Afternoon Session
THE PRESIDENT: You have finished, have you not, Dr. Kranzbühler, with this witness?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.
[The witness left the stand.]
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: And now I should like to call my next witness, Admiral Godt.
[The witness Godt took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name?
EBERHARD GODT (Witness): My name is Eberhard Godt.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.
[The witness repeated the oath.]
You may sit down.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral Godt, when did you enter the Navy as an officer cadet?
GODT: On 1 July, 1918.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: How long have you been working with Admiral Dönitz, and in what position?
GODT: Since January 1938; first of all as First Naval Staff Officer attached to the Commander, U-boats, and immediately after the beginning of the war as Chief of the Operations Department.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Chief of the Operations Department with the Chief of Submarines?
GODT: Yes, attached to the Chief of Submarines, later Flag Officer, U-boats.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you collaborate since 1938 in the drafting of all operational orders worked out by the staff of the Flag Officer, U-boats?
GODT: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: How many officers were on this staff at the beginning of the war?
GODT: At the beginning of the war there were four officers, one chief engineer, and two administrative officers on that staff.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I shall now show you Document GB-83 of the Prosecution’s document book Page 16, which is a letter from Commander U-boats, dated 9 October 1939. It refers to bases in Norway. How did this letter originate?
GODT: At that time I was visiting the Naval Operations Staff in Berlin on other business. On the occasion of that visit I was asked whether Commander, U-boats, was interested in bases in Norway and what demands should be made in that connection.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were you informed how those bases in Norway were to be secured for the use of the German Navy?
GODT: No.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The Prosecution has quoted an extract from the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff dating from the same period.
Mr. President, I am thinking of the extract reproduced on Page 15 of the document book.
[Turning to the witness.] That extract contains four questions. Questions (a) and (d) deal with technical details regarding bases in Norway, whereas (b) and (c) deal with the possibility of obtaining such bases against the will of the Norwegians, and the question of defending them.
Which of these questions was put to you?
GODT: May I ask you to repeat the questions in detail first of all.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The first question is: Which places in Norway can be considered for bases?
GODT: That question was put.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Will you show me from the letter from Commander, U-boats, whether the question was answered and where it is answered?
GODT: The question was answered under Number 1 (c) at the end of Number 1.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: There it says, “Trondheim or Narvik are possible places.”
GODT: Yes, that is right.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Question Number 2 is: “If it is impossible to obtain bases without fighting, can it be done against the will of the Norwegians by the use of military force?” Was that question put?
GODT: No.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Can you tell me if the question was answered in the letter from Commander, U-boats?
GODT: This question was not answered.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The third question is: “What are the possibilities of defense after occupation?” Was that question put to you?
GODT: No, that question was not put.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Is it replied to in the letter?
GODT: III-d refers to the necessity of adopting defense measures.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Is that reference connected with the fourth question I put to you now: “Will the harbors have to be developed to the fullest extent as bases, or do they already offer decisive advantages as possible supply points?”
GODT: These two questions are not connected.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was that fourth question put to you?
GODT: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was it answered?
GODT: Not in this letter.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What is the significance of the figures II and III? Do they not answer the question of whether these ports must be developed as bases or whether they can be used just as supply points?
GODT: They indicate what was thought necessary in order to develop them to the fullest extent as bases.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Will you please read the last sentence of the document? There it says, “Establishment of a fuel supply point in Narvik as an alternative supply point.” Is that not a reply to the question asking whether a supply point is enough?
GODT: Yes; I had overlooked that sentence.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Can I sum up, therefore, by saying that the first and fourth questions were put to you and answered by you, whereas questions 2 and 3 were not put to you and not answered by you?
GODT: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff there is a note which says, “Commander, U-boats, considers such ports extremely valuable even as temporary supply and equipment bases for Atlantic U-boats.” Does that note mean that Admiral Dönitz was working on this question before your visit to Berlin? Or what was the reason for the note?
GODT: That was my own opinion, which I was entitled to give in my capacity as Chief of the Operations Department.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was that the first time that plans for bases were brought to your notice?
GODT: No. We had been considering the question of whether the supply position for U-boats could be improved by using ships—in Iceland, for instance.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were these considerations in any way connected with the question whether one ought to start a war against the country concerned?
GODT: No.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I shall now show you Document GB-91. This appears on Page 18 of the Prosecution’s document book. It is an operational order issued by Commander, U-boats, on 30 March 1940 and dealing with the Norwegian enterprise. Is it true, that this is your operational order?
GODT: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: How many days before the beginning of the Norwegian action was that order released?
GODT: Approximately ten days.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Paragraph II, Section 5, contains the following sentence: “While entering the harbor and until the troops have been landed, the naval forces will probably fly the British naval ensign, except in Narvik.” Is that an order given by Commander, U-boats, to the submarines under his command?
GODT: No. That passage appears under the heading: “Information on our own combat forces.”
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: And what is the meaning of this allusion?
GODT: It means that U-boats were informed that in certain circumstances our own naval units might fly other flags.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Why was that necessary?
GODT: It was necessary so as to prevent possible mistakes in identity.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Are there any other references to mistakes in identity in this order?
GODT: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Where?
GODT: In Paragraph IV, Section 5.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Will you please read it?
GODT: There it says, “Beware of confusing our own units with enemy forces.”
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Only that sentence. Did this order instruct U-boats to attack Norwegian forces?
GODT: No.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Will you please indicate what the order says about that?
GODT: IV, a2 states, “Only enemy naval forces and troop transports are to be attacked.”
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What was meant by “enemy” forces?
GODT: “Enemy” forces were British, French, and Russian—no, not Russian. It goes on: “No action is to be taken against Norwegian and Danish forces unless they attack our own forces.”
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Will you please look at Paragraph VI-c?
GODT: Paragraph VI says: “Steamers may only be attacked when they have been identified beyond doubt as enemy steamers and as troop transports.”
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was Commander, U-boats, informed of the political action taken with regard to incidents caused by submarines?
GODT: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In what way?
GODT: U-boats had orders to report immediately by wireless in the case of incidents, and to supplement the report later.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I do not think you quite understood my question. I asked you, was Commander, U-boats, informed as to how an incident caused by a submarine would later on be settled with a neutral government?
GODT: No, not as a rule.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Can you remember any individual case where he was informed?
GODT: I remember the case of the Spanish steamer Monte Corbea. Later on I learned that Spain had been promised reparations. I cannot remember now whether I received the information through official channels or whether I just heard it accidentally.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I should now like to establish the dates of certain orders which I have already presented to the Tribunal. I shall show you Standing Order Number 171, which is on Page 159 of Volume III of the document book. What is the date on which that order was issued?
GODT: I shall have to look at it first.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Please do.
GODT: That order must have originated in the winter of 1939-1940. Probably 1939.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: On what do you base that conclusion?
GODT: I base it on the reference made in 4a to equipment for depth charges. This was taken for granted at a later stage. I also gather it from the reference made in 5b to the shifting of masts and colored lights, something which was formulated then for the first time.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Can you tell us the exact month in 1939?
GODT: I assume that it was November.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I am now going to show you another order, Standing War Order Number 122. It appears on Page 226 in Volume IV of my document book. Up to now all we know is that this order was issued before May 1940. Can you give us a more exact date?
GODT: This order must have been issued about the same time as the first, that is to say, about November 1939.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Thank you. How was the conduct of U-boat warfare by Commander, U-boats, organized in practice? Will you explain that to us?
GODT: All orders based on questions of international law, et cetera, originated with the Naval Operations Staff. The Naval Operations Staff also reserved for itself the right to determine the locality of the center of operations—for instance, the distribution of U-boats in the Atlantic Theater, the Mediterranean Theater, and the North Sea Theater. Within these various: areas U-boat operations were, generally speaking, entirely at the discretion of Commander, U-boats.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were the standing orders for U-boats given verbally or in writing?
GODT: In writing.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were there not verbal orders as well?
GODT: Verbal instructions personally issued by Commander, U-boats, played a special part and amounted to personal influence on commanders, as well as to explanations of the contents of written orders.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: On what occasions was that personal influence exerted?
GODT: Particularly when reports were being made by the commanders after each action. There must have been very few commanders who did not make a personal and detailed report to Commander, U-boats, after an action.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was it possible for written orders to be changed in the course of verbal transmission, or even twisted to mean the opposite?
GODT: Such a possibility might have existed, but it never actually happened.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: When they made these verbal reports, could the commanders risk expressing opinions which were not those of Commander, U-boats?
GODT: Absolutely. Commander, U-boats, even asked his commanders in so many words to give him their personal opinions in every case, so that he could maintain direct personal contact with them and thus remain in close touch with events on the front, so that he could put matters right, where necessary.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was this personal contact used for the verbal transmission of shady orders?
GODT: No.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The Prosecution holds that an order—apparently a verbal order—existed, prohibiting the entry in the log of measures considered dubious or unjustifiable from the point of view of international law. Did such a general order exist?
GODT: No; there was no general order. In certain individual cases—I can remember two—an order was given to omit certain matters from the log.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Which cases do you remember?
GODT: The first was the case of the Athenia; and the second was the sinking of a German boat, which was coming from Japan through the blockade, by a German submarine.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Before I ask you to give me details of that, I should like to know the reason for omitting such matters from the log.
GODT: It was done for reasons of secrecy. U-boat logs were seen by a great many people: First, in the training stations of the U-boat service itself; and, secondly, in numerous offices of the High Command. Special attention had therefore to be paid to secrecy.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: How many copies of each U-boat war log were made?
GODT: I should say six to eight copies.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did the omission of such an item from the log mean that all documentary evidence was destroyed in every office; or did certain offices keep these documents?
GODT: These records were received by Commander, U-boats, and probably by the Naval Operations Staff as well.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was there a standing war order prescribing treatment of incidents?
GODT: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What were the contents?
GODT: It stated that incidents must be reported immediately by wireless and that a supplementary report must be made later, either in writing or by word of mouth.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Does this standing order contain any allusion to the omission of such incidents from the log?
GODT: No.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Will you please tell me now how this alteration was made in the log in the case of the Athenia?
GODT: In the case of the Athenia Oberleutnant Lemp reported on returning that he had torpedoed this ship, assuming it to be an auxiliary cruiser. I cannot now tell you exactly whether this was the first time I realized that such a possibility existed or whether the idea that this might possibly have been torpedoed by a German submarine had already been taken into consideration. Lemp was sent to Berlin to make a report and absolute secrecy was ordered with regard to the case.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: By whom?
GODT: By the Naval Operations Staff, after a temporary order had been issued in our department. I ordered the fact to be erased from the war log of the U-boat.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: And that, of course, was on the orders of Admiral Dönitz?
GODT: Yes, or I ordered it on his instructions.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you participate in the further handling of this incident?
GODT: Only with regard to the question of whether Lemp should be punished. As far as I remember, Commander, U-boats, took only disciplinary action against him because it was in his favor that the incident occurred during the first few hours of the war, and it was held that in his excitement he had not investigated the character of the ship as carefully as he might have done.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did I understand you correctly as saying that the detailed documentary evidence in connection with the sinking of the Athenia was retained by both Commander, U-boats, and, you believe, the Naval Operations Staff?
GODT: I can say that with certainty only as far as Commander, U-boats, is concerned. That is what happened in this case.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You mentioned a second case just now where a log book had been altered. Which case was that?
GODT: That incident was as follows: A German blockade breaker, that is to say, a merchant vessel on its way back from Japan, was accidentally torpedoed by a German submarine and sunk in the North Atlantic. This fact was omitted from the log.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: So it was only a question of keeping matters secret from German offices?
GODT: Yes. The British learned the facts from lifeboats as far as I know; and these facts were to be concealed from the crews of other blockade-breaking vessels.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Documents submitted to the Tribunal by the Defense show that until the autumn of 1942, German U-boats took steps to rescue crews as far as was possible without prejudicing the U-boat’s safety and without interfering with their own assignment. Does this agree with your own experiences?
GODT: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I should now like to put a few questions to you regarding the so-called Laconia order which still require clarification. I refer to Document GB-199. As you know, the Prosecution calls this order an order to kill survivors. Who formulated this order?
THE PRESIDENT: Where is it?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: It is the document book of the Prosecution on Page 36, Mr. President.
GODT: I cannot now tell you that for certain. Generally speaking, such an order was discussed by Commander, U-boats, the First Naval Staff Officer, and myself; Commander, U-boats, decided on the general terms of the order and then it was formulated by one of us. It is quite possible that I myself worded the order.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: But, at any rate, Admiral Dönitz signed it, did he not?
GODT: He must have; yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral Dönitz thought that he remembered that you and Captain Hessler were opposed to this order. Can you remember this, too; and if so, why were you against it?
GODT: I do not remember that.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What was the meaning of the order?
GODT: The meaning of the order is plain. It prohibited attempts at rescue.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Why was that not forbidden by a reference to Standing War Order Number 154, which was issued in the winter of 1939-40?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, surely a written order must speak for itself. Unless there is some colloquial meaning in a particular word used in the order, the order must be interpreted according to the ordinary meaning of the words.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I was not proposing to go into the question any further, Mr. President.
[Turning to the witness.] I should like to repeat my last question. Why, instead of issuing a new order, did they not simply refer commanders to Standing War Order Number 154, which was issued in the winter of 1939-40?
I refer, Mr. President, to Document GB-196, on Page 33 of the Prosecution’s document book.
You remember that order, don’t you. I have shown it to you.
GODT: Yes, I do. That order had already been canceled when the so-called Laconia order was issued. Apart from that, a mere reference to an order already issued would have lacked the character of actuality which orders should have.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you mean by that that your staff, as a matter of principle, did not issue orders by references to earlier orders?
GODT: That was avoided, whenever possible; that is to say, almost always.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Will you explain to me why that order was issued as “top secret”?
GODT: The order appeared after an operation in which we nearly lost two boats, and contained a severe reprimand for the commanders concerned. It was not customary for us to put such a reprimand in a form accessible to any one except the commanders and all the officers.
THE PRESIDENT: Which is the severe reprimand?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Will you please explain of what this severe reprimand for the commander consisted?
GODT: It is understandable in the light of previous events—namely, those very things which it forbids. It is largely contained in the sentence beginning: “Rescue is against the most elementary demands” and it is also implied by the harshness, whereby the commander is reproached with being softhearted.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Does this mean that the commanders were accused of having endangered their boats too much in connection with the rescue action of the Laconia and of acting in a manner which was not in accordance with the dictates of war?
GODT: Yes, and that after having been repeatedly reminded during the action of the necessity for acting in a manner in accordance with the dictates of war.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You were interrogated on this order after the capitulation, as you told me; but you could not at the moment remember its exact wording. How was it possible for you not to remember this order?
GODT: There were certain orders which had to be kept in collective files and which one therefore saw very frequently. This order was not one of them, but was filed separately after being dealt with. After it had been issued I never saw it again until the end of the war.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What did an order intended for inclusion in such a collection look like on the outside?
GODT: It had to be a “Current Order” or an “Admonition Message.”
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did that occur in the text of the order concerned?
GODT: It would be in the heading of the order concerned. That is not the case here.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: So we may conclude from the fact that this wireless message is not headed either “Admonition Message” or “Current Order” that it did not belong to a collection of orders?
GODT: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: But then, how is it possible that Korvettenkapitän Möhle gave lectures on this order apparently until the end of the war?
GODT: Korvettenkapitän Möhle had access to all wireless messages issued by Commander, U-boats. He was entitled to select from these signals anything he thought necessary for the instruction of commanders about to go to sea. It made no difference whether the order was marked “Admonition” or “Current Order.” He had obviously taken out this message and had had it among the material to be used for these instructions to the commanders.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did Möhle ever ask you about the interpretation of that order?
GODT: No.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you ever hear of any other source interpreting this order to mean that survivors were to be shot?
GODT: No.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Can you judge from your own experience whether this order had, or could have had, any effect practically on Allied naval losses?
GODT: That is very difficult to judge. At that time something like 80 percent of all U-boat attacks were probably carried out under conditions which made any attempt at rescue impossible. That is to say, these attacks were made on convoys or on vessels in close proximity to the coast.
The fact that some 12 captains and engineers were brought back as prisoners by U-boats is an indication of what happened in the other cases. It is difficult to say with any degree of certainty whether it was possible to take rescue measures in all cases. The situation was probably such that the Allied sailors felt safer in the lifeboats than they did, for instance, aboard the U-boat and probably were glad to see the U-boat vanish after the attack. The fact that the presence of the U-boat involved danger to itself is proved by this same case of the Laconia, where two U-boats were attacked from the air while engaged in rescuing the survivors.
I do not think it is at all certain that this order had any effect one way or the other.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What do you mean “one way or the other”?
GODT: I mean whether it meant an increase or a decrease in the number of losses among enemy seamen.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: There is one argument I did not quite understand. You pointed to the fact that approximately 12 captains and chief engineers were made prisoner after this order was issued. Do you mean by that that only in these few cases was it possible, without endangering the submarine, to carry out the order to transfer such officers from the lifeboats?
GODT: It is too much to say that it was only possible in these few cases, but it does afford some indication of the number of cases in which it was possible.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I shall now show you the wireless message which went to Kapitänleutnant Schacht. It is on Page 36 of the Prosecution’s document book. This message, too, was sent as “top secret.” What was the reason for that?
GODT: It is a definite and severe reprimand for the commander.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: How far was that reprimand justified? Schacht had not received previous instruction to rescue Italians only?
GODT: No, but it had been assumed that U-boats would realize that it was of primary importance that allies should be rescued, that is, that they should not become prisoners of war. Apart from that, several reminders had been issued in the course of operations warning commanders to be particularly careful. After that came Schacht’s report, which appeared at the time to indicate that he had disobeyed orders. Viewed retrospectively, Schacht’s action must have taken place before Commander, U-boats, issued the order in question, so that in part at least, the accusation was unjustified.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were any further rescue measures carried out by U-boats after this order was issued in September 1942?
GODT: In isolated cases, yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did Commander, U-boats, object to these rescues?
GODT: I have no recollection of that.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: To your knowledge, did German U-boats deliberately kill survivors?
GODT: The only case I know of—and I heard of it after the capitulation—is that of Kapitänleutnant Eck. We heard an enemy broadcast which hinted at these happenings, but we were unable to draw any conclusions from that.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I now hand to you the Prosecution’s Exhibit GB-203, which is regarded by the Prosecution as proof of the shooting of survivors. This is the war log of U-247 from which I mimeographed an extract on Page 74 of Volume II of my document book. This extract describes an attack made by the U-boat on a British trawler. You have already seen this war log. After his return, did the commander make a report on this action?
GODT: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did he report anything about the shooting of survivors on that occasion?
GODT: No.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: According to a statement made by a survivor named McAllister this trawler, the Noreen Mary, had a gun aboard. Do you know whether trawlers had guns mounted fore or aft?
GODT: They were almost always in the bows.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Can you remember, with the help of this extract from the war log and on the strength of your own recollection of the commander’s report, the exact details of this incident?
GODT: Originally the U-boat when submerged encountered a number of vessels escorting trawlers close to Cape Wrath. It tried to torpedo one of the trawlers.
THE PRESIDENT: Is the witness trying to reconstruct this from the document, reconstruct the incident?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I am asking him to tell us what he remembers of the event, basing his account on his own recollection of the commander’s report supplemented by the entry in the war log.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, he hasn’t said whether he ever saw the commander.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Oh yes, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Well then, all he can tell us is what the commander told him.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, have him do that then.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Will you please tell us what you remember after reading the log.
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. If he remembers anything about what the commander told him he can tell us that, but the log speaks for itself and he can’t reconstruct it out of that. He must tell us what he remembers of what the officer said.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Very well, Sir.
[Turning to the witness.] Will you please speak from memory.
GODT: The commander reported that he had encountered a number of trawlers extraordinarily close to the coast, considering conditions at the time. Failing in his attempt to torpedo one of them, he sank it with gunfire. That was all the more remarkable because, in the first place, the incident occurred quite unusually near the coast and, in the second place, the commander risked this artillery fight regardless of the presence of other vessels nearby.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were these other ships also armed trawlers?
GODT: It was to be assumed at the time that every trawler was armed.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The witness McAllister thought that the submarine surfaced 50 yards away from the trawler. In the light of your own recollections and experiences, do you think this is possible?
GODT: I do not remember the details; but it would be an unusual thing for a U-boat commander to do.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: McAllister also stated the U-boat used shells filled with wire.
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. Wait a minute. Dr. Kranzbühler, the Tribunal thinks that the witness oughtn’t to express opinions of this sort. He ought to give us the evidence of any facts which he has. He is telling us in his opinion it is impossible that a naval commander would ever bring his submarine up within 50 yards of another vessel.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: That is not a matter for him to say.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, I was going to ask the witness next whether German U-boats used shells filled with wire as stated by the witness McAllister. Is that question admissible?
THE PRESIDENT: Shells filled with wire?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes, that is the question I want to put.
Will you answer that question, Witness.
GODT: There were no such shells.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was this attack by the submarine on the Noreen Mary reported by wireless immediately? Do you know anything about it?
GODT: Do you mean the U-boat commander’s report?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: No, by the British.
GODT: As far as I remember, a wireless message sent by a British vessel was intercepted, reporting a U-boat attack in the area.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: A signal is entered in the war log under 0127 hours. It is intended for Matschulat, which means that it was sent by you to the commander, and it reads, “English steamer reports attack by German U-boat west of Cape Wrath.”
GODT: That is the message intended to inform the U-boat that a wireless signal sent by a British steamer concerning a submarine attack in that area had been intercepted.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I should now like to ask you something about Standing War Order Number 511. This is in Volume I of my document book, Page 46. When I presented this order, the Tribunal was not sure of the significance of Paragraph 2, which I am going to read:
“Captains and officers of neutral ships which may be sunk according to Standing Order Number 101, (such as Swedish except Göteborg traffic), must not be taken on board, since internment of these officers is not permitted by international law.”
Can you tell me first the experiences or calculations which led to the inclusion of Paragraph 2 in the order?
GODT: On one occasion a U-boat brought a Uruguayan officer—a captain whose ship had been sunk—to Germany. We were afraid that if we released this captain he might report some of the things he had seen while he was interned aboard the U-boat. The reason for this order was to avoid difficulties of that kind in the future; for the Uruguayan captain had to be released and was, in fact, released.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What is the meaning of the reference to neutral ships which might be sunk according to Standing War Order Number 101?
GODT: May I please see the order for a minute?
[The document was submitted to the witness.]
The Standing War Order Number 101 contains the following directives in connection with the sinking of neutral ships: Once inside the blockade zone, all neutral ships can be sunk as a matter of principle, with two main exceptions, or shall we say, two general exceptions.
To begin with, ships belonging to certain neutral countries, with whom agreements had been made regarding definite shipping channels, must not be sunk; further, ships belonging to certain neutral states which might be assumed not to be working exclusively in the enemy’s service. Outside the blockade zone neutral ships might be sunk; first, if they were not recognizable as neutrals and therefore must be regarded as enemy vessels by the submarine in question and, second, if they were not acting as neutrals.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: As, for instance, those traveling in enemy convoy?
GODT: Yes, those traveling in convoys, or if they reported the presence of U-boats, et cetera, by wireless.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did Paragraph 2 mean that the captains of neutral ships would in the future be in a worse position than captains of enemy ships, or would they be in a better position?
GODT: This is not a question of better or worse, it is a question of taking prisoners. They were not to be taken prisoners because they could not be detained as such. Whether this meant that their positions would be better or worse is at least open to doubt. Captains of enemy ships usually tried to avoid being taken aboard the U-boat probably because they felt safer in their lifeboats.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What do you know about orders to respect hospital ships at the beginning of the invasion?
GODT: At the beginning of the invasion the rule in this area, as in any other area, was that hospital ships were not to be attacked. Commanders operating in the invasion zone then reported that there was a very large number of hospital ships sailing.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: From where to where?
GODT: Between the Normandy invasion area and the British Isles. Commander, U-boats, then had investigations made by the competent department as to whether hospital traffic was really as heavy as alleged in these reports. That was found to be the case.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What do you mean by that?
GODT: It means that the number of hospital ships reported corresponded to the estimated number of wounded. After that it was expressly announced that hospital ships were not to be attacked in the future.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was the strict respect paid to hospital ships at that stage of the war in our own interests?
GODT: At that time we only had hospital ships in the Baltic where the Geneva Convention was not recognized by the other side; so we had no particular interest in respecting hospital ships.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you know of any case of an enemy hospital ship being sunk by a German U-boat during this war?
GODT: No.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did it happen the other way round?
GODT: The German hospital ship Tübingen was, I think, sunk by British aircraft in the Mediterranean.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Presumably because of mistaken identity?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, the question on German hospital ships which were sunk isn’t relevant, is it?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I was going to show by it, Mr. President, that the possibility of mistaken identity does exist and that a hospital ship was in fact sunk in consequence of such a mistake. My evidence therefore goes to show that from the sinking of a ship it must not be concluded that the sinking was ordered.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal quite realize that mistakes may be made in sea warfare. It is a matter of common knowledge. Should we adjourn now?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes, Mr. President.
[A recess was taken.]
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral Godt, you have known Admiral Dönitz very well since 1934; and you have had a good deal to do with him during that time. Did he have anything to do with politics during that time?
GODT: Nothing at all, to my knowledge, before he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. As Commander-in-Chief of the Navy he made occasional speeches outside the Navy; for instance, he addressed dock workers, made a speech to the Hitler Youth at Stettin, and gave a talk over the air on “Heroes’ Day” and on 20 July; I remember no other occasions.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were these speeches not always directly connected with the tasks of the Navy—for instance, the address to the dock laborers—shipbuilding?
GODT: Yes, when he spoke to the dock laborers.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: And to the Hitler Youth?
GODT: The Hitler Youth, too.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: And what was the connection there?
GODT: As far as I remember, the speech was concerned with recruiting for the Navy.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did he select his staff officers for their ideological or military qualifications?
GODT: Their military and personal qualities were all that mattered. Their political views had nothing to do with it.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The question of whether Admiral Dönitz knew, or must have known, of certain happenings outside the Navy is a very important one from the Tribunal’s point of view. Can you tell me who his associates were?
GODT: His own officers and officers of his own age, almost exclusively. As far as I know, he had very few contacts beyond those.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did matters change much in this respect after he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Navy?
GODT: No. He probably had a few more contacts with people from other branches, but on the whole his circle remained the same.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Where did he actually live at that time, that is, after his appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy?
GODT: After his appointment as Commander-in-Chief, he was mainly at the headquarters of the Naval Operations Staff near Berlin.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did he live with his family or with his staff?
GODT: He made his home with his family; but the main part of his life was spent with his staff.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: And where did he live when his staff was transferred to the so-called “Koralle” quarters in the neighborhood of Berlin in the autumn of 1943?
GODT: He lived at his headquarters, where his family also lived—at least for some time. His official discussions, however, usually lasted till late in the evening.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In other words, from that time on he lived constantly in the naval officers’ quarters?
GODT: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You were in a better position than almost any of the other officers to observe the Admiral’s career at close quarters. Can you tell me what you think were the motives behind the military orders he issued?
THE PRESIDENT: You can’t speak about the motives of people. You can’t give evidence about other people’s minds. You can only give evidence of what they said and what they did.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, I still think that an officer who lived with another officer for years must have a certain knowledge of his motives, based on the actions of the officer in question and on what that officer told him. However, perhaps I may put my question rather differently.
THE PRESIDENT: He can give evidence about his character, but he can’t give evidence about his motives.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Then I shall question him on his character, Your Honor.
Witness, can you tell me whether Admiral Dönitz ever expressed selfish motives to you in connection with any other orders he gave or any of his actions?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, that is the same thing, the same question again, really.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I beg your pardon, Mr. President. I meant it to be a different question.
THE PRESIDENT: Nobody is charging him with being egotistical or anything of that sort. He is charged with the various crimes that are charged against him in the Indictment.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Then I shall ask a direct question based on the Prosecution’s opinion.
The Prosecution judged Admiral Dönitz to be cynical and opportunistic. Does that agree with your own judgment?
GODT: No.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: How would you judge him?
GODT: As a man whose mind was fixed entirely on duty, on his work, his naval problems, and the men in his service.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, I have no further questions to put to this witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any other members of the defendants’ counsel want to ask any questions?
[There was no response.]
COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, might I first mention the documents that I put in in cross-examination this morning, or rather it was a document which had been in before. It was D-658, GB-229. That is the document dealing with Bordeaux, and there was a dispute as to whether it was from the Bordeaux Commando Raid. The dispute was as to whether it was from the SKL, that is the Naval War Staff Diary, or from the war diary of some lower formation. My Lord, I have had the matter confirmed with the Admiralty, and I will produce the original for defense counsel; it comes from the SKL War Diary, Tagebuch der Seekriegsleitung, and it is from Number 1 Abteilung, Teil A—that is part A—for December 1942. So it is from the War Diary of the Defendant Raeder and the witness.
You have said, Witness, that you don’t recollect protesting against this order of 17 September 1942.
GODT: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: I will try and refresh your memory. Would you look at a document, D-865?
That’s GB-458, My Lord; that is an extract from an interrogation of Admiral Dönitz on 6 October. I should say that the record was kept in English and therefore the translation into German does not represent necessarily the Admiral’s actual words.
[Turning to the witness.] Would you look at the second page of that document at the end of the first paragraph. It is the end of the first paragraph on Page 207 in the English text. The Admiral is dealing with the order of 17 September 1942, and in that last sentence in that paragraph he says:
“I remember that Captain Godt and Captain Hessler were opposed to this telegram. They said so expressly because, as they said, ‘it might be misunderstood.’ But I said, ‘I must pass it on now to these boats to prevent this 1 percent of losses. I must give them a reason, so that they do not feel themselves obliged to do that.’ ”
Do you remember protesting now, saying “That can be misunderstood”?
GODT: No, I do not recall that.
COL. PHILLIMORE: And a further extract on Page 3 of the English translation, the bottom of Page 2 of the German:
“So I sent a second telegram to prevent further losses. The second telegram was sent at my suggestion. I am completely and personally responsible for it, because both Captain Godt and Captain Hessler expressly stated they thought the telegram ambiguous or liable to misinterpretation.”
Do you remember that now?
GODT: No, I do not recall that.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Would you look at a further statement to the same effect, on Page 5 of the English, first paragraph; Page 4 of the German text, third paragraph. He has been asked the question:
“Why was it necessary to use a phrase like the one that I read to you before: Efforts to rescue members of the crew were counter to the most elementary demands of warfare for the destruction of enemy ships and crews?”
It is the last clause of the first sentence, and he answered:
“These words do not correspond to the telegram. They do not in any way correspond to our actions in the years of 1939, 1940, 1941 and 1942, as I have plainly shown you through the Laconia incident. I would like to emphasize once more that both Captain Godt and Captain Hessler were violently opposed to the dispatch of this telegram.”
Do you still say that you don’t remember protesting against the sending of that telegram?
GODT: I have stated repeatedly that I do not remember it.
COL. PHILLIMORE: I will show you one more extract, Document D-866, which will become GB-459. That is a further interrogation on 22 October. The first question on the document is:
“Do you believe that this order is contrary to the Prize Regulations issued by the German Navy at the beginning of the war?”
And the last sentence of the first paragraph of the answer is:
“Godt and Hessler said to me, ‘Don’t send this message. You see, it might look odd some day. It might be misinterpreted.’ ”
You don’t remember using those words?
GODT: No.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You were an experienced staff officer, were you not?
GODT: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You knew the importance of drafting an operational order with absolute clarity, did you not?
GODT: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: These orders you were issuing were going to young commanders between 20 and 30 years of age, were they not?
GODT: Certainly not as young as 20. They would be in their late twenties, most probably.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes. Do you say that this order is not ambiguous?
GODT: Yes. Perhaps if you take one sentence out of the context you might have some doubt, but not if you read the entire order.
COL. PHILLIMORE: What was the point of the words: “Rescue runs counter to the most elementary demands of warfare for the destruction of enemy ships and crews”?
[There was no response.] Show it to him, will you?
[The document was submitted to the witness.]
What was the point of those words, if this was merely a nonrescue order?
GODT: It was served to motivate the remainder of the order and to put on an equal level all the ships and crews which were fighting against our U-boats.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You see, all your orders were so clear, were they not? Have you got the Defense documents there in the witness box?
GODT: I think so—no.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Look at the Defense Document Number Dönitz-8, Page 10. It is on Page 10 of that book. Let me just read you the second paragraph:
“U-boats may instantly attack, with all the weapons at their command, enemy merchant vessels recognized with certainty as armed, or announced as such, on the basis of unimpeachable evidence in the possession of the Naval Operations Staff.”
The next sentence:
“As far as circumstances permit, measures shall be taken for the rescue of the crew, after the possibility of endangering the U-boat is excluded.”
Now, no commander could go wrong with that order, could he? It is perfectly clear.
Look at another one, D-642, at Page 13. It is the last paragraph of the order, on Page 15. Now, this is a nonrescue order. Have you got it? Paragraph E, Standing Order 154:
“Do not rescue crew members or take them aboard and do not take care of the ship’s boats. Weather conditions and distance from land are of no consequence. Think only of the safety of your own boat and try to achieve additional success as soon as possible.
“We must be harsh in this war. The enemy started it in order to destroy us; and we have to act accordingly.”
Now, that was perfectly clear, was it not? That was a “nonrescue” order?
GODT: It was just as clear as the order we are talking about.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Look at one or two more and then let me come back to that order; Page 45, another order:
“Order from Flag Officer, U-boats”—reading the third line—“to take on board as prisoners captains of sunk ships with their papers, if it is possible to do so without endangering the boat or impairing its fighting capacity.”
It is perfectly clear to anybody exactly what was intended, is it not?
GODT: That is not an order at all; it only reproduces an extract from the War Diary.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes, reciting the words of the order; and then, on the next page in Paragraph 4:
“Try under all circumstances to take prisoners if that can be done without endangering the boat”—Again, perfectly clear.
Look at the next page, Page 47, Paragraph 1 of your order of the 1 June 1944, the last sentence:
“Therefore every effort must be made to bring in such prisoners, as far as possible, without endangering the boat.”
Now, you have told us that this order of 17 September 1942 was intended to be a nonrescue order; that is right, is it not?
GODT: Yes, certainly.
COL. PHILLIMORE: I ask you again, what was meant by the sentence: “Rescue runs counter to the most elementary demands of warfare for the destruction of enemy ships and crews”?
GODT: That is the motivation of the rest of the order, which states that ships with crews armed and equipped to fight U-boats were to be put on the same level.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Why do you speak about the destruction of crews if you do not mean the destruction of crews?
GODT: The question is whether the ships and their crews were to be destroyed; and that is something entirely different from destroying the crews after they had left the ship.
COL. PHILLIMORE: And that is something entirely different from merely not rescuing the crews; isn’t that a fact?
GODT: I do not quite understand that question.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Destruction of crews is quite different from nonrescue of crews?
GODT: Destruction—as long as the ship and crew are together.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You are not answering the question, are you? But if you want it again: Destruction of crews is quite different from nonrescue of crews?
GODT: The destruction of the crew is different from the nonrescue of survivors, yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Were those words merely put in to give this order what you described as a “lively character,” which an order should have?
GODT: I cannot give you the details; I have already said that I do not remember in detail the events leading up to this order.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Phillimore, the Tribunal has already said to the witness that the document speaks for itself.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes.
[Turning to the witness.] Would you just look at the next document in the Prosecution book, that is D-663, at the last sentence of that document? In view of the desired destruction of ships’ crews, are you saying that it was not your intention at this time to destroy the crews if you could?
GODT: I thought we were talking about survivors.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Well, it is the same thing, to some extent, is it not; ships’ crews, once they are torpedoed, become survivors?
GODT: Then they would be survivors; yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Will you now answer the question? Was it not your intention at this time to destroy the crews, or survivors if you like, if you could?
GODT: If you mean survivors; the question can refer to two things. As regards survivors—no.
COL. PHILLIMORE: If you are not prepared to answer the question, I will pass on.
Do you remember the case of Kapitänleutnant Eck?
GODT: I only heard of the case of Kapitänleutnant Eck from American and British officers, and only after I came to Germany.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Do you know that he was on his first voyage when his U-boat sank the Peleus and then machine-gunned the survivors? Do you know that?
GODT: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: He had set out from the 5th U-boat flotilla at Kiel where Möhle was briefing the commanders, had he not?
GODT: He must have.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes. Now, if—instead of taking the whole blame upon himself for the action which he took—if he had defended his action under this order of 17 September 1942, are you saying that you could have court-martialed him for disobedience?
GODT: It might have been possible.
COL. PHILLIMORE: In view of the wording of your order, do you say that?
GODT: That would have been a question for the court-martial to decide. Moreover, Eck, as far as I heard, did not refer to this order.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Can you explain to the Tribunal how the witness Möhle was allowed to go on briefing that this was an annihilation order, from September 1942 to the end of the war?
GODT: I do not know how Möhle came to interpret this order in such a way. In any case he did not ask me about it.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You realize that he is putting his own life in great jeopardy by admitting that he briefed as he did, don’t you.
GODT: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You also know, don’t you, that another commander he briefed was subsequently seen either by yourself or by Admiral Dönitz before he went out?
GODT: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Again when he came back?
GODT: In general, yes, almost always.
COL. PHILLIMORE: In general. Are you seriously telling the Tribunal that none of these officers who were briefed that this was an annihilation order, that none of them raised the question either with you or with Admiral Dönitz?
GODT: In no circumstances was this order discussed.
COL. PHILLIMORE: But I suggest to you now that this order was very carefully drafted to be ambiguous; deliberately, so that any U-boat commander who was prepared to behave as he did was entitled to do so under the order. Isn’t that right?
GODT: That is an assertion.
COL. PHILLIMORE: And that you and Hessler, you tried to stop this order being issued?
GODT: I have already said that I do not remember this.
COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any other cross-examination? Do you wish to re-examine, Dr. Kranzbühler?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you know that Korvettenkapitän Möhle has testified before this Tribunal that he told only a very few officers about his interpretation of the Laconia order?
GODT: I read that in the affidavit which Möhle made before British officers last year.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you know that Möhle testified here personally that he did not speak to Admiral Dönitz, yourself, or Captain Hessler about his interpretation of the Laconia order, although he repeatedly visited your staff?
GODT: I know that. I cannot tell you at the moment whether I know it from the affidavit which Möhle made last year or from another source.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You have been confronted with Admiral Dönitz’ testimony that you and Captain Hessler opposed the Laconia order. You stated that Admiral Dönitz gave an exaggerated account of your objection to this order, so as to take the whole responsibility upon himself?
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. I do not think you can ask him that question, Dr. Kranzbühler, whether it is possible that the Admiral was over-emphasizing what he said.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Then I will not put this question. Your Honor, I have no further question to put to this witness.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Then with the permission of the Tribunal I would like to call Captain Hessler as my next witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
[The witness Hessler took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name?
GÜNTHER HESSLER (Witness): Günther Hessler.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and will add nothing.
[The witness repeated the oath.]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Captain Hessler, when did you enter the Navy?
HESSLER: In April 1927.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What was your last grade?
HESSLER: Fregattenkapitän.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You are related to Admiral Dönitz. Is that correct?
HESSLER: Yes. I married his only daughter in November 1937.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: When did you enter the U-boat service?
HESSLER: I started my U-boat training in April 1940.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were you given any information during your period of training on economic warfare according to the Prize Ordinance?
HESSLER: Yes. I was informed of it.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was the so-called “prize disc” used which has just been submitted to you?
HESSLER: Yes, I was instructed about it.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Will you tell the Tribunal briefly just what the purpose of this “prize disc” is?
HESSLER: It was a system of discs by means of which, through a simple mechanical process in a very short time one could ascertain how to deal with neutral and enemy merchant ships—whether, for instance, a neutral vessel carrying contraband could be sunk or captured, or whether it must be allowed to pass.
This disc has another great advantage in that it indicates at the same time the particular paragraph of the Prize Ordinance in which the case in question may be found. This made it possible to cut down the time required for the investigation of a merchant ship to a minimum.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: That means that the disc was in the nature of a legal adviser to the commander?
HESSLER: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I now submit this disc to the Tribunal as Exhibit Dönitz-95.
In your training were you told what attitude you were required to adopt toward shipwrecked survivors? If so, what was it?
HESSLER: Yes. The rescuing of survivors is a matter of course in naval warfare and must be carried out as far as military measures permit. In U-boat warfare it is utterly impossible to rescue survivors, that is, to take the entire crew on board, for space conditions in the U-boat do not permit of any such action. The carrying out of other measures, such as, approaching the lifeboats, picking up swimmers and transferring them to the lifeboats, handing over provisions and water, is, as a rule, impossible, for the danger incurred by the U-boat is so great throughout the operational zone that none of these measures can be carried out without endangering the boat too much.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You yourself went out on cruises as commander soon after receiving these instructions?
HESSLER: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: From when to when?
HESSLER: From October 1940 till November 1941.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In what areas did you operate?
HESSLER: South of Iceland, west of the North Channel, in the waters between Cape Verde and the Azores, and in the area west of Freetown.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What success did you have against merchant shipping?
HESSLER: I sank 21 ships, totaling more than 130,000 tons.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You received the Knight’s Cross?
HESSLER: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: How did you act toward the survivors of the crews of the ships you sank?
HESSLER: In most cases the situation was such that I was compelled to leave the scene of the wreck without delay on account of danger from enemy naval or air forces. In two cases the danger was not quite so great. I was able to approach the lifeboats and help them.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What were the ships concerned?
HESSLER: Two Greek ships: the Papalemos and Pandias.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: How did you help the lifeboats?
HESSLER: First of all I gave the survivors their exact position and told them what course to set in order to reach land in their lifeboats. In the second place, I gave them water, which is of vital importance for survivors in tropical regions. In one case I also furnished medical aid for several wounded men.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did your personal experience with torpedoed ships dispose you to caution with regard to rescue measures?
HESSLER: Yes. The experienced U-boat commander was justifiably suspicious of every merchantman and its crew, no matter how innocent they might appear. In two cases this attitude of suspicion saved me from destruction.
This happened in the case of the steamer Kalchas, a British 10,000 ton ship which I torpedoed north of Cape Verde. The ship had stopped after being hit by the torpedo. The crew had left the ship and were in the lifeboats, and the vessel seemed to be sinking. I was wondering whether to surface in order at least to give the crew their position and ask if they needed water. A feeling which I could not explain kept me from doing so. I raised my periscope to the fullest extent and just as the periscope rose almost entirely out of the water, sailors who had been hiding under the guns and behind the bulwark, jumped up, manned the guns of the vessel—which so far had appeared to be entirely abandoned—and opened fire on my periscope at very close range, compelling me to submerge at full speed. The shells fell close to the periscope but were not dangerous to me.
In the second case, the steamer Alfred Jones, which I torpedoed off Freetown, also seemed to be sinking. I wondered whether to surface, when I saw in one of the lifeboats two sailors of the British Navy in full uniform. That aroused my suspicions. I inspected the ship at close range—I would say from a distance of 50 to 100 meters—and established the fact that it had not been abandoned, but that soldiers were still concealed aboard her in every possible hiding-place and behind boarding. When I torpedoed the ship this boarding was smashed. I saw that the ship had at least four to six guns of 10 and 15 centimeter caliber and a large number of depth charge chutes and antiaircraft guns behind the bulwarks. Only a pure accident, the fact that the depth charges had not been timed, saved me from destruction.
It was clear to me, naturally, after such an experience, that I could no longer concern myself with crews or survivors without endangering my own ship.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: When did you enter the staff of the Commander, U-boats.
HESSLER: In November 1941.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You were First Naval Staff Officer?
HESSLER: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was it your task to instruct the commanders on orders issued before they left port?
HESSLER: Yes, I did that.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: And what was the connection between the instructions given by you and those to be given by the flotilla chiefs—Korvettenkapitän Möhle, for instance?
HESSLER: The commanders whom I had to instruct received a complete summary of all questions concerning procedure at sea. The flotilla chiefs were charged with ascertaining that all commanders should receive a copy of the most recent orders issued by Commander, U-boats. I might say that these were limited instructions, compared with the full instructions they received from me.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did these full instructions include the instructions to the commanders regarding the treatment of survivors?
HESSLER: Yes, in much the same style as the instructions I received during my training in the U-boat school.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was any change made in the manner of instruction after the Laconia order of September 1942?
HESSLER: Yes. I related the incident briefly to the commanders and told them:
“Now the decision as to whether the situation at sea permits of rescue attempts no longer rests with you. Rescue measures are prohibited from now on.”
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you mean to say that during the whole of the rest of the war—that is, for 2½ years—the commanders continued to be told about the Laconia incident, or was that only done immediately after this incident in the autumn of 1942?
HESSLER: I would say up to January 1943 at the latest. After that, no further mention was made of it.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You mean, no further mention of the incident?
HESSLER: No further mention of the Laconia incident.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: But the orders issued as a result of it were mentioned?
HESSLER: Yes, that a specific order not to take any more rescue measures had been issued.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did the commanders at any time receive orders or suggestions from you or from one of your staff to shoot at survivors?
HESSLER: Never.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were the commanders told by you about the order to take captains and chief engineers on board, if possible?
HESSLER: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was it emphasized in those instructions that this was only to take place when it could be done without endangering the U-boat?
HESSLER: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you know of the incident of U-boat U-386 which passed some airmen shot down in the Bay of Biscay?
HESSLER: I remember this incident very distinctly.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Then you also remember that this incident took place in the autumn of 1943?
HESSLER: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did Commander, U-boats, think, with regard to this incident, that the U-boat commander should have shot at the airmen in the rubber dinghy?
HESSLER: No, on the contrary, he was annoyed because the crew of the aircraft had not been brought along by the U-boat.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did any other person or persons on the staff put forward the view I have just expressed?
HESSLER: No, we knew every one on the staff, and it is out of the question that any member of the staff held a different opinion.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Korvettenkapitän Möhle testified that he asked Korvettenkapitän Kuppisch, who was a member of your staff, for an explanation of the Laconia order and that Kuppisch told him about the incident of the U-386; and told it in such a way as to make it appear that Commander, U-boats, ordered the shooting of survivors.
HESSLER: That is impossible.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Why?
HESSLER: Because Kuppisch took his U-boat out to sea in July 1943 and never returned from that cruise. The incident of U-386 happened in the autumn of 1943, which was later.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Korvettenkapitän Möhle in his first statement left the possibility open that this story about U-386 might have come from you. Did you discuss this matter with him?
HESSLER: No.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Are you certain of that?
HESSLER: Absolutely certain.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you hear of the interpretation given by Korvettenkapitän Möhle to this Laconia order?
HESSLER: After the capitulation—that is, after the end of the war and then through a British officer.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: How do you explain the fact that of the very few officers who received these instructions from Möhle, none raised the question of the interpretation of this order with Commander, U-boats?
HESSLER: I have only one explanation of this; and that is that these officers thought Korvettenkapitän Möhle’s interpretation completely impossible, and not in agreement with the interpretation of Commander, U-boats.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Therefore, they did not think that clarification was necessary?
HESSLER: They did not think that clarification was necessary.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The Prosecution’s charges against Admiral Dönitz are based to a great extent on extracts from the War Diary of the SKL and Commander, U-boats, documents which are in the possession of the British Admiralty. How is it possible that all these data fell into the hands of the British Admiralty—and in toto?
HESSLER: It was the Admiral’s desire that the war diaries of the U-boats and of Commander, U-boats, which formed part of the Navy archives, should be preserved and not be destroyed.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did he say anything to you about this?
HESSLER: Yes, in that form, when I told him that our own staff data had been completely destroyed.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did he give any reason as to why he did not want the Navy archives destroyed?
HESSLER: He wanted to keep these data until after the war, and the Naval Operations Staff had nothing to conceal.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Is that your opinion or is that the opinion which Admiral Dönitz expressed to you?
HESSLER: He told me, “We have a clear conscience.”
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Immediately after the capitulation you were repeatedly interrogated on questions of U-boat warfare and you asked the senior officer present whether the German U-boat command would be accused by the British Navy of criminal acts. Is that right?
HESSLER: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: And what answer did you receive?
HESSLER: An unhesitating “No.”
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I have no further questions, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Does any defendant’s counsel wish to ask any questions?
[There was no response.]
The Prosecution?
COL. PHILLIMORE: With the Tribunal’s permission I would not propose to cross-examine and ask leave to adapt my cross-examination of the last witness because it is the same ground substantially.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
Does any other Prosecutor wish to cross-examine?
Yes, Dr. Kranzbühler?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I have no further questions to ask the witness, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: In the interrogation of the Defendant Dönitz he said that Godt and Hessler—that is you, is it not...?
HESSLER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: ...told him, “Don’t send that signal. You see, one day it might appear in the wrong; it might be misinterpreted.” Did you say that?
HESSLER: I do not remember. As consulting officers, we often had to oppose orders which were being drafted, and we were entitled to do so; but I do not remember whether Admiral Godt and I did so in this case.
THE PRESIDENT: Then later in this interrogation the Defendant Dönitz said:
“I am completely and personally responsible for it”—that is that order—“because Captains Godt and Hessler both expressly stated that they considered the telegram as ambiguous or liable to be misinterpreted.”
Did you say that this telegram was ambiguous or liable to be misinterpreted?
HESSLER: I do not remember that point. I do not think I thought the telegram was ambiguous.
THE PRESIDENT: And lastly the Defendant Dönitz said this:
“I would like to emphasize once more that both Captain Godt and Captain Hessler were violently opposed to the sending of the telegram.”
Do you say that you were not violently opposed to the sending of the telegram?
HESSLER: It is possible that we opposed the dispatch of the telegram because we did not consider it necessary to refer to the matter again.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you say anything to the Defendant Dönitz about this telegram at all?
HESSLER: At the drafting of the telegram we talked it over, just as we discussed every wireless message drafted by us. As time went on, we drafted many hundreds of wireless messages so that it is impossible to remember just what was said in each case.
THE PRESIDENT: You began your answer to that question: “At the drafting of this telegram...”
Do you remember what happened at the drafting of this telegram?
HESSLER: I can remember only that in the course of the so-called Laconia incident a great many wireless messages were sent and received; that many wireless messages were drafted; and that, in addition, U-boat operations were going on in the Atlantic, so that I cannot recall details of what happened when the message was drafted.
THE PRESIDENT: You said now that it was possible that you and Admiral Godt were opposed to the sending of this telegram. Is that your answer?
HESSLER: It is possible, but I cannot say.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Dr. Kranzbühler, the witness can retire.
[The witness left the stand.]
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, this morning I had already advised the Prosecution that I shall not call the fourth witness scheduled—that is Admiral Eckardt. Therefore, my examination of witnesses has been concluded.
THE PRESIDENT: And that concludes your case for the present?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: That concludes my case, but with the permission of the Tribunal I would like to clarify one more question which deals with documents.
The Tribunal has refused all documents which refer to contraband, control ports, and the “Navicert” system. These questions are of some importance if I am to give a correct exposition later on.
May I interpret the Tribunal’s decision as saying that these documents are not to be used now as evidence but that I may have permission to use them later on in my legal exposition?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, the Tribunal thinks that is a question which may be reserved until the time comes for you to make your speech.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Thank you, Mr. President. Then I have concluded my case.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.