Morning Session
[The witness Von Weizsäcker resumed the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, I think yesterday we got to the stage whether any of the other defendants’ counsel wished to ask any questions.
DR. SIEMERS: Yes, indeed; I believe Dr. Von Lüdinghausen wishes to examine the witness.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN (Counsel for Defendant Von Neurath): Witness, I should like to put a few questions to you about the activity of Herr Von Neurath in his capacity as Foreign Minister. You were at that time Director of the Political Department of the Foreign Office. What were the dates?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: I believe from late autumn of 1936, as a deputy, and from the spring of 1937 until the spring of 1938 with full capacity.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: But before then you had already had occasion to work with Herr Von Neurath? In the autumn of 1932 were you not together now and then at the Disarmament Conference at Geneva?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What tendencies did Herr Von Neurath follow, and what attitude did Von Neurath adopt at the Disarmament Conference?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: The attitude of Herr Von Neurath was dictated by the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations which provided for disarmament. He followed those lines.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In that he followed the same policy which his predecessors had followed at the Disarmament Conference?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: It was always the same.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes, all the previous governments pursued a policy aimed at peace and unity, or understanding; and Herr Von Neurath continued this policy wholeheartedly, is that not correct?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: I never noticed anything to the contrary.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did you at that time—that is in 1932—notice in any way that he had National Socialist tendencies or that he was at all in sympathy with the National Socialists?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: I had the impression that there was no common ground between him and National Socialism.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Can you quite briefly summarize Herr Von Neurath’s views with respect to foreign politics? Could he have been at that time in favor of belligerent action, or was he the representative, the acknowledged representative, of a policy of understanding and peace?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: I should say that Herr Von Neurath pursued a policy of peaceful revision, the same policy that had been carried on by his predecessors. His aim was good neighborliness with all, without binding himself politically in any special direction. I never noticed any bellicose tendencies in his policies.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Was there any change in Herr Von Neurath’s views in the year 1936, when you became one of his closest collaborators, or did they always remain the same?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: They were always the same.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: He was especially interested in bringing about an understanding with England, but also with France; is that right?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: I had the impression that Herr Von Neurath wanted to bring about an understanding with all sides.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I should like to put a few more questions to you which more or less concern his relations with Hitler.
According to your knowledge of the circumstances, as his collaborator, can it be said that he had the confidence of Adolf Hitler at all times when he was Foreign Minister, and also that Hitler let himself be advised and led by him altogether?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: As far as I am in a position to judge, he was the adviser but not the confidant of Hitler.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: But there was a certain contact between those gentlemen; is that not right?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: I was hardly ever a witness of such contacts.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did you observe, when Von Neurath and Hitler met, whether they frequently discussed the political situation, what had to be done, and what should be done?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: I can only say that we of the Foreign Office regretted that the contact was not closer; all the more so as Hitler was frequently absent from Berlin. We considered the contact too loose.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Then, one cannot speak of close relations or of very close collaboration with Hitler in the case of Von Neurath?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: In my opinion, no.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: And, in your opinion and according to your observation, how did the activity of Von Neurath affect foreign policy? Was he the leading man, or was he not perhaps a retarding element, that is a brake, so to speak, where matters contrary to his convictions were concerned?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: I have no actual proof that important foreign political actions of this period were influenced by Von Neurath. But I can well imagine that certain actions in the sphere of foreign politics were prevented...
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. I do not think we can have the witness imagine. We cannot have the witness telling us what he can imagine. I think the question is too vague, and not a proper question to ask.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: During the time when Herr Von Neurath was Foreign Minister, did any authority in the Party also have an influence on the foreign policy which in effect was contrary to the tendencies of Von Neurath or at least was not shared by him?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: I believe there was not only one but many who acted in that way and had connection and influence with Hitler of course. That could not be verified, but it could be concluded from the results.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know why, for what reason, the Anti-Comintern Pact with Japan in November 1935 was not signed by Von Neurath but by the then Ambassador Von Ribbentrop in London?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: Was not that in 1936?
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: 1936; yes that is right.
VON WEIZSÄCKER: I assume for the reason that Hitler always liked to put several persons on to certain work, and he would then select from among them the one he considered best suited to carry the work through.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Was Von Neurath at all in agreement with this Anti-Comintern Pact?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: That I do not know.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What was Von Neurath’s policy regarding personnel? Did he try to keep old officials in office, or did he bring in National Socialist officials?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: Herr Von Neurath was very anxious to retain the old and familiar Foreign Office staff, in the Foreign Office, as well as in positions abroad.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: But that changed the moment he resigned?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: Not immediately, but later on to an increasing extent.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now, just two more questions. What was the attitude of Herr Von Neurath when he was no longer Foreign Minister and the Sudeten questions became acute, in the autumn of 1938; and what part did he play at the Munich Conference?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: I recall a scene in the Reich Chancellery, a day before the Munich Agreement, when Herr Von Neurath very strongly recommended pursuing a policy of appeasement and following the suggestion of Mussolini to hold a four-power conference.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know that after Von Neurath had left the Foreign Office that office was forbidden to give him any information about foreign politics?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: I think I remember that the successor of Herr Von Neurath kept to himself information his predecessor received about foreign political matters.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I have no further questions.
DR. LATERNSER: Herr Von Weizsäcker, you were German Ambassador to the Holy See in Rome from the summer of 1943?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: At the same time the commander-in-chief in the Italian theater of war was Field Marshal Kesselring?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes; that is, he was the commander-in-chief in that theater from 25 September 1943. Before that time an Italian general held the post.
DR. LATERNSER: Were you frequently called upon by Kesselring to settle differences between the German Army on one hand and the civil authorities on the other?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: There was constant communication between Field Marshal Kesselring and my own office, not only in order to straighten out differences, but above all to prevent differences.
DR. LATERNSER: Did you, through your frequent contacts with Field Marshal Kesselring, gain a personal impression with regard to the attitude of the military...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, we are not trying Kesselring. What relevance has this question got?
DR. LATERNSER: This question is relevant because in the cross-examination of Field Marshal Kesselring the Prosecution produced incriminating material to the effect that the military leadership in Italy did not observe the usages of war and the laws of humanity. I distinctly remember that you, Mr. President—and this may be seen on Pages 5803 and 5805 (Volume IX, Pages 234, 235)—said in reply to an objection by Dr. Stahmer that it was material incriminating the General Staff. I should like to ask the witness now present a few questions about this incriminating material.
THE PRESIDENT: If you wish to ask him anything that he knows about accusations which have been made by the Prosecution against Kesselring as a member of the General Staff, then you may do that.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, Mr. President. I started and that was to be a preparatory question.
Herr Von Weizsäcker, were the objects of art of Italy in the Italian theater of war spared and put in safekeeping?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: The German Wehrmacht, under the leadership of Field Marshal Kesselring, made the greatest efforts to spare and protect edifices, property, and objects of art belonging to the Church. This was a large chapter in the activities of the staff of Field Marshal Kesselring, and success was not wanting.
DR. LATERNSER: Can you give us one or two especially significant examples on this point?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes, there are a lot of examples. I would like to mention that 6 months or a year ago an exhibition of manuscripts, incunabula, and similar things, was held in the Vatican. The German Wehrmacht is to be thanked for having saved a large part, if not the greater part of these objects.
DR. LATERNSER: That is sufficient, Herr Von Weizsäcker. The high military command in Italy is accused of having treated the Italian population with especial harshness and cruelty. Can you tell us anything about the fact that precisely on the part of the high military command in Italy special measures were taken for the feeding of the population at a period when the food problem was difficult?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: Does this question refer especially to the food problem?
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, the food problem in Rome.
VON WEIZSÄCKER: Well, my field of observation was only Rome. But there I can say that Field Marshal Kesselring told me one day that half his time was taken up with the question of feeding Rome. And I knew one of the higher military officials—I believe his name was Seifert or something like that—who with great devotion concerned himself with this task and carried it through with success.
DR. LATERNSER: Now my last question, Herr Von Weizsäcker: Through your observations of the activities of the high military leaders in Italy you must have gained a personal impression of these people. Did you get the impression that there was a sincere effort on the part of these military leaders to observe the laws of war and the laws of humanity?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: That is a matter of course, for otherwise certain results could not have come about. Perhaps it is not known here that in the autumn of 1943 the Holy See published a communiqué, an official communiqué, which especially praised the behavior of the German soldiers in Rome. Besides that, the sparing of the Eternal City could not have been realized if the German Wehrmacht had not behaved as it did.
DR. LATERNSER: And that was a special merit of Field Marshal Kesselring in particular?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: I would say that when the history of this time comes to be written first in the list of merit will be Pope Pius XII. Then praise will be accorded, in the second place to the German Wehrmacht under the leadership of Kesselring.
DR. LATERNSER: Thank you very much. I have no further questions.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: It has been asserted once that the Defendant Von Papen, who in the summer of 1934 had been appointed ambassador to Vienna, directed from that office a policy of aggressive expansion taking in the entire southeast up to Turkey; and that he, among other things, had offered neighboring states like Hungary and Poland territory to be gained from the intended partitioning of Czechoslovakia. Did this policy actually exist?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: I am sorry. I did not quite understand your question.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did this policy, which I just outlined, actually exist?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: My observation dates only from the late summer of 1936, as before that time I was abroad. I did not notice later that Herr Von Papen had carried on a southeastern policy for Vienna, or that he was commissioned to do so. The Foreign Office could not entrust him with such a mission, for he did not come under the Foreign Office.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: And this policy, as just outlined, did that exist at all when you entered the Foreign Office?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: Please repeat the question.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did this policy of expansion on the part of Germany...
VON WEIZSÄCKER: Which policy?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The aggressive policy of expansion on the part of Germany to the southeast as far as Turkey, the partitioning of Czechoslovakia, and the cession of parts of Czechoslovakia to Poland and Hungary.
VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes. In 1939, no doubt?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: 1936—in 1936.
VON WEIZSÄCKER: No.
THE PRESIDENT: The Prosecution?
MAJOR JONES: Witness, I want to ask you one or two questions about the Athenia matter. You have told the Tribunal that you, yourself, saw the American chargé d’affaires and informed him, about the middle of September, that the Athenia could not have been sunk by a German U-boat. That is so, is it not?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: I did not see the American chargé d’affaires in the middle of September, but on the day on which I heard of the sinking, and that must have been, perhaps, 3, 4, or 5 of September.
MAJOR JONES: Were you already assuring the American representatives as early as that that a U-boat could not have been responsible?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: That is correct.
MAJOR JONES: And did you recommend, or rather, did the German Foreign Office recommend that the Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy should receive the American naval attaché and tell him the same thing, namely, that a U-boat could not have sunk the Athenia?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: That I do not know. I only dealt with the chargé d’affaires.
MAJOR JONES: I would like you to look at a new document, Document. Number D-804, which will be Exhibit GB-477, which is an extract from the SKL on the Athenia case. You will see that that is a report from Neubauer to the naval attaché and it reads as follows:
“The Foreign Office has had a report of the meeting between the Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy and the American naval attaché, on 13 September 1939, passed on to it by telephone. It is worded as follows:
“ ‘On the 16th of September, at about 1300 hours, the Commander-in-Chief of...’ ”
VON WEIZSÄCKER: I am sorry; I have not found the place as yet.
MAJOR JONES: Perhaps you would like to follow the English copy, Witness, if you would like.
I read the second paragraph:
“ ‘On the 16th of September, at about 1300 hours, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy received the American naval attaché on the advice of the Reich Foreign Minister and told him more or less the following: He had intended for some days already—as he knew—to write him that he should visit him in order to tell him his opinion about the sinking of the Athenia, in view of the continued agitation about it. However, he had waited for the return of those of the submarines that had been employed in waging war against merchant ships at the time in question and which might possibly be concerned, in order to receive reports about their activity personally. He repeated most emphatically that the sinking of the Athenia was not caused by a German submarine. The ship nearest to the place of the incident was at the time actually situated about 170 sea miles away from the place of the sinking. Besides this, the instructions as to how the commanders were to wage war against merchant shipping, had after all been published. Up to date, in no case had these instructions been even slightly disregarded. On the contrary, an American captain reported a short time before about the particularly courteous and chivalrous behavior of the submarine commanders.’ ”
Well, now, it is clear from that, is it not, that the German Foreign Office was most anxious to cover up this matter of the Athenia as best it could; was it not?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: No; there was nothing to be covered up.
MAJOR JONES: When you discovered at the end of September that in fact it was the U-30 that had sunk the Athenia, there was then a good deal to be covered, was there not?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: I believe that I stated already yesterday that I had heard nothing to that effect.
MAJOR JONES: Are you saying that you did not know at the end of September, on the return of the U-30, that the U-30 had in fact sunk the Athenia?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: I do not remember that in any way at all.
MAJOR JONES: When did you first discover that the U-30 had sunk the Athenia?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: As far as I remember, not at all during the war.
MAJOR JONES: But I understood you to say yesterday that you thought that the publication in the Völkischer Beobachter, accusing Mr. Winston Churchill of sinking the Athenia, was a piece of perverse imagination; is that right?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: Completely.
MAJOR JONES: Are you really saying to the Tribunal that—though you were in a responsible job—are you saying to the Tribunal that you did not discover the true facts about the Athenia until the end of the war, when you were directly concerned in the Foreign Office with this matter?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: I told you already yesterday what I know about this. It seems, does it not, that it was realized later by the Navy that the sinking of the Athenia was due to the action of a German submarine, but I cannot at all remember that I or the Foreign Office were informed of this fact.
MAJOR JONES: At any rate, the Defendant Raeder took no steps to correct the information that had been passed to the American diplomatic representatives, did he?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: I do not recall at all that Admiral Raeder advised me or the Foreign Office of the fact.
MAJOR JONES: Now, with regard to the Defendant Von Neurath.
If it please the Tribunal, I am not proposing to question the witness as to the earlier diplomatic history, as this Tribunal has indicated that it is desirable to reserve the matter for the defendants as they go into the witness box later.
[Turning to the witness.] But I want to ask you a general question. What was the earliest date at which responsible officials of the Foreign Office, like yourself, first realized that Hitler intended to wage aggressive war?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: That the foreign policy of Hitler’s Government was a dangerous one I realized clearly for the first time in May 1933; the fact that an aggressive war was planned, perhaps, in the summer of 1938, or at least that the course pursued in foreign policy might very easily lead to war.
MAJOR JONES: Already in April 1938, the foreign political situation was so tense that you sent a special memorandum to all German diplomatic representatives dealing with the situation—the critical situation of Germany.
VON WEIZSÄCKER: That may be. May I be permitted to read the document?
MAJOR JONES: I want you to look at Document Number 3572-PS, which is a memorandum of the 25th of April 1938, signed by yourself, and a copy of which was sent to all the German diplomatic representatives. It will be Exhibit GB-478. That document reads:
“Since the work in the field of preparation for the mobilization has made further progress within Germany in the Armed Forces and in all civil administrations including the Foreign Office, it is necessary now that in the case of government offices abroad corresponding measures also be taken in their area of jurisdiction without delay.”
And then there follows a series of instructions as to the actions that are to be taken on the commencement of the period of crisis, or of actual mobilization, and there is an insistence in the last paragraph but one:
“I request the heads of offices, without waiting for further instructions, to start considering now the measures to be taken in their sphere of activity in the case of an emergency. In the interest of absolute secrecy it must be observed strictly that the number of people informed remains as restricted as possible.”
That suggests, does it not, that as early as April 1938 you were conscious of the imminent approach of actual mobilization; is that so?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: May I ask, is this document really dated the year 1938, or is it 1939? I cannot quite distinguish the date.
MAJOR JONES: It is dated the 25th of April 1938.
VON WEIZSÄCKER: Well, that may be.
MAJOR JONES: Now, you yourself were opposed to Hitler’s aggressive foreign policy, were you not?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: I did not quite understand your question.
MAJOR JONES: You yourself were opposed to Hitler’s aggressive foreign policy, were you not?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: I personally, completely.
MAJOR JONES: Did you endeavor to persuade the Defendant Von Neurath also to oppose Hitler’s aggressive foreign policy?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: Herr Von Neurath was not Foreign Minister at that time.
MAJOR JONES: But he continued to be a very important functionary of the Nazi State, did he not?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: I believe that his influence in that period was even smaller than before; but I kept in touch with him, and I think I agreed with his opinion and he with mine.
MAJOR JONES: And yet he continued to serve the Nazi State, in particular, in a territory which was acquired as a result of this policy of aggression; is that not so?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: I should be grateful if this question would be put to Herr Von Neurath rather than to me.
MAJOR JONES: If you please. Now, you were in Italy and in Rome, were you not, in March of 1944?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes.
MAJOR JONES: You have given me some evidence as to the behavior of the German forces in Italy. Were you in Rome at the time of the massacres in the Hadrian Cave? You remember the incident, Witness, do you not?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes.
MAJOR JONES: When 325 Italians were murdered and 57 Jews were thrown in as a bit of makeweight. You were there when that happened, were you not?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: I believe it was 320 prisoners who were murdered in this cave which you just mentioned.
MAJOR JONES: Yes. Were you consulted about that matter?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: No.
MAJOR JONES: That was an action by German forces, was it not?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: I believe by the German Police, and not by the German Armed Forces.
MAJOR JONES: And you know, Witness, that there were many murders of that kind carried out by the SS during the period of German activity in Italy, do you not?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: I do not know about many murders having taken place, but I believe that the German Police were quite capable of such things.
MAJOR JONES: You know that they left a record of terror and brutality wherever they left their mark upon Italy; is that not so?
VON WEIZSÄCKER: The German Police, yes.
MAJOR JONES: I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you want to re-examine?
DR. SIEMERS: I have no more questions, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness can retire.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I now call the witness Vice Admiral Schulte-Mönting.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, go ahead.
[The witness Schulte-Mönting took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name?
ERICH SCHULTE-MÖNTING (Witness): Erich Schulte-Mönting.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.
[The witness repeated the oath in German.]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, please tell us briefly what positions you held from 1925 to 1945, particularly in what positions you served immediately under Admiral Raeder.
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: From 1925 to 1928 I was naval adjutant to Reichspräsident Hindenburg and, as such, simultaneously second adjutant to the Chief of the Naval Command Staff. Consequently my first collaboration with Raeder dates back to 1928.
From 1929 until 1933 I had several front commands. From 1933 to 1937 I was first adjutant to Raeder. From 1937 to 1939 I had several front commands. From 1939 to 1943 I was Admiral Raeder’s Chief of Staff; and up to 1944 I remained Admiral Dönitz’ Chief of Staff. In January 1944 I was naval commander in southern France until the invasion; subsequently commanding general in North Trondheim. After the collapse I was employed for some months with the British Navy in winding up activities. Then in the autumn I was interned in a camp for generals in England.
DR. SIEMERS: Please tell me, if you can remember, in which month of 1939 you started to work with Raeder.
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: The first of January 1939.
DR. SIEMERS: Can you tell us briefly anything about Raeder’s prestige as a navy expert, especially abroad? I mean only with regard to technical naval questions.
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. I believe that through the many years of service I had with Raeder, and the many conversations I had with foreigners, I have been able to form some idea. After all, Raeder was head of the Navy for 15 years. He was known, or rather had a name, as a naval officer and as Chief of Staff of the last Commander-in-Chief of the German Imperial Navy, Admiral Hipper, the opponent of the famous British Admiral Beatty in the Skagerrak battle. He was known...
THE PRESIDENT: Witness, will you kindly observe that light. When the yellow light goes on, you are talking too fast. When the red light goes on, you must stop.
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: He was known through his literary activity at the time of the “Tirpitz Era,” when he edited the Nautikus, and later, after the first World War, through his two works on cruiser warfare in the last World War, for which he received an honorary doctor’s degree and which, I should say, gained him a reputation among experts.
DR. SIEMERS: The defendant is accused of building up the Navy with the intention of carrying on an aggressive war, and this even after the Treaty of Versailles was already in force.
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: That is not correct. Never in all my conversations which I had with Raeder was the thought—much less the word—of an aggressive war mentioned. I believe that all his actions and his directives contradict this.
DR. SIEMERS: Were there possibly any ideas of a strategic nature under consideration, while the Versailles Treaty was in force, with a view to an aggressive war?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Never.
DR. SIEMERS: What was the basic reason for the maneuvers held by the Navy from the years 1932 until 1939?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: They were held exclusively with a view to the security, protection, and defense of the coastal waters and the coast itself.
DR. SIEMERS: Was a war with England taken as a basis for any of these maneuvers between 1932 and 1939?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, that was never made a basis, and I believe that would have appeared impossible and unreasonable to every naval officer. I remember that even at the beginning of the year 1939 Raeder issued a directive to the front commanders to hold maneuvers, in which he excluded a maneuver directed against England as an impossibility. It was forbidden to carry out that maneuver at all.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, it is now confirmed, as you know, that the Navy in the twenties, with the knowledge of the then parliamentary government, violated the Treaty of Versailles. These questions have been discussed a great deal here, therefore, we can be brief.
I should like to ask you generally: Is it possible from these violations, which are known to you, to deduce aggressive intentions?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, I consider that is completely out of the question. The violations were so insignificant and were based so exclusively on protection and defense that I think it is impossible to construe them as aggressive intentions.
DR. SIEMERS: Can you give us briefly a few instances or name a few cases where violations took place?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: First of all, they were limited to the installation of coastal batteries, antiaircraft batteries, the procuring of mines and similar things, all of which were exclusively for the purpose of defense or protection.
DR. SIEMERS: Did these violations of the Treaty of Versailles—or, shall we say, the slight deviations—become known to the Inter-Allied Commission in whole or in part, and did that commission partly overlook these things because they were really trifles?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. I would say it was an open secret.
DR. SIEMERS: May I ask you, Admiral, to pause between question and answer so that the interpreters can keep up. Just pause a moment after my questions before you reply. May I ask you to repeat the answer to my question with regard to the commission?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I would say that it was an open secret. It was just passed by.
DR. SIEMERS: As proof that these violations of the treaty were made with the intention of waging aggressive war the Prosecution has several times presented the book by Post Captain Schüssler entitled The Navy’s Fight against Versailles. It is Document C-156. I will have this document submitted to you in the original. In order to save time and not to burden the Tribunal again with details—I do not want to go into details—I shall just ask you: What do you know about this book, and what caused it to be written at all? When was it written and what is your general opinion about it?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I know this book. It came about as a result of the attacks of the National Socialist regime in the years 1934 and 1935, which blamed the preceding government and the Navy for not having done enough in the past to arm the nation and for not even having exhausted the possibilities of the Treaty of Versailles. Consequently, the idea arose at that time of publishing a sort of justification. This brochure is to be considered in that light; a sort of justification for, I might say, sins of omission.
This booklet was later never actually published, or rather it was withdrawn from circulation because it was, I might say, a rather poor attempt, for, after all, it contains no challenging points which might be classified as rearmament.
DR. SIEMERS: Was this booklet distributed within the Navy later on?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No. As I said, it was withdrawn from the circles which had already had it and it was also severely criticized.
DR. SIEMERS: Was the book withdrawn on Raeder’s orders?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I believe so, yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Through this book and another document, by Assmann, a charge has been brought concerning the known endeavors made with a construction firm in Holland. And it was also said yesterday that, by order of Admiral Raeder, U-boats were built for Germany in Finland and in Spain. Is that correct?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: That is not correct. The U-boats which were designed by the Dutch firm, and which were built abroad, were not built for the German Navy, but for foreign countries.
DR. SIEMERS: Do you know for whom they were built? Who received the boat which was built in Finland?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I believe Turkey received one, and one went to Finland.
DR. SIEMERS: Then the ships were constructed for foreign orders and for a foreign country?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: What advantages at all did the Navy have from their collaboration in the construction?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: We were only interested in keeping alive the experiences gained in U-boat warfare during the last World War. Consequently the Navy was interested in seeing that constructors of U-boats continued along those lines.
DR. SIEMERS: In your opinion, was that prohibited according to the Treaty of Versailles?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, I know of no paragraph which prohibits our activity in foreign countries along those lines.
DR. SIEMERS: In the beginning of February 1933 Admiral Raeder made his first naval report to Hitler. Do you know what Hitler, on that occasion, gave Raeder as the basis for rebuilding the Navy?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, I remember it exactly, because it was the first report which the then Chief of the Naval Command Staff, Admiral Raeder, made to the Reich Chancellor Hitler.
Hitler said to Raeder that the basis of his future policy was to live in peace with England and that he intended to demonstrate that by trying to conclude a naval agreement with England. In this he wanted the German Navy to be kept relatively small. He wished to recognize Britain’s naval superiority because of her position as a world power. He would accordingly suggest an appropriate ratio of strength. He wanted an understanding with regard to the construction of our Navy; and we should take these, his political points of view, into consideration. Raeder was impressed with the statements, for they were completely in accordance with his own basic attitude.
DR. SIEMERS: Within the framework of this policy the German-British Naval Agreement was then concluded in 1935. Was the Navy as a whole and Raeder in particular pleased with this agreement, or did they see certain disadvantages in it?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Raeder and the Navy were very pleased with this agreement, although we had to impose voluntarily upon ourselves severe limitations for a certain length of time. By this agreement, in comparison with the Washington conference, I should say we ranged among the smallest sea powers. In spite of that, this agreement was generally welcomed, because friendly relations with the British Navy were desired, and it was believed that if we followed a wise and moderate policy, England in return would show her appreciation.
DR. SIEMERS: Do you know whether at that time Hitler as well approved of the agreement in that form and was pleased about it?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, I can affirm that. Raeder and I happened to be together with Hitler in Hamburg the day this agreement was concluded, and Hitler said to Raeder when this fact was reported to him:
“This is the happiest day of my life. This morning I received word from my doctor that my throat trouble is insignificant, and now this afternoon I receive this very gratifying political news.”
DR. SIEMERS: You have already stated, Admiral, that the naval agreement was welcomed by the Navy. You will recall that in the year 1937 a modified naval agreement was concluded with England. Was the attitude of the Navy to that question still the same at that time?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, absolutely. The Naval Agreement of 1937 brought merely one, I might say, additional clause. This was for an exchange of information; and we had also reached an agreement with the British Navy with regard to a fixed U-boat tonnage. We had no reason...
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, referring to the U-boat tonnage, I remember the 1935 agreement: 100 percent of the British U-boat tonnage; Germany limited herself to 45 percent, but reserved the right to increase the tonnage up to possibly 100 percent, in which case she must, however, notify England and discuss it with the British Admiralty.
Was this notification about the increase to 100 percent given, and if so, when and in what way?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: After we had reached 100 percent, Admiral Cunningham was in Berlin and on that occasion the fact was discussed once more. Whether a written confirmation was made in addition I no longer recall. I take it for granted because that was the purpose of the agreement of 1937. On the occasion of his visit in December 1938, Admiral Cunningham explicitly gave Britain’s agreement to the final 100 percent equality in U-boats. That is the way I, or rather all of us, interpreted his visit.
DR. SIEMERS: Do you remember whether there was a special conversation, or a conversation between Admiral Cunningham and Raeder, on the occasion of this visit, in which Admiral Cunningham discussed generally the relations between the German and the British Navy, and between Germany and England?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I had the personal impression that Cunningham and Raeder parted on very friendly terms. At Cunningham’s departure there was a breakfast for a rather limited circle, and on that occasion Cunningham expressed his pleasure at the conclusion of the naval agreement, concluding his speech with a toast to the effect that now all these questions had been settled at last, and it was to be hoped that in the future there would be no war between our navies.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the date of this incident?
DR. SIEMERS: December 1938. I believe that is correct, Admiral?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: As far as I remember, December 1938.
DR. SIEMERS: I remember the date from the testimony given by Admiral Raeder. I myself knew only that it took place in 1938.
THE PRESIDENT: What Admiral Cunningham is it?
DR. SIEMERS: I do not know, I am not a naval expert. Perhaps Admiral Schulte-Mönting can tell us.
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I did not understand the question, Doctor.
DR. SIEMERS: Which Admiral Cunningham is that?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: The present Lord Cunningham. The elder of the two.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I point out that it must have been on 30 or 31 December 1938, as far as we, or rather as far as Raeder recalls.
[Turning to the witness.] From 1933 until 1939 was Raeder confident that Hitler would not start a war?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. Raeder was completely confident of that. As proof of this I may say that actually nothing was changed in our building program within that period. That would have been necessary if one had had to prepare oneself, at least mentally, for an armed conflict.
DR. SIEMERS: In what respect would the building program have had to be changed if one had wanted to wage an aggressive war?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: It would have been necessary to give priority at least to the U-boat building program.
DR. SIEMERS: Was it clear to you and to the leading naval officers that a real aggressive war started by Germany would perforce result in a war with England?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. The knowledge of this fact is proof in my opinion that a war of aggression was not planned.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, now in 1938 and 1939 incidents took place which perhaps justified a certain amount of skepticism. I should like to remind you of the crisis in the autumn of 1938 concerning the Sudetenland which almost led to war, which was then prevented only at the last moment through the Munich Agreement. I should like to call your attention specifically to the occupation of the rest of Czechoslovakia in March of 1939, which was contradictory to the Munich Agreement.
Now, what was the attitude of Raeder to this incident, which you must know as you spoke to him practically every day.
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: As Hitler had stated expressly at Munich that he was interested only in the German areas of Czechoslovakia; and, even though perhaps he seemed exceedingly determined to the outside world, was actually willing to negotiate, Raeder and the leading circles in the Navy believed that these things would be adjusted politically.
With the occupation of Czechoslovakia a great disquiet certainly did arise among us. But we were firmly convinced that Hitler would not make any exaggerated demands, and that he would be prepared to settle these matters politically, because we could not imagine that he would expose the German people to the danger of a second world war.
DR. SIEMERS: Did you know that before the agreement with Hacha was made, under rather strange circumstances, a bombardment of Prague had allegedly been threatened; or did Raeder know anything about that?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I do not believe that Raeder knew anything about this. I am hearing about it for the first time now.
DR. SIEMERS: Now I shall turn to the Document L-79. This is a speech delivered by Hitler on 23 May 1939; that is the so-called “Little Schmundt File.”
Mr. President, this is Exhibit USA-27, and is to be found in Document Book Number 10, Page 74, of the British Delegation. I am submitting this document to the witness.
[Turning to the witness.] This speech delivered by Hitler on 23 May 1939 was recorded by the adjutant on duty, Lieutenant Colonel Schmundt. As far as I know, Raeder, on the same day, discussed this speech with you in detail. At that time you had been Chief of Staff for a period of about 6 months. From your later activity are you familiar with the type of recording which was customary for military speeches?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: This record can really not be considered a true account. I have from this record...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, in the first place, your question was very much leading. You did not ask him a question. You put into his mouth what had happened. That is altogether wrong. You ought to have asked him, if you wanted to prove a conversation he had with Raeder, whether he did have a conversation with Raeder. You have told him that he had a conversation with Raeder. The purpose of examination is to ask questions, and then he could tell us if he had a conversation with Raeder. He cannot tell us whether this is a true account or a true form of the account when he was not at the meeting himself.
DR. SIEMERS: I wish to thank the High Tribunal, and I shall try to put the questions properly. The witness...
THE PRESIDENT: Not only that, but the Tribunal cannot listen to this witness’ account, or his opinion as to whether this is a true account of a meeting at which he was not present.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, the witness, as Chief of Staff, has always seen the exact minutes on important meetings. They were delivered to him in accordance with the distribution list. Therefore, as this document is of a decisive nature, I should like to determine whether Schulte-Mönting, as Chief of Staff, received the minutes or whether he just received knowledge of the contents through Admiral Raeder’s immediate reporting. That was the purpose of my question.
THE PRESIDENT: I beg your pardon, you mean you want to ask him whether he ever saw this document. Yes, you may certainly ask him that. Ask him if he saw the document.
DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, Your Honor, but I believe the answer of the witness was lost in the interpretation, and if I am correct...
THE PRESIDENT: Never mind about his answer; the question is what question you are to put to him, and he can answer whether he ever saw the document.
DR. SIEMERS: Yes, I shall put that question.
Admiral, did you get to see this document at the time?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, I am just seeing it now for the first time, here in Nuremberg.
DR. SIEMERS: How did you hear about the contents of the speech of 23 May?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Raeder informed me fully, as a matter of principle, after every speech or conference, confidential or otherwise. Immediately after the speech, Raeder gave me his impressions which are in contradiction to these so-called minutes. Raeder did not have this, I might say, exaggerated bellicose impression which is apparent in this document. But, on the other hand...
THE PRESIDENT: The witness must tell us what Raeder said to him. That is what I told you before. He may tell us what Raeder said to him.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, I should like you to tell us just what Raeder said to you.
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Raeder told me that Hitler in his speech said there was a prospect of a future conflict with Poland, and that this was in contradiction to those things which he had discussed with him alone. That the speech in itself was contradictory, was the impression he expressed to me at that time. He also told me that after the speech he had had a conversation with Hitler alone during which he called his attention to the contradictions contained in the speech. At the same time he reminded Hitler of what he had told him previously, namely that he would settle the Polish case under all circumstances in a peaceful way; and now he was considering a warlike solution possible. Hitler, he said, had reassured him and had told him that politically he had things firmly in hand. Then when Raeder asked him, or rather called his attention to this contradiction and asked him just what he really intended to do, Hitler had answered, Raeder told me, the following:
“I, Hitler, have three ways of keeping secrets. The first, when we two speak alone; the second, when I, Hitler, keep them to myself; the third, for problems of the future, which I do not think out to an end.”
Raeder called his attention to the impossibility of a warlike conflict. To that, according to Raeder, Hitler replied:
“It is as if you and I had agreed on a settlement of one mark. Now, I, Hitler, have already paid you 99 pfennig. Do you think that because of this last 1 pfennig you would take me to court?”
And Raeder said “No.”
“You see”—Hitler said to Raeder—“I have got what I want by political means, and I do not believe that because of this last political question”—the solution of the Polish Corridor, as we called it—“we will have to anticipate a war with England.”
DR. SIEMERS: And that was in a conversation between Hitler and Raeder after this speech had been made?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: That took place after this speech.
THE PRESIDENT: We will break off now.
[A recess was taken.]
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, with regard to the minutes which I have shown you, I have one final question: Did you personally, as Chief of Staff, also receive and read all minutes which were sent to Raeder?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, as a rule I saw all minutes and reports before they were given to Raeder.
DR. SIEMERS: Was Admiral Reader of the opinion—excuse me, I should like to put the question differently.
What was Raeder’s point of view concerning the Navy and politics?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Raeder’s opinion was that we, the Navy, had nothing to do with politics. He adopted that attitude as an order and a trust received from the old Reich President, Von Hindenburg, who, when appointing Raeder to be head of the Navy, imposed that as a duty upon him.
DR. SIEMERS: I now come to Norway. What were the reasons which induced Raeder, in September and October 1939, to consider a possible occupation of Norway?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: The reasons were the reports which came from various sources about alleged intentions of an occupation of Norway by the Allies. These reports came from the following sources: First, Admiral Canaris, who was the chief of our intelligence service. He reported to Raeder, in my presence, once a week, the information that had come in. Secondly, the reports that came from the naval attaché in Oslo, Korvettenkapitän Schreiber, which indicated that rumors were increasing that the Allies intended to drag Scandinavia into the war in order to prevent, if possible, the iron ore exports from Sweden to Germany. We did not consider these reports altogether impossible, because, as documentary evidence from the last World War proves, Churchill had seriously considered the occupation of Norway.
DR. SIEMERS: Was there a further source for reports of that kind?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Admiral Carls, the Commander-in-Chief of Group North, had received similar reports which he passed on orally and in writing.
DR. SIEMERS: Do you remember any details from these reports which you could give us quite briefly?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. There were reports concerning the presence of British air crews in Oslo, allegedly posing as civilians. There were reports about Allied officers making surveys of Norwegian bridges, viaducts, and tunnels all the way to the Swedish border, which was taken as an indication that the transportation of heavy material and equipment was planned. And last but not least there were reports about a secret mobilization of Swedish troops because of the alleged danger to the ore areas.
DR. SIEMERS: What danger arose for Germany on account of that?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: If Norway were to have been actually occupied, the conduct of the war in the North Sea would have become almost impossible, and it would have been very difficult in the Baltic Sea. The ore imports most probably would have been stopped. The danger from the air would have become terrible for north Germany and the eastern territories. In the long run the North Sea and the Baltic would have been blocked completely, which eventually would have led to the total loss of the war.
DR. SIEMERS: What did Admiral Raeder do on the basis of these considerations?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: He reported to Hitler about his misgivings and called his attention to the dangers.
DR. SIEMERS: When was that report made?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: If I remember correctly, in the autumn of ’39.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, until the adjournment, will you go very slowly because, owing to the power of the electrical recording being off, what is happening here in Court is impossible to take and therefore we have to rely solely upon the shorthand notes which cannot be checked back against the electrical recording. Do you understand? Therefore I want you to go rather more slowly than usual.
DR. SIEMERS: When was the conference between Hitler and Raeder in which Raeder for the first time pointed out these dangers?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: In October 1939.
DR. SIEMERS: According to the War Diary that conference took place, which of course you cannot remember offhand, on 10 October. At any rate you probably mean that conference.
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Did Hitler then, as a result of that conference, make a final decision?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, in no way at all.
DR. SIEMERS: Did discussions about that subject then take place continually between Hitler and Raeder?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No. No further discussions along that line took place then until perhaps the end of the year. Only when the reports which I mentioned before were received in increasing numbers was that subject taken up again.
DR. SIEMERS: Is it known to you that in December 1939 Quisling came to Berlin and also talked with Raeder?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, that is known to me, and I took part in that meeting.
DR. SIEMERS: What did Quisling tell Raeder?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Quisling came on a recommendation from Rosenberg and said he had important news of a military and political nature. He confirmed, more or less, the things which we knew already.
DR. SIEMERS: Were only the military dangers discussed in this conference?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Only these things were discussed; the conference was very short.
DR. SIEMERS: No political questions were discussed?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, not at all.
DR. SIEMERS: Do you know when Raeder met Quisling for the first time?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: On the occasion of that visit.
DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder have at that time any close connections with Rosenberg?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, he knew him casually, having just seen him a few times.
DR. SIEMERS: Had Rosenberg informed Raeder before about the relations between Rosenberg and Quisling?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, not to my knowledge.
DR. SIEMERS: What did Raeder do when Quisling confirmed the reports received from Canaris and other sources?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: As the things we suspected were confirmed from Norway, Raeder considered this so serious that he went immediately to Hitler.
DR. SIEMERS: Do you also know what he suggested to Hitler?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Hitler wanted to talk to Quisling himself.
DR. SIEMERS: And that took place?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, it did.
DR. SIEMERS: Was a final decision made then concerning Norway, in December 1939?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, Hitler directed that as a countermeasure, theoretical preparations should be made for a German landing in Norway. The order, the final order, as far as I know was not given until March.
DR. SIEMERS: Was the landing in Norway an undertaking which you and Raeder considered a risky one or was it considered absolutely safe to do so?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, Raeder and the gentlemen from the Naval Operations Staff and also the front commanders considered that undertaking very risky. I remember Churchill’s speech in Parliament when he said, after he had been questioned about that matter, that he did not believe the German Navy would undertake that risk in face of the British Navy.
DR. SIEMERS: Do you know when Churchill made that statement, approximately?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I believe it was between 7 and 9 April.
DR. SIEMERS: 1940?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, 1940.
DR. SIEMERS: What was your estimate at the Naval Operations Staff of the risks of losses?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Raeder had told Hitler that he would have to reckon on the possible complete loss of the fleet, and that if the operations were carried out successfully he would have to be prepared for the loss of about 30 percent of the forces used.
DR. SIEMERS: And how much was lost?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: About 30 percent.
DR. SIEMERS: In view of the risk of losing the entire fleet, was Raeder at first in favor of that operation?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No. He considered a neutral attitude on the part of Norway as much better than having to take this risk.
DR. SIEMERS: The Prosecution have asserted that Raeder and the Naval Operations Staff recommended the occupation of Norway out of the desire for fame and conquest. What do you say about that?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: The desire for fame was not in Raeder’s character. The plans for operations which came from his desk bore the mark of bold daring, but also of thorough planning. One does not work out plans to the minutest detail covering the distance from German ports up to Narvik, which is about that from Nuremberg to Madrid, and one does not use the Navy against a superior British fleet for the sake of fame.
Raeder had told the Naval Operations Staff and the front commanders that he had to carry out that operation against all the rules of warfare because there was a compelling necessity to do so.
DR. SIEMERS: When did the actual drafting of the military operation take place at the Naval Operations Staff?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: February 1940.
DR. SIEMERS: During the period from December 1939 until March 1940 did you continue to receive reports from the sources you have mentioned?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Did these later reports contain a clearer indication as to the place of the landings, or did you not see the details about that?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, they covered the areas between Narvik via Bergen to Trondheim, from Bergen to Oslo.
DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder—excuse me, I want to put the question differently: What was the basis which Raeder suggested to Hitler for the relations between Germany and Norway?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: To that I would like to...
DR. SIEMERS: Excuse me, I mean in the period after the operation was carried out and Germany had occupied Norway.
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Raeder in speaking to Hitler advocated a policy of peace. He suggested repeatedly that attempts should be made for peace with Norway. He was in agreement in that respect with the German Commander-in-Chief in Norway, Generaladmiral Böhm, while Terboven, who was directing political matters, was of a somewhat different opinion.
DR. SIEMERS: Did serious conflicts arise in that respect between Terboven and his civil administration on the one side, and Raeder and Böhm and his colleague, Korvettenkapitän Schreiber, on the other?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, there were serious differences and quarrels all the way up the line to Hitler. Hitler at that time told Raeder that he could not make peace with Norway because of France.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, you said, “because of France.” Was it not possible to make peace with France also, and what was Raeder’s attitude in that regard?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Raeder advocated the same thing concerning France.
DR. SIEMERS: And what did he say?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: He tried to arrange a conference with Admiral Darlan in an effort to forward these matters. He had pointed out to Hitler, when the Atlantic Coast was fortified, that it would be better and more practical to make peace with France than to make great though inadequate sacrifices for defense. Hitler replied that he fully agreed but out of consideration for Italy he could not conclude a peace treaty with France.
DR. SIEMERS: Did the conversations between Raeder and Darlan take place?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, near Paris.
DR. SIEMERS: Were you present?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, Admiral Schultze, the Commanding Admiral in France.
DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder tell you whether the results of the conversation were favorable?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, he told me about the very favorable results.
DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder report on that to Hitler?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: And in spite of that, Hitler refused?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Out of consideration for Mussolini.
DR. SIEMERS: According to your knowledge, did the Party or the leadership of the SS through Heydrich attempt to fight Raeder?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Heydrich repeatedly attempted to bring Raeder and the Navy into discredit with Hitler through defamatory remarks and by spying, either by posting spies in the officers corps or the casinos, or by misrepresenting or distorting news. Against these attacks, Raeder defended himself tenaciously and successfully.
DR. SIEMERS: Why was the Party against Raeder?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: That is a question which is very difficult to answer. I believe mainly because, first of all, there were differences in the religious field. Many commanders before they put to sea for combat turned to Raeder for help so that during their absence their relatives would not have their religious freedom curtailed.
DR. SIEMERS: When did the first differences occur between Raeder and Hitler, and during what period did Raeder ask for his dismissal?
THE PRESIDENT: We have had that from that defendant himself, have we not? Raeder told us when he asked for it. No cross-examination about it.
DR. SIEMERS: Then may I ask you for what reasons Raeder remained?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: First, because Hitler himself had asked him to stay, and gave him assurances for the integrity of the Navy. Furthermore, at that time, there were discussions about combining the Navy and the merchant marine into one ministry and putting Party people into that ministry. In that event we did not see a strengthening but a weakening of our fighting force. Besides, during that period there occurred a gap in the line of successors, due to illness and losses.
And last but not least, Raeder remained in the war out of a sense of responsibility and patriotism.
DR. SIEMERS: Did you yourself ask Raeder to remain in office?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. I had to ask Raeder frequently and very seriously. I myself was once ordered by Hitler to come to the Reich Chancellery.
DR. SIEMERS: When was that?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: In the beginning of 1939, when he explained his standpoint to me in a long conversation and asked me to convince Raeder that he had to stay. Moreover, he enjoyed the confidence of the Navy. The senior officers and officials of the Navy had asked me orally and in writing to try to persuade Raeder not to leave his office prematurely. Since 1928 he had led the Navy with a firm hand through all political vicissitudes.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, may I return again to your conversation with Hitler in the beginning of 1939? Did you speak with Hitler alone?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, that was a private conversation of about an hour and a half.
DR. SIEMERS: Did Hitler tell you anything about his political plans on that occasion?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No; not about political plans in the sense of what is called politics, but he tried once more to bridge political differences with Raeder. He told me one should not weigh each individual word of his. His visitors were right, but only after they had left; he would put forward records and witnesses; all he wanted was to appeal to the emotions of his listeners and to stir them up to do their utmost, but not to commit himself with words. In the future he promised he would try to give the Navy independence in all technical questions.
DR. SIEMERS: You just said “not to weigh each individual word.” Admiral, were the speeches of Hitler ever taken down accurately, that is, by stenographers?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, but as far as I know only in the later part of the war. Hitler was against having his words put on record, because everyone who listened to him returned home with his own opinion. He himself did not stick to his text; he thought out loud and wanted to carry his listeners away, but he did not want his individual words to be taken literally. I spoke about that to Raeder very frequently. We always knew what was expected of us, but we never knew what Hitler himself thought or wanted.
DR. SIEMERS: If Hitler did not want to be taken at his word, how did it come about that he agreed in the war to have his speeches taken down by stenographers?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I told you before that too many misunderstandings had occurred, and that Hitler as well as those who reported to him believed that everyone had convinced the other of his opinion. Thereupon they started keeping minutes. The minutes kept up to then were personal impressions of those who were not instructed to keep them but who did so on their initiative.
THE PRESIDENT: What time is the witness speaking of? He said up to then the minutes had been kept on the personal initiative of the person who took them. What time is he speaking of?
DR. SIEMERS: From what time, according to your recollection, were these minutes taken by the stenographers?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: From 1942, I believe.
DR. SIEMERS: From 1942?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: It might also be 1941. During the war, at any rate.
DR. SIEMERS: But your conversation with Hitler was in January 1939?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, January 1939.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, what did the stenographic minutes look like later on? Did you ever see them?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: We repeatedly asked for excerpts from the minutes and tried to compare them with the prepared text and they too contained contradictions.
DR. SIEMERS: Now, I come to the period when Hitler prepared for war against Russia, and I am going to show you the Directive Number 21, of 18 December 1940, concerning the Case Barbarossa.
Mr. President, that is Document Number 446-PS, Exhibit USA-31, in the Document Book of the British Prosecution Number 10a, Page 247.
[Turning to the witness.] The Prosecution have asserted that Raeder or the Naval Operations Staff had taken part in the drafting of that directive; is that correct?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, that is not correct. The Navy had nothing to do with the drafting of that directive.
DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder have any previous knowledge of Hitler’s plan to attack Russia, before he received that directive?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, by an oral communication from Hitler to Raeder, about the middle of August 1940—or October 1940.
DR. SIEMERS: October 1940. Did Raeder inform you about his conferences with Hitler concerning Russia, and what attitude did he adopt in these conferences?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Raeder informed me fully, because the prospect of war with Russia was much too serious to be taken lightly. Raeder opposed most energetically any plan for a war against Russia; and, I should like to say, for moral reasons because Raeder was of the opinion that the pact with Russia should not be broken as long as the other side gave no cause for it. That, as far as Raeder knew, was not the case in October. That economic treaty—as we called it at that time—to our knowledge was about 90 percent at the expense of the Navy. We gave Russia one heavy cruiser, heavy artillery for battleships, artillery installations, submarine engines, submarine installations, and valuable optical instruments for use on submarines. Besides, Raeder was of the opinion that the theater of operations should not be allowed to be carried into the Baltic Sea. The Baltic Sea was our drill field, I might say. All our recruits were trained there; all our submarine training took place in the Baltic Sea.
We had already partly stripped the Baltic coast of batteries and personnel for the purpose of protecting the Norwegian and the French coasts. We had very small oil reserves at our disposal, the synthetic oil production was not yet in full swing. The Navy had to turn over some of its reserves to industry and agriculture. Consequently, Raeder was strongly opposed to waging war against Russia.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, the Prosecution believe that Raeder was only opposed to the date set for the war against Russia and concludes this from the War Diary in which actually the entries refer to the date. Is that correct?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, that is not correct. After the receipt of Directive 21, called Barbarossa, Raeder approached Hitler again with reference to the war against Russia, and also put down his thoughts in a memorandum. He tried to convince Hitler of the following: Poland had been crushed, France had been occupied, and, for military reasons, an invasion of England was out of the question. He said clearly that now the time had arrived when the further conduct of the war could not be decisive on the Continent, but in the Atlantic. Therefore, he told him that he had to concentrate all forces at his disposal on one objective: To hit the strategic points of the Empire, especially the supply lines to the British Isles in order to compel England to sue for negotiations or, if possible, to make peace. He suggested, as has been mentioned before, that the policy of peace with Norway should be pursued, peace with France, and closer co-operation with the Russian Navy, such as was provided for in the economic treaty, and the repurchase of submarine equipment or submarines. He said that the decision or the date for a decision no longer rested with us because we did not have the necessary sea power and that in case of a long duration of the war the danger of the participation of the United States had also to be considered; that therefore the war could not be decided on the European continent and least of all in the vastnesses of the Russian steppes. That point of view he continued to present to Hitler as long as he was in office.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, you said at first that Raeder had protested, in principle as you have expressed it, for moral reasons, that is, for reasons of international law.
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Why was not that entered into the War Diary when the other reasons that you have mentioned can be found in the War Diary? At least they are alluded to.
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: That I can answer, or at least give you an explanation. Raeder, as a matter of principle, never criticized the political leadership in the presence of the gentlemen of the Naval Operations Staff or the front commanders. Therefore, he did not speak to me and the others about the private conversations which he had with Hitler, except when it was necessary for military reasons.
DR. SIEMERS: When were the preparations by the Navy, on the basis of Directive 21 that you have in front of you, made? Do you remember that?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I believe about 3 months later.
DR. SIEMERS: At any rate, certainly after the directive?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, after the directive.
DR. SIEMERS: Were they made on the basis of that directive?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: On the basis of that, yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Was that directive already a final order or was it just a precautionary strategic measure?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: In my estimation it should not be considered as an order, and that can be seen from Points IV and V.
DR. SIEMERS: In what way?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Point V says that Hitler was still waiting for reports from commanders-in-chief. And Raeder still reported to Hitler after he had received the directive.
DR. SIEMERS: Is Point IV, if you will look at it once more, also in accordance with your opinion?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, absolutely. The words “precautionary measures” are underlined.
DR. SIEMERS: Precautionary measures for what?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: In case of war against Russia.
DR. SIEMERS: Well, I think, Admiral, since you have mentioned it yourself, you should read the sentence which follows the words “precautionary measures.”
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: “In case Russia should change her attitude, she is...”
THE PRESIDENT: You cannot argue with your own witness about the meaning of the words. He has given his answer.
DR. SIEMERS: Very well.
[Turning to the witness.] Was Raeder of the opinion, at any time, that he had succeeded in dissuading Hitler from the unfortunate plans against Russia?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. After he had made his report at that time, he returned and said, “I believe I have talked him out of his plan.” And at first we did have that impression because in the following months there were no more conferences about it, to my knowledge, not even with the General Staff.
DR. SIEMERS: May I ask you quite briefly then about Greece. According to Document C-152, which I will have shown to you, Raeder made a report to Hitler on 18 March 1941, in which he asked that the whole of Greece should be occupied. What were the reasons that caused the High Command, that is, Raeder and you, to make that suggestion?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: When Raeder asked for authorization, as it says here in the War Diary, for the occupation of the whole of Greece, even in the event of a peaceful settlement, we, according to my recollection, had already been for 3 months in possession of the directive which was concerned with the occupation of Greece, and when...
DR. SIEMERS: Excuse me. Was that Directive Number 20? I will have it shown to you. Is that the one you mean?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, “Marita,” that is the one.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, that is Document Number 1541-PS, Exhibit GB-13, in the Document Book of the British Prosecution 10a, Page 270. That is Directive Number 20, Case Marita of 13 December 1940.
[Turning to the witness.] Admiral, what caused Raeder, apart from that point which Hitler had already explained, to ask that specific question again in the month of March, that is to say, on 18 March?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: A British landing had already occurred in the south of Greece a few days before.
DR. SIEMERS: Did this landing make it necessary to occupy the whole of Greece?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, for strategic reasons, absolutely. The menace of an occupation from the sea or from the air, or the formation of a Balkan front against Germany, or the menace from the air to the oil fields, had to be eliminated under all circumstances. May I only remind you of the Salonika operation in the first World War. I believe that was a similar situation.
DR. SIEMERS: Here again the Prosecution say this was governed by the desire for conquest and fame. Is that correct?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I should like to answer that fame requires achievements, and I do not know what the Navy could have conquered in the Mediterranean. We did not have a single man or a single ship down there; but Raeder, of course, for the strategic reasons I have mentioned, had to advise Hitler in that direction.
DR. SIEMERS: Were breaches of neutrality on the part of Greece known to you before this time, before we occupied Greece?
SCHULTE-MÖNTING: We had been informed that in 1939, certain Greek political and military circles had been in the closest connection with the Allied General Staff. We knew that Greek merchantmen were in British service. Therefore we were compelled to consider the Greek merchantmen which sailed through the prohibited zone to England as enemy ships. And, I believe, in the beginning of 1940, or the middle of 1940, we received information that the Allies intended to land in Greece or to establish a Balkan front against Germany.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now.