Afternoon Session
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn this afternoon at 4:30 in order to sit in closed session.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral Wagner, as time went on a close relationship developed between Admiral Dönitz and Adolf Hitler. Was this due to the fact that the Admiral was particularly ready to comply with the Führer’s wishes?
WAGNER: No, not at all. Admiral Dönitz’ activity as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy began with a very strong opposition to Hitler. It was Hitler’s intention to scrap the large ships of the Navy, that is to say, the remaining battleships and cruisers. Admiral Raeder had already rejected that plan.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: That story is already known, Admiral. You need not go into it in detail.
WAGNER: Very well. Apart from that, Hitler’s respect for Dönitz was due to the fact that every statement which the Admiral made was absolutely reliable and absolutely honest. The Admiral attached particular importance to the fact that particularly unfavorable developments, failures, and mistakes were to be reported at headquarters without digression, objectively, and simply. As an example, I should like to mention that the Admiral had given me the order...
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think we need examples of that sort of thing. Surely the general statement is quite sufficient.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did the Admiral in any way show himself particularly willing to comply with the Führer’s political wishes or those of the Party?
WAGNER: No. Such wishes of the Party were, in my opinion, only put to the Navy in three cases. One was the question of the churches, which for the most part came up during the time of Admiral Raeder. I think it is generally known that the Navy retained its original religious organization and, in fact, extended it as the Navy grew.
The second request made by the Party was that, modeled on the Russian example, political commissars should be set up within the Armed Forces. On that occasion Admiral Dönitz went to see Hitler and prevented the carrying out of that plan. When after 20 July 1944 Bormann nevertheless succeeded in getting the so-called “NSFO”—the National Socialist Leadership Officers—introduced into the Armed Forces, it did not happen in the way the Party wished, by appointing political commissars. It was merely done by using officers who were under the jurisdiction of the commander and who could not in any way interfere with the leadership of the troops. The third case was the intention on the part of the Party to take away from, the Armed Forces the political penal cases.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: This case is also already known, Admiral. You kept the records of the visits at the Führer’s headquarters, is that correct?
WAGNER: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: A number of these records have been introduced as evidence in this Court. Will you please explain to the Tribunal what was the purpose of keeping these records of visits of commanders-in-chief to the Führer’s headquarters?
WAGNER: The Chief of the Naval Operations Staff, the Chief of the Naval Armaments, and the Chief of the General Navy Department—that is to say, the three leading men in the High Command of the Navy—were to be informed by means of these records of all happenings which took place in the presence of the Admiral, as far as they were of any interest to the Navy. That was one of my tasks.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You have just said “informed about happenings which took place in the presence of the Admiral.” Does that mean that he himself must have heard everything that has been put down in these records?
WAGNER: Not necessarily. It happened quite frequently that during situation reports, when they took place in a large room and when subjects were discussed which did not interest him so much, the Admiral would retire to another part of the room and deal with some business of his own or discuss Navy questions with other participants in the meeting. It was possible that on such occasions I heard things and put them down in the record which the Admiral himself did not hear. But, of course, he would know about them later when he saw my record.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I am going to have shown to you one of your own records of discussions on 20 February 1945. It is Exhibit Number GB-209, and it is on Page 68 of the document book of the Prosecution. This deals with considerations regarding the renouncing of the Geneva Convention. Will you please describe exactly what happened as you remember it?
WAGNER: Approximately two or three days before the date in this record—in other words, on or about 17 or 18 February 1945—Admiral Voss telephoned me from headquarters, which at that time was situated in Berlin, and informed me that in connection with Anglo-Saxon propaganda to induce our troops to desert in the West, Hitler had stated his intention to leave the Geneva Convention.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What did he hope to achieve?
WAGNER: According to my first impression at the time, the intention was evidently to express to the troops and the German people that captivity would no longer bring any advantage. Thereupon, I immediately telephoned to the Naval Operations Staff, since I considered the intention to be completely wrong, and I asked them for a military opinion and an opinion from the point of view of international law.
On the 19th, when taking part in the situation discussion, Hitler once more referred to this question, but this time not in connection with happenings on the western front; but in connection with the air attacks by the western enemies on open German towns—attacks had just been made on Dresden and Weimar.
He ordered the Admiral to examine the effects of leaving the Geneva Convention from the point of view of naval warfare. An immediate answer was not expected and it was not given. Generaloberst Jodl was also quite strongly opposed to these intentions and he sought the Admiral’s support. Thereupon it was agreed to have a conference and that is the conference which is mentioned in the record under Figure 2.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: That is the conference of 20 February, Admiral?
WAGNER: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Who participated in that conference?
WAGNER: Admiral Dönitz, Generaloberst Jodl, Ambassador Hewel, and myself.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What was the subject?
WAGNER: The subject was the Führer’s intention of renouncing the Geneva Convention. The result was the unanimous opinion that such a step would be a mistake. Apart from military consideration we especially held the conviction that by renouncing the Geneva Convention both the Armed Forces and the German people would lose confidence in the leadership, since the Geneva Convention was generally considered to be the conception of international law.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In your notes there is a sentence, “One would have to carry out the measures considered necessary without warning and at all costs ‘to save face’ with the outer world.” What is the significance of that sentence?
WAGNER: That sentence means that on no account should there be any irresponsible actions. If the leaders considered it necessary to introduce countermeasures against air attacks on open German towns, or against the propaganda for desertion in the West, then one should confine oneself to such countermeasures which appear necessary and justifiable. One should not put oneself in the wrong before the world and one’s own people by totally repudiating all the Geneva Conventions and announce measures which went far beyond what appeared to be necessary and justifiable.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were any concrete measures discussed in this connection or were any such measures even thought of?
WAGNER: No. I can remember very well that no specific measures were discussed at all during the various conferences. We were mainly concerned with the total question of whether to repudiate the Geneva Convention or not.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you ever learn anything about a so-called intention on Adolf Hitler’s part to shoot 10,000 prisoners of war as a reprisal for the air attack on Dresden?
WAGNER: No, I have never heard anything about that.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The expression “to save face”—doesn’t that mean secrecy, hiding the true facts?
WAGNER: In my opinion it was certain that there was no question of secrecy, for neither the countermeasures against air attacks nor the measures of intimidation against desertion could be effective if they were concealed.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: How long did this whole conversation which you recorded last?
WAGNER: Will you please tell me which conversation you mean?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The discussion of 20 February which contains the sentences which I have just read to you.
WAGNER: It took perhaps ten minutes or a quarter of an hour.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: So that your record is a very brief condensed summary of the conversation?
WAGNER: Yes, it only contains the important points.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did Admiral Dönitz also submit his objections to the Führer?
WAGNER: As far as I recollect, it never reached that point. One became convinced that Hitler, as soon as he put his questions to the Admiral, could gather from the Admiral’s expression and the attitude of the others that they rejected his plans. We passed our views on to the High Command of the Armed Forces in writing and heard no more about the whole matter.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I am now going to show you another record which is submitted under GB-210. It is on the next page of the document book of the Prosecution and it refers to conferences at the Führer’s headquarters from 29 June to 1 July 1944.
You will find an entry under the date of 1 July which reads, “In connection with the general strike in Copenhagen, the Führer says that terror can be subdued only with terror.” Was this statement made during a conversation between Hitler and Admiral Dönitz or in which connection?
WAGNER: This is a statement made by Hitler during a situation discussion and addressed neither to Admiral Dönitz nor to the Navy.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Well, if it was not addressed to the Navy, then why did you include it in your record?
WAGNER: I included in my record all statements which could be of any interest to the Navy. The High Command of the Navy was, of course, interested in the general strike in Copenhagen because our ships were repaired in Copenhagen; and apart from that Copenhagen was a naval base.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: And to whom did you pass this record? Who received it?
WAGNER: According to the distribution list on Page 4, the paper went only to the Commander-in-Chief and department 1 of the Naval Operations Staff.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did the Naval Operations Staff have anything to do with the treatment of shipyard workers in Denmark?
WAGNER: No, nothing at all. From 1943 on the shipyards were entirely under the Ministry of Armaments.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The Prosecution sees in this statement and its transmission to a department of the OKW an invitation to deal ruthlessly with the inhabitants. Does that in any way tally with the meaning of this record?
WAGNER: There can be no question of that. The only purpose of this record was to inform the Departments of the High Command.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I am now going to have another document shown to you. It is Exhibit Number USA-544. It is in the document book of the Prosecution on Pages 64 and 65. It is a note by the international law expert in the Naval Operations Staff regarding the treatment of saboteurs. Do you know this note?
WAGNER: Yes. I have initialed it on the first page.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: At the end of that note you will find the sentence:
“As far as the Navy is concerned, it should be investigated whether the occurrence cannot be used, after reporting to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, to make sure that the treatment of members of Commando troops is absolutely clear to all the departments concerned.”
Was this report made to Admiral Dönitz who at that time had been Commander-in-Chief of the Navy for ten days?
WAGNER: No, that report was not made, as the various remarks at the head of it will show.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Will you explain that, please?
WAGNER: The international law expert in the Naval Operations Staff IA made this suggestion through the Operations Office IA to me as Chief of the Operational Department. The chief of the IA Section in a handwritten notice beside his initials, wrote, “The subordinate commanders have been informed.” That means that he had objected to the proposal of the international law expert and considered that an explanation of the orders within the Navy was superfluous. I investigated these matters and I decided that the operations officer was right. I sent for the international law expert, Dr. Eckardt, informed him orally of my decision, and returned this document to him. Thus the suggestion to report to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy made in connection with the explanation of this order was not actually carried out.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Can you remember whether Admiral Dönitz on some later occasion received reports on this Commando order?
WAGNER: No, I have no recollection of that.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I have submitted to you GB-208, which is a record regarding the case of a motor torpedo boat at Bergen. It is the case which is contained in the British document book on Pages 66 and 67. Have you ever heard about this incident before this Trial?
WAGNER: No. I heard about it for the first time on the occasion of interrogations in connection with these proceedings.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I gather from the files of the British court-martial proceedings, which have been submitted by the Prosecution during cross-examination, that before the shooting of the crew of that motor torpedo boat there had been two telephone conversations, between the Chief of the Security Service in Bergen and the SD at Oslo, and between the SD at Oslo and Berlin. Can you recollect whether such a conversation took place between the SD at Oslo and yourself or one of the representatives in the High Command?
WAGNER: I certainly had no such conversation, and as far as I know neither did any other officer in my department or in the High Command.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you consider it at all possible that the SD at Oslo might get in touch with the High Command of the Navy?
WAGNER: No, I consider that quite out of the question. If the SD in Oslo wanted to get in touch with a central department in Berlin then they could only do so through their own superior authority, and that is the RSHA.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I now put to you another document; it is Exhibit GB-212 which appears on Page 75 of the document book of the Prosecution. It mentions an example of a commandant of a German prisoner-of-war camp and it says he had communists who had attracted attention among the inmates suddenly and quietly removed by the guards. Do you know of this incident?
WAGNER: Yes, such an episode is known to me. I think we received the report from a prisoner-of-war—a man who had been severely injured and who had been exchanged—that the German commandant of a prisoner-of-war camp in Australia, in which the crew of the auxiliary cruiser Cormoran were detained, had secretly had a man of his crew killed because he had been active as a spy and traitor.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: But this order does not mention the word “spy.” It says “communist.” What is the explanation?
THE PRESIDENT: It does not say “communist.” It says “communists” in the plural.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: “Communists,” plural.
WAGNER: In my opinion the only explanation is that the true state of affairs was to be concealed so as to prevent the enemy intelligence from tracing the incident and making difficulties for the senior sergeant in question. Thus, a different version was chosen.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: It was the opinion of the Soviet Prosecution that this showed there was a plan for the silent removal of communists. Can you tell us anything about the origin of this order, whether such a plan existed and whether it had ever come under discussion?
WAGNER: First of all the order was addressed to those personnel offices which were responsible for choosing young potential officers and noncommissioned officers in the Navy. There were about six or seven personnel offices. Beyond that I can only say that of course...
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Just a moment, Admiral, please.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, is it necessary to go into all this detail? The question is, was there an order with reference to making away with the people of this sort or was there not—not all the details about how the order came to be made.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In that case I shall put the question this way: Was there any order or any desire in the Navy to kill communists inconspicuously and systematically?
WAGNER: No, such an order or such a plan did not exist. Of course, there were a considerable number of communists in the Navy. That was known to every superior officer. The overwhelming majority of those communists did their duty as Germans just as any other German in the war.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral Dönitz has been accused by the Prosecution because as late as the spring of 1945 he urged his people to hold out obstinately to the end. The Prosecution considers that evidence of the fact that he was a fanatical Nazi. Did you and the majority of the Navy consider this to be so?
WAGNER: No, the Admiral’s attitude was not considered to be political fanaticism. To them it meant that he was carrying out his ordinary duty as a soldier to the last. I am convinced that this was the view of the great majority of the entire Navy, the men and the noncommissioned officers as well as the officers.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, I have no further questions to put to this witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other defendant’s counsel want to ask any questions?
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral Wagner, you have already briefly sketched the positions you have held. In supplementing I should like to make quite sure who held a leading position in the Naval Operations Staff under Grossadmiral Raeder in the decisive years before and after the outbreak of the war. Who was the Chief of Staff during the two years before the war, and at the beginning of the war?
WAGNER: The Chief of Staff of the Naval Operations Staff from 1938 until 1941 was Admiral Schniewind. From 1941 until after Raeder’s retirement it was Admiral Fricke.
DR. SIEMERS: Those, therefore, were the two officers who worked in the highest posts under Admiral Raeder in the Naval Operations Staff?
WAGNER: They were the immediate advisers of the Admiral.
DR. SIEMERS: And the Naval Operations Staff had several departments?
WAGNER: Yes, it consisted of several departments, which were given consecutive numbers.
DR. SIEMERS: And which was the most important department?
WAGNER: The most important department of the Naval Operations Staff was the Operations Department, which was known as Number 1.
DR. SIEMERS: And the other departments, 2, 3—what did they do?
WAGNER: They were the Signals and Communications Department and the Information Department.
DR. SIEMERS: Who was the chief of the Operations Department?
WAGNER: From 1937 until 1941 it was Admiral Fricke. From 1941 until after Raeder’s retirement I was the chief of that department.
DR. SIEMERS: In other words, for many years you worked under Admiral Raeder. First of all I should like to ask you to speak briefly about Raeder’s basic attitude during the time you were working in the Naval Operations Staff.
WAGNER: Under Admiral Raeder the Navy was working for a peaceful development in agreement with Britain. The foremost questions were those regarding the type of ships, training, and tactical schooling. Admiral Raeder never referred to aggressive wars during any conference which I attended. Nor did he at any time ask us to make any preparations in that direction.
DR. SIEMERS: Do you remember that in 1940 and in 1941 Raeder declared himself emphatically against a war with Russia?
WAGNER: Yes, he was very strongly opposed to a war with Russia, and that for two reasons; first, he considered that to break the treaty of friendship with Russia was wrong and inadmissible, and secondly, for strategic reasons he was convinced that our entire strength should be concentrated against Britain. When in the autumn of 1940 it appeared that the invasion of Britain could not be carried out, the Admiral worked for a strategy in the Mediterranean to keep open an outlet against Britain’s policy of encirclement.
DR. SIEMERS: The Navy had rather a lot to do with Russia during the friendship period between Russia and Germany in the way of deliveries. As far as you know did everything in that respect run smoothly?
WAGNER: Yes, I know that a large number of deliveries from the Navy stocks went to Russia; for instance, uncompleted ships, heavy guns, and other war material.
DR. SIEMERS: And the Navy, of course, always made efforts to maintain the friendly relations laid down in the Pact?
WAGNER: Yes, that was the Admiral’s opinion.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral Wagner, Admiral Raeder has been accused by the Prosecution that he had never bothered about international law and that he broke international law conventions as a matter of principle if it suited him. Can you express a general opinion about Raeder’s attitude in that respect?
WAGNER: Yes; that is completely wrong. Admiral Raeder considered it most important that every measure for naval warfare should be examined from the point of view of international law. For that purpose we had a special expert on international law in the Naval Operations Staff with whom we in the Operations Department had almost daily contact.
DR. SIEMERS: Furthermore, Raeder has been accused by the Prosecution of advising a war against the United States and trying to get Japan to go to war with the United States. May I ask for your opinion on that?
WAGNER: I consider this charge completely unjustified. I know that Admiral Raeder attached particular importance to the fact that all naval war measures—especially in the critical year of 1941—were to be examined very closely as to the effects they might have on the United States of America. In fact he refrained from taking quite a number of militarily perfectly justified measures in order to prevent incidents with the U.S.A. For instance, in the summer of 1941 he withdrew the submarines from a large area off the coast of the U.S.A. although that area could certainly be regarded as the open sea. He forbade mine-laying action which had already begun against the British port of Halifax, Canada, to prevent, at all costs, the possibility of a United States ship striking a mine. And finally, he also forbade attacks on British destroyers in the North Atlantic because the fifty destroyers which had been turned over to England by the United States created the dangerous possibility of confusing the British and American destroyers. All this was done at a time when the United States, while still at peace, occupied Iceland, when British warships were being repaired in American shipyards, when American naval forces had orders that all German units should be reported to the British fleet, and when finally President Roosevelt in July 1941 gave his forces the order to attack any German submarines they sighted.
DR. SIEMERS: Did Admiral Raeder ever make a statement in the Naval Operations Staff that there was no risk in a war against America and that the fleet or the American submarines were not much good?
WAGNER: No, Admiral Raeder as an expert would never have made such a statement.
DR. SIEMERS: On the contrary, did not Raeder expressly speak of the strength of the American fleet and that one could not fight simultaneously two such great sea-powers as America and Great Britain?
WAGNER: Yes, it was perfectly clear to him and to us that America’s entry into the war would mean a very substantial strengthening of the enemy forces.
DR. SIEMERS: Now on one occasion Admiral Raeder suggested in his war diary that Japan should attack Singapore. Was there any discussion about Pearl Harbor in connection with that in the Naval Operations Staff?
WAGNER: No, not at all. The attack by the Japanese on Pearl Harbor was a complete surprise, both to the Admiral and to the Naval Operations Staff and, in my opinion, to every other German department.
DR. SIEMERS: Were there no continuous naval-military discussions and conferences between Japan and Germany?
WAGNER: No, before Japan’s entry into the war there were no military discussions according to my conviction.
DR. SIEMERS: I should now like to show you Document C-41, Mr. President, this is Exhibit GB-69. Later on, the British Delegation will submit it in Document Book 10a for Raeder. I do not know whether the Tribunal already has it. It is as yet not contained in the trial brief against Raeder. In the newly compiled: Document Book 10a, it is on Page 18.
THE PRESIDENT: You can offer it in evidence now, if you want to, so you can put it to the witness.
DR. SIEMERS: The Prosecution has submitted it; yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. SIEMERS: This concerns a document signed by Admiral Fricke, and it is dated 3 June 1940. It is headed “Questions of Expansion of Areas and Bases.” That document contains detailed statements on future plans.
[Turning to the witness.] I should like to ask you if Raeder gave the order to prepare this memorandum or how did this memorandum come to be written?
WAGNER: Admiral Raeder did not give the order to draft this memorandum. This constitutes the personal, theoretical ideas of Admiral Fricke regarding the possible developments in the future. They are quite fantastic, and they had no practical significance.
DR. SIEMERS: Was this study or this note talked about or discussed in any large group in the Naval Operations Staff?
WAGNER: No, in my opinion only the Operations officers had knowledge of this document, which by its very form shows that it is not a well-thought-out study made by order of Grossadmiral Raeder but an ad hoc jotting-down of thoughts which occurred to Admiral Fricke at the moment.
DR. SIEMERS: Was this study or this document passed on to any outsiders at all?
WAGNER: I think I can remember that this document was not sent to any outside office but remained in the Operations Department. The Grossadmiral, too, in my opinion did not have knowledge of it, particularly since this document shows that he did not initial it.
DR. SIEMERS: You have a photostat copy of that document?
WAGNER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Are there any other initials on it which might show that it was put before Admiral Raeder? How was this sort of thing generally handled in the Naval Operations Staff?
WAGNER: Every document that was to be put before the Admiral had on its first page in the left margin a note: “v.A.v.,” which means “to be submitted before dispatch,” or “n.E.v.,” “to be submitted after receipt,” or else “to be reported during situation reports.” And then at that place the Admiral would initial it with a green pencil, or the officers of his personal staff would make a note indicating that it had been submitted to him.
DR. SIEMERS: And there are no such marks on this document?
WAGNER: No.
DR. SIEMERS: I should like to show you Document C-38, which is a document of the Prosecution bearing the number Exhibit GB-223. It is contained in the Prosecution’s document book on Raeder, Page 11.
The war between Germany and Russia began on 22 June 1941. According to the last page but one of the document which you have before you, the OKW as early as 15 June—a week before the outbreak of the war—ordered the use of arms against enemy submarines south of the Memel line, the southern tip of Oeland, at the request of the Naval Operations Staff.
The Prosecution is basing the accusation on this document and once more referring to an aggressive war. Unfortunately, the Prosecution has only submitted the last page of this document. It did not produce the first and second page of the document. If it had done so, then this accusation would probably have been dropped. May I read to you, Witness, what is contained there; and I quote:
“On 12 June at 2000 hours one of the submarines placed as outposts on both sides of Bornholm, as precautionary measure, reported at 2000 hours an unknown submarine in the vicinity of Adlergrund (20 miles southwest of Bornholm) which had surfaced and was proceeding on a westerly course and which answered a recognition signal call with a letter signal which had no particular significance.”
That ends the quotation.
May I ask you to explain what it means that this submarine did not reply to the recognition signal call?
WAGNER: In time of war the warships of one’s own fleet have an arrangement of recognition signals; that is to say, the recognition signal has a call and a reply which immediately identifies the ship as belonging to one’s own fleet. If a recognition signal is wrongly answered, it proves that it is a foreign vessel.
DR. SIEMERS: As far as you can remember, were there any other clues showing that ships appeared in the Baltic sea which were recognized as enemy ships?
WAGNER: Yes. I remember that there were individual cases where unknown submarines were observed off the German Baltic ports. Subsequently it was found, by comparing the stations of our own submarines, that these were indeed enemy vessels.
DR. SIEMERS: Were these facts the reason which caused the Naval Operations Staff to ask for the use of weapons?
WAGNER: Yes, these very facts.
DR. SIEMERS: A similar case has been made the subject of an accusation in connection with Greece. It has been ascertained here in Court from the War Diary that on 30 December 1939 the Naval Operations Staff asked that Greek ships in the American blockade zone around Great Britain should be treated as hostile. Since Greece was neutral at the time, there has been an accusation against Raeder of a breach of neutrality.
May I ask you to tell us the reasons which caused the Naval Operations Staff and the Chief, Raeder, to make such a request to the OKW?
WAGNER: We had had news that Greece had placed the bulk of its merchant fleet at the disposal of England and that these Greek vessels were sailing under British command.
DR. SIEMERS: And it is correct that Greek vessels in general were not treated as hostile, but only vessels in the American blockade zone around England?
WAGNER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: The next case, which is somewhat similar, is that which occurred in June 1942, when the Naval Operations Staff made an application to the OKW to be allowed to attack Brazilian ships, although Brazil at that time was still a neutral. The war with Brazil started some two months later on 22 August. What reasons were there for such a step?
WAGNER: We were receiving reports from submarines from the waters around South America, according to which they were being attacked by ships which could only have started from Brazilian bases. The first thing we did was to refer back and get these questions clarified and confirmed. Moreover, I think I can remember personally that at that time it was already generally known that Brazil was giving the use of sea and air bases to the United States with whom we were at war.
DR. SIEMERS: So that this was due to a breach of neutrality on the part of Brazil?
WAGNER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: I should like to submit to you Documents C-176 and D-658. Document C-176 has the number Exhibit GB-228. These two documents are based on the Commando Order, that is, the order to destroy sabotage troops. The Prosecution has charged Raeder with an incident which occurred in December 1942 in the Gironde estuary at Bordeaux. In Document C-176, on the last page, you will find something which I would like to quote.
“Shooting of the two captured Englishmen took place by a firing-squad, numbering one officer and 16 men, detailed by the port commander at Bordeaux, in the presence of an officer of the SD and by order of the Führer.”
Previous entries, which I do not want to quote separately and which portray the same things, show that the SD had intervened directly and had got into direct touch with the Führer’s headquarters.
I now ask you whether the Naval Operations Staff had heard anything at all about this matter before these two prisoners were shot, or whether they knew anything about this direct order from Hitler which is mentioned in this connection?
WAGNER: The Naval Operations Staff had nothing to do with a direct order for the shooting of people in Bordeaux. The Naval Operations Staff knew the tactical course of events of this sabotage undertaking in Bordeaux and nothing at the time beyond that.
DR. SIEMERS: Therefore, this case was not put to the Naval Operations Staff or to Admiral Raeder, and it was not discussed by them?
WAGNER: Yes. I am certain that that was not the case.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I ask the Tribunal to take notice of the fact that this war diary is by no means the war diary which has been frequently mentioned, the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff, but the war diary of the Naval Commander west, and was therefore unknown to the Naval Operations Staff. That is why the Naval Operations Staff did not know of this case.
THE PRESIDENT: You are referring now to Document C-176?
DR. SIEMERS: Yes, and also to D-658, which is the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff.
THE PRESIDENT: What was the reference to it?
DR. SIEMERS: This is D-658, which shows the following: According to the OKW communiqué, these two soldiers had in the meantime been shot. The measure would be in keeping with the special order by the Führer. That has been submitted by the Prosecution, and it shows—and I shall refer to this later—that the Naval Operations Staff knew nothing about the entire episode because this shows an entry dated 9 December, whereas the whole affair happened on the 11th.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps this would be a good time to break off.
[A recess was taken.]
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, I am now submitting to you Document UK C-124.
Mr. President, C-124 corresponds to USSR-130. This document deals with a communication from the Naval Operations Staff, dated 29 September 1941, addressed to Group North, and it deals with the future of the city of Petersburg. This report to Group North says that the Führer had decided to wipe the city of Petersburg from the face of the earth. The Navy itself had nothing to do with that report. Despite that, this report was sent to Group North.
Witness, I will return to this point, but I, would like to ask you first—you have a photostatic copy of the original—to tell me whether Raeder could have seen this document before it was dispatched?
WAGNER: According to my previous statements Admiral Raeder did not see this document since there are no marks or initials to that effect.
DR. SIEMERS: And now the more important question on this point. In view of the terrible communication which is mentioned by Hitler in Point 2, why did the Naval Operations Staff transmit it even though the Navy itself had nothing to do with it?
WAGNER: The Naval Operations Staff had asked that in bombarding, occupying or attacking Leningrad the dockyards, wharf installations, and all other special naval installations be spared so that they might be used as bases later on. That request was turned down by Hitler’s statement as contained in this document, as can be seen from Point 3.
We had to communicate this fact to Admiral Carls so that he could act accordingly and because in the case of a later occupation of Leningrad he could not count on this port as a base.
DR. SIEMERS: Because of the significance of this testimony, I would like to quote to the Tribunal the decisive point to which the witness just referred, and that is III of USSR-130. I quote:
“The original requests of the Navy to spare the dock, harbor, and other installations important from the Navy viewpoint are known to the High Command of the Wehrmacht. Compliance with these requests is not possible, because of the fundamental aim of the action against Petersburg.”
That was the decisive point which the SKL told Admiral Carls as commander of Group North.
WAGNER: That was the sole reason for this communication.
DR. SIEMERS: Do you know whether Admiral Carls did anything with this document? Did he transmit it to any one, or do you not know anything about that?
WAGNER: As far as I am informed, this communication was not passed on; and it was not the intention that it should be passed on for it was meant solely for Group North. On the strength of this document, Admiral Carls stopped the preparations which had already been made for using the Leningrad naval installations later on and made the personnel available for other purposes. That is the only measure which the Navy took on the basis of this communication and the only measure which could have been taken.
DR. SIEMERS: I should tell the Tribunal that accordingly I will submit, under Number 111 in my Document Book Raeder, an affidavit which contains this fact, which the witness also points out, that nothing was passed on by Group North so that the commanding naval officers never learned of this document.
This concerns an affidavit by Admiral Bütow who at that time was Commander-in-Chief in Finland, and I shall come back to this point when I present the case on behalf of Admiral Raeder.
I have no more questions to put to the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of defendants’ counsel wish to ask any questions?
[There was no response.]
The Prosecution may cross-examine.
COLONEL H. J. PHILLIMORE (Junior Counsel for the United Kingdom): May it please the Tribunal, with regard to the questions asked by Dr. Siemers, I was going to leave the cross-examination on those points to the cross-examination of the Defendant Raeder so as to avoid any duplication.
[Turning to the witness.] As I understand the evidence which the Defendant Dönitz has given and your evidence, you are telling the Tribunal that with respect to the treatment of neutral merchant ships, the German Navy has nothing to reproach itself with. Is that right?
WAGNER: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: And the Defendant has said that the German Navy was scrupulous in adhering to orders about the attitude towards neutral shipping, and the neutrals were fully warned of what they should and should not do. Is that right?
WAGNER: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Admiral Dönitz has also said that there was no question of deceiving neutral governments; they were given fair warning of what their ships should not do. Do you agree?
WAGNER: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Now, I want just to remind you of what steps were taken as regards neutrals, as they appear from the defense documents.
First of all, on 3 September orders were issued that strict respect for all rules of neutrality and compliance with all agreements of international law which were generally recognized were to be observed.
My Lord, that is D-55, Page 139.
THE PRESIDENT: In the British document book?
COL. PHILLIMORE: In the Defense document book—Dönitz-55.
And then, on 28 September, a warning was sent to neutrals to avoid suspicious conduct, changing course, zig-zagging, and so on. That is Dönitz-61, at Page 150. On 19 October that warning was repeated and neutrals were advised to refuse convoy escort. That is Dönitz-62, at Page 153. On 22 October there was a repetition of the warning, that is Dönitz-62, Page 162; and on 24 November the neutrals were told that the safety of their ships in waters around the British Isles and in the vicinity of the French coast could no longer be taken for granted. That is Dönitz-73, at Page 206; and then from 6 January onwards, certain zones were declared dangerous zones. That is right, is it not?
WAGNER: No. On 24 November a general warning was issued that the entire United States fighting zone was to be considered dangerous. The specific zones which since January were used as operational zones were not made public, since they came within the scope of the first warning and served only for internal use within the Navy.
COL. PHILLIMORE: That is the point I want to be clear about. The zones that you declared from 6 January onwards were not announced. Is that the point?
WAGNER: Yes, the neutrals were warned on 24 November that all of those zones which had been specifically declared as operational zones since January would be dangerous for shipping.
COL. PHILLIMORE: But when you fixed the specific zones from 6 January onwards, no further specific warning was given. Is that the case?
WAGNER: That is correct. After the general warning, we issued no further specific warnings about parts of this zone.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Now, you are not suggesting, are you, that by these warnings and by this declaration of an enormous danger zone, you were entitled to sink neutral shipping without warning?
WAGNER: Yes. I am of the opinion that in this zone which we, as well as the United States of America before us, regarded as dangerous for shipping it was no longer necessary to show consideration to neutrals.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Do you mean to say that from 24 November onwards every neutral government was given fair warning that its ships would be sunk without warning if they were anywhere in that zone?
WAGNER: What I want to say is that on 24 November all the neutral countries were notified officially that the entire United States of America zone was to be considered as dangerous and that the German Reich could assume no responsibility for losses in combat in this zone.
COL. PHILLIMORE: That is quite a different case. Do not let us have any mistake about this. Are you saying that by that warning you were entitled to sink neutral ships anywhere in that zone without warning, sink on sight?
WAGNER: I did not quite catch the last few words.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Are you suggesting that you were entitled to sink at sight neutral shipping anywhere in that zone, as from 24 November?
WAGNER: I am of the opinion that we were justified from that period of time onwards in having no special consideration for neutral shipping. If we had made exceptions in our orders to our U-boats, it would have meant in every case that they could not have sunk enemy ships without warning.
COL. PHILLIMORE: It is not a question of any special consideration. Do you say that you became entitled to sink at sight any neutral ship, or sink it deliberately, whether you recognized it as neutral or not?
THE PRESIDENT: Surely you can answer that question “yes” or “no.”
WAGNER: Yes, I am of that opinion.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Will you tell me how that squares with the submarine rules?
WAGNER: I do not feel competent to give a legal explanation of these questions because that is a matter of international law.
COL. PHILLIMORE: At any rate, that is what you proceeded to do, is it not? You proceeded to sink neutral ships at sight and without warning anywhere in that zone?
WAGNER: Yes; not just anywhere in this zone, but in the operational zones stipulated by us neutral ships were...
COL. PHILLIMORE: But wherever you could—wherever you could?
WAGNER: In the operational zones stipulated by us we sank neutral ships without warning, for we were of the opinion that in this case we were concerned with secured zones near the enemy coast which could no longer be considered the open sea.
COL. PHILLIMORE: And that is what you desired to do at the very start of the war, was it not? That is what you decided to do?
WAGNER: From the beginning of the war we decided to adhere strictly to the London Agreement.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Would you look at the document which was put in yesterday? My Lord, it is D-851. It is put in as GB-451. It is a memorandum of 3 September.
THE PRESIDENT: Where is it?
COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, it was the only new document that Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe put in in cross-examination.
[Turning to the witness.] Would you look at the third paragraph:
“The Navy has arrived at the conclusion that the maximum damage to England can be achieved with the forces available only if the U-boats are permitted an unrestricted use of arms without warning against enemy and neutral shipping in the prohibited area indicated on the enclosed map.”
Do you still say that you did not intend from the start of the war to sink neutral shipping without warning as soon as you could get Hitler to agree to let you do so? Do you still say that?
WAGNER: Yes, absolutely. In this document, in the first paragraph, it says:
“In the attached documents sent to the Navy by the OKW the question of unrestricted U-boat warfare against England is discussed.”
I cannot judge these documents if they are not submitted to me.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You were in the general staff at that time. You were in charge of the Department IA. This point of view must have been put forward by your department?
WAGNER: Yes. I have said already that we had decided, after consulting with the Foreign Office, to adhere strictly to the London Agreement until we had proof that English merchant shipping was navigated militarily and was being used for military purposes. Here we are apparently concerned solely with information, with an exchange of opinions with the Foreign Office...
COL. PHILLIMORE: I did not ask for your general view on the document. We can read that for ourselves. Your object was to terrorize the small neutrals and frighten them from sailing on their ordinary lawful occasions. Is that not right?
WAGNER: No.
COL. PHILLIMORE: And is that not why in the orders you issued in January of 1940 you excepted the larger countries from this “sink at sight” risk? Would you look at Document C-21. That is GB-194, at Page 30 of the Prosecution document book in English; Pages 59 and 60 in the German. Now, just look at the second entry on Page 5, 2 January 1940: “Report by IA.” That is you, is it not? That was you, was it not?
WAGNER: Yes, but I cannot find the point which you are quoting.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Page 5 of the original, under the date of 2 January 1940. Report by IA on directive of Armed Forces High Command, dated 30 December, referring to intensified measures in naval and air warfare in connection with Case Yellow:
“Through this directive the Navy will authorize, simultaneously with the beginning of the general intensification of the war, the sinking by U-boats without any warning of all ships in those waters near the enemy coasts in which mines can be employed. In this case, for external consumption, the use of mines should be simulated. The behavior of, and use of weapons by, U-boats should be adapted to this purpose.”
That has nothing to do with the arming of British merchant ships. That is not the reason that is given, is it? The reason is because it fitted in with your operations for Case Yellow.
WAGNER: I did not understand the last sentence.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You do not give as your reason that the British were arming their merchant ships. The reason you give is that it was necessary in connection with intensified measures for Case Yellow. Why is that?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The German translation is so inadequate that it is almost impossible to understand the question.
COL. PHILLIMORE: I will put the question to you again. The excuse for this directive is to be the intensification of measures in connection with Case Yellow. You notice, do you not, that nothing is said about the arming of British merchant ships as justifying this step? That is correct, is it not?
WAGNER: May I have time, please, to peruse these papers first?
COL. PHILLIMORE: Certainly. This was written by yourself, you know.
WAGNER: No, that was not written by me. This measure really came within the warning which was given to the neutrals on 24 November 1939.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Nothing is said about the warning of 24 November. If you were entitled, as you have told us, under that to sink neutral ships, there would not be any need for this special directive, would there?
WAGNER: No.
COL. PHILLIMORE: No. Now, let us just...
WAGNER: For military and political reasons we ordered that a hit by a mine was to be simulated, and that is a special point of this order.
COL. PHILLIMORE: And just before we leave that document, have a look at the entry on 18 January, will you? Have you got it? 18 January.
WAGNER: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: That is the actual order for sinking without warning. You notice the last sentence: “Ships of the United States, Italy, Japan, and Russia are exempted from these attacks.”
And then Spain is added in pencil. Is it not right that you were out to terrorize the small neutrals and to bully them, but you were not running any risks with the big ones?
WAGNER: No, that is not correct. The explanation is, of course, that one must take military disadvantages into the bargain if one can obtain political advantages for them.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Oh, yes, it was just entirely a question of how it paid you politically. That is all it was, was it not?
WAGNER: Of course, all military actions were strongly influenced by the political interests of one’s own country.
COL. PHILLIMORE: And because the Danes and the Swedes were not in any position to make any serious protest, it did not matter sinking their ships at sight. That is right, is it not?
WAGNER: The motivation you give to this conduct is entirely incorrect.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Well, but what is the difference?
WAGNER: We sank the ships of all neutrals in these areas with the exception of those countries where we had a special political interest.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes, you had no special political interest at this time for Norway and Sweden and Denmark, so you sank their ships at sight. That is right, is it not?
WAGNER: We sank them because they entered this area despite warning.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes, but if a Russian ship or a Japanese ship did that, you would not sink it.
WAGNER: No, not at that period of time.
COL. PHILLIMORE: I just want to show you what you actually did. Would you look at Documents D-846 and 847?
My Lord, they are two new documents. They will be GB-452 and 453.
[Turning to the witness.] Will you look at the first of these, that is D-846? That is a telegram from your Minister at Copenhagen, dated 26 September 1939. That is before your first warning and before any of these zones had been declared. The second sentence:
“Sinking of Swedish and Finnish ships by our submarines has caused great anxiety here about Danish food transports to England.”
You see, you had started sinking ships of the small neutrals right away in the first three weeks of the war, had you not?
WAGNER: In single cases, yes; but there was always a very special reason in those cases. I know that several incidents occurred with Danish and Swedish ships in which ships had turned against the U-boat and the U-boat in turn because of this resistance was forced to attack the ship.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You do not think it was because the blame could be put upon mines?
WAGNER: At this period not at all.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Look at the second telegram, if you would; 26 March 1940, again from the German Minister at Copenhagen. It is the first paragraph:
“The King of Denmark today summoned me to his presence in order to tell me what a deep impression the sinking of six Danish ships last week, apparently without warning, had made on him and on the whole country.”
And then, passing on two sentences:
“I replied that the reason why the ships sank had not yet been clarified. In any case, our naval units always kept strictly to the Prize Regulations; but vessels sailing in enemy convoy or in the vicinity of the convoy took upon themselves all the risks of war. If there were any cases of sinking without warning, it seemed that they could be traced back to the German notifications made to date.
“At the same time I stressed the danger of the waters around the British coast, where neutral shipping would inevitably be involved in compromising situations on account of measures taken by the British. The King assured me emphatically that none of the Danish ships had sailed in convoy, but it would probably never be possible subsequently to clear up without possibility of doubt the incidents which had led to the sinking.”
Have you any doubt that those six ships were sunk deliberately under your sink-at-sight policy?
WAGNER: Without checking the individual cases, I cannot answer this question; but I am of the opinion that possibly these ships were sunk in that area off the English coast where, because of heavy military defenses, there would no longer be any question of open sea.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Very well. We will come to an incident where I think I can supply you with the details. Would you look at Document D-807?
My Lord, that is a new document, it becomes GB-454.
[Turning to the witness.] You see, this document is dated 31 January 1940; and it refers to the sinking of three neutral ships, the Deptford, the Thomas Walton, and the Garoufalia. The document is in three parts. It first sets out the facts as they were known to you. The second part is a note to the Foreign Office, and the third is a draft reply for your Foreign Office to send to the neutral governments; and if you look at the end of the document you will see “IA”; it emanates from your department.
“It is proposed in replying to Norwegian notes to admit only the sinking by a German U-boat of the steamship Deptford, but to deny the sinking of the two other steamers.”
Would you follow it.
“According to the data attached to the notes presented by the Norwegian Government, the grounds for suspecting a torpedo to have been the cause of the sinkings do in fact appear to be equally strong in all these cases. According to the Norwegian Foreign Minister’s speech of 19 January, the suspicion in Norway of torpedoing by a German U-boat appears, however, to be strongest in the case of the steamship Deptford, whereas in the other two cases it is at least assumed that the possibility of striking mines can be taken into account; this is considered improbable in the case of the steamship Deptford, because other vessels had passed the same spot.
“The possibility that the steamship Thomas Walton struck a mine can be supported, since the torpedoing occurred towards evening and nothing was observed, and also because several explosions took place in the same area owing to misses by torpedoes.
“In the case of the steamship Garoufalia, a denial appears expedient, if only because a neutral steamer is concerned, which was attacked without warning. Since it was attacked by means of an electric torpedo, no torpedo wake could be observed.”
Do you say in the face of that that you did not deceive the neutrals? That is the advice you were giving to the Defendant Raeder as his staff officer, is it not?
WAGNER: This memorandum did not emanate from me; it emanated from “Iia.”
COL. PHILLIMORE: Where does it originate?
WAGNER: That is the assistant of the expert on international law.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You would not have seen it?
WAGNER: I do not recall this document.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Why do you say it emanated from “Iia?” It has “Ia” at the end of it.
WAGNER: If this memorandum was dispatched then I also saw it...
COL. PHILLIMORE: I will just read the next part of the note to remind you.
“The following facts have thus been ascertained:”—this is what you are writing to the Foreign Office—
“The steamer Deptford was sunk by a German U-boat on 13 December...”
I am sorry. I should have started earlier.
“It is suggested that Norwegian notes regarding the sinking of the steamships Deptford, Thomas Walton, and Garoufalia be answered somewhat in the following manner:
“As a result of the communication from the Norwegian Government, the matter of the sinking of the steamships Deptford, Thomas Walton, and Garoufalia has been thoroughly investigated. The following facts have thus been ascertained:
“The steamer Deptford was sunk by a German U-boat on 13 December, as it was recognized as an armed enemy ship. According to the report of the U-boat commander, the sinking did not take place within territorial waters but immediately outside. The German Naval Forces have strict instructions not to undertake any war operations within neutral territorial waters. Should the U-boat commander have miscalculated his position, as appears to be borne out by the findings of the Norwegian authorities, and should Norwegian territorial waters have been violated in consequence, the German Government regrets this most sincerely. As a result of this incident, the German Naval Forces have once again been instructed unconditionally to respect neutral territorial waters. If a violation of Norwegian territorial waters has indeed occurred, there will be no repetition of it.
“As far as the sinking of the steamships Thomas Walton and Garoufalia is concerned, this cannot be traced to operations by German U-boats, as at the time of the sinking none of them were in the naval area indicated.”
And then there is a draft reply put forward which is on very much the same lines.
And you say in the face of that document that the German Navy never misled the neutrals?
WAGNER: The neutrals had been advised that in these areas dangers of war might be encountered. We were of the opinion that we were not obliged to tell them through which war measures these areas were dangerous, or through which war measures their ships were lost.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Is that really your answer to this document? This is a complete lie, is it not? You admit the one sinking that you cannot get away from. And you deny the others. You deny that there was a German U-boat anywhere near, and you are telling this Tribunal that you were justified in order to conceal the weapons you were using. Is that the best answer you can give?
WAGNER: Yes, certainly. We had no interest at all in letting the enemy know what methods we were using in this area.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You are admitting that one of them was sunk by a U-boat. Why not admit the other two as well? Why not say it was the same U-boat?
WAGNER: I assume that we were concerned with another area in which the situation was different.
COL. PHILLIMORE: What was the difference? Why did you not say, “One of our U-boats has made a mistake or disobeyed orders, and is responsible for all these three sinkings?” Or, alternatively, why did you not say, “We have given you fair warning, we are going to sink at sight anyone in this area. And what is your complaint?”
WAGNER: Obviously I did not consider it expedient.
COL. PHILLIMORE: It was considered expedient to deceive the neutrals. And you, an Admiral in the German Navy, told me you did not do that ten minutes ago. As a matter of fact, these three boats were all sunk by the same U-boat, were they not?
WAGNER: I cannot tell you that at the moment.
COL. PHILLIMORE: I say they were all sunk by U-38, and the dates of sinking were: the Deptford, on 13 December, the Garoufalia on the 11th, and the Thomas Walton on the 7th. Do you dispute that?
WAGNER: I did not understand the last sentence.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Do you dispute those details, or do you not remember?
WAGNER: I cannot recall; but I actually believe it is impossible.
COL. PHILLIMORE: I will show you another instance of deceiving the neutrals, and this time it was your friends, the Spanish. Would you look at C-105?
My Lord, that is a new document; it becomes GB-455. It is an extract from the SKL War Diary for 19 December 1940.
[Turning to the witness.] You kept the SKL War Diary yourself at that time, did you not?
WAGNER: No, I did not keep it, but I signed it.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You signed it. Did you read it before you signed it?
WAGNER: The essential parts, yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You see, it reads: “News from the Neutrals,” and it is headed “Spain”:
“According to a report from the naval attaché, Spanish fishing vessel was sunk by a submarine of unknown nationality between Las Palmas and Cape Juby. In the rescue boats the crew was subjected to machine gun fire. Three men badly wounded. Landed at Las Palmas on 18 December. Italians suspected. (Possibility it might have been U-37).”
Then on 20 December, the next day:
“Commander, Submarine Fleet, will be informed of Spanish report regarding sinking of Spanish fishing vessel by submarine of unknown nationality on 16 December between Las Palmas and Cape Juby, and requested to conduct an investigation. On the responsibility of the Naval Operations Staff it is confirmed to our naval attaché in Madrid that, regarding the sinking, there is no question of a German submarine.”
When you reported that, you thought it possible, did you not, that it might have been U-37; is that not so?
WAGNER: It seems to me that in the meantime it became known that it was not U-37.
COL. PHILLIMORE: I will read on. This is under date of 21 December:
“U-37 reports: a torpedo fired at a tanker of the Kopbard type (7329) ran off in a circle and probably hit an Amphitrite submarine in the tanker’s convoy. Tanker burned out. Spanish steamer St. Carlos (300) without distinguishing marks, through concentrated gunfire. Nine torpedoes left.
“Then U-37 torpedoed French tanker Rhone and the submarine Sfax and sank the Spanish fishing vessel.”
And then, if you will read the next entry.
“We shall continue to maintain to the outside world that there is no question of a German or Italian submarine in the sea area in question being responsible for the sinkings.”
Do you still say that you did not deceive the neutrals?
WAGNER: This case is doubtless a deception, but I do not remember for what particular reason this deception was carried through.
COL. PHILLIMORE: But it is pretty discreditable, is it not? Do you regard that as creditable to the German Navy, that conduct?
WAGNER: No, this...
COL. PHILLIMORE: Did the Defendant Raeder sign the War Diary?
WAGNER: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Did you tell the Defendant Dönitz what answer you were giving to the Spaniards and the Norwegians?
WAGNER: That I do not recall.
COL. PHILLIMORE: He would get a copy, would he not?
WAGNER: I did not understand you.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You would send him a copy, would you not, of your note to the Foreign Office?
WAGNER: That is possible.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Phillimore, does the signature of the Defendant Raeder appear at the end of this document, C-105?
COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, I regret to say I have not checked that. But as the witness has said, the practice was that he was to sign the War Diary, and that the Commander-in-Chief was to sign it periodically.
Is that right, Witness?
WAGNER: Yes. On the next page, on 21 December my signature appears as well as those of Admiral Fricke, Admiral Schniewind, and Admiral Raeder.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I would be very grateful to the Prosecution if the documents which concern the Defendant Raeder would also be given to me, for it is relatively difficult for me to follow the situation otherwise. I have received none of these documents.
COL. PHILLIMORE: I am extremely sorry, My Lord. That is my fault, and I will see that Dr. Siemers has the copies tonight.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now at this point until tomorrow morning.