Afternoon Session
DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, will you please grant permission for the Defendant Sauckel to be absent from the courtroom from the sessions of the 16th to the 18th inclusive so that he may prepare his defense?
THE PRESIDENT: Be absent in order to prepare his defense? Yes, certainly.
MR. DODD: Mr. President, I would like to suggest that, before the witness Puhl is recalled, the witness Thoms be called. I think it will save some of the Tribunal’s time. I think, from what I know of the prospective testimony, there may be questions that will arise in the mind of the Tribunal which it would like to put to the witness Puhl after having heard the witness Thoms.
And also I would ask, so as to be absolutely fair to all concerned, that the witness Puhl be in the courtroom when the witness Thoms testifies. I think he should have that opportunity.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you any objections, Dr. Sauter?
DR. SAUTER: No, I have no objections.
MR. DODD: May we call the witness Thoms?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, call Thoms, and have Puhl somewhere in the courtroom where he can hear.
[The witness Thoms took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name?
ALBERT THOMS (Witness): Albert Thoms.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.
[The witness repeated the oath.]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
MR. DODD: Mr. President, I am aware that he has been called for cross-examination. However, there are one or two matters, now material, which were not included in the affidavit, and to save time I would like to bring those out before the cross-examination takes place.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
MR. DODD: Herr Thoms, you executed a statement on the 8th day of May 1946. Is that so?
THOMS: Yes.
MR. DODD: And you signed it?
THOMS: Yes.
MR. DODD: And everything in it was true?
THOMS: Yes.
MR. DODD: And is true now, of course?
THOMS: Yes.
MR. DODD: I wish you would just look at it for the purposes of certainty and identify it now. Is that the statement that you signed, Herr Thoms?
THOMS: Yes.
MR. DODD: All right. Now, I have one or two questions to ask you about it. I wish to offer it, Mr. President, as Exhibit USA-852. You know this gentleman sitting to your left, do you not?
THOMS: Yes.
MR. DODD: That is Mr. Puhl, is it not?
THOMS: Yes.
MR. DODD: He was the Vice President of the Reichsbank when you were employed there.
THOMS: Yes.
MR. DODD: Now, did you ever have a conversation with Herr Puhl about any special deposit which was coming to the Reichsbank and about which you should maintain the utmost secrecy?
THOMS: Yes.
MR. DODD: Tell us when that conversation took place, what was said, and if anyone else was present at the time.
THOMS: This conversation took place in the summer of 1942. I was called to Vice President Puhl’s office by Herr Frommknecht, a Treasury official. Herr Frommknecht took me to Herr Puhl, and there Herr Puhl disclosed the fact that a special transaction with the office of the Reichsführer-SS was to be undertaken. Do you want me to explain it in detail?
MR. DODD: Tell us everything that he said to you.
THOMS: Herr Puhl told me that the affair was to be kept absolutely secret and confidential. Not only would articles be delivered which would be automatically taken over in the ordinary course of business of the Reichsbank, but also the disposal of jewelry and other articles would have to be effected. Upon my objection that we had no expert men for such matters, he replied that we would have to find a way to convert these articles. First I made the suggestion that these special articles should then be sent to the Reich Main Treasury—that is, the Main Treasury of the Reich Government—which also held all booty of the Army. However, Herr Puhl thought that this matter should not go through the Reich Main Treasury, but should be handled by the Reichsbank in some other way. Thereupon I suggested that these articles could be sent to the Municipal Pawnbroker’s Office in Berlin, exactly as the deliveries from the confiscated Jewish property had been dealt with before. Herr Puhl agreed to this suggestion.
MR. DODD: Now, when did the first of these shipments arrive?
THOMS: The first delivery came to the Reichsbank during the month of August, as far as I can remember.
MR. DODD: 1942?
THOMS: 1942.
MR. DODD: Does the name Melmer mean anything to you?
THOMS: Melmer was the name of the SS man who subsequently brought these valuables to the Reichsbank. Under this code word all deliveries of the SS were later entered in the books of the bank.
MR. DODD: Did you ever mention the name or the word “Melmer” to Puhl, and did he ever mention it to you?
THOMS: The name “Melmer” was not mentioned by Vice President Puhl to me, but was mentioned by me to Vice President Puhl as I had to inform him about the start of the entire transaction and particularly about the carrying out of the transaction regarding the conversion of the valuables. In accordance with the suggestion of the office of the Reichsführer-SS, the money equivalent was transferred to the Reich Ministry of Finance into an account which was given the name “Max Heiliger.” I duly informed Vice President Puhl briefly about these facts.
MR. DODD: Did you ever tell Puhl the nature of the material that you were receiving in the SS shipments?
THOMS: After some months Vice President Puhl asked me how the “Melmer” affair was getting along. I explained to him that, contrary to the expectation that there would really be very few deliveries, deliveries were increasing and that apart from gold and silver coins they contained particularly a great deal of jewelry, gold rings, wedding rings, gold and silver fragments, dental gold, and all sorts of gold and silver articles.
MR. DODD: What did he say when you told him there were jewels and silver and dental gold and other articles?
THOMS: May I first of all add a few things. I drew his attention especially to the fact that on one occasion something like 12 kilograms of pearls had been collected and that I had never before seen such an unusual amount in all my life.
MR. DODD; Wait a minute! What was it?
THOMS: They were pearls and pearl necklaces.
MR. DODD: Did you also tell him you were receiving a quantity of eyeglass rims?
THOMS: I cannot swear to that at the moment, but I described the general character of these deliveries to him. Therefore, I think, I probably used “spectacles,” and similar words; but I would not like to state it on my oath.
MR. DODD: Was Puhl ever in the vaults when this material was being looked through?
THOMS: On several occasions he visited the strong-rooms of the bank to inspect the gold stored there and particularly to inform himself about the type of stores. The deliveries of the “Melmer” transactions were kept in a special part of one of the main safes, so that on those occasions Herr Puhl must also have seen the boxes and sacks full of those deliveries. Nearby in the corridor of the vault the articles of the “Melmer” deliveries were being dealt with.
I am firmly convinced that when he walked through the strong-rooms, Herr Puhl must have seen these objects, as they were lying quite openly on the table and everyone who visited the strong-room could see them.
MR. DODD: There were about 25 or 30 people that sorted this stuff out, were there not, before it was shipped away for melting and for sale in the pawnshops?
THOMS: I would say that there were not 25 to 30 people who sorted these things—in the course of a day perhaps 25 to 30 people would visit the strong-rooms to carry out some official business there. For this particular business some four or five officials were occupied in sorting out the things, getting them ready.
MR. DODD: And everyone under your supervision was sworn to secrecy? They didn’t talk about this business; they were forbidden to do so, were they not?
THOMS: There were strict instructions in the bank that secret matters must not be discussed, not even with a colleague of one’s own department, if that colleague did not himself also work at the same job. So that...
MR. DODD: Well, this was a super-secret matter, wasn’t it? It wasn’t the ordinary secrecy that attended. Wasn’t there a special secrecy surrounding these deliveries?
THOMS: Quite right. It was quite an exceptional affair and it had to be kept especially secret. I would say that it went beyond the limits of top secrecy. For even I had been strictly forbidden to talk to anybody about it; and I said at the time when I left Vice President Puhl, after the first conversation, that I would however inform the leading officials in the Treasury, because after all my superiors must be informed about this business.
MR. DODD: Was there a report made about these “Melmer” deposits to the Directorate?
THOMS: No. The matter was treated as a verbal agreement. It was after all an exceptional case and only one account was kept of the deliveries made, which was called the “Melmer account.” This account was transmitted by the head cashier’s office to the foreign exchange department which, in turn, had to take further steps with the Directorate of the Reichsbank.
MR. DODD: Well, the Directorate had to approve the handling of this type of thing, did it not? You weren’t allowed to handle materials like this without the approval of the bank Directorate?
THOMS: In matters concerning gold particularly instructions had to be given and approved respectively by the Board of Directors. I could therefore never act independently. Generally the instructions were given to the Treasury in writing and they were signed by at least two officials and one member of the Board of Directors. So that it was quite unique that in this case instructions were given in a verbal form.
MR. DODD: By the way, Herr Thoms, you have seen the film this noontime? We have shown you a film, haven’t we?
THOMS: Yes.
MR. DODD: After seeing that film, are you able to say whether or not that represents a fair representation of the appearance of some of the shipments that were received by the Reichsbank from the SS?
THOMS: I may say that this film and the pictures which I have seen in it were typical of the “Melmer” deliveries. Perhaps I should qualify that by saying that the quantities shown in this film were in excess of the quantity of dental gold and particularly jewelry which came with the first deliveries. Only later did these amounts increase, so that the quantities which we have seen in this film had actually not yet been seen by the Reichsbank because they were contained in boxes or trunks which until then had remained locked. But generally the material which I have seen in that film is typical of the “Melmer” deliveries.
MR. DODD: All right, sir. Now, approximately—I don’t expect a completely accurate answer, but approximately how many shipments did you receive of this stuff from the SS?
THOMS: As nearly as I can remember at the moment, there must have been more than 70 deliveries, possibly 76 or 77. I can’t tell you exactly at the moment, but that must be about the right figure.
MR. DODD: Very well, I have no further questions.
DR. SAUTER: Witness, what is your occupation?
THOMS: A councillor of the Reichsbank.
DR. SAUTER: Where do you live?
THOMS: Berlin-Steglitz. Then I—after my home was bombed I lived at Potsdam, Neu-Fahrland.
DR. SAUTER: Did you volunteer for the examination of the Prosecution or how did you happen to be interrogated...
THOMS: I was...
DR. SAUTER: Please, will you wait until I have finished my question so that the interpreters can keep up with us? Will you please make a pause between question and answer.
THOMS: I was ordered here.
DR. SAUTER: By whom?
THOMS: Probably by the Prosecution.
DR. SAUTER: Are you a free man?
THOMS: Yes, I am free.
DR. SAUTER: Did you receive the summons in writing?
THOMS: No. I was asked orally yesterday in Frankfurt to come to Nuremberg.
DR. SAUTER: Frankfurt? Are you living in Frankfurt at the moment?
THOMS: Yes.
DR. SAUTER: Herr Thoms, where were you living on 8 May? That is a week ago today?
THOMS: On 8 May of this year?
DR. SAUTER: You are Herr Thoms, aren’t you?
THOMS: Yes.
DR. SAUTER: Yes, on 8 May, a week ago today.
THOMS: In Frankfurt.
DR. SAUTER: You were interrogated there, weren’t you?
THOMS: That is quite right. I was interrogated at Frankfurt.
DR. SAUTER: That is the affidavit which the Prosecutor has just put to you?
THOMS: Yes.
DR. SAUTER: How did you come to make the affidavit? Did you volunteer as a witness, or how did this happen?
THOMS: I want to point out to you that already a year ago when I was working at Frankfurt, I voluntarily gave the American offices the details of the transactions which were known to me in the matter of the gold of the Reichsbank.
DR. SAUTER: I see. So last year you already offered yourself as a witness?
THOMS: I wouldn’t say as a witness in this matter. I merely placed myself at their disposal for the clarification of Reichsbank affairs for American purposes.
DR. SAUTER: Yes. Did you ever discuss this matter with the President of the Reichsbank, Funk?
THOMS: No. During my term of service, I never had an opportunity of talking to Minister Funk.
DR. SAUTER: Have you any positive knowledge, perhaps from some other source, as to whether President of the Reichsbank Funk had exact knowledge of these things, or is that also unknown to you?
THOMS: I cannot say anything about that either, because these matters happened on a higher level, which I could not judge.
DR. SAUTER: Then I would be interested in hearing something about this deposit, or whatever you call it, which was under the name “Melmer”?
THOMS: I want to point out that this was not a deposit, but that these were deliveries which were delivered under the name “Melmer.” Insofar as the transactions were those which the Reichsbank had to deal with, the Reichsbank took over these articles directly, and insofar as it was a question of matters not pertaining to the bank, the Reichsbank to a certain extent was the trustee for the conversion of these things.
DR. SAUTER: More slowly, more slowly. Why was this matter, whether we call it a deposit or anything else, not dealt with under the name “SS,” why was it given the name “Melmer”? Did you ask anybody about that, Witness?
THOMS: I have already mentioned at the beginning of the examination that this was a particularly secret affair in connection with which the name of the depositor was not to appear. In this case, therefore, it was Vice President Puhl who had to decide the way this affair was to be dealt with; and he desired and ordered this.
DR. SAUTER: Did only officials of the Reichsbank come to the strong-room where these things were kept, or did other persons also have access to it, for instance, people who had a safe in the strong-room?
THOMS: The Reichsbank did not have any private depositors, that is to say, we did not have any locked deposits which belonged to customers of the Reichsbank—at least not in those vaults. Deposits from private customers were in another vault so that there was no contact between the deposits of the bank and the deposits of the customers.
DR. SAUTER: But quite a number of officials went down there. You have already said that.
There is one thing I am not clear about: On the one hand, you have told us that these articles were lying about openly on tables so that everybody could see them; and on the other hand, you said previously towards the end of your statement that these things were kept in locked boxes and trunks. How does that tally?
THOMS: I have stated that these things were delivered in closed boxes and trunks, and stored in them. When from time to time the deliveries were inventoried, the delivery which was to be dealt with naturally had to be opened and the contents counted, examined, and re-weighed. That, of course, could only be done by spreading out the contents, counting them, checking the weight, and then locking them in new containers.
DR. SAUTER: Did you perhaps on your own initiative tell Herr Puhl—after all, you were a bank councillor, therefore also a senior official—that you had misgivings about the whole business? Please think over the question and give your answer very carefully, because you are under oath.
THOMS: First of all, I have to say that I belonged to the group of officials of middle rank, but that is just in passing. Then, of course—or let me put it this way—when an official has worked for thirty years or longer for a concern and if throughout the long years of his career he has always had the feeling that the directors were irreproachable, then, I believe, he could have no misgivings if in a special case he is instructed to keep silent about a certain transaction. He would not object to carrying out this order. I have already said that the term “booty” was not unknown to us officials in the Reichsbank, because there was the order that all booty goods which came in from the Army were to be delivered directly to the Treasury, that is the Treasury of the Reich Government; and we in the Bank thought, of course, that the booty from the SS troops was to go through the Reichsbank. An official of the Reichsbank cannot very well oppose such an order. If the Directors of the Bank give him instructions, then he has to carry them out, because of the oath which he has sworn.
DR. SAUTER: So that, Witness, if I understand you correctly, you are telling us that at the beginning, at any rate, you considered that the matter was in order, and there was nothing wrong with it?
THOMS: At the beginning? As a matter of fact, I considered it correct that it should be carried right through.
DR. SAUTER: Did you ever have any doubts that this might be, let us say, criminal?
THOMS: Certainly I would have had doubts if I had had the knowledge and experience then which I have today.
DR. SAUTER: That is the same with everyone.
THOMS: Yes, quite right. As far as that is concerned, I had to suppress any doubts; I would not admit any doubts, because the affair was not known only to me, it was known to the Reichsbank Directorate and in the administration office of the Main Treasury. The valuables in the strong-room were checked every night by a deputy director of the Main Treasury, so that I was responsible only for the technical carrying out of this business; and the responsibility for the correctness of this transaction was not within my competence.
DR. SAUTER: I do not know about the responsibility but, Witness, I asked you, did you ever have any doubts, and at what precise moment did you consider the whole affair criminal? Did you consider it criminal?
THOMS: We assumed that these were goods which the SS—after they had partly burned down towns in the East, particularly in the battle for Warsaw—we thought that afterwards they captured this booty in the houses and then delivered this booty to our Bank.
DR. SAUTER: As booty?
THOMS: Yes. If a military department delivers booty goods it does not follow that an official who is entrusted with the handling of these things would have to consider these deliveries as being criminal.
DR. SAUTER: When taking over these articles, did you think, or did Vice President Puhl tell you, or at least hint to you, that these gold articles might have been taken from victims in the concentration camps?
THOMS: No.
DR. SAUTER: You did not think of that, did you?
THOMS: No.
DR. SAUTER: Not at all?
THOMS: Once we saw the name “Auschwitz,” and another time the name “Lublin,” on some slips of paper which we found. I said that in connection with Lublin we found this inscription on some packets of bank notes which came in to be dealt with and which were then returned to the Polish Bank to be cashed. Strangely enough, the same packets came back later after they had been dealt with by the bank. Consequently, here the explanation was that these could not be deliveries from a concentration camp, since they had come to us through official bank channels. As regards the camp at Auschwitz—well, I cannot say today with what sort of deliveries these slips of paper were found, but it is possible that they were slips attached to some notes, and perhaps they may have been deliveries of foreign bank notes, from the concentration camps. But then there were arrangements according to which prisoners of war, or prisoners, could exchange their notes for other money in the camp, so that such deliveries could have been made through legal channels.
DR. SAUTER: If I understand you correctly, Witness, then, the meaning of what you have just told us is that you still considered the matter legal or lawful even when in 1943 you saw the inscription “Auschwitz” and “Lublin” on some items. Even then you considered the matter legal, didn’t you?
THOMS: Yes.
DR. SAUTER: Well, then, why did you in your affidavit of 8 May 1946—it is true it is not a sworn affidavit—tell the story somewhat differently? Perhaps I can read the sentence to you...
THOMS: Please, do.
DR. SAUTER: ...and you can then tell me if I misunderstood you or whether the official took it down incorrectly. It says there, after first of all saying that you considered the matter to be legal:
“One of the first indications of the origin of these articles was when it was noticed that a packet of bills, presumably bonds...”
THOMS: No, they were bank notes.
DR. SAUTER: “...were stamped ‘Lublin.’ ”
THOMS: This occurred early in 1943.
DR. SAUTER: “Another indication was the fact that some articles bore the stamp ‘Auschwitz.’ We all knew these places were the sites of concentration camps. In connection with the tenth delivery in November 1942”—that is, previously—“gold teeth appeared, and the quantity of gold teeth grew to an unusual extent.”
So much for the quotation from your unsworn statement of 8 May 1946. Now, will you please tell us: Does that mean the same as you said a little earlier, or does it mean something different in your opinion?
THOMS: That in my opinion tallies with my statement. We could not assume that deliveries which came through the concentration camp had to be absolutely illegal. We only observed that gradually these deliveries became larger. A delivery of notes from a concentration camp need not be illegal because of this. It might have been an official calling-in, especially as we did not know the regulations applicable to concentration camps. It would be perfectly possible that these people had the right to sell the articles in their possession or give them in payment.
DR. SAUTER: The dollars which you have also seen in that film would hardly be sold by anybody.
THOMS: May I point out to you that I was not of the opinion that these bank notes necessarily came from concentration camps. I merely said that the word “Lublin” was on some of the packets of bank notes. That might have pointed to their having come from a concentration camp; but it did not necessarily mean that these particular notes came from that concentration camp, and the same applies to “Auschwitz.” The name “Auschwitz” cropped up. There may have been a certain suspicion, but we had not any proof, and we did not feel that we were in any way called upon to object to these deliveries of the SS.
DR. SAUTER: Consequently, Witness, apparently because you put this construction on it, you did not use the occasion to make a report to Vice President Puhl or the Directorate, or to voice any doubts; you did not have any cause for that?
THOMS: I called Vice President Puhl’s attention to the composition of these deliveries as early as a few months after the arrival of the first delivery. Therefore, the general character of these deliveries was known to Herr Puhl. He knew the contents of the deliveries.
DR. SAUTER: But you told us earlier that the character of these deliveries did not seem peculiar to you. You considered that it was booty. And now you want to say that you called Vice President Puhl’s attention to it and that he must have noticed something peculiar.
THOMS: I did not say that. I did not say that Herr Puhl must have noticed something peculiar. I merely said that, if any objections were to be raised, then they would have to come from Herr Puhl, since he was as well aware of the character of these deliveries as I was. And, if there was any suspicion, then Herr Puhl’s suspicion would probably have been aroused more strongly than mine.
DR. SAUTER: Witness, you told us earlier that special secrecy was ordered in this connection, but at the same time you mentioned that quite apart from this SS affair, there were also other business matters which apparently had to be handled with special secrecy. Is that true?
THOMS: Yes.
DR. SAUTER: You need not give us any names, but I would only like to know what the other affairs were?
THOMS: These are matters which had to do with the conduct of the war. There were transactions in gold, and perhaps also in foreign currency, et cetera.
DR. SAUTER: They were not criminal affairs, therefore?
THOMS: No, not criminal.
DR. SAUTER: Then, Witness...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, the Tribunal thinks that this is getting too far away from the point really to ask him about other deliveries.
DR. SAUTER: Yes, but the question is already answered, Mr. President.
Witness, because of this secrecy in connection with the SS deliveries which reached the Reichsbank, I should be interested in knowing, insofar as they were realized by the Reichsbank, whether any accounts were rendered, as I assume to be the case from the documents before us?
THOMS: Yes.
DR. SAUTER: By your Main Treasury?
THOMS: Yes.
DR. SAUTER: To whom were these accounts sent?
THOMS: They were sent to the Reichsführer-SS office direct; that is to say, they were collected by Melmer directly from the bank.
DR. SAUTER: Did they not go to any other office?
THOMS: And then they were officially passed on to the Foreign Currency Department.
DR. SAUTER: To the Foreign Currency Department, that is, to a State Department?
THOMS: No, that is a department of the Reichsbank which in turn is the link with the Directorate.
DR. SAUTER: Were not these accounts also transmitted, or did they not go, to the Reich Ministry of Finance?
THOMS: The liaison man, Melmer, always received two accounts, that is, in duplicate. Whether the Reichsführer’s office sent one copy to the Reich Ministry of Finance, I do not know.
DR. SAUTER: Were these accounts really treated confidentially, that is, kept secret?
THOMS: Yes.
DR. SAUTER: For instance, the accounts with the Municipal Pawn Broker’s Office?
THOMS: In the account with the Municipal Pawn Broker’s Office the depositor was not named.
DR. SAUTER: What happened to these gold teeth?
THOMS: They were melted down by the Prussian State Mint. The gold was then refined and the fine gold was returned to the Reichsbank.
DR. SAUTER: Witness, you said earlier that at the beginning of 1943 certain articles had arrived stamped “Auschwitz.” I think you said at the beginning of 1943.
THOMS: Yes, but I cannot tell you the exact date now.
DR. SAUTER: You said “We all knew that there was a concentration camp there.” Did you really know that as early as the beginning of 1943, Witness?
THOMS: Naturally, now I can...
DR. SAUTER: Yes, now of course, we all know it. I am talking about the time at which this happened.
THOMS: I cannot say that for certain. I made that statement on the strength—I beg your pardon, that is, probably—these deliveries were probably not handled until as late as 1945 or 1944 in the late autumn. It is possible that something about Auschwitz had already leaked out.
DR. SAUTER: Now, you said under Number 14 of your statement that one of the first clues to the source of these articles—apparently meaning the concentration camps—was the fact that a parcel of paper was stamped “Lublin.” This was early in 1943. And another indication was the fact that some items bore the stamp “Auschwitz.” “We all knew”—I’ve already emphasized this before for a very good reason—“we all knew that these places were the sites of concentration camps.” That’s your statement, and I now repeat the question. Of course we all know it now; but did you, Herr Reichsbank Councillor, know at the beginning of 1943 that there was this huge concentration camp at Auschwitz?
THOMS: No. To that positive type of question I must say no, I did not know it, but...
THE PRESIDENT: He did not say anything about a huge concentration camp at Auschwitz.
DR. SAUTER: No, that was a rhetorical exaggeration of mine. I said that we knew from the Trial that there was a huge concentration camp there.
THE PRESIDENT: Did he know it? Did he know that there was a huge concentration camp in 1943? He has not said so.
THOMS: I can answer “no” to your question, but this is the point: I assume that this slip marked “Auschwitz” came from a delivery which was probably made in 1943, but was not dealt with until much later; and I made that statement when I was already in Frankfurt, so that the name “Auschwitz” was familiar to me. I admit that there may be an exaggeration insofar as I did retrospectively tell myself that that was a concentration camp, you see. But I know that at the time, somehow, our attention was drawn to the name “Auschwitz,” and I think we even asked a question about the connection; but we received no answer and we never asked again.
DR. SAUTER: Well then, Witness, I have one last question. The Prosecution has shown us the Document 3947-PS. I repeat, 3947-PS. Apparently this is the draft of a memorandum which some department in the Reichsbank seems to have prepared for the Directorate of the Reichsbank. It is dated 31 March 1944, and it contains the sentence on Page 2 which I shall read to you because it refers to Defendant Funk and to Defendant Göring. This is the sentence:
“The Reich Marshal of the Greater German Reich, the Delegate for the Four Year Plan, hereby informs the German Reichsbank, in a letter of 19 March 1944, copy of which is enclosed,”—incidentally, the copy is not here, at least I have not got it—“that the considerable amounts of gold and silver objects, jewels, and so forth, at the Main Trustee Office East should be delivered to the Reichsbank according to the order issued by Reich Minister Funk”—the defendant—“and Graf Schwerin-Krosigk, Reich Finance Minister. The conversion of these objects should be accomplished in the same way as the ‘Melmer’ deliveries.”
That is the end of my quotation.
Defendant Funk tells me, however, that he knew nothing about such instructions, and that such an agreement or such a letter was entirely unknown to him and that he did not know anything at all about the “Melmer” deliveries.
MR. DODD: I must object to the form of the question. I have objected before that it is a long story anticipating the answer to the question put to the witness. I think it is an unfair way to examine.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, you know, do you not, that you are not entitled to give evidence yourself? You are not entitled to say what Funk told you, unless he has given the evidence.
DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, this is not one of our witnesses. This is a witness who has volunteered for the Prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, it is not a question of whose witness he is. You were stating what Funk told you, and you were not referring to anything that Funk had said in evidence, and you are not entitled to do that.
DR. SAUTER: As you were Reichsbankrat I should be interested to know whether you knew anything about these orders which are mentioned in the letter of 31 March 1944 from an office of the Reichsbank, and whether the Defendant Funk was concerned with this?
THOMS: I think I can remember that instructions actually did exist which stated that gold from the Main Trustee Office East should be delivered to the Reichsbank. I am not absolutely certain whether this sentence is from a note written by the Deputy Director of the Main Treasury, Herr Kropp, to the Directorate of the Reichsbank at the time. I am fairly certain that originally such instructions were actually given, but I want to point out that the Main Treasury through the Precious Metal Department was against accepting these valuables because technically they were not in a position permanently to assume responsibility for such considerable deliveries of miscellaneous articles. This instruction was cancelled later on through Herr Kropp’s intervention. The deliveries from the Main Trustee Office East to the Reichsbank, especially to the Main Treasury, were not undertaken. I believe, however, I am right in saying that originally instructions of the type which you have just described did exist.
DR. SAUTER: Did you see that instruction yourself?
THOMS: I think that in the files of the Precious Metals Department, which are in the hands of the American Government, there will be carbon copies of these instructions.
DR. SAUTER: Was that instruction signed by the Defendant Funk?
THOMS: That I cannot say.
DR. SAUTER: Or by some other office?
THOMS: I really cannot tell you at the moment, but I cannot assume that it is the case because if the text reads, “from the Finance Minister and Herr Funk,” then some other department must have signed.
DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, I have no further questions.
MR. DODD: May I ask one or two questions on re-direct examination.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. DODD: Herr Thoms, there wasn’t any exaggeration about the fact that you did find a slip of paper with the word “Auschwitz” written on it among one of these shipments, was there?
THOMS: No. I found the note.
MR. DODD: Now, I suppose you found lots of things among these shipments with names written on them. There must have been something that made you remember “Auschwitz,” isn’t that so?
THOMS: Yes.
MR. DODD: Well, what was it?
THOMS: I must assume—I mean that I know from my recollection that there was some connection with a concentration camp, but I cannot say. I am of the opinion that it must have happened later. It is really...
MR. DODD: Well, I don’t care to press it. I just wanted to make perfectly clear to the Tribunal that you told us that you did remember “Auschwitz” and it had such a meaning for you that you remembered it as late as after the surrender of Germany. That is so, isn’t it?
THOMS: Yes.
MR. DODD: I have no further questions.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): You said there were about 77 deliveries, is that right?
THOMS: Yes, there were over 70.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): How large were the deliveries? Were they in trucks?
THOMS: They varied in size. Generally they arrived in ordinary cars, but sometimes they arrived in trucks. It depended. When there were bank notes, for instance, the bulk was smaller and the weight was less. If it was silver or silver articles, then the weight was greater and a small lorry would bring it.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): There were several lorries, or trucks, in each delivery, usually?
THOMS: No, the deliveries were not so large as that. There was at the most one truck.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And one other question: Do I understand you to say that these articles were transferred to new containers?
THOMS: Yes, they were put into ordinary bags by the Reichsbank. The bags were labeled “Reichsbank.”
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Bags marked with the Reichsbank’s name on the bag?
THOMS: Yes, on which the word “Reichsbank” was written.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.
[The witness Puhl took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Now, Dr. Seidl, do you want to ask the witness Puhl a few questions?
Witness, you remember that you are still on oath?
PUHL: Yes, Sir.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, in connection with Document 3947-PS, USA-850, I have several questions to put to you.
You heard earlier when the witness Thoms was examined that this letter contains a paragraph which refers to Reich Marshal Göring and which is connected with the Main Trustee Office East. Is it true that this Main Trustee Office was an office which had been established by a Reich law and that its right to confiscate had also been specifically outlined by Reich law?
PUHL: I cannot answer the second part of your question without looking it up since I am not a legally trained man. The Main Trustee Office East was an officially established office—whether by a law or by a decree, is something I cannot tell you at the moment.
DR. SEIDL: To your knowledge, did the Main Trustee Office East have any connection with the SS Economic Administration headquarters, that is to say, with the office of Pohl?
PUHL: I have never observed that.
DR. SEIDL: Is it obviously out of the question, at least when you read the letter, that the Main Trustee Office East and its deliveries could in any way be connected with the “Melmer” action?
PUHL: That very probably is so, yes.
DR. SEIDL: You mean there was no connection?
PUHL: That there was no connection.
DR. SEIDL: You mentioned this morning that among the business transactions which the Reichsbank handled very unwillingly were those with the Customs Investigation and the Currency Control Offices. The last part of this paragraph which refers to the Defendant Göring contains a sentence which refers to the conversion of objects of a similar type which were taken from the occupied western territories. Is it true that, particularly in the occupied western territories, both the Currency Control Offices and the Customs Investigation Offices obtained rich booty?
PUHL: The total of the valuables which were brought in by both these offices is unknown to me. I rather doubt that it was extraordinarily big. However, they were fairly large sums, mostly, of course, in foreign currency.
DR. SEIDL: I have no further questions to the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, do you want to ask him anything?
MR. DODD: After having heard Herr Thoms’ testimony, do you wish to change any of your testimony that you gave this morning?
PUHL: No.
MR. DODD: And your affidavit that you gave under oath, do you wish to have it remain as it is?
PUHL: Yes.
MR. DODD: That is all I have.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you know who Kropp, who signed under the word “Hauptkasse” in the letter of 31 March 1944, Document 3947-PS, is?
PUHL: Herr Kropp was an official of our Treasury Department. He had a comparatively responsible position.
THE PRESIDENT: Of which department?
PUHL: The Treasury Department.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. The witness can retire.
[The witness left the stand.]
Dr. Siemers.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral Raeder, will you come up to the witness stand?
[The Defendant Raeder took the stand.]
May I remind you that I put the basic question whether the construction of the Navy was to serve aggressive or defensive purposes.
The witness wishes to answer that question by referring to parts of the speech he made in 1928. It is Exhibit Number Raeder-6, Document Book 1, Page 5, and the speech itself begins on Page 17.
Please go ahead.
RAEDER: First of all, I want to say that Minister Severing, whom I had asked for as one of my witnesses, brought this speech along of his own free will, as he still remembers the year 1928.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, this is to be found on Page 16 of the document book. It is Raeder’s letter to Minister Severing, dated 8 October 1928. Severing gave me this speech when he came to Nuremberg to appear as a witness.
RAEDER: I shall quote from Page 17, the fifth line from the bottom, to shorten the sentence somewhat for the interpreters:
“The Armed Forces—I am speaking of course primarily for the Navy, but I know that today it is the same with the Army, because since 1919 its inner solidarity and training has been perfected with the greatest devotion and loyalty to duty—in their present structure, whether officer or soldier, in their present form of development and their inner attitude, are a firm and reliable support, I might even say, because of their inherent military might and in view of conditions within the Reich, the firmest and most reliable support of our German fatherland, the German Reich, the German Republic, and its Constitution; and the Armed Forces are proud to be that.”
I then turn to Page 3, and it is the sixth line:
“If, however, the State is to endure, this power must be available only to the constitutional authorities. No one else may have it; that is, not even the political parties. The Wehrmacht must be completely nonpolitical and be composed only of servicemen who, in full realization of this necessity, refuse to take part in any activity of domestic politics. To have realized this from the outset and organized the Wehrmacht accordingly is the great and enduring achievement of Noske, the former Reichswehrminister, whom the meritorious Minister Dr. Gessler followed on this road with the deepest conviction.”
Then I talk about the composition of the Navy, and on the fourth page I continue, Line 7. Perhaps this is the most important sentence:
“In my opinion, one thing is of course a prerequisite for the inner attitude of the serviceman, namely, that he is willing to put his profession into practice when the fatherland calls upon him. People who never again want war cannot possibly wish to become soldiers. One cannot take it amiss if the Wehrmacht infuses into its servicemen a manly and warlike spirit; not the desire for war or even a war of revenge or a war of aggression, for to strive after that would certainly in the general opinion of all Germans be a crime, but the will to take up arms in the defense of the fatherland in its hour of need.”
Then I pass on to the last paragraph on Page 4.
“One must understand—for it is in accordance with the essence of the Wehrmacht—if it strives to be as far as possible in a position to fulfil its tasks, even under the conditions today, dictated by the limitation of the Versailles Treaty.”
I then refer to the tasks of the small Navy, and that is on Page 5, second paragraph, Line 6.
“Consider the extent of the German coast line in the Baltic and North Sea, chiefly the Prussian coast line, which would be open to invasion and to the ravages of even the smallest maritime nation, had we not at our disposal modern mobile naval forces at least up to the strength permitted by the provisions of the Versailles Treaty. Above all, think of the position of East Prussia, which in the event of the closing of the Corridor would be wholly dependent on overseas imports, imports which would have to be brought past the bases of foreign nations and in the event of war would be endangered to the utmost, or even be made impossible if we were not in possession of fighting ships. I ask you to remember the reports about the effect of the visits of our training ships and of our fleet to foreign countries, when, already in 1922, the model conduct of our ship crews testified to an improvement in the internal conditions of the Reich, and increased considerably the esteem for the German Reich.”
So much for this speech.
THE PRESIDENT: Since you are passing from that now, we might perhaps adjourn.
[A recess was taken.]
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, hanging over this Trial are the words: “Wars of Aggression are Crimes.”
We have just seen from your speech that, as early as January, 1928, you used these words, before the Kellogg Pact. In conclusion, I should like to ask you, did this principle of January 1928 remain your principle during the whole time of your command of the Navy?
RAEDER: Of course.
DR. SIEMERS: In connection with the Versailles Treaty, I should now like to submit an affidavit, because some figures are necessary here which are easier to present in writing than by interrogation. I shall submit Affidavit II by Vice Admiral Lohmann, Exhibit Number Raeder-8, Document Book 1, Page 39.
For the guidance of the Tribunal, so that there may be no misunderstanding, I should like to point out that Vice Admiral Lohmann has nothing to do with the Captain Lohmann who was well-known, almost famous, in the twenties.
The Tribunal may remember that the Lohmann affair was mentioned in connection with the breaches of the Versailles Treaty. Captain Lohmann died in 1930, and has nothing to do with the present author of this affidavit, Vice Admiral Lohmann. I also remind the Court that the Lohmann affair took place before Admiral Raeder was in charge of the Navy, before 1928.
I quote from the Lohmann affidavit the statement under Numeral I.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you wanting to call this Admiral Lohmann as a witness?
DR. SIEMERS: No, I did not name him as a witness; I was satisfied with an affidavit, because of the many figures. The British Prosecution has already agreed to the affidavit being submitted, but asked that Admiral Lohmann might be cross-examined. It was arranged between Sir David and myself.
THE PRESIDENT: I see, yes. You do not need to go into all these figures of tons, do you? You do not need to read all these, do you?
DR. SIEMERS: No. I did not want to read the individual figures. I would point out that this affidavit does not deal with tonnage; it concerns Number Raeder-8, Page 39.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I have got the one. There are a good many tons in it, though.
DR. SIEMERS: I should like to read under Numeral I:
“Under the Versailles Treaty, Germany was permitted to build eight armored ships. Germany, however, built only three armored ships, the Deutschland, the Admiral Scheer, and the Graf Spee.”—I will skip the following.
“II. Under the Versailles Treaty, Germany was permitted to build eight cruisers. Germany, however, built only six cruisers.”
I shall omit the details according to the wish of the Tribunal.
“III. Under the Versailles Treaty, Germany was permitted to build 32 destroyers and/or torpedo boats. Germany, however, built only 12 destroyers and no torpedo boats.”
According to this, in building up the Navy, Germany in no way took advantage of the possibilities of the Versailles Treaty, and if I understand correctly, she specifically omitted the construction of offensive weapons, namely, the large ships.
May I ask you to make a statement about this.
RAEDER: That is entirely correct. It is astonishing that at this period of time so little advantage was taken of the Versailles Treaty. I was reproached for this later when the National Socialist government came to power. They did not bear in mind, however, that the government at that time, and the Reichstag, were not inclined to let us have these ships. We had to fight hard for permission. But this failure to build up the Navy to the strength permitted has no relationship to the small breaches of the Versailles Treaty, which we committed mainly in order to build up, one could say, a pitiable defense of the coast in the event of extreme emergency.
DR. SIEMERS: I shall come back to Document C-32. It is established that during the time of the Versailles Treaty, Germany did not take advantage of the provisions of the Treaty, particularly in regard to offensive weapons. On the other hand, on the basis of the documents submitted by the Prosecution, it has been established and it is also historically known, that the Navy in building itself up committed breaches of the Versailles Treaty in other directions. I should like to discuss with you the individual breaches which were presented with great precision by the Prosecution. But first I should like to discuss the general accusation, which I have already mentioned, that these breaches were committed behind the back of the Reichstag and the Government.
Is this accusation justified?
RAEDER: Not at all. I must repeat that I was connected with these breaches only when on 1 October 1928, I became Chief of the Navy Command in Berlin. I had nothing to do with things which had been done previously.
When I came to Berlin, the Lohmann case, which you mentioned previously, had already been concluded. It was in the process of being liquidated; and the Reich Defense Minister Gröner, when the affair was first discovered, ordered the Army as well as the Navy to report to him all breaches which were in process; and from then on he was going to deal with these things together with Colonel Von Schleicher, his political adviser. He liquidated the Lohmann affair, and this liquidation was still in progress when I came there.
On 1 October 1928 he had already come to the decision to transfer the responsibility for all these evasions and breaches of the Versailles Treaty to the Reich Government, as a whole, at that time the Müller-Severing-Stresemann Government, since he believed that he could no longer bear the responsibility alone.
As a result on 18 October, when I had just become acquainted with these matters, he called a cabinet meeting to which the Chief of the Army Command, General Heye, and I, as well as some office chiefs in both administrations, were called. At this cabinet meeting, General Heye and I had to report openly and fully before all the Ministers as to what breaches there were on the part of the Army and the Navy. The Müller-Severing-Stresemann government took full responsibility and exonerated the Reich Defense Minister, who, however, continued to be responsible for carrying things through. We had to report to the Reich Defense Minister everything which happened in the future and were not allowed to undertake any steps alone. The Reich Defense Minister handled matters together with the Reich Minister of the Interior, Severing, who showed great understanding for the various requirements.
DR. SIEMERS: At this cabinet meeting you and General Heye as Chief of the Army Command submitted a list of the individual small breaches?
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: And thereupon the Government told you, “We will take the responsibility”?
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Accordingly, in the following years did you always act in agreement with the Reich Government?
RAEDER: Yes, the Reich Defense Minister, Gröner, was extremely sensitive on this point. He had dissolved all the so-called “black” funds which existed and insisted absolutely that he should know about everything and should sanction everything. He thought that only in this way could he take the responsibility towards the Government.
I had nothing whatever to do with the Reichstag. The military chiefs were not allowed to have contact with the members of the Reichstag in such matters. All negotiations with the Reichstag were carried out through the Reich Defense Minister or by Colonel Von Schleicher on his behalf. I was therefore in no position to go behind the back of the Reichstag in any way. I could discuss budget matters with the Reichstag members only in the so-called Budget Committee, where I sat next to the Reich Defense Minister and made technical explanations to his statements.
DR. SIEMERS: From 1928 on, that is from your time on, there were no longer any secret budgets within the construction program of the Navy without the approval of the Reich Government?
RAEDER: Without the approval of the Reich Government and, above all, of the Reich Defense Minister who allotted the money to us exactly as the other budgets were allotted.
DR. SIEMERS: May I ask the Tribunal in this connection to look at Document Exhibit Number Raeder-3 which has already been submitted, “Constitution of the German Reich,” Document Book 1, Page 10, Article 50; it is brief and reads:
“In order to be valid, all decrees and orders issued by the Reich President, including those pertaining to the Armed Forces, must be countersigned by the Reich Chancellor or the competent Reich Minister. By the act of countersigning, responsibility is accepted by the Reich Chancellor.”
That is the constitutional principle which the Reich Government at that time—Stresemann, Müller, Severing—insisted upon in October 1928.
An important part of the building up of the Navy consisted in renewing the old capital ships and cruisers from the last war. In this connection, I take the liberty of submitting to the Tribunal Exhibit Number Raeder-7, Document Book 1, Page 23. This document deals with the so-called ship replacement construction plan. This ship replacement construction plan was, as Page 24 of the document book shows, Paragraph 2, Figure 2, submitted by a resolution of the Reichstag. I should like to refer you to Page 24, Figure 3, of the document which shows that this ship replacement construction plan covered three armored ships, and it adds that the construction might last until 1938.
May it please the Tribunal, this figure is important. The Prosecution desired to construe the chance fact that in 1933 a construction plan was drawn up to extend until 1938, to mean that there were aggressive intentions.
This ship replacement construction plan of the year 1930 had the same goal in 1938 and, as the Prosecution will admit, can have nothing to do with a war of aggression.
The plan was submitted then, Witness, through the Reich Government and you did only the preparatory work?
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Is this only true of the ship replacement plan for 1930, or was it always handled in the same way in subsequent years?
RAEDER: The plan as submitted was approved in principle by the Reichstag. Each individual ship, however, had to be approved again in the budget plan of the year in which the construction was to begin. The whole construction program was thus always in close agreement with the Reich Government and the Reichstag.
DR. SIEMERS: In connection with this ship replacement program within the framework of the documentary evidence, I should like to refer to two points which will greatly shorten the questioning of the witness.
For the time being I do not want to quote from Page 26. I ask you to take judicial notice of the rest of the contents, and wish merely to point out that this refers to the great age of all capital ships, and their replacement which this necessitated.
On Page 27 of the document book it expressly mentions that the Reichstag in its 89th session of 18 June 1929 asked the Reich Government for an extension of the period for the construction program. The general opinion at that time was, as the ship replacement program shows, set out in the Frankfurter Zeitung of 15 August 1928, where the Frankfurter Zeitung points out that an armored cruiser gains its full value only when it forms part of a squadron. The Frankfurter Zeitung was, as is well known, the best German newspaper; and it was banned only in 1943 during the war by the National Socialist dictatorship which was growing ever stronger.
I should like to refer to Page 29 and quote one sentence:
“The building of battleships will be extended as far as possible, so as to keep the naval yards at Wilhelmshaven occupied continuously. The ideal time of construction is about three years; and it is then explained that, working on the principle of giving as long employment as possible, the building time is prolonged as much as possible.”
I believe this shows there was no aggressive intention, since otherwise the building program would have been speeded up.
Then I ask you to take judicial notice of Page 30, the construction cost of an armored ship having a tonnage of 10,000 tons, where it mentions that it was about 75 million marks. This figure is important to me as evidence in view of the further course of the testimony, where the cost of the breaches of the Versailles Treaty will be shown.
Finally may I quote from Page 30 a few lines which give the principle for the employment of the Wehrmacht. I quote:
“Since carrying out the disarmament program, which so far the German Republic alone among all the Great Powers has effected, for the Wehrmacht, which serves to protect the borders and peace, the following eventualities for the taking up of arms comes into consideration: (a) defense against the stealing of territories, (b) defense of neutrality in conflicts among third parties.”
[Turning to the defendant.] I should like to refer to the individual breaches of the Treaty of which the Prosecution has accused you. In this connection, I submit Exhibit Raeder-1, in Document Book 1, Page 1, and I refer to Page 3, Article 191. It concerns the accusation that Germany, contrary to the Versailles Treaty, constructed submarines. Article 191 reads, and I quote, “The construction and acquisition of all submersible craft, even for commercial purposes, is forbidden to Germany.”
I will soon put a question to you in regard to the established fact that the Navy was interested in a firm which dealt with the designing of submarines in Holland and in a general construction program for ships and submarines, which was being carried out in Holland; but in order to save time, it will be simpler if I read from the Lohmann affidavit which I submit as Exhibit Raeder-2, in Document Book 1, Page 4. I quote a short paragraph under 1:
“According to the Treaty of Versailles, the German Reich was neither to build nor to acquire U-boats. When in July, 1922, the firm N. V. Ingenieurskantoor Voor Scheepsbouw was established in the Hague, the Navy acquired an interest in it in order to keep informed on modern U-boat construction. The intention was to use the experience gained thereby for the German Navy, when later on the conditions of the Treaty of Versailles would be annulled by negotiations and Germany would be again permitted to build U-boats. Moreover, the Navy wanted, for the same purpose, to train a small nucleus of skilled personnel. The Dutch firm was strictly a designing bureau.”
May it please the Tribunal, as a precaution I should like to point out in this passage that there is a translation mistake in the English copy. The word “Konstruktion” has been translated “construction,” and construction means “building” in German. It was not a construction bureau. As far as I know, “Konstruktion” must be translated “design.” Since in view of Article 191 this point is important, I want to correct this.
I quote further:
“The first German U-boat was commissioned 29 June 1935. The procuring of parts to build U-boats had started correspondingly earlier.”
I wish to remind you that, when the first submarine was commissioned, the Anglo-German Naval Agreement, according to which submarine construction was permitted, was already in existence. I will ask if this statement of Admiral Lohmann is correct.
RAEDER: Yes. It entirely corresponds with the facts.
DR. SIEMERS: Then I come to Prosecution Document C-141, Exhibit USA-47. This is in the Raeder Document Book Number 10, on Page 22, in the compilation of the British Delegation. This is your letter of 10 February 1932 in regard to torpedo armament of the S-boats, the speed boats.
THE PRESIDENT: Is this in Document Book 10a or 10?
DR. SIEMERS: Document Book 10. The old document book.
THE PRESIDENT: I’ve got my pages wrongly marked somehow. It is all right.
DR. SIEMERS: Please excuse me. That is how the page numbers were given to me.
THE PRESIDENT: It is correct in the other members’ books.
DR. SIEMERS: The torpedo armament of speed boats was not expressly permitted in the Versailles Treaty and for that reason you are accused in this connection. Did this involve only the five speed boats mentioned in this document?
RAEDER: Yes. There were five boats which we had ordered for use as patrol boats in the shipbuilding replacement program and which in themselves had no armament.
DR. SIEMERS: How big were these boats?
RAEDER: Certainly not bigger than 40 tons, probably considerably smaller.
DR. SIEMERS: Were more boats of this type built during the Versailles Treaty?
RAEDER: I cannot say with certainty. In any case, we had no armed boats in addition.
DR. SIEMERS: Yes, excuse me, that is what I mean—more armed boats.
RAEDER: No. We could build 12 plus 4, which makes 16 torpedo boats of 200 tons. A torpedo boat of 200 tons could not be produced in a practical manner at that time because of the question of the motors and the question of seaworthiness. For that reason we did not build these torpedo boats for the time being but kept in service a number of quite old torpedo boats, built at the beginning of the century, in order to be able to train crews with them. We could no longer use these boats for fighting. But so that—as long as we could not replace these boats—we might have a few boats capable of action, however small, which could be of use in blocking the Baltic, I ordered that these patrol boats should be equipped to take torpedo tubes on board.
However, so that in 1932 we should not make our situation worse by open breaches of the Treaty, when we hoped that at the Disarmament Conference we might make some progress, I had one boat at a time armed in order to fit and test the armament; and I then had the armament dismounted again so that there was always only one boat available with armament at any one time. We planned to put the torpedo tubes on board the speed boats only if the political situation, that is, the situation after the Disarmament Conference, would permit it. That is what I say in Number 3 in the concluding sentence.
DR. SIEMERS: I can take it then that we were allowed to build 16 torpedo boats making 3,200 tons in all?
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: And instead we built only five speed boats totalling 200 tons?
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Concerning the accusation made by the Prosecution that you did not count the speed boats against the torpedo boats you actually did not intend to keep anything secret; but you wanted to discuss it with the Control Commission when the time came?
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Now I come to the most extensive document in regard to breaches which the Prosecution submitted, Document C-32, USA-50. The document is in Document Book 10a, Page 8; in the new document book of the British Delegation.
In this list all breaches are included under date 9 September 1933. The Prosecution justly points out that this compilation is very thorough; and the Prosecution presented it just as thoroughly, although, as I believe I can prove, they are, in the last analysis, small matters. I am compelled to ask the witness to answer these points in detail since they were brought up in detail. Breach Number 1 concerns the exceeding of the permitted number of mines. In Column 2 it states that according to the Versailles Treaty, that is, by the Commission, 1,665 mines were permitted; but we owned 3,675 mines. That is 2,000 too many. Will you please tell the Court the significance of this breach; it doubtlessly was a breach.
RAEDER: I should like to say in advance that this list was prepared for our Navy representative at the Disarmament Conference, so that if these things should be mentioned, he could give them an explanation. That is why it was so explicit, even though most of the things it contains are of minor importance. I should like to add to what I said previously, in regard to the danger of attacks by Poland, that in view of the political situation at that time we always feared that the Poles, if they should undertake an invasion of our country, might receive certain support from the sea by France, inasmuch as French ships, which at that time often visited the Polish port of Gdynia, could attack our coast through the Baltic entrances, the Belt, and the Sound. For this reason the defense of the Baltic entrances by mines played an important role. Thus, we undertook this breach of the Treaty in order to be able to close at least the Baltic entrances at the narrow points, which was of course possible only for a certain time. With these mines only a stretch of 27 nautical miles could have been closed. Thus, we would have been able to close a part of Danzig Bay on which Gdynia was situated, or a part of the Belt, by laying several rows of mines. This was the only method which could be effective for any length of time. This was purely a question of defense, but still they exceeded the number of mines permitted from the war supplies still available.
DR. SIEMERS: Just now in the calculation of the 27 nautical miles you included the total number which Germany had at that time.
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Not just the number which exceeded that which was permitted?
RAEDER: No, the total.
DR. SIEMERS: So that the number in excess is only half this number?
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: And then I should like to have an approximate comparison. I was told, by way of comparison, that the British in the first World War laid about 400,000 to 500,000 mines in the North Sea. Do you recall if this number is approximately right?
RAEDER: Approximately it may be right. I cannot say exactly from memory.
DR. SIEMERS: I believe the approximation suffices to give a picture of the relative values.
A second small question now. Is it true that for mining English ports Reich Marshal Göring’s Luftwaffe in one action alone used 30,000 to 50,000 mines? Do you know of that?
RAEDER: I have heard so.
DR. SIEMERS: Then there is a second point. I quote, “Continuous storing of guns from the North Sea area for Baltic artillery batteries.”
This involves 96 guns, only 6 of which are of large caliber, the others of smaller caliber. May I ask you to explain this breach of the Treaty?
RAEDER: This is quite a small breach. We were allowed a comparatively large number of guns on the North Sea coast. On the other hand, according to plans the Baltic coast was comparatively bare of guns, since they wanted to retain free entry to the Baltic, whereas we had the greatest interest in closing the Baltic against attacks. For this reason we stored the gun barrels, which belonged in the North Sea but which had been brought to the Baltic for repairs, in sheds in the Baltic area for a long time in order to be able to mount these guns on the Baltic coast in case of attack. The North Sea coast had many guns; and because of the shallowness, it was much easier to defend than the Baltic coast. That was the breach.
DR. SIEMERS: In practice it only involved moving them from the North Sea to the Baltic coast. That is, not mounting them, but merely storing them.
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Then under Figure 3, another charge, “non-scrapping of guns.” A total of 99 guns is mentioned of which the ten largest, of 28 centimeters, were actually scrapped. Please comment on this.
RAEDER: When we acquired new guns, as for example, for the battleship Deutschland, six 28-centimeter guns were constructed, or for the Deutschland and the cruisers, forty-eight 15-centimeter guns, we had to scrap a corresponding number of old guns. Ten of this number were actually scrapped. All the guns were turned over to the Army for scrapping and we received a receipt for them, saying that the guns had been scrapped. We learned, however, that the Army in fact had not scrapped the guns, but with the exception of the ten 28-centimeter guns, it intended to use them for arming the fortifications to be built in case of attack, since the Army had no such guns at all.
DR. SIEMERS: I should like to make the time clear. This must have been a breach of the Treaty which occurred long before the time you took office as Chief of the Navy Command.
RAEDER: This happened between 1919 and 1925 for the most part. In any case I had nothing to do with these matters.
DR. SIEMERS: Number 4 is very simple: “Deviation from the places settled by the Entente for the disposition of coastal batteries.”
RAEDER: Previously, up to the time of the World War, especially the heavy batteries and the medium-sized batteries were placed very close to each other, or rather in the batteries the guns were placed very close to each other. According to our experience in the World War the heavy and medium-sized guns within the batteries were placed further apart, so that a single hit would not destroy several guns at once. For this reason we re-arranged these heavy and medium batteries and moved the guns a little further apart. For that reason they were no longer exactly in the places where they had been at the time of the Treaty. Otherwise nothing was changed.
DR. SIEMERS: Would not these things have been approved by the Control Commission because they were purely technical?
RAEDER: I cannot say, I never took part in these negotiations.
DR. SIEMERS: Number 5 concerns the laying of gun platforms for artillery batteries and the storing of A. A. ammunition. In Column 2 there is again the question of changing to a different place than that allowed by the Entente. Does the same thing apply here as to Number 4?
RAEDER: No, not completely. We wanted to put the A. A. batteries where they were particularly useful and could be fully utilized, whereas the Commission did not want to have them at these places. As a result we left the A. A. batteries where they were; but at other points we prepared so-called gun platforms, which were improvised wooden platforms, so that in case of attack from any enemy we could set up the A. A. guns in order to use them most effectively. In the same way...
DR. SIEMERS: This is only a question then of platforms for an A. A. battery, only the foundations for a defense?
RAEDER: Yes, only foundations.
DR. SIEMERS: Then comes Number 6: “Laying gun platforms in the Kiel area.”
RAEDER: The Kiel area was especially bared of guns, because the entrance through the Belt to Kiel was to be as little armed and as open as possible. For this reason the setting up of guns in the Kiel area was especially forbidden; and in order to be able to set up some guns in a hurry, in case of necessity, gun platforms were prepared there also.
DR. SIEMERS: The next point the Prosecution gives comes under Number 7: “Exceeding the caliber permitted for coastal batteries.” “Coastal batteries” shows that it is for defense, but nevertheless it was brought up as an accusation.
RAEDER: Yes. It says here that instead of six 15-centimeter, three 17-centimeter guns were built. Of course, it is a deviation, insofar as the guns were to stay there; but it is open to doubt whether these six 15-centimeter guns might not have been better along the coast than the three 17-centimeter guns.
DR. SIEMERS: I see, you mean that they are actually less than the number permitted?
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Instead of five 15-centimeter there were only three 17-centimeter?
RAEDER: Instead of six.
DR. SIEMERS: Yes, instead of six only three, and the caliber was 2 centimeter larger.
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Then comes Number 8, the arming of M-boats. M-boats are mine sweepers.
RAEDER: We had the old mine sweepers which in case of attack on the Baltic were to serve the double purpose of finding the mines and of guarding the mine barrage which we wanted to lay in the exits of the Belt in order to close the Baltic, and of defending it against light enemy forces. For this reason we gave each one a 10.5-centimeter gun and one machine gun C-30.
DR. SIEMERS: Actually a minimum armament?
RAEDER: Yes, quite a minimum armament.
DR. SIEMERS: Number 9 can be quickly settled, I believe: “Arming of six S-boats and eight R-boats.”
The six S-boats are those which were discussed in the Document C-141?
RAEDER: Yes, it says here boats armed with torpedoes.
DR. SIEMERS: Number 10: “Setting up practice A. A. batteries.” Is that a breach of the Treaty?
RAEDER: Yes, it was, after all, an A. A. battery. It was only because near the garrisons where there were barracks with our men we wanted an opportunity to practice A. A. firing exercise. That is why we set up these batteries near the barracks. There was no intention of using them in this place for defense. It was only a matter of expediency for training.
DR. SIEMERS: Then comes Number 11.
RAEDER: The individual cases are gradually becoming more ridiculous. I consider it a waste of time.
DR. SIEMERS: I am sorry, Admiral, that I must put you to this trouble; but I believe it is necessary, since the Prosecution read almost all these items into the record and wanted to put a construction on them which puts you at a disadvantage.
RAEDER: Then there is the “Salute Battery Friedrichsort.”
Friedrichsort is the entrance to Kiel where foreign ships salute when they enter, and the salute must be returned. Two 7.7-centimeter field guns which had been rendered unserviceable had been approved for this purpose. With these guns, sharp-shooting was not possible; it was since there was a battery foundation already available there, that instead of these two 7.7-centimeter guns we should set up four 8.8-centimeter A. A. guns which were ready for full use. But this too was long before the time when I was Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.
[The Tribunal adjourned until 16 May 1946, at 1000 hours.]
TRANSCRIBER NOTES
Punctuation and spelling have been maintained except where obvious printer errors have occurred such as missing periods or commas for periods. English and American spellings occur throughout the document; however, American spellings are the rule, hence, “Defense” versus “Defence”. Unlike Blue Series volumes I and II, this volume includes French, German, Polish and Russian names and terms with diacriticals: hence Führer, Göring, etc. throughout.
Although some sentences may appear to have incorrect spellings or verb tenses, the original text has been maintained as it represents what the tribunal read into the record and reflects the actual translations between the German, English, French, and, most specifically with this volume, Russian documents presented in the trial.
An attempt has been made to produce this eBook in a format as close as possible to the original document presentation and layout.
[*] Page 155 in the text has a date correction where the Reich Defense Law of 4 September 1939 has been corrected to 4 September 1938.
“Under the Reich Defense Law of 4 September 1938 I have the direction for the economic preparations for the Reich defense, except the armament industry.”
[The end of Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal Vol. 13, by Various.]