Morning Session
[The Defendant Jodl resumed the stand.]
THE MARSHAL: If it please the Tribunal, the report is made that Defendant Seyss-Inquart is absent.
PROFESSOR DR. HERBERT KRAUS (Counsel for Defendant Schacht): Mr. President, in agreement with the Prosecution I ask permission to submit a memorandum by Hitler, concerning the Four Year Plan of 1936. It is a certified copy, certified by a British officer in Dustbin Camp. I have numbered it Exhibit Schacht-48. In the afternoon session of 1 May my friend Dr. Dix referred to this memorandum, which could not at that time be incorporated into the record. Dr. Schacht then quoted a few passages from this memorandum. The President stated that we could submit the memorandum at a later date on condition, of course, that the Prosecution agreed. The Prosecution has acquiesced and I therefore trust that I may now be permitted to submit it.
Furthermore I am handing in a number of English translations. I regret I have not yet been able to have translations made in the other languages, and I ask permission to supply those translations later on.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kraus, until the other translations are actually made, the documents will not become part of the record.
DR. KRAUS: No. The English translations are available, and the others are not yet ready. May I submit them later?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly. And they will then become part of the record.
DR. KRAUS: Yes, as a supplement to the document book.
DR. EXNER: Generaloberst, you told us yesterday that you were the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff during the war and that your main task consisted in the preparation of military operational plans. That is correct, is it not?
JODL: That is correct.
DR. EXNER: Then, where did you get the plans? Who decided what plans you had to make?
JODL: It was the same as in any other military staff. The Commander-in-Chief—in this case the Führer personally—received data for the decisions to be made: maps, strength returns of both our own and enemy forces, and information about the enemy. He then made his own decisions, and thereupon I would set my general staff to work, giving these decisions the military form necessary for the entire machinery of the Wehrmacht.
DR. EXNER: Now, in the course of these tasks and studies you also had to work on operations which were never actually carried out?
JODL: I have prepared a great number of such operations. Of the total number of operations for which I prepared orders and instructions there was only one which I definitely knew would be carried out; that was the operation against Yugoslavia. In the case of all the other operational plans, the decision as to whether it would be carried out or not remained undecided for a long time.
As an example of operational plans which had been drafted in every detail but which were never carried out, I mention the invasion of England, the march into Spain, the seizure of Gibraltar, the seizure of Malta, the capture of the Fischer Peninsula near Petsamo, and a winter attack on Kandalakscha on the Murmansk Railway.
DR. EXNER: Then, did these tasks of yours cover all the theaters of the war?
JODL: At the beginning of the war the work of my general staff did not apply to theaters of war at all, but the Führer’s instructions went only to the branches of the Wehrmacht—that is to the Army, the Navy and the Air Force; and it was only in the Norwegian campaign that circumstances developed for the first time so that the Armed Forces Operations Staff was made responsible for a theater of war. And this condition changed completely when in the beginning of 1942 the Führer himself assumed supreme command in the Army. Kesselring has already been asked about this, but did not answer. However, it stands to reason that the Führer, as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, could not issue orders through Jodl to himself in his capacity of Commander-in-Chief of the Army and then have them carried out through Generaloberst Zeitzler. Consequently a separation came about. From that moment on he, with the General Staff of the Army, directed the entire Eastern Front, while the Armed Forces Operations Staff became responsible for the general staff work of all the other theaters of war.
DR. EXNER: Now, the witness Field Marshal Paulus stated before the Tribunal that the OKW was responsible for the order to hold Stalingrad; and, as a matter of fact, both Keitel and Jodl have been repeatedly accused by the foreign press of having given that disastrous order. Is that true?
JODL: No, that is not true. The witness, for whom I feel the deepest sympathy and with whom I have worked in the most comradely fashion possible, could not have known anything at all about it. The facts are as follows: The moment danger threatened, the decision that Stalingrad must be held was made by the Führer during a private conversation with Generaloberst Zeitzler and contrary to the latter’s advice. Zeitzler told me so himself on his return from this interview. At a later stage, when blizzards were already raging across the steppes of the Don, the question of a break-through by the Stalingrad garrison was discussed again. Field Marshal Keitel, Generaloberst Zeitzler, and I were present on this occasion.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, I do not quite see how that is relevant, although Field Marshal Paulus may have said something about it. I mean, he may have given some evidence on the fighting at Stalingrad, and he undoubtedly did; but I do not see how it bears upon the case before us, or how it bears upon the case for Jodl.
DR. EXNER: Mr. President, this has already settled the matter. It was necessary to clear up Field Marshal Paulus’ error. But this has already settled the matter.
[Turning to the defendant.] We now come to the time when you were recalled from Vienna to Berlin in 1939. What state of affairs did you find in Berlin on your arrival?
JODL: I found a completely incomprehensible state of affairs in Berlin—at least it was incomprehensible to me. Nobody knew what was really true or what was bluff. The pact with Russia sustained all our hopes for the preservation of peace, hopes which were immensely increased and strengthened by the surprise cancellation of the attack ordered for 26 August. None of the soldiers to whom I spoke expected a war with the Western Powers at that time. Nothing had been prepared except the operations for the attack on Poland.
There was only a defensive deployment of troops on the West Wall. The forces stationed there were so weak that we could not even man all the pillboxes. The actual efforts for the preservation of peace, however, efforts I have heard about here from the Reich Marshal, the name of Dahlerus—all these negotiations remained unknown to me insofar as they were not published in the press. But there is one thing I can say in conclusion. When the declaration of war was received from England and France it was like a blow from a cudgel for us soldiers who had fought in the first World War. And I heard in confidence from General Stapf—today the matter is no longer confidential—that the Reich Marshal reacted in exactly the same way.
DR. EXNER: Do you know when Poland mobilized?
JODL: That I cannot say. I only know that at the moment when I arrived in Berlin and was being informed by General Von Stülpnagel for the very first time about the situation and our own strength, a Polish deployment was already in progress along the frontier, as well as the German one.
DR. EXNER: That in itself already answers the accusation brought against you in the trial brief, namely “planning against Poland.”
Had you prepared a plan against Poland?
JODL: No. Not by a single stroke of the pen did I participate in the preparations for the Polish war.
DR. EXNER: Then I am right in saying, to sum up, that when you left Berlin there was not yet a plan of operations against Poland?
JODL: No.
DR. EXNER: And when you returned to Berlin the plan was ready?
JODL: Yes. The plan of attack was completely worked out.
DR. EXNER: Did you hear the Führer’s speech of 22 August 1939 which has been so often quoted here?
JODL: No; on that day I was still in Vienna.
DR. EXNER: When did you hear of that speech?
JODL: For the first time here in Nuremberg.
DR. EXNER: Do you remember the meeting in the Führer’s special train on 9 September 1939, described here by General Lahousen? Can you remember that?
JODL: Yes, I remember that meeting perfectly.
DR. EXNER: What was the subject of conversation during that meeting while you were on the Führer’s train?
JODL: I met the Führer in the so-called command car, in the chartroom, where Field Marshal Keitel, Canaris, and Lahousen were; and then Canaris made a brief report on the information he had received from the West and expressed the opinion that a French attack in the Saarbrücken sector was imminent. The Führer contradicted this, and so did I. Apart from that nothing else was discussed.
DR. EXNER: Then Lahousen’s statement is correct that you were only present during that particular part of the discussion?
JODL: As far as I am concerned I have not a word of objection to raise against Lahousen’s statement. Absolutely correct.
DR. EXNER: Frequent mention has been made during this Trial of the artillery and air bombardment of Warsaw. Did you participate in the giving of the orders for this?
JODL: Yes, I participated insofar as the Commander-in-Chief of the Army had applied to the Führer for permission for the artillery to bombard Warsaw as soon as the deployment of artillery units had been completed. The Führer refused this. He said, “What is happening here because of the Poles is madness.” He ordered me to draft new leaflets—which I did personally and immediately—and have them dropped again over the city of Warsaw. It was only when this renewed demand to cease the hopeless resistance had proved absolutely unsuccessful that he sanctioned artillery bombardment and air attacks on the fortress of Warsaw—and I emphasize the word “fortress.”
DR. EXNER: When issuing orders, did you have anything to do with the co-ordination of German and Soviet Russian operations?
JODL: Yes. When we were still 3 days’ march away from the Vistula, I was informed to my great surprise—by, I believe, the representative of the Foreign Office—while I was entering the Führer’s headquarters, that Soviet Russia would occupy the Polish territories...
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, if it is convenient to you, I think you might speak a little faster.
JODL: ...that the Polish territories east of an agreed demarcation line would be occupied by Soviet Russian troops at the appointed time. When we were approaching this agreed demarcation line, which was shown to me on a map—the line was the East Prussian Lithuanian border, Narew, Vistula, San—I telephoned to our military attaché in Moscow and informed him that we could probably reach individual points of this demarcation line in the course of the following day. Shortly afterwards I was informed over the telephone that the Russian divisions were not yet ready.
When, the day after the next, we reached the demarcation line and had to cross it in pursuit of the Poles, I once again received news from Moscow, at 0200 hours, that the Soviet Russian divisions would take up their position along the entire front at 0400 hours. This maneuver was punctually carried out, and I then drafted an order to our German troops that wherever they had contacted the troops of the Soviet Union, and in agreement with them, they were to withdraw behind the demarcation line.
DR. EXNER: Do you know on what day all this happened?
JODL: I cannot tell you exactly when the troops reached the line, but I would say it was about 14 or 15 September.
DR. EXNER: We shall now deal with aggressive wars against the neutral countries...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, now all that the defendant has just been telling us seems to be to me a simple waste of our time, with absolutely no relevance to this case at all; and why you let him do it, I do not know.
DR. EXNER: You have been accused of having used your personal influence and your close relations with the Führer to attack a whole series of neutral countries. Tell me, is that true?
JODL: No, it is untrue. I remember that a witness here spoke of a sinister influence, of a key position of a sinister kind—at any rate, something sinister. But my influence on the Führer was unfortunately not in the least as great as it might, or perhaps even ought to have been in view of the position I held. The reason lay in the powerful personality of this despot who never suffered advisers gladly.
DR. EXNER: When did you first hear of a plan for a possible occupation of Norway?
JODL: The Führer first spoke to me—I think it was in mid-November 1939—at any rate, a fairly long time after Grossadmiral Raeder had first spoken to him. At that first conference, which I believe took place on 10 October, I had not yet heard of anything nor did the Führer give me any information. But in the middle of November he spoke to me about it. I first learned the details during the oral report made by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, which took place on 12 November and at which I was present.
DR. EXNER: In this connection I would draw your attention to Document C-64, Exhibit GB-86, Page 46 of the document book. But I do not need to read it aloud. Volume I, Page 46.
What was the Führer’s point of view?
JODL: The general attitude of the Führer at that time was—it is also established in writing: “I am not at all interested in extending the theaters of war, but if the danger of an occupation of Norway by England really exists and if that is true, then the situation would be quite different.”
DR. EXNER: Was anything ordered at that time?
JODL: Nothing was ordered at that time, but he merely instructed me to think this problem over generally. The preliminary work, as has been proved by documents, began on 27 January 1940.
DR. EXNER: That may be seen from Document C-63, Exhibit GB-87.
Were you at that time of the opinion that the assurance given by Hitler in December and October 1939 that Norwegian neutrality would be respected—were you of the opinion that this assurance was given for the purpose of lulling Norway into a state of security, as has been alleged by the Prosecution?
JODL: That allegation can be definitely refuted, and by means of a few dates which I shall now enumerate. These assurances, these political assurances, were given by the Führer—or by the Reich Government, I do not know which—on 2 September and 6 October. On 9 October the Führer read and signed the famous memorandum known as Document L-52. I do not know whether the Tribunal is aware of the fact that it is a personal memorandum by the Führer.
DR. EXNER: That is Document L-52, Exhibit USA-540. It is printed on Page 48, Volume I, of my document book.
In this memorandum—for whom was the memorandum prepared?
JODL: This memorandum, as I think is obvious from the document, went out to the three Commanders-in-Chief and to the Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces. It was dictated word for word by the Führer himself and was completed in 2 nights.
DR. EXNER: I shall read Paragraph 2, printed on Page 48 of my document book:
“The Nordic States.
“Their neutrality, provided no completely unforeseen circumstances arise, may be assumed also for the future. The continuation of German trade with these countries appears possible, even if the war is of long duration.”
JODL: It is quite out of the question that the Führer, in this extremely secret memorandum, could have mentioned anything but his true purpose at that particular time. That, however, is all the more comprehensible since it was not until 1 day later, namely 10 October, that Grossadmiral Raeder first mentioned these fears to the Führer.
DR. EXNER: Was the occupation of Norway a very weighty decision for the leadership?
JODL: It was a terribly weighty decision. To put it shortly—it meant gambling with the entire German fleet. The result of it was that we had to defend a coastline of over 3,000 kilometers, and that meant that nearly 300,000 men were lying idle there. The decision, therefore, depended on really reliable information that Norway was threatened by actual danger. That is the reason why no definite date was fixed for this operation “Weserübung,” and the reason why I at a later date suggested that the forces for the Norway operation, in case it became necessary, and for an attack in the West, should be completely separate from each other.
DR. EXNER: What were the reasons why the occupation had to be prepared in every detail?
JODL: The reasons are quite openly and definitely stated in the order of 1 March 1940 which is Document C-174...
DR. EXNER: That is Exhibit GB-89.
JODL: Yes; we had to be prepared in any case.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that Document 174-PS, or what?
DR. EXNER: It is not printed in my document book. It refers to a document which the British Prosecution has submitted under Exhibit GB-89.
THE PRESIDENT: But 174 must mean something, must it not? The document said Document 174.
DR. EXNER: Document C-174.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, it is C-174.
THE PRESIDENT: C-174. Very well.
MR. ROBERTS: And it was put in by Mr. Elwyn Jones, in Document Book 3.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. EXNER: Now, you say in your diary that the Führer was searching for a justification. The meaning has already been explained here; but you yourself should know best what the meaning is, since you wrote it yourself. What does it mean?
JODL: The Führer said in those days, when I wrote it—not in a diary, but in my notebook, my memorandum book—he said: “To carry out a decision of this kind I need absolutely reliable information with which I can really justify this decision before the world and prove that it was necessary. I cannot tell, I only heard the following from Herr Quisling...” And for this reason he kept the Intelligence Service in particular very busy at this time, in order to get even more precise information for the Führer about these many reports which we received...
DR. EXNER: Now, Grossadmiral Raeder has explained the facts from which England’s plans could be deduced. Have you anything to add to that, or is the question settled?
JODL: On the whole, Grossadmiral Raeder has already submitted all the information. There is one thing which remains in my memory and which is also written in my notebook. That is the special insistence, quite openly advocated in the French press, that under all circumstances Germany must be cut off from the Swedish ore supplies. Then came the mine-laying in Norwegian territorial waters; and then came the Altmark case which, according to my study of international law, was a flagrant breach of the agreement ruling the rights and duties of neutral states in naval warfare, and Articles 1 and 2...
DR. EXNER: Regarding the first two points which the witness has mentioned, I should like to draw attention to Document 1809-PS—that is, his diary, Exhibit GB-88, Page 53 of Volume I of my collection. There is an entry on 10 March:
“The news about the Finnish-Russian negotiations is very gratifying from a political point of view. The French press is furious about it, because it considers it necessary to cut Germany off from Swedish ore.”
And then the entry of 25 March:
“The English have begun to molest or to fire on our merchantmen in Danish and Norwegian territorial waters.”
Now, please tell us what gave rise to the decision to attack?
JODL: The Führer’s final decision was made on 2 April and was made on the basis of two pieces of information. First, the reports from the Navy regarding repeated firing on German merchant ships both in Norwegian and Danish territorial waters. Second, a report from Canaris that British troops and transports were lying in a state of readiness in the northern part of the English east coast.
DR. EXNER: What would have been the consequences for us if England had got there first?
JODL: As to that I can refer to Grossadmiral Raeder’s testimony, and can only say that once Norway was in British hands the war would have been half lost for us. We would have been strategically encircled on the northern flank and because of the weakness of our fleet we would have been incapable of ever rectifying this again.
DR. EXNER: Was indisputable proof found later that the British plan really existed?
JODL: We captured the entire records of the British brigade which landed in Namsos and in other places. We surprised and captured the British war correspondent Romilly in Narvik, where he expected anything rather than the arrival of German ships, otherwise he could have escaped capture. To the question what he wanted to report about the war in peaceful Narvik he could not give us any information at all.
Later on we captured all the records of the French General Staff, a part of which have already been presented by Admiral Raeder’s counsel. Particularly instructive, and of great interest to me, were the diaries carried by the English officers and some of the noncommissioned officers whom we captured in Norway. At least they proved one thing, namely, that all these troops had already been embarked and had been put ashore again the moment our German fleet advanced towards Norway.
DR. EXNER: I should like to refer again to two entries in the diary, Page 54, Volume I of my document book, the entry of 24 April and the entry of 26 April. There it says:
“Major Soltmann reports on the interrogation of the Englishmen and submits additional important documents, among them the secret Army list. At noon the first prisoners arrived in Berlin. They are being interrogated in the Alexander Barracks and confirm the authenticity of the orders. All the material is being handed over to the Foreign Office.”
In conclusion, I also draw your attention again to Soltmann’s interrogatory. It is Document AJ, Number 4, Exhibit Jodl-57, which I now present; Page 173 of Volume II. I need not read it aloud; I merely draw your attention to Soltmann’s answers to questions 4 and 5.
Now, one last question about this Norwegian affair. The English representative of the Prosecution has said that this shows how honorable the soldiers were who attacked Norway and then made use of lies and excuses. What do you say about this?
JODL: The Prosecution has thereby placed a purely operational problem on the level of soldierly or human honor. Until now that has never been the custom in this world. I can only say that I neither attacked Norwegians, nor did I resort to lies or excuses. But I did use all my strength to contribute to the success of an operation which I considered absolutely necessary in order to forestall a similar action on the part of the English. If the seals of the archives are ever broken, the rightness of my attitude will then be clearly shown. But even if it were wrong, the honesty of my own subjective opinion at that time cannot for that reason be changed in any way.
DR. EXNER: We will now talk about the war in the West. After the end of the Polish campaign, was there already an operational plan for attacks in the West?
JODL: No. To begin with, there was no plan of attack in the West; but, on the contrary, there was, particularly in the Army, a widespread opinion that the war would die a natural death if only we kept quiet in the West. That went so far that the Commander-in-Chief of the Army transformed even mobile infantry divisions into fortress divisions, and took away all their mobile equipment from them.
DR. EXNER: Did you already know during the Polish campaign what the Führer’s intentions were concerning the West?
JODL: The Führer himself had his doubts during the Polish campaign. He too could find no plausible explanation for the complete inactivity of the French and English forces in France, who only staged a kind of a sham war with the help of their war communiqués. In reality not a single shot was fired at the front. But by the end of September, if I remember rightly, the Führer did realize that once England enters a war she fights it out to the bitter end.
DR. EXNER: As an officer of the General Staff you should be able to answer the following questions better than anybody else. Could we, from a purely strategical viewpoint, have remained purely on the defensive as far as the West was concerned?
JODL: I shall be very brief since such problems are not directly connected with the Trial. I will only say that it would have been the greatest possible error of strategy, because the superiority we possessed at that time would necessarily have diminished in proportion to our delay in making aggressive use of it; for England was continually bringing further divisions over to France, just as the French were from their colonial empire.
I believe I need say no more about that.
DR. EXNER: I draw your attention to Document C-62, Exhibit GB-106, Volume I of my document book, Page 56. I need not, however, read it aloud. It is a directive for the conduct of the war, and contains the basic ideas which we have already heard expressed.
JODL: One thing more is perhaps important. The Führer took such a serious view of this danger, that we might not maintain our superiority in the long run, that he actually wanted to attack in the winter, although all soldiers without exception advised him against it.
DR. EXNER: Here attention might be drawn to our document, Volume I, Pages 48 and 49. It is a memorandum of the Führer on the conduct of the war in the West, from which Jodl has already quoted Document L-52, Exhibit USA-540. A detailed justification of this is on Page 49 of my document book.
Why then was France not attacked without violating the neutrality of Holland, Luxembourg, and Belgium?
JODL: It was no trifle for the Führer to create new enemies possessing a strength of 500,000 men, which the Dutch and Belgian forces represented. It resulted in our having to make the attack in the West with actually inferior forces, namely, with 110 divisions against approximately 135 of the enemy. No military commander would do that except in an emergency.
DR. EXNER: Now, what were the reasons?
JODL: We were not in a position to break through the Maginot Line at its strongest points, which would then have remained uncaptured—namely, between the Rhine and the Luxembourg border, or the Upper Rhine where the Vosges mountains were an additional obstacle in breaking through this West Wall at these points, this Maginot Line. For this purpose heavy artillery was lacking. But that was not a moral reason; it was, in fact, rather an unmoral one.
The great danger lay in the fact that so protracted an attack on the fortifications exposed us to an attack in the rear by the combined English and French mobile forces thrusting through Belgium and Holland; and they were north of Lille with their engines already running, one might say, for this very task. And the decisive factor was that owing to the many reports which reached us, the Führer and we ourselves, the soldiers, were definitely under the impression that the neutrality of Belgium and Holland was really only pretended and deceptive.
DR. EXNER: How did you arrive at that conclusion?
JODL: Individually the reports are not of great interest. There was, however, an endless number of reports from Canaris. They were supplemented and confirmed by letters from the Duce, Mussolini. But what was absolutely proved and completely certain, which I could see for myself on the maps every day, were the nightly flights to and fro of the Royal Air Force, completely unconcerned about neutral Dutch and Belgian territory. This necessarily strengthened the conviction in us that even if the two countries wished to—and perhaps in the beginning they did so wish—they could not possibly remain neutral in the long run.
DR. EXNER: What danger would the occupation of Belgium and Holland by the English and French have meant to us?
JODL: Those dangers were quite clearly indicated by the Führer, first, in his memorandum, Document L-52, which has been repeatedly quoted. There, on Page 48 of the document book, in the last paragraph of the page, is a reference to the enormous importance of the Ruhr—of which, incidentally, there seems to be quite sufficient evidence even today.
In his address of 23 November 1939 to the Commanders-in-Chief—Document 789-PS, or Exhibit USA-23—he describes once more, on Page 59, Volume I of the document book, precisely how that danger would be for the Ruhr district if one day British and French forces were to appear by surprise in that region. He referred to it there as the “Achilles’ heel,” and that is just what it was for German war strategy.
DR. EXNER: And he said there, on Page 59 of our document book:
“We have an Achilles’ heel: the Ruhr district. The strategy of the war depends on the possession of the Ruhr district. If England and France thrust through Belgium and Holland into the Ruhr, we shall be in the very greatest danger.”
JODL: I cannot, of course, or could not at the time, swear to the absolute accuracy of the numerous reports from Canaris, but the material we captured afterwards—and in this connection I would draw your attention to the conference of the Supreme War Council in London of 17 November 1939—confirmed on the whole the accuracy of the intelligence reports.
DR. EXNER: Presumably you had no reason at that time to doubt Canaris’ honesty, had you?
JODL: No. At that time there was not the slightest reason for doubt.
DR. EXNER: Yes. But now some doubt has arisen as to his honesty.
Now, the German attack was originally planned for November 1939. Why did the Führer postpone it over and over again? We have before us no less than 17 orders postponing the attack time and again.
JODL: It is not quite correct to say that the Führer had ordered the attack for mid-November, but rather he wanted to order the attack for a time when the meteorologists could predict about 6 or 7 days of clear, frosty weather. But the meteorologists failed completely in this. At times they thought they could predict such a state of the weather, and then all preparations would be made for the attack. Then they would cancel their weather forecasts again, and the final preparations for attack would be discontinued once more. That is why we so often prepared for the attack and then refrained from carrying it out.
On such an occasion I received a report from Canaris to the effect that one unit of the French Army had already crossed one part of the Belgian frontier. I do not know if that is true.
DR. EXNER: You have been accused by the Prosecution of first deceiving these countries and then invading them. Please tell us what you have to say on that subject.
JODL: The same applies here as I said before. I was neither a politician, nor was I the military Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht. I was under the impression—and, indeed, an impression which could be proved—that in actual fact the neutrality of these two countries was no longer being respected. And as for the ethical code of my action, I must say that it was obedience—for obedience is really the ethical basis of the military profession. That I was far from extending this code of obedience to the blind code of obedience imposed on the slave has, I consider, been proved beyond all manner of doubt by my previous testimony. Nevertheless, you cannot get around the fact that, especially in operational matters of this particular kind, there can be no other course for the soldier but obedience.
And if the Prosecution today is in a position to indict German officers here at all, it owes this only to the ethical concept of obedience of its own brave soldiers.
DR. EXNER: We now come to the Balkans. In your diary, Document 1809-PS, on 19 March you made the following entry: “The Balkans should and must remain quiet.” That is on Page 61 of Volume I of my book, Exhibit GB-88, Document 1809-PS, the entry of 19 March. It says first:
“The Führer has returned beaming with joy and highly satisfied from the conference with the Duce. Complete agreement. ... The Balkans should and must remain quiet.”
What does that mean?
JODL: Herr Professor, I must correct you. This is not my diary.
DR. EXNER: Yes. Well then I must put in another question here. Your diary and your diaries are always being talked about. Explain just what this is—what we are dealing with here. Is one a real diary and the other not?
JODL: There is only one diary, and that is Document 1780-PS, which is from the year 1937 to 1938, and I used to make entries in it every evening.
DR. EXNER: And now this diary, Document 1809-PS, what was that?
JODL: I kept no diary at all during the war, but, of course, I filled up dozens of small notebooks. When one of these notebooks was full I marked important passages in red on the margin, and my secretary copied them out later, as they might be important for writing the history of the war and for the official diary of the Armed Forces Operations Staff. An example would be Document 1809-PS.
DR. EXNER: Did you check what your secretary had compiled?
JODL: No, I did not check it, and never saw it again. It fell then into the hands of the Prosecution.
DR. EXNER: Now, there is still a third one which is always quoted here as a diary. That is the Diary of the Armed Forces Operations Staff.
THE PRESIDENT: You said it fell into the hands of the Prosecution. Do you mean it was not one of the documents that you handed over to the Prosecution?
JODL: No. I did not know at all where those extracts from my notebook had gone. The Prosecution captured it somewhere or other. The remainder are extracts, and partial extracts, from the official Diary of the Armed Forces Operations Staff.
DR. EXNER: And who kept this, the official Diary of the Armed Forces Operations Staff? Not you?
JODL: No. It was always kept by a highly qualified expert of my own selection.
DR. EXNER: Did you check it?
JODL: The final check was made by Dr. Schramm, a professor at the Göttingen University.
DR. EXNER: We shall hear him as a witness.
Did you check the entries made in that official diary, or did you not?
JODL: I usually did not have the time; but if General Scherff read through it and discovered anything in particular he would draw my attention to it.
DR. EXNER: Well, so much for clearing that up.
We now come back to the Balkan question again. It says in your so-called diary, “The Balkans should and must remain quiet.” What was meant by that?
JODL: That was a brief note on the statement by the Führer—namely, that he was in perfect agreement with Mussolini that the Balkans must be kept quiet.
DR. EXNER: And did we not actually try to keep the Balkan states as quiet as possible?
JODL: Yes. We made unremitting endeavors for that. Our attitude toward Yugoslavia was as considerate as if we were dealing with a prima donna. Matters went so far that when we had to prepare the Greek campaign the Führer even refused a proposal from the Quartermaster General of the Army that sealed trains—the supply trains—should be sent through Yugoslavia, which would have been permissible according to international law. Moreover, we brought pressure to bear on Bulgaria so that she should not participate in the impending campaign against Greece, above all so as not to alarm Turkey. And even after the Greco-Italian campaign, the Führer still hoped that a conflict, an actual war, between Germany and Greece could be avoided.
DR. EXNER: I refer here to Directive Number 18, printed on Page 66 of Volume I of our document book, which contains an extract from Document 444-PS, Exhibit GB-116, and here we find the following statement in the paragraph before the last:
“The preparatory measures of the High Command for the conduct of the war in the near future are to be made in accordance with the following guiding principles...”
And it is then stated in the last but one paragraph of that page:
“The utilization of the railway through Yugoslavia may not be counted on for the deployment of these forces...”
Well, what forced us to give up this program?
JODL: That program was completely wrecked by Italy’s arbitrary act, about which the Reich Marshal and the Grossadmiral have already made statements. I have only a brief addition to make. Italy was beaten, as usual, and sent the Chief of the Operational Staff of the Supreme Command to me crying for help. But in spite of this calamity the Führer did not intervene in the war in Albania. He did not send a single German soldier there, although the matter had been under consideration. He ordered only an operation against Greece, starting from Bulgaria, to be prepared for the following spring. Even that was for the primary purpose of occupying the Salonika Basin, thereby giving direct relief to the Italians and only in the event, which to be sure was feared, of English divisions now landing in the Balkans as the result of Italy’s madness. In that case it was decided to consider the whole of Greece as an operational area, since we could not possibly tolerate a Royal Air Force base in the immediate vicinity of the Romanian oil fields. And this contingency is shown very clearly in the order which has been submitted to the Tribunal as Document 1541-PS, Exhibit GB-117, Pages 63 and 64 of the document book. I should like to quote two passages, two very brief passages from it. In Paragraph 2, Subparagraph b of Page 63, it says:
“ ‘Operation Marita.’ My plan therefore is”—I am quoting—“... to send these forces straight through Bulgaria, for the occupation of the north Aegean coast and, if necessary, the entire mainland of Greece.”
I then quote from Page 64, Paragraph 4, Subparagraph a:
“The primary objective of the operation is the occupation of the Aegean coast and the Salonika Basin. The continuation of the attack by way of Larissa and the Isthmus of Corinth may prove necessary.”
It is quite obvious from these conditional orders that the occupation of the whole of Greece was intended only if we should be forced to take this measure by the landing of English troops, which at that time was not yet the case.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now.
[A recess was taken.]
DR. EXNER: You said we had planned to leave Yugoslavia neutral. Now this plan was apparently changed by the Simovic Putsch. Why did this event alter our policy toward Yugoslavia?
JODL: This Putsch against a legal government, by officers meddling in politics, immediately after Yugoslavia had joined the Tripartite Pact had necessarily an anti-German tendency. We stood directly on the verge of the campaign against Greece, against the whole of Greece, for in the meantime English divisions had landed there, and this campaign could only be waged with a safely neutral Yugoslavia behind us.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, various other members of the defendants—Defendants Göring and Keitel—have dealt with the political aspects of the entry of Germany into Yugoslavia. Unless there is anything new for this defendant to give evidence about it seems to be entirely cumulative.
DR. EXNER: Then kindly just tell us, if you have anything new to add—some documents, et cetera.
JODL: I have something to add which concerns myself personally.
THE PRESIDENT: Nothing is coming through—the English was not coming through. Please, try it again. Repeat what you said.
JODL: I have something else to add which concerns me personally with regard to the Yugoslav problem...
THE PRESIDENT: No. There is nothing coming through to us. Go on then, Defendant. You were asked if there is anything new to say.
JODL: Yes, I have something personal to add.
DR. EXNER: Yes, do so.
JODL: On this morning when the Führer spontaneously ordered the immediate preparation of an attack on Yugoslavia, I proposed to him, or at least I mentioned to him, that after concentrating our troops we ought first to clarify the real situation, the political situation, by an ultimatum. He refused to do so. He said, “That will not be of any use.” Field Marshal Keitel has already confirmed this.
DR. EXNER: Tell me, was that on 27 March?
JODL: Yes, that was on the 27th. May I give proof of this. On the evening of the 27th the order was issued...
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think it is necessary if the Defendant Keitel said it, and you say it, and there is no cross-examination about it.
DR. EXNER: But I feel that there is something important.
JODL: A document was submitted, Document 1746-PS, Exhibit GB-120, on Page 70 of the document book.
DR. EXNER: Page 71.
JODL: Yes, the text is on Page 71. If the Court will compare this sentence on Page 71, Paragraph 1, with the sentence on Page 69 of the document book a difference will be noticed. Page 69 contains the order signed by the Führer, and it begins with this sentence which I shall quote:
“The military Putsch in Yugoslavia has altered the political situation in the Balkans. Even if she makes a declaration of loyalty, Yugoslavia must be considered as an enemy and therefore beaten as quickly as possible.”
This, as appears from the date, was issued on 27 March. I worked that whole night at the Reich Chancellery, which is another proof of the sudden nature of the whole case. At 4 o’clock on the morning of the 28th, as stated on Page 71, I put the following aide-mémoire, this operational aide-mémoire, into the hand of General Von Rintelen, our liaison officer with the Italian High Command. In it I had written—I quote:
“Should political developments call for armed intervention against Yugoslavia, it is the German intention...” et cetera.
I must admit that, in this instance, I ventured a little into the political field, but in so doing I thought that if Germany did not clarify the political situation beyond any doubt, Italy perhaps might do it.
DR. EXNER: The next document is also evidence of the suddenness of this decision, and I have had it printed on Page 73, Volume 1. That is the order issued by the High Command of the Army on the basis of these directives—the order for deployment of troops for the operation. That is Document R-95, Exhibit GB-127, Page 73, of Volume I, as I have already stated, and it says there:
“As a result of the change in the political situation...” et cetera—and then—“there will be concentrated...”—and then the last paragraph states—“The operation will be given the code name ‘Project 25.’ ”
I ask you, Generaloberst, can anything be gathered from this?
JODL: The order issued was not until 3 April...
DR. EXNER: No, 30 March.
JODL: ...30 March.
DR. EXNER: Did the operation receive the code name “Project 25”?
JODL: A code name for this operation was ordered for the first time 3 days after the Putsch, which proves that it had not been planned in 1937 as was once stated here.
DR. EXNER: And now, just one last question on this Balkan matter. Was Greek neutrality still being maintained on 24 March 1941 when we gave permission for the Luftwaffe attack on her territory of Crete? In this connection I refer to Document C-60, Exhibit AJ-13. It is an order of 24 March 1941 which, as I have just stated, sanctioned air attacks on Crete and also on Greek shipping. Now, what about Greek neutrality on 24 March 1941?
JODL: From the point of view of international law it no longer existed at that date. The English had in the meantime landed on Crete and at Piraeus, and we had already learned about this on 5 or 6 March. The order, therefore, was in accordance with all the principles of international law. But to conclude the Yugoslav problem I may add that the allegation made by the Prosecution, that the plan to attack Yugoslavia emanated from Jodl’s office, is a statement which has not been and cannot be substantiated by anything.
THE PRESIDENT: What was that document that you were referring to? 24-March 1941? You said 360, which did not indicate anything to us.
DR. EXNER: 24 March, which is Document C-60, Exhibit AJ-13.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. What page?
DR. EXNER: Page 76, Volume I.
[Turning to the defendant.] We now come to the question of the Soviet Union. How many troops did we have in the East during the Western campaign?
JODL: At first it was 10 divisions, which in the course of the Western campaign were reduced to 6 or 5 divisions.
DR. EXNER: What prompted us to send troops to the East after the Western campaign?
JODL: The notification from the commander in the East that with such weak forces he could neither keep Poland quiet nor guard the demarcation line.
DR. EXNER: In your diary—the so-called diary—Document 1809-PS, Volume I of my document book, Page 83, you write on 24 May: “Situation in the East becomes precarious due to the Russian menace against Bessarabia.” That is on 24 May 1940. That is what you wrote in your diary. How did you come to this conclusion?
JODL: The reason was a dispatch from Canaris reporting the concentration of 30 Russian divisions against Bessarabia. Whether the note expressing anxiety originated with me, or whether it was an idea of the Führer’s which I jotted down, I can no longer say today.
DR. EXNER: Well, on 6 September 1940 you signed an order stating that the regrouping should not give the impression of an offensive preparation. How should that be understood?
JODL: This order signed by me was interpreted as the first attempt to conceal the impending attack on Russia.
DR. EXNER: One moment. I want to point out the order in question to the Tribunal. It is Page 78, Volume I, Document 1229-PS, Exhibit USA-130. It is an order by Jodl, addressed to the Foreign Intelligence Service, and it says there:
“The Eastern area will be manned by stronger forces in the coming weeks. By the end of October, the status indicated on the enclosed map ought to have been reached.”
And now, Your Honors, I am sorry to have to point out an omission in the English and French translations. The next paragraph is missing, and this is very important for the understanding of the entire document. It says, namely, “For the work of our own Intelligence Service, as well as for answering questions asked by the Russian Intelligence Service...”
THE PRESIDENT: It does not appear to be in our document. What paragraph are you reading?
DR. EXNER: It is Paragraph 2 in my document book, Page 78.
THE PRESIDENT: It has not been translated.
DR. EXNER: That is just what I said. That is the error. Therefore I will dictate it now, or read it slowly.
THE PRESIDENT: You want it to be translated?
DR. EXNER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: You see, Paragraph 2 is not translated at all. There is nothing here.
DR. EXNER: These three lines were not translated at all, but they are very important.
THE PRESIDENT: Just read it through the earphones, then. Read the passage.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, the full document is in the British Document Book 7, Page 102.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much. Go on.
DR. EXNER: “For the work of our own Intelligence Service, as well as for answering questions asked by the Russian Intelligence Service, the following guiding principles apply...”
And now explain the subject further.
JODL: Instructions such as these to Canaris’ office were issued by me every 6 weeks. They formed the basis for the so-called counterespionage work, which I do not wish to discuss in detail here. In this case what matters to me was that the weak forces which we kept in the East at this time should be made to appear actually stronger. That, for instance, can be clearly seen from Paragraph 3 which says, and I quote:
“In statements on the equipment situation of the forces, especially of the armored divisions, it is advisable to exaggerate if necessary.”
I also pointed out in the next paragraph that antiaircraft defenses should be exaggerated. All this was done because at that time anxiety had already arisen that possibly a Russian operation against Romania might develop. The purpose of this order was to deter them from that, and it was intended for the intelligence only. If on 6 September, I had already known of any aggressive intention against Russia I would have said exactly the contrary; for with this order, as I had issued it, I would have been working in the interests of Gisevius and his friends—namely, I would have been informing the Russians that we were beginning to deploy our troops.
DR. EXNER: Now, when did you first hear of the Führer’s fears that Russia might prove hostile to us?
JODL: For the first time, on 29 July 1940, at the Berghof near Berchtesgaden.
DR. EXNER: In what connection?
JODL: The Führer kept me back alone after a discussion on the situation and said to me, most unexpectedly, that he was worried that Russia might occupy still more territory in Romania before the winter and that the Romanian oil region, which was the conditio sine qua non for our war strategy, would thus be taken from us. He asked me whether we could not deploy our troops immediately, so that we would be ready by autumn to oppose with strong forces any such Russian intention. These are almost the exact words which he used, and all other versions are false.
DR. EXNER: You have just mentioned Hitler’s concern about the seizure of the Romanian oil fields. Did the Führer do anything on account of this apprehension?
JODL: It was precisely on the basis of this conversation—when I protested that it was quite impossible to carry out a troop deployment at that time for it would take 4 months—that the Führer ordered that these deployment arrangements were to be improved. Two orders were then issued immediately. One, I believe, is of 9 August. It was called “Reconstruction East” and included all measures to improve the deployment arrangements in the eastern area. The second order was issued on 27 August. We do not have it here, but it has been recorded in the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff.
DR. EXNER: Yes, that is Page 85, Volume I of my document book. There is an entry, right at the end of the page, in the Diary of the Naval Operations Staff:
“Transfer of 10 divisions and 2 armored divisions to the Government General, in case prompt intervention should prove necessary for the protection of the Romanian oil fields.”
That is an excerpt from Document C-170, Exhibit USA-136.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, you seem to be reading from Page 85. Were you?
DR. EXNER: Yes, from Page 85. It is Page 85 of the German version. Perhaps the numbering of the pages does not quite tally with the numbering of the English version. It is the entry: “Transfer of 10 divisions and 2 armored divisions to the Government General.”
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I see.
JODL: This entry is a proof of the Führer’s intentions at that time with regard to this reinforcement in the East.
DR. EXNER: Well, when was the Führer’s order issued to prepare for attack?
JODL: The first order for deliberation concerning an attack, or for the discussion of any aggressive operation at all, was issued in writing by the Armed Forces Operations Staff and submitted to the Führer on 12 November. It is Document 444-PS...
DR. EXNER: It is on Page 66, Volume I of my document book.
JODL: ...and it is already known to the Tribunal. But this first order, which is known to me, had to be preceded by oral instructions from the Führer to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army.
DR. EXNER: That can be gathered from the document itself, namely from Page 67 which reads:
“Irrespective of the result of these discussions, all preparations for the East which have already been verbally ordered are to be carried out.”
This is proof, therefore, that oral orders and preparation had preceded.
JODL: I am not in a position to say, however, when these oral instructions had been given to the Army.
DR. EXNER: Tell me, in these statements, which Hitler made to you, was there ever any mention made of such things as the extension of the “Lebensraum,” and of the food basis as a reason for a war of conquest, and so on?
JODL: In my presence the Führer never even hinted at any other reason than a purely strategic and operational one. For months on end, one might say, he incessantly repeated:
“No further doubt is possible. England is hoping for this final sword-thrust against us on the continent, else she would have stopped the war after Dunkirk. Private or secret agreements have certainly already been made. The Russian deployment is unmistakable. One day we shall suddenly become the victim of cold-blooded political extortion, or we shall be attacked.”
But otherwise, though one might talk about it for weeks on end, no word was mentioned to me of any other than purely strategical reasons of this kind.
DR. EXNER: According to the reports received, how did the military situation develop in the East after the Polish campaign?
JODL: When we first contacted the Russians in the Polish campaign, relations were rather cool. We were carefully prevented from gaining any information about their troops or equipment. There were constantly unpleasant incidents on the San. The Russians shot at everything, at fleeing Poles or at German soldiers, and there were wounded and dead; and the demarcation line was flown over in numerous cases. The unusually strong forces employed, by Russia for the occupation of the Baltic states, of Poland and Bessarabia struck us from the very beginning.
DR. EXNER: Did the reports which you received contain indications of military reinforcements for the Red Army?
JODL: From maps which were submitted every few days, which were based on intelligence reports and information from the radio interception section, the following picture was formed: In the summer of 1940 there were about 100 Russian divisions along the border. In January 1941, there were already 150 divisions; and these were indicated by number, consequently the reports were reliable. In comparison with this strength, I may add that the English-American-French forces operating from France against Germany never, to my knowledge, amounted to 100 divisions.
DR. EXNER: Did Hitler attempt to clear up the political situation by diplomatic means?
JODL: He attempted to do so by the well-known conference with Molotov; and I must say that I placed great hopes on this conference, for the military situation for us soldiers was as follows: With a definitely neutral Russia in our rear—a Russia which in addition sent us supplies—we could not lose the war. An invasion, such as took place on 6 June 1944, would have been entirely out of the question if we had had at our disposal all the forces we had used and lost in this immense struggle in Russia. And it never for a single moment entered my mind that a statesman, who after all was also a strategist, would needlessly let such an opportunity go. And it is a fact that he struggled for months with himself about this decision, being certainly influenced by the many contrary ideas suggested to him by the Reich Marshal, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, as well as the Minister for Foreign Affairs.
DR. EXNER: On the basis of the reports which you received, what did the further military situation on both sides look like?
JODL: The Intelligence Service was put to work as from January 1941. The divisions on our borders and also along the Romanian frontier grew rapidly. On 3 February 1941 the Chief of the General Staff of the Army informed the Führer of the operations which he himself intended to carry out. At the same time he presented a map showing the Russian troop deployment. This map indicated—and this has been proved by documents—that there were 100 infantry divisions, 25 cavalry divisions...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, do we need all these strategic details of plans which were drawn up by the German General Staff?
DR. EXNER: It is of very great importance to establish the picture facing the General Staff at that time. If an overwhelming concentration of Russian troops had not...
THE PRESIDENT: But that is not what he tells about. He is telling us about February 1941. The OKW had produced plans to show the deployment of German troops.
DR. EXNER: That is a plan which was developed by...
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think it is necessary to go into such details as to tell us how many cavalry regiments they had there.
DR. EXNER: [Turning to the defendant.] Please tell us on general lines how Halder pictured the situation to you after the February 1941 reports. One figure only: how many divisions were deployed?
JODL: I have already said that 150 Russian divisions were deployed against us in February.
THE PRESIDENT: He said that already.
DR. EXNER: And how many were there on our side?
JODL: I should like to say in reply that at this same time our deployment, as reported by General Halder, had only just begun. And furthermore, I should like to point out that according to Document C-39, Exhibit USA-138, Page 92 of the first document book, it is clear from a study of this document book—it is the timetable for the deployment—that it was not until 1 June that the actual attack formations, consisting of 14 armored divisions and 12 motorized infantry divisions, were brought up. In fact they were not actually moved until 10 June. I mention this so that it cannot be said that the German intention to attack was already obvious in February 1941. Such was not the case.
DR. EXNER: The Prosecution has especially emphasized that this plan for the attack on Soviet Russia had been drawn up long before then. Can you perhaps say anything more about that?
JODL: I will explain the matter in a few words. We had to use 10,000 trains for this deployment. If one could have run 100 a day it would have taken 100 days; but we never reached that figure. So for purely technical reasons this deployment had already taken 4 months.
DR. EXNER: Did events in Yugoslavia have any influence on the Führer’s decision?
JODL: They gave it the final impetus. Until that time the Führer still had doubts. On 1 April, not earlier, he decided to attack; and on 1 April he ordered the attack to be made ready for about 22 June. The order for the attack itself—that is, the real opening of the campaign—was issued only on 17 June, which is likewise proved by documents.
DR. EXNER: Then, in your opinion, the Führer waged a preventive war. Did later experiences prove that this was a military necessity?
JODL: It was undeniably a purely preventive war. What we found out later on was the certainty of enormous Russian military preparations opposite our frontiers. I will dispense with details, but I can only say that although we succeeded in a tactical surprise as to the day and the hour, it was no strategic surprise. Russia was fully prepared for war.
DR. EXNER: As an example, could you perhaps tell the Tribunal the number of new airfields which were discovered in the Russian-Polish area?
JODL: I recall approximately that there had been about 20 airfields in eastern Poland, and that in the meantime these had been increased to more than a hundred.
DR. EXNER: Quite briefly, under these conditions what would have been the result of Russia’s having forestalled us?
JODL: I do not want to go into the strategic principles, into the operations behind the front; but I can state briefly that we were never strong enough to defend ourselves in the East, as has been proved by the events since 1942. That may sound grotesque, but in order to occupy this front of over 2,000 kilometers we needed 300 divisions at least; and we never had them. If we had waited until the invasion, and a Russian attack had caught us in a pincer movement, simultaneously, we certainly would have been lost. If, therefore, the political premise was correct, namely that we were threatened by this attack, then from a military point of view also the preventive attack was justified. The political situation was presented to us soldiers in this light, consequently we based our military work accordingly.
DR. EXNER: Now, a few questions concerning Japan. What significance did Directive 24 of 5 March 1941 have for co-operation with Japan? It has already been mentioned, but the matter is not quite clear. That is Page 94, Volume I of our document book, which is Document C-75, Exhibit USA-151. Grossadmiral Raeder, in the witness stand, has already said something about this directive. Can you tell me anything new?
JODL: The document is very important. First, I must make a confession. So far I have been accused of merely having received this document. But it emanated from me; I authorized it. It was worked out by my staff in the Navy group. Consequently, I knew this document better than anybody else. It is not an operational order, it is a guide for German officers.
DR. EXNER: What does that mean?
JODL: All German officers who officially or unofficially came into contact with Japanese officers were to be told exactly what the aims of German policy were, namely, to attack England even in the Far East and precisely thereby to keep America out of the war.
DR. EXNER: In Paragraph 3, Subparagraph a, of this directive we read:
“It must be emphasized that the common aim in this war is to crush England as soon as possible and thereby keep the United States out of the war.”
JODL: Such a directive was necessary in order that careless statements on the part of German officers should not be used by officers of the Japanese Army and Navy for their own political purposes. For this reason the Foreign Office also received a copy, as is shown in the distribution list on the bottom of Page 96. This would never have happened in the case of an operational order. Also that is why the Führer did not sign it.
DR. EXNER: The objectives of the German Navy are also stated on the top of Page 96. They read as follows:
“Moreover, attacks on other British bases—on American naval forces only if the entry of the United States into the war cannot be prevented—are capable of shattering enemy forces in those places.”
And so we again find the endeavor to prevent the entry of the United States into the war and to attack them only if nothing else should prove possible.
JODL: I should like to add that the purpose of this document was not to exert influence on Japan, as that would have been a political action; it was merely a directive for all officers telling them what to say in such a case.
DR. EXNER: Grossadmiral Raeder has already told us by what naval orders he had endeavored to keep the United States out of the war. Have you anything to add to that?
JODL: Only one point, which the Grossadmiral did not mention. It comes from Document C-119 and Exhibit Jodl-37. It can be read on Page 98 of Document Book Number 1.
DR. EXNER: Page 98 of Volume I, Exhibit Jodl-37, which we submit. There we find: “Special regulations on deportment during the occupation of Denmark and Norway.” And then...
JODL: Only the last sentence need be read.
DR. EXNER: Please read it.
JODL: “All warships and merchant vessels under the U.S.A. flag, as well as aircraft, are excepted from the prohibition to sail or take off.”
DR. EXNER: And that is the last sentence at the bottom of Page 98. The paragraph speaks of prohibiting warships, merchant vessels, aircraft, et cetera, from leaving port, with the exception of the Americans.
JODL: And so, in all the war measures of the Naval Operations Staff, America was granted an exceptional position for a long time.
DR. EXNER: Before Japan’s attack on America, did you have any official dealings with Japanese officers?
JODL: No, not before.
DR. EXNER: None at all?
JODL: No.
DR. EXNER: Did you expect the attack on Pearl Harbor?
JODL: The attack came as a complete surprise. It was a complete surprise to me, and I had the feeling it was also a surprise for the Führer; for he came, in the middle of the night, to my map room in order to give the news to Field Marshal Keitel and myself. He was completely surprised.
DR. EXNER: Now, I should like you to clear up an erroneous interpretation of this letter of Falkenstein’s. It is Page 81, Volume I, of our document book. A letter, Document 376-PS, Exhibit USA-161, can be found there. There is a letter from Falkenstein to yourself, I believe?
JODL: No, no.
DR. EXNER: No?
JODL: No, to General Von Waldau, of the Air Force Operations Staff.
DR. EXNER: It states:
“With a view to a future war against America, the Führer is considering the question of the occupation of the Atlantic islands.”
That can be interpreted to mean that he intended to attack America: “With a view to a future war against America, the Führer is considering...” What is meant by that, and how did you interpret it?
JODL: That is perfectly obvious. At that time consideration was actually being given to the occupation of the Atlantic islands, a thing the Führer had always wanted to do.
DR. EXNER: For what purpose?
JODL: As a certain security base, thus an outpost in case of American intervention; and so we had to take this idea into consideration. Although the Navy as well as the Armed Forces Operations Staff and the Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces definitely rejected it, we had to consider these matters in theory at least; and this is what he tells General Von Waldau in this letter.
Furthermore, the same thing was then written in a document, later in an order, Document 444-PS, exactly as written here.
DR. EXNER: Did we have any interest at all in extending the war?
JODL: I, personally, none. I can only say that the expanse from the North Cape to Tobruk, and from Brest to Rostov-on-the-Don was too great for my liking.
DR. EXNER: And were we interested in having Japan at war with America?
JODL: No, we would have much preferred a new and powerful ally without a new and powerful enemy.
DR. EXNER: Did we drag Italy into the war?
JODL: I do not know what was done politically; but after the collapse of France, when Italy also wished to take an active part in the war, we tried to prevent this, we soldiers in the OKW. But we only succeeded in delaying her intervention by 4 to 6 days; the Führer could not refuse altogether. But during the whole of the war Italy was of no help to us, rather only a burden; and this will be confirmed by subsequent histories of the war.
DR. EXNER: As to all the accusations concerning Crimes Against Peace, I should like to refer to the relevant documents which have been submitted by Göring, Ribbentrop, Raeder, and Dönitz. I do not know whether such a reference is at all necessary according to the rules of procedure.
Now one final question. The Prosecution has represented this whole series of campaigns as a long premeditated and concerted plan of conquest which you, as a conspirator, both instigated and carried out. What have you to say to this?
JODL: I believe I have already corrected this completely distorted picture by my testimony. The war against Poland broke out without my having taken any part in its preparation. It developed into a World War contrary to the hopes of all soldiers. Everything had to be improvised for this war. There was nothing ready except the plan of attack against Poland. There were neither enough bombs nor enough ammunition. At that time not a single soldier thought about Norway, Belgium, Holland, Yugoslavia, Greece, or even Russia. No military agreements had been reached with Italy or with Japan.
I acknowledge the statement of the American Chief of General Staff, General Marshall, to be absolutely correct in almost every point.
DR. EXNER: Mr. President, I have no further questions to ask.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants’ counsel want to ask any questions?
DR. HANS LATERNSER (Counsel for the General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces): General, as Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, you were for many years the leading General Staff officer of the German Armed Forces?
JODL: Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: In the course of your military activity you were also for a fairly long time a teacher at the War Academy?
JODL: Not exactly at the War Academy but at the General Staff courses which preceded the War Academy and which at that time were held at the individual district headquarters.
DR. LATERNSER: As all our higher military leaders came from the professional class of General Staff officers, I ask you to tell us briefly how these officers were trained at the War Academy. Please confine yourself exclusively to the following points:
How was, or rather how much time was allotted to instruction on attack; then for propaganda for wars of aggression; and the attitude toward international law and politics?
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal think this question is completely irrelevant.
DR. LATERNSER: If the Court considers these questions to be irrelevant, I will dispense with the answers to these questions.
Generaloberst, you know the standpoint of the Prosecution, that the military leaders are supposed to have formed a group with the aim of unleashing wars of aggression and, in the course of these wars, committing crimes against military law and the laws of humanity. Please explain to the Tribunal your attitude toward this point, particularly as to whether the higher military leaders ever actually formed such a group.
JODL: I never understood the idea of such a group, and I never shall understand it. It is just as if the passengers of a passenger ship were to meet on an ocean liner and there form a unit—or be obliged to form a unit—under the authority of the captain. This so-called group of high-ranking officers might possibly have existed in imperial times as an absolute entity, but not entirely even then. But here, after the National Socialist revolution, these groups broke up completely in all spheres of life, politically, philosophically, and ideologically. The goal that united them was the military profession and the necessary obedience.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we had better adjourn at this time.