Afternoon Session
MARSHAL: If it please the Tribunal, the Defendant Streicher is absent from this session.
THE PRESIDENT: I will deal with the documents in the order in which they were dealt with by Fleet Judge Kranzbühler.
The Tribunal rejects Dönitz-5, Page 7 of the document book.
The Tribunal rejects Dönitz-60, Page 152.
The Tribunal allows Dönitz-69, Page 170.
The Tribunal rejects Dönitz-60, Pages 173 to 197.
The Tribunal rejects Dönitz-72, Page 185.
The Tribunal rejects Dönitz-60, Page 204.
It rejects Dönitz-74, Page 207.
It allows Dönitz-60, Page 208.
It rejects Dönitz-60, Page 209.
It rejects Dönitz-75, Page 218.
It rejects Dönitz-60, Page 219, Page 222 and Page 224.
It allows Dönitz-60, Page 256.
It rejects Dönitz-81, Page 233 and 234; 234 being Dönitz-82.
It rejects Dönitz-85, Page 242.
It rejects Dönitz-89, Page 246.
It allows Dönitz-9, Page 11, and Dönitz-10, Page 12.
It rejects Dönitz-12, Page 18.
It allows Dönitz-13, Pages 19 to 26, and Page 49.
It allows Dönitz-19, Page 34.
It allows Dönitz-29, Pages 54 to 59, leaving out—that is to say, not allowing—Page 58.
It rejects Dönitz-31, Page 64.
It rejects Dönitz-32, Page 65.
It rejects Dönitz-33, Page 66.
It allows Dönitz-37, Page 78.
It rejects Dönitz-38, Page 80.
It rejects Dönitz-40, Page 86.
It rejects Göring Number 7, Page 89.
With reference to the next exhibit, Page 91, the Tribunal would like to know from Fleet Judge Kranzbühler whether that is already in evidence or not. It is Page 91 in the Dönitz Document Book in English, Volume II, Page 91.
It is headed “C-21, GB-194.”
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: That is an excerpt from a document which the Prosecution has submitted here and which is therefore already in evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, then; we need not be troubled about it.
The Tribunal rejects Dönitz-43, Page 95.
It allows Dönitz-90, Page 258.
It allows Dönitz-67, Page 96.
It allows Dönitz-53, Page 99.
It rejects Dönitz-47, Page 120.
It allows Dönitz-48, Page 122.
It rejects Dönitz-49, Page 131.
It rejects Dönitz-51 and 52, Pages 134 and 135.
That is all.
The Tribunal will adjourn today at a quarter to five and it will be sitting in closed session thereafter.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: With the permission of the Tribunal, I call Admiral Dönitz as witness.
[The Defendant Dönitz took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name?
KARL DÖNITZ (Defendant): Karl Dönitz.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.
[The defendant repeated the oath in German.]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral, since 1910 you have been a professional officer; is that correct?
DÖNITZ: Since 1910 I have been a professional soldier, and an officer since 1913.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes. During the World War, the first World War, were you with the U-boat service?
DÖNITZ: Yes, from 1916.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Until the end?
DÖNITZ: Until the end of the war.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: After the first World War, when did you again have contact with the U-boat service?
DÖNITZ: On 27 September 1935 I became the commanding officer of the U-boat Flotilla Weddigen, the first German U-boat flotilla after 1918. As an introduction to taking up that command, that is, in September 1935, I spent a few days in Turkey, in order to go there in a U-boat and to bridge the gap from 1918.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Thus from 1918 to 1935 you had nothing to do with U-boats?
DÖNITZ: No, nothing at all.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What was your rank when you went to the U-boat service in 1935?
DÖNITZ: I was a Fregattenkapitän.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What did the German U-boat service at that time consist of?
DÖNITZ: The U-boat Flotilla Weddigen, of which I became the commanding officer, consisted of three small boats of 250 tons each, the so-called “Einbäume.” Besides, there were six somewhat smaller boats which were in a U-boat school, which was not under my command, for the purpose of training. Then there were afloat and in service perhaps another six of these small boats.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Who informed you of that command as C. O. of the U-boat flotilla?
DÖNITZ: Admiral Raeder.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did Admiral Raeder on that occasion issue the order that the U-boat arm should be prepared for a specific war?
DÖNITZ: No. I merely received the order to fill in that gap from 1918, to train the U-boats for the first time in cruising, submersion, and firing.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you prepare the U-boats for war against merchant shipping?
DÖNITZ: Yes. I instructed the commanders as to how they should behave if they stopped a merchantman and I also issued an appropriate tactical order for each commander.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you mean to say that the preparation for war against merchantmen was a preparation for war according to Prize Regulations?
DÖNITZ: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: That is to say, the preparations were concerned with the stopping of ships on the surface?
DÖNITZ: The only instruction which I gave concerning the war against merchantmen was an instruction on how the U-boat should behave in the stopping and examining, the establishing of the destination and so on, of a merchantman. Later, I believe in the year 1938, when the draft of the German Prize Regulations came, I passed this on to the flotillas for the instruction of the commanders.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You developed a new tactic for U-boats which became known under the name “wolf pack tactics.” What was there to these pack tactics, and did that mean anything in connection with the warfare against merchantmen according to the Prize Regulations?
DÖNITZ: The U-boats of all navies had so far operated singly, contrary to all other categories of ships which, by tactical co-operation, tried to get better results. The development of the “wolf pack tactics” was nothing further than breaking with that principle of individual action for each U-boat and attempting to use U-boats exactly in the same manner as other categories of warships, collectively. Such a method of collective action was naturally necessary when a formation was to be attacked, be it a formation of warships, that is, several warships together, or a convoy. These “wolf pack tactics,” therefore, have nothing to do with war against merchantmen according to Prize Regulations. They are a tactical measure to fight formations of ships, and, of course, convoys, where procedure according to Prize Regulations cannot be followed.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were you given the mission, or even obliged to prepare for war, against a definite enemy?
DÖNITZ: I did not receive such a general mission. I had the mission of developing the U-boat service as well as possible, as it is the duty of every front-line officer of all armed forces of all nations, in order to be prepared against all war emergencies. Once, in the year 1937 or 1938, in the mobilization plan of the Navy, my order read that, in case France should try to interrupt the rearmament by an attack on Germany, it would be the task of the German U-boats to attack the transports in the Mediterranean which would leave North Africa for France. I then carried out maneuvers in the North Sea with this task in mind. If you are asking me about a definite aim or line of action, that, so far as I remember, was the only mission which I received in that respect from the Naval Operations Staff. That occurred in the year 1936 or 1937. According to my recollection, that plan had been issued lest the rearmament of Germany, at that time unarmed, might be interrupted by some measure or other.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In the year 1939, then, was the German U-boat service prepared technically and tactically for a naval war against England?
DÖNITZ: No. The German U-boat service, in the fall of 1939, consisted of about thirty to forty operational boats. That meant that at any time about one-third could be used for operations. In view of the harsh reality the situation seemed much worse later. There was one month, for instance, when we had only two boats out at sea. With this small number of U-boats it was, of course, only possible to give pinpricks to a great naval power such as England. That we were not prepared for war against England in the Navy, is, in my opinion, best and most clearly to be seen from the fact that the armament of the Navy had to be radically changed at the beginning of the war. It had been the intention to create a homogeneous fleet which, of course, since it was in proportion much smaller than the British fleet, was not capable of waging a war against England. This program for building a homogeneous fleet had to be discontinued when the war with England started; only these large ships which were close to completion were finished. Everything else was abandoned or scrapped. That was necessary in order to free the building capacity for building U-boats. And that, also, explains why the German U-boat war, in this last war, actually only started in the year 1942, that is to say, when the U-boats which had been ordered for building at the beginning of the war were ready for action. Since peacetime, that is in 1940, the replacement of U-boats hardly covered the losses.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The Prosecution has repeatedly termed the U-boat arm an aggressive weapon. What do you say to this?
DÖNITZ: Yes, that is correct. The U-boat has, of course, the assignment of approaching an enemy and attacking him with torpedoes. Therefore, in that respect, the U-boat is an aggressive weapon.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you mean to say by that that it is a weapon for an aggressive war?
DÖNITZ: Aggressive or defensive war is a political decision and, therefore, it has nothing to do with military considerations. I can certainly use a U-boat in a defensive war because, in defensive war also, the enemy’s ships must be attacked. Of course, I can use a U-boat in exactly the same way in a politically aggressive war. If one should conclude that the navies which have U-boats are planning an aggressive war, then all nations—for all the navies of these nations had U-boats, in fact many had more than Germany, twice and three times as many—planned aggressive war.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In your capacity as Flag Officer of U-boats, did you yourself have anything to do with the planning of the war as such?
DÖNITZ: No, nothing at all. My task was to develop U-boats militarily and tactically for action, and to train my officers and men.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Before the beginning of this war did you give any suggestions or make any proposals concerning a war against a definite enemy?
DÖNITZ: No, in no instance.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you do so after this war had started concerning a new enemy?
DÖNITZ: No, not in that case either.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The Prosecution has submitted some documents which contain orders from you to the U-boats and which date from before the beginning of this war. An order for the placing of certain U-boats in the Baltic and west of England, and an order before the Norway action for the disposition of U-boats along the Norwegian coast. I ask you, therefore, when, at what time, were you as Flag Officer of U-boats, or from 1939 on as Commander of U-boats, informed about existing plans?
DÖNITZ: I received information on plans from the Naval Operations Staff only after these plans had been completed; that is to say, only if I was to participate in some way in the carrying out of a plan, and then only at a time necessary for the prompt execution of my military task.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Let us take the case of the Norway action, Admiral. When did you find out about the intention to occupy Norway, and in what connection did you receive that information?
DÖNITZ: On 5 March 1940 I was called from Wilhelmshaven, where I had my command, to Berlin, to the Naval Operations Staff, and at that meeting I was instructed on the plan and on my task.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I present you now with an entry from the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff, which I will submit to the Tribunal as Dönitz Exhibit Number 6. It is on Page 8 of Document Book 1.
“5 March 1940: The Flag Officer of U-boats participates in a conference with the Chief of Staff of the Naval Operations Staff in Berlin.
“Object of the conference: Preparation of the occupation of Norway and Denmark by the German Wehrmacht.”
Is that the meeting which you have mentioned?
DÖNITZ: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In the case of Norway, or in the previous case of the outbreak of war with Poland, did you have the opportunity to examine whether the tactical instructions which you had to give to your U-boats led or were to lead to the waging of an aggressive war?
DÖNITZ: No, I had neither the opportunity nor indeed the authority to do that. I should like to ask what soldier of what nation, who receives any military task whatsoever, has the right to approach his general staff and ask for examination or justification as to whether an aggressive war can evolve from this task. That would mean that the soldiers...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, the Tribunal has itself to decide as a matter of law whether the war was an aggressive war. It does not want to hear from this witness, who is a professional sailor, what his view is on the question of law.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, I believe my question has been misunderstood. I did not ask Admiral Dönitz whether he considered the war an aggressive war or not; but I asked him whether he had the opportunity or the task, as a soldier, of examining whether his orders could become the means for an aggressive war. He, therefore, should state his conception of the task which he had as a soldier, and not of the question of whether it was or was not an aggressive war.
THE PRESIDENT: He can tell us what his task was as a matter of fact, but he is not here to argue the case to us. He can state the facts—what he did.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Does one not also, Mr. President, have to allow a defendant to say what considerations he had or what considerations he did not have? What I mean is that the accusations of the Prosecution arise from this, and the defendant must have the opportunity of stating his position regarding these accusations.
THE PRESIDENT: We want to hear the evidence. You will argue his case on his behalf on the evidence that he gives. He is not here to argue the law before us. That is not the subject of evidence.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I shall question him on his considerations, Mr. President.
Admiral, in connection with the orders which you issued to the U-boats before the war or in connection with the orders which you issued before the beginning of the Norway action—did you ever have any considerations as to whether it would lead to aggressive war?
DÖNITZ: I received military orders as a soldier, and my purpose naturally was to carry out these military tasks. Whether the leadership of the State was thereby politically waging an aggressive war or not, or whether they were protective measures, was not for me to decide; it was none of my business.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: As Commander of U-boats, from whom did you receive your orders about the waging of U-boat warfare?
DÖNITZ: From the Chief of the SKL, the Naval Operations Staff.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Who was that?
DÖNITZ: Grossadmiral Raeder.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What were the orders which you received at the beginning of the war, that is, the beginning of September 1939, for the conduct of U-boat warfare?
DÖNITZ: War against merchantmen according to the Prize Regulations, that is to say, according to the London Pact.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What ships, according to that order, could you attack without previous warning?
DÖNITZ: At that time I could attack without warning all ships which were guarded either by naval vessels or which were under air cover. Furthermore, I was permitted to exercise armed force against any ship which, when stopped, sent radio messages, or resisted the order to stop, or did not obey the order to stop.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Now, there is no doubt that, a few weeks after the beginning of the war, the war against merchantmen was intensified. Did you know whether such an intensification was planned, and if you do, why it was planned?
DÖNITZ: I knew that the Naval Operations Staff intended, according to events, according to the development of the enemy’s tactics, to retaliate blow for blow, as it says or said in the order, by intensified action.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What were the measures of the enemy and, on the other hand, what were your own experiences with the measures taken by the enemy which led to an intensification of action?
DÖNITZ: Right at the beginning of the war it was our experience that all merchantmen not only took advantage of their radio installations when an attempt was made to stop them, but that they immediately sent messages as soon as they saw any U-boat on the horizon. It was absolutely clear, therefore, that all merchantmen were co-operating in the military intelligence service. Furthermore, only a few days after the beginning of the war we found out that merchantmen were armed and made use of their weapons.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What orders on the part of Germany resulted from these experiences?
DÖNITZ: They first brought about the order that merchantmen which sent radio messages on being stopped could be attacked without warning. They also brought about the order that merchantmen whose armament had been recognized beyond doubt, that is, whose armament one knew from British publication, could be attacked without warning.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: This order concerning attacks on armed merchantmen was issued on 4 October 1939; is that right?
DÖNITZ: I believe so.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was there a second order, soon after that, according to which all enemy merchantmen could be attacked, and why was that order issued?
DÖNITZ: I believe that the Naval Operations Staff decided on this order on the basis of the British publication which said that now the arming of merchantmen was completed. In addition, there was a broadcast by the British Admiralty on 1 October to the effect that the merchantmen had been directed to ram German U-boats and furthermore—as stated at the beginning—it was clear beyond doubt that every merchantman was part of the intelligence service of the enemy, and its radio messages at sight of a U-boat determined the use of surface or air forces.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you have reports about that from U-boats, according to which U-boats were actually endangered by these tactics of enemy merchantmen and were attacked by enemy surface or air forces?
DÖNITZ: Yes. I had received quite a number of reports in this connection, and since the German measures were always taken about 4 weeks after it had been recognized that the enemy employed these tactics, I had very serious losses in the meantime—in the period when I still had to keep to the one-sided and, for me, dangerous obligations.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: By these obligations, are you referring to the obligation to wage war against merchantmen according to the Prize Regulations during a period when the enemy’s merchant ships had abandoned their peaceful character?
DÖNITZ: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you protest later against the directives of the Naval Operations Staff which led to an intensification of the war on merchantmen, or did you approve these directives?
DÖNITZ: No, I did not protest against them. On the contrary, I considered them justified, because, as I said before, otherwise I would have had to remain bound to an obligation which was one-sided and meant serious losses for me.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was this intensification of the war against merchantmen by the order to fire on armed merchantmen, and later the order to attack all enemy merchantmen, based on the free judgment of the Naval Operations Staff, or was it a forced development?
DÖNITZ: This development, as I have said before, was entirely forced. If merchantmen are armed and make use of their arms, and if they send messages which summon protection, they force the U-boat to submerge and attack without warning.
That same forced development, in the areas which we patrolled, was also the case with the British submarines, and applied in exactly the same way to American and Russian submarines.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: If, on one side, a merchantman sends a message and opens fire, and on the other side the submarine, for that reason, attacks without warning, which side has the advantage of this development, according to your experience? The side of the merchantman or the side of the submarine?
DÖNITZ: In an ocean area where there is no constant patrolling by the enemy, by naval forces of any kind or by aircraft, as along the coast, the submarine has the advantage. But in all other areas the ship acquires the main attack weapons against a submarine, and the submarine is therefore compelled to treat that ship as a battleship, which means that it is forced to submerge and loses its speed. Therefore, in all ocean areas, with the exception of coastal waters which can be constantly controlled, the advantage of arms lies with the merchantman.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Are you of the opinion that the orders of the Naval Operations Staff actually remained within the limits of what was militarily necessary due to enemy measures, or did these orders go beyond military necessity?
DÖNITZ: They remained absolutely within the bounds of what was necessary. I have explained already that the resulting steps were always taken gradually and after very careful study by the Naval Operations Staff. This very careful study may also have been motivated by the fact that for political reasons any unnecessary intensification in the West was to be avoided.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral, these orders we have mentioned were based at that time only on German experiences and without an accurate knowledge of the orders which had been issued on the British side. Now, I should like to put these orders to you; we now have information on them through a ruling of the Tribunal, and I should like to ask you whether these individual orders coincide with your experiences or whether they are somewhat different. I submit the orders of the British Admiralty as Exhibit Dönitz-67. It is on Page 163 in Document Book 3. As you know, this is the Handbook of the British Navy of 1938, and I draw your attention to Page 164, to the paragraph on reporting the enemy.
DÖNITZ: There is no pagination here.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: It is D. M. S. 3-1-55, the paragraph on radio. The heading is “Reporting the Enemy.”
DÖNITZ: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I will read the paragraph to you:
“As soon as the master of a merchant ship realizes that a ship or aircraft in sight is an enemy, it is his first and most important duty to report the nature and position of the enemy by wireless telegraph. Such a report promptly made may be the means of saving not only the ship herself but many others; for it may give an opportunity for the destruction of her assailant by our warships or aircraft, an opportunity which might not recur.”
Then there are more details which I do not wish to read, on the manner and method, when and how these radio signals are to be given. Is this order in accordance with your experience?
DÖNITZ: Yes. In this order, there is not only a directive to send wireless signals if the ship is stopped by a U-boat—that alone would, according to international law, justify the U-boat in employing armed force against the ship—but beyond that it is stated that as soon as an enemy ship is in sight this signal is to be transmitted in order that the naval forces may attack in time.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: So this order is in accord with the experiences which our U-boats reported?
DÖNITZ: Entirely.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I shall draw your attention now to the Paragraph D. M. S. 2-VII, on Page 165, that is the paragraph on opening fire: “Conditions under which fire may be opened.”
“(a) Against enemy acting in accordance with international law.—As the armament is solely for the purpose of self-defense, it must only be used against an enemy who is clearly attempting to capture or sink the merchant ship. On the outbreak of war it should be assumed that the enemy will act in accordance with international law, and fire should therefore not be opened until he has made it plain that he intends to attempt capture. Once it is clear that resistance will be necessary if capture is to be averted, fire should be opened immediately.
“(b) Against enemy acting in defiance of international law.—If, as the war progresses, it unfortunately becomes clear that in defiance of international law the enemy has adopted a policy of attacking merchant ships without warning, it will then be permissible to open fire on an enemy vessel, submarine, or aircraft, even before she has attacked or demanded surrender, if to do so will tend to prevent her gaining a favorable position for attacking.”
Is this order, that is to say, the order “(a)” and “(b),” in accord with the experiences made?
DÖNITZ: In practice no difference can be established between “(a)” and “(b).” I should like to draw attention in this connection to D. M. S. 3-III, Page 167, under IV; that is the last paragraph of “(b)” of the number mentioned.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: One moment, do you mean “(b)-V”?
DÖNITZ: It says here “(b)-IV”. There...
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: That is not printed, Mr. President.
DÖNITZ: “In ships fitted with a defensive armament, open fire to keep the enemy at a distance”—that is (b)-IV—“if you consider that he is clearly intending to effect a capture and that he is approaching so close as to endanger your chances of escape.”
That means therefore that as soon as the ship sights a U-boat, which during war must be assumed to be there for a reason to effect a capture—the ship will, in its own defense, open fire as soon as it comes within range; that is when the submarine has come within range of its guns. The ship, in using its guns for an offensive action, can act in no other way.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral, did the armed enemy vessels act then in the manner which you have described; that is, did they really fire as soon as a submarine came within range?
DÖNITZ: Yes. As early as—according to my recollection, the first report came from a U-boat about that on 6 September 1939.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: With this order, however, we find a further supplement under AMS 1-118, dated 13 June 1940, on Page 165, and here we read:
“With reference to D.M.S. Part 1, Article 53, it is now considered clear that in submarine and aerial operations the enemy has adopted a policy of attacking merchant ships without warning. Subparagraph (b) of this article should therefore be regarded as being in force.”
That means, then, that the order which we read before, “(b)” was to be considered in effect only from 13 June 1940. Do you mean to say that actually before that, from the very beginning, you acted according to the order “(b)”?
DÖNITZ: I have already stated that between an offensive and defensive use of armament on the part of a ship against a submarine, there is practically no difference at all, that it is a purely theoretical differentiation. But even if one did differentiate between them, then beyond doubt the Reuter report—I believe dated 9 September—which said incorrectly that we were conducting unlimited submarine warfare was designated to inform ships’ captains that now case “(b)” was valid.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I put to you now a directive on the handling of depth charges on merchant ships. It is on Page 168, the reference list. The heading is “Reference List (D),” the date is “14 September 1939.” I read:
“The following instructions have been sent out to all W.P.S.’s: It has now been decided to fit a single depth charge chute, with hand release gear and supplied with 3 charges, in all armed merchant vessels of 12 knots or over.”
Then there are more details and at the end a remark about the training of the crews in the use of depth charges. The distribution list shows numerous naval officers.
Did you experience this use of depth charges by merchant vessels and were such depth charge attacks by merchant ships observed?
DÖNITZ: Yes, repeatedly.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Speaking of a ship with a speed of 12 knots or more, can one say that a depth charge attack against a U-boat is a defensive measure?
DÖNITZ: No. Each depth charge attack against a submarine is definitely and absolutely an offensive action; for the submarine submerges and is harmless under water, while the surface vessel which wants to carry out the depth charge attack approaches as closely as possible to the position where it assumes the U-boat to be, in order to drop the depth charge as accurately as possible on top of the U-boat. A destroyer, that is, a warship, does not attack a submarine in any different way.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You are therefore basing the manner in which you attacked enemy ships on these tactics employed by enemy merchantmen. However, neutral ships also suffered, and the Prosecution charges the German U-boat command expressly with this. What do you have to say to that?
DÖNITZ: Neutral merchantmen, according to the political orders, the orders of the Naval Operations Staff, were only attacked without warning when they were found in operational zones which had been definitely designated as such, or naturally only when they did not act as neutrals should, but like ships which were participating in the war.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The Prosecution has offered a document in evidence, according to which, in certain ocean areas, attack without warning against neutrals was authorized, beginning January 1940. I am referring to Prosecution Document GB-194. I will read to you the sentence which the Prosecution is holding against you.
THE PRESIDENT: Can you tell us where it is?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: It is in the British document book, Page 30, Mr. President. In the document book of the Prosecution, Page 30.
[Turning to the defendant.] I will read you the sentence which is held against you:
“In the Bristol Channel, attack without warning has been authorized against all ships where it is possible to claim that mine hits have taken place.”
This order is dated 1 January 1940. Can you tell me whether at that time neutrals had already actually been warned against using this shipping lane?
DÖNITZ: Yes. Germany had sent a note to the neutrals on 24 November 1939, warning them against using these lanes and advising neutrals to use the methods of the United States, whereby American ships—in order to avoid any incidents—had been forbidden to enter the waters around England.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I will hand you the note of which you speak, and I will at the same time submit it to the Tribunal as Exhibit Dönitz-73, to be found on Page 206 of the document book. It is in Document Book 4, Page 206.
This is an excerpt from the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff, dated 24 November 1939. It has the following text:
“To the Missions, according to enclosed list.
“Telegram.
“Supplement to wire release of 22 October.
“Please inform the Government there of the following:
“Since the warning issued on (date to be inserted here) regarding the use of English and French ships, the following two new facts are to be recorded:
“a) The United States has forbidden its ships to sail in a definitely defined area.
“b) Numerous enemy merchant ships have been armed. It is known that these armed ships have instructions to use their weapons aggressively and to ram U-boats.
“These two new facts give the Reich Government occasion to renew and emphasize its warning, that in view of the increasingly frequent engagements, waged with all means of modern war technique, in waters around the British Isles and in the vicinity of the French coast, the safety of neutral ships in this area can no longer be taken for granted.
“Therefore the German Government urgently recommends the choice of the route south and east of the German-proclaimed danger zone, when crossing the North Sea.
“In order to maintain peaceful shipping for neutral states and in order to avoid loss of life and property for the neutrals, the Reich Government furthermore feels obliged to recommend urgently legislative measures following the pattern of the U.S. Government, which in apprehension of the dangers of modern warfare, forbade its ships to sail in an exactly defined area, in which, according to the words of the President of the United States, the traffic of American ships may seem imperiled by belligerent action.
“The Reich Government must point out that it rejects any responsibility for consequences brought about by disregarding recommendations and warnings.”
This is the note to which you referred, Admiral?
DÖNITZ: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In other words, in your opinion, these sinkings in the Bristol Channel could be carried out lawfully as from 1 January?
DÖNITZ: Yes; these ocean areas were clearly limited areas in which hostilities took place continuously on both sides. The neutrals had been warned expressly against using these areas. If they entered this war area, they had to run the risk of being damaged. England proceeded likewise in its operational areas in our waters.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Since you considered these sinkings legal, why was the order given to attack without being sighted, if possible, in order to maintain the fiction that mine hits had taken place? Doesn’t that indicate a bad conscience?
DÖNITZ: No. During a war there is no basic obligation to inform the enemy with what means one does one’s fighting. In other words, this is not a question of legality, but a question of military or political expediency.
England in her operational areas did not inform us either as to the means of fighting she uses or did use; and I know how many headaches this caused me when I was Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, later, in endeavoring to employ economically the small means we had.
That is the principle. At that time when, as Commander of U-boats, I received this order to simulate mine hits where possible, I considered this as militarily expedient, because the counterintelligence were left in doubt as to whether mine sweepers or U-boat defense means were to be employed.
In other words, it was a military advantage for the nation conducting the war, and today I am of the opinion that political reasons also may have influenced this decision, with the object of avoiding complications with neutral countries.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: How could complications with neutral countries come into being, in your opinion, if this naval warfare measure was a legal one?
DÖNITZ: During the first World War we had experienced what part is played by propaganda. Therefore I think it possible that our Government, our political leaders, for this reason, too, may have issued this order.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: From your own experience you know nothing about these political reasons?
DÖNITZ: Nothing at all.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Up to now you have spoken about the orders which were received by the U-boats, first for combating enemy ships, and secondly for combating or searching neutral ships. Were these orders then actually executed? That was primarily your responsibility, was it not?
DÖNITZ: No U-boat commander purposely transgressed an order, or failed to execute it. Of course, considering the large number of naval actions, which ran into several thousands within the 5½ years of war, a very few individual cases occurred in which, by mistake, such an order was not followed.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: How could such a mistake occur?
DÖNITZ: Every sailor knows how easily mistakes in identification can occur at sea; not only during a war, but also in peacetime, due to visibility, weather conditions, and other factors.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Is it also possible that submarines operated on the borders of the operational areas, although they were already outside these borders?
DÖNITZ: That is, of course, also possible. For again every sailor knows that after a few days of bad weather, for instance, inaccuracy in the ship’s course happens very easily. This occurs, however, not only in the case of the submarine, but also of the ship, which perhaps is under the impression of having been outside the operational area when torpedoed. It is very difficult to establish the fact in such cases.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What steps did you, as Commander of U-boats, take when you heard of such a case, a case in which a U-boat had transgressed its orders, even if by mistake?
DÖNITZ: The main thing was the preventive measures, and that was done through training them to be thorough and to investigate quietly and carefully before the commander took action. Moreover, this training had already been carried on in peacetime, so that our U-boat organization bore the motto: “We are a respectable firm.”
The second measure was that during the war every commander, before leaving port, and after returning from his mission, had to report to me personally. That is, before leaving port he had to be briefed by me.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I beg your pardon, Admiral. That did not continue when you were Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, did it?
DÖNITZ: That was limited after 1943, after I had become Commander-in-Chief. Even then it did continue. In any case, it was the definite rule during my time as Commander of U-boats, so that a commander’s mission was considered completed and satisfactory only after he had reported to me in full detail. If, on such an occasion, I could establish negligence, then I made my decision according to the nature of the case, as to whether disciplinary action or court-martial proceedings and punishment had to take place.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I have found here an entry GB-198, on Page 230, in Document Book 4 of the Prosecution, which I would like to read to you. This is a war diary of the Commander of U-boats, that is, yourself.
I read the entry of 25 September 1942:
“U-512 reports that the Monte Corbea was recognized as a neutral ship before being torpedoed. Assumed suspicions of being a camouflaged English ship are insufficient and do not justify the sinking. The commander will have to stand court-martial for his conduct. All boats at sea will be informed.”
Two days later, on 27 September 1942, a radio signal was sent to all. I read:
“Radio signal to all:
“The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy has personally and expressly ordered anew that all U-boat commanders are to comply exactly with the orders concerning the treatment of neutral ships. Violations of these orders will have incalculable political consequences. This order is to be disseminated at once to all commanders.”
Will you please tell me what resulted from the court-martial which you ordered here?
DÖNITZ: I had sent my radio signal to the commander stating that after his return he would have to be answerable before a court-martial, because of the sinking. The commander did not return from this mission with his boat. Therefore this court-martial did not take place.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you, in any other case, have experience as to how the courts-martial treated the difficult task of the U-boat commanders when you had ordered a court-martial?
DÖNITZ: Yes. I remember a case against Kapitänleutnant Kraemer, who had to be acquitted by the court-martial because it was proven that, before the attack, before firing the shot, he had taken note once more through the periscope of the identification of the ship—it was a German blockade-runner—and, in spite of that, was of the opinion that it was a different ship, an enemy ship, and that he was justified in sinking it. In other words, it was not a case of negligence, and therefore in this case he was acquitted.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Taking into consideration all the results of your measures for training and punishing personnel, do you have the impression that enough was done to make the U-boat commanders obey your orders, or did the U-boat commanders in the long run disobey your orders?
DÖNITZ: I do not think it is necessary to discuss this question at all. The simple facts speak for themselves. During the 5½ years, several thousand naval actions were engaged in by submarines. The number of incidents is an extremely small fraction and I know that this result is only due to the unified leadership of all submarine commanders, to co-ordination and also to their proper training and their responsibility.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The Prosecution has offered a document, GB-195 on Page 32 of the Prosecution’s document book. In this document is entered an order of the Führer, dated 18 July 1941, and it reads as follows:
“In the original operational area, which corresponds in extent with the U.S. prohibited zone for U.S. ships and which is not touched by the U.S.-Iceland route, attacks on ships under American or British escort or U.S. merchantmen sailing without escort are authorized.”
In connection with this order by the Führer, the Prosecution, Admiral, termed your attitude cynical and opportunistic. Will you please explain to the Tribunal what the meaning of this order actually is?
DÖNITZ: In August 1940 Germany had declared this operational area in English waters. U.S. ships were, however, expressly excluded from attack without warning in this operational area because, as I believe, the political leaders wanted to avoid any possibility of an incident with the U.S.A. I said the political leaders. The Prosecution has accused me, in my treatment and attitude, my differing attitude toward the neutrals, of having a masterful agility in adapting myself, that is guided by cynicism and opportunism. It is clear that the attitude of a state toward neutrals is a purely political affair, and that this relation is decided exclusively by the political leadership, particularly in a nation that is at war.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You mean to say, in other words, that you had nothing to do with the handling of this question?
DÖNITZ: As a soldier I had not the slightest influence on the question of how the political leadership believed they had to treat this or that neutral. Regarding this particular case, however, from knowledge of the orders I received through the Chief of the Naval Operations Staff from the political leadership, I should like to say the following: I believe that the political leadership did everything to avoid any incident on the high seas with the United States. First, I have already stated that the U-boats were actually forbidden even to stop American ships. Second...
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: One moment, Admiral. To stop them where, in the operational area or outside the operational area?
DÖNITZ: At first, everywhere.
Second, that the American 300-mile safety zone was recognized without any question by Germany, although according to the existing international law only a three-mile zone was authorized.
Third, that...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, an interesting distinction which may be drawn between the United States and other neutrals is not relevant to this Trial, is it? What difference does it make?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In connection with the document cited by me, GB-195, the Prosecution has made the accusation that Admiral Dönitz conducted his U-boat warfare cynically and opportunistically: that is, in that he treated one neutral well and the other one badly. This accusation has been made expressly, and I want to give Admiral Dönitz the opportunity to make a statement in reply to this accusation. He has already said that he had nothing to do with the handling of this question.
THE PRESIDENT: What more can he say than that?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, according to the principles of the Statute, a soldier is also made responsible for the orders which he executed. For this reason it is my opinion that he must be able to state whether on his side he had the impression that he received cynical and opportunistic orders or whether on the contrary he did not have the impression that everything was done to avoid a conflict and that the orders which were given actually were necessary and right.
THE PRESIDENT: You have dealt with this order about the United States ships, now.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes, I have almost finished.
[Turning to the defendant.] Did you want to say something more about the third point, Admiral?
DÖNITZ: I wanted to mention two or three more points on this subject.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I think that is possible.
THE PRESIDENT: You may go on, but we hope that you will deal with this point shortly. It appears to the Tribunal to be very unimportant.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes, Sir.
DÖNITZ: For instance, I had suggested that mines be laid before Halifax, the British port of Nova Scotia, and before Reykjavik, both bases being important for warships and merchant shipping. The political leaders, the Führer, rejected this because he wanted to avoid every possibility of friction with the United States.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: May I formulate the question this way, that you, from the orders for the treatment of U.S. ships, in no way had the impression that opportunism or cynicism prevailed here, but that everything was done with the greatest restraint in order to avoid a conflict with the United States?
DÖNITZ: Yes. This went so far, in fact, that when the American destroyers in the summer of 1941 received orders to attack German submarines, that is, before war started, when they were still neutral and I was forbidden to fight back, I was then forced to forbid the submarines in this area to attack even British destroyers, in order to avoid having a submarine mistake an American for a British ship.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn.