Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremburg, 14 November 1945-1 October 1946, Volume 12

by Various

Afternoon Session

DR. DIX: Dr. Gisevius, before the noon recess we had just come to the outbreak of the war, and so that your subsequent testimony may be understood, I must ask you first in what capacity you served during the war.

GISEVIUS: On the day of the outbreak of war I was called to Security Intelligence by General Oster by means of a forged order. However, as it was a regulation that all officers or other members of the intelligence service had to be examined by the Gestapo, and as I would never have received permission to be a member of the intelligence, they simply gave me a forged mobilization order. Then I was at the disposal of Oster and Canaris without doing any direct service.

DR. DIX: And after the outbreak of war what were the activities of your group of conspirators, the members of which you have already mentioned? Who took over the leadership, who participated, and what was done?

GISEVIUS: Immediately after the outbreak of the war Generaloberst Beck was at the head of all oppositional movements which could exist in Germany at all, with the exception of the Communists with whom we had no contact at that time. We were of the opinion that only a general could be the leader during war, and Beck stood so far above purely military matters that he was the suitable man to unify all groups from the left to the right. Beck chose Dr. Goerdeler as his closest collaborator.

DR. DIX: Consequently the only civilians who worked with this group of conspirators were Schacht and Goerdeler as before?

GISEVIUS: No, on the contrary; all the opposition groups, who had so far had merely loose connections with each other, were now drawn together under the pressure of war. This was especially so with the left opposition movements, which had been greatly reduced in the early years as all their leaders had been interned. These left groups especially now came in with us. In this connection I shall merely mention Leuschner and Dr. Karl Muehlendorf. However, I must also mention the Christian Trade Unions, and Dr. Habermann, and Dr. Jacob Kaiser. Further I must mention the Catholic circles, the leaders of the Confessional Church, and individual political men such as Ambassador Von Hassell, State Secretary Planck, Minister Popitz, and many, many others.

DR. DIX: What was the attitude of these left circles, especially concerning the question of a revolt, the forceful removal of Hitler or even an attempt on his life? Did they also consider the possibility of an attempt at assassination, which later was actually suggested in your group?

GISEVIUS: No, the left circles were very much under the impression that the “stab in the back” legend had done much harm in Germany; and the left circles thought that they ought not to expose themselves again to the danger of having it said later that Hitler or the German Army had not been defeated on the battlefield. The left-wing had long been of the opinion that no matter how bitter an experience it might be for them, it must now be proved absolutely to the German people that militarism was committing suicide in Germany.

DR. DIX: I have already submitted to the Tribunal, a letter which you, Doctor, smuggled to Switzerland for Schacht at about this time—the end of 1939. It is a letter to the former president of the International Bank at Basel, later president of the First National Bank of New York; a man of influence, who probably had access to President Roosevelt.

In anticipation of the documentary evidence pertaining hereto I had originally intended to read this letter to the Tribunal now. However, in discussing the admissibility of evidence I informed the Tribunal of most of the essential points, and as Mr. Justice Jackson could not yet have the Schacht Document Book in hand, and as he remarked previously that he did not like me to produce documentary evidence at this point, I will not carry out my original intention to read this letter in its entirety. I will come back to it when I present my documentary evidence. Just to refresh the witness’ memory about this letter, I will give the underlying reasons for it. Schacht suggested to President Fraser that now the moment...

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I make no objection to the use of the letter from Schacht to Leon Fraser as one banker writing to another. If you want to claim that Mr. Fraser was influential with President Roosevelt, I should want you to prove it; but I have no objection to the letter.

DR. DIX: The letter is dated 14 January 1946. I will not read it in its entirety, for there are six long pages. Its contents are...

THE PRESIDENT: What date was it?

DR. DIX: I had the wrong letter. The 16 October 1939. It will be Exhibit Number 31 in my document book. He writes that now would be an excellent time to give peace to the world with President Roosevelt—that would be a victory, also a German victory...

THE PRESIDENT: Is the letter from Schacht?

DR. DIX: From Schacht to Fraser.

THE PRESIDENT: Do you have proof for the letter?

DR. DIX: If the Tribunal prefers, Schacht can also deal with the letter. In that case I will only ask the witness whether it is true that he smuggled this letter into Switzerland.

[Turning to the witness.] Please answer the question, Witness.

GISEVIUS: Yes. I took this letter to Switzerland and mailed it there.

DR. DIX: Very well. What did your group do to bring about peace, or prevent the war from spreading? Did you undertake further activities in foreign politics in that direction in your opposition group, that is, your group of conspirators?

GISEVIUS: The main thing for us was with all possible means to prevent the war from spreading. It could only spread toward Holland and Belgium or Norway. We recognized clearly that if a step was taken in this direction, the consequences, not only for Germany, but for the whole of Europe would be tremendous. Therefore, we wanted to prevent war in the West by all means.

Immediately after the Polish Campaign Hitler decided to move his troops from the East to the West, and to launch the attack by violating the neutrality of Holland and Belgium.

We believed that if we could succeed in preventing this attack in November we would in the coming winter months gain enough time to convince the individual generals, above all Brauchitsch and Halder and the leaders of the army groups, that they must at least oppose the expansion of the war.

Brauchitsch and Halder evaded the question and said it was now too late, that the enemy would fight Germany to the end and destroy her. We did not share this opinion. We believed a peace with honor was still possible, and by honor I mean that we would of course eliminate the Nazi hierarchy to the last man. In order to prove to the generals that the foreign powers did not wish to destroy the German people, but wanted only to protect themselves against the Nazi terror, we took all possible steps abroad. The first attempt in that direction, or a small part of that attempt, was the letter written by Schacht to Fraser, the object of which was to point out that certain domestic political developments were imminent and that if we could gain time, that is, if we could come through the winter, we could perhaps persuade the generals to undertake a revolt.

DR. DIX: Thank you. May I interrupt you for a moment? I would like to call the attention of the Tribunal now to the fact that the witness is referring to a passage, to a suggestion, contained in the letter. This letter is in English. I have no German translation, and I must therefore read this sentence in English. “My feeling is that the earlier discussions be opened, the easier it will be to influence the development of certain existing conditions.” The question is now...

Now, I would like to ask you: What did Dr. Schacht mean by the “certain existing conditions” that were to be influenced? Did he mean your efforts?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I must interpose an objection. I am not sure whether you have misunderstood it. I think that what Schacht meant is not a question to be addressed to this witness. I shall have no objection to Dr. Schacht telling us what he meant by his cryptic language, but I don’t think that this witness can interpret what Schacht meant unless he has some information apart from anything that now appears. I don’t want to be over technical about this, but it does seem to me that this is the sort of question which should be reserved for Dr. Schacht himself.

DR. DIX: Mr. Justice Jackson, of course, is right, but this witness said that he smuggled the letter into Switzerland, and I assume that he discussed the contents of the letter with Schacht and was therefore in a position to explain the cryptic words.

THE PRESIDENT: He didn’t say this yet; he hasn’t said he ever saw the letter except the outside of it. He hasn’t said he ever saw the letter.

DR. DIX: Will you please tell us whether you saw the letter and knew its contents?

GISEVIUS: I am sorry that I did not so clearly at once, but I helped in drafting the letter. I was there when the letter was drafted and written.

DR. DIX: Then I believe Justice Jackson will withdraw his objection.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes.

DR. DIX: Will you please answer my question; what is meant by those cryptic words?

GISEVIUS: We wanted to suggest that we, in Germany, were interested in forcing certain developments and that we now expected an encouraging word from the other side. I do not, however, want any misunderstanding to arise here. In this letter it also states very clearly that President Roosevelt had in the meantime been disappointed many times by the German side, so that we had to beg, to urge him to take such a step. It is a fact that President Roosevelt had taken various steps for peace.

DR. DIX: Let us go on now. If I give you the cue “Vatican Action”?...

GISEVIUS: In addition to this attempt to enter into discussions with America, we believed we should ask for a statement from the British Government. Again it was our aim solely to...

THE PRESIDENT: Is the original of this letter still available or is this only given from memory?

DR. DIX: The original copy, yes; that is, a copy signed by Schacht is here. It was kept during the war in Switzerland and was brought back to us from Switzerland by this witness.

[Turning to the witness.] Now, let us go on to the “Vatican Action.”

GISEVIUS: We tried in every possible way to prove to General Halder and General Olbricht that their theory was wrong, that there could be no longer a question of dealing with a decent German government. We believed that we should now follow a particularly important and safe road. The Holy Father made personal efforts in these matters, as the British Government had, with justification, become uncertain whether there really existed in Germany a trustworthy group of men with whom talks could be undertaken. I remember that shortly afterwards the Venlo incident took place when, with the excuse that there was a German opposition group, officials of the English Secret Service were kidnapped at the Dutch border. Therefore, we were anxious to prove that there was a group here which was honestly trying to do its best and which, if the occasion arose, would stand by its word under all circumstances. I believe that we kept our word regarding the things we proposed to do, while we said quite frankly that we could not bring about this revolt as we had said previously we hoped to do.

These negotiations began in October—November 1939. They were only concluded later in the spring, and if I am asked I will continue.

DR. DIX: Yes, please describe the conclusion.

GISEVIUS: I believe I must add first that, during November of 1939, General Halder actually had intended a revolt, but that these intentions for a revolt again came to naught because at the very last minute Hitler called off the western offensive. Strengthened by the attitude of Halder at that time, we believed that we should continue these discussions at the Vatican. We reached what you might call a gentleman’s agreement, on the grounds of which I believe that I am entitled to state that we could give the generals unequivocal proof that in the event of the overthrow of the Hitler regime, an agreement could be reached with a decent civil German government.

DR. DIX: Did you read the documents yourself, Doctor?

GISEVIUS: These were oral discussions which were then written down in a comprehensive report. This report was read by the Ambassador Von Hassell and by Dr. Schacht before it was given to Halder by General Thomas. Halder was so taken aback by the contents that he gave this comprehensive report to Generaloberst Von Brauchitsch. Brauchitsch was enraged and threatened to arrest the intermediary, General Thomas, and thus this action which had every prospect of success, failed.

DR. DIX: Doctor, you have testified...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, the last notes that I have got down in my notebook are these: “That we knew that if Holland, Belgium, and the other countries were attacked, it would have very grave consequences and we therefore negotiated with Halder and Brauchitsch and they weren’t prepared to help us to stop the war at that time. We wanted peace with honor, eliminating politics. We took all possible steps.” Well, now, since I took these notes down, I think we spent nearly 10 minutes in details, which are utterly irrelevant, about further negotiations. If they took all possible steps, what is the point of giving us these details about it?

DR. DIX: Yes, Your Lordship, if a witness is called in a matter of such importance, where he as well as the defendants’ counsel must always take into account that people who are of a different opinion may say “these are just generalities, we want facts and particulars,” then I cannot forego having the witness testify at least in broad outline that, for example, a detailed action had been undertaken through His Holiness in the Vatican. If he merely says that the result of this action was a comprehensive report, if with Halder and Brauchitsch the above mentioned...

THE PRESIDENT: I agree with you that the one sentence about some negotiations with the Vatican may have been properly given, but all the rest of it were unnecessary details.

DR. DIX: Anyway we have already concluded this chapter, Your Lordship.

[Turning to the witness.] You have already testified that the revolt which was planned for November did not occur because the western offensive did not take place. Therefore, we need not pursue this subject any further. I would merely like to ask you at this point: Did your group of conspirators remain inactive during the winter, and particularly during the spring, or were further plans followed and acted upon?

GISEVIUS: Constant attempts were made to influence all generals within our reach. Besides Halder and Brauchitsch we tried to reach the generals of the armored divisions in the West. I remember, for instance, there was a discussion between Schacht and General Hoeppner.

DR. DIX: Hoeppner?

GISEVIUS: Hoeppner. We also tried to influence Field Marshal Rundstedt, Bock, and Leeb. Here, too, General Thomas and Admiral Canaris were the intermediaries.

DR. DIX: And how did the generals react?

GISEVIUS: When everything was ready, they would not start.

DR. DIX: Now, we come to the summer of 1941. Hitler is in Paris. The aerial offensive against England is imminent. Tell us about your group of conspirators and their activity during this period and the period following.

GISEVIUS: After the fall of Paris, our group had no influence at all for months. Hitler’s success deluded everyone, and it took much effort on our part, through all channels available, to try at least to prevent the bombardment of England. Here again the group made united efforts and we tried, through General Thomas and Admiral Canaris and others, to prevent this evil.

DR. DIX: Do I understand you correctly, when you use the word “group” you mean the group which was led by Beck, in which Schacht collaborated?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

DR. DIX: Now, at that time did Schacht have several talks, or one talk, along the same line in Switzerland?

GISEVIUS: That was a little later. We have now come to the year 1941, and on this trip to Switzerland Schacht tried to urge that a peace conference should be held as soon as possible. We knew that Hitler was thinking about the attack on Russia, and we believed that we should do everything to avert at least this disaster. With this thought in mind Schacht’s discussions in Switzerland were conducted. I myself took part in arranging a dinner in Basel with the president of the B. I. Z., Mr. McKittrick, an American, and I was present when Schacht tried to express at least the opinion that everything possible must now be done to initiate negotiations.

DR. DIX: In this connection I would respectfully like to remind the Tribunal of the article in the Basler Nachrichten, of which I presented the essential contents when we discussed the admissibility of the document. It deals with a similar conversation between Schacht and an American economist. That is the same trip which the witness is now discussing. I will take the liberty of referring to this article later, when presenting documentary evidences.

[Turning to the witness.] Now, the war continued. Do you have anything to say about Russia; about the imminent war with Russia?

GISEVIUS: I can say only that Schacht knew of all the many attempts which we undertook to avert this catastrophe.

DR. DIX: Now let us go further to the time of Stalingrad. What was done by your group of conspirators after this critical period of the war?

GISEVIUS: When we did not succeed in persuading the victorious generals to engineer a revolt, we then tried at least to win them over to one when they had obviously come up against their great catastrophe. This catastrophe, which found its first visible signs in Stalingrad, had been predicted in all its details by Generaloberst Beck since December of 1942. We immediately made all preparations so that at the moment, which could be forecast with almost mathematical exactitude, when the army of Paulus, completely defeated, would have to capitulate, then at least a military revolt could be organized. I myself was called back from Switzerland and participated in all discussions and preparations. I can only testify that this time a great many preparations were made. Contact was also made with the field marshals in the East, with Witzleben in the West but again, things turned out differently, for Field Marshal Paulus capitulated instead of giving us the cue at which Kluge, according to plan, was to start the revolt in the East.

DR. DIX: This was the time of the so-called Schlaberndorff attempt?

GISEVIUS: No, a little later.

DR. DIX: Now I shall interpose another question. Until now you have always described the group led by Generaloberst Beck and supported by Schacht, Goerdeler, et cetera, as a revolt movement, that is, a group which wanted to overthrow the government. Did you not now more and more aim at an assassination?

GISEVIUS: Yes, from the moment when the generals again deserted us, we realized that a revolt was not to be hoped for, and from that moment on we took all the steps we could to instigate an assassination.

DR. HANS LATERNSER (Counsel for General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces): Mr. President, I must object at this point to the testimony of the witness. The witness, Dr. Gisevius, by his testimony has incriminated the group which I represent. However, some of this testimony is so general that it cannot be referred to as fact. Furthermore, he has just testified that the field marshals in the East had “deserted” the group of conspirators. These statements are opinions which the witness is giving, but they are not facts, to which the witness must limit his testimony, and therefore I ask—Mr. President, I have not yet finished. I wanted to conclude with the request for a resolution by the Court that the testimony given by the witness, where he asserted that the generals had “deserted” the group of conspirators, be stricken from the record.

DR. DIX: May I please reply briefly? I cannot agree with the opinion of my esteemed colleague Dr. Laternser that the statement “the generals deserted us” was not a statement of fact...

THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think we need to hear further argument upon it. It certainly won’t be stricken from the record until we have had time to consider it, and Dr. Laternser will have his opportunity of examining this witness, and he can then elucidate any evidence he wants to.

DR. LATERNSER: But, Mr. President, if I make the motion for the reason that the witness is giving testimony which is beyond his scope as a witness, and that he is giving his opinion, then to that extent it is inadmissible testimony which would have to be stricken from the record.

THE PRESIDENT: If you mean that the evidence is hearsay, that will be perfectly obvious to the Tribunal, and doesn’t make the evidence inadmissible, and you will be able to cross-examine him about it.

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I have been misunderstood. I did not say, and I am not basing my request to strike the testimony from the record on the allegation that the witness made statements from hearsay; but I say that it is not a statement of fact, but an opinion which the witness is giving when he says that “the generals in the East deserted the group of conspirators.”

DR. DIX: May I answer briefly to that? If I try to influence a group of generals to organize a revolt and if they do not do so, that is a fact and I can state this fact with the words, “They deserted us.” Naturally I can also say, “They did not revolt,” but that is merely a matter of expression. Both are facts and not an opinion. He is not appraising the behavior of the generals in an ethical, military, or political sense, he is merely pointing out, “They were not willing.”

THE PRESIDENT: Go on.

DR. DIX: [Turning to the witness.] If I recall correctly, you were just about to tell us that now the policy of the conspirators’ group changed from a revolt to an assassination. Is that correct?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

DR. DIX: Do you wish to state anything further?

GISEVIUS: You had asked me about the first step in this direction after Generaloberst Beck had given up all hope of being able to win over another general to a revolt. It was said at that time that there was now nothing left for us but to free Germany, Europe, and the world from the tyrant by a bomb attack. Immediately after this decision, preparations were started. Oster spoke to Lahousen and Lahousen furnished the bombs from his arsenal. The bombs were taken to the headquarters of Kluge at Smolensk, and with every possible means we tried to bring about the assassination, which was unsuccessful only because at a time when Hitler was visiting the front, the bomb which had been put in his airplane did not explode. This was in the spring of 1943.

DR. DIX: Now, an event took place in the Abwehr OKW, which as a result of further developments, strongly affected Schacht’s further attitude and also your remaining in Germany. Will you please describe that?

GISEVIUS: Gradually even Himmler could not fail to see what was happening in the OKW, and at the urgent request of SS General Schellenberg a thorough investigation of the Canaris group was now started. A special commissioner was appointed and on the first day of this investigation Oster was relieved of his post and a number of his collaborators were arrested. A short time afterwards Canaris was also dismissed from his post. I myself could no longer remain in Germany and thus this group, which until now had in a certain sense been the directorate of all the conspiracies, was eliminated.

DR. DIX: During that time, that is January 1943, Schacht was also relieved of his position as Reich Minister without Portfolio. Did you meet Schacht after that time?

GISEVIUS: Yes. By chance I was in Berlin on the day this letter of dismissal arrived. It was an unusually sharp letter and I remember that that night I was asked to the country house of Schacht, and as the letter had simply stated that Schacht was to be dismissed, we wondered whether he was also going to be arrested.

DR. DIX: I would like to remind the Tribunal that I read this letter into the record when Lammers was examined and showed it to him. This letter—I mean Schacht’s letter of dismissal signed by Lammers—has already been read into the record and is probably contained in my document book.

[Turning to the witness.] You were in Switzerland at that time, but on 20 July you were in Berlin. How did that happen?

THE PRESIDENT: You mean the 20th of July 1944?

DR. DIX: Yes, the well-known day of the 20th of July. We are rapidly approaching the end now.

GISEVIUS: A few months after the elimination of the Canaris-Oster circle we formed a new group around General Olbricht. At that time Colonel Count Von Stauffenberg also joined us. He replaced Oster in all activities, and when after several months, and after many unsuccessful attempts and discussions, the time finally arrived in July 1944, I returned secretly to Berlin in order to participate in the events.

DR. DIX: But you had no direct connection with Schacht at this attempted assassination?

GISEVIUS: No; I, personally, was in Berlin secretly and saw only Goerdeler, Beck, and Stauffenberg; and it was agreed expressly at this time that no other civilian except Goerdeler, Leuschner, and myself were to be informed of the matter. We hoped thus to protect lives by not burdening anyone unnecessarily with this knowledge.

DR. DIX: Now I come to my last question.

You know that Schacht had after all held high government positions under the Hitler regime. You, Doctor, as is shown by your testimony today were an arch enemy of the Hitler regime. Despite that you had, as can also be seen from your testimony today, special confidence in Schacht. How do you explain this fact which at first sight seems to be contradictory in itself?

GISEVIUS: My answer can, of course, only express a personal opinion and I will formulate it as briefly as possible. However, I would like to emphasize that the problem of Schacht was confusing not only to me but to my friends as well; Schacht was always a problem and a puzzle to us. Perhaps it was due to the contradictory nature of this man that he kept his position in the Hitler government for so long. He undoubtedly entered the Hitler regime for patriotic reasons, and I would like to testify here that the moment his disappointment became obvious he decided for the same patriotic reasons to join the opposition. Despite Schacht’s many contradictions and the puzzles he gave us to solve, my friends and I were strongly attracted to Schacht because of his exceptional personal courage and the fact that he was undoubtedly a man of strong moral character, and he did not think only of Germany but also of the ideals of humanity. That is why we went with him, why we considered him one of us; and, if you ask me personally, I can say that the doubts which I often had about him were completely dispelled during the dramatic events of 1938 and 1939. At that time he really fought, and I will never forget that. It is a pleasure for me to be able to testify to this here.

DR. DIX: Your Lordship, I am now through with the questioning of this witness.

THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of the defendants counsel want to ask questions of the witness?

HERR GEORG BÖHM (Counsel for SA): Witness, yesterday you said that you were a member of the Stahlhelm. When and for how long were you a member?

GISEVIUS: I entered the Stahlhelm in 1929, I believe, and left that organization in 1933.

HERR BÖHM: You know the mentality of the members of the Stahlhelm. You know that, almost without exception, they were people who had served in the first World War, and I would like to ask you now whether the internal and foreign political goals of the Stahlhelm were to be reached by its members in a legal or in a revolutionary manner?

GISEVIUS: To my knowledge the Stahlhelm always favored the legal way.

HERR BÖHM: Yes. Was the fight of the Stahlhelm against the Treaty of Versailles which every organization with national tendencies took up, to be carried on by legal or revolutionary means, or means of force?

GISEVIUS: It is very hard for me to answer for the entire Stahlhelm, but I can only say that I, and the members of the Stahlhelm organization with whom I was acquainted, knew that the Stahlhelm wanted to take the legal way.

HERR BÖHM: Is it correct to say that in the year 1932 and 1933 hundreds of thousands, regardless of party and race, entered the Stahlhelm organization?

GISEVIUS: That is correct. The more critical matters became in Germany, the more people went to the right. I myself having experienced this growth of the Stahlhelm as an official speaker at public meetings, from 1929 to 1933, I would describe it in this way: That those who did not want to join the NSDAP and the SA, deliberately entered the Stahlhelm so that within the German rightist movement there would be a counterbalance against the rising “brown” tide. That was the underlying reason of our recruitment for the Stahlhelm at that time.

HERR BÖHM: You know, of course, that in the year 1933 the Stahlhelm organization as a whole was taken into the SA. Was it possible at that time for the individual member of the Stahlhelm to say “no,” or to protest against being taken over into the SA?

GISEVIUS: That was possible, of course, as everything was possible also in the Third Reich.

HERR BÖHM: What would have been the possible consequences of such a step?

GISEVIUS: The possible consequences would have been a violent discussion with the regional Party leaders or SA leaders. At that time I was no longer a member of the Stahlhelm and I can merely say that it undoubtedly must have been very difficult for many people, particularly those living in the country, to refuse being transferred to the SA. After they had been betrayed by their leader, Minister Seldte, or as it was said at that time “sold” to the SA, refusal to transfer to the SA was naturally a sign of open distrust toward National Socialism.

HERR BÖHM: I gather from my correspondence with the former members of the Stahlhelm, that these people who, as former members of the Stahlhelm, were taken into the SA, remained a foreign body in it and were in constant opposition to the NSDAP and the SA. Is that correct?

GISEVIUS: As I myself no longer belonged to that organization, I can only say that I assume that those members of the Stahlhelm felt very uneasy in their new surroundings.

HERR BÖHM: Do you know whether the members of the Stahlhelm, before 1934 and from 1934, participated in Crimes against Peace, against the Jews, against the Church, and so forth?

GISEVIUS: No, I know nothing about that.

HERR BÖHM: Now I would also like to question you about the SA as far as you are able to give information. Yesterday at least you expressed yourself freely with regard to the SA leaders. I would like to ask you, in replying to a question I shall now ask, to confine yourself to a circle of SA members which lies between the simple SA man and the Standartenführer or the Brigadeführer. Could you tell from the attitude and activity of the ordinary SA man and that of the Standartenführer or Brigadeführer—and I do not go beyond that limit because I well remember the statements you made yesterday concerning the Gruppenführer or Obergruppenführer—that these people intended to commit Crimes against Peace?

GISEVIUS: It is, of course, very difficult to answer such a general question. If you ask me about the majority of these SA men, I can only say no.

HERR BÖHM: Witness, did you notice that SA men were arrested and that SA men were also put into concentration camps?

GISEVIUS: I saw that many times. In 1933, 1934, and 1935, that was in the years when it was my official duty to deal with these matters, many SA men were arrested by the Gestapo, beaten to death, or at least tortured, and put into concentration camps.

HERR BÖHM: Could a man, who was in the SA, or anyone outside for that matter, judge the SA as a whole from the activity of its members, or from individual cases, and gather that the SA intended to commit Crimes against Peace?

GISEVIUS: No. When I consider what efforts even we in the High Command of the Wehrmacht had to make to try and discover whether or not Hitler was planning a war, I naturally cannot attribute to a simple SA man knowledge of something which we ourselves did not know for certain.

HERR BÖHM: The Prosecution asserted that the SA incited the youth and the German people to war. Did you observe anything of that nature? You were a member of the Gestapo and such activities could not have escaped your notice.

GISEVIUS: That is another extremely general question, and I do not know to what extent certain songs, and other things, can be considered a preparation for war. At any rate I cannot imagine that the mass of the SA was of a different frame of mind than the mass of the German people in the years up to 1938, and the general trend of opinion beyond a doubt was that the mere thought of war was absolute madness.

HERR BÖHM: Was there anything that made you think that the SA intended to commit Crimes against Peace, or that they had committed such crimes?

GISEVIUS: As far as the ordinary SA man is concerned, I must say “no” again, and I say the same for the mass of the SA. I could not say to what extent the higher leaders were involved in plotting all the horrible things we have heard about here, but the majority undoubtedly did not know of such things and were not trained for them.

HERR BÖHM: Witness, it cannot be denied that mistakes were made by a number of SA men, and criminal acts were committed for which these people certainly should be punished.

You know the SA and know what took place during the revolutionary period and afterwards. Are you in a position to estimate or to give a proportional figure as to what percentage of the numerous members of the SA conducted themselves in a punishable manner? I call your attention to the fact that up to, perhaps 1932 or 1933, the SA...

THE PRESIDENT: Just a moment, Dr. Böhm. The Tribunal doesn’t think that is a proper question to put to a witness, what percentage of a group of this sort, of hundreds of thousands of men, take a certain view.

HERR BÖHM: However the explanation of this question would be very important for my case, Mr. President. Here is a witness who was outside the SA, who as a member of the Gestapo was perhaps one of the few people who could look into the activities of the SA, and actually did look into them, and he will certainly be believed by the Tribunal. He knew fairly well what criminal procedures were carried out and also—and that is what I want to say—the number of members of the SA, and he is one of the few who are in a position to testify on this matter. I believe that if the witness is in a position to testify hereto, the testimony given by him will be of great importance to the Tribunal also.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has already ruled that not only this witness, but other witnesses, are not in a position to give such evidence, and the question is denied.

HERR BÖHM: Witness, do you know of cases in which SA members worked in opposition to the SA?

GISEVIUS: I answered that question when I said that quite a number of SA members were arrested by the Gestapo.

HERR BÖHM: Yes. Do you know what criminal proceedings were taken against the members of the SA, and possibly how many?

GISEVIUS: Far too few, I am sorry to say, if you put it that way.

HERR BÖHM: Yes.

GISEVIUS: Unfortunately there were many who committed misdeeds in the SA and who went scot-free. I am sorry that I must answer in this way.

HERR BÖHM: Certainly. And in what relation do they stand to the entire SA?

GISEVIUS: Now we have come again to the question...

THE PRESIDENT: That is the same question over again.

HERR BÖHM: Do you know under what circumstances one could resign from the SA?

GISEVIUS: In the same manner as one could resign from all organizations of the Party. That was, of course, a brave decision to make.

HERR BÖHM: Thank you. I have no further question.

DR. LATERNSER: Witness, in replying to a question of my colleague Dr. Dix, you told the Tribunal that after the defeat at Stalingrad a military revolt was to be organized. You testified on this point that discussions had already taken place, that preparations had been made, and that the execution of the military revolt was prevented because the field marshals in the East had deserted the group of conspirators.

I ask you now to give us more details on this question so that I can understand why you came to the conclusion that the field marshals had deserted the conspiracy group.

GISEVIUS: From the outbreak of the war Generaloberst Beck tried to contact one field marshal after another. He wrote letters and he sent messengers to them. I particularly remember the correspondence with General Field Marshal Von Manstein, and I saw with my own eyes General Von Manstein’s answer of the year 1942. To Beck’s strictly military explanations that the war had been lost and why, Manstein could reply only: A war is not lost until one considers it as lost.

Beck said that with an answer like that from a field marshal strategic questions could certainly not be raised. Several months later another attempt was made to win General Field Marshal Von Manstein. General Von Tresckow, also a victim of the 20th of July, went to the headquarters of Manstein. Oberstleutnant Count Von der Schulenburg also went to the headquarters of Manstein, but we did not succeed in winning Herr Von Manstein to our side.

At the time of Stalingrad we contacted Field Marshal Von Kluge, and he, in his turn, contacted Manstein. This time discussions reached a point when Kluge definitely assured us that he would win over Field Marshal Von Manstein at a discussion definitely fixed to take place in the Führer’s headquarters. Because of the importance of that day, a special telephone line was laid by the General of the Signal Corps, Fellgiebel, between the headquarters and General Olbricht at the OKW in Berlin. I myself was present when this telephone conversation took place. Even today I can still see that paper which said, in plain language, that Manstein, contrary to his previous assurances, had allowed himself to be persuaded by Hitler to remain in office. And even Kluge expressed himself as satisfied at the time with very small military strategic concessions. This was a bitter disappointment to us, and, therefore, I would like to repeat again what Beck said at that time: “We were deserted.”

DR. LATERNSER: What further preparations had been made in this special connection?

GISEVIUS: We had made definite agreements with Field Marshal Von Witzleben. Witzleben was the Commander-in-Chief in the West, and therefore he was very important for starting or protecting a revolt in the West. We had made further definite agreements with the Military Governor of Belgium, Generaloberst Von Falkenhausen. In addition, as on 20 July 1944, we had assembled a certain contingent of armored troops in the vicinity of Berlin. Furthermore, those commanders of the troops who were to participate in the action had been assembled in the OKW.

DR. LATERNSER: All this happened after Stalingrad?

GISEVIUS: At the time of the Stalingrad revolt.

DR. LATERNSER: Please continue.

GISEVIUS: We had made all other political preparations which were necessary. It is difficult for me to tell here the entire story of the revolts against the Third Reich.

DR. LATERNSER: Yes. What were the reasons why this intended military revolt was not carried through?

GISEVIUS: What was that?

DR. LATERNSER: Witness, what were the reasons why this revolt, which was intended by the group of conspirators, was not carried through?

GISEVIUS: Contrary to all expectations, Field Marshal Paulus capitulated. This, as is known, was the first wholesale capitulation of generals; whereas we had expected that Paulus with his generals would issue, before his capitulation, a proclamation to the German people and to the East Front, in which the strategy of Hitler and the sacrifice of the Stalingrad army would be branded in suitable words. When this cue had been given, Kluge was to declare that in future he would take no further military orders from Hitler. We hoped with this plan to circumvent the problem of the military oath which kept troubling us more and more; the field marshals one after the other were to refuse military obedience to Hitler, whereupon Beck was to take over the supreme military command in Berlin.

DR. LATERNSER: Witness, you just mentioned the military oath. Do you know whether Blomberg and Generaloberst Beck opposed, or tried to oppose, the pledge the Armed Forces took to Hitler?

GISEVIUS: I know only that Beck up to the last day of his life considered the day he gave his pledge to Hitler as the blackest day of his existence, and he gave me an exact description of how completely taken unawares he had felt at the rendering of the oath. He told me that he had been summoned to a military roll call; and that suddenly it was announced that an oath of allegiance was to be given to the new head of State; that unexpectedly a new form of oath was to be used. Beck could never rid himself of the awful thought that at that time he perhaps should not have given his oath. He told me that while he was on his way home, he said to a comrade, “This is the blackest day of my life.”

DR. LATERNSER: Witness, in your testimony, you also mentioned that between the Polish campaign and the Western campaign, or with the beginning of the Western campaign, a further military Putsch was to be attempted, and that this Putsch failed because Halder and Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch shirked it. You used the term “shirked” previously in your testimony. Now I ask you to tell me on the basis of what facts did you arrive at this opinion that both these generals shirked...

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I do not raise an objection that this is harmful to us if we have plenty of time, but this evidence as to these Putsche, and threatened Putsche, and rumored Putsche, was all admissible here in our view only as bearing on the attitude of the Defendant Schacht. We are not trying these generals for being in a Putsch or not being in a Putsch. For all purposes it is just as well as they should not be in a Putsch. I do not know what purposes this can have in doing it over again. I call the Tribunal’s attention for the limited purpose for which this historical matter was admitted, and suggest that it is serving no purpose in this connection to review it.

THE PRESIDENT: What is the answer to that, Dr. Laternser?

DR. LATERNSER: Since the witness has talked about this matter and testified that Halder as well as Brauchitsch shirked, and I cannot establish whether the opinion expressed by this witness with “shirked” is correct on the basis of the facts, I think I am obliged to clarify this point. In a general sense I would like to add further that the Prosecution is also justified in going into this point. I refer to the contention of the French Prosecutor in which he stated that in the light of all these circumstances it was beyond comprehension why Halder, as well as the entire German nation, did not rise as one man against the regime. Therefore, if I start from the viewpoint of the Prosecution, then my question on this point, as I have just put it, is undoubtedly of importance, and I, therefore, ask that this question be permitted.

THE PRESIDENT: The charge against the High Command is that they were a criminal organization within the meaning of the Charter; that is to say that they planned an aggressive war, or that they committed War Crimes or Crimes against Humanity in connection with an aggressive war. Well, whether or not they took part, or were planning to take part in a Putsch to stop the war does not seem very material to any of those questions.

DR. LATERNSER: I agree with you entirely on this point, Mr. President, that it cannot actually be considered of special importance; but on the other hand...

THE PRESIDENT: I did not say that it was not of special importance. I say that it was not material to the relevancy. The Tribunal does not think that any of these questions are relevant.

DR. LATERNSER: Then I will withdraw my question. I have one final question.

[Turning to the witness.] Witness, can you tell me the names of those generals who participated on the 20th of July?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, what has that got to do with any charge against the High Command?

DR. LATERNSER: The General Staff is accused of having participated in a conspiracy. The question...

THE PRESIDENT: We are not here to consider the honor of the High Command. We are here to consider whether or not they are a criminal organization within the meaning of the Charter, and that is the only question with which we are going to deal as far as you are concerned.

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, the General Staff and the OKW are accused of having participated in a conspiracy. If I prove, as I am trying to do with this question, that on the contrary, instead of participating in a conspiracy, part of the General Staff took part in an action against the regime, then the answer to this question on this point indicates that precisely the opposite was the case; and, for that reason, I ask that the question be permitted.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not think what the General Staff did in July 1944, when the circumstances were entirely different to what they were in September 1939, has any relevancy to the question whether they took part, either before or in September 1939.

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, if I put myself in the place of the Prosecution, I must assume that the Prosecution assumes that the conspiracy continued. It cannot be inferred, from testimony by the Prosecution or from anything that has been submitted, that the conspiracy was to have stopped at a certain period of time. So that the answer to this question would be of importance, I believe of decisive importance. I would like to supplement my statement, Mr. President...

THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Laternser.

DR. LATERNSER: I would like to add that it is precisely for the members of the group I represent that the period of time between 1938 and May 1940 is considered decisive.

THE PRESIDENT: You mean the group changed; therefore, they might be different in 1944?

DR. LATERNSER: I wish to add that a particularly large number of the members of this group only joined it in the course of 1944 because of their official positions, and I do consider this point important.

THE PRESIDENT: All right.

DR. LATERNSER: Witness, my question was: Can you give me the names of those generals who participated in the attempted assassination of the 20th of July 1944?

GISEVIUS: Generaloberst Beck, General Field Marshal Von Witzleben, General Olbricht, General Hoeppner.

DR. LATERNSER: One question: General Hoeppner was previously commander-in-chief of an armored army?

GISEVIUS: I believe so; General Von Haase, and certainly a large number of other generals whom I cannot enumerate offhand. Here I have mentioned only the names of those who were at Bendlerstrasse that afternoon.

DR. LATERNSER: One question, Witness: Do you know whether Field Marshal Rommel also participated on the 20th of July 1944?

GISEVIUS: I cannot answer by merely saying “yes,” for it is a fact that Rommel, as well as Field Marshal Von Kluge, did participate. However, it would give a wrong picture if Field Marshal Rommel were suddenly to appear in the category of those who fought against Hitler. Herr Rommel, as a typical Party general, sought to join us very late, and it gave us a very painful impression when suddenly Herr Rommel in the face of his own military catastrophe, proposed to us to have Hitler assassinated, and then, if possible, Göring and Himmler as well. And, even then, he did not want to join in at the first opportunity, but wanted to stay somewhat in the background in order to allow us to profit by his popularity later on. Therefore, it is extremely difficult to know whether these gentlemen, when they joined our group, came as the fallen might, as people who wished to save their pensions, or as people who, from the beginning, stood for decency and honor.

DR. LATERNSER: Did you yourself ever speak to Field Marshal Rommel about this?

GISEVIUS: No. I never considered it worth while to make his acquaintance.

DR. LATERNSER: A further question: Did officers of the General Staff participate in the 20th of July?

GISEVIUS: Yes, a great number.

DR. LATERNSER: About how many would you say?

GISEVIUS: I cannot give you the number, for at that time I was not informed of how many of the General Staff Stauffenberg had on his side. I do not doubt that Stauffenberg, Colonel Hansen, and several other stout-hearted men had discovered a number of clean, courageous officers among the General Staff, and that they could count on the support of very many decent members of the General Staff, but whom they naturally could not initiate into their plans beforehand.

DR. LATERNSER: Yes, that will be sufficient for this point. Another question has occurred to me. You mentioned General Von Tresckow previously. Did you know General Von Tresckow personally?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

DR. LATERNSER: Do you know anything about the fact that, after he learned that the commissar decree had been issued, General Von Tresckow remonstrated with Rundstedt and that these remonstrances contributed to the fact that the commissar decree was not passed on in General Field Marshal Von Rundstedt’s sector?

GISEVIUS: Tresckow belonged to our group for many years. There was no action which made us so ashamed as this one, and from the very start he courageously called the attention of his superiors to the inadmissibility of such terrible decrees. I remember how at that time we learned of the famous commissar decree at first through hearsay, and we immediately sent a courier to Tresckow to inform him simply of the intention of such an outrage, and how after the decree had been published, Tresckow, at a given signal, remonstrated with General Field Marshal Von Rundstedt in the way you described.

THE PRESIDENT: You said a while ago that you were just going to ask your last question.

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I am sorry I could not keep to that. A number of questions arose from the testimony of the witness, but this was my last question.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.

[A recess was taken.]

THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of the defendants’ counsel wish to ask any questions of the witness?

[There was no response.]

Then do the Prosecution desire to cross-examine?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May it please the Tribunal, I have a few questions to put to you, Dr. Gisevius, and if you will answer them as nearly as possible, “yes” or “no,” as you are capable of giving a truthful answer, you will save a great deal of time.

The Tribunal perhaps should know your relations with the Prosecution. Is it not a fact that within 2 months of the surrender of Germany I met you at Wiesbaden, and you related to me your experiences in the conspiracy that you have related here?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you were later brought here, and after coming here were interrogated by the Prosecution as well as by the counsel for Frick and for Schacht?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, your attitude and viewpoint are, as I understand you, those of a German who felt that loyalty to the German people required continuous opposition to the Nazi regime. Is that a correct statement of your position?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you had a very large experience in police matters in Germany.

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: If your Putsche or other moves to obtain power in Germany were successful, it was planned that you would be in charge of the police in the reorganization, was it not?

GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Either as Minister of the Interior or as Police Commissioner, whatever it might be called.

GISEVIUS: Yes, certainly.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you represented the belief that it was not necessary to govern Germany with concentration camps and with Gestapo methods; is that correct?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you found all of the ways of presenting your viewpoint to the German people cut off by the Gestapo methods which were used by the Nazi regime; is that a fact?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So that there was no way open to you to obtain any change in German policy except through revolt or assassination, or means of that kind?

GISEVIUS: No. I am convinced that until 1937 or the beginning of 1938 the position could have been changed in Germany by a majority of votes in the Reich Cabinet or through pressure by the Armed Forces.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Then you fix 1937 as the time when it ceased to be possible by peaceful means to effect a change in Germany; is that correct?

GISEVIUS: That is how I would judge it.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, it was not until after 1937 that Schacht joined your group; is that not a fact?

GISEVIUS: Yes, as I said, the group was not formed until 1937, 1938; but Schacht had already introduced me to Goerdeler in 1936, and Schacht and Oster had known each other since 1936. And naturally Schacht had also known a large number of other members of the group for a long time.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But Schacht did not become convinced, as I understand your statement to us, until after 1937—until the Putsch affair—that he wouldn’t be able to handle Hitler in some peaceful way; is that not correct?

GISEVIUS: In what manner? In a peaceful manner or...

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In a peaceful manner.

GISEVIUS: Yes, until the end of 1937 Schacht believed that it ought to be possible to remove Hitler legally.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But by the end of 1937, as you now say, the possibility of a peaceful removal of Hitler had become impossible in fact?

GISEVIUS: Yes, that is what we thought.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes; now, there was, as I understand your view in going to the general—there was no power in Germany that could stop or deal with the Gestapo, except the Army.

GISEVIUS: Yes. I would answer that question in the affirmative.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is, in addition to the Gestapo, this Nazi regime also had a private army in the SS, did they not? And, for a period, in the SA?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And if you were to combat successfully the Nazi regime, you had to have manpower which only the Army had; is that right?

GISEVIUS: Yes, only people who could be found in the Army; but at the same time we also attempted to influence certain people in the Police, and we needed all the decent officials in the ministries, and the broad masses of the people altogether.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But the Wehrmacht was the source of power capable of dealing with the SS and the Gestapo if the generals had been willing?

GISEVIUS: That was our conviction.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that is the reason you kept seeking the help of the generals and felt let down when they wouldn’t give you their assistance finally?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, there came a time when everybody connected with your group knew that the war was lost.

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that was before these plots on Hitler’s life, and it was apparent before the Schlaberndorff plot and before the July 20th plot, that the war was lost, was it not?

GISEVIUS: I should like to make it quite clear that there was no one in our group who did not already know, even when the war started, that Hitler would never win this war.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But it became very much more apparent as time went on, not only that the war could not be won by Germany, but that Germany was going to be physically destroyed as a result of the war; is that not true?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yet, under the system which the Nazi regime had installed, you had no way of changing the course of events in Germany except by assassination or a revolt; is that true?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And so you resorted to those extreme measures, knowing that Hitler could never make peace with the Allies; is that true?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And your purpose in this was to save Germany the last destroying blows, which unfortunately she received, from the point of view of the Germans; is that not a fact?

GISEVIUS: I should like to say that actually since the beginning of the war, we no longer thought only of Germany. I think that I may say that we bore a heavy share of responsibility towards Germany and towards the world.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, what you were endeavoring to do was to get the war to an end, since you had not been able to stop its commencement, were you not?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that was impossible as long as Hitler was at the head of the government and this group of men behind him?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, there was another plot on Hitler’s life that you haven’t mentioned. Was there not a bomb that was later found to have been a communist bomb?

GISEVIUS: This happened on 9 November 1939, in the Bürgerbräukeller, in Munich. It was a brave Communist who acted independently.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, at none of these times when Hitler’s life was endangered, by a strange coincidence, was Göring or Himmler ever present; is that not true?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you attach any importance to that fact?

GISEVIUS: We sometimes regretted it. For instance, the attempt at assassination would perhaps have succeeded, if Göring and Himmler had been with Hitler on 17 July. But as the years went by, the members of this clique separated to such an extent, and protected themselves so much that they could hardly be found together anywhere. Göring, too, was gradually so absorbed in his transactions and art collections at Karinhall that he was hardly ever to be found at a serious conference.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, the assassination of Hitler would have accomplished nothing from your point of view if the Number 2 man had stepped into Hitler’s place, would it?

GISEVIUS: That was a debatable problem for a long time, because Brauchitsch, for instance, imagined that we could create a transitional regime with Göring. Our group always refused to come together with that man even for an hour.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: How did you plan—if you were successful—to deal with the other defendants here, with the exception of the Defendant Schacht, all of whom, I understand, you regard as a part of the Nazi government?

GISEVIUS: These gentlemen would have been behind lock and key in an extremely short time, and I think they would not have had to wait long for their sentences.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, does that apply to every man in this dock with the exception of Schacht?

GISEVIUS: Yes, every man.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is, you recognized them, your group recognized them all as parts and important parts of the Nazi regime—a Nazi conspiracy. Is that a fact?

GISEVIUS: I should not like to commit myself to the words “Nazi conspiracy.” We considered them the men responsible for all the unspeakable misery which that government had brought to Germany and the world.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I should like to ask you a few questions about the Gestapo. You had testified generally in reference to the crimes which were committed by that organization and I ask you to state whether that included the torturing and burning to death of a large number of persons?

GISEVIUS: The question does not seem to have come through correctly.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I am asking you as to the crimes committed by the Gestapo, and I am asking if it included the torturing and burning to death of thousands of persons?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did it involve the unlawful detention of thousands of innocent people?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The throwing of them into concentration camps where they were tortured and beaten and killed?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did the Gestapo engage in wholesale confiscation of property?

GISEVIUS: Yes, to a very large extent; they called it “property of persons hostile to the State.”

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And did it practice extortion against Jews and against others?

GISEVIUS: In masses and by the million.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did the Gestapo hinder and molest the public officials, who were too prominent to be murdered, until they resigned or were driven from office?

GISEVIUS: The Gestapo used every means, from murder to the extortion which has just been described.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, the question arises here as to whether the members of the Gestapo knew what the Gestapo was doing; and will you please tell the Tribunal what the situation was as to the membership in that organization and its knowledge of its program?

GISEVIUS: I have already stated at the beginning of my testimony that from the first or second day every member of the Gestapo really could not help seeing and knowing what took place in that institution.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, there were some people who were taken into the Gestapo at the beginning, who were transferred from other branches of the civil service, were they not; who were in a sense involuntary members of the Gestapo?

GISEVIUS: Yes; these members were eliminated in the course of the first year as being politically unreliable.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the transfer took place at the time Göring set up the Gestapo, did it not?

THE PRESIDENT: What did the witness mean by “eliminated”?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think eliminated from the Gestapo.

GISEVIUS: Gradually they were released from the service of the Gestapo.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, after the purge of the 30th of June 1934, were special pains taken to see that no one was permitted in the organization who was not in sympathy with its program?

GISEVIUS: These attempts started after 1 April 1934, when Himmler and Heydrich took over affairs. Actually, from that date, no official was allowed into the Gestapo any longer unless Himmler and Heydrich considered that he held the opinions which they desired. It may be that during the first months some officials, who had not yet been screened by the SS, may have got in. The Gestapo was, of course, a large organization and it naturally took quite a time until the SS had educated and trained their own criminal officials.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: However, did there come a time, and if so, will you fix it as nearly as possible, after which every member of the Gestapo must have known the criminal program of that organization?

GISEVIUS: For many years I have considered that question myself and discussed it with Nebe and my friends. The reply entails very great responsibility, and in the knowledge of that responsibility I would say that from the beginning of 1935, at the latest, everyone must have known what sort of organization he was joining and the type of orders he might have to expect.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You have testified as to the investigations which you made when you were connected with the police administration and you mentioned the Reichstag fire but you did not tell us what your findings were when you investigated that. Will you please tell us?

GISEVIUS: To speak briefly and to begin with the facts, we ascertained that Hitler in a general way had expressed a wish for a large-scale propaganda campaign. Goebbels undertook to prepare the necessary proposals and it was Goebbels who first thought of setting the Reichstag on fire. Goebbels discussed this with the leader of the Berlin SA Brigade, Karl Ernst, and he suggested in detail how it should be done.

A certain chemical, known to every maker of fireworks, was chosen. After spraying it, it ignites after a certain time—hours or minutes. In order to get inside the Reichstag, one had to go through the corridor leading from the palace of the Reichstag President to the Reichstag itself. Ten reliable SA men were provided, and then Göring was informed of all the details of the plan, so that by chance he did not make an election speech on that particular evening, but at such a late hour would still be sitting at his desk in the Ministry of the Interior in Berlin.

Göring—and he gave assurances that he would do so—was to put the police on wrong trails in the first confusion. From the very beginning it was intended that the Communists should be accused of this crime, and the 10 SA men who had to carry out the crime were instructed accordingly.

That is, in a few words, the story of the events. To tell you how we got hold of the details, I have only to add that one of these 10 who had to spray the chemical was a notorious criminal. Six months later he was dismissed from the SA, and when he did not receive the reward which he had been promised he decided to tell what he knew to the Reich Court sitting in Leipzig at the time. He was taken before an examining magistrate who made a record of his statement, but the Gestapo heard of it and the letter to the Reich Court was intercepted and destroyed. The SA man, named Rail, who betrayed the plan, was murdered in a vile manner with the knowledge of the Defendant Göring, by order of Gestapo chief Diels. Through the finding of the body, we picked up the threads of the whole story.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What happened to the 10 SA men who carried out the Reichstag fire? Are any of them alive now?

GISEVIUS: As far as we are aware none of them are still alive. Most of them were murdered on 30 June under the pretext of the Röhm revolt. Only one, a certain Heini Gewaehr, was taken over by the police as a police officer, and we tracked him down as well. He was killed in the war, while a police officer on the Eastern Front.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think you testified that you also investigated, with the entire affair of Röhm, the murders that followed the Röhm affair. Didn’t you so testify?

GISEVIUS: I cannot actually say that we carried out the investigation, as we, of the Ministry of the Interior, had really been excluded from the entire affair. However, matters were such that after 30 June, all the appeals for help, and all the complaints of the people who were affected reached us in the Ministry of the Interior; and during 30 June, through the continual radio messages, incidental visits to Göring’s palace, and the information received from Nebe, we discovered all the details.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, about how many people were killed in that purge?

GISEVIUS: We have never been able to establish the number exactly, but I estimate that no more than 150 to 200 persons lost their lives, which, at that time, was an enormous figure.

I myself with Minister of Justice Gürtner checked the list of the number of the dead which had been given him by Hitler and Göring, and we ascertained that the list which contained the names of 77 dead, who had allegedly been justly killed, was exceeded by nearly double that number only by those names which we had received through the prosecuting authorities, or through the appeals for help coming from relatives to the Ministry of the Interior.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, did you ascertain who selected the men who were killed in that purge?

GISEVIUS: To begin with we ascertained that Himmler, Heydrich, and Göring had compiled exact lists of those to be murdered; for I myself heard in Göring’s palace—and it was confirmed by Daluege who was present, and also by Nebe who was present from the very first second—that not one of those who were killed was mentioned by name; instead they just said: “Number so and so is now gone,” or, “Number so and so is still missing,” and “It will soon be Number so and so’s turn.”

There is, however, no doubt that Heydrich and Himmler also had a special list. On that special list there were several Catholics, Klausner, and others. I cannot, for instance, say here under oath whether Schleicher was murdered by order of Göring, or whether he was a man who was on Heydrich’s and Himmler’s special list.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, was the Defendant Frick fully informed as to the facts which you knew about the illegal conduct of the Gestapo?

GISEVIUS: Yes. I had to submit to him all the material that arrived which was important, and I have already described that we reported all these matters to the Secret State Police or to the Ministries of the Interior of the Länder. Naturally I could submit only the most important of these things to Frick personally. I estimate that I received several hundred such complaints daily, but the most important had to be submitted to Frick, because he had to sign them personally; for Göring always complained as soon as he saw that such a young official signed reports and appeals to the Ministry and to himself.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, was Frick informed of your conclusions about the Röhm purge?

GISEVIUS: Yes, because on the Sunday, while the murders were continuing, I spoke to Frick about the murder of Strasser, Klausner, Schleicher and the many other murders; and Frick was particularly disgusted at the murder of Strasser, because he considered that an act of personal revenge by Göring and Himmler. Likewise, Frick was extremely indignant about the murders of Klausner, Bose, Edgar Jung, and the many other innocent men who were murdered.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But when Frick signed the decree, along with Hitler, declaring these murders legitimate and ordering no prosecutions on account of those murders, Frick knew exactly what had happened from you; is that the fact?

GISEVIUS: He knew it from me, and he had seen it for himself. The story of the 30th of June was undoubtedly known to Frick.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, did Frick ever talk with you about Himmler and Heydrich as being bad and dangerous, cruel persons?

GISEVIUS: On that Sunday, the 1st of July, Frick said to me, “If Hitler does not very soon do to the SS and Himmler what he has done to the SA today, he will experience far worse things with the SS than he has experienced now with the SA.”

I was greatly struck by that prediction at the time, and by the fact that Frick should speak so openly to me.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But notwithstanding the estimate he made of those men as dangerous persons, did he not thereafter appoint them both in his Ministry of Interior?

GISEVIUS: Well, of course, they were actually appointed by Hitler. However, I can only say that when I took leave of Frick, at the time I left the Ministry of the Interior in May 1935, Frick told me literally that the constant difficulties he had had because of me had taught him from now on to take Party members only in his Ministry, and as far as possible those who had the Golden Party Emblem. He said that it was possible that in the course of events he might even be forced to allow Himmler into his Ministry, but in no case would he accept the murderer Heydrich. Those were the last words I exchanged with Frick.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Both were put in charge of matters that were under his legal control, were they not?

GISEVIUS: Yes, they became members of the Reich Ministry of the Interior and Frick remained their superior.

THE PRESIDENT: Did you say that those were the last words which you exchanged with the Defendant Frick?

GISEVIUS: Yes. That was in 1935 and I have not met him or talked to him since.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, after 1934 Frick was the Minister in charge of the running and controlling of concentration camps, was he not, Dr. Gisevius?

GISEVIUS: In my opinion the Reich Minister of the Interior was responsible from the beginning for all police matters in the Reich and therefore also for the concentration camps, and I do not believe that one can say he had that responsibility only since 1934.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I am willing to accept your amendment to my question. I ask that you be shown Document Number 3751-PS of the United States, which has not yet been offered in evidence.

[The document was submitted to the witness.]

Now, this purports to be a communication from Dr. Gürtner, the Minister of Justice, to the Reich and Prussian Minister of the Interior. That would be from your friend Dr. Gürtner to Frick, would it not?

GISEVIUS: I believe I heard you say “friend.” During the time he acted as Minister, Gürtner did not conduct himself in such a way that I could consider him my friend.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well then, tell us about Gürtner. Tell us about Gürtner’s position in this situation because we have a communication here apparently from him.

GISEVIUS: Gürtner?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes.

GISEVIUS: At that time Gürtner without doubt made many attempts to expose the cruelty in the camps and to initiate criminal proceedings. In individual cases Gürtner did make many attempts; but after the 30th of June he signed that law which legalized all those dreadful things, and also in other respects Gürtner never acted consistently with his views. But this document which you submit to me was just such an attempt by Gürtner and the many decent officials in the Ministry of Justice to bring the question of the Gestapo terror to discussion. As far as I recollect this is one of those letters which we discussed unofficially beforehand in order to provoke an answer, so to say.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I now desire to read some parts of this into the record. It becomes Exhibit USA-828. I will offer it as such.

Will you kindly follow the German text and see if I correctly quote:

“My dear Reich Minister!

“Enclosed you will find a copy of a report of the Inspector of the Secret State Police, dated 28 March 1935.

“This report gives me an occasion to state my fundamental attitude towards the question of corporal punishment for internees. The numerous instances of ill-treatment which have come to the knowledge of the authorities of justice point to three different reasons for such ill-treatment of prisoners:

“1. Beating as a disciplinary punishment in concentration camps.

“2. Ill-treatment, mostly of political internees, in order to make them talk.

“3. Ill-treatment of internees arising out of sheer wantonness or for sadistic motives.”

I think I will not take the Tribunal’s time to read his comment on Number 1 or Number 2. About Number 3, you will find in the German text:

“The experience of the first revolutionary years has shown that the persons who are charged to administer the beatings generally lose all sense of the purpose and meaning of their action after a short time, and permit themselves to be governed by personal feelings of revenge, or sadistic tendencies. Thus members of the guard detail of the former concentration camp at Bredow, near Stettin, completely stripped a prostitute who had an argument with one of them and beat her with whips and cowhides in such a fashion that the woman 2 months later still showed two open and infected wounds.”

I shall not go into the dimensions; they are not important.

“In the concentration camp at Kemna near Wuppertal, prisoners were locked up in a narrow clothing locker and were then tortured by blowing in cigarette smoke, upsetting the locker, et cetera. In some cases the prisoners were first given salt herring to eat, in order to produce an especially strong and torturing thirst.

“In the Hohnstein Concentration Camp in Saxony, prisoners had to stand under a dripping apparatus especially constructed for this purpose, until the drops of water, which fell down at even intervals, caused seriously infected wounds on their scalps.

“In a concentration camp in Hamburg four prisoners were lashed in the form of a cross to a grating for days, once without interruption for 3 days and nights, once for 5 days and nights and fed so meagerly with dry bread that they almost died of hunger.

“These few examples show a degree of cruelty which is such an insult to every German feeling, that it is impossible to consider any extenuating circumstances.

“In conclusion, I should like to present my opinion about these three points to you, my dear Herr Reich Minister, in your capacity as departmental minister competent for the establishment of protective custody, and the camps for protective custody.”

And he goes on to make certain recommendations for action by the Minister. I do not know whether the Tribunal cares to have more of this read.

Was any improvement in conditions noted after the receipt of that communication by Frick?

GISEVIUS: The letter was received just at the time I left the Ministry of the Interior. I should like to say only one thing concerning this letter: What is described therein is really only a fraction of what we knew. I helped prepare this letter in that I spoke to the officials concerned in the Ministry of Justice. The Minister of Justice could bring up only those matters which had by chance become known legally through some criminal record. But there can be no doubt that this communication was merely a motive, and the cause of a very bold letter from Heydrich to Göring, dated 28 March 1935, in which he disputed the right of the Minister of Justice to prosecute cases of ill-treatment. The letter, therefore does not add anything new to my descriptions, and no doubt all have been convinced that these conditions, which started at that time, never ceased but became worse as time went on.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, there came a time when Heydrich was assassinated in Prague, was there not?

GISEVIUS: Yes, some very brave Czechs were able to do what we unfortunately could not achieve. That will always be to their glory.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, I suppose the Czechs expected, and did you expect that the assassination of Heydrich would result in some improvement in this condition?

GISEVIUS: We doubted—we, Canaris, Oster, Nebe, and the others of the group—whether it was possible at all for an even worse man to be found to succeed such a monster as Heydrich, and to that extent we really did think that the Gestapo terror would now subside, and that perhaps we would return to a certain amount of honesty and integrity, or that at least the cruelties might be lessened.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And then came Kaltenbrunner. Did you notice any improvement after the appointment of Kaltenbrunner? Tell us about that.

GISEVIUS: Kaltenbrunner came and things became worse from day to day. More and more we learned that perhaps the impulsive actions of a murderer like Heydrich were not so bad as the cold, legal logic of a lawyer who took over the administration of such a dangerous instrument as the Gestapo.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Can you tell us whether Kaltenbrunner took an even more sadistic attitude than Himmler and Schellenberg had done? Were you informed about that?

GISEVIUS: Yes. I know that Heydrich, in a certain sense, really had something akin to a bad conscience when he committed his crimes. At any rate, he did not like it when those things were discussed openly in Gestapo circles. Nebe, who as Chief of the Criminal Police had the same rank as the Chief of the Gestapo, Müller, always told me that Heydrich took care to conceal his crimes.

With the entry of Kaltenbrunner into that organization, this practice ceased. All those things were now openly discussed among the department chiefs of the Gestapo. By now the war had started, of course. These gentlemen lunched together, and Nebe often came to me from such luncheons so completely exhausted that he had a nervous breakdown. On two occasions Nebe had to be sent on long sick leave because he simply could not stand the open cynicism with which mass murder, and the technique of mass murder, were discussed.

I remind you only of the gruesome chapter of the installation of the first gas chambers, which was discussed in detail in this circle, as were the experiments as to how one could remove the Jews most quickly and most thoroughly. These were the most horrible descriptions I have ever heard in my life. It is, of course, so much worse when you hear them first-hand from someone who is still under the direct impression of such discussions—and who because of this is almost at the point of physical and mental collapse, than when you hear of them now from documents. Nebe became so ill that actually as early as 20 July he suffered from a persecution mania and was a mere human wreck after everything he had gone through.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Was it the custom to have daily dinner conferences of the chiefs of the Main Security Office, those who happened to be in town?

GISEVIUS: Daily conferences; everything was discussed at luncheon. This was of particular importance to us, because we heard details of the methods used by the Gestapo in the fight against our group.

To prove what I say, I can state here that, for instance, the order issued for the arrest of Goerdeler on 17 July was decided upon during such a luncheon conference, and Nebe warned us at once. That is the reason why Goerdeler was able to escape, at least for some time, and why we were able to know to what extent the Gestapo were aware of our plot.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And who were the regular attendants at those luncheon conferences?

GISEVIUS: Kaltenbrunner presided. Then there were Gestapo Müller, Schellenberg, Ohlendorf, and Nebe.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And do you know whether, at those meetings, the new kinds of torture and the technique of killing by gas, and other measures in the concentration camps, were discussed?

GISEVIUS: Yes. That was discussed in great detail, and sometimes I received the description only a few minutes later.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, what is the situation with reference to the information of the Foreign Office about the conduct of the Gestapo? Will you tell us what was done to inform the Foreign Office from time to time of the crimes that the Gestapo were committing?

GISEVIUS: The Foreign Office, particularly during the earlier years, was continually kept informed, as nearly every day some foreigner was half beaten to death or robbed, and then the diplomatic missions would come with their complaints, and these complaints were sent to the Ministry of the Interior by the Foreign Office. These went through my office and sometimes I had four or five such notes a day from the Foreign Office regarding excesses by the Gestapo; and I can testify that in the course of years there were no crimes by the Gestapo which were not set forth in these notes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you make certain reports to the Foreign Office which were so dispatched that you are reasonably certain they would reach Neurath?

GISEVIUS: Ribbentrop was not yet the Foreign Minister at that time...

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: No, Neurath.

GISEVIUS: I very often discussed these matters personally with the officials of the Foreign Office, because they were of a particularly difficult nature, and because the officials of the Foreign Office were very indignant, I asked them repeatedly to put these matters before the Minister through the official channels. In addition, I gave as much material as I could to one of the closest collaborators of the Foreign Minister at that time, the Chief of Protocol, “Minister” Von Bülow-Schwante; and according to the information I received from Bülow-Schwante, he very often submitted that material to Neurath.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, were certain of the collaborators close collaborators of Von Papen? Was Von Papen subject to action by the Gestapo?

GISEVIUS: To start with, the entire group around Von Papen was continuously under surveillance by the Gestapo because in the earlier years there was an impression among great masses of people that Von Papen was a special advocate for decency and right. A large group collected around Von Papen and that, of course, was most carefully watched by the Gestapo. As the complaints, which Von Papen received by the score, were carefully compiled in his office, and as no doubt Von Papen quite often took these papers either to Göring or to the Hindenburg palace, the closest collaborators of Von Papen were especially suspected by the Gestapo. So it was that on 30 June 1934 Oberregierungsrat Von Bose, the closest collaborator of Von Papen, was shot dead in the doorway of Von Papen’s office. The two other colleagues of Von Papen were imprisoned, and the man who wrote Von Papen’s radio speeches, Edgar Jung, was arrested weeks before the 30th of June; and on the morning of 1 July, he was found murdered in a ditch along the highway near Oranienburg.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did Von Papen continue in office after that?

GISEVIUS: I have never heard that he resigned; and I know that very soon after the Austrian Chancellor Dollfuss was murdered, he was sent to Vienna as Hitler’s ambassador.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did he ever make any protests that you know of?

GISEVIUS: I personally heard of none at the time, although, we were naturally extremely eager to hear which minister would protest. However, no letter from Papen arrived at the Ministry of the Interior.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Were some of his collaborators murdered after the Anschluss in Austria?

GISEVIUS: On the day of the Anschluss, when the SS entered Austria, Von Papen’s closest collaborator, Legation Counsellor Freiherr von Ketteler, was kidnapped by the Gestapo. We searched for him for weeks, until 3 or 4 weeks later his body was washed up on the banks of the Danube.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: After that did Papen continue to serve as a part of the Hitler Government and accept further offices from Hitler’s hands?

GISEVIUS: He was no longer a member of the Government at the time. Immediately after the march into Austria Von Papen was disposed of by being made envoy. However, it was not long before he continued his activities as Ambassador at Ankara.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Does the Tribunal desire to rise at this point?

THE PRESIDENT: You would like a little more time, wouldn’t you, with this witness?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: It will take a little more time, Your Honor.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. We will adjourn now.

[The Tribunal adjourned until 26 April 1946 at 1000 hours.]

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ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTEENTH DAY
Friday, 26 April 1946