 March, was in no way satisfied with this British proposal for negotiations but rather demanded far more concrete commitments from England on behalf of Poland. Therefore, also on 23 March, Foreign Minister Beck instructed the Polish Ambassador in London, Count Edward Raczynski, to submit to the British Government the following proposal for an Anglo-Polish union:
“ ‘Referring to the English proposal’ ”—it says further on—“ ‘of 21 March, I request you to ask Lord Halifax if: (1) In view of the difficulties and the unavoidable complications and ensuing loss of time...’ ”
MR. DODD: If Your Honor pleases, I see no reason—if I may say so with greatest respect—for reading any part of any of these documents. They are all in evidence, or will be, I assume. All that needs be done, it seems to us, is to give them numbers. I know that we read and commented at the time we put in the Prosecution’s case, but the compelling reasons for that system are not present now and cannot apply as far as these defendants are concerned.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, the Tribunal would like to know what the compelling reasons were that you were referring to.
MR. DODD: Yes, I shall be glad to. At that time it was physically impossible for the Prosecution to have its material all translated in the four languages, or the three languages in addition to the one in which the original was written. Now the defendants do have those facilities. Had we been able to have our papers all translated, we would have submitted them and we would not have commented; but the necessity for comment seemed very real to us, because we had to read everything that we wanted into the record over the speaking system, and if we read a lot of disjointed excerpts from documents we could not have presented any reason of evidence before this Tribunal. But I say that now the Defense can do so, it can submit the whole document, and later on, as I understand the rules and the Charter, Counsel will have an opportunity to argue and comment about it as evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: But you will remember that this matter was argued—I think it was a week or so ago. And if I remember rightly, Dr. Dix argued in favor of the defendants’ counsel being still entitled to read such passages as they wanted, and with short connecting remarks; and we adhered to that rule.
MR. DODD: I did not understand that Your Honors had already ruled. I remember Dr. Dix’s statement. One of his principal reasons was that he wanted an opportunity to make this information available to the press or the public. If that is still his reason, they are all available; the press can have them without having them read over this microphone. However, I won’t press the matter if the Court has already ruled.
THE PRESIDENT: I think so.
GENERAL R. A. RUDENKO (Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): I would like to say a few words on the subject of Mr. Dodd’s proposal. I fully support...
THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, I just pointed out to Mr. Dodd that we have made a specific ruling upon this subject, and, in the opinion of the Tribunal, Dr. Horn has been performing his task with great discretion.
GEN. RUDENKO: I still would like to be permitted to make a few remarks in regard to Mr. Dodd’s proposal.
As the Tribunal will remember, just before the start of the questioning of the Defendant Keitel the Defense gave full documentation for Keitel, and the Tribunal looked into the matter of what document was to be accepted as evidence and what was to be declined...
THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, if you are repeating, you are repeating the very words I used to Dr. Horn when he began, and, as I say, in the opinion of the Tribunal Dr. Horn has met the views of the Tribunal and has made his reading of these documents reasonably short.
GEN. RUDENKO: I understand, Mr. President. I merely wanted to remark that the Soviet Prosecution consider that Dr. Horn’s comments are superfluous as the defendant has already given us too many comments on the subject.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, I am sure you will continue to use every possible means of cutting it short as much as you can.
DR. HORN: I hope, Mr. President, that I have convinced the Tribunal that I will be as brief as possible and that I shall read as little as possible, only that which is necessary to make understandable why I am presenting the documents.
THE PRESIDENT: Shall we adjourn now?
[A recess was taken.]
DR. HORN: I had last quoted some passages from Document Ribbentrop-159, Page 317 of the document book, and I wish to briefly summarize what these documents refer to.
This document contains the request from England to the Polish Government to formulate the consultation into a concrete agreement. This agreement was then in fact made, between 21 March and 26 March, between England and Poland.
Furthermore, and as a parallel to this, there is the coalition policy on the part of England which is proved by Documents Ribbentrop-182 to 186, on Pages 370 and following of Ribbentrop Document Book Number 5. As is shown in Document 182, the following states were concerned. I am quoting from Document 182, at the bottom of Page 6:
“The following countries are said to have been invited to participate in the question of guarantees: Russia, Poland, Turkey, and Yugoslavia. It is said to be definitely established”—it says further—“that Hungary was not approached. It was left up to Poland to approach Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia. The same is supposed to apply to Turkey with regard to Greece.”
As evidence of this policy of coalition, I refer to Document Ribbentrop-185, Page 372 of the document book. This is a telegram from the German Chargé d’Affaires in London to the Foreign Office, and I should like briefly to quote a few passages from that. They read:
“The available news proves clearly that the plan for a declaration pre-announced by telegram on the part of Britain can actually be divided into two parts. The first part deals with guarantees to Belgium, Holland, and Switzerland; the second part aims to protect the Eastern countries against aggression. The British Cabinet is said to have been informed by a military spokesman that Romania, because of her oil wells, will definitely have to be protected against German military seizure.”
The same subject is dealt with in Document Ribbentrop-186. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it without my reading from it. And I also ask that Document Ribbentrop-183, which is on Page 375 of the document book, be taken judicial notice of; once more, so as to save time, I do not propose to read it.
Based on this policy of coalition on Britain’s part which was directed against Germany, the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between Germany and Italy was concluded on 22 May 1939. I am submitting it as Document Ribbentrop-187, on Page 376 of the Ribbentrop document book. I request the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it without my reading it.
The result of the guarantee given by England to Poland was that Ambassador Lipski, on 26 March 1939, on the occasion of a conference with the Reich Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop, declared—and I am here referring to Document Ribbentrop-162, and quoting from the third paragraph:
“Mr. Lipski replied that it was his unpleasant duty to point out that any further pursuance of these German plans, particularly regarding a return of Danzig to the Reich, would mean a war with Poland.”
I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document. The same applies to the previous document, Document Ribbentrop-160, on Page 320 of the document book, which refers to the consultations between Britain and the governments previously mentioned.
On the strength of the declaration of Lipski which I have just read—namely, that further pursuance of an attempt to alter the status quo regarding the Corridor and Danzig would mean war—the Reich Foreign Minister declared to the Polish Ambassador on 27 March 1939—I again quote from Document Ribbentrop-163, on Page 335 of the document book—that this attitude of Poland could not be the basis for a settlement of these questions so far as Germany was concerned. The corresponding passage is the next to the last paragraph on Page 2 of this document, where it says:
“In conclusion, the Foreign Minister remarked that he no longer knew what to make of the attitude of the Polish Government. They had given a negative answer to the generous proposals which Germany had made to Poland. The Foreign Minister could not regard the proposal, submitted yesterday by the Polish Ambassador, as a basis for the settlement of the problems. The relations between the two countries were, therefore, more and more strained.”
I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document.
So as to prove that the Anglo-Polish Pact for Mutual Assistance was clearly aimed against Germany, I submit to the Tribunal as evidence Document Ribbentrop-164, which is on Page 338 of the document book. I quote the last two lines, where it says:
“...that the pact applied only in the case of an attack by Germany. The Polish Government affirms that this is so.”
I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the document.
The result of the Anglo-Polish agreement of 6 April 1939, which has been submitted by the Prosecution as Document Number TC-72, and which appears on Page 337 of my document book, was the termination of the Polish-German agreement of 26 January 1934, since Germany was convinced that the Anglo-Polish guarantee declaration was contrary to the spirit of this agreement.
Subsequently there were a number of excesses against the German minorities in Poland. The documents referring to this are contained in my document book under Documents Ribbentrop-165 to 181. I am asking the Tribunal to take judicial notice of these numbers, and to save time I shall limit myself to very short quotations.
I refer to Document Ribbentrop-166, which states that serious incidents occurred in Pommerellen, Njevo, and Bromberg.
I also refer to Document Ribbentrop-167, on Page 353 of the document book. This document shows that in the last days there was a public declaration in Warsaw which openly appealed for a boycott of German trade and handicraft.
Furthermore, as evidence for my statement, may I refer to Document Ribbentrop-180, which is on Page 368 of the Ribbentrop document book. May I read this brief report, which I quote as follows:
“During the last few months the German Foreign Office has continuously received reports from the German Consulate in Poland about the cruel treatment to which racial Germans are subjected by the Poles, who have been more and more stirred up and have abandoned themselves to unbridled fanaticism. In Appendix 38 especially grave cases have been collected.”
From Document Ribbentrop-181, on Page 369 of the document book, it appears that these clashes, as a matter of fact, took place with the knowledge and under the protection of Polish statesmen and high officials. As evidence for this, I refer to Document Ribbentrop-181, but for reasons of time I am not going to read from it, but ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it.
At the beginning of August 1939 an acute crisis developed in German-Polish relations. As evidence of this I present Document Ribbentrop-188, on Page 381 of my document book. The cause was actually a small one. There was dispute regarding the functions of the customs officials on the Danzig frontier. Because of this dispute, the diplomatic representative of the Polish Republic in Danzig made a protest to the President of the Senate of the Free City of Danzig. This protest is contained in Document Ribbentrop-188. It contained an ultimatum, which becomes clear from Paragraph 3 of the document.
On 7 August the then President of the Free City of Danzig replied to this as appears in Document Ribbentrop-189. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document also.
In Document Ribbentrop-190, on Page 383, the Reich Government warns Poland not to deliver any ultimatum. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document, and I do not propose to read from it.
The next document I am presenting is Document Ribbentrop-192, which is on Page 385 of the document book. This is a document from the Under State Secretary at the Polish Foreign Ministry to the German Chargé d’Affaires in Warsaw, and it is dated 10 August 1939. It appears from the last two lines of the document that Poland would consider any intervention of the Reich Government to the detriment of Danzig’s rights an aggressive act.
These notes created an even more critical situation in German-Polish relations. The Reich Government and their departments attempted, in the time that followed, to avoid a threatening conflict. As evidence of this I submit Document Ribbentrop-193, which is on Page 404 of the document book; and I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it.
This is a memorandum of the State Secretary of the Foreign Office regarding—it is in Ribbentrop Document Book 6, Page 404—this is a memorandum regarding a visit of the French Ambassador to the State Secretary of the Foreign Office, Weizsäcker. During that conversation the then State Secretary, Weizsäcker, emphasized that Germany had no more urgent wish than German-Polish agreement regarding Danzig. The French Ambassador assured him that his Government would co-operate in these attempts.
I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document, Document Ribbentrop-193, and the next document, Number 194, on Page 406 of the document book.
The last document concerns the discussion between the State Secretary and the British Ambassador, Sir Nevile Henderson, during which the German State Secretary pointed out the seriousness of the situation.
I read from Page 1 of the document, the third paragraph, fifth line, the following sentence which characterizes the situation:
“Danzig was only protecting itself against its protector.”
Apart from that, the State Secretary pointed out that the situation regarding Danzig had now reached extreme tension.
The next document I refer to is Document Ribbentrop-195, on Pages 408 to 415 of the document book. This document refers to a conference between Hitler and Ambassador Henderson on 23 August 1939. This conference is contained in Document Ribbentrop-199, on Page 422 of the Ribbentrop document book. I also ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document, and, so as to clarify the content of that conference briefly, I am going to refer to Page 4 of the document, where it says:
“He once more drew attention to the Danzig and Polish question in connection with which England’s attitude was, ‘Better war than something to Germany’s advantage.’ ”
The second paragraph after that reads:
“The Führer stated that the fact that England opposed Germany in the Danzig question had deeply shaken the German people.
“Henderson then stated that one was merely opposing the principle of force, whereupon the Führer wanted to know whether England had ever found a solution by negotiation for any of the idiocies of Versailles.
“The Ambassador had no reply to this, and the Führer then stated that, according to a German saying, it took two to make a friendship.”
Because of the tense relations the late Prime Minister Chamberlain, on 22 August 1939, wrote a letter directly to Hitler. This letter is Document Ribbentrop-200, on Page 426 of the document book. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document also.
The next document is Document Ribbentrop-201, and it contains Hitler’s reply to the British Prime Minister Chamberlain.
On 25 August 1939 there was yet another meeting between Hitler and Ambassador Sir Nevile Henderson. That meeting is contained in Document Ribbentrop-202, which is on Page 431 of the Ribbentrop document book. May I refer to Paragraph 5, where Hitler emphasized once more that, “The problem of Danzig and the Corridor would have to be solved.” On the following page, in Paragraph 3 on Page 2, Hitler says:
“But after the solution of this problem he is prepared and determined to approach England with a major, all-inclusive proposal.”
This offer is contained in detail in the same Document Number 202.
Henderson made an entry regarding this discussion in his diary, which is Exhibit Ribbentrop-195, and on Page 415 he refers to this last-mentioned meeting of 25 August 1939:
“My interview with Hitler”—says Henderson—“at which Herr Von Ribbentrop and Dr. Schmidt were also present, lasted over an hour on this occasion. The Chancellor spoke with calm and apparent sincerity. He described his proposals as a last effort for conscience’s sake to secure good relations with Great Britain and suggested that I should fly to London myself with them.”
Under Number 8, on the same page, 415, Henderson continues to say:
“Whatever may have been the underlying motive of this final gesture on the part of the Chancellor, it was one which could not be ignored...”
The next document, which gives in detail the course of events and the crisis which led up to the outbreak of war, is Document Ribbentrop-208, on Page 451 of the document book. To the extent that I do not read from it, I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the entire document.
The first extract from this document, which is a telegram from Lord Halifax to Sir Kennard in Warsaw, states the following, and I quote:
“Our proposed reply to Herr Hitler draws a clear distinction between the method of reaching agreement on German-Polish differences and the nature of the solution to be arrived at. As to the method, we wish to express our clear view that direct discussion on equal terms between the parties is the proper means.”
This request for direct negotiations is an essential part of the events which followed.
Under Number 5 of the same document, on Page 452 of the document book, it states as follows:
“As the Polish Government appear in their reply to President Roosevelt to accept the idea of direct negotiations, His Majesty’s Government earnestly hope that, in the light of the considerations set forth in the foregoing paragraph, the Polish Government will authorize them to inform the German Government that Poland is ready to enter at once into direct discussions with Germany.”
In the following document, which has the same number and is on the same page, is a telegram from Sir Nevile Henderson to Lord Halifax, which was dispatched on 29 August 1939. Great Britain’s role as mediator is once more clarified. It says under Number 3 of this document:
“Note observes that German proposals have never had for their object any diminution of Polish vital interests, and declares that the German Government accepts mediation of Great Britain with a view to visit to Berlin of some Polish plenipotentiary. German Government, note adds, counts on arrival of such plenipotentiary tomorrow, Wednesday, 30th August.
“I remarked that this phrase sounded like an ultimatum, but, after some heated remarks, both Herr Hitler and Herr Von Ribbentrop assured me that it was only intended to stress urgency of the moment when the two fully mobilized armies were standing face to face.”
These proposals, which I have previously submitted in a special exhibit, had the following reaction in Great Britain—I read from Page 453 of Ribbentrop’s document book. It is a telegram from Lord Halifax to Sir Nevile Henderson of 30 August 1939. It says:
“We shall give careful consideration to German Government’s reply, but it is, of course, unreasonable to expect that we can produce a Polish representative in Berlin today, and German Government must not expect this.”
In the meantime the situation had become so serious that Sir Nevile Henderson did not consider that a success of Britain’s action would be possible. This is shown in the same document on Page 454. This is a telegram from Sir Nevile Henderson to Lord Halifax. I am reading only a short quotation, to save time, from Point 3 of the telegram:
“While I still recommend that the Polish Government should swallow this eleventh-hour effort to establish direct contact with Herr Hitler, even if it be only to convince the world that they were prepared to make their own sacrifices for preservation of peace....”
The Polish Government was, nevertheless, not willing to enter into direct negotiations. This can be seen from the same document on Page 455, from which I will read only the first three lines. It is a telegram from the British Ambassador in Warsaw to Lord Halifax, and it states:
“I feel sure that it would be impossible to induce the Polish Government to send M. Beck or any other representative immediately to Berlin....”
In the same telegram the British Ambassador emphasizes, under Number 4, and I quote:
“I am, of course, expressing no views to the Polish Government, nor am I communicating to them Herr Hitler’s reply until I receive instructions, which I trust will be without delay.”
Through the failure to pass on the German Government’s proposals to the Polish Government, direct negotiations were frustrated. As evidence of the fact that the Polish Government, too, had no intention of entering into such direct negotiations, I refer to Page 465 of the same document, which is a telegram from Lord Halifax to Sir Kennard in Warsaw. Once more he is asking the Ambassador to invite the Polish Government to enter into direct negotiations. I will not quote from this document, but I will quote from the next document, Page 466, which is an extract from the British Blue Book, and which refers to the Polish reaction. It is a telegram from Sir Kennard to Lord Halifax, 31 August 1939.
I am going to read the first three paragraphs of this document. From these paragraphs it becomes clear what the Polish attitude was regarding the possibility of direct negotiations. I quote:
“M. Beck has just handed me in writing the Polish reply to my démarche last night.”
The second paragraph states:
“I asked M. Beck what steps he proposed to take in order to establish contact with the German Government. He replied that he would instruct M. Lipski to seek an interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs or State Secretary in order to say Poland had accepted British proposals. I urged him to do this without delay.
“I then asked him what attitude the Polish Ambassador would adopt if Herr Von Ribbentrop, or whomever he saw, handed him the German proposals. He said that M. Lipski would not be authorized to accept such a document as, in view of past experience, it might be accompanied by some sort of ultimatum.”
This extract from the British Blue Book proves that, as far as Poland was concerned, all possibilities of clarifying the question of Danzig or the minorities were refused. In this manner it was no longer possible for the German Government or the British Government to discuss this question with Poland any further. As evidence for further efforts, I submit to the Tribunal Document Ribbentrop-209, on Page 494, of which I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice. I will not quote from it, or from Document Ribbentrop-210, which I also offer to the Tribunal for judicial notice.
The next document is Document Ribbentrop-213, which is on Page 504-b of my document book. This last document is an official German report regarding the subject and basis of negotiations during the time of the Polish-German crisis.
Since Poland was unable to discuss these questions of Danzig or the Corridor with Germany, a war arose between these two countries. In my final defense speech, I shall discuss specifically the legal aspect of this war and its nature in respect to international law. What I want to state today is that the lack of any effective international institution for the alteration of the insufferable status quo was the final reason which led to the outbreak of war in 1939.
The next group of documents which I am submitting to the Tribunal are those which refer to the occupation of Denmark and Norway by Germany. These are the Documents Ribbentrop-216(a)—on Page 509 of the document book—216(b), and 217. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of these documents, and, as far as evidence and the actual events are concerned, I refer to the documents and statements which my colleague, Dr. Siemers, will submit to the Tribunal when he speaks on behalf of Raeder.
The next group of documents are those which refer to the occupation of Holland and Belgium. They are Documents Number 218 and the following, on Page 518 of the document book. The documents are contained in Document Book Number 7. So as to explain the German viewpoint, I quote from Document Ribbentrop-218 Page 518 in Document Book Number 7. I am going to quote the following brief passages, Paragraph 2:
“As the Reich Government has long been aware, the true aim of England and France is the carefully prepared and now immediately imminent attack on Germany in the West, so as to advance through Belgium and Holland to the region of the Ruhr. Germany has recognized and respected the inviolability of Belgium and Holland, it being a natural prerequisite that these two countries, in the event of a war between Germany and England and France, maintain the strictest neutrality.
“Belgium and the Netherlands have not fulfilled this condition.”
On Page 2 in the same document, under Number 8, reference is made to the evidence which was known to the German Government at the time and which I will submit in due course in support of the assertion just made. It says:
“Documents at the disposal of the German Government prove that preparations by Britain and France on Belgian and Netherlands territory are already far advanced.
“Thus, for some time, all obstacles on the Belgian border toward France which might hinder the entry of the English and French invasion army have been secretly removed. Air fields in Belgium and the Netherlands have been reconnoitered by English and French officers, and their enlargement has been ordered. Belgium has made transport facilities available at the frontier, and recently advance parties of staff personnel and units of the French and English Army have arrived in various parts of Belgium and the Netherlands. These facts, together with further information which has accumulated in the last few days, furnish conclusive proof that the English and French attack against Germany is imminent and that this thrust will be directed against the Ruhr through Belgium and the Netherlands.”
As proof of these statements I refer to Documents Ribbentrop-221 through 229, which I submit to the Tribunal for judicial notice. They are the Anglo-French plans in preparation for violation of Holland’s and Belgium’s neutrality in agreement with these countries.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, the Tribunal has to adjourn at 5 o’clock into a closed session. They hope very much that you will conclude your examination of these documents by then.
DR. HORN: Very well, Mr. President. So as to save time, I shall only state briefly what these documents are. Document Ribbentrop-221 is the proof of an intended intervention in Belgium. This is a report from the military attaché at the French Embassy in London, General Lelong, addressed to the Chief of the French General Staff for National Defense. I am going to quote a very brief passage from it which says:
“Intervention in Belgium.
“The British Delegation readily recognized how uncertain the conditions are for eventual intervention in Belgium. It was proposed that we, in order to prevent a battle of junction on the Belgian flatlands, must plan to organize our defenses at least along the Schelde, or preferably, along the Albert Canal. By request of the British Delegation, the following points have been considered:
“(1) The possibility of intervention along the line Antwerp-Brussels-Namur, assuming that it were possible to organize such a position in good time.
“(2) The importance of holding the Belgian and Dutch territory as a base for a resumption of the offensive against Germany.”
Again, to save time, I shall not refer to any other documents in connection with this group. I merely ask the Tribunal that Document Ribbentrop-219, on Page 521 of the document book, which is a memorandum of the German Government to the Luxembourg Government, of 9 May 1940, and Document Ribbentrop-220, should be taken judicial notice of, so that I can refer to them when I present my case. Furthermore, I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the Documents Number 230, 230(a), 231, 231(a), 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, and 245, which, again are documents which originate from the French General Staff and are clear proof that on the part of Britain and France, before 9 May 1940, detailed plans for military co-operation had been prepared, and that British and American advance parties were already on Belgian and Dutch territory before German troops crossed the border. That is the end of this particular group.
I now come to those documents which I intend to submit to the Tribunal with reference to the occupation of Yugoslavia and Greece. These are Documents Ribbentrop-272 and the following, Pages 604 and the following, of the document book. Here again, we are concerned with documents which partly come from the files of the French General Staff. The first document of the type is Document Ribbentrop-272, which is a note from the German Government to the Yugoslav Government, dated March 1941. This is concerned with the joining of the Three Power Pact by Yugoslavia. This document shows that Germany and the Axis Powers did not intend to put demands to Yugoslavia during the war at all, least of all with reference to the march of troops through Yugoslav territory. Documents Ribbentrop-273 and 274 contain the minutes of Yugoslavia’s entry into the Three Power Pact on 25 March 1941, and connected with it is a note from the Reich Government to the Yugoslav Government. With Document Ribbentrop-277 I submit to the Tribunal a note from the Reich Government to the Greek Government, which was handed to that Government after Greek territory had been occupied by British troops. From Page 3 I quote the following sentence:
“During recent days, Greece had become an operational territory for British forces.”
Under Document Ribbentrop-278, I submit to the Tribunal an official statement from the Reich Government, dated 6 April 1941, which is addressed to both Yugoslavia and Greece. In this note the reasons are stated which, after the Simovic revolt, led to military action by Germany in Yugoslavia. These reasons can be found on Page 4 of this document. As evidence that the statements contained therein are true, I am referring to the so-called “Charité Files” which are the files of the French General Staff.
This completes the group of documents with reference to Yugoslavia and Greece, but I should like to add that once again I will rely on further evidence which will be submitted by my colleague, Dr. Siemers, for the Defendant Raeder, and which also refers to the German action against Greece.
The next group of documents refer to Russia. They are the ones in Documents Ribbentrop-279 and the following, which can be found on Pages 619 and the following of the document book. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of Numbers 279, 280, 282, 283, and 284. During the presentation of my argument I shall refer to these documents further.
The next and last group of documents are those which refer to the accusation against the Defendant Ribbentrop regarding the Anti-Comintern Pact and his policy in connection with Japan and the U.S.A.
The first document of this type is Document Ribbentrop-291, on Page 652 of the document book. This document contains the text of the Anti-Comintern Pact. Document Ribbentrop-281 refers to the extension of the Anti-Comintern Pact, the Three Power Pact of 27 September 1940. I submit these documents to the Tribunal as proof of the fact that Ribbentrop and the Reich Government made efforts, by means of this policy, to keep the United States out of the war. In spite of this policy, an active support of our opponents by the United States took place. As proof of this, I refer to the documents in Document Ribbentrop-306 and Document Ribbentrop-308, on Pages 700 and 702 and following of the document book. These documents are the last I am submitting to the Tribunal with reference to the policy of Germany during the years when the Defendant Von Ribbentrop was Foreign Minister. Finally I refer briefly to Document Ribbentrop-313. That is an affidavit from the Legation Counsellor, Bernd Gottfriedsen. This affidavit actually has nothing to do with the aggressive war, but it refers to questions which have been brought up by the Prosecution in connection with the case of Ribbentrop, and this affidavit contains statements regarding the real estate property of the Defendant Ribbentrop and regarding his ownership of art works.
May I point out that Legation Counsellor Gottfriedsen, as he has stated in the affidavit, handled the financial affairs of the Foreign Office and particularly those of the Foreign Minister. I will quote a brief passage in connection therewith from question Number 5:
“Question: ‘What is the situation with regard to Von Ribbentrop’s art possessions?’
“Answer:”—by Legation Counsellor Gottfriedsen—“ ‘Herr Von Ribbentrop was a wealthy man before he entered diplomatic life. During the time of his activities in the above-mentioned department he acquired some paintings, for the most part on the art market in Germany itself. Every one of these paintings was acquired properly and, above all, at correct prices, and of course paid for out of the private funds of the Reich Foreign Minister.
“ ‘During the time he was Foreign Minister, Herr Von Ribbentrop acquired art objects abroad for purposes of furnishing the Foreign Office and German missions in foreign countries, which became state property and were used accordingly. All these art objects were catalogued and carried in the books as inventory. No foreign art objects were acquired illegally, that is by pressure, et cetera. Herr Von Ribbentrop’s private art objects, too, were catalogued, and the objects themselves marked distinctly by me.’ ”
I now skip one paragraph and read the end of the statement which says:
“ ‘During the war he did not acquire any art objects illegally from any of the territories occupied by German troops, be it for his own private use or for the Foreign Office of the Reich.’ ”
I should like to add that Legation Counsellor Gottfriedsen knew thoroughly the private property affairs of the Defendant Von Ribbentrop, and had annually made a survey of them together with a certified accountant for the purpose of taxes and inventory.
Finally, I should like to quote a paragraph from the affidavit which is Document Ribbentrop-317, and which is in the document book on Page 749. This is an affidavit from Frau Von Ribbentrop given before a notary in Nuremberg. It refers to accusations raised by the Prosecution in connection with the Russian policy pursued by Ribbentrop. I am quoting, as follows:
“In 1940 we had a very inadequate air-raid shelter in the Foreign Office (official residence). During air raids, therefore, on the order of Adolf Hitler, we used the air-raid shelter of the Reich Chancellery, since he considered it important that my husband, in his capacity as Reich Foreign Minister, and the documents of the Foreign Office should be safe from air raids. I was at that time expecting my youngest child, which was born on 19 December 1940, and can therefore clearly remember an air-raid which took place shortly before this event, which caused us to go to the air-raid shelter of the Reich Chancellery. On this occasion Adolf Hitler was also present and came into our room in the shelter. He, my husband, and I sat at a table in this room. In the course of our stay my husband spoke at length of his efforts to induce Russia to join the Tripartite Pact. He developed the possibilities of such diplomatic action and his ideas of how he imagined the conclusion of such a pact. I remember clearly that Adolf Hitler closed the conversation with the words, ‘Ribbentrop, why shouldn’t we be able to manage that, when we have managed so many things?’
“My husband presented his ideas with great élan and with great impressiveness. After he had finished I noticed that Adolf Hitler, who had received my husband’s statements without pertinent remarks, seemed to be a little absent-minded, so that I had the impression that my husband’s statements had not made any convincing impression.”
I have offered this affidavit so as to prove that at that time Ribbentrop was still eager to avoid a conflict with Russia.
This ends the presentation of the documents on behalf of the Defendant Von Ribbentrop.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, could you inform us how far you have been able to get with Dr. Thoma in connection with his documents, that is, the Rosenberg documents?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the American delegation, the Soviet, and the French are dealing with Rosenberg.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps Mr. Dodd can tell us.
MR. DODD: Captain Krieger of our staff, Your Honor, has been in consultation with Dr. Thoma and will continue to be, in an effort to follow the procedures laid out by the Court.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. DODD: While on that subject, if I may, I would like to inform the Court that we have concluded our conversations with Dr. Dix, and we are, I think it fair to say, at some differences. I think it would be necessary to have a hearing by the Court on these matters that we do not agree on. However, we have agreed to a considerable number of Schacht items.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but what I want to insure is that there shall be no delay at the end of Kaltenbrunner’s case with reference to Rosenberg’s case. And as I understand it, the documents in the Rosenberg case, which it has been suggested we might have to consider, are very numerous; and the sooner the Tribunal gets to them the better.
MR. DODD: We shall be available at all times to talk with Dr. Thoma and move right along—in the evening if he cares to do it.
THE PRESIDENT: It might possibly be desirable, it seems to me, to have the documents which have been translated presented to the Tribunal before the others; I mean to say not have them all together, because there are, no doubt, various volumes.
MR. DODD: There are three so far; I understand there will be more. But we will press it and continue to talk with Dr. Thoma, and just as soon as possible on the first book we will be prepared to come before the Court for a hearing.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Thoma, wouldn’t the best thing be for you to submit the volumes which have been translated to the Court so that they can consider them beforehand as we did with Dr. Horn’s books?
DR. THOMA: Yes, My Lord, that is possible. The documents have already been processed. With reference to my Document Books Number 2 and 3, I have discussed them with Captain Krieger, in Room 216, and we came to an agreement.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, well you could specify that agreement in the books. I suppose you could show which documents you were prepared to withdraw.
DR. THOMA: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, then, as soon as possible you will let the General Secretary have those books, showing the agreement which you have made with Captain Krieger; is that right?
DR. THOMA: But I do want to point out that I have come to an agreement with Captain Krieger, in Room 216, only with reference to Books 2 and 3 and that refers only to the Einsatzstab and the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories.
I have not yet come to an agreement regarding the philosophy and writings of Rosenberg, but I shall do that in due course.
THE PRESIDENT: No; one—is that in Book 1?
DR. THOMA: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, if you are unable to come to an agreement, you can specify that, and we will consider those matters. Possibly you could take some time with Captain Krieger—take time off from Court—in order to come to an agreement with reference to Book 1 and with reference to the other books.
How many more books have you got?
DR. THOMA: All together four document books.
THE PRESIDENT: Four more?
DR. THOMA: All together four document books.
THE PRESIDENT: Oh yes, I see. So there is only one more to be translated.
DR. THOMA: Yes.