Afternoon Session
DR. EXNER: I have one further question concerning the partisan regulations. The Prosecution brings the charge that you, through Number 161 of the partisan regulations—that, Your Honors, is in the document we used last, F-665, Page 130 of Volume II—were responsible for the destruction of whole villages, and even of the total population of villages in France. Will you please comment on this?
JODL: I believe the opposite is true. Through Number 161, I reduced the collective measures and collective punishments that the Führer had decreed without restraint, to what was permitted by Article 50 of the Hague Rules of Land Warfare. In this article collective punishment is prohibited unless the entire population is equally guilty in terror activities of any kind. Therefore, with this Number 161 I did not order the burning down of villages, not even in exceptional cases, but on the contrary I said that such collective measures might be used only in very exceptional cases, and then only with the approval of a divisional commander, for he would have a tribunal and could make a judicial investigation.
I do not wish to trouble the Tribunal with any other merits of mine, which may be read in this document. I discussed the good treatment of the population; the necessity of leaving them the necessaries of life, et cetera. I believe, at any rate, that this document actually serves as a model of how this sort of war may be brought within the scope of international law. I did this as I was convinced that at that time the French Maquis movement, and also the Tito revolt had gradually begun to develop into a regular war.
Now the case of the 2d SS Panzer Division is cited as an example of things that I caused through this Number 161. I can say only that the behavior of the SS Panzer Division is the responsibility of its commander. I learned about it only months afterwards. I am grateful to the French Prosecution for having submitted this document, and I am grateful also for the statement that the Maquis movement in the beginning was nothing else than franc-tireur warfare, the heroism of which I do not dispute.
DR. EXNER: Now we shall turn to a different problem, the low-level fliers. From Document 731-PS, Page 139 of the second document book, and Page 144 of Volume II of my document book—from these documents it can be seen that from various sources proposals had been made as to the treatment of enemy airmen who had made emergency landings. Can you tell us, first of all, the reason for this, and what your attitude was toward these proposals?
JODL: I shall try to be as brief as possible. The reason was that numerous reports had been received of people being attacked by individual enemy aircraft contrary to international law. The Führer demanded countermeasures, and that is the origin of the memorandum 731-PS, Exhibit RF-1407. It is not a draft for an order, still less an order. It is a note containing proposals made by the Luftwaffe in that connection. There was no talk as yet about lynching. The fact that I concerned myself with this problem at all may find its explanation in the responsibility which, as I have previously mentioned, I believed had rested with me since 1 May with regard to questions of international law. The note which I wrote on the document has already been read. I objected to one paragraph—a case which I nevertheless considered entirely admissible according to international law. This was later crossed out and replaced by a statement that it was to be considered murder if one of our soldiers landing by parachute was shot. I wrote this objection on Document 735-PS. The concept of lynching...
DR. EXNER: I should like to state, for the assistance of the Tribunal, where this passage is. The remark made by Jodl in his handwriting is found on Page 144 of the document book. Various proposals are made in this memorandum, and then Jodl adds “To Number 3...”; and then there is a notation.
[Turning to the defendant.] Please comment on this.
JODL: My notation was: “Is the Foreign Office in agreement with Number 3b?”—namely, that the shooting of our own airmen who have been shot down and are parachuting to earth is to be considered a mean terrorist act.
DR. EXNER: This Number 3b is on the same page, at the top.
JODL: I just wanted to add that lynching was suggested in an article by Goebbels, published in the Völkischer Beobachter. The more I concerned myself with this problem, the more it was obvious that nothing at all could be achieved with measures of this kind, for one could never capture a guilty low-flying airman, for he would either escape or he would be dashed to pieces on the ground. This would only lead to a general murder of airmen. Therefore, I decided—and I was in complete agreement with Field Marshal Keitel on this point—to cause this entire action to fail. The Court can see that between Document 731-PS, which was compiled on 21 May, and Document 735-PS, 16 days had elapsed wherein nothing had been done. When on 6 June I received a rather lengthy report, I noted on it, “This is not sufficient; we have to start all over again; how can we be certain that other enemy airmen will not be treated in the same way? Should some legal procedure be arranged or not?” If I wrote that, then, Your Honors, it is absolute proof, if you consider my general method of work, that I had no other intention than to delay and drag things out until the matter had solved itself. And I succeeded in this case. No military authority issued an order. We did not even go so far as to make a draft of an order. The only thing we had were these scraps of paper. It has been proved, and it will be proved further, that many months afterwards the Führer brought the gravest charges against us, and against the Luftwaffe in particular, of having torpedoed his order.
DR. EXNER: Now we shall turn to something entirely different. The Chief of the OKW, in a letter written in 1941, called you and Warlimont his representatives for collaborating with Rosenberg’s Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories. That is Document 865-PS, Exhibit USA-143. How did that work out in practice?
JODL: Not at all. Apart from one conference in 1943 dealing with an appeal to the peoples of the East, I had no connection with Rosenberg’s Ministry whatsoever. The only collaboration which took place constantly was carried on by my propaganda division, for all pamphlets which it compiled and which were dropped over Russia were discussed first with the Ministry of the Occupied Eastern Territories.
DR. EXNER: Then why were you appointed at all? Why was that necessary?
JODL: That was purely a matter of form, because Minister Dr. Lammers wrote to each of the higher Reich authorities in general asking that a deputy be designated; and so Field Marshal Keitel also designated a deputy.
DR. EXNER: We shall now turn to something new. You have been shown the rather strange Document C-2, Exhibit USA-90. It is not contained in my document book, but the Court will remember it at once. It is a compilation in tabular form in which certain incidents of significance in international law are cited in the first column. In the second column there are examples; in the third and fourth...
MR. ROBERTS: It is Page 163 in the big document book.
DR. EXNER: This is a diagramatic compilation which sets down on one side a certain incident, and on the other enumerates the consequences of this incident: its appraisal in the light of international law, its use for propaganda, and so forth.
Will you explain how this came about? It is really a very strange document. Twelve infringements of international law by our side are set down, and, I believe, 13 infringements by the enemy.
JODL: I do not think this document is so remarkable after all. It was compiled at the end of September 1938, shortly before the Munich Conference. As I, in my department, did not know for certain whether we would have an armed conflict or not, and as at that time the stipulations of international law were not clear to us, I wanted, by taking various examples, to find out from the experts on international law what the present attitude was towards such infractions. Every officer in my division then racked his brain to find an example, and we tried to cover every branch of international law through some specific instance. I consider it worthy of note that even then we concerned ourselves with the conception of international law. There can be no doubt whatsoever that I alone carry responsibility for having thought out these examples. But if one were to take exception to the reply to these examples, that is to the judgment on the lines of international law or to justification according to the rules of warfare, I can only say that this did not come from me; it emanated from the office of Canaris. Apart from that, it shows a very careful and noteworthy attitude toward international law, especially concerning air warfare. At any rate, it was on a much higher level than what took place in actual practice.
DR. EXNER: Therefore, was it the intention to commit these infractions of international law?
JODL: Not at all, but as one conversant with the history of warfare, I knew that there has never yet been in this world a war in which infractions of international law did not occur.
If, perhaps, objection should be raised that quite at the end of the paragraph there appears: “Explanation by the Propaganda Ministry,” I should like to say that that comes at the end, after the justification according to the laws of war and the judgment from the standpoint of international law, and that Admiral Bürckner, who gave the reply, himself referred to it—that propaganda could be put into practice only after the aspects of international law had been clarified. Moreover the whole answer was only a preliminary one, as first the Foreign Office and the various branch chiefs of the Wehrmacht would have had to be heard on the subject.
DR. EXNER: I asked for Admiral Bürckner as a witness on this question, but it really seems to be too unimportant a matter, and I shall therefore forego the calling of this witness.
[Turning to the defendant.] I want to ask you the following question in this connection: What was your attitude in general as to the limitations placed on the conduct of war by international law?
JODL: I recognized and valued international law with which I was well acquainted, as a prerequisite for the decent and humane conduct of war. Copies of the Hague Rules of Land Warfare and the Geneva Convention were always lying on my desk. I believe that by my attitude toward the Commissar Order, toward lynching, and toward the intention to repudiate the Geneva Convention—bluntly rejected by all Commanders-in-Chief and all branches of the Wehrmacht, and by the Foreign Office—I have proved that I tried, as far as it was possible for me, to observe international law.
Of course, there is a wealth of positive proof available. The pertinent documents will probably be submitted by my defense counsel. I will refer only to the behavior of the German Wehrmacht in Norway, a matter in which I collaborated. I refer to the partisan regulations...
DR. EXNER: I submit Document AJ-14, Pages 99 and 100 in my document book, Volume I. These are special directives for conduct during the occupation of Norway and Denmark, directives which, therefore, were issued when those countries were occupied. There are some very characteristic sentences contained in this document, sentences which I should like to read. You will find on Page 98, Figure I:
“The military occupation of Denmark and Norway is taking place for the purpose of ensuring the neutrality of these countries. The aim must be to carry this out in a peaceful way.”
Then on Page 99, at the top it says:
“Directives for conduct in personal intercourse with the Norwegian population.
“Every member of the Armed Forces must remember that he is not entering enemy country, but that the troops are moving into Norway for the protection of the country and for the safety of its inhabitants.
“Therefore, the following is to be observed:
“I. The Norwegian has a strongly developed national consciousness. Moreover the Norwegian people feel themselves closely related to other Nordic peoples.
“Therefore avoid anything that might wound national honor.”
Figure 2 is also very characteristic. Then I shall turn to Figure 4:
“The home of the Norwegian is sacred according to the old Germanic conception. Hospitality is offered generously. Property is inviolable. The house remains...”
THE PRESIDENT: It is not necessary to read all of this. One paragraph is enough to show the nature of the document, isn’t it?
DR. EXNER: Then I will make mention of the remainder of the document which I shall not read, and ask that the Tribunal take official notice of this document.
Then there is a directive here, Document AJ-16...
THE PRESIDENT: But, Dr. Exner, that last document does not appear to have been signed by the defendant, does it?
DR. EXNER: [Turning to the defendant.] What had you to do with this document? Did you...
JODL: It is signed by Von Falkenhorst, but it is well known that we—the Armed Forces Operations Staff and the staff of Von Falkenhorst—comprised one unit for the Norwegian enterprise. I participated in the drawing up of this document, and I submitted it to the Führer and the Führer approved of it. There is even an entry to that effect in my diary.
DR. EXNER: Then comes Document AJ-16, which I submit herewith.
“Special directives for the administration and pacification of the occupied areas of Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg.” This is Page 161, Volume II of my document book. I will quote only from Page 162 in order to save time. I will read perhaps the last sentence: “International law must be strictly observed in every case.” But I request the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the other regulations.
In this connection I should like to mention Document 440-PS, Exhibit GB-107, in my Document Book 2, Page 164—Directive Number 8 regarding the conduct of war, dated 20 November 1939. It says in respect to the tasks of the Air Force—I will read the last paragraph:
“Localities, especially large open cities, and industries are not to be attacked without a compelling military reason, neither in the Dutch nor in the Belgian-Luxembourg areas.—Signed Keitel.”
Did you also draft that?
JODL: I drafted that order.
DR. EXNER: Then we might refer to the regulations for fighting partisans, a matter which has been discussed here also.
JODL: And I should like to refer to something I believe I have stated already, that I ordered an immediate investigation of the Malmédy incident.
DR. EXNER: Did you constantly bear in mind the aspects of international law where your orders were concerned?
JODL: I believe I have already stated that. I studied international law very carefully in its bearing on my orders. I do not wish to detain the Court with the knowledge I gathered from these regulations, for it is only incomplete, but I should like to conclude by saying that owing to the fact that there were no regulations governing air warfare, deplorable confusion in definition arose—for instance between rebellion and legal war force; between franc-tireur, bandit, and scout; between spy and scout; demolition crews and saboteurs. Any time with the help of aircraft a rebellion might be converted into a legal war; and a legal war, on the other hand, might become a state of rebellion. That is the effect that parachute troops and the furnishing of supplies by air have had on international law.
DR. EXNER: In this connection, I should like to submit the affidavit of Lehmann, Exhibit AJ-10 (Document Number Jodl-63). This document has not been submitted to the Court because it was only yesterday that the Prosecution declared itself in agreement with the use of this affidavit. I believe it is the affidavit of the Judge Advocate General, Dr. Lehmann. If the Tribunal will declare this affidavit admissible, I can perhaps merely refer to it...
THE PRESIDENT: Where is it?
DR. EXNER: I submit it herewith but it has not been translated yet, as we received permission for it only yesterday in Court.
MR. ROBERTS: As Sir David said yesterday there is no objection to the affidavit, although there was no actual order granting the affidavit of Lehmann. My Lord, it is very short, especially the copy I had, and I think there is no reason to object to it.
DR. EXNER: Then, in order to save time, I shall just refer to it; and I beg the Tribunal to read these statements of Dr. Lehmann. They seem to me to be significant, as after all it is the highest jurist in the German Wehrmacht, Judge Advocate General Lehmann, who is giving information here.
THE PRESIDENT: You had better give it an exhibit number.
DR. EXNER: Yes, AJ-10 was the exhibit number I gave it, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. EXNER: This gentleman mentions legal discussions, which he had occasion to carry on with Jodl, and he gives us Jodl’s attitude toward legal questions.
And now, General, in connection with crimes against the laws of war there is one last question which comes to our attention. Numerous entries in the war diary, orders, et cetera, are the subject of serious charges against you. Did you have the possibility, before you were captured, of destroying all this material?
JODL: Yes, between 3 May and 23 May I had time and leisure to burn every piece of paper, but I gave instructions to my staff not to destroy a single file, for I felt I had nothing to conceal. I handed the complete files, and above all the especially important ones, all the original Führer directives since 1940, to the American officer when I was captured.
DR. EXNER: And now I shall turn to the alleged Crimes against Peace. First of all we have to make it clear what posts you held during this critical period. Tell us, please, what posts you held from 1933.
JODL: From 1932 to 1935 I was in the division which was later called the Operations Division of the Army. From the middle of 1935 until October 1938 I was Chief of the Department for National Defense in the Wehrmachtsamt, which was later called the OKW.
DR. EXNER: That means the Wehrmachtsamt was actually the OKW?
JODL: Yes, later on. From October 1938 until shortly before the Polish campaign I was artillery commander at Vienna and at Brünn, in Moravia; and from 27 October 1939...
DR. EXNER: Just a moment please. 27 September?
JODL: No—August, rather. On 27 August 1939 I took over the office and the tasks of Chief of the General Staff.
DR. EXNER: Now, let us take that period. Did you concern yourself with war plans in the years 1932-35 when you were in the so-called Truppenamt?
JODL: At that time there were no preparations in the Operations Division, except for combat directives for the improvised Grenzschutz Ost (frontier guard East). This was a militia-like organization, and preparations were made to evacuate the whole German border in case of enemy occupation. That was all.
DR. EXNER: Had you anything to do with the proclamation of general conscription?
JODL: No, I had nothing to do with that. I believe I heard about it the day before.
DR. EXNER: What were your duties as chief of the Department for National Defense from June 1935 to October 1938?
JODL: In this position I had to work out the operational strategic directives according to the instructions of my chiefs, Keitel and Blomberg. I had to study and to clarify the problem of the leadership of the Wehrmacht; to prepare studies and exercises for the big Wehrmacht maneuvers in 1937. I had to supervise the Wehrmacht Academy; I had to work out drafts for laws in connection with the general conscription order and with the unified preparation for mobilization in the civilian sector, that is, of state and people. The so-called Secretariat of the Reich Defense Committee came under me.
DR. EXNER: Tell us, please, what were you at that time? What was your military rank?
JODL: I acquired that position while I was lieutenant colonel; and in 1936—I believe—I became a colonel.
DR. EXNER: Did you take any part in the Reich Defense Law?
JODL: No, that law originated before I entered my office in the Wehrmachtsamt.
DR. EXNER: But the Prosecution is accusing you of participation in it on the grounds of a supplement which you made to the Document 2261-PS, Exhibit USA-24, which is to be found in Volume I, Page 9. In this document it says, “Attached a copy of the Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935...” The signature is Blomberg’s and it is dated 24 June. Then comes a supplementary paragraph: “Berlin, 3 September 1935. To the Defense Economic Group la, copy transmitted, Signed Jodl.” What can you tell us about that?
JODL: Indisputably that is a valid Reich law of which I had to transmit a copy to one of the other offices. I need not say more than that.
DR. EXNER: You yourself did not participate in the drawing up of the law itself?
JODL: No.
DR. EXNER: Were you a member of the Reich Defense Council?
JODL: No.
DR. EXNER: Were you a member of the Reich Defense Committee?
JODL: I was that automatically from the moment I took over the direction of the National Defense Department. At the tenth session of this meeting of experts, on 26 June 1935, General Von Reichenau designated me as his deputy.
DR. EXNER: What was the purpose of this committee? This has already been discussed, I believe, so please be as brief as possible.
JODL: In a few words: With this committee a unified mobilization, not of the Army, but the mobilization of the State and people, corresponding to military mobilization, was prepared. These plans were laid down in the mobilization books giving final figures and various stages of tension.
DR. EXNER: What were these various stages of tension?
JODL: We had learned about this from France and had adopted it. The French had a system by which mobilization was carried out in five stages according to the degree of tension existing.
THE PRESIDENT: Do we need the detail about this? Is it not sufficient to say it was copied from France?
DR. EXNER: Very well.
[Turning to the defendant.] Perhaps you can tell us what this meant; why we adopted this system of stages of tension? What was the reason?
JODL: The purpose was to have some means at our disposal—as was customary all over Europe at that time—that would achieve an intensified readiness for war before the public order for mobilization was issued.
DR. EXNER: Did the Reich Defense Committee concern itself with armament?
JODL: No. It did not concern itself with armament at all.
DR. EXNER: Did the Reich Defense Committee concern itself with political plans or intentions?
JODL: It had nothing to do in any way with political problems.
DR. EXNER: But how about war?
JODL: It was concerned only with mobilization.
DR. EXNER: That means, a certain particular war...
JODL: Mobilization is a necessity for every possible war.
DR. EXNER: In this committee you concerned yourself with mobilization books. Is that correct?
JODL: Yes. I believe I have already explained that. In these books the details of all the chief Reich authorities were set down and indexed according to degrees of tension.
DR. EXNER: What do you mean by chief Reich authorities?
JODL: I mean all the ministries.
DR. EXNER: You mean the civil authorities?
JODL: Yes, the civil authorities. And the preparations made by them had to be brought into line with the preparations by the military.
DR. EXNER: What were the preparations in the demilitarized zone?
JODL: The preparations in the demilitarized zones were connected solely with evacuation, that is the surrendering of the areas west of the Rhine in case of a French occupation.
DR. EXNER: I believe we have discussed that at length already, and in this connection I should like to refer to Document EC-405, Exhibit GB-160, Page 11 of my document book, the first volume, where the tenth session is mentioned. You are accused of having decreed the utmost secrecy concerning all these preparations, which, according to your description, were of a purely defensive nature. Why all this secrecy?
JODL: Keeping measures of this kind secret is taken for granted all over the world. For us in Germany it was especially important, as for years the civil authorities had no longer been accustomed to concern themselves with military matters, and it seemed to me of particular importance that in foreign countries no misunderstanding should arise by, let us say, the capture of an order of this nature—a very characteristic misunderstanding such as occurred in these proceedings in connection with the “Freimachung” of the Rhine.
DR. EXNER: And why did you decree secrecy? So that foreign countries would not be disquieted?
JODL: At that time we were even weaker than during the period when we had an army of only 100,000 men. This army of 100,000 men had been broken up into hundreds of small groups. It was the time of our very greatest impotence, and at that period we had to be extremely careful to avoid any and all tension with foreign countries.
DR. EXNER: What were the military plans of those days?
JODL: I have already said that there were the combat directives for the Grenzschutz Ost. I had also worked out instructions for the commander in East Prussia in case he were cut off from the Reich through a sudden attack by Poland.
DR. EXNER: Did you know of any German intentions of attack at that time?
JODL: There was no thought or talk of that whatsoever.
DR. EXNER: Well, I should like to quote one sentence from the twelfth session of the Reich Defense Council. It is on Page 14 of Volume I of my document book, Document EC-407, Exhibit GB-247. At that meeting Lieutenant Colonel Wagner of the OKH said—who was he, by the way?
JODL: He later became Quartermaster General.
DR. EXNER: Lieutenant Colonel Wagner said:
“The outcome of the war”—that is, the last war—“has resulted in a completely changed military and political situation in the case of a future war, namely the necessity for waging it in one’s own country.”
He said that on 14 May 1936. What would you gather from this sentence?
JODL: Of course, one can perhaps say...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, surely it is a statement by somebody else, and this statement speaks for itself. It is not a matter that this witness can interpret to us.
DR. EXNER: Very well.
[Turning to the defendant.] Now, were you concerned with armament in the Truppenamt, and later in the Department for National Defense?
JODL: I personally had nothing at all to do with armament in the real sense. That was a matter for the various branches of the Wehrmacht—the Army, the Navy, the Air Force—and it was dealt with and handled by their organizational staffs. The Commanders-in-Chief discussed these matters with the Führer direct. But I hope, and I will not deny, that my work in the General Staff contributed to the reconstruction of the German Wehrmacht.
DR. EXNER: Your diary, 1780-PS, does not contain a word about armament, and it seems obvious that at that time you did not concern yourself with this problem. What were your thoughts and ideas on the question of armament? Were you in favor of it?
JODL: At that time I was of the same opinion as my superiors; and it was characteristic that on the day before the statement was made that 36 divisions were to be formed, Blomberg as well as Fritsch suggested to the Führer that only 24 divisions should be formed. They feared a thinning down of the entire army. Perhaps they also feared too stormy a foreign policy, based on forces existing only on paper.
DR. EXNER: Please answer a question which appears to be important to me: What were the deadlines in connection with the armament in 1935?
JODL: Various stages were provided for. The first deadline set was 1942-43. Most of the West Wall was to be completed by 1945. The Navy’s plan of construction ran on to 1944-45.
DR. EXNER: At that time what did you consider the objective of the armament?
JODL: Since it was not possible to achieve general disarmament, the objective was to establish military parity between Germany and the neighboring countries.
DR. EXNER: In this connection I should like to refer to a document which has already been submitted—the 2-year report of General George Marshall. This has already been submitted as Raeder-19. I have a part of it here before me, a part which I submitted under Exhibit AJ-3, (Document Jodl-56) Page 168. Regarding the problem of rearmament, some sentences seem to hit the nail right on the head.
In the second paragraph on Page 6, or rather the last sentence there, we see:
“The world does not seriously consider the wishes of the weak. Weakness is too great a temptation to the strong, particularly to the brutal who scheme for wealth and power.”
Then on the next page there is another sentence:
“Above all we must, I think, correct the tragic misunderstanding that a security policy is a war policy...”
Can you tell us, please, what the ratio of our military strength to that of foreign countries was at that time?
JODL: In 1935, when we set up 36 divisions, France, Poland, and Czechoslovakia possessed 90 divisions for times of peace, and 190 divisions for war. We had hardly any heavy artillery, and tank construction was in its earliest stages. The conception of defensive and offensive armament has been discussed here on various occasions. It would lead us too far afield to go into that in detail. But I should like to say only that as far as Germany was concerned, with her geographical position this conception did not apply. The disarmament conference too, after months of discussion, failed because a proper definition for this conception could not be formed.
DR. EXNER: I should like to quote from an expert, George Marshall again, on Page 168 of my document book, from which I have just quoted; and again just one sentence. It is in the first paragraph: “The only effective defense a nation can now maintain is the power of attack...”
Now, however, the Prosecution asserts that you should have known that such a tremendous rearmament as the German rearmament could serve only for an aggressive war. Will you comment on this, please?
JODL: I believe this can only be explained as an expression of military ignorance. Up to the year 1939 we were, of course, in a position to destroy Poland alone. But we were never, either in 1938 or 1939, actually in a position to withstand a concentrated attack by these states together. And if we did not collapse already in the year 1939 that was due only to the fact that during the Polish campaign, the approximately 110 French and British divisions in the West were held completely inactive against the 23 German divisions.
DR. EXNER: But tell us, when did intensive rearmament actually begin?
JODL: Real rearmament was only begun after the war had already started. We entered into this world war with some 75 divisions. Sixty percent of our total able-bodied population had not been trained. The peacetime army amounted to perhaps 400,000 men, as against 800,000 men in 1914. Our supplies of ammunition and bombs, as the witness Milch has already testified, were ridiculously low.
DR. EXNER: In that connection I should like to read a diary entry of yours, Page 16 of Volume I of my document book, which is 1780-PS, USA-72. On 13 December you said:
“After completion of project for L”—that is the Landesverteidigung, National Defense—“Field Marshal reports on state of war potential of Wehrmacht, indicating chief bottleneck is inadequate stocks of ammunition for Army—10 to 15 days of combat equals 6 weeks’ supply.”
JODL: That is right, we had ammunition for 10 to 15 days of combat.
DR. EXNER: Now I shall turn to the question of the occupation of the Rhineland.
THE PRESIDENT: Let us break off now.
[A recess was taken.]
DR. EXNER: General, when did you first hear of the plans to occupy the Rhineland?
JODL: On 1 or 2 March 1936; that is to say about 6 days before the actual occupation. I could not have heard of them any earlier because before that the Führer had not yet made the decision himself.
DR. EXNER: Did you and the generals have military objections to that occupation?
JODL: I must confess that we had the uneasy feeling of a gambler whose entire fortune is at stake.
DR. EXNER: Did you have legal objections?
JODL: No; I was neither an expert on international law nor a politician. Politically speaking it had been stated that the agreement between Czechoslovakia, Russia, and France had made the Locarno Pact void, which I accepted as a fact at the time.
DR. EXNER: How strong were our forces in the Rhineland after the occupation?
JODL: We occupied the Rhineland with approximately one division, but only three battalions of that went into the territory west of the Rhine; one battalion went to Aachen, one to Trier, and one to Saarbrücken.
DR. EXNER: Three battalions. That is really only a symbolic occupation, is it not?
JODL: Yes, and they acted only symbolically.
DR. EXNER: Did you do anything to avoid a military conflict because of that occupation?
JODL: There were serious reports which came from our military attachés in Paris and London at the time. I could not fail to be impressed by them. We suggested to Field Marshal Von Blomberg then that perhaps he ought to discuss withdrawing these three battalions west of the Rhine on condition that the French would withdraw four to five times as many men from their borders.
DR. EXNER: Was that suggestion ever made?
JODL: Yes, it was made to the Führer, but he turned it down. He rejected very bluntly General Beck’s suggestion that we should declare that we would not fortify the area west of the Rhine. That was a suggestion of General Beck’s, which the Führer turned down very bluntly.
DR. EXNER: Did you think at the time that that action was connected with any aggressive intention?
JODL: No, there could not be any question of aggressive intentions.
DR. EXNER: Why not?
JODL: I can only say that, considering the situation we were in, the French covering army alone could have blown us to pieces.
DR. EXNER: Do you think that the leading men had aggressive intentions then?
JODL: No, nobody had aggressive intentions; but it is of course possible that in the brain of the Führer there was already an idea that the occupation was a prerequisite for actions to be taken later in the East. That is possible; but I do not know, because I could not see into the Führer’s brain.
DR. EXNER: But you did not see any outward signs of it?
JODL: No, none whatsoever.
DR. EXNER: Did you know of the so-called testament of Hitler dated 5 November 1937 which has been presented here?
JODL: The first time I heard it read was here in Court.
DR. EXNER: What did you learn about it at the time?
JODL: Field Marshal Von Blomberg informed Keitel and Keitel informed me that there had been a discussion with the Führer. When I asked for the minutes I was told that no minutes had been taken. I refer to my diary, Document 1780-PS, as proof of this. What I was told was not at all sensational and hardly different in any way from anything contained in general directives for the preparation of a war. I can only assume that Field Marshal Von Blomberg at that time kept these things to himself because he may not have believed that they would ever be carried out.
DR. EXNER: Was there an operational plan against Austria?
JODL: There was no operational plan against Austria. I state that most emphatically.
DR. EXNER: Now we come to Document C-175, a directive which has the Exhibit Number USA-69. It is in Volume I; Page 18 and the following pages. It is a directive for the unified preparation of the armed forces for war of the year 1937. The Prosecution quoted Case Otto only from this directive, so that the impression was bound to be created that the whole was a plan for a campaign against Austria. Please explain what this directive means.
JODL: It was one of those typical standard preparations for war, for every conceivable eventuality. Such directives had come out every year in Germany ever since there was a General Staff and general conscription. These theoretical military studies made a distinction between two cases, namely cases of war which because of their nature were politically probable or might be probable, and cases which were improbable. As far as the former were concerned, a plan of operations was to be drafted by the Army and the Air Force. For the latter appropriate suggestions only were to be brought forward. If the Tribunal would turn to Page 21 of the document, there appears at the end of the page, Part 3, a sentence as follows: “The following ‘special cases’ are to be considered by the High Command in general without participation by regional authorities...” and among such cases, on Page 22, is the special “Case Otto.”
DR. EXNER: On Page 18 of this document is a directive valid from 1 July 1937 until, probably, 30 September 1938, that is a little more than a year. That, in turn, replaces another similar directive which is referred to in the first paragraph, which had been drawn up for the same problems previously. Did you participate in discussions on the Austrian case?
JODL: No, I did not participate in any discussions.
DR. EXNER: It is said in the trial brief that on 12 February 1938 you had been at Obersalzberg. Keitel has already rectified that. Your entry in the diary under 12 March 1938 is, therefore, based only on an account which you received through Keitel; is that right?
JODL: Yes. It is merely a note on a brief account given to me by General Keitel about that day, probably related a bit colorfully.
DR. EXNER: But then it says, evening of 11 February: “General Keitel with Generals Von Reichenau and Sperrle at Obersalzberg. Schuschnigg and G. Schmidt are being subjected to very great political and military pressure.” In the English and French translations it says that Schuschnigg and Schmidt are “again subjected to very great political and military pressure.” This word “again” does not appear in my German original.
Now, did you suggest deceptive maneuvers against Austria? That is being held against you.
JODL: I did not suggest any deceptive maneuvers. The Führer ordered them; and I do not think that they are illegal, because I believe that in the gambling of world history, in politics and in war, false cards have always been played. But the Führer ordered it and that is stated in the entry in my diary. I supplied military information and documents to Canaris as to where our garrisons were situated, what maneuvers were taking place. Canaris elaborated them and then released them in Munich.
DR. EXNER: What did you think was the purpose of...
JODL: I had been told that the purpose was to exert a certain amount of pressure so that Schuschnigg, when he had returned home, would adhere to the agreement made at Obersalzberg.
DR. EXNER: How long before the actual entry into Austria did you know of such intentions?
JODL: On 10 March in the morning just before 11 o’clock I heard of it for the first time.
DR. EXNER: And the entry took place when?
JODL: On the 12th. It was when General Keitel and General Viehbahn, who was then temporarily Chief of Armed Forces Operations Staff, were suddenly ordered to the Reich Chancellery that I heard of the intention for the first time.
DR. EXNER: Then did you have a plan made, or what?
JODL: The Führer surprised them by stating that the question involved was the Austrian problem; and then they remembered, that there was a General Staff plan called “Otto.” They sent for me and for the directive, and learned from me that such a directive actually did exist, but that in practice nothing at all had been prepared. As it had only been a theoretical plan and drafted solely in the event of an Austrian restoration, and as such a restoration was not expected for the moment, the High Command of the Army had virtually done nothing about it.
DR. EXNER: How did you yourself understand the entire Austrian action?
JODL: It appeared to me to be a family squabble which Austria herself would solve through her domestic politics in a very short time.
DR. EXNER: And what made you think that?
JODL: My own extensive knowledge of Austria. Through relatives and acquaintances, through the German-Austrian Alpine Club to which I belonged, as one who knew the Austrian mountains, I had been in closer contact with Austria than with northern Germany, and I knew that in that country there had been a government against the will of the people for a long time. The peasant uprising in Styria was a characteristic example.
DR. EXNER: Was the march into Austria the carrying out of the suggestion, C-175?
JODL: No, it was completely improvised within a few hours with the corresponding result. Seventy percent of all the armored vehicles and lorries were stranded on the road from Salzburg and Passau to Vienna, because the drivers had been taken from their recruitment training to be given this task.
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, you said just now, didn’t you, that the Führer told them it was the problem of Austria? You said that, didn’t you?
JODL: I said that the Führer had informed General Keitel and General Viehbahn about that on 10 March, in the morning. He did not talk to me, and until that day I had not talked to the Führer either.
THE PRESIDENT: I only wanted to know the date. You said it was 10 March?
JODL: Yes, on 10 March, in the morning.
DR. EXNER: Is it correct that only peacetime formations marched into the frontier districts, into Austrian territory?
JODL: Yes; it is a fact that only peacetime units which were intended for the parade in Vienna actually marched in. All units which might have been necessary for a military conflict, say, with Czechoslovakia or Italy, were stopped at the last moment and did not cross the border.
DR. EXNER: Ammunition columns, for instance?
JODL: No, everything remained behind.
DR. EXNER: Was there any hesitation among the political leaders at the last moment?
JODL: On 11 March, in the afternoon, I had news from the Reich Chancellery that the Wehrmacht was not to move in, but that the Police would pass through the Wehrmacht and move in alone. In the evening, however, on 11 March, at 2030 hours, the final decision reached me, which was that the Wehrmacht was to move in after all. I was unable to find out the reason for that hesitation.
DR. EXNER: So that altogether there was not really an invasion by force?
JODL: No, it was a purely peaceful occupation. It was characterized by my suggestion to the chief of the operations department of the Army that he should have bands marching at the head of the columns and that all drivers should be sure to wear goggles, otherwise they might be blinded by the flowers thrown at them.
DR. EXNER: What was the significance of the order you signed regarding the march into Austria? It has been put before you under Document Number C-182, Exhibit USA-77. You remember it, do you not?
JODL: Yes, I remember. That is nothing other than the written record of something which had previously been ordered orally and which was already being carried out. That written order, you see, would have come much too late.
DR. EXNER: And what is the significance of Document C-103, Exhibit USA-75, referring to a possible clash with Czech troops or Italian troops on Austrian territory? How did you come to that?
JODL: That was based on an inquiry from the General Staff of the Army. They wanted to know, even in the case of the remotest eventuality, how the troops were to comport themselves. I clarified the matter over the telephone, through General Schmundt, with the Führer, and I then put his decision down in writing, by his order.
DR. EXNER: And how did the operation come off?
JODL: It came off exactly as expected. There was jubilation and a triumphal march, such as the world probably has seldom seen—even though no one likes to acknowledge it today. The population came to meet us during the night already; the custom barriers were removed, and all the German troops called that march just a battle of flowers.
DR. EXNER: We now turn to the question of Czechoslovakia. Did you participate in the conferences on 21 April 1938, and 28 May 1938, which the Prosecution have described as conspirators’ conferences?
JODL: I did not participate in any of these conferences.
DR. EXNER: What type of General Staff work were you carrying out for “Case Green”—which is, of course, the Czechoslovakia operation?
JODL: I must refer again to Document C-175, which is on Page 17 of the first volume of my document book. In that general directive for the unified preparation for war two important cases were dealt with, or were to be dealt with: A defensive deployment against France if she opened hostilities—“Case Red” and an offensive deployment—Case Green—against Czechoslovakia. That would have been worked out in just the same way, even if we had not had an acute conflict with Czechoslovakia, because a war on two fronts—which was the problem we always faced—could never be conducted or won in any other way than by means of an attack against the weaker. This directive, as far as the Case Green is concerned, had to be drawn up afresh the very moment that Austria automatically became a new assembly zone. Thus, on 20 May 1938, a new draft was made by me for Case Green which began with the customary words: “I do not intend to attack Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future without provocation...”
DR. EXNER: Just wait a minute. That quotation is Document 388-PS, Exhibit USA-26. It is the document dated 20 May 1938. “I do not intend to attack Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future without provocation...” Now, please continue.
JODL: That was 20 May. On the 21st, the day after, a monstrous incident occurred. Czechoslovakia not only mobilized but even marched up to our borders. The Czechoslovakian Chief of General Staff explained this to Toussaint by saying that 12 German divisions had been assembled in Saxony. I can only state—and my diary entries prove it—that not a single German soldier had been moved. Nothing, absolutely nothing had happened.
DR. EXNER: In this connection I think I ought to draw the attention of the Tribunal to a questionnaire—Exhibit AJ-9 (Document Jodl-62). It is a questionnaire submitted to General Toussaint who at that time was the German military attaché in Prague. He confirms the mobilization of that time. Third volume, 199—Page 201 of the document, at the bottom, there is the following question: “What was the reason for the Czechoslovakian mobilization in May 1938?”
And he answered:
“It is my personal opinion that the Czechoslovakian Government wished to force her political allies to take up a definite position. Krejci, the Czechoslovak Chief of General Staff, informed me, as the reason for the mobilization, that he had exact information that 10 to 12 German divisions had assembled in the Dresden area, and that he could no longer bear the responsibility of not taking countermeasures.”
On the other hand a diary note from Jodl, Volume I, Page 26 should be mentioned:
“The Führer’s intention not to touch on the Czech problem yet is altered by the Czech deployment on 21 May, which took place without any German threat and without even any apparent cause. Germany’s silence thereto would lead to a loss of prestige for the Führer, to which he is not willing to submit again. Hence the issuing on 30 May of the new directive for Case Green.”
[Turning to the defendant.] That is from Jodl’s diary, Page 26, first volume. Now continue, please.
JODL: That was the information which I received, partly through General Keitel and partly through the then Major Schmundt, regarding the impression made on the Führer. The result was that he personally changed my draft of 20 May and put at the beginning the following words:
“It is my unalterable decision that Czechoslovakia must be destroyed within a reasonable period of time by military action. To decide upon the militarily and politically opportune moment is a matter for the political leadership.”
DR. EXNER: These words appear in the Document 388-PS, which I have already referred to, which is Exhibit USA-26. It is the order of 30 May 1939.
[Turning to the defendant.] Please tell us briefly what the contents of these directives were.
JODL: In that order of 30 May three possibilities were mentioned by the Führer as to how a conflict with Czechoslovakia might arise: 1) Without particular cause—politically impossible and out of the question; 2) after a prolonged period of tension—most undesirable, because of the lack of the element of surprise; 3) the best solution, after an incident, such as were happening nearly daily at that time, and which would justify us morally before the world if we decided to intervene.
Furthermore, there was the command that on the first day the Army should break through the fortifications in order to clear the way for the free operation of the mobile forces, the armored divisions, so that after 4 days such a situation would be created that the military position of Czechoslovakia would become untenable.
DR. EXNER: Why was the entire directive redrafted in June?
JODL: The entire directive C-175 was thoroughly revised in June. This was done because on 1 October a new mobilization year began, and because this directive C-175 was in any case planned to be valid only until 30 September 1938. The old directive was, of course, still in force until 1 October, but became invalid on 1 October through that directive which had been drafted by me on 24 June, or 18 June. In that directive the Case Green was mentioned in the sense of the Führer’s intention—namely, that it was the immediate aim of his policy that from 1 October 1938—not on, but from 1 October 1938—every favorable opportunity was to be utilized to solve the problem of Czechoslovakia, but only if France did not interfere or march, or Great Britain either.
I confirm that no date existed in any of the orders for the starting of a war against Czechoslovakia. In the directive of 30 May the date was left open altogether; and the new instructions, C-175, of 18 June stated only from 1 October, on the first favorable occasion.
DR. EXNER: That is on Page 29 of our document book, second paragraph: “I have decided, from 1 October...”
JODL: May I perhaps conclude this whole question by saying, in order to be explicit, that actually before 14 September, as far as the military forces were concerned, nothing happened.
DR. EXNER: I once again refer to an entry in Jodl’s Diary Volume I, Page 32. It is an extract from Document 1780-PS, Exhibit USA-72, and is the entry under 14 September 1938:
“At noon it was announced that the general order for mobilization had been posted in Czechoslovakia.... This, however, did not take place, although approximately eight age groups were called up at short notice. As the Sudeten Germans are crossing the border en masse, we request at about 1730 hours, at the suggestion of the OKH, Department 2, the calling up of the strengthened frontier guard (GAD) along the Czech border in military districts VIII, IV, XIII, and XVII. The Führer gives his authorization from Munich.”
THE PRESIDENT: What was it that you were reading from then?
DR. EXNER: I have read from Page 32 of my document book; Volume I, Page 32, and it is an excerpt from Jodl’s diary of 14 September, therefore an entry made in the midst of that critical period.
[Turning to the defendant.] Just what were these military measures which were being introduced?
JODL: On 13 or 14 September the eight age groups were called up in Czechoslovakia. We used the strengthened frontier guard so that the many escaping Sudeten Germans could be taken over.
On 17 September the Führer formed the Freikorps Henlein, contrary to the previous agreement and without telling us beforehand. Previously it had been agreed that these Sudeten Germans of military age were to join the Reserve Army.
Around that time the political discussions started. The first one at the Berghof had already taken place. Beneš ordered mobilization in Czechoslovakia on 23 September and only now, and in accordance with the political discussions, did the military deployment against Czechoslovakia commence.
I had no doubt that it was going to be used in the event of Czechoslovakia not submitting to any agreement we had made with the Western Powers; for the Führer had clearly stated that he would negotiate only if France and England did not intervene politically or militarily.
DR. EXNER: You made two more entries in your diary, on 22 and 26 September, which prove that you were worried at the time. Statement made by Captain Bürckner, in the first volume of my document book, on Page 34; again an excerpt from 1780-PS, dated 22 September:
“Captain Bürckner, chief of the foreign section, reports that according to an intercepted long-distance telephone conversation between Prague and the local Czech Legation Counsellor, the German Embassy in Prague has just been stormed. I am immediately having connection made by telephone and wireless with Prague through Colonel Juppe.
“1050 hours: Bürckner reports that the incident has not been confirmed. The Foreign Office has spoken with our Embassy.
“1055 hours: I establish liaison with Prague and with Toussaint. To my question as to how he is getting along, he replies, ‘Thanks, excellently.’ The Commander-in-Chief of the Air Forces, who had been informed of the first report with the suggestion that he should think over what measures would have to be taken if the Führer should wish for an immediate bombardment of Prague, is informed through Ic about the false report which may have had the purpose of provoking us to a military action.”
Then, on 26 September, it says:
“It is important that false reports do not induce us to military actions before Prague replies.”
The Prosecution have stated that 1 October had long before been decided on as the date for aggression. Will you tell me what significance that date, 1 October 1938, had for Case Green?
JODL: I have already said that, I believe. I explained that the new mobilization year had started, and that no order contained a fixed date for the beginning of the campaign against Czechoslovakia.
DR. EXNER: Did you believe that the conflict might be localized?
JODL: I was certainly convinced of that, because I could not imagine that the Führer, in the position we were in, would start a conflict with France and Britain which had to lead to our immediate collapse.
DR. EXNER: And the entries in your diary probably show your concern about incidents?
JODL: Yes. In my diary on 8 September there is reference to a conversation with General Stülpnagel. According to that, Stülpnagel was at the moment very worried lest the Führer should depart from his oft-defined attitude and allow himself to be dragged into military action, in spite of the danger of France’s intervention.
According to the entry in my diary I replied that actually at the moment I shared his worries to some extent.
DR. EXNER: This is an entry which the Tribunal will find on Page 26 of the first volume of my document book. Once again it is an extract from Document 1780-PS, and it is the entry of 8 September 1938.
[Turning to the defendant.] You have already said, have you not, what your worries were? Our weakness?
JODL: It was out of the question with five fighting divisions and seven reserve divisions in the western fortifications, which were nothing but a large construction site, to hold out against 100 French divisions. That was militarily impossible.
DR. EXNER: On 24 August, in a letter addressed to Schmundt, you referred to the importance of an incident for the tasks of the Wehrmacht in this case. You have been gravely accused of that, and I want you to tell me what the significance of that statement is.
Your Honor, it is 388-PS, and it is on Page 35 of the first volume. It is an extract from the often quoted Document 388-PS: It is a report made at the time of the “X” Order and the preliminary measures.
[Turning to the defendant.] Please, will you state what you intended in this work of the General Staff?
JODL: The Führer’s order of 30 May which I have already explained, assuming that it ever came to this action, left no other choice than to attack on a previously decided date. This could only follow as the result of an incident, because without provocation the operation was out of the question; and it was not to be attempted if too long a time had passed.
The Army, in order to be ready for such a surprise break-through of the Czech fortifications, required 4 days of preparation. If nothing happened after those 4 days, the military preparations could no longer be kept secret and the surprise element would disappear. Therefore, nothing else remained but either a spontaneous incident in Czechoslovakia, which would then 4 days later have resulted in military action, or a date which had to be decided on previously. In that case an incident had to happen during those 4 days which the Army required for deployment.
The Führer’s demands could, in fact, not be solved in any other way from the point of view of the General Staff. My letter to Major Schmundt was meant to explain that difficult situation to the Führer.
At that time incidents occurred every day. May I remind you that since the first partial mobilization in Czechoslovakia the Sudeten Germans liable to be called for military service had mostly evaded the order. They escaped over the border into Germany, and the Czechoslovakian border police shot at them. Bullets were shot over daily into Germany. All together, more than 200,000 Sudeten Germans crossed the border in that manner.
From that point of view the conception of an incident was not so mean and criminal as it might have been, for instance, if peaceful Switzerland had been involved. If I said, therefore, how keenly interested we would be in such an incident, that was meant to express that if one resorted to military action at all—all this is, of course, purely theoretical—one might use just such an incident as a casus belli.
DR. EXNER: And how do you explain this remark of yours: “...unless the intelligence department is ordered to organize this incident in any case”?
That is at the end of Page 38 in the second paragraph. It is an extract from 388-PS.
JODL: Yes, I had too much knowledge of European military history not to know that the question of the first shot—the apparent cause of war, not the inner cause of war—has played an important part in each war and on each side.
The responsibility for the outbreak of war is always attributed to the enemy; it is not characteristic of Germany alone, but of all European nations who have ever been at war with one another. In the case of Czechoslovakia the deeper cause of the war was quite apparent. I need not describe the condition in which 3½ million Germans found themselves who were supposed to fight against their own people. I myself was able to watch that tragedy in my own house. In this case, the deeper cause of the war, was firmly established, and Lord Runciman, who came on that mission from London, left no doubt about it whatsoever. In such a situation I certainly had no moral scruples about exaggerating one of these incidents, and, by means of a counteraction in vigorous reply to the Czech doings and activities, extending and enlarging such an incident in order that if the political situation allowed it, and England and France did not interfere—as the Führer believed—we might find a really obvious reason for taking action.
DR. EXNER: Gentlemen of the Tribunal, there is one point to which I wish to draw your attention. In my opinion it is once more a mistake in translation. I refer to the second paragraph from the bottom on Page 36. It is the report about the incident. The second but last paragraph on Page 36 states: “...that Case Green may be set in motion as a result of an incident in Czechoslovakia which will give Germany provocation (Anlass) for military intervention.” The translation in English of these last words is a “provocation”; “Anlass” is translated as “provocation.”
THE PRESIDENT: What are you saying? What is the alteration?
DR. EXNER: I believe that the translation is not correct. I am not absolutely certain but I would like to call the Tribunal’s attention to it. “Anlass” means “prétexte” in French—which as far as we know is “pretext.”
THE PRESIDENT: But, Dr. Exner, there is no difference in the meaning of the words, whether it is “provocation,” or whether it is “cause.”
DR. EXNER: “Provocation” sounds a bit more aggressive, does it not? I just want to call your attention to it. In the German it is “cause” and not “provocation.”
[Turning to the defendant.] Now the Prosecution calls these considerations, which we have just talked about, criminal ideas and connects them with the supposedly planned murder of the German Ambassador in Prague. We are said to have planned that murder so as to have a cause for marching into Czechoslovakia. What do you have to say to that?
JODL: This, of course, is grotesque. The example that the Führer allegedly mentioned in his talks with Field Marshal Keitel, that the German Ambassador had been murdered by the people of Prague, was not even known to me. General Keitel did not tell me; I only heard of it here. Apart from that, I think it is useless to go on discussing it as we did exactly the opposite. We gave the order to General Toussaint to protect the German Embassy in Prague and to protect the lives of the people in it, because, in fact, at one stage it had been seriously threatened.
DR. EXNER: This is proved by Exhibit AJ-9, Document Jodl-62, third volume of the document book, Page 200. That again is the interrogatory of General Toussaint, who was a military attaché in Prague at that time. The third question is as follows:
“Is it true or not that in the summer of 1938 you received the order to defend the German Embassy at Prague and to protect the lives of all the Germans in the Embassy?”
And his answer is:
“Yes, it is true. I remember this order was given to me by telephone probably in September 1938...”—and so on and so forth.
Then in Question 4...
“It is true that the German Embassy...”
THE PRESIDENT: The witness has already said once it was so.
DR. EXNER: [Turning to the defendant.] Then I shall only refer to the testimony of Toussaint. In addition it has been said that the incident had been staged by us. We need not go into that in detail. Did the incident really happen?
JODL: No, there was neither a preparation for the incident, nor was it necessary. Incidents kept multiplying day after day, and the solution was a political one and entirely different.
DR. EXNER: So that this note, which we have often read, remained purely theoretical, did it?
JODL: It was merely work on paper, an idea, which was not really necessary at all.
But it has already been made clear that as soon as the political discussions started I made continuous efforts to prevent the provocations, apparently desired on the part of the Czechs, from leading to any military measures on our part.
DR. EXNER: Did the signatory powers in Munich at the end of September know of Germany’s military preparations? Did the statesmen there know that we were militarily prepared?
JODL: The Prosecution gave me the distinct impression that that had become known only today, and that it was unknown in the autumn of 1938 at Munich. But that is quite impossible. All the world knew of the calling up of the eight age groups in Czechoslovakia in September. The whole world knew of the total mobilization on 23 September. A political correspondent of The Times wrote an article on 28 September against this Czechoslovakian mobilization. Nobody was surprised that immediately after the signing of the Munich Pact, on 1 October, we marched into...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner...
DR. EXNER: Well, that ends this subject.
Is it true that in August 1938 you prepared a new operational plan of which you had already spoken on 7 July? A new plan based on the previous one?
JODL: Yes. Already before the solution brought about by the Munich Pact, I, on my own initiative, drew up a secret operational plan for the protection of all the German borders. It was so arranged that the borders only were to be protected while the bulk of the Army was to be kept in reserve in the center of Germany. That complete plan was available here during my interrogation. It is now no longer contained in Document 388-PS, but there is a reference made to it.
DR. EXNER: On Page 40, Volume I of our document book, I again read an extract from 388-PS. At the very end the following is stated:
“...after the conclusion of Green, it must be made possible to put a provisional deployment into action soon.”
And then:
“...first the Wehrmacht will guarantee the protection of the German frontiers, including those of the newly acquired lands, while the bulk of the Army and of the Air Force will remain at our disposal. Such a future ‘frontier protection’ deployment should be executed separately on the various fronts.”
Why did you prepare this “frontier protection” deployment? What was the cause of it?
JODL: The reason was that once the necessity for an operation against Czechoslovakia had become superfluous, through the problem being solved in some way, we would no longer have had any deployment plan at all. And as no other intention of the Führer was known to me, I on my own initiative drew up a plan for this operation which would be suitable for any eventuality.
DR. EXNER: Did you know anything about the intentions of the Führer, after the Munich Agreement, to go even further and occupy Bohemia and Moravia?
JODL: No, I had no idea of that. I knew of his speech of 26 September where he said: “Now we are facing the last problem to be solved.”
I believed in that assurance, and this is proved by the fact that during those days—it was about 10 or 11 September—I suggested to Field Marshal Keitel, than General Keitel, that he should ask the British Delegation, whose arrival had been announced, to come to Iglau in Moravia, because many Germans who were living there had been threatened by armed Czechoslovakian Communists. This of course was a suggestion which I would never have made if I had had any idea that the Führer nourished any further intentions concerning Bohemia and Moravia.
DR. EXNER: These further intentions of the Führer were recorded on 21 October 1938 in a directive. Did you know about that in the OKW, or what was the position?
JODL: No, I did not know about it. I did not see it. I only saw it here in this courtroom during my preliminary interrogation.
DR. EXNER: Then were you transferred to...
JODL: I was transferred to Vienna as Artillery Commander of the 44th Division stationed there.
DR. EXNER: That was the end of October, was it not?
JODL: The end of October.
DR. EXNER: How did you imagine further military developments would be? But, of course, you have already answered that.
JODL: Actually, I expected an easing of the political tension and a period of peace. I can certainly say that.
DR. EXNER: And what happened to you then?
JODL: As I knew of no other plans, I transferred my home to Vienna taking all my furniture with me. Naturally I would never have done that if I had had the faintest idea that war was pending, because I knew that in the event of war I was to become the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff and so would have to return to Berlin. I asked General Keitel to help me to become the Commander of the 4th Mountain Division in Reichenhall, from 1 October 1939, a request which again it would never have entered my mind to make if I had any idea of what was going to come.
DR. EXNER: Did you as Artillery Commander in Vienna remain in contact with the OKW?
JODL: No, hardly at all. I had no connections with the OKW. I received no military documents from the OKW during all that period.
DR. EXNER: And who informed you then about the situation during that time?
JODL: Nobody. During that time I knew no more about what was going on or what was intended than any lieutenant in my artillery.
DR. EXNER: Did you have private correspondence with Keitel?
JODL: I received one letter from General Keitel. It was, I think, at the end of July 1939. He personally gave me the good news that quite probably I would become Commander of the 4th Mountain Division in Reichenhall on 1 October, and that General Von Sodenstern would become Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, now on peacetime footing, on 1 October.
DR. EXNER: Did you help to draw up the plan for the occupation of the remaining parts of Czechoslovakia?
JODL: No, I did not. During this occupation I remained in Vienna for the time being and temporarily became Chief of Staff of the 18th Army Corps at Vienna. Then, later on, I was transferred to Brünn in Czechoslovakia together with the entire 44th Division.
DR. EXNER: When did you hear about the whole thing?
JODL: It was through the orders of my divisional staff that I heard of that operation in March of 1939, some 2 or 3 days beforehand.
DR. EXNER: Was this move into Czechoslovakia the carrying out of Case Green which you had originally drafted?
JODL; No; it had no longer anything to do with that. There were completely different troop units, and not even half of the troops provided for in 1938 were actually used for the march into Czechoslovakia in 1939.
DR. EXNER: Now, during that period when you were in Vienna there was a conference with the Führer on 23 May 1939, which has often been mentioned here, concerning the disregarding of neutrality, et cetera. It has often been stated that Warlimont was present there as your representative. What was the position? Was he your representative?
JODL: With great persistence it has been said again and again that General Warlimont took part in the conference as the representative of Jodl, or even, it was once said, as his assistant. There is no question of that. He was my successor but not my representative. And even if it is repeated again and again, it still does not make it true. He was my successor.
DR. EXNER: You had left the OKW, had you not?
JODL: Yes, I had completely left the OKW. The fact that quite accidentally Warlimont became my deputy later on has nothing whatsoever to do with the events of May 1939.
DR. EXNER: When did you hear for the first time of this meeting in May 1939?
JODL: Here in Nuremberg in 1946.
DR. EXNER: Did you have any contact with Party leaders meanwhile, or with Austrian National Socialists?
JODL: No, not at all; with nobody.
DR. EXNER: Or with these defendants here?
JODL: No, not with them either.
DR. EXNER: Once during that time the Führer went to Vienna with Keitel. I think they were there 2 days or so. Did you have to report to him on that occasion?
JODL: Yes, coming from Prague he visited Vienna quite unobtrusively, and on that occasion I spoke a few words to General Keitel, but I did not talk to the Führer.
DR. EXNER: You were not presented to him?
JODL: No.
DR. EXNER: What was your war appointment to be?
JODL: As I have already said, in the event of a war I was to become Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff.
DR. EXNER: What about your private personal plans for that summer?
JODL: For that summer I already had tickets for a cruise in the eastern Mediterranean on 23 September 1939.
DR. EXNER: On 23 September 1939 the voyage...
JODL: The voyage was to start at Hamburg; I had already paid for the tickets.
DR. EXNER: When did you buy the tickets? Do you remember?
JODL: I bought them about the second half of July.
DR. EXNER: When did you return to Berlin?
JODL: I am not absolutely certain about the exact date, but I imagine that it was on 23 or 24 August—according to a telegram which reached me unexpectedly in Brünn.
DR. EXNER: If you had not received that telegram, when would you have had to go to Berlin?
JODL: In case of a general mobilization I would have had to go to Berlin anyway.
DR. EXNER: And did you now have to report to the Führer in Berlin?
JODL: No, I did not report to him, either. I only reported, of course, to General Keitel and to the Chief of the General Staff of the Army and the Air Force and to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.
DR. EXNER: Mr. President, I have now completed that subject, and I thought that this would be a convenient time to adjourn.
THE PRESIDENT: Can you tell us how long you are likely to be?
DR. EXNER: I very much hope—certainly it will be in the course of tomorrow morning; but shall we say until noon?
DR. GUSTAV STEINBAUER (Counsel for Defendant Seyss-Inquart): Mr. President, as Counsel for Dr. Seyss-Inquart, I have to ask on behalf of my client that he may be permitted to be absent from the session for 2 days, to prepare his defense.
THE PRESIDENT: Certainly.