Morning Session
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: With the permission of the Tribunal I would like to submit my remaining documents, and then call Admiral Wagner as my first witness.
The next document I come to is Dönitz-37. It is an extract from Dokumente der Deutschen Politik on the Altmark case. I do not propose to read it. It concerns a report of the captain of the Altmark, which shows how the sailors of the Altmark were shot at while trying to escape by water and across the ice. There were seven dead. It can be found, Mr. President, on Page 78 of Volume II; from Page 79 it can be seen that this action on the whole found full recognition in spite of the casualties which, no doubt were regretted by the Admiralty too.
The next document, Dönitz-39, has partly been read by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe during cross-examination. It can be found on Page 81 and the following pages. It deals with the question of reprisals following a report received regarding the shooting of survivors of the German mine-layer Ulm.
On Page 83 there is a summary regarding the incidents which had been reported to the Naval Operations Staff at that time and which contained examples dealing with cases where survivors were shot at by Allied naval forces. I am not so much interested in these 12 actual examples as in the attitude adopted by the Naval Operations Staff in transmitting these examples to the OKW. It is so important that I would like to read the three sentences. They are on Page 83, at the top.
“The following accounts deal with incidents which have already been reported, and in making use of them it must also be considered that:
“a) some of these incidents occurred while fighting was still going on;
“b) shipwrecked persons swimming about in the water easily think that shots which missed their real target are directed against them;
“c) so far no evidence whatsoever has been found that a written or oral order for the shooting of shipwrecked persons has been issued.”
The idea of reprisals did not only occur to the Command, but it also occurred to the personnel serving on the ships at the front.
Now, we come to Document Dönitz-41, which is on Page 87 and deals with a conversation between Admiral Dönitz and a commander. The conversation took place in June 1943, and it is dealt with in an affidavit made by Korvettenkapitän Witt. Following descriptions of attacks made by British fliers on shipwrecked German submarine crews, the opinion was expressed by the crews that in reprisal the survivors of enemy ships should also be shot at.
The affidavit also says in the third paragraph:
“The Admiral sharply declined the idea of attacking an enemy rendered defenseless in combat; it was incompatible with our way of waging war.”
In connection with the Prosecution’s Exhibit GB-205 I shall submit a document of my own which deals with the question of terroristic actions. It is an extract from Exhibit GB-194 of the Prosecution, and it can be found on Page 91. It deals with the question of whether the crews of scuttled German ships should be rescued or not. The French press tends to say they should not, in view of the pressing need of the Allies for freight space. The same entry contains a report according to which British warships also had special instructions to prevent further scuttling of German ships.
I now shall try to prove that the principle according to which no commander undertakes rescue actions if he thereby endangers a valuable ship is justified. For that purpose I refer to Document Dönitz-90, which is in the Volume IV of the document book, Page 258. It is an affidavit of Vice Admiral Rogge, retired. He reports that in November 1941 his auxiliary cruiser was sunk from a great distance by a British cruiser and that the survivors had taken to the boats. They were towed away by a German submarine to a German supply ship and this supply ship too, a few days later, was sunk from a great distance by a British cruiser. Once again the survivors took to the boats and to floats. The affidavit closes with the words:
“At both sinkings no attempt was made, presumably due to danger involved for the British cruiser, to save even individual crew members.”
The principle that a valuable ship must not risk rescue actions to save even members of its own crew is expressed with classical clarity and severity in the British Admiralty Orders which I have already submitted as Dönitz-67. The extract is printed on Page 96. There it says:
“Aid to ships attacked by submarines: No British ocean-going merchant ship should aid a ship attacked by U-boats. Small coastal ships, fishing steamers, and other small ships with little draught should give all possible aid.”
The next document I submit is Dönitz-44, which is on Page 97. It is a questionnaire for Vice Admiral Kreisch who, according to a decision by the Tribunal, was interrogated in a British camp for prisoners of war. From January 1942 to January 1944 he was the officer in charge of submarines in Italy, which means that he was responsible for submarine warfare in the Mediterranean. According to his statements he knows of no order or suggestions regarding the killing of survivors. He advised his commanders that rescue measures must not endanger the task and safety of their own ships.
In connection with the question whether Admiral Dönitz was a member of the Reich Government I should like to ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the German Armed Forces Law of 1935 which can be found on Page 105 of Volume II of my document books. Paragraph 3 will show that there was only one Minister for the German Armed Forces and that was the Reich Minister of War. On the following page in Paragraph 37 it is shown that this one Minister was assigned the right to issue legislative orders.
On Page 107 I again have the decree which has been submitted to the Tribunal as Document 1915-PS, in which, dated 4 February, the post of the Reich Minister of War is abolished and the tasks of his Ministry are transferred to the Chief of the OKW. No new Ministry for the Army or the Navy is established.
The Prosecution has described Admiral Dönitz as a fanatical follower of the Nazi Party. The first document to prove this statement is dated 17 December 1943; it is Exhibit GB-185. Considering the time factor, I shall refrain from reading a few sentences from it to show that anything that Admiral Dönitz may have said about political questions was said from the point of view of the unity and strength of his sailors. May I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document, which again appears on Pages 103 and 104 of Volume II.
I only want to draw your attention to the last paragraph on Page 104. It deals with the handing over of Navy shipyards to the Ministry of Armament in the autumn of 1943. It is an important question, important for the responsibility regarding the use of labor in the shipyards, and has been touched upon repeatedly in this Court. This sole tendency toward unity becomes clear from yet another document of the Prosecution from which I propose to read one sentence. It is Exhibit GB-186. In the British trial brief it is on Page 7. I shall only read the second and third sentences: “As officers we have the duty to be guardians of this unity of our people. Any disunity would also affect our troops.” The following sentence deals with the same thought at greater length.
THE PRESIDENT: British trial brief, Page 7? Mine has only five pages. You mean the document book?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: It is the British document book; not the trial brief, but the document book, second and third sentences on Page 7, which I have read, Mr. President.
The fact that Admiral Dönitz was not a fanatical follower of the Party but on the contrary fought against a political influence exercised upon the Armed Forces by the Party is shown in my following document, Dönitz-91. It is on Page 260 of Document Book 4. It is an affidavit from the chief of the legal department in the High Command of the Navy, Dr. Joachim Rudolphi. The Soviet Prosecution has already used this document during its cross-examination. I should like to give a brief summary of the contents:
In the summer of 1943 Reichsleiter Bormann made an attempt through the Reich Minister of Justice to deprive the Armed Forces courts of their jurisdiction in so-called political cases. They were to be transferred to the Peoples’ Court and other courts. The attempt, however, failed. It failed due to a report which Admiral Dönitz made verbally to the Führer on this subject and during which he violently opposed the intentions of the Party. After the assassination attempt on 20 July, Bormann renewed his attempt. Again Admiral Dönitz raised objections, but this time without success. A decree was issued on 20 September 1944 which deprived the Armed Forces courts of their jurisdiction regarding so-called political perpetrations. This decree, which was signed by Adolf Hitler, was not carried out in the Navy by explicit order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.
I shall read the last paragraph but one of the affidavit, which says:
“This attitude of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy made it possible for the Navy, as the only branch of the Armed Forces until the end of the war, not to have to transfer to the Peoples’ Court or to a special court any criminal procedures of political coloring.”
On page 113 in Volume II of my document book I have included a lengthy extract from Exhibit GB-211, a document of the Prosecution; and this is an application by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy addressed to the Führer and asking for supplies for the construction and repair of naval and merchant ships. During the interrogation and cross-examination of Admiral Dönitz this document has already been referred to. I should merely like to point out that this is a memorandum containing more than 20 pages; the Prosecution took up two points contained therein.
The origin of the document is dealt with in Document Dönitz-46, Page 117 and the following pages. This is an affidavit from the officer who had drafted this memorandum. I can summarize the contents. The memorandum is concerned with measures which did not actually come within the sphere of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. It arose on the basis of a discussion which took place between all departments taking part in the construction and repair of war and merchant vessels. All these measures are summarized in this memorandum. The point objected to in particular by the Prosecution as amounting to a suggestion in favor of punitive measures against sabotage in shipyards is dealt with in detail on Page 119. I should like to point out particularly that at that time seven out of eight ships under construction were destroyed by sabotage.
It was not a question of terror measures but of punitive measures entailing the forfeiting of certain advantages and, if necessary, the concentration of workers in camps adjoining the shipyards, so as to cut them off from any sabotage agents.
Following Exhibit GB-209 of the Prosecution, which deals with the alleged renunciation of the Geneva Convention, I submit Dönitz-48, which is on Page 122 and the following pages. It will show the model treatment afforded Allied prisoners of war in the only prisoner-of-war camp which was under the jurisdiction of Admiral Dönitz as the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.
To begin with, the document contains an affidavit from two officers who dealt with prisoner-of-war affairs in the High Command of the Navy. This statement is to the effect that all the suggestions of the International Red Cross regarding these camps were followed.
The next extract is a report by the last commandant of that camp, Korvettenkapitän Rogge, and I should like to read the second paragraph from that report:
“In the camp Westertimke there were housed at my time about 5,500 to 7,000, at the end 8,000, prisoners of war and internees of different nations, mainly members of the British Navy. The camp had a good reputation, as was generally known. It was the best in Germany. This was expressly stated at a congress of British and other prisoner-of-war physicians of all German camps, which took place in Schwanenwerder near Berlin at the villa of Goebbels about December 1944. This statement was confirmed by the British chief camp physician in Westertimke, Major Dr. Harvey, British Royal Army, whom I am naming as a witness.”
I shall also read the last paragraph on Page 126:
“As I was deputy commandant I stayed at the camp up to the capitulation and gave up the camp in the regular way to British troops who were quite satisfied with the transfer. Squadron Leader A. J. Evans gave me a letter confirming this. I enclose a photostat of this letter.”
This photostat copy appears on the following page, and it says:
“Korvettenkapitän W. Rogge was for 10 months chief camp officer at the Marlag Camp at Westertimke. Without exception all the prisoners of war in that camp have reported that he treated them with fairness and consideration.”
Then follows another affidavit from the intelligence officer in that camp. I should like to point out that this officer was born in February 1865 and that his age alone would, I think, exclude the use of any terror measures. I shall read from Page 129, the third from the last paragraph:
“No means of pressure were employed at Dulag Nord. If a man told falsehoods he was sent back to his room and was not interrogated for 2 or 3 days. I believe I can say that no blow was ever struck at Dulag Nord.”
I should now like to refer briefly to the accusation raised against the defendant according to which he as “a fanatical Nazi” prolonged a hopeless war. I submit Dönitz-50, which contains statements made by Admiral Darlan, Mr. Chamberlain, and Mr. Churchill in 1940. They will be found on Pages 132 and 133 of the document book and they will show that the afore-mentioned persons also considered it expedient in a critical situation to call upon the nation—partly with success and partly without—to render the utmost resistance.
During his examination Admiral Dönitz gave as the reason for his views that he wanted to save German nationals in the East. As evidence for this I draw your attention to Exhibit GB-212, which can be found on Page 73 of the British document book. It is a decree of 11 April 1945, and I shall read two sentences under heading 1:
“Capitulation means for certain the occupation of the whole of Germany by the Allies along the lines of partition discussed by them at Yalta. It also means, therefore, the ceding to Russia of further considerable parts of Germany west of the river Oder. Or does anyone think that at that stage the Anglo-Saxons will not keep to their agreements and will oppose a further advance of the Russian hordes into Germany with armed forces, and will begin a war with Russia for our sake? The reasoning, ‘Let the Anglo-Saxons into the country; then at least the Russians will not come,’ is faulty, too.”
I shall also quote from Exhibit GB-188, which is on Page 10 of the document book of the Prosecution—I beg your pardon, Page 11. It is an order to the German Armed Forces dated 1 May 1945. I shall quote the second paragraph:
“The Führer has designated me to be his successor as head of State and as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. I am taking over the Supreme Command of all branches of the German Armed Forces with the will to carry on the struggle against the Bolsheviks until the fighting forces and hundreds of thousands of families of the German eastern areas have been saved from slavery and destruction.”
This, Mr. President, is the end of my documentary evidence.
Two interrogatories are still outstanding. One is that of Kapitän zur See Rösing and the other of Fregattenkapitän Suhren. Furthermore—and this is something I particularly regret—the interrogatory from the Commander-in-Chief of the American Navy, Admiral Nimitz, has still not been received. I will submit these documents as soon as I have received them.
And now, with permission of the Tribunal, I should like to call my witness, Admiral Wagner.
MR. DODD: Mr. President, while the witness is being called in, I would like to raise one matter with the Tribunal. On Saturday I understand that the question of when the witness Puhl would be called was raised before the Tribunal. And as I understand it from the record, it was left for counsel to settle the matter as to whether he should be called before the Raeder case comes on or after the Raeder case.
I should like to say that we have some reasons for asking that he be called before the Raeder case, and there are two: First of all, he is here in the prison under a kind of confinement different from that under which he has been held by the French in the French territory; and secondly, the officer, Lieutenant Meltzer, who has been assisting in the Funk case, is very anxious—for compelling personal reasons—to return to the United States, and of course he will not be able to do so until we have concluded the Funk case. And, Mr. President, it will not take very long in my judgment to hear this witness. He is only here for cross-examination on his affidavit and we would appreciate it if he could come on at the conclusion of the Dönitz case.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Mr. Dodd, he can be brought for cross-examination after the Dönitz case.
[The witness Wagner took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?
GERHARD WAGNER (Witness): Gerhard Wagner.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.
[The witness repeated the oath.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you sit down.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral, when did you join the Navy?
WAGNER: On 4 June 1916.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Which positions did you hold in the High Command of the Navy, and at what time?
WAGNER: From summer 1933 until the summer of 1935 I was adviser in the operational department of the High Command. I was Kapitänleutnant and then Korvettenkapitän. In 1937, from January until September, I had the same position. From April 1939 until June 1941 I was the head of the operational group, known as “IA,” in the operations section of the Naval Operations Staff. From June 1941 until June 1944 I was the chief of the operations section of the Naval Operations Staff. From June 1944 until May 1945, I was admiral for special tasks attached to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: So that during the entire war you were a member of the Naval Operations Staff?
WAGNER: Yes, that is so.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What were the general tasks of the Naval Operations Staff?
WAGNER: The tasks of the Naval Operations Staff included all those involved in naval warfare, both at sea and in the defense of the coasts, and also in the protection of our own merchant shipping. As far as territorial tasks were concerned, the Naval Operations Staff did not have any, neither at home nor in the occupied territories.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was the Naval Operations Staff part of the High Command of the Navy, the OKM?
WAGNER: The Naval Operations Staff was part of the High Command of the Navy.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What was the relationship between the Naval Operations Staff and the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, the OKW?
WAGNER: The OKW passed on the instructions and orders of Hitler, who was the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, regarding the conduct of the war; usually, as far as naval warfare particularly was concerned, after examination and review by the Naval Operations Staff. General questions of the conduct of the war were decided without previous consultations with members of the Naval Operations Staff.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In which manner were the preparations of the High Command of the Navy for a possible war carried out?
WAGNER: Generally speaking, they consisted of mobilization preparations, tactical training, and strategic considerations for the event of a possible conflict.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did the Naval Operations Staff during your time receive an order to prepare for a definite possibility of war?
WAGNER: The first instance was the order for “Case White,” the war against Poland. Before that, only tasks regarding security measures were given us.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were plans elaborated for the naval war against England?
WAGNER: A plan for the war against England did not exist at all before the beginning of the war. Such a war seemed to us outside the realm of possibility. Considering the overwhelming superiority of the British fleet, which can hardly be expressed in proportionate figures, and considering England’s strategical domination of the seas such a war appeared to us to be absolutely hopeless. The only means by which Britain could have been damaged effectively was by submarine warfare; but even the submarine weapon was by no means being given preferential treatment nor was its production accelerated. It was merely given its corresponding place in the creation of a well-balanced homogeneous fleet.
At the beginning of the war all we had were 40 submarines ready for action, of which, as far as I can remember, barely half could have been used in the Atlantic. That, in comparison with the earth-girdling naval means at the disposal of the first-ranking world power England, is as good as nothing. As a comparison, I should like to cite the fact that both the British and the French Navy at the same time had more than 100 submarines each.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did the then Captain Dönitz, as chief of the submarines, have anything to do with the planning of the war?
WAGNER: Captain Dönitz at that time was a subordinate front-line commander, under the command of the chief of the fleet and he, because of his warfare experience, had the task of training and tactically guiding the inexperienced submarine personnel.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did he in turn make any suggestions or instigate any plans for the war?
WAGNER: No, these preparations and this war planning, in particular for the “Case White,” were exclusively the task of the Naval Operations Staff.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did Dönitz at any previous time hear about the military intentions of the Naval Operations Staff?
WAGNER: No.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did Admiral Dönitz hear of the military intentions of the Naval Operations Staff at a time earlier than necessary for the carrying out of the orders given him?
WAGNER: No, he heard of it by means of the orders reaching him from the Naval Operations Staff.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral Wagner, you know of the London Agreement of 1936 regarding submarine warfare. Did the Naval Operations Staff draw any conclusions from that agreement for their preparation for a war, in particular, for carrying on a possible economic war?
WAGNER: The Prize Regulations still existing from the last war were revised and made to conform with the London Agreement. For that purpose a committee was formed which included representatives from the High Command of the Navy, the Foreign Office, the Reich Ministry of Justice, and scientific experts.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were these new Prize Regulations made known to the commandants some time before the war or were they communicated to them just when they were published shortly before the outbreak of the war?
WAGNER: These new Prize Regulations were published in 1938 as an internal ordinance of the Navy, which was available for the purpose of training officers. During the autumn maneuvers of the Fleet in 1938 a number of exercises were arranged for the purpose of acquainting the officer corps with these new regulations. I, myself, at that time...
THE PRESIDENT: Where are the new Prize Regulations you are referring to?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I am talking about the regulations published on 26 August 1939, which are contained in my document book. They are on Page 137, in Volume III of my document book.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I beg your pardon, Mr. President; the date is not 26, but 28 August.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness was saying that exercises were carried out?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes, in the year 1938.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: [Turning to the witness.] Which conceptions did the Naval Operations Staff have after the beginning of the war regarding the development of the naval war against Britain?
WAGNER: The Naval Operations Staff thought that Great Britain would probably start in where she had stopped at the end of the first World War. That meant that there would be a hunger blockade against Germany, a control of the merchandise of neutral countries, introduction of a system of control, the arming of merchant ships, and the delimitation of operational waters.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I am now going to have the battle order of 3 September 1939 shown to you. It is Document Dönitz-55. It can be found on Page 139, in Volume III of the document book. You will see from this that submarines, like all naval forces, had orders to adhere to this Prize Ordinance in the economic warfare.
Then, at the end, you will find an order which I propose to read to you. This is on Page 140:
“Order prepared for intensifying the economic war because of the arming of enemy merchant ships.
“1) Arming of, and therefore resistance from, the majority of English and French merchant ships is to be expected.
“2) Submarines will stop merchant ships only if own vessel is not endangered. Attack without warning by submarines is allowed against plainly recognized enemy merchant ships.
“3) Battleships and auxiliary cruisers will watch for possibility of use of arms by merchant ships when stopped.”
I should like to ask you whether this order was prepared long ago or whether it was improvised at the last moment?
WAGNER: At the beginning of the war we were forced to improvise a great many orders we were issuing, because they were not prepared thoroughly.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did this order become operative at all?
WAGNER: No.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Why not?
WAGNER: After consultation with the Foreign Office, we had decided that we would strictly adhere to the London Agreement until we had clear-cut evidence of the British merchant navy being used for military purposes. We remembered from the last war the power which the enemy propaganda had, and we did not under any circumstances want to give anyone cause once more to decry us as pirates.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: When, at what stage, did the military use of enemy merchant ships become clear to the Naval Operations Staff?
WAGNER: The fact that enemy merchant vessels were armed became clear after a few weeks of the war. We had a large number of reports about artillery fights which had occurred between U-boats and armed enemy merchant ships. Certainly one, and probably several boats were lost by us. One British steamer, I think it was called Stonepool, was praised publicly by the British Admiralty for its success in combating submarines.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The Tribunal already has knowledge of the order of 4 October allowing attacks against all armed merchant ships of the enemy and also of the order of 17 October allowing attacks on all enemy merchant ships with certain exceptions.
Were these orders the result of experiences which the Naval Operations Staff had regarding the military use of enemy merchant ships?
WAGNER: Yes, exclusively.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Both orders contain exceptions favoring passenger ships. They were not to be attacked even when they were members of an enemy convoy. To what were these exceptions due?
WAGNER: They were due to an order from the Führer. At the beginning of the war he had stated that Germany did not have any intention of waging war against women and children. He wished, for that reason, that also in naval war any incidents in which women and children might lose their lives should be avoided. Consequently, even the stopping of passenger ships was prohibited. The military necessities of naval warfare made it very difficult to adhere to this order, particularly where passenger ships were traveling in enemy convoys. Later on, step by step, this order was altered as it became evident that there was no longer any peaceful passenger traffic at all and that enemy passenger ships were particularly heavily armed and used more and more as auxiliary cruisers and troop transport ships.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were the orders of the German Naval Operations Staff regarding the combating of armed enemy ships and later enemy ships as a whole made known to the British Admiralty?
WAGNER: Neither side made its war measures known during the war, and that held true in this case also. But in October the German press left no doubt whatsoever that every armed enemy merchant ship would be sunk by us without warning, and later on it was equally well known that we were forced to consider the entire enemy merchant marine as being under military direction and in military use.
These statements by our press must no doubt have been known to the British Admiralty and the neutral governments. Apart from that, and I think this was in October, Grossadmiral Raeder gave an interview to the press on the same theme.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: A memorandum of the Naval Operations Staff was issued in the middle of October: “On the Possibilities of Intensifying the War against Merchant Shipping”; I am going to have this memorandum shown to you. Its number is GB-224. After looking at this memorandum please tell me what its purpose was and what the memorandum contains.
Mr. President, some extracts can be found on Page 199, in Volume IV of the document book.
WAGNER: This memorandum was issued due to the situation that existed since the beginning of the war. On 3 September 1939 Britain had begun a total hunger blockade against Germany. Naturally that was not directed only against the fighting men, but against all nonfighting members, including women, children, the aged, and the sick. It meant that Britain would declare all food rations, all luxury goods, all clothing, as well as all raw materials necessary for these items, as contraband and would also exercise a strict control of neutral shipping of which Germany would be deprived insofar as it would have to go through waters controlled by Great Britain. Apart from that, England exercised a growing political and economic pressure upon the European neighbors of Germany to cease all commerce with Germany.
That intention of the total hunger blockade was emphatically confirmed by the Head of the British Government, Prime Minister Chamberlain, during a speech before the House of Commons at the end of September. He described Germany as a beleaguered fort; and he added that it was not customary for beleaguered forts to be accorded free rations. That expression of the beleaguered fort was also taken up by the French press.
Furthermore, Prime Minister Chamberlain stated around the beginning of October—according to this memorandum it was on 12 October—that in this war Britain would utilize her entire strength for the destruction of Germany. From this we drew the conclusion, aided by the experiences of the last World War, that England would soon hit German exports under some pretext or other.
With the shadow of the total hunger blockade, which no doubt had been thoroughly prepared during long years of peace, creeping in upon us we now had a great deal to do to catch up, since we had not prepared for war against Great Britain. We examined, both from the legal and military point of view, the possibilities at our disposal by which we in turn might cut off Britain’s supplies. That was the aim and purpose of that memorandum.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You are saying, therefore, that this memorandum contains considerations regarding means for countering the British measures with correspondingly effective German measures?
WAGNER: Yes, that was definitely the purpose of that memorandum.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Studying that memorandum you will find a sentence—C. 1. is the paragraph—according to which the Naval Operations Staff must remain basically within the limits of international law, but that decisive war measures would have to be carried out even if the existing international law could not be applied to them.
Did this mean that international law was to be generally disregarded by the Naval Operations Staff, or what is the meaning of this sentence?
WAGNER: That question was duly studied by the Naval Operations Staff and discussed at great length. I should like to point out that on Page 2 of the memorandum, in the first paragraph, it states that obedience to the laws of chivalry comes before all else in naval warfare. That, from the outset, would prevent a barbarous waging of war at sea. We did think, however, that the modern technical developments would create conditions for naval warfare which would certainly justify and necessitate further development of the laws of naval warfare.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Which technical developments do you mean?
WAGNER: I am thinking mainly of two points: First, the large-scale use of the airplane in naval warfare. As a result of the speed and wide range of the airplane, militarily guarded zones could be created before the coasts of all warfaring nations, and in respect to these zones one could no longer speak of freedom of the seas. Secondly, the introduction of electrical orientation equipment which made it possible, even at the beginning of the war, to spot an unseen opponent and to send fighting forces against him.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: It says in this memorandum that decisive war measures are to be taken even though they create new laws at sea. Did occasion arise for such measures?
WAGNER: No; at any rate, not at once. In the meantime, I think on 4 November, the United States of America declared the so-called American combat zone, and the specific reason given for it was that in that zone actual belligerent actions rendered the sea dangerous for American shipping. By this announcement some of the points of that memorandum were in immediate need of being revised. As a rule we remained within the limits of the measures as they had been employed by both parties during the first World War.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: By these measures do you mean the warning against navigating in certain zones?
WAGNER: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: According to some of the exhibits used by the Prosecution, Numbers GB-194 and 226, submarines were permitted to attack all ships without warning in certain areas, beginning with January 1940. The attacks were to be carried out, if possible, unseen, while maintaining the fiction that the ships struck mines.
Will you please tell the Tribunal which sea lanes or areas were concerned in this? I shall have a sea-chart handed to you for that purpose. I am submitting it to the Tribunal as Exhibit Dönitz-93.
Will you please explain what can be seen on that map.
WAGNER: In the middle of the map you will find the British Isles. The large part of the ocean which is shaded on the edge shows the afore-mentioned American combat zone. The shaded parts of the sea near the British coast are those parts which were ordered to be German submarine operational zones. They were given letters from A to F in accordance with the time when they were set up.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Can you tell us up to which depth these German operational zones went?
WAGNER: I think perhaps as far as the 200 meter line.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Does this depth guarantee favorable use of mines?
WAGNER: Yes, down to 200 meters the use of anchored mines is possible without any difficulty.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In these operational zones certain dates have been entered. Will you please explain how it happened that on those particular dates, and in that sequence, these territories were made operational zones?
WAGNER: All those areas were declared to be operational zones where our fighting forces came into contact with enemy traffic and a concentration of the enemy defense, resulting in main combat areas.
To begin with, they were the zones at the northern and southern end of the German-mined zones which had been declared along the British East Coast and in the Bristol Channel. You can see, therefore, that Zone A lies to the east of Scotland and is dated 6 January. The Bristol Channel Zone is dated 12 January, and finally at the southern end of this danger zone, that is, to the east of London, there is the date of 24 January.
Later on, according to the fluctuations of the actual fighting, further areas around the British Isles and then off the French Coast were designated.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Up to what date did this development continue?
WAGNER: The last zone was declared on 28 May 1940.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Had neutrals been warned against navigating in these zones?
WAGNER: Yes, an official note had informed neutral countries that the entire U.S.A. fighting zone had to be considered as being dangerous, and that they should negotiate the North Sea to the east and to the south of the German mine area which was north of Holland.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What difference is there between the situation as shown by this map, and the German declaration of a blockade of 17 August 1940?
That is, Mr. President, the declaration I have submitted as Dönitz-104, which can be found on Page 214 in Volume IV of the document book.
WAGNER: As far as the limits of the danger zone are concerned, there was really no difference. This fact was also stated by Prime Minister Churchill in the House of Commons at the time. However, the difference which did exist was that up to that time we confined ourselves to the area I have just described, near the British Coast, whereas now we considered the entire U.S.A. combat zone as an operational zone.
The declaration regarding a blockade was based on the fact that in the meantime France had been eliminated from the war, and that Britain now was the focal point of all belligerent action.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did the German blockade zone in its entirety correspond exactly or more or less with the U.S.A. combat zone?
WAGNER: It was nearly exactly the same as the U.S.A. combat zone. There were merely a few insignificant corrections.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, I am submitting another sea-chart as Dönitz-92, in which...
THE PRESIDENT: I think perhaps that would be a good time to break off then.
[A recess was taken.]
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Now, Mr. President, as Dönitz-94, I submit a chart of the German blockade zone dated 17 August.
Admiral Wagner, just for the sake of repeating, what were the limits of the German blockade region in relation to the U.S. fighting zone?
THE PRESIDENT: I thought you had already told us that. You told us that the blockade zone was the same as the American zone, didn’t you?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes, Mr. President, I thought that we had not been understood quite correctly before the recess.
[Turning to the witness.] What was the naval practice of the enemy as far as this operational zone was concerned? Was there any practice that they followed?
WAGNER: Yes, the practice on the part of the enemy was identical with ours. In the areas controlled by us in the Baltic, in the eastern part of the North Sea, around Skagerrak and later on in the Norwegian and French waters, the enemy used every suitable weapon without giving previous warning, without notifying us in advance by which means of combat other ships were to be sunk—submarines, mines, aircraft, or surface vessels. In these regions the same thing applied to neutrals, and especially to Sweden.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Now, I would like to confront you with a statement by the First Lord of the British Admiralty. You will find this on Page 208 of the document book, Volume IV. This statement is dated 8 May 1940, and I have ascertained, Mr. President, that unfortunately it is wrongly reproduced in the British document book; so I shall quote from the original.
“Therefore we limited our operations in the Skagerrak to the submarines. In order to make this work as effective as possible, the usual restrictions which we have imposed on the actions of our submarines were relaxed. As I told the House, all German ships by day and all ships by night were to be sunk as opportunity served.”
I should like to submit this as Exhibit Dönitz-102.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the difference that you were making in the copy we have before us—“...all ships were to be sunk by day and German ships by night...” Is that it?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes, Mr. President. It should be corrected to read, “all German ships by day and all ships by night were to be sunk.”
THE PRESIDENT: I see; I said it wrong—“and all ships by night.” Yes, very well.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral Wagner, what was the significance of this statement and this practice so far as the German ships were concerned?
WAGNER: It means that all German ships by day and by night in this area were to be sunk without warning.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: And what does it mean for the neutral ships?
WAGNER: It means that without warning all neutral ships in this area by night...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, surely the document speaks for itself. We don’t need to have it interpreted by a witness who isn’t a lawyer.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Very well.
[Turning to the witness.] Then, tell me, please, from what period of time onward, according to German experiences, did this practice exist in the Skagerrak?
WAGNER: With certainty from 8 April 1940, but I believe I recall that even on 7 April this practice was already in existence.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Had this area at this period of time, that is, the 7th or 8th of April, already been declared a danger zone?
WAGNER: No, the first declaration of danger zone for this area took place on 12 April 1940.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Now I shall have a sea-chart handed to you dealing with the British danger zones, and this shall be Dönitz-92. Please explain the significance of this chart briefly to the Tribunal.
WAGNER: This chart shows the danger zones in European waters as declared by England on the basis of German data. The following areas are of special significance:
First of all, the area in the Bay of Helgoland which on 4 September 1939, that is, on the second day of the war, was declared dangerous. Then the afore-mentioned danger zone, Skagerrak and the area south of Norway, which was declared on 12 April 1940. Then the danger zone in the Baltic, on 14 April 1940; and following upon that, the other danger zones as declared in the course of the year 1940.
I should like to remark also that, according to my recollection, these danger zones were all declared mine danger zones, with the exception of the Channel zone and of the Bay of Biscay, on 17 August 1940. These were generally dangerous zones.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were these areas actually dominated by the British sea and air forces, or did German traffic still continue?
WAGNER: In these areas there was even very lively German traffic. Thus the Baltic Sea, which in its entire expanse from East to West, about 400 nautical miles in length, had been declared a danger zone, was in reality controlled by us during the entire war. In this area there was an extensive freight traffic, the entire ore traffic from Sweden and the corresponding exports to Sweden.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was there only traffic of German ships or also of neutral ships?
WAGNER: This traffic was in German and Swedish ships, but other neutrals also participated in this traffic, for instance, Finland. A similar situation applied in the Skagerrak where, besides the German supply traffic, a large part of the foodstuffs for the Norwegian population was transported. Of course, during this time both German and neutral ships were lost.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I assume, therefore, that both German and neutral seamen lost their lives. Is that correct?
WAGNER: Of course, personnel losses took place as well.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were the German merchantmen, at the time when these operational zones were declared, armed—that is, at the end of 1939 or the beginning of 1940?
WAGNER: Until the middle of 1940 German merchantmen were not at all armed. From then on they were comparatively slightly armed, especially with antiaircraft weapons.
Transport ships of the Navy had always been armed, that is, government ships, which supplied German cruisers and auxiliary cruisers in the Atlantic.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Now I shall submit to you a document of the Prosecution, Exhibit GB-193, which is found in the Prosecution’s document book on Page 29. This document deals with a proposal by the Commander of the U-boats that “...in the Channel, ships with blacked-out lights may be sunk without warning.” Can you tell me just whose ideas we are dealing with in the statements set forth in this document?
WAGNER: From the signature found in this document it appears that we are concerned with a document by a U-boat expert in the Naval Operations Staff.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Who was that?
WAGNER: Lieutenant Fresdorf, who was my subordinate.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Are these statements in accord with the actual circumstances and were they approved by the Naval Operations Staff, or just what was the situation?
WAGNER: Here we are concerned with the rather romantic ideas of a young expert, ideas which were in no way commensurate with the situation. The situation was rather as follows: At this time, that is, in September 1939, the second wave of the British Expeditionary Corps left England for France. The transports ran mostly during the night and were blacked out. At this same time an order existed according to which French ships were neither to be stopped nor attacked; this was still in force for political reasons.
It is quite obvious that at night a blacked-out French ship cannot be told from a blacked-out English ship, just as at night a merchant ship cannot, or only with difficulty, be told from a warship.
These orders, therefore, meant that at night, in order to avoid a mistake, practically no shooting could be done, and therefore the English troop transport was entirely unhampered. This brought about really grotesque situations. It was ascertained that a German U-boat in a favorable position of attack let a fully-loaded English troop transport ship of 20,000 tons pass by, since there was the possibility of making a mistake. The Naval Operations Staff agreed completely with the commanders of the U-boats that no naval war could be carried on in this manner. If a blacked-out ship sails in a belligerent area, better still, in an area where there is a large supply and troop transport traffic, it is liable to suspicion and cannot expect the war to be halted at night for its sake.
Therefore it was not a question of our explaining or excusing ourselves for sinking a ship without warning because we had mistaken it, but the obvious fact at hand was that the blacked-out ship alone was to blame if it was not properly recognized and was sunk without warning.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In these notes we find that the commanders of U-boats, when sinking a merchant ship without warning, were required to make the notation in their log that they had taken it for a warship and that an order, a verbal order, to this effect was to be given to the commanders of the U-boats. Is that correct, and was it done in actual practice?
WAGNER: No, we never did anything like that.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was the Flag Officer of the U-boats given strict and clear orders that blacked-out ships at night in the Channel might be attacked without warning?
WAGNER: Yes. This clear order was issued, but nothing more.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: If the statements of this young officer are not correct, and if no orders were issued accordingly, how is it that these things can be found in the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff?
WAGNER: This paper is not a direct part of the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff. The War Diary itself, in which the daily happenings were recorded, was signed by me, by the Chief of Staff of the Naval Operations Staff, and by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. Here we are concerned with the entry of an expert which was destined for a file collection and motivated by the War Diary.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: That means, then, that the considerations and opinions of experts were collected and filed no matter whether they were approved of or put into actual practice?
WAGNER: Yes. All of these files were collected for later purposes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did the Naval Operations Staff receive news of the incidents which happened after the sinking of the Laconia, and did it approve of the measures taken by the Commander of the U-boats?
WAGNER: The Naval Operations Staff, then as always, listened in on all the wireless messages of the Commander-in-Chief in the Laconia case. It approved of the measures taken by him, but it would not have been at all surprised if the Commander of the U-boats had stopped the entire rescue work at the very first air attack upon the U-boats.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did the Naval Operations Staff know of the order of the Commander of the U-boats, dated 17 September, in which rescue work by U-boats was expressly prohibited?
WAGNER: This order given by the Commander of the U-boats was also heard by wireless.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was this order interpreted by the Naval Operations Staff to the effect that it was to be an order for the shooting of shipwrecked people?
WAGNER: No; no one ever had this idea.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, at this point I should like to put several questions to the witness which have a bearing on the credibility of the statements made by the witness Heisig. But I should like to ask in advance whether there are any objections to my putting these questions, since my documents referring to the witness Heisig were not ruled admissible.
THE PRESIDENT: Was the object of the questions which you were offering to put to this witness to show that the witness Heisig was not a witness who could be believed upon his oath? Was that your object?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The general object is to show how the testimony of this witness originated; that is, the testimony which was submitted to the Court.
THE PRESIDENT: What do you mean by “originated”?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: That is to say, what influence on the witness Heisig forms the basis of this testimony.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the exact question you wanted to ask? You may state it, and we will let the witness wait until we have seen what the question is.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I should like to ask the witness, “Did the witness Heisig report to you about the manner in which his affidavit, which was submitted to the High Tribunal as evidence by the Prosecution, originated?”
THE PRESIDENT: The question that you put, as I took it down, was: What did the witness Heisig report to you about the way his affidavit came about? Is that the question?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: What are you purporting to prove by getting the reports that Heisig may have made to this witness?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I should like to prove therewith, Mr. President, that Heisig was under a certain influence, that is, that he wrongly assumed that he could help a comrade through his testimony.
THE PRESIDENT: Who applied for Heisig’s affidavit?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I did not understand, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Heisig has given an affidavit, has he not?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: That was for the Prosecution, was it?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: That is right.
THE PRESIDENT: And have you asked to cross-examine him?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I interrogated him about this affidavit, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: You did?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes, I did question him; and I called his attention to the contradictions between his affidavit and his testimony here in Court.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I have not read the transcript on this point for about 10 days. But I did read it then, and my recollection is that it was never suggested to the witness Heisig that he gave his affidavit under pressure, which I gather is the suggestion now. Your Lordship will remember that although we had the affidavit, we called the witness Heisig. He said that what was in his affidavit was true; and then he gave his evidence, giving a detailed account of all the relevant matters. So we made it perfectly possible for Dr. Kranzbühler to cross-examine him at the time and to show any differences, as Dr. Kranzbühler just said he purported to do, between the affidavit and his oral evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler has just said, I think, that he did actually cross-examine him.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: He did cross-examine him on that point—on any differences that appeared between his affidavit and his oral testimony. But he was here to be cross-examined, and if it is going to be suggested that the affidavit was obtained by improper means, that suggestion ought to have been made at the time, and then it could have been dealt with.
My Lord, I object to its coming in at this stage, after the witness Heisig has been away, and therefore no opportunity has been given to us either to investigate the matter or to have the evidence there, which could have been done when Heisig gave his evidence; and we could have been prepared for any contradictory evidence now.
My Lord, as a matter of strictness, surely, if I may put it that way, there are two distinct lines. If it was a question of whether Heisig’s evidence was admissible or whether it had been obtained under pressure, then it would be quite possible to have this trial within a trial as to whether it was admissible or not. But if this evidence is, broadly, merely directed to the credibility of Heisig’s evidence, then I respectfully submit it falls within the same objections I made on Saturday to general evidence directed against the credibility of a witness.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think it is suggested that there was any pressure put by the Prosecution upon Heisig. I do not understand that that is what you are suggesting, Dr. Kranzbühler, is it?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: No, no pressure; but the picture as drawn was not true.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I understood Dr. Kranzbühler—if I misunderstood him, so much the easier—I understood him to say that he wanted to give this evidence as to certain influence. I thought that was the word used.
THE PRESIDENT: I think he meant, not influence exerted by the Prosecution, but exerted by a mistaken notion in the witness’ own mind that he was helping a friend.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. My Lord, then that merely goes to credibility and it does then fall within my general objection; that is, if we are going to have evidence as directed on credibility, we go on ad infinitum.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, the Tribunal will allow this question to be put in this particular instance, but they make no general rule as to the admissibility of such questions.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Thank you very much, Mr. President.
Admiral Wagner, in December you were in the prison here together with the witness Heisig. Is that correct?
WAGNER: Yes, from the first until the fifth of December.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: And what did Heisig tell you about the underlying considerations of his affidavit?
WAGNER: He told me the following personally: At the interrogation he had been told that Lieutenant Hoffmann, officer of the watch of Kapitänleutnant Eck, had testified that at that time he had listened to the speech by Admiral Dönitz at Gotenhafen in the autumn of 1942, and that he had considered this as a demand for the killing of survivors of shipwrecks. Heisig had been told:
“If you confirm this testimony of Hoffmann, then you will save not only Eck and Hoffmann, but also two others who would have been sentenced to death. You will prevent any kind of judicial proceeding against Captain Möhle from being instituted. Of course, you will thus incriminate Grossadmiral Dönitz but the material against Admiral Dönitz is of such tremendous weight that his life has been forfeited anyway.”
Further he told me, and without prompting, that at that time, on the occasion of the speech by the Admiral Dönitz, he had been deeply distressed. He had just returned from Lübeck, where he had experienced and seen the frightful consequences of an air attack; that is he had perhaps not experienced it, but at least he had seen the consequences. His mind was set on revenge for these brutal measures, and he considered it possible that this emotional state might have influenced his interpretation of Grossadmiral Dönitz’ speech.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Now we shall turn to a different point.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: If the Prosecution desire to do so, they can, of course, recall Heisig for the purpose of investigating this further.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases, Heisig is no longer here; that is the difficulty when this is done in this order. However, we can consider the matter, My Lord, and we are grateful to the Tribunal for the permission.
THE PRESIDENT: Is Heisig not in custody? Is that what you mean?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, he is no longer in custody.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: He is studying medicine at Munich; he can be very easily reached.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Thank you.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: From when on were you admiral for special tasks attached to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy and what were your tasks in that capacity?
WAGNER: From the end of June 1944 onward, and the purpose of my assignment was the following: After the success of the Anglo-Saxon invasion in northern France, Admiral Dönitz counted on an increased tension in the military situation. He believed that one day he might be forced to leave the Naval Operations Staff, either to remain permanently at the Führer’s headquarters, or at least for a longer period of time, in order to keep up with the development of the entire war situation, or because a transfer of the Naval Operations Staff might be necessary because of the increasingly heavy air attacks on Berlin. For this purpose the Grossadmiral wanted an older and experienced naval officer in his immediate vicinity, an officer who was well-versed in the problems of sea warfare and who was acquainted with the duties and tasks of the Naval Operations Staff.
My mission was, therefore, a sort of liaison between the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, the Naval Operations Staff and the other offices of the High Command for the duration of the Grossadmiral’s absence from the High Command.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you accompany the Grossadmiral regularly on his visits to the Führer’s headquarters?
WAGNER: Yes; from the period mentioned I was present regularly.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Now I hand you a list of these visits which has been submitted by the Prosecution as GB-207. This may be found in the document book of the Prosecution on Page 56. Please look at this list and tell me whether the dates recorded there are essentially correct.
WAGNER: The dates are essentially correct. At the end the list is not complete, for the period from 3—no; from 10 April until 21 April 1945 is missing. On that day the Grossadmiral participated for the last time at the conferences in the Führer’s headquarters. Beyond that, it seems to me that the list of the people present is incomplete. I also do not know according to what point of view or with what idea in mind this was compiled.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: If you carefully examine this list of people, can you tell me whether Admiral Dönitz was always with these people on the dates mentioned, or does this mean only that these persons were at the Führer’s headquarters at the same time he was? Can you still recall these points?
WAGNER: Yes. If these people participated in the military conferences, then Admiral Dönitz at least saw them. Of course, people in high positions were frequently at the Führer’s headquarters who did not participate in the military conferences and whom the Grossadmiral did not see unless he had special conversations with them.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: For what reason did Admiral Dönitz...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, upon this point, if the witness is saying that any one of these minutes is incomplete, I should be very grateful if he would specify it, because we can get the original German minutes here and confirm the affidavit.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I believe the witness said only that additional people participated in these discussions and that, at the end, some of the conferences are lacking. However, I do not know just what details I should question him about. Perhaps the Prosecution will deal with that matter later in cross-examination?
THE PRESIDENT: But Sir David wants him to specify which are the ones, if he can.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Very well.
[Turning to the witness.] Can you tell me more specifically as to any one of these dates, whether those present are correctly named or whether there were other people present, or whether Grossadmiral Dönitz was not present?
WAGNER: I can tell you exactly that this list is incorrect because it never occurred that neither Field Marshal Keitel nor Generaloberst Jodl was present at the headquarters. For example, on 4 March 1945 neither one of these men is mentioned, nor on 6 March or 8 March. Therefore I conclude that this list cannot be complete. In other places, however, the name of Jodl appears; for example, on 18 March 1945.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The decisive point seems to be whether Admiral Dönitz was present in the Führer’s headquarters on all of these days. Can you confirm that point?
WAGNER: Of course, from memory I cannot confirm that with reference to every single day. However, I am under the impression that the list is correct in that connection, for the frequency of the visits of the Grossadmiral corresponds with the notes in this list, and spot checks show me that the dates are correct.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Why did Grossadmiral Dönitz come to the Führer’s headquarters? What were the reasons?
WAGNER: The chief reason for the frequent visits, which became even more frequent toward the end of the war, was the desire to keep up with the development of the general war situation so that he, Dönitz, could lead the Navy and carry on the naval war accordingly. Beyond that, questions usually came up which the Admiral could not decide for himself out of his own authority and which, because of their importance, he wanted to bring up personally or to discuss with the representatives of the OKW and of the General Staff.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In each of these cases was there a personal report of the Grossadmiral to the Führer?
WAGNER: This is what happened: Most of the problems and reports for the Führer were taken care of during the conference in connection with the Admiral’s report on the naval warfare situation.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: One moment. Was the Admiral always present at the military conferences when he was at the headquarters?
WAGNER: The Admiral took part at least in the discussion of the main session every day.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: And what is the main session?
WAGNER: At noon every day there was a military conference which lasted several hours. This was the main conference. In addition, for months, sessions, including special sessions, were held in the evening or at night, at which the Admiral participated only when very important matters were to be discussed—matters of special importance for the conduct of the war. Then, as I said, he participated.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Now you say that most of the questions which the Grossadmiral had to put to the Führer were taken care of at the military conference. Were there any personal reports besides this?
WAGNER: Personal reports on the part of the Grossadmiral to Hitler took place very seldom; on the other hand, personal discussions with the OKW and the other military offices at the headquarters took place daily.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Now, I would like to know something more in detail about this so-called “Lagebesprechung,” the conferences.
The Prosecution seem to consider this as a sort of War Cabinet at which, for instance, Ribbentrop would report about foreign policies, Speer about questions of production, Himmler about security questions. Is this a correct picture? Who took part in these sessions, what people participated regularly and who attended only once in a while?
WAGNER: The participants at the conferences were generally the following:
Regular participants: from the OKW, Field Marshal Keitel, General Jodl, General Buhle, Post Captain Assmann, Major Büchs, and a few more Chiefs of Staff. Then the Chief of the General Staff of the Army with one or two aides, and as a rule also the Chief of the General Staff of the Air Force with one aide. Further regular participants were: the Chief of the Army Personnel Office, who was Chief Adjutant to the Führer; General Bodenschatz, until 20 July 1944; Vice Admiral Voss who was the permanent deputy of the Grossadmiral; Gruppenführer Fegelein, as Himmler’s permanent deputy; Ambassador Hewel; Minister Sonnleitner, permanent deputy of the Foreign Minister; Reich Press Chief Dr. Dietrich. Frequently the following participated: the Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe; less frequently, Himmler. In addition to these there was a varying participation on the part of special officers, mainly from the General Staff of the Army, and on the part of higher front commanders of the Army and of the Air Force who happened to be in headquarters. Beyond that, toward the end of the war Reich Minister Speer in his capacity as Armament Minister also participated in an increasing measure, and in rare cases the Reich Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop, both as listeners at the conferences. I believe that is the complete list.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Who reported at these conferences and what was reported on?
WAGNER: These sessions were for the sole purpose of informing Hitler about the war situation—about the Eastern situation through the General Staff of the Army, and through the OKW about the situation in all other theaters of war and concerning all three branches of the Wehrmacht. The report took place as follows:
First of all, the Chief of General Staff of the Army reported about the Eastern situation; then Generaloberst Jodl reported on the situation in all other theaters of war on land. Next, Post Captain Assmann of the OKW reported on the naval situation. In between, frequent, often hour-long, conversations took place which dealt with special military problems, panzer problems, aerial problems and such. And after the aerial problems were dealt with the discussion was at an end, and we left the room. I frequently saw that Ambassador Hewel went in to Hitler with a batch of reports, apparently from the Foreign Office, and reported on them without the rest of us knowing what they contained.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In these conferences was there voting or was there consultation, or who gave the orders?
WAGNER: In these conferences all military questions were discussed and frequently decisions were reached by the Führer, that is, if no further preparations were necessary for a decision.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What for example did the Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop do there when he was present?
WAGNER: I only saw Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop perhaps five or six times at these conferences, and I cannot remember that he ever said anything during the entire session. He was only present at the conference for his own information.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: How about Minister Speer, what did he do?
WAGNER: Minister Speer also very seldom brought in armament problems during the discussion. I know that questions of armament were always discussed between Hitler and Speer in special discussions. However, some exceptions may have occurred.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What was Himmler doing there, or his permanent deputy Fegelein? Did they discuss questions of security, or what was their mission?
WAGNER: No. During the military conference security problems were never discussed. Himmler and his deputy appeared very frequently in connection with the Waffen-SS, and Fegelein had always to give reports about the setup, organization, arming, transportation and engagement of the SS divisions. At this time the SS divisions, according to my impression, still played a very important part, for ostensibly they represented a strategic reserve and were much discussed.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I have a record of the meeting which was written by you. It has the Number GB-209. It is not found in the document book. It says in the third paragraph—and I am just reading one sentence:
“The Deputy of the Reichsführer-SS at the Führer’s headquarters, SS Gruppenführer Fegelein, transmits the request of the Reichsführer as to when he can count on the arrival of the ‘Panther’ ”—those are tanks—“coming from Libau.”
Is this typical of SS Gruppenführer Fegelein’s work?
WAGNER: Yes. That was the kind of questions which were dealt with at every one of these sessions.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: At the end of the war Kaltenbrunner appeared several times also. Did he speak or report?
WAGNER: I cannot remember one single utterance on Kaltenbrunner’s part during one of these military conferences.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What role did Admiral Dönitz play at the session discussions?
WAGNER: Even when Grossadmiral Dönitz was present the naval situation was reported by the deputy from the OKW, Commodore Assmann. However, the Admiral used this occasion to present, in connection with the individual theaters of war, or in summary at the end, those questions which he had in mind. The Admiral was neither asked nor did he give any opinion on questions dealing with air or land warfare which had no connection with the conduct of the naval war. In his statements he strictly confined himself to the sphere of the Navy, and very energetically objected if someone else during the session tried to interfere in questions of naval warfare.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, I have come to a break. If the Tribunal agrees to declare a recess...
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. We will adjourn.