Afternoon Session
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, as the last point in my questions dealing with Russia, I should like to show you the document submitted by the Soviet Prosecution, Document USSR-113. This document is a communication from the Naval Operations Staff of 29 September 1941 to Group North, that is, Generaladmiral Carls. Under II it states as to the result of a conversation between Admiral Fricke and Hitler: “The Führer is determined to make the city of St. Petersburg disappear from the face of the earth.” Raeder has been accused of not having done anything to oppose such a monstrous intention and has been accused because the Naval Operations Staff passed on this communication. I ask you, Admiral, did you know of this communication in 1941?
[Turning to the President.] I beg your pardon, Mr. President, I should like to remark that at this moment, I am sorry to say, I have no photostatic copy of this document. I tried to procure it. I have this very moment received it, and I should like to submit the photostatic copy at this point, instead of the written copy.
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: This seems to be the original which I have before me?
DR. SIEMERS: No, Admiral, it is a copy, an exact copy of the photostatic copy with all paragraphs and names, made for my own special use.
Were you acquainted with this piece of writing in 1941?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I did not know it in 1941, it is submitted to me at this moment for the first time.
DR. SIEMERS: Do you believe that Admiral Raeder saw this communication before it was sent off, even though you yourself had not seen it?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: That would have been a miracle. Communications which were submitted to Admiral Raeder all went through my hands. They always had the notation, either “the Commander-in-Chief has taken due note,” and were initialed by me personally in order to certify this notation, or “this order or this directive is to be submitted to the Commander-in-Chief,” and in this case too my initials were affixed. This order and this copy which you have just shown to me I have never seen before; I am not acquainted with it; and I consider it impossible that Admiral Raeder should have seen it, because on 29 September 1941 I was in good health and exercising my duties in Berlin.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, what do you know about this question of Leningrad and the Navy?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I recall that at the so-called daily discussions regarding the general situation one of the officers of the Naval Operations Staff reported on the intentions of the Army regarding the future of Leningrad—not Petersburg. Whereupon Raeder expressed the desire that it be kept in mind during the operations that Leningrad should, under all circumstances, fall intact into our hands, for he needed shipyards and adjoining territory for naval construction; and he wished that the Army be informed of the urgency of this desire, because in view of the ever-increasing danger of air attacks, we intended to shift part of our shipyard facilities to the East.
At that time we had already begun, if I remember correctly, to move installations from Emden to the East and wanted, furthermore, as Raeder wished, to evacuate Wilhelmshaven subsequently and move the installations there as far to the East as possible. He emphasized expressly that the city should also be left as undamaged as possible because otherwise there would be no place for the workers to live. This is all I can truthfully tell you about the case of Leningrad.
DR. SIEMERS: Do you know that this wish of Raeder’s was rejected by Hitler because he said it was not possible?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, I do not recall that this case was taken up again. For the operations in the North soon came to a standstill, I believe.
DR. SIEMERS: Did other high officers tell you anything at all about this document?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, I never heard anything about this document, nor did I see any reason to discuss it with anyone.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, if it is agreeable to the Tribunal, I should like to submit a document which was granted me, Exhibit Raeder-111, because of its connection with this problem. It is to be found in my Document Book 6, Page 435. It is an affidavit by Rear Admiral Hans Bütow, dated 21 March 1946. I should like to read this document since it is very brief.
THE PRESIDENT: What page is this?
DR. SIEMERS: Page 435 in Document Book 6, Exhibit Number Raeder-111. It reads as follows:
“During the period from 20 June 1941 to 20 October 1941, namely, the period to which Document USSR-113, (1), UK-45, refers, I was stationed in Finland as Naval Commander. I was under Generaladmiral Carls, the Commander-in-Chief of Group North. I declare that the document in question, USSR-113, (1), UK-45, a communication of 29 September 1941 sent by the Naval Operations Staff to Group North, and its contents have never come to my knowledge, as it doubtless would have if Generaladmiral Carls had passed on the letter to the offices subordinate to him. As far as I know, no one else in my command received this communication.
“I myself first obtained knowledge of this order of Hitler’s in November 1945 on the occasion of a conversation with Dr. Siemers, the defense counsel for Admiral Raeder.
“Other officers, especially other naval commanders, have never spoken to me about this order. It is thus clear that the other commanders likewise had no knowledge of this order.”
Then there is the certification and the signature of the senior naval judge before whom this affidavit was made.
Admiral, then I should like to turn to a new topic, the alleged war of aggression which Raeder is supposed to have planned against America. Did Raeder at any time try to instigate Japan to a war against America?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, never. We never had any military discussions with Japan at all before her entry into the war. Quite on the contrary, he warned Hitler against war with America in view of England’s naval superiority and her co-operation with America.
DR. SIEMERS: For what reasons did you, Raeder, and the High Command especially, warn Hitler?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: First of all, for the reasons which I outlined before, reasons of over-all strategy which motivated Raeder during the entire course of the war. Raeder considered the enemy on the sea primarily, and not on land. If the largest sea power in the world were added to England, which was already superior, then the war would have taken on unbearable proportions for us.
Besides, through the reports of our naval attaché in Washington, Vice Admiral Witthöft, Raeder was very well informed about the tremendous potential at the disposal of the United States.
I might also say with reference to the conversion of the normal economy into a war economy, that the tremendous outlay of shipyards and installations, as Witthöft stated a few months before the war, permitted the construction of a million tons of shipping each month. These figures were very eloquent and were naturally at the same time a terrible warning to us not to underestimate the armament potential of the United States.
DR. SIEMERS: The Prosecution believes it must draw a contrary conclusion from the fact that Raeder on 18 March 1941, according to the War Diary, proposed that Japan should attack Singapore.
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: In my opinion, that was an absolutely correct measure and a correct proposal, which was in line with Raeder’s reasoning. He was interested in dealing blows to England’s important strategic centers. That he tried to ease our situation is understandable and self-evident. But at no time did he propose that Japan should enter into a war against America, but rather against England.
DR. SIEMERS: Were there any discussions about these strategic questions at that time between you and Raeder on the one hand and Japanese military authorities on the other?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, I have already stated that before Japan’s entry into the war no military discussions with Japan had ever taken place. The Japanese attitude was very reserved.
DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder ever discuss the fact that Japan should attack Pearl Harbor?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No. We heard about this for the first time over the radio.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, during the time of your activity in the High Command of the Navy or during your activity as a commanding admiral at Trondheim did you have any knowledge about the treatment of Allied prisoners of war by the German Navy?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I might reply that I know of no case in which Allied prisoners of war, as long as they were under the control of the Navy, were treated other than properly and chivalrously. I could refer to the testimony given by the English commander of the midget U-boat, which attacked the Tirpitz in the Alta Fjord, who after his return to England from imprisonment, gave a press interview on the occasion of his being awarded the Victoria Cross. In this interview he mentioned the particularly chivalrous and correct treatment he had received at the hands of the commander of the Tirpitz.
From my own command in Norway I could mention a case in which members of the Norwegian resistance movement dressed in civilian clothing were treated just as chivalrously and correctly. I had to investigate these cases in the presence of British authorities, and the correctness of the treatment became evident.
DR. SIEMERS: When did you have to investigate this at the order of the British Military Government?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: After the capitulation.
DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, not the Military Government, but the British Navy.
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: The British Navy at Trondheim, while I was a commanding admiral.
DR. SIEMERS: And the cases which were investigated there, first by you and then by the competent British admiral, were not contested?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Were not contested. The naval officer handed them over to me for safekeeping, and I had to present the findings of the courts of inquiry in writing.
DR. SIEMERS: And the result...
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: The result was good, proper, and occasioned no protests.
DR. SIEMERS: And the result was presented to the competent British officer?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, it was on his very order that I had to do it.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, the case of the Athenia has been dealt with here in detail and is known to the Tribunal. Therefore, in order to save time, I should like merely to touch this case in passing. I should like you to tell me: Did the High Command know, did you and Raeder know, at the beginning of September 1939 that the Athenia had been sunk by a German U-boat?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No. The Commander of U-boats reported on the 3d that the Athenia could not have been sunk by a German U-boat since, if I remember correctly, the nearest boat was about 70 nautical miles away.
DR. SIEMERS: When did you learn that a German U-boat had sunk the Athenia?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I believe 2 or 3 weeks afterwards, after this U-boat returned.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I should like to refer to a document, according to which the date was 27 September.
[Turning to the witness.] Do you know that a declaration had been made by State Secretary Von Weizsäcker on 3, 4, or 5 September to the effect that it was not a German U-boat? When it was established that it actually had been a German U-boat, what did Raeder do about it?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: The assumption that it had not been a German U-boat was at first justified and State Secretary Von Weizsäcker therefore acted in the best of faith, as did we. After this regrettable mistake became known, Raeder reported this fact to Hitler. Hitler then gave the order that he did not want the statement which had been made by the Foreign Office denied. He ordered that the participants, that is those who knew, should give their oath to remain silent until, I believe, the end of the war.
DR. SIEMERS: Did you give your oath of silence?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I personally did not give my oath of silence, and neither did Admiral Raeder. In the High Command we were the only ones, I believe, with the exception of Admiral Fricke who had knowledge of that, and we should probably have taken the oath.
DR. SIEMERS: At Hitler’s order you were obliged to administer an oath to the others who knew about this?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. I am of the opinion that it was the crew of the U-boat, insofar as they knew about this mistake.
DR. SIEMERS: The Prosecution accuses Admiral Raeder of not having gone to Freiherr Von Weizsäcker to tell him that it actually was a German U-boat and of not having said to the American naval attaché, “I am sorry; it was a German U-boat after all.”
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Such thoughts occurred to us as well, but we thought that any discrepancies which might arise and lead to political ill-humor in America were to be avoided as much as possible. Stirring up this case once more would have greatly aroused public feeling. I remember, for instance, the Lusitania case during the first World War. To have stirred up this case again after a few weeks and to arouse public opinion, and then to force entry into the war would have had little sense.
DR. SIEMERS: And that was the train of thought which caused Hitler to issue this decree?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: It was the train of thought which we also shared.
DR. SIEMERS: You said it was not to be stirred up again but regrettably, as you know, this case was stirred up again. On 23 October 1939 in the Völkischer Beobachter a very unfortunate article appeared with the heading “Churchill Sinks the Athenia.” Do you remember that article?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, of course. That article was published without Raeder’s knowledge and without the knowledge or complicity of the Navy. Even today I do not know yet who the author of the article was. It originated in the Propaganda Ministry, and Raeder and the rest of us in the High Command of the Navy were most indignant, not so much because this topic was being stirred up again, but rather because of the tenor of the article for whether deliberately or unintentionally—we did not know which it was—there was a misrepresentation.
We were obliged to keep silence. To what extent the Propaganda Ministry had been informed about this matter by Hitler, we did not know. We also had no opportunity to speak with the Propaganda Ministry about this case and we were completely surprised when this article appeared several weeks later in the Völkischer Beobachter. We were therefore deeply indignant, especially Raeder, because it was fundamentally against his principles that leading foreign statesmen be attacked in a caustic manner; and, in addition, the facts were completely distorted. And besides—this may also be important—this involved Raeder’s opponent whom Raeder did not in the least wish to disparage before the German public, for Raeder took him only too seriously; and this was, I believe, no other than Churchill.
DR. SIEMERS: Now, one last question: Did the Propaganda Ministry call you or Raeder up before this article appeared?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, no.
DR. SIEMERS: Then I should like to turn to the last question of my examination. This is the last point.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, that is about the sixth final question you have asked.
DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, Mr. President, the translation must have been wrong. The previous question was the final question on the Athenia problem. Now, this is actually the final question which I wish to put.
[Turning to the witness.] The Prosecution accuses Admiral Raeder of not supporting Generaloberst Freiherr Von Fritsch after the latter had been exonerated and acquitted in court and accuses Raeder of not having used his influence to reinstate Fritsch in office and restore his dignity. Is that correct?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, that is not correct. Raeder gave me all the files of the legal proceedings against Generaloberst Von Fritsch sometime in the beginning of 1939 to be kept in the safe. At that time he told me how the course of the proceedings had impressed him and also of the fact that he had made Generaloberst Von Fritsch the offer of a complete reinstatement, going so far as to have him reinstated in his previous office. Von Fritsch thanked him for that and told him personally that he would never assume his former office again, that he would not even consider returning after what had happened, for which reason he was requesting Raeder not to make any efforts in this direction.
Besides, Fritsch and Raeder were on good personal terms—to say that they were friends is going perhaps too far, but I have often seen Fritsch at Raeder’s house even after his dismissal.
DR. SIEMERS: Thank you, Admiral.
Mr. President, I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of the defendants’ counsel want to ask any questions?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral Schulte-Mönting, you just spoke about the correct treatment of prisoners in connection with a U-boat attack on the Tirpitz. Do you mean by that the attack in November 1943 in the Alta Fjord?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, that is the one I mean.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was it a two-man U-boat?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Whether it was a two-man or three-man U-boat, I do not know, but it was a midget U-boat. Several U-boats attacked simultaneously. Some of them were sunk, and the commander who successfully, I believe, placed his magnetic mine was taken prisoner.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: And this commander was treated according to the Geneva convention?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Absolutely.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine?
MAJOR JONES: Witness, I want to ask you first about the Athenia episode. I take it you agree that the article in the Völkischer Beobachter was thoroughly dishonorable, lying, and discreditable.
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I heard nothing at all in German.
MAJOR JONES: I will repeat my question. With regard to the Athenia—do you hear me now?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes.
MAJOR JONES: With regard to the Völkischer Beobachter article on the Athenia, do you agree that it was a thoroughly dishonorable publication?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, I agree that it was a dishonorable publication, untrue and dishonorable.
MAJOR JONES: Perhaps if you keep your headphones on—I have a number of questions to ask you, I am afraid—it might be more convenient for the work we have to do.
And you say that the Defendant Raeder thought it was dishonorable?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, he did as well.
MAJOR JONES: What action did he take to manifest his displeasure?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: In this case he valued the interests of the State more than a newspaper article. The interests of the State required that in any event all complications with the United States were to be avoided.
MAJOR JONES: That appears to be a characteristic on the part of Raeder that runs throughout the history from 1928 to 1943, that throughout he put what he thought were the interests of the Nazi State before conditions of morality, honor, and public decency, is that not so?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: That I do not believe. I believe that in this he acted consistently as a good patriot would act.
MAJOR JONES: You see, with regard to the invasion of Russia, for example, you said to the Tribunal that on both moral and strategic grounds, Raeder was against the invasion of Russia. Why did he not resign?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: By way of reply I must mention first Hitler’s answer to Raeder’s statements against a war with Russia. This answer was to the effect that he saw no possibility of avoiding a conflict for the following reasons:
First, because of the personal impression which he, Hitler, had received from Molotov’s visit, which had taken place in the meantime. By “in the meantime” I mean between the directive and the carrying through of the directive.
Secondly, the fact that allegedly the economic negotiations had not only been dragged out by the Russians but, as Hitler expressed it, had been conducted with blackmail methods.
Thirdly, as he had been informed by the German General Staff. Russian troop deployment had taken on such threatening proportions that he, Hitler, could not wait for the first blow from the other side because of the air threat to Brandenburg and the capital and to the Silesian industry. Raeder then, of course, had to realize that he could not refute these arguments or prove the opposite.
MAJOR JONES: You are not suggesting that you thought that the war between Germany and Russia was a defensive war so far as Germany was concerned, are you?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, we were of the opinion that the deployment of troops on both sides had reached such an extreme point that it would not take long for the storm to burst, and that from the military point of view anyone who sees that a conflict is inevitable, naturally likes to have the advantages which result from dealing the first blow.
MAJOR JONES: The invasion of Russia was a brutal aggression on the part of Nazi Germany, you admit that now, do you not?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, I do admit that.
MAJOR JONES: I want you to turn your mind for a moment, if you will, to Document L-79, which is in the British Document Book 10, Page 74. Those are the minutes of the Hitler conference on 23 May 1939 which you discussed in your evidence-in-chief this morning. I take it that you have read those minutes, Witness?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: May I look at them now? I have never seen these minutes before. If I were to be asked about them, I would first have to read them in toto.
MAJOR JONES: Well, you need not trouble to do that, Witness. You gave evidence this morning as to Raeder’s discussion with you about this conference. Did Raeder tell you that Hitler had said on 23 May 1939, for instance:
“There is no question of sparing Poland, and we are left with the decision to attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity. We cannot expect a repetition of the Czechoslovakian affair. There will be war.”
Then further, Page 76 of the report:
“The Führer doubts the possibility of a peaceful settlement with England. We must prepare ourselves for the conflict... England is therefore our enemy, and the conflict with England will be a life and death struggle.”
And then the next paragraph but one:
“The Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied by armed force. Declarations of neutrality must be ignored.”
Now, I am suggesting to you that those statements of Hitler’s represented Hitler’s considered policy, and that that policy was in fact carried out in the field of action. Is that not so?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: First of all, I must correct a mistake. I thought that you had shown me a record on Russia and not the one on Poland. I saw it in different writing, and I thought it was another record. If it is the same record which I mentioned this morning, then I must state again that Raeder did not agree with the belligerent wording of these minutes as written down by Schmundt.
MAJOR JONES: Just one moment, Witness, if you please. I have read out certain extracts from that document, which I take it that you heard interpreted. Do you agree with me that those extracts represented Hitler’s considered policy at the time and that that policy was in fact carried out in the field of action?
If you keep your headphones on—I know it is difficult. Just move them back if you wish to talk. Now, see if you can answer my question.
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I should like to remark in this connection that Hitler in his speeches pursued a certain purpose. In preparations for war he saw a means of political pressure, and in the phrase “war of nerves” (which was not used in Germany only, but went everywhere through the ether far beyond Europe’s boundaries) he tried to find a means of preventing war as well as a means of exerting pressure. This document itself contains contradictions which lead to the conclusion that he himself could not seriously have thought that a war would develop. I can prove this by saying, for example, that he states that the General Staff or the general staffs are not to concern themselves with this question; but toward the end he says that all the branches of the Wehrmacht must get together to study the problem. He says that a war with Poland must in no event result in war with England; politics must see to that. But in the next paragraph one reads: “But if a war actually does arise, I shall deal short sharp blows for a quick decision.” In the next paragraph it says again, “But I need 10 to 15 years to prepare,” and in the concluding paragraph it says: “The construction program of the Navy will in no wise be changed.”
If, therefore, Hitler at that time had really been serious in his speech, that is, that an armed conflict with Poland would result shortly, then he would not have exclaimed first that we would have time until 1943 and, secondly, that there were to be no changes as far as the Navy was concerned. Rather he would have said to Raeder, privately at least: “In all haste prepare a strong U-boat program because I do not know what course events will take.”
MAJOR JONES: But it is a fact that at about this time, the Fall Weiss operation was being prepared to the very last detail, was it not? That is the operation against Poland.
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: The operation was prepared to such a stage that when it was canceled at the last minute we thought that we would not be able to reach our forces at sea by wireless. We considered this an extreme policy of exerting pressure in the form of a war of nerves. Since at the last minute everything was canceled we believed without doubt that it was only a means of pressure and not an entry into war. Not until we heard the cannons were we convinced that the war was no longer to be prevented. I personally believe...
MAJOR JONES: If you would shorten your answers as best you can, it would be very convenient.
I want to go from Poland to Norway. The first conference of the Defendant Raeder with regard to Norway took place on 10 October, you have told us. I want you to hear the record of that conference, which is found in Admiral Assmann’s headline diary. It is dated 10 October 1939:
“The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy states conquering the Belgian coast no advantage for U-boat warfare; refers to value of Norwegian bases.”
I suggest to you that the interests of the German Navy in Norway from the point of view of requiring submarine bases was manifesting itself at that time; is that not so?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: May I look at this document first? It is unknown to me.
MAJOR JONES: You shall see the original diary, if you want to reassure yourself that I am reading it correctly.
[The document was handed to the witness.]
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: In this sentence, I do not see any belligerent intentions. It says expressly that he attaches importance to the winning of Norwegian bases.
MAJOR JONES: That is all I am putting to you at the moment. And do you know that on 3 October the Defendant Raeder was sending out a questionnaire upon the possibility of extending the operational base to the north, and upon the bases that it would be desirable for German power to acquire?
I am referring to Document C-122, My Lord. The document C-122 is in Document Book 10a at Page 91.
If you will look at that document, Witness, you will see in the second sentence:
“It must be ascertained whether it is possible to gain bases in Norway with the combined pressure of Russia and Germany, with the aim of improving fundamentally our strategic and operational position. The following questions are to be examined...”
And then there follow these questions:
“What places in Norway can be considered as bases?
“Can bases be gained by military force against Norway’s will, if it is impossible to achieve this without fighting?
“What are the possibilities of defense after the occupation?
“Will the harbors have to be developed completely as bases, or do they possibly have decisive advantages simply as supply centers? (The Commander of U-boats considers such harbors extremely useful as equipment and supply bases for Atlantic U-boats on temporary stops.)”
And then finally:
“What decisive advantages would there be for the conduct of the war at sea in gaining a base in North Denmark, for instance, Skagen?”
Now, I suggest to you that those documents are the clue to the German invasion of Norway. Do you not agree with that?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, I do not see any aggressive intentions in these purely operational plans and considerations when thinking of what bases might come into consideration for the conduct of the war. This morning I said that, to the best of my knowledge, Generaladmiral Carls as early as September sent a letter to this effect to Raeder in which he expressed his concern and stated his strategical ideas and plans in case of an Allied occupation of Norway.
MAJOR JONES: The source of the information which the Defendant Raeder was receiving you discussed this morning, but one source that you did not give wets the Norwegian traitor Quisling. The relations between the Defendant Raeder and him were very close, were they not?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: There was no contact at all between Raeder and Quisling until December 1939; then Raeder met Quisling for the first time in his life and never saw him again.
MAJOR JONES: But after December Quisling’s agent Hagelin was a very frequent visitor of the Defendant Raeder, was he not?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I do not believe that Hagelin ever went to Raeder before Quisling’s visit, unless I am very mistaken. I think he visited Raeder for the first time when he accompanied Quisling.
MAJOR JONES: Yes, but thereafter Raeder was in very close touch with the Quisling movement, the Quisling treachery, was he not?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No. Raeder had nothing at all to do with the Quisling movement.
MAJOR JONES: Do you know a man, Erich Giese, Walter Georg Erich Giese, who was an administrative employee of the adjutancy of the supreme commander of the Navy in Berlin?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I did not quite catch the name.
MAJOR JONES: Giese, G-i-e-s-e. He was a—part of his duties were to receive the visitors of the supreme commander. He was an assistant of the supreme commander’s adjutant and he was dismissed from his post in April 1942. And no doubt you recollect the man.
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Will you please tell me the name again? Although it was spelled to me I did not catch it. Is this a Norwegian?
MAJOR JONES: This is a German subject, an employee of the supreme command of the Navy. Part of his duties were to receive all the supreme commander’s visitors, to accept applications for interviews, and draw up the list of callers for the supreme commander. Now you are looking at an affidavit from this man, Document D-722, to be Exhibit GB-479.
THE PRESIDENT: Has the witness answered the question yet?
MAJOR JONES: Not yet, My Lord.
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Now I have the name. The man of whom you are talking was in the reception room of the adjutant’s office. It was not up to this man, who was to be admitted to the Admiral; that was up to me. I asked the callers for what reason they had come. Mr. Hagelin did not visit Raeder before Quisling’s visit, that is, not before December 1939.
MAJOR JONES: I am not suggesting that but what I am suggesting is that after December 1939 there was a very close link between Raeder and the Quisling movement. I just read out to you this extract from the affidavit of this man. From Page 3, My Lord, of the English text:
“I can state the following about the preparations which led up to the action against Denmark and Norway: An appointment with the Commander-in-Chief was frequently made for a Mr. Hagelin and another gentleman, whose name I cannot recall at present, by a party official of Rosenberg’s Foreign Political Office; as a rule they were received immediately. I also had received instructions that if a Mr. Hagelin should announce himself personally, I should always take him to the Commander-in-Chief at once. Shortly afterwards I learned from the minute book and from conversations in my room that he was a Norwegian confidential agent. The gentleman from the Foreign Political Office who frequently accompanied him and whose name I do not remember at the moment also conversed with me and confided in me, so that I learned about the Raeder-Rosenberg discussions and about the preparations for the Norway campaign. According to all I heard I can say that the idea of this undertaking emanated from Raeder and met with Hitler’s heartiest approval. The whole enterprise was disguised by the pretense of an enterprise against Holland and England. One day Quisling, too, was announced at the Commander-in-Chief’s by Hagelin and was received immediately. Korvettenkapitän Schreiber of the Naval Reserve, who was later naval attaché in Oslo and knew the conditions in Norway very well, also played a role in all these negotiations. He collaborated with the Quisling party and its agents in Oslo.”
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: It is not true that Mr. Hagelin was received by Admiral Raeder. Herr Giese cannot possibly have any information about that because he was stationed two rooms away. If he had perhaps noted down that he was received by me, that would in a certain sense be correct. The fact is that at the time, after the Quisling-Hagelin visit, I had said that if he were to pass through Berlin again and he had any naval political information in this connection, I should like him to make this information available to me.
MAJOR JONES: Are you saying that Defendant Raeder never met Hagelin?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: He did not meet him before Quisling’s visit in December. Later he did not receive him any more.
MAJOR JONES: But he in fact received Hagelin and took him to Hitler on 14 December 1939, did he not?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: He was accompanied by Quisling, that is correct. But he did not have any special discussion with Raeder alone.
MAJOR JONES: You said—you spoke this morning as to a conference between Quisling and Raeder on 12 December 1939 and suggested that politics were not discussed at that conference.
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: By the word “politics” I mean politics in the National Socialistic sense, that is, National Socialistic politics on the Norwegian side and on our side. The matters discussed were only naval political questions.
MAJOR JONES: But I will not go into a discussion of the question of politics with you. I will consider the familiar German definition that politics is a continuation of war by other means. But if you look at the Document C-64 you will see that political problems were discussed on 12 December. You see that is a report of Raeder to Hitler. It is found on Page 31 of the Document Book 10a, in which Raeder writes in Paragraph 2:
“As a result of the Russo-Finnish conflict, anti-German feeling in Norway is even stronger than hitherto. England’s influence is very great, especially because of Hambro, the President of the Storting (a Jew and a friend of Hore-Belisha) who is all-powerful in Norway just now. Quisling is convinced that there is an agreement between England and Norway for the possible occupation of Norway, in which case Sweden would also stand against Germany. Danger of Norway’s occupation by England is very great—possibly very shortly. From 11 January 1940 on, the Storting and thereby the Norwegian Government is unconstitutional since the Storting, in defiance of the constitution, has prolonged its term for a year.”
Politics was very much under discussion at that conference, was it not? You have said that the Defendant Raeder was anxious for peace with Norway. Was it for peace with a Norway ruled by the traitor Quisling?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: In reply to your first question I should like to say that in the minutes it says:
“The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy points out that in connection with such offers we can never know to what extent the persons involved want to further their own party aims, and to what extent they are concerned about German interests. Hence caution is required.”
This entry in the document which you have just presented to me corroborates what I was trying to say, that is, that no party matters or matters depending on agreement along ideological lines were to be settled between Admiral Raeder and Quisling. For this reason I said that Raeder did not discuss politics with him, but merely factual matters. That Quisling, at the time of his introduction, should mention certain things as a sort of preamble is self-evident. But he points out the factor of caution and asks: “What does this man want? Does he want to work with the Party or does he really want to remain aloof?”
MAJOR JONES: At any rate, the Defendant Raeder was preferring the reports of Quisling to the reports of the German Ambassador in Oslo which were entirely different from the reports of the traitor Quisling. That is so, is it not?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I believe that Raeder never saw the reports from the German Ambassador in Oslo. I at any rate do not know these reports.
MAJOR JONES: Now the Tribunal has the documents with regard to that matter. I will not pursue it. I want to ask you next about the relations with the United States of America. When did the German Admiralty first know of Japan’s intention to attack the United States?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I can speak only for Raeder and myself. As far as I know, it was not until the moment of the attack on Pearl Harbor.
MAJOR JONES: But you had received a communication from your German naval attaché at Tokyo before the attack on Pearl Harbor, indicating that an attack against the United States was pending, had you not?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Pearl Harbor? No.
MAJOR JONES: But against the United States forces. Just look at the Document D-872, which will be Exhibit GB-480. You see that those are extracts from the war diary of the German naval attaché in Tokyo. The first entry is dated 3 December 1941:
“1800 hours. The naval attaché extended an invitation to several officers of the Japanese Naval Ministry. It transpires from the conversation that the negotiations in Washington must be regarded as having broken down completely and that, quite obviously, the beginning of actions to the south by the Japanese Armed Forces is to be expected in the near future.”
And then on 6 December 1941:
“Conversation with Fregattenkapitän Shiba.”
The outcome of the conversation is reported to Berlin in the following telegram:
“Naval Attaché, 1251. Military Secret:
“1. Last week America offered a nonaggression pact between the United States, England, Russia and Japan. In view of the Tripartite Pact and the high counterdemands, Japan rejected this offer. Negotiations have therefore completely broken down.
“2. The Armed Forces foresaw this development and consented to Kurusu’s being sent only to impress the people with the fact that all means had been exhausted.
“3. The Armed Forces have already decided 3 weeks ago that war is inevitable, even if the United States at the last minute should make substantial concessions. Appropriate measures are under way.”
And then—I will not read the whole document, and at the end it says:
“A state of war with Britain and America would certainly exist by Christmas.”
Assuming that signal reached you before 8 December, you became familiar with the plans of the perfidious Japanese attack upon the United States, did you not?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I do not quite grasp it. I have already said that we had no contact with the Japanese experts or attachés in Berlin. I asserted that we first learned of the Pearl Harbor incident by radio, and I cannot quite see what difference it makes whether on 6 December the attaché in Tokyo told us his predictions, or whether he was drawing conclusions about a future conflict from information sources which we could not control. That has nothing to do with our having advised the Japanese in Berlin to attack America.
MAJOR JONES: Are you saying that you had no conversations in Berlin with the Japanese attaché?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: To my knowledge there were no official conferences between the two admiralty staffs, that is, official operational conferences between the Naval Operations Staff and the Japanese admiralty staff.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Elwyn Jones, before you part from that document, I think you ought to read Paragraph 5.
MAJOR JONES: Paragraph 5, My Lord, reads:
“5. Addition—Naval Attaché.
“No exact details are available as to the zero hour for the commencement of the southern offensive. All the evidence, however, indicates that it may be expected to start within 3 weeks, with simultaneous attacks on Siam, the Philippines and Borneo.
“6. The Ambassador has no knowledge of the transmission of the telegram, but is acquainted with its contents.”
Now I want to...
THE PRESIDENT: With reference to what the witness has just said, I do not know whether I understood him right before, but what I took down he said was that the German Admiralty first knew of Japan’s intention to attack, after Pearl Harbor, not that it first knew of Pearl Harbor by radio. It was the first indication they had of an intention to attack.
MAJOR JONES: That is so, My Lord.
[Turning to the witness.] I am suggesting to you, Witness, that you knew perfectly well of the Japanese intention to attack the United States before the incident of Pearl Harbor.
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I do not know whether you are stressing Pearl Harbor, or the fact that 2 days before the attack on Pearl Harbor we received a telegram from Tokyo to the effect that a conflict was to be counted on. I was asked whether we had known of the fact of the attack on Pearl Harbor, and to that I said: “No.” I said that we had had no conferences in Berlin between the Naval Operations Staff and the Japanese admiralty staff. What you are presenting to me...
MAJOR JONES: I just want to deal with that, but I want to read out to you what your Commander-in-Chief said about that, because it is not what you are saying, you know. On the interrogation of Admiral Raeder on 10 November 1945 (Document D-880, GB-483) he was asked:
“Question: Would such matters be accomplished by Foreign Office people alone, or would that be in collaboration with the High Command of the Navy and OKW?”
And Defendant Raeder’s answer was:
“No, the negotiations were conducted by the Foreign Office and on the part of the Japanese diplomats there was this delegate, Oshima, who was an officer. He negotiated with the Foreign Office in his capacity as delegate, but apart from that he was enough of an expert to look at this thing from a military standpoint as well. Military authorities had long before that carried on negotiations with military and naval attachés about the needs and other things that the Japanese needed... This was all talked about and thrashed out with the military and naval attachés.”
That is a very different version of the fact from the version you have given, Witness, is it not? Now, there are two more matters which I want to deal with.
I do not know whether it will be convenient, My Lord, to have a brief adjournment.
[A recess was taken.]
MAJOR JONES: May it please the Tribunal, with regard to the extract from the interrogation of the Defendant Raeder which I read I wanted to be clear that the defendant was then dealing with the relationship generally between the German authorities in Berlin and the Japanese representatives. I do not want to have given the Court the impression it was a direct negotiation with regard to intervention against America itself. I do not want to mislead the Court in any way with regard to that matter.
[Turning to the witness.] Did you know of the shooting in December 1942 by a naval unit belonging to the German naval officer in command at Bordeaux of two British Royal Marines who took part in a raid on shipping in the Gironde estuary?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I learned of that later.
MAJOR JONES: Did you see the entry with regard to that shooting in the SKL War Diary?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, here in Nuremberg the defendant’s counsel showed me an entry, but I do not know whether it was the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff.
MAJOR JONES: It has been suggested by both counsel for the Defendant Dönitz and counsel for the Defendant Raeder that the entry in D-658 which contained the sentence: “The measure would be in accordance with the Führer’s special order, but is nevertheless something new in international law since these soldiers were in uniform,” that that entry was not from the SKL War Diary. Now, you are familiar with the initial of the Defendant Raeder, are you not?
I want you now to look at the original of D-658, so that it may be established beyond peradventure that this matter was entered in the SKL War Diary. I will put in a photostatic copy of the original if the Tribunal will allow me, because the original is required for other purposes. D-658 was GB-229, and it may be convenient to call the photostats of the originals D-658(a) and GB-229(a). That is the War Diary of the SKL, is it not?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, I recognize it as such.
MAJOR JONES: And the SKL was perfectly familiar with that dreadful murder of the men at Bordeaux, was it not?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: From the War Diary I can see—such is my impression—that afterward on 9 December they were informed about the fact of the shooting.
MAJOR JONES: And their laconic comment was...
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: In the Armed Forces communiqué it says: “According to the Armed Forces communiqué, the two soldiers have been shot in the meantime.” This can be seen in the War Diary of the SKL and I acknowledged it.
MAJOR JONES: And the humane comment of the SKL is, “It is something new in international law, since the soldiers were in uniform.”
There is one final matter which I wish to ask you about: Is it your contention that the German Navy fought a clean war at sea?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I contend that the German Navy fought a very clean war and that has nothing to do with the fact that it is said here in the Diary of the SKL, as taken from the Armed Forces communiqué, that two soldiers were shot and that this was in accordance with the special order given by the Führer which has been cited but, as the Naval Operations Staff adds, was something new in the history of naval warfare. This too...
MAJOR JONES: I am turning to another matter, but you say generally...
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: May I just say in conclusion that this postscript has been confirmed and that the Navy, in this case Raeder, had no influence on these matters. If you ask me whether I approved that order or something of the sort I would give you my personal opinion of the matters which Raeder and I discussed.
MAJOR JONES: But you know Raeder was Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, and who would have influence in Germany if the commanders-in-chief did not have influence? Here was a matter directly reflecting on the honor of German Armed Forces and despite that deliberate denial of the protection of the Geneva Convention for those British marines he continued in office, after they were deliberately murdered.
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: That is a matter of opinion. I may take the following stand: The fact is that in this war, for the first time, a form of sabotage was applied, whether behind the lines by means of air landings or otherwise.
MAJOR JONES: Just a moment. These were marines in uniform. Your own report in the SKL War Diary says so.
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I have to comment on that order which was issued earlier. The preamble of that order said that, since there was knowledge of orders to the Allied soldiers or—I do not remember the exact wording any more—since these soldiers were given orders not to bother taking German prisoners but rather to shoot them while carrying out their work in the so-called Commando raids, the following directives had to be issued.
At that time I discussed this matter with Raeder, of course, and I can merely state my personal opinion. I felt that I could believe this preamble because I am of the opinion that if I resorted to, let us say, sabotage behind the lines then of course I could not be bothered with taking prisoners, because then the element of surprise would be excluded. If, therefore, a troop of three to five men, a so-called Commando undertaking, is sent behind the lines in order to destroy enemy installations, then of course they cannot burden themselves with prisoners without running the risk of being killed themselves or of being recognized before they can carry out their undertaking. Therefore I considered this preamble quite credible and I expressly said so at that time.
MAJOR JONES: And you think that that shooting of those two marines was therefore perfectly justified? That is your position on this matter, is it not? Just say “yes” or “no” on that; I will not argue with you.
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I have not asserted that in any way. Rather I said, here is a fact of which we were informed only by the Armed Forces communiqué, and that Raeder and the High Command had not been heard on this point. That is what I stated.
MAJOR JONES: Now, the final matter I wanted to ask you about, you have indicated that in your opinion Germany fought a clean war at sea. I want you to look at the new Document D-873 which will be GB-481, which is the log book of U-boat U-71, under the date line 21 June 1941, when the Defendant Raeder was Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy. You see the entry reads:
“Sighted lifeboat of the Norwegian motor tanker John P. Pederson drifting under sail. Three survivors were lying exhausted under a tarpaulin and only showed themselves as the U-boat was moving away again. They stated that their ship had been torpedoed 28 days before. I turned down their request to be taken aboard, provisioned the boat with food and water and gave them the course and distance to the Icelandic coast. Boat and crew were in a state that, in view of the prevailing weather, offered hardly any prospects of rescue.”—Signed: “Flachsenberg.”
Is that your conception of a clean war at sea?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I observe that the commanding officer did what he could, in view of the weather which he described when he said that in view of the bad weather he could not rescue them. He threw provisions to them in a sack and gave them the course to the coast. I do not know what there is about that that is inhumane. If he had left without giving them food and the course, then you might make that accusation.
MAJOR JONES: But he could have taken them aboard, you know. These were three men who did...
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, I believe you cannot judge that. Only the commanding officer himself can judge that, the man in charge of the U-boat. I would have to look at the weather, because it says here “Medium swell.” That could also...
MAJOR JONES: But you see here the U-boat commander must have spoken to these people and physically it must have been possible to take them aboard, but he left them to their fate, you know, knowing quite well he was leaving them to die.
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, not at all. Then he would not have needed to give them any food and to give them the course to the coast. What makes you think that they had to die? By the way...
MAJOR JONES: The last sentence is a clear indication that the U-boat captain knew he was leaving them to die. I am suggesting to you that he could have taken them aboard and should have done so if he had the elements of humanity in him.
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No; I do not know the condition of the U-boat, whether the boat was in a position to take prisoners on board. I believe that you have never seen conditions on a U-boat; otherwise you would not judge it like that. Considering that the crew of a U-boat is under water for weeks and uses every last bit of space and is exposed to the greatest dangers day and night, one cannot simply say that it would have been a humane act to take these additional men aboard. Besides, the commander himself says there was hardly a chance of rescue in view of the prevailing weather.
MAJOR JONES: I have no further questions, My Lord.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, I have some questions concerning a few points which Mr. Elwyn Jones put to you. An entry was shown to you from the document by Assmann of 10 October 1939 with the assertion that from this it can be seen that Raeder wanted to occupy Norway only in order to have Norwegian bases. I should like to read to you the full entry and I should like you then to take position to the entire document:
“The Führer agrees that full use of the only two battleships which we have at the time should not be made for the time being. Russia offered bases near Murmansk...
“Question of siege of England: Führer and Commander-in-Chief of Navy agree that all objections by neutrals have to be rejected, even in view of the danger of entry of U.S.A. into the war which seems certain if the war keeps on.
“The more brutally the war is conducted the sooner the effect, the shorter the war.
“Capacity for large U-boat production program. Führer rejects suggestion to have submarines built by or bought from Russia for political reasons. Commander-in-Chief of Navy states no advantages to be won for the U-boat war by conquest of Belgian coast; refers to the value of winning Norwegian bases—Trondheim—with the help of Russian pressure. Führer will consider the question.” (Document D-879, Exhibit GB-482)
Admiral, according to the entire contents, is this a complete clarification of the Norwegian problem?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, not at all.
DR. SIEMERS: Am I right in concluding that here a great number of questions are treated and only one strategic question with reference to Norway...
MAJOR JONES: If your Lordship pleases, the translation came through as, “no advantage of occupation of Norwegian bases” and the translation which is in the document is “Raeder stresses importance of obtaining Norwegian bases.” Perhaps if there might be a careful—I am not saying this in any critical sense—a very careful translation of the entry, it might be important.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the—did you give that an exhibit number?
MAJOR JONES: No, My Lord. That is the entry from Assmann’s headline diary.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I know it is. But I want to know the exhibit number.
MAJOR JONES: I will have an extract made and the exhibit number given this evening, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: It would be GB-482, would it not?
MAJOR JONES: Yes, My Lord, that is it; GB-482.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, it is the same date; I beg your pardon if it does not agree; but the document from which I read I received through the courtesy of Mr. Elwyn Jones.
THE PRESIDENT: You had better go into the question of translation and get that settled.
MAJOR JONES: Yes, Your Lordship.
DR. SIEMERS: At any rate, Admiral, both entries are 10 October, that is, of the same conference. Am I right in saying that consequently there were many strategic questions, not one of which can be said to have been treated completely and conclusively?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, I believe that this complex of questions has nothing to do with the comprehensive discussion between Hitler and Raeder concerning the occupation of Norway. The Norwegian question was touched upon, the occupation of Norway, and then a few points brought up for discussion which Raeder usually jotted down in his notebook. Apart from the question whether an occupation of Norway was necessary or not, the possibility of conquering bases outside German territory was accidentally touched on the same day.
DR. SIEMERS: Therefore, Murmansk which had been offered by Russia was discussed.
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: From Russia to Belgium—all along the coast, wherever there were possibilities and advantages for our submarine strategy.
DR. SIEMERS: If in the War Diary a sentence in connection with a conference between Raeder and Hitler is in quotation marks, does that mean that these words were used by Hitler? Can one assume that?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: If it says...
MAJOR JONES: If your Lordship please, the translation has now been checked, and the original reading of “Raeder stresses the importance of obtaining Norwegian bases” appears to be a perfectly correct translation.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Siemers.
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I understood, Dr. Siemers; shall I speak about that?
DR. SIEMERS: Yes, did you want to add something to that point?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. I understand that the other gentleman just pointed out that Raeder allegedly called Hitler’s attention to the necessity of acquiring submarine bases and in that connection once spoke about Russian assistance and also about the possibility of acquiring bases from Norway. But that does not reveal any aggressive intentions.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, in order to save time, I also asked Dr. Kranzbühler to check the translation. The German text as I should like to point out right now says: “The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy points out the value of winning Norwegian bases.” That is something different from the English translation. But I should like to come back to this later.
[Turning to the witness.] Admiral, Mr. Elwyn Jones then submitted the affidavit of Walter Giese. I should be grateful if you would look at it again. It is D-722. The first line reads:
“I was born at Stettin on 24 November 1900, the son of a bricklayer’s foreman, Ernst Giese.”
Then it says:
“I sat in the reception room of the Commander-in-Chief as assistant to the adjutant.”
Then it says, in the same paragraph:
“I received the minute book from the adjutant at midday after the conferences had ended and locked it up in the general safe.”
Then it says on the second page:
“I did not have much contact with the Commander-in-Chief personally. This consisted merely in my submitting to him or fetching from him top-secret correspondence.”
Admiral, am I right in assuming, therefore, that Giese was a sort of messenger?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. In order to save officers we filled a large number of unimportant positions with civilians, people who we thought were worthy of our confidence. The care of a safe or guarding the key was really the task of the second adjutant, who later had to be used elsewhere.
Giese had been a sergeant in the Navy for many years and for 12 years had been a clerk in the Navy, and therefore had had a certain amount of practice in keeping files.
THE PRESIDENT: All this is stated in the document. If there is anything inaccurate in the document, you can put it to him. But it all is set out in the document, exactly as the Admiral said. You are wasting the time of the Tribunal by repeating it.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I believe what Mr. Elwyn Jones presented was also in the document. What matters is the question of interpretation and the witness has been referred to very definite points. If I should be mistaken, I beg your pardon. I believed that I also had the right in re-examination to refer to certain points in the document.
THE PRESIDENT: If you want to, you can draw our attention to the paragraphs.
SCHUJLTE-MÖNTING: I can be very brief.
Giese had no inside information about the facts, and even if he had, without permission, looked into the minutes of the adjutant, which were not a shorthand record but merely notes to aid the memory of the adjutant, he could never have received the right impression without having taken part in the conference. And it was not up to him in the reception room to decide who should be admitted to the Commander-in-Chief, but rather up to the adjutant or to me. He did not even know who was to be admitted. And it is a bold statement or assumption when he says that a man like Hagelin saw Raeder each time instead of seeing me first. By the way, Hagelin came to me perhaps four or five times.
DR. SIEMERS: Do you believe Giese was present when Raeder talked to Hitler?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Giese? No, never. Giese sat in the reception room and took care of Raeder’s telephone calls.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, nobody here suggests that he was. Mr. Elwyn Jones was not putting it that this man Giese was present at talks between Raeder and the Führer or Raeder and Hagelin.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, this is his affidavit, and in the affidavit, it says, as I should like to point out now, on Page 5, “According to all I heard, I can say that the idea of this undertaking emanated from Raeder and met with Hitler’s joyous agreement.”
How could he know that?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I might stress that even I as chief of staff was not present at these private conferences, and Herr Giese had to stay with the telephone and had no other way of gaining an insight than by giving his imagination free rein.
DR. SIEMERS: That is enough, thank you. I come now to Document D-872. That is the war diary of the naval attaché in Japan, in connection with which you were told that you must have known that Japan would attack America on 7 December. The telegram which is mentioned here is of 6 December. When could that telegram have arrived in your office?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: You mean, when could I have received it personally?
DR. SIEMERS: Yes; or Raeder.
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Not before the next morning.
DR. SIEMERS: That would be 7 December.
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: At the earliest. In this case, the Chief of Staff of the Naval Operations Staff would decide whether for operational reasons that telegram should be presented at once, or not.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, do you remember that document?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Is Pearl Harbor mentioned in the document?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No. I tried to explain that Pearl Harbor had no connection with that telegram from Admiral Wennecker at all and that Wennecker depended on sources of information and on his assumptions or formulated his assumptions in a telegram on the basis of his information without having any definite facts. Such telegrams were received continuously. Sometimes these assumptions were correct; sometimes they were incorrect.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, the Prosecution has submitted it to prove that military negotiations had taken place with Japan. Am I correct in saying that that was only a message concerning possible developments?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, of course. I have tried before to explain that there were no military negotiations between the admiralty staffs. Rather the naval attaché was charged with examining and transmitting all information of value which came to him.
DR. SIEMERS: Then a document was shown you which was not submitted, an interrogation of Raeder of 10 November 1945. May I ask to look at the bottom of Page 5 of this document which I am handing to you and the passage which was read on Page 6?
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Elwyn Jones, that ought to have a number, ought it not?
MAJOR JONES: That will be GB-483, My Lord.
DR. SIEMERS: On that document, Page 5 at the bottom, is Document C-75 mentioned?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No.
DR. SIEMERS: I believe you are mistaken, Admiral, or else I have made a mistake.
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I have an English copy—do you mean the English one?
DR. SIEMERS: Yes, the English copy because it does not exist in German.
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: You mean the last paragraph?
DR. SIEMERS: I believe the last line or the line before the last. The page numbers are very hard to read. Maybe you have the wrong page.
This interrogation, Mr. President, concerns Document C-75. I believe the witness will find it soon. Mention has been made of this document recently and in accordance with the wish recently expressed by the Tribunal, I am submitting C-75; that is Directive Number 24 about the co-operation with Japan, and the full text is Document Number Raeder-128. The Tribunal will recall that the British Delegation...
THE PRESIDENT: Has it already been put in, C-75, has it already been put in?
DR. SIEMERS: I submit it now, C-75.
THE PRESIDENT: No, has it already been put in? Has it already been offered in evidence?
DR. SIEMERS: You may recall that the Prosecution has submitted Document C-75 as USA-151...
THE PRESIDENT: Well, that is all I wanted to know. If it has already been put in, it does not need a new number, is that not the position?
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I remind you that it needs a new number because only the first part was submitted by the Prosecution.
MAJOR JONES: It has already been exhibited as USA-151, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think we are not giving fresh numbers, Dr. Siemers, to parts of documents which had already been put in. If the document has been put in, then where you want to use a fresh part of the document it has the same number as the old number; that is all.
DR. SIEMERS: But, Mr. President, if the Prosecution in their document put in only the first three paragraphs then I cannot...
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I know; I know that perfectly well, but you are perfectly entitled to put in any part of the document. It is only a question of what number is to be given to it and I think—I may be wrong—that up to the present we have not given new numbers to documents once that they have been put in, although fresh parts of the documents are put in.
MAJOR JONES: My Lord, the position with regard to C-75 is that the whole of the original has been put in as USA-151, but only an extract from the original was included in the English document which was put before the Court.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I see. All I was concerned with was the number of the thing. It has got the number USA-151 and I thought our practice had been that it should continue to have that number. You can put in any part of it you like, and if it is a question of translation, no doubt the Prosecution will hand it to the translation department and have it translated for you; but you are attempting to give it a new number, that is all.
DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, once more, but I was asked recently to submit the document anew and that is where the misunderstanding arose. Under these circumstances, now that I hear that it has been submitted in its entirety, I can withdraw it; I should be grateful if the Tribunal were also to receive the complete translation of the document in English and not only the first two paragraphs.
[Turning to the witness.] Admiral, have you found it in the meantime?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, it is on Page 7 as you thought and not on Page 5. The document refers...
DR. SIEMERS: I apologize. It is right then that the interrogation refers to Document C-75?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Document C-75, Admiral, is Directive Number 24 concerning collaboration with Japan, and it says: “The following rules apply: Our common war aim is to defeat England quickly and thereby keep the U.S.A. out of the war.”
Besides that the document also mentions the fact I referred to recently, that Singapore should be occupied by Japan.
Now Raeder, on 10 November ’45 stated his position in respect to this and, according to the next page of the document, he said that which Mr. Elwyn Jones has just put to you. May I ask you to look at it again? It says there, on Page—I thought it was at the top of Page 6, maybe it is at the top of Page 8...
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: The top of Page 8. I do not know English as well as German, but I would translate it: “If that which Japan needs...”
DR. SIEMERS: If I remember correctly, the word is “need.”
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, he uses the word “need”—“and other things, things that the Japanese need.”
DR. SIEMERS: That is to say, Japan’s needs and other things which Japan requires. Therefore, the conversations mentioned by Raeder were not concerned with strategic points?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, these are two entirely different things.
DR. SIEMERS: So that Raeder’s answer is concerned purely with questions of supplies and material.
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, purely questions of supplies and material...
DR. SIEMERS: Thank you.
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: ...which we had with all the navies, not only with the Japanese.
DR. SIEMERS: Then I come to the Commando Order about which you testified already. I want to put to you the following: You have been shown Document D-658, which says that according to the Armed Forces communiqué the soldiers were executed, that the soldiers wore uniforms and that the Führer’s Order was something new in international law. I believe that the naval commander in western France reported this and that this was contained in the Armed Forces communiqué. The man who compiled the War Diary wrote: “A new thing in international law.” I am not a military man, but I should like to ask you, would you consider such a reference a criticism of the order?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I believe that I have to answer the question in the following manner: Normally, the fact of an execution is not entered in a war diary on operational matters.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think that is really a matter which we can go into, whether he thinks this is an entry which is a criticism of the order.
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I believe he wanted to establish that it was something new.
DR. SIEMERS: Never mind, Admiral. A factual question. The Prosecution asserts again that it concerns soldiers in uniform. The Wehrmacht communiqué announced the execution on 9 December. The execution, as I have already shown in another connection, did not take place until 11 December. I am presenting to you now Document UK-57, and ask you to look at the second paragraph under Figure 4. The heading Figure 4 reads: “Sabotage against German ships near Bordeaux”; then it says: “December 12, 1942”; and further on we read:
“From the submarine the participants went two by two in paddle boats up the Gironde estuary. They wore special olive gray uniforms. After carrying out the blastings they sank their boats and tried, with the aid of French civilians, to escape to Spain in civilian clothes.”
Did these soldiers behave correctly according to the provisions of international law?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: In my opinion, no.
DR. SIEMERS: Then I have no more questions.
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: If they had had a clear conscience, they would not have needed to wear civilian clothes.
DR. SIEMERS: Excuse me, just this final question:
Did you personally in the High Command receive an inquiry or any information before this execution which was carried out at the direct order of the Führer?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, neither an inquiry nor any information.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, the question as to whether a document concerning Norway had been translated correctly was just discussed. I shall find out what number it is. The English translation which I have before me is not identical with the German original. It deviates considerably. It is Document GB-482.
I shall read the German text which in my opinion differs from the English translation.
“The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy states: Conquest of Belgian coast provides no advantage for our submarine warfare; points out value of winning Norwegian bases (Trondheim) with the help of Russian pressure. The Führer will consider the question.”
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, would it not save time, really, if we have the sentence which is said to have been wrongly translated referred to a committee of experts in the translating division?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President...
THE PRESIDENT: It really is not a matter which it is worth while wasting time over.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I beg your pardon, I did not know that it was to be examined again.
THE PRESIDENT: I think we had better have it examined and then the translation certified to.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I beg your pardon, Mr. President. I, myself, have a question to put to the witness.
Admiral, Document D-873 has been put to you before. That was a war diary of U-71 and concerned the supplying of three Norwegians in a lifeboat. The entry was on 21 June. I have already submitted it to the Tribunal under Dönitz Number 13, on Page 23 of my document book, a statement by the above-mentioned commanding officer Flachsenberg. According to that statement this submarine put to sea on 14 June. It was west of Norway. Can you tell me if that U-boat, therefore, on 21 June, was putting out for operations or returning from operations?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: You mean from memory?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: No, considering the dates, put out to sea on 14 June, this entry on 21 June.
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Putting out.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Putting out. As you know, this submarine was a 500-ton vessel. Is a boat of that size in a position to carry out an operation over several weeks with three additional people on board?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I believe not. I am not enough of an expert to be able to judge definitely what the extra weight of additional persons on board might mean as far as trimming experiments and such things are concerned; but aside from that, I do not believe that such a small boat, which is putting out to sea for an operation, can load itself on the way with prisoners. I do not consider that possible.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.
DR. SIEMERS: Then, with the permission of the Court, the witness may retire.
[Turning to the President.] Mr. President, in accordance with my statement at the beginning of this case, I have already submitted the majority of my documents during the examination. With the permission of the Tribunal, may I proceed now to submit as quickly as possible the remainder of the documents with a few accompanying statements.
I submit to the Tribunal Exhibit Number Raeder-18, an excerpt from the Document Book 2, Page 105, an excerpt from a book which Churchill wrote in 1935 called Great Contemporaries. I ask the Tribunal to take official notice of the contents. Churchill points out that there are two possibilities, that one cannot say whether Hitler will be the man who will start another world war or whether he will be the man who will restore honor and peace of mind to the great German nation and bring it back serene, helpful and strong to a galaxy of the European family of nations.
As Exhibit Number Raeder-20 I submit a short excerpt from Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kampf with reference to the fact that the Prosecution has said that from that book one could see that Hitler intended to wage aggressive wars. I shall show in my final pleadings how much one can see from that book. I ask that the Tribunal take judicial notice of the short excerpt on Page 154: “For such a policy there was but one ally in Europe, England.”
Exhibit Number Raeder-21, a speech made by Hitler to the German Reichstag on 26 April 1942, is to show how rights were increasingly limited in Germany and how the dictatorship became more and more powerful.
Document Book 4, Exhibit Number Raeder-65, intended to facilitate my arguments, is the Hague Agreement about the rights and duties of neutrals in naval warfare. I need that for my final pleadings in connection with Exhibit Number Raeder-66, the statement of opinion by Dr. Mosler in Document Book 4, Page 289, the first document.
THE PRESIDENT: Can you give us the pages?
DR. SIEMERS: Page 289, Mr. President. It is the first page of the Document Book 4.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Then I ask the Tribunal to be kind enough to take up Document Book 5, since the remaining documents have already been submitted. I submit as Exhibit Number Raeder-100, Document Book 5, Page 437, a document from the White Book concerning the “top-secret” meeting of the French War Commission on 9 April 1940, with Reynaud, Daladier, Gamelin, General Georges, the Minister of the Navy, the Minister of the Colonies and the Air Minister present. It concerns the suggestion by Admiral Darlan of moving into Belgium. The suggestion was supported by General Gamelin and also by the Minister for National Defense and War. On Page 442 there is mention of the march into Holland and finally of Luxembourg. Since the High Tribunal has knowledge of the contents from the discussion of the documents, I do not want to read any details. I simply ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it. I should also like to point out that on Page 443 of this very long document mention is made of the occupation of the harbor of Narvik and of the intention to get hold of the mines of Gallivare.
I now submit Exhibit Number Raeder 102, in the same document book, Page 449. This is an order of the 2d Belgian Infantry Regiment of 13 April 1940 concerning information about friendly troops and the building of a fortified position. It can be seen from the document that the friendly troops mentioned are the Allies.
Then I submit Exhibit Raeder-103, Page 452, which is a French document of 16 April 1940 from headquarters concerning measures about the rail transportation of French troops in Belgium.
I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of all these documents, which I shall not read in detail.
The same applies to Exhibit Number Raeder-104, Document Book 5, Page 455, which is the order of 19 April 1940 of the 2d British Division concerning security measures in Belgium. There we find a directive similar to one in a document which has been submitted by the Prosecution, a directive to establish contact with Belgian civilian authorities.
Exhibit Number Raeder-105, Document Book 5, Page 459, is the statement of a Luxembourg citizen which shows that 200 men, French soldiers in uniform, entered Belgium in armored cars 7 days before the outbreak of the German-Belgian hostilities.
May it please the Tribunal, I originally intended not to submit anything in this Trial concerning the character of my client because I was of the opinion that Admiral Raeder, both at home and abroad, enjoyed great respect. The first trial brief against Raeder did not affect that intention. Shortly before the presentation of that trial brief it was changed, becoming considerably more severe and containing moral accusations which seriously injure and insult Raeder’s honor. I have no doubt that the High Tribunal will understand why under these circumstances I ask to be permitted to submit some of the documents granted me which concern Raeder’s character. I submit Exhibit Raeder-119, Document Book 6, Page 514. That is a letter from Frau Von Poser addressed to me. It is not an affidavit and quite purposely I have submitted the original because in my opinion it will make a more immediate and direct impression than an affidavit which I would first have to ask for in my capacity as defendant’s counsel.
Similarly, there is a fairly long letter from Professor Dr. Seibt who approached me on his own initiative. I submit Exhibit Number Raeder-120, Document Book 6, Page 517. I would be grateful to the Tribunal if it would take judicial notice of that letter. In order to save time I refrain from reading it since it is six pages long.
Then I submit Exhibit Raeder-122, Document Book 6, Page 526, a letter from Herr Erich Katz, which I submit with its appendices and I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it. This presents one of the cases in which Raeder intervened personally, using his influence and position—he used the official stationery of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy to intervene on behalf of Herr Katz who had been attacked as a Jew—and actually succeeded in protecting him. Herr Katz has sent me these documents on his own initiative in order to show his gratitude.
As Exhibit Raeder-123 I submit a letter from Günter Jacobsen that concerns a similar case. Jacobsen also, without my asking it, approached me in order to testify that Raeder rescued his father, who as a Jew had been accused of race defilement, from the concentration camp Fuhlsbüttel—I believe it was still a prison at that time—so that Jacobsen could emigrate to England where he is living now.
I submit as Exhibit Number Raeder-124, an affidavit...
GENERAL RUDENKO: Mr. President, I must make the following statement. All four exhibits mentioned just now by Dr. Siemers are personal letters from various persons to Dr. Siemers. They are not sworn affidavits. They are not interrogations. Therefore these documents have little probative value, and I hold the view that they ought not to be admitted as evidence. Many letters are received, and if they were all to be submitted to the Tribunal, the Tribunal would have great difficulty in establishing the truth and how far they are of probative value. In that connection, I personally object to the fact that these documents should be accepted as evidence in Raeder’s case.
DR. SIEMERS: My Lord, may I...
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not think that the matter is of sufficient importance to insist upon evidence being upon oath. The documents are admitted.
DR. SIEMERS: As Exhibit Number Raeder-124 I submit an affidavit by Konrad Lotter. The affidavit is very short and with the permission of the Tribunal, I should like to read this one page:
“Grand Admiral Raeder has always appeared to me a man who embodied the finest traditions of the old Imperial Navy. This was true particularly in regard to his philosophy of life. As a man and as an officer he was at all times the best model imaginable.
“In 1941, when the anti-Christian policy of the Hitler regime was in full force in Bavaria, when cloisters were closed and in the education of the youth intolerance against every creed became crassly manifest, I sent a memorandum of 12 pages to the Admiral in which I presented to him my objections to this policy. Admiral Raeder intervened at once. Through his mediation, I was called to the Gauleiter and Minister of the Interior, Wagner, in Munich. After a series of discussions between the clerical, governmental, and Party authorities an agreement was reached which had the following results: The school prayer was retained, the crucifix was allowed to remain in the schools, et cetera; furthermore, 59 clergymen who had been fined 500 marks each were pardoned.
“The closing down of cloisters was also stopped at that time. Gauleiter Wagner had to...”
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, all these documents have been read by us very recently.
DR. SIEMERS: Very well. Then I just ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the remainder.
I submit also the two documents, Exhibit Number Raeder-125 and Exhibit Number Raeder-126. Number 125 is an affidavit by the former Reich Defense Minister, Dr. Otto Gessler, and Number Raeder-126 is an affidavit by the Navy Chaplain Ronneberger. I ask you to take judicial notice of this latter document.
I should like to be permitted to read the short affidavit by Dr. Gessler since it contains not only something of a purely personal nature, but also remarks concerning the accusations against Raeder.
“I, Gessler, have known the former Admiral Dr. Raeder personally since about the middle of the 20’s when I was Reichswehrminister. Raeder was then inspector of the educational system in the Navy. I have always known Raeder as a man of irreproachable, chivalrous character, as a man fully conscious of his duty. As to the subject of the Indictment, I know very little.
“Raeder visited me repeatedly after my release from imprisonment by the Gestapo in March 1945 when I lay in the Hedwig Hospital in Berlin and he also made arrangements for me to get home, as I was ill and completely exhausted. I told him then about the ill-treatment I had suffered, especially the torture. He was obviously surprised and incensed about this. He said he would report this to the Führer. I asked him at once to refrain from that, for I had been told before the torture, and officially, that all of this was taking place at the explicit order of Hitler. Moreover, I knew definitely that I would immediately be rearrested, since on my release I had signed the well-known declaration and could not even obtain a confirmation of my detention in order to get a ticket for my trip home.
“I heard nothing about secret rearmament in the Navy, neither during my term of office nor later. During my term of office, until January 1928, Admiral Raeder would not have been responsible either, for at that time he was not Chief of the Naval Command.
“At the time of the National Socialist regime I was ignored by my former department and snubbed. One of the few exceptions was Dr. Raeder. Before 1939 among other things he invited me three times to visit on the cruiser Nürnberg although I had refused twice. During the visit in June 1939 he came to Kiel personally to pay his respects to me. At that time we also discussed the political situation. I expressed the apprehension that an attack on Poland would mean a European war. Raeder declared positively that he considered it out of the question that Hitler would attack Poland. When this did happen later, I explained this to myself on the grounds that Hitler liked to place even the highest military leaders face to face with accomplished facts.”
Then there is the statement “under oath” and the signature of the notary.
As to the last Exhibit Number Raeder-126, from the Navy Chief Chaplain Ronneberger, I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it since it is too late to read it. It is a factual description and survey of church questions and of religious matters in the Navy.
Mr. President, with that, with the exception of three points, I can conclude my case. There are still two interrogatories missing which have not yet been returned. I ask permission to submit these as soon as they are received.
Then, there is the witness Generaladmiral Böhm, who has already been approved, but who on account of illness has not yet been able to appear. The British Delegation, through Sir David, has been kind enough to agree that if necessary this witness can be interrogated at a later date. May I be permitted to ask the Tribunal to keep this open, and if possible to permit Admiral Böhm to be questioned at a later date. I want to point out now that it will not be so large a complex of questions as in the case of Admiral Schulte-Mönting, which the Tribunal knows from the material I have submitted.
This concludes my case Raeder.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.