Morning Session
MARSHAL: May it please the Tribunal, the report is made that Defendant Schirach is absent.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, with the permission of the Tribunal, I shall now state my opinion on the documents to which the Prosecution has objected.
Before I refer to the individual documents, I should like to say two things concerning the groups.
First: I ask the Tribunal to recall that in general questions on naval warfare I also defend Admiral Raeder. I already mentioned, when I first applied for documents, that all the charges against naval warfare cannot be dealt with separately as concerning Dönitz or Raeder; therefore Dr. Siemers and I agreed that I should deal with these charges together. I ask the Tribunal in evaluating the question to take into consideration whether the charges are relevant.
Second: A large number of the objections which the Prosecution has made are directed against the fact that the war measures of the Allies are mentioned in the documents. I believe that I have been completely misunderstood especially in this field. I am not interested and it is not my intention to disparage any war methods, and I shall demonstrate later in detail that the documents are not suitable for this. But I should like to state from the beginning that I want to show with these documents what naval warfare was really like. I could not demonstrate this by showing only the German methods; but I also have to submit to this Tribunal the methods of the Allies in order to prove that the German methods, which are similar to the Allies’ methods, were legal. The Tribunal has even recognized this to be correct by approving the use of British Admiralty orders and an interrogatory of the Commander-in-Chief of the American Navy, Admiral Nimitz.
I am very grateful that these documents were approved; and my own documents in this field are along the same line.
I shall now refer to the individual documents against which objections have been raised; first to the Document Dönitz-5, which is in Document Book 1, Page 7.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, the Tribunal has examined all these documents; so I think you can deal with them as far as possible in groups.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Very well.
THE PRESIDENT: If possible, follow the order of Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, it will not be possible for me to follow the order of Sir David, because then I shall have to return repeatedly to the line of ideas which I have already mentioned. I believe it will facilitate and speed up the proceedings if I form groups according to the order in which I intended to present them; and I should like to remind the Tribunal that that was expressly approved for me yesterday.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, it would be very much more convenient to the Tribunal if you followed the order in the groups. But if you find that impossible, the Tribunal would not make it a matter of an order.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I should be very grateful, Mr. President, if I could keep the order which I had prepared. It corresponds to the order of Sir David.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Concerning the question of aggressive war, I have another document to submit which is Dönitz-5. It is an excerpt from Documente der Deutschen Politik, and concerns the question of bases in Norway. I consider this document relevant because it shows that on the part of the British Admiralty an interrogatory was prepared on the question of the necessity of such a base, which corresponds exactly to the one with which the Prosecution has charged Admiral Dönitz in Document GB-83 as proof for aggressive war.
Thereby I wish to say that the answers on such interrogatories have nothing to do with any considerations concerning an aggressive war, which a subordinate office could not even make. The document is in Group 2 of Sir David’s classification.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you saying that the footnote stands on the same footing as the other part of the document?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The footnote is the essential part for me, Mr. President. I had the other part copied only to keep the connection with the footnote.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, who wrote the footnote? Doesn’t the footnote represent information which was not before the German Admiralty at the time?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: No, no.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, does the footnote state that it was before the German Admiralty at the time?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: No, Mr. President. The footnote was not known to the German Admiralty at the time.
THE PRESIDENT: That is what I said; the footnote was not known to the German Admiralty. Who wrote it?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The footnote is part of this document, which can be found in the collection Dokumente der Deutschen Politik...
THE PRESIDENT: Is the Defendant Ribbentrop the author of it?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: No, Mr. President. The Dokumente der Deutschen Politik are an official collection, and the footnotes have been written by the editor of that collection on the basis of official material.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I see.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Now I come to the documents concerning naval warfare in general. A large part of those are in Sir David’s Group 3. The first document is Dönitz-60, on Page 152. It concerns an American note of 6 October 1939, and is in connection with the Document Dönitz-61, to which the Prosecution has not objected. It is in Volume III of the document book, Mr. President. Volume III, Page 152. This document is an American reply to the document which you will find two pages before this, on Page 150. Both documents deal with the warning of neutral nations against suspicious actions of their merchant vessels. The question is relevant in respect to Exhibit GB-193 of the Prosecution. In this document a charge is made against an order that ships which act suspiciously—that is, proceed without lights—should be sunk.
The next document is from Sir David’s Group 1, Dönitz-69, on Page 170, in Book 3. It is an excerpt from several copies of the Völkischer Beobachter of November and December 1939. In these copies are published lists of armed British and French passenger ships. This document also is in connection with a preceding document and the one following. All these documents deal with the question of treatment of passenger ships by the naval warfare command.
THE PRESIDENT: I think you had better give the numbers of the documents. You said the next document and the one before it. I think you had better give the numbers of the documents.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes. That is Document 69, Mr. President, Dönitz-69, and it is on Page 170, in Book 3.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I know it is, but you said something about documents that were akin, or some words to that effect, to the documents next to it.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: It is in relation to Dönitz-68, on Page 169 of the document book.
THE PRESIDENT: Was that objected to?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: No.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, then, you need not bother with it.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I only wanted to show, Mr. President, that this document is only part of the proof about the treatment of passenger ships, and should prove that the German press had warned against the using of armed passenger ships. The next documents objected to by the Prosecution concern Group 3, “The Contraband and Control System.” These are the documents Dönitz-60, from Page 173 to Page 197 of the document book, and I should like to form three groups of these.
The first group, from Page 173 to Page 181, concerns the question of contraband. I consider this question relevant because Document GB-191 has stated that the German U-boats sank a large number of Allied ships while these ships were on a legal merchant trip. The development of rules against contraband will show the Tribunal that from 12 December 1939 on, a legal import to England no longer existed but actually only contraband. These documents concerning contraband are important, furthermore, for the German point of view, which became known under the slogan of “Hunger Blockade” and which played an important part in all German deliberations about the conduct and the intensification of naval warfare. The documents contain in detail the German contraband regulations, the British regulations, and two German statements concerning these contraband regulations.
The next group is Dönitz-60, from Page 183 to Page 191. That concerns the regulations about putting into control ports; that is to say, the British Admiralty removed the control over neutral merchant shipping from the high seas into certain British ports. This group is also relevant in connection with Exhibit GB-191 because in this document the German Naval Operations Staff is accused of carrying out war measures against England without consideration of the danger to neutrals. The group which I have dealt with shows that it was not possible for the British Admiralty either to take war measures without endangering the neutrals, because, by the establishment of control ports, the neutrals were forced into German zones of operations and thereby, of course, endangered. This danger was confirmed by the neutrals themselves, and the documents on Pages 186 to 189 will prove this.
An excerpt from the document of the Prosecution GB-194 on Page 198 belongs to that same group. It contains a renewed American protest against the control ports.
The third group goes from Page 192 to 197, also Dönitz-60, and is concerned with the question of an export embargo. This export blockade was declared against Germany in an Order in Council of 27 November 1939. This measure is important in the question of legal trade because thereby legal export was no longer possible either. The export blockade therefore is a basis for the total blockade which was later declared by Germany against England. Since the Exhibit GB-191 disputes the legality of a total blockade I must prove the basic grounds and also the export blockade.
The next document objected to is Dönitz-72 on Page 185. It deals with a note by Great Britain to Belgium of 22 September. In this note the British Government states that they will not tolerate any increase of trade between Belgium and Germany. I use it as evidence for the fact that the economic pressure which can be seen from this note was a natural and accepted means of warfare. This question is relevant concerning the document of the Prosecution, Exhibit GB-224. There on Page 6 under heading (c) it is stated that Germany would necessarily have to exert economic pressure on the neutrals, and these statements were submitted by the Prosecution as measures contrary to international law.
The next group contains the following documents: Dönitz-60, Page 204; Dönitz-72, Page 207; Dönitz-60, Page 208; Dönitz-60, Page 209; and Dönitz-75, Page 218. All of these documents concern the development of German zones of operation and the recognition of the zones of operation which were declared by the opponents. These documents are relevant for the question of the treatment of neutrals. In Exhibit GB-191 the charge was made against the Naval Operations Staff that without any consideration it had given the order to torpedo neutral ships. My evidence shall prove that that happened only in those areas which the neutrals had been warned against using and that this is a permissible measure of warfare, as shown also by the practices of the enemy.
I should like to refer individually to two documents which concern the practices of the opposing side. Dönitz-60, Page 208, concerns the statement by Mr. Churchill of 8 May 1940 regarding the torpedoing of ships in the Jutland area. This document and the next one, Dönitz-60, Page 209, I wanted to put to a witness. Dönitz-60, Page 209, concerns a French statement about a danger zone near Italy. I am using both documents as evidence for the practical state of naval warfare and should like to discuss them with a witness. It goes without saying that the methods of the enemy also had some influence on German practices.
The next group contains documents Dönitz-60, Pages 219, 222, and 224. They deal with the British system of navicerts. The navicerts, as can be seen from these documents, were certificates which all neutral ships had to get from the British Consulate before they could put to sea. Ships which refused to use navicerts were confiscated. The navicert system is relevant in two respects.
First, it is mentioned in the German statement concerning the total blockade against England on 17 August 1940 as one reason for that blockade. Secondly, from the German point of view it was a nonneutral act on the part of the neutrals if they submitted to that system. This question plays a considerable part in determining to what extent Germany herself from that time on took consideration of neutrals in the zones of operations. Finally, the navicert system shows the development of an entirely new naval warfare law, and that is a very important subject for me.
The next document is Dönitz-60, Page 256. It is a French decree of 11 November 1939 concerning the creation of insignia for the crews of merchant ships who could be mobilized. This document is relevant for the question of whether the crews of merchant ships at that stage of the war should be considered combatants or noncombatants. The details of the decree seem to me to show that they would have to be considered combatants.
With the two following documents I should like to object to the probative value of the document of the Prosecution, Exhibit GB-191. This concerns my Documents Dönitz-81, Page 233, and Dönitz-82, Page 234. I had said that these two documents would dispute the probative value of the Document GB-191. That is the report of the British Foreign Office about German naval warfare. On Page 1 this report attacks Article 72 of the German Prize Regulations in which it states that ships can be sunk if they cannot be brought into port. Document GB-191 says that this is contrary to the traditional British conception.
My Document Dönitz-81 shows the sinking of the German freighter Olinda by the British cruiser Ajax on the first day of the war. It is only one example to show that the statement made in the report of the British Foreign Office, according to which the British fleet had not sunk ships if they could not or would not bring them to port, is incorrect.
In the same report of the British Foreign Office, German U-boats are accused of never differentiating between armed and unarmed merchant ships. Later I shall submit to the Court the orders concerning armed and unarmed merchant ships.
By my next document I merely wish to defend the U-boats against having each mistake interpreted as bad intent. Therefore, in Dönitz-82, I submit a statement by the British Foreign Office which confirms that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, in some cases to distinguish between armed merchant ships and unarmed merchant ships.
The next document, Dönitz-85, Page 242, contains a statement by the American Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Knox, concerning the question of keeping secret the sinking of German U-boats by American naval forces. For me it is essential in connection with the document of the Prosecution, Exhibit GB-194. In this document the measures which the naval war staff took to keep secret the sinkings by U-boats, that is, using as a pretense the fiction of sinking through mines, are presented as fraudulent. I should like to give this as an example that during a war military measures can naturally be kept secret, but that that is no proof for or against their legality.
The next document is Dönitz-89, on Page 246. It is a list drawn up by the Naval Operations Staff of violations of neutrality committed by the United States from September 1939 to 29 September 1941. The document is essential to counter the document of the Prosecution, Exhibit GB-195, which contains an order from Adolf Hitler of July 1941 in which it is stated that in the future even the merchant ships of the United States must be treated within the German zone of blockade in the same manner as all other neutral ships, that is to say, they should be sunk.
The Prosecution has interpreted this order as proof of a cynical and opportunistic conduct of U-boat warfare by Admiral Dönitz. I wish to show, by submitting this list, that from the German point of view it was completely understandable and is justifiable if in the summer of 1941 one did not grant the United States a better position than any other neutral.
Now I come to the subject of the treatment of shipwrecked survivors. These documents are in Volume I of the document book. The first document, Dönitz-9, on Page 11, offers a description of over-scrupulous measures taken by German U-boats to save survivors in September and October 1939. This is essential for Admiral Dönitz...
THE PRESIDENT: There must surely be a group of these, is there not? Haven’t you got a number of documents which deal with shipwrecks?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes, there are a number of documents.
THE PRESIDENT: Can you not deal with them all together?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes, Mr. President, I can assemble them. They are Documents Dönitz-9, Page 11, Dönitz-10, Page 12, Dönitz-12, Page 18, and Dönitz-13, Pages 19 to 26, and Page 49, and Dönitz-19 on Page 34. All these documents are related to Exhibit GB-196 of the Prosecution. That is an order from the winter of 1939-1940 in which the rescue measures of U-boats are limited. Sir David objected to that group that it was not important if, after this order of the winter 1939-1940, rescues were still carried out. I cannot share this opinion. If the Prosecution accuses Admiral Dönitz of having given an order about the limitation of rescue measures in the winter of 1939-1940, then it is essential to point out for what reasons such an order was issued and what practical consequences it had in fact. It is my assertion that that order can be traced, first, to the fighting conditions of the U-boats along the British coasts, and second, to over-scrupulous rescue measures taken by the commanders. The order did not prohibit measures of rescue generally, and that will be shown by the statements made by the commanders, which I have submitted under Dönitz-13.
THE PRESIDENT: Is it possible for you to give us a page where we can find these GB documents? For instance, GB-196.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes. It is in the British document book on Page 33. In the document book of the Prosecution, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: GB-195?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Page 32, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I should like to state my position on a formal objection. Some of these statements are not sworn statements. I refer to Article 19 of the Charter, according to which the Tribunal is to use all matters of evidence which have probative value. I believe that a written report by an officer about his activity as commanding officer has probative value, even if it is not sworn to. A report of this kind before a German naval court would be accepted in evidence without question.
The last document in this group, Dönitz-19, Page 34, concerns the document of the Prosecution, Exhibit GB-199. It is a radio message on Page 36 of the British document book of the Prosecution. It concerns a radio message which the U-boat commanded by Kapitänleutnant Schacht received from Admiral Dönitz, and deals with the rescue or nonrescue of Englishmen and Italians.
Document Dönitz-19 is a log book of Schacht’s U-boat and shows, first, the armament and crew of the Laconia, whose crew is the one in question, and second, it explains why comparatively few of the numerous Italians and comparatively many of the less numerous Englishmen were rescued. The events were known to Admiral Dönitz from radio messages.
Document Dönitz-29...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, as I told you, the Tribunal has read all of these documents and examined them, and therefore it isn’t necessary for you to go into them as a small group, and it isn’t necessary for you to go into each document, if you will indicate the nature of the groups.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Then I should like to mention the Documents Dönitz-29 on Pages 54 to 59 of the document book; Dönitz-31, Page 64; Dönitz-32 on Page 65; Dönitz-33 on Page 66; Dönitz-37 on Page 78; Dönitz-38 on Page 80 and Dönitz-40 on Page 86; these documents are also concerned with the subject of survivors. Dönitz-29 is concerned with a statement of the witness Heisig.
The Prosecution has declared that I could not question the character of the witness Heisig because I had not made that point during the cross-examination of Heisig. In this connection I wish to state that in my opinion I attacked the credibility of Heisig during the cross-examination as far as it was possible at the time. I knew of the existence of that witness only three days before he appeared here.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, you are now proceeding to deal with each document. You have given us quite a number of documents which all fall in this group, of the treatment of shipwrecks and we have already seen those documents and therefore, we can consider them as a group. We do not need to have these details about the question of the credibility of Heisig, which is already before us.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, I believe it is very difficult to judge the relevancy of documents if I am not permitted to say what the connection is. For instance, the next three documents, Dönitz-31, 32 and 33, are related to GB-200. That is an order by the Flag Officer of the U-boats dealing with the treatment of so-called rescue ships. The Tribunal will recall that the Prosecution has stated it did not object to the order as such with reference to the sinking of rescue ships, but only to the tendency to kill the survivors also by sinking rescue ships.
My documents pertaining to this issue are to show that thus they apply moral standards which do not exist in wartime. I wish to show this comparison with the sea rescue planes. The sea rescue planes were rightfully shot down by the British Air Force, because there was no agreement which prohibited that. The British Air Force was therefore naturally not kept from shooting down rescue planes by moral consideration, if international law permitted it; and we have exactly the same point of view concerning the rescue ships.
In the case of the sinking of the steamer Steuben, I should like to correct an error. That is Document Dönitz-33. It does not deal, as Sir David mentioned yesterday, with the sinking of a hospital ship by a Russian U-boat, but it concerns the sinking of a German transport ship which carried wounded. This sinking was, therefore, completely justified and I would like to show with this document that the Naval Operations Staff did not for a moment consider it unjustified. I believe, Mr. President, that I shall have to speak in more detail about the Documents Dönitz-37, 38, and 40, for it is precisely these documents which have been objected to by the Prosecution, because they show the conduct of the Allies in certain war measures.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, as I have told you more than once, the Tribunal does not wish to hear you on each individual document. We have already considered the documents and we want you to deal with them in groups. You have already given us the documents in a group and have indicated to what subject they relate.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, may I at least mention the documents of the Prosecution to which my documents refer?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Dönitz-37 refers to a document of the Prosecution, Exhibit GB-638. That is the statement by Admiral Dönitz concerning the case of the Athenia. At the end of that statement the question of the punishment of the U-boat commander is mentioned and the Prosecution apparently accuses Admiral Dönitz of not punishing the commander except in a disciplinary manner. I want to prove with this Document Dönitz-37 that a commanding officer will tolerate certain war measures once even if they were not correct or at least partly not correct.
Dönitz-38 is in connection with Document Dönitz-39, which has not been objected to by the Prosecution. It brings out only one detail from the Document Dönitz-39. This document states the attitude of the Naval Operations Staff to alleged reports about the Allies’ firing on survivors and similar incidents. By Dönitz-38 I only intend to show that the very careful attitude of the Naval Operations Staff was not based on lack of proof for they even had affidavits to prove it, and in spite of that rejected any possibility of reprisals.
Dönitz-40 is in connection with Document Dönitz-42 which I submitted and against which no objection has been raised. In this document quite sober considerations are raised as to whether survivors could be fired on or not. I should like to show that such considerations perhaps appear inhumane and impossible after a war, but that during war such questions are examined and in certain cases are answered in the affirmative, according to military necessity.
The next two documents, Göring-7, on Page 89, and C-21, on Page 91, deal with the document of the Prosecution, Exhibit GB-205. That was a radio message concerning the sinking of an Allied sailing cutter. GB-205 is on Page 53 of the Prosecution’s document book. The Prosecution in connection with this document has accused our naval warfare command of trying to terrorize the crews of neutral ships. Both my documents, Göring-7 and C-21, give only a few examples to the effect that that terrorizing is nothing illegal but that naturally each belligerent in taking military measures considers the psychological effect of these measures on the enemy.
The next group is Document Dönitz-43, on Page 95; Dönitz-90, on Page 258, and Dönitz-67, on Page 96. They all deal with the subject of whether a ship is obliged to carry out rescues if this would endanger the ship itself, and relates to the document of the Prosecution, GB-196 on Page 33 of the document book of the Prosecution and GB-199 on Page 36 of the Prosecution’s book. They show first the methods of the British navy...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, you have told us the subject they relate to. That is to say, they relate to the subject whether a ship is obliged to rescue if in danger, and that, you say, is an answer to GB-196 and 199. Why should you tell us anything more than that?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: If that is sufficient, then I shall proceed, Mr. President. The last document in this group is Dönitz-53, Page 99. It is a statement signed by some 60 U-boat commanders from an English prisoner-of-war camp, and it deals with the fact that they never received an order to kill survivors. The Prosecution objected to it because it was considered too general and was not sworn to. I believe that it contains a very concrete statement concerning the alleged order for destruction. Furthermore, it is an official report by the German commanders as prisoners of war to their superior, the English camp commandant; and I received it through the British War Office. I request the Tribunal particularly to approve this document, because it has a high probative and moral value for myself and for my client.
The last group of the documents objected to comes under the heading “Conspiracy.” It is in the document book, Volume II, Mr. President, Dönitz-47, and relates to Exhibit GB-212. Dönitz-47 is on Page 120. The document of the Prosecution is Exhibit GB-212. On Page 75 an incident is mentioned, namely, that Admiral Dönitz approved the fact that a traitor in a prisoner-of-war camp was done away with. Dönitz-47 will show that the removal of traitors is an emergency measure which is approved by all governments in time of war.
Dönitz-48 deals with the subject of the treatment of prisoners of war. It is related to the document of the Prosecution, Exhibit GB-209. Dönitz-48 is on Page 122 in my document book, and GB-209 is on Page 68 of the document book of the Prosecution. In connection with GB-209, which deals with the possibility of abandoning the Geneva Convention, the Prosecution accuses Dönitz of wanting to risk the lives of 150,000 American and over 50,000 British prisoners of war without scruple. In my opinion, it is not sufficient merely to dispute such a statement which is made by the Prosecution, but I must prove that those prisoners of war for whom Admiral Dönitz himself was responsible were not only treated according to international law but in an exemplary manner and as can be seen from a British statement, which is contained in evidence, “with fairness and consideration.”
The next document Dönitz-49 deals with the treatment of native populations. It is on Page 130. It is relevant to the documents of the Prosecution GB-210, Prosecution document book Page 69, and GB-211, Prosecution document book Page 72. According to these two documents of the Prosecution Admiral Dönitz is connected with the conspiracy for committing crimes against the native populations of occupied territories. Here again, I would like to show that in that sector for which he was personally responsible, he did everything necessary to protect the inhabitants of the occupied territories. Therefore I have submitted evidence concerning the sentences imposed by the naval courts for the protection of the inhabitants, which have been confirmed by Admiral Dönitz even in the case of death sentences against German soldiers.
The Prosecution states that this document is also very general. The document has an appendix with about 80 individual examples of sentences. I have not included these examples, in order to save the translators this work; but if the Tribunal considers it necessary, I will certainly have that appendix translated.
The last group contains Dönitz-51, on Page 134, and Dönitz-52, on Page 135. They are in connection with the Prosecution’s Document GB-188, on Page 10 of the British document book. That is the speech made by Admiral Dönitz on the occasion of Adolf Hitler’s death. In connection with that document and another, the Prosecution has accused him of being a fanatical Nazi and, as such, of prolonging the war at the expense of the men, women, and children of his country. The very documents of the Prosecution, however, show that he considered a delay of capitulation necessary in order to make it possible to get as many people as possible from the East to the West and thus bring them to safety.
The Documents Dönitz-51 and Dönitz-52 will prove that in fact many hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of German people were brought to safety during these last weeks of the war.
THE PRESIDENT: We shall see that from the documents presumably. That is part of the details in the documents, isn’t it, what you say?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I do not need to say anything further about it, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Are these all the documents? Dr. Kranzbühler, the Tribunal is inclined to think that it would save time after the Tribunal has ruled upon these documents, if you called the Defendant Dönitz first. Would you be willing to do that?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, I was not prepared for it, but I am in a position to do so.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the object of it of course is to try and save time, and the Tribunal thinks that in the course of the examination of the defendant a considerable number of these documents might possibly be dealt with in the course of direct and cross-examination.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes, Mr. President. The difficulty, however, is that during the examination of Admiral Dönitz I should like to count on the knowledge of the contents of the documents; and I should also like to discuss some documents with him. But I do not know whether the Tribunal will approve these documents now or not.
THE PRESIDENT: But what I am suggesting is that the Tribunal should consider now the relevance of these documents, the admissibility of these documents, and then tell you—make a rule—as to what documents are admitted. You will then know what documents are admitted. Then you can call Admiral Dönitz and of course examine him with reference to the documents which are admitted; and as I have told you, the Tribunal has already looked at these documents. They will now reconsider them, in order to see whether they are admissible, and the Tribunal will in that way, to a large extent, be fully acquainted with the documents.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes, I agree to that, Mr. President. I will call Admiral Dönitz if the Tribunal deems it proper.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, you have been dealing with a Document Dönitz-60, which contains a great number of pages to which you wish to refer. When we have ruled upon them you will have to give separate exhibit numbers to each one of the documents—to each one of the pages which we will rule are admissible and which you wish to offer in evidence.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, may I point out that this is one book. Dönitz-60 is one book. That is why I have not given it an exhibit number, because I submit it as one.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but it contains so many pages that it will be more convenient, will it not, to give each separate page a separate exhibit number?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: It seems to relate to a great variety of subjects.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes, a collection of documents.
THE PRESIDENT: Now as you dealt with the various subjects in entirely different order than the way in which Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe dealt with them, I think it would be convenient if we heard anything he wants to say about it. Only if you do wish to say something, Sir David.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly, My Lord. My Lord, I have heard the Tribunal say that they have had an opportunity of examining the documents and therefore I propose to be extremely brief in any remarks I have to make: and may I make one explanation before I deal with the very few points?
My friend, Colonel Pokrovsky, wanted to make it clear—as I think it was clear to the Tribunal yesterday—that there had been no objection to Documents 3 and 4 because in these they deal with a secret base in the North which is only of importance for the attacks against wood transports from the North Russian ports. The objectionable matter, as I think the Tribunal pointed out, was introduced in a statement of Dr. Kranzbühler which has no foundation in the documents. Colonel Pokrovsky was very anxious that I should make that clear on behalf of the Prosecution.
My Lord, I think there are really only two points which I need emphasize in reply to the Tribunal. The first is on my Group 3, the details of the Contraband Control System. My Lord, I submit that on this there is an essential non sequitur in Dr. Kranzbühler’s argument. He says that, first of all, the carrying of contraband by merchant ships, to carry his argument to its logical conclusion, would entitle a belligerent to sinking at sight. That, I submit, with great respect to him, is completely wrong; and it does not follow that because you establish certain rules and lists of contraband that the right to sink at sight is affected at all.
Similarly, his second point with regard to the British navicert system. That system was used in World War I and is a well-known system. But again, the essential non sequitur or absence of connection is this, that if a neutral goes to one of the control ports and gets a navicert, that does not put that neutral into so un-neutral an act as to make it the equivalent of a ship of war, which is the position that my friend—that Dr. Kranzbühler—would have to take if that argument were to succeed.
His third division wishes to put in documents showing economic pressures on, for example, Belgium, with regard to the import of goods. The naval defendants are not being charged with economic pressure; they are charged with killing people on the high seas. Now again, I have dealt with it very shortly, and the Prosecution submits and takes the view very strongly that the whole of that documentary evidence is several steps removed from the issues in the case.
Now the second group of matters which I wanted to refer to. I can take as an example the document making several score of allegations of un-neutral acts against the United States. The case for the Prosecution on sinking at sight is that sinking at sight against various groups of neutrals was adopted as a purely political matter, according to the advantage or, when it was abstained from, the disadvantage which Germany might get from her relations with these neutrals. And it does not help in answering that allegation of the Prosecution. That is a matter of fact which can be judged, whether the Prosecution is right. It does not help on that to say that the United States committed certain nonneutral acts. If anything, it would be supporting the contention of the Prosecution that sinking on sight was applied arbitrarily according to the political advantages which could be obtained from it.
And the only other point—and again my friend, Colonel Pokrovsky, wishes me to emphasize it—is that these, the collection of unsworn statements, are of course in a very different position, from any legal standard, from reports made by officers in the course of their duty. Those are admissible in all military courts, probably in every country in the world. These are an ad hoc collection. They are not only unsworn but they are vague, indefinite, and insufficiently related to the order which is adhered to in the case of the Prosecution.
My Lord, I have tried to cut it very short, but I did want the Tribunal to appreciate that on all these groups and especially, if I may say so, on Groups 3 and 4, the Prosecution feels very strongly on this matter in the case. I am grateful to the Tribunal for giving me the opportunity of saying this.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.