Trial of the major war criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremburg, 14 November 1945-1 October 1946, volume 18

by Various

Morning Session

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn today at 4 o’clock.

DR. MARX: Mr. President, with the permission of the Tribunal I shall now continue with the presentation of the final plea for the Defendant Streicher. Yesterday I had come to the point where the individual accusations against Streicher had been summarized, and I had taken liberty of explaining that these accusations are subdivided into three different paragraphs:

1. Support of seizure of power and consolidation of the power of the NSDAP after its entry into the Government.

2. Preparation of aggressive wars by propaganda aimed at the persecution of the Jews.

3. Intellectual and spiritual preparation and education of the German people and German youth to effect the destruction of Jewry and to encourage hatred of the Jews.

With respect to Count One of the Indictment, the defendant does not deny that, with regard to the Party’s later seizure of power, he supported and promoted it with all his might from the very beginning. His support went to the extent of a whole movement which he had built up personally in Franconia and which he put at the disposal of Adolf Hitler’s Party, which was quite small after the first World War and limited to Southern Bavaria only. Furthermore, after Hitler’s release from the fortress of Landsberg he immediately joined him again and subsequently championed his ideas and aims with the greatest determination.

Until 1933 the defendant’s activity was limited to propaganda for the NSDAP and its aims, particularly in the field of the Jewish question. Nothing criminal can be seen in this attitude of the defendant as such. Participation in a party within a state which allows such an opposition party can be regarded as criminal only if, first of all, the aims of such a party are objectively criminal and if, subjectively, a member of such a movement knows, approves of, and thereby supports, these criminal aims.

The foundation of the entire charges against all the defendants lies in this very fact that the NSDAP is accused of having had criminal aims from the very beginning. According to the assertion of the Prosecution, the members of this Party started out with the plan of subjugating the world, of annihilating foreign races, and of setting the German master race above the whole world. They are accused of having harbored the will to carry out these aims and plans from the very outset by means of aggressive wars, murder, and violence. If, therefore, the Defendant Streicher’s mere participation in the NSDAP and his support of it are to be ascribed to him as a crime, it must be proved that the Party had such plans and that the defendant knew and approved of them.

The gentlemen who spoke before me have already demonstrated sufficiently that a conspiracy with such aims did not exist. Therefore I can save myself the trouble of making further statements on this subject and I can refer to what has already been set forth by the other defense counsel. I have only to deal with the point that the Defendant Streicher did not in any case participate in such a conspiracy, if the latter should be considered by the High Tribunal to have existed.

The official Party Program strove to attain power in a legitimate way. The aims advocated therein cannot be considered as criminal. Thus, if such aims did actually exist, they could only—by the very nature of a conspiracy—be known in a restricted circle.

The Party Program was not kept secret but was announced at a public meeting in Munich, so that not only the whole public of Germany but also that of the entire world could be informed about the aims of the Party. Therefore that element supplied by secret agreement towards a common aim, which is usually the characteristic sign of a conspiracy, is not present.

The evidence too, has shown nothing to the effect that already at that time there existed a plan for a war of revenge or aggression connected with the previous or simultaneous extermination of the Jews. If, nevertheless, a conspiracy should have existed, the latter would have confined itself to the restricted circle which revolved exclusively around Hitler. But the Defendant Streicher did not belong to that circle. None of the offices he occupied provides the least proof of that. As an old Party member he was just one among many thousands. As honorary Gauleiter, as honorary SA Obergruppenführer, he was also only an equal among equals. Thus one cannot find in any of the offices he held any connection or complicity with the innermost circle of the Party. It is also impossible to discern after the end of 1938 any personal relations with the leading men of the Movement, either with Hitler himself or with the Defendant Göring, or with Goebbels, Himmler, or Bormann.

The Prosecution did not offer any evidence on this point, nor did the proceedings produce any proof to that effect. Of all the material presented during all these months of the Trial, nothing can be taken as even a shadow of proof that the Defendant Streicher was so closely connected with the supreme authority of the Party that he could have, or even must have, known its ultimate aims.

In the Jewish question too the final aims of the Party—the effects of which were manifest in the concentration camps—were not, before the seizure of power and for several years after, formulated and determined as they appeared in the end. The Party Program itself provided for Jews to be placed under aliens’ law, and so the laws issued in the Third Reich followed this line. Only later on, it may be added, the program in this as in many other points became more radical and finally went haywire altogether under the influence of the war. But any proof that the Defendant Streicher knew other aims than those of the official Party Program has not been offered. Consequently it has not been proved that the defendant supported the seizure of power of the Party in cognizance of its criminal aims; and only on such a basis could a penal charge be brought against him.

The fact that the defendant, as Gauleiter, further endeavored to increase and maintain the power of the Party after the seizure of power is not disputed by him. But here, too, the defendant’s conduct can only be considered punishable if he knew at that time the objectionable aims of the Party. As a matter of actual fact it must be said here that the Defendant Streicher, in contrast to almost all the other defendants, did not remain in his position until the end, not even until the war. Officially he was dismissed in 1940 from his position of Gauleiter, but actually and practically he had been without any influence and power for more than a year before that time. But as long as he could still work within the modest framework of his capacity of Gauleiter, no criminal plans of the NSDAP were recognizable. In any case not for anybody who, like the Defendant Streicher, was outside the close circle surrounding Adolf Hitler.

Count Two of the Indictment brought against the Defendant Streicher, namely, the persecution of Jews as a means of preparation for a war of aggression, can be included here. Up to 1937 the existence of a plan for a war of aggression was in no way recognizable. In any case, if Hitler had had any intentions in that direction, he did not allow them to be recognized from the outside. If, however, anybody had been taken into his confidence at that time, it would have been the leading men in politics and the Armed Forces, who belonged to the closest circle around him. To those, however, the Defendant Streicher by no means belonged. It is especially significant here that at the outbreak of the war Streicher was not even appointed Wehrkreiskommissar (Commissioner of Military Administrative Headquarters) of his Gau. The individual conferences from which the Prosecution derives the evidence for the planning of the war which broke out later in no case ever saw the Defendant Streicher as participant. His name does not appear anywhere, neither in any written decree, nor in any minutes. Consequently no proof has been offered that Streicher knew of such alleged plans for waging war. This does away with the accusation that he preached hatred against the Jews in order to facilitate thereby the conduct of the war planned for some later time.

In this connection I should add that one of the main points in the program of the NSDAP was the slogan, “Get rid of Versailles!” The defendant adopted this point of the program which, however, does not mean he envisaged a repeal of the treaty by means of war.

Even the former democratic German governments, in the course of their negotiations with their former opponents in the World War, stressed the fact at all times that the Versailles Treaty presented no proper basis for permanent world peace and particularly for economic adjustment. Not only in Germany but everywhere in the rest of the world clear-thinking economic circles were against the Versailles Treaty. We may point especially to the United States of America as an example of this.

Almost all political parties in Germany, irrespective of their other aims, agreed that the Treaty of Versailles should be revised. Neither was there any difference of opinion over the fact that such revision was possible only on the basis of an agreement. Even to consider any other possibility of solution would have seemed Utopian, for the German Reich lacked all military power. The NSDAP also strove, at any rate as far as could be seen from outward signs, to find a solution to the problem in this way. To support such an aim, however, cannot be looked upon as a violation of treaty obligations and, therefore, cannot be made the object of a charge against the defendant. No proof has been offered that he thought of warlike complications or that he desired them.

I now come to the matter of the defendant’s attitude in the Jewish question. He is accused of having incited and instigated for decades the persecution of the Jews and of being responsible for the final extermination of Europe’s Jewry. It is clear that this accusation constitutes the decisive point of the Indictment against Julius Streicher and perhaps the decisive point of the total Indictment, for in this connection the attitude of the German people to this question must be tried and judged as well. The Prosecution takes the point of view that there is just as little doubt as to the responsibility of the defendant as there is doubt about the guilt in which the German people are involved. As evidence of this the Prosecution put forward:

(a) The speeches by Streicher before and after the seizure of power, particularly one speech in April 1925, in which, he spoke about the extermination of the Jews. Herein, in the prosecutor’s opinion, is the first evidence to be seen regarding the final solution of the Jewish question planned by the Party, namely, the extermination of all Jews.

(b) Active assertion of the person and authority of the defendant, especially on “Boycott Day,” 1 April 1933.

(c) Numerous articles published in the weekly paper, Der Stürmer, among them especially those dealing with ritual murder and with quotations from the Talmud. He is said to have knowingly and intentionally described therein the Jews as a criminal and inferior race and created and wished to create hatred of these people and the wish to exterminate them. The defendant’s reply to these points is as follows:

He states that he worked merely as a private writer. His aim was to enlighten the German people on the Jewish question as he saw it. His description of the Jews was merely intended to show them as a different and a foreign race and to make it clear that they live according to laws which are alien to the German conception. It was far from his intention to incite or inflame his circle of listeners and readers. Moreover, he always only propagated the idea that the Jews, because of their alien character, should be removed from German national and economic life and withdrawn from the close association with the body of the German people.

Further, he always had in mind an international solution of the Jewish question; he did not favor a German or even European partial solution and rejected it. That was why he suggested, in an editorial in Der Stürmer in the year 1941, that the French island of Madagascar should be considered as a place of settlement for the Jews. Consequently, he did not see the final solution of the Jewish question in the physical extermination of the Jews but in their resettlement.

It cannot be the aim of the Defense to go into further details of the defendant’s actions as a writer and speaker, particularly with regard to Der Stürmer and his reply to the accusations raised against him. His ideology and convictions shall not be explained, excused, or defended, nor his manner of writing and speaking either. Examination and judgment in this respect rest with the Tribunal alone. This much only shall be said, that between the defendant’s actions and the expressions frequently employed by him there is an antithesis which cannot be bridged. It may be stated that the defendant never, when in charge of an anti-Jewish undertaking, had coercive measures used against the Jewish population, as might necessarily be expected of him if the accusations made by the Prosecution were true.

I consider it my duty as defense counsel to broach and examine the question as to whether the Defendant Streicher with his speeches, his actions and his publications, not only strove towards the result alleged by the Prosecution but actually attained it. The question therefore should be examined as to whether Streicher actually educated the German people to a degree of anti-Semitism which made it possible for the leadership of the German nation to commit such criminal acts as actually occurred. Furthermore, it must be examined whether the defendant filled German youth with hatred against the Jews to the extent that is charged by the Prosecution. Finally, the question must be examined whether Streicher actually was the man who spiritually and morally prepared the executive organs for their active persecution of the Jews.

At the beginning of this exposition it appears important to point out that a great many of Der Stürmer articles, from which the Prosecution endeavors to deduce an incitement to stamp out and annihilate the Jews, were not written by Streicher himself, but by his collaborators, especially by the Deputy Gauleiter, Karl Holz, who was well known for extremely radical tendencies. Even though the Defendant Streicher bears formal responsibility for these articles, which responsibility he expressly assumed before the Tribunal, this aspect nevertheless appears very important for the extent of his criminal responsibility.

Further it may be said in this connection that, according to the unrefuted statement of the defendant, the most caustic articles were written in reply to articles and writings in the foreign press, which contained very radical suggestions for the destruction of the German nation—also, no doubt, due to the existing war psychosis.

The Defendant Streicher—and this cannot be denied and shall not be defended—continually wrote articles in Der Stürmer and also made speeches in public which were strongly anti-Jewish and at least aimed at the elimination of Jewish influence in Germany. During the first years Streicher found a comparatively favorable soil for his anti-Jewish tendencies. The first World War ended with Germany’s defeat, but wide circles did not wish to admit the fact of a military victory of Germany’s opponents of that time. They attributed this defeat exclusively to a breakdown of national defense and resistance from within and depicted Jewry as being the main culprit for this inner undermining. In doing this they intentionally overlooked the mistakes which had been committed by the Government of that time before and during the war with respect to domestic and foreign policy, as well as the errors of strategy. A scapegoat was sought on which to lay the blame for the loss of the war, and it was thought to have been found in the Jews. Jealousy, envy, and also disregard of personal shortcomings accomplished the rest in influencing feelings unfavorably toward the Jewish population. In addition to that came the inflation and in the following years the economic depression with its steadily increasing misery which, as experience shows, makes any nation ripe for any form of radicalism.

On this ground and in this setting Der Stürmer developed. For these reasons it first met with a certain amount of interest and attracted a considerable number of readers. But even in the last years before the seizure of power it did not have great influence; its distribution hardly went beyond Nuremberg and its close vicinity. By means of attacks on persons known locally in Nuremberg and in other places, it managed to arouse in these localities, from time to time, a certain amount of interest and thereby to extend its circle of readers. Certain parts of the population were interested in the propagation of such scandal and for that reason subscribed to Der Stürmer.

But criminal action can only be seen here—and this is presumably the opinion of the Prosecution also—if this type of literary and oral activity led to criminal results. Now, was the German nation really filled with hatred for the Jews by Der Stürmer and by Streicher’s speeches in the sense and to the extent asserted by the Prosecution?

The Prosecution submitted the evidence on this point in a very brief manner. It draws conclusions, but it has not produced actual proof. It alleges the existence of results, but cannot produce evidence for that assumption. The prosecutor has maintained that without Streicher’s incitements over a number of years the German people would not have sanctioned the persecution of the Jews and that Himmler would not have found among the German people anyone to carry out the measures for the extermination of the Jews. If, however, the Defendant Streicher is to be made legally responsible for this, then not only must it be proved that the incitement as such was actually carried through and results achieved in this direction; but—and this is the decisive point—conclusive proof must be produced that the deeds which were done can be traced back to that incitement. It is not the question of the result obtained which must primarily and irrefutably be proved but the causative connection between incitement and result. Now, how is the influence of Der Stürmer upon the German people to be estimated, and what picture unfolds in the handling of the Jewish problem during the years between 1920 and 1944?

It is easy to recognize here three stages of development. The first period comprises the time of the defendant’s activity between 1922 and 1933; the second that between 1933 and 1 September 1939, or February 1940; the third, the time from 1940 to the collapse.

With regard to the first period, it would show a considerable lack of appreciation of the tendencies which had already existed in Germany for a long time and thereby a completely groundless exaggeration of Streicher’s influence, if no mention were made of the fact that long before Streicher there was already a certain amount of anti-Semitism in Germany. For instance a certain Theodor Fritsch had touched on the Jewish question in his journal Der Hammer long before Streicher’s time, referring especially to the alleged menace offered by the immigration of Jewish elements from the East, which might overflow the country and acquire too much control in it.

Immediately after the end of the first World War the so-called “German National Protective and Defensive League” (Deutsch-Völkischer Schutz- und Trutzbund) appeared on the scene, which in contrast to Der Stürmer and the Movement brought into being by Streicher, extended over the whole of Germany, setting as its aim the repression of Jewish influence. Anti-Semitic groups existed in the South as well as in the North long before Streicher. In comparison with these large-scale efforts, Der Stürmer could only have a regional importance. This alone explains why its influence was never at any time or in any place of great importance.

It is a decisive fact, however, that the German nation in its totality did not let itself be influenced by all these groups either in its business relations or in its attitude towards Jewry and that even during the last years before the NSDAP came to power no violent actions against the Jews were committed anywhere by the people. However, when towards the end of the second decade after the first World War a considerable increase of the NSDAP became noticeable, this was not due to anti-Semitic reasons but to the fact that the prevailing confusion in the various parties had been unable to point to a way out of the ever-increasing economic misery. The call for a strong man became ever more urgent. The conviction became more and more firmly rooted among the broad masses that only a personality who was not dependent on the change of majorities would be able to master the situation.

The NSDAP knew how to exploit this general trend for its own ends and to win over the nation, sunk in despair, by making promises in all directions. But never did the masses think, when electing the NSDAP at that time, that its program would produce developments as we have witnessed.

With the seizure of power by the NSDAP in 1933, the second epoch was introduced. The power of the State was exclusively in the hands of the Party and nobody could have prevented the use of violence against the Jewish population. Now would have been just the right moment for the Defendant Streicher to put into effect the baiting the Prosecution has alleged. If by that time wide circles of the population, or at least the veteran members of the NSDAP, had been trained to be radical Jew haters, as stated by the Prosecution, acts of violence against the Jewish population would necessarily have taken place on a greater scale due to that feeling of hatred. Pogroms on the largest scale would have been the natural result of a truly anti-Semitic attitude of the people. But nothing like that happened. Apart from some minor incidents, evidently caused by local or personal conditions, no attacks on Jews or their property took place anywhere. It is quite clear that a feeling of hatred for the Jewish people did not prevail anywhere at least up to 1933, and the charge brought by the Prosecution against the defendant that ever since the very outset of his fight he successfully educated the German people to hate the Jews can thus be dropped.

The year of the seizure of power by the NSDAP also put Der Stürmer to a decisive test. Had Der Stürmer been considered by the broad masses of the German people as the authoritative champion against the Jews and therefore indispensable for that fight, an unusually large increase in the circulation would have followed. No such interest was, however, shown. On the contrary, even in Party circles demands were made that Der Stürmer should be discontinued entirely; or at least that its illustrations, style, and tone should be altered. It became more and more clear that the already small interest in Streicher’s Jewish policy was steadily declining. It must be added that with the seizure of power by the Party the total press apparatus came under the control of the Party, which immediately undertook to co-ordinate the press, that is, to direct it from a central office in the spirit of the National Socialist policy and ideology. This was done through the Minister of Propaganda and the Reich Press Chief via the official “National Socialist Correspondence.” Particularly Dr. Goebbels, the Minister of Propaganda, described by various witnesses such as Göring, Schirach, Neurath, and others as the most bitter advocate of the anti-Semitic trend in the Government, is said to have given each week to the entire German press several anti-Jewish leaders, which were printed by more than 3,000 dailies and illustrated papers. If in addition we take into account that Dr. Goebbels was making broadcasts of an anti-Semitic nature, we need no further explanations for the fact that the interest in a one-sided anti-Semitic journal should diminish and that is what actually happened.

It is particularly significant that at that time it had been repeatedly suggested that Der Stürmer should be suppressed altogether. This is brought out clearly in the testimony given by Fritzsche, on 27 June 1946, who stated in addition that neither Streicher nor Der Stürmer had any influence in the Ministry of Propaganda and that he was considered so to speak as nonexistent. It may have been for the same reason that Der Stürmer was not even declared a press organ of the NSDAP and was not even entitled to show the Party symbol. It was looked upon by the Party and State administration, in contrast to all papers which were considered to be of any importance, as a private paper belonging to a private writer.

The firm which published Der Stürmer, and which belonged at that time to a certain Härdel, was not inclined, however, to accept so quietly the dwindling of its circle of readers, for it was now aided by the fact that Streicher had become the highest leader in Franconia; and it knew how to make the most of this circumstance. Already at that time pressure was exerted on many sections of the population to prove their loyal political attitude and trustworthiness by subscribing to Der Stürmer. The witness Fritzsche also has alluded to this circumstance, stating that many Germans only decided to subscribe to Der Stürmer because they thought it would be a means of paving the way for their intended membership in the Party.

So as not to give a false impression of the circulation figures of Der Stürmer during the years between 1923 and 1933, the following analysis will show the different stages of its development.

In the years 1923 to 1933 Der Stürmer was able to increase its circulation from some 3,000 to some 10,000 copies, and this in turn went up to some 20,000 shortly before the seizure of power. On the average, however, between 1923 and 1931 the circulation was only some 6,000 copies. Following the seizure of power, by the end of 1934 it had reached an average of some 28,000 copies. It was not until 1935 that Der Stürmer became the property of the Defendant Streicher who, according to his statement, bought it from the widow of the previous owner for 40,000 RM—a not very considerable sum. From 1935 on the management of the business was taken over by an expert, who succeeded by clever canvassing in increasing the circulation to well over 200,000 copies; and this figure was later increased still further until it more than doubled. The relatively low circulation figures for Der Stürmer up to the beginning of 1935 show that, despite the Party’s rise to power, popular interest in Der Stürmer existed only to a small extent. The extraordinary increase in the circulation which began in 1935 is to be traced to the adroit canvassing methods already mentioned which were carried out by the new director Fink. The use of the Labor Front, as explained by the proclamation of Dr. Ley in Number 36 of Der Stürmer, 1935—which copy, Mr. President, I have taken the liberty of submitting as an exhibit—and the acquisition thereby of many thousands of forced subscribers must be ascribed to the personal relations of the manager Fink with Dr. Ley.

In that connection I further refer to a quotation from the Pariser Tageblatt of 29 March 1935 reproduced in Der Stürmer of May 1935. Here, too, it is stated that the increase of Der Stürmer’s circulation cannot be ascribed to the desire of the German people for such kind of spiritual food. It is neither presumable nor probable in any way that the compulsory subscription to Der Stürmer, forced on the members of the Labor Front in such a manner, could have actually turned subscribers into readers of Der Stürmer and followers of its line of thought. On the contrary, it is known that bundles of Der Stürmer in their original wrappings were stored in cellars and attics and that they were brought to light again only when the paper shortage became more acute.

When, therefore, the Defendant Streicher wrote in his paper in 1935—Document Number GB-169—that the 15 years’ work of enlightenment of Der Stürmer had already attracted to National Socialism an army of a million of “enlightened” members, he claimed a success for which there was no foundation whatsoever. The men and women who joined the Party after 1933 did not apply for membership as a result of the so-called enlightenment work of Der Stürmer but either because they believed the Party’s promises and hoped to derive advantages from it or because by belonging to the Party they wanted, as the witness Severing expressed it, to insure for themselves immunity from political persecution. The sympathy for the Party and its leadership very soon decreased in the most marked manner. Thus the Defendant Streicher, too, lost authority and influence to an ever-increasing extent even in his own district of Franconia, at least from 1937 on. The reasons for this are sufficiently known.

Toward the end of 1938 he saw himself deprived of practically all political influence, even in his own district. The controversy between him and Göring ended with the victory of the latter. Hitler, when pressed to do so by the Defendant Göring, had dropped Streicher completely, as the Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe at that time was naturally more important and far more influential than the Gauleiter, Streicher. The defendant even had to submit to Aryanization as carried out in the district of Franconia with its correctness being checked by a special commission sent by Göring. In the course of the year 1939 Streicher was completely pushed aside and was even forbidden to speak in public. At the outbreak of the war, in contrast to all other Gauleiter, he was not even appointed to the position of Wehrkreiskommissar of his own district.

During the last phase, in the war years, the Defendant Streicher had no political influence whatsoever. As from February 1940 he was relieved of his position as a Gauleiter and lived on his estate in Pleikershof, cut off from all connections. Even Party members were forbidden to visit him. Since the end of 1938 he had no connections whatsoever with Hitler, by whom he had been completely cast off from that time on.

In what way now did Der Stürmer exert any influence during the war period? It can be said that during the war Der Stürmer no longer attracted any attention worth mentioning. The gravity of the times, the anxiety for relatives on the battlefield, the battles at the front, and finally the heavy air attacks completely diverted the German people’s interest from questions dealt with in Der Stürmer. The people were weary of the continuous repetition of the same assertions. The best proof of how little Der Stürmer was desired as reading matter can be seen in the fact that in restaurants and cafés Der Stürmer was always available for perusal, whereas other papers and magazines were permanently being read. The circulation figures decreased steadily and unceasingly in those years. Certainly the influence of Der Stürmer in the political sphere no longer amounted to anything.

During the periods mentioned Der Stürmer was rejected by large circles of the population from the very outset. Its crude style, its often objectionable illustrations, and its one-sidedness aroused widespread displeasure. There can be no question of any influence being exercised by Der Stürmer upon the German people or even the Party. Although the German people for years had been deluged with Nazi propaganda, or rather because of that very fact, a journal such as Der Stürmer could exert no influence upon its inner attitude. Had the German people—as maintained by the Prosecution—actually been saturated with the spirit of fanatical racial hatred, other factors certainly would have been far more responsible for it than Der Stürmer and would have contributed far more essentially to a hostile attitude towards the Jews.

But nothing of such nature can be established. The general attitude of the German people was not anti-Semitic, at any rate, not in such a way or to such a degree that they would have desired, or approved of, the physical extermination of the Jews. Even official Party propaganda with regard to the Jewish problem had exerted no influence upon the broad masses of the German people, neither had it educated them in the direction desired by the State leadership.

This is shown by the fact that it was necessary to issue a number of legal decrees in order to segregate the German population from the Jewish. The first example of this is the so-called Law for the Protection of German Blood and German Honor of September 1935, by the provisions of which any racial intermingling of German people with the Jewish population was subject to the death penalty. The passing of such laws would not have been necessary if the German people had been predisposed to an anti-Semitic attitude, for they would then of their own accord have segregated themselves from the Jews.

The law for the elimination of the Jews from German economic life, promulgated in November 1938, was along the same lines. In a people hostile towards the Jews, any trade with Jewish circles would have necessarily ceased and their business would have automatically come to a standstill. Yet in fact the intervention of the State was needed to eliminate Jewry from economic life.

The same conclusion can be drawn from the reaction of the greater part of the German populace to the demonstrations carried out against the Jews during the night of 9-10 November 1938. It is proved that these acts of violence were not committed spontaneously by the German people but that they were organized and executed with the aid of the State and Party apparatus upon instructions of Dr. Goebbels in Berlin. The result and the effect of these State-directed demonstrations—which in a cynical way were depicted for their effect abroad as an expression of the indignation of the German people at the assassination of the Secretary of the Embassy in Paris, Vom Rath—were different from that visualized by the instigators of this demonstration.

These acts of violence and excesses based upon the lowest instincts found unanimous condemnation, even in the circles of the Party and its leadership. Instead of creating hostility towards the Jewish population they roused pity and compassion for their fate. Hardly any other measure taken by the NSDAP was ever rejected so generally. The effect upon the public was so marked that the Defendant Streicher in his capacity as Gauleiter found it necessary in an address in Nuremberg to give a warning against exaggerated sympathy for the Jews. According to his statement he did not do this because he approved of these measures but only in order to strengthen by his influence the impaired prestige of the Party.

Previously, as appears from the testimony of the witness Fritz Herrwerth examined here, he refused SA Obergruppenführer Von Obernitz’s request to take part personally in the demonstration planned and called it useless and prejudicial. He publicly expressed this point of view later also, during a meeting of the League of Jurists at Nuremberg. In doing so he risked placing himself in open opposition to the official policy of the State.

All these facts show that despite the anti-Jewish propaganda carried on by the Government, actual hostility against the Jewish population did not exist among the people themselves. Thus it is as good as proved that neither Streicher’s publications in Der Stürmer nor his speeches incited the German people in the sense maintained by the Prosecution. Therefore the general attitude of the German nation provides no proof of incitement to hatred of the Jews having been successfully carried out by the Defendant Streicher and leading to criminal results. The Prosecution, however, has further supported its accusation by the specific assertion that only a nation educated to absolute hatred of Jews by men like the defendant could approve of such measures as the mass extermination of Jews. Thereby the charge is made against the whole of the German people that they knew about the extermination of the Jews and approved of it; the severity and consequences of such a charge on the whole future of the German nation is impossible to estimate.

But did the German nation really approve of these measures? A fact can only be approved of if it is known. Therefore should this assertion of the Prosecution be considered as proved, then logically it must also be considered as proved that the German nation actually had knowledge of these occurrences. However, evidence in this respect has shown that Reichsführer SS Himmler, who was entrusted by Hitler with the mass assassinations, and his close collaborators shrouded all these events in a veil of deepest secrecy. By threatening with the most severe punishments any violations of the rule of absolute silence which was imposed, they managed to lower before the events in the East and in the extermination camps an iron curtain which hermetically sealed off those facts from the public.

Hitler and Himmler prevented even the corps of the highest leaders of the Party and State from gaining any insight and information. Hitler did not hesitate to give false information to even his closest collaborators, like Reich Minister Dr. Lammers, who was heard here as a witness, and to make him believe that the removal of the European Jews to the East meant their settlement in the Eastern Territories but by no means their extermination. However much the statements of the defendants may diverge on many points, in this connection they all agree so completely with one another and with the statements of other witnesses that the veracity of their testimonies simply cannot be questioned. If it was not possible for even the Defendant Frank in his capacity as Governor General of Poland to get through to Auschwitz, because without Hitler’s special consent even he was denied entrance, then this fact speaks for itself.

If even the leading personalities of the Third Reich, with the exception of a very small circle, were not informed and if even they had at best very vague information, then how could the general public have known about it? Under these circumstances the possibilities for finding out what was going on in the camps were extremely slight.

For the majority of the people, foreign news did not exist as a source of information. Listening to foreign radio stations was punishable with the heaviest penalties and therefore did not take place. And if it did, the news broadcast by foreign radio stations concerning events in the East, although, or rather because, it corresponded to facts, was so crass, so horrible beyond any human understanding, that it was bound to appear to any normal individual, as in fact it did, as intentional propaganda. Germany could only gain factual knowledge of the extermination measures against the Jews from people who either were working in the camps themselves or came in contact with the camps or their inmates or from former concentration camp inmates.

There is no need to explain that members of the camp personnel who were concerned with these happenings kept silent, not only because they were under stringent orders to do so, but also in their own interest. Furthermore, it is known that Himmler had threatened the death penalty for information from the camps and for spreading news about the camps and that not only the actual culprit but also his relatives were threatened with this punishment. Finally, it is known that the extermination camps themselves were so hermetically sealed off from any contact with the world that nothing concerning the events which took place in them could penetrate to the public.

The prisoners in the camps who came into contact with fellow-workers in their work kept silent because they had to. People who came to the camps were also under the threat of this punishment insofar as they could obtain any insight into things at all, which was all but impossible in the extermination camps. From these sources, therefore, no knowledge could come for the German people.

But the order for absolute silence was compulsory to a still greater measure for every concentration camp inmate who had been released. Hardly anybody ever came back to life from the actual murder camps; but if, once in a while, a man or woman was released, in addition to the other threatened punishments the threat of being sent back to the camp hung over them if they violated the order for silence. And this renewed detention would have meant gruesome death.

It was therefore nearly impossible to learn from released concentration camp prisoners positive facts concerning the occurrences in the camps. If this was the case with regard to normal concentration camps in Germany, it applied in a still greater measure to the extermination camps. Every lawyer who, as I did, defended people before detention in a concentration camp and who was visited by them again after their release, will be able to confirm that it was not possible, even in such a position of trust and under the protection of professional legal secrecy, to get former concentration camp inmates to talk.

If men such as Severing, who testified here—a Social Democrat of long standing, who was highly trusted by his party comrades and who was, because of this, in touch with many former concentration camp inmates—came to know of the real facts connected with the extermination of the Jews only very late and even then to a very restricted extent, then such considerations must apply even more to any normal German.

It can be derived with absolute certainty from these facts that the leaders of the State, that Hitler and Himmler, wanted under all circumstances to keep secret the extermination of the Jews; and this forms the base for another argument—in my opinion, a cogent one—against the anti-Semitism of the German people asserted by the Prosecution. If the German people had indeed been filled with such hatred of Jewry as the Prosecution affirms, then such rigorous methods for secrecy would have been superfluous.

If Hitler had been convinced that the German nation saw in the Jews its principal enemy, that it approved of and desired the extermination of Jewry, then he would obviously have published the planned and also the effected extermination of this very enemy. As a sign of the “total war” constantly propagandized by Hitler and Goebbels, there would indeed have been no better means to strengthen the faith in victory and the will of the people to fight than the information that Germany’s principal enemy, these very Jews, had already been annihilated.

So unscrupulous a propagandist as Goebbels certainly would not have failed to use such a striking argument if he could have based it on the necessary presupposition, that is, the German people’s absolute determination to exterminate the Jews. However, the “final solution” of the Jewish question had by all possible means to be kept secret even from the German people who had for years been subjected to the heaviest pressure by the Gestapo. Even leading men in the State and the Party were not allowed to be told of it.

Hitler and Himmler were evidently themselves convinced that even in the midst of a total war, and after decades of education and gagging by National Socialism, the German nation—and above all its Armed Forces—would have reacted most violently on the publication of such a policy against the Jews. The policy of secrecy followed here cannot be explained by any considerations of the enemy nations. In the years 1942 and 1943 the whole world was already engaged in a bitter war against National Socialist Germany.

An intensification of this struggle seemed hardly possible, at any rate not by the mere publishing of facts which had long since become known abroad. Apart from this, considerations of making a still worse impression on the enemy countries could hardly influence men such as Hitler, Goebbels, and Himmler.

If they had expected to achieve even the slightest tangible results by proclaiming to the German people the extermination of the Jews, they would certainly not have omitted to proclaim it. On the contrary, they would have tried in every way to strengthen by this means the German people’s faith in victory. The fact that they did not do this is the best proof that even they did not consider the German people radically anti-Semitic, and it is also the best proof that there can be no question of such anti-Semitism on the part of the German people.

I may therefore sum up by saying that all this stands in contradiction to the Prosecution’s assertion that the Defendant Streicher brought up the German people to hate the Jews to an extent which made them approve of the extermination of Jewry. Therefore, even if the defendant by means of his proclamations had aimed at achieving such an end he was not successful.

In this connection, light must also be thrown upon the part attributed by the Prosecution to the Defendant Streicher, namely that he had educated German youth in the spirit of anti-Semitism and had inculcated the poison of anti-Semitism so deeply into their hearts that these pernicious effects would be felt long after his death.

The main reproach made against the defendant in this connection is based on the fact that young people, as a result of Streicher’s education in hatred toward the Jews, are supposed to have been ready to commit crimes against Jews which otherwise they would not have committed, and that youth thus educated might be expected to perpetrate such crimes in the future too. Here the Prosecution relies mainly on the juvenile literature published by Der Stürmer and some announcements addressed to youth which appeared in this paper.

Far be it from me to gloss over these products or to defend them. Evaluation of them can and must be left to the Tribunal. In accordance with the basic principle of the Defense, the only question to be taken up here will be whether or not the defendant in any way influenced the education of youth in a manner to promote criminal hatred of Jews.

As for the books which have been mentioned here, it must be said that German youth scarcely knew of their existence—much less did they read them. No evidence has been produced in support of the Prosecution’s assumption to the contrary. The healthy common sense of German youth refused such stuff. German boys and girls preferred other reading material. It may be emphasized in this connection that neither the text nor the illustrations in these books could attract youth in any way. They were, on the contrary, bound to be shunned.

Of special importance in regard to this point is the fact that, Defendant Baldur von Schirach, the man responsible for educating the whole body of German youth, testified under oath that the afore-mentioned juvenile books published by this company were not circulated by the Hitler Youth Leadership and did not find a circle of readers among the Hitler Youth. The witness made the same assertions in regard to Der Stürmer. One of his closest co-workers, the witness Lauterbacher, stated in this connection that Der Stürmer was actually banned for the Hitler Youth by the Defendant Von Schirach. It is clear that the very style and illustrations of Der Stürmer were ill-adapted to attract the interest of young persons or to offer them ethical support. The step taken by the Reich Youth Leadership is therefore quite understandable.

Although some of Der Stürmer articles submitted by the Prosecution seem to indicate that Der Stürmer was read in youth circles and produced a certain effect there, it must be borne in mind that these were typical commissioned articles, that is, commissioned for propaganda purposes. There is no evidence whatsoever to support the Prosecution’s assertion that German youth harbored criminal hate toward Jews. Therefore, neither the German people nor its youth ...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, perhaps this would be a convenient time to break off.

[A recess was taken.]

DR. MARX: One might now be tempted to assume that Der Stürmer exercised a particularly strong influence upon the Party organizations, the SA and SS; but this was not the case either. The SA, the largest mass organization of the Party, rejected Der Stürmer just as did the mass of the people. Its publications were Der SA-Führer and Die SA. The mass of the SA took these as the foundation of their ideology. These publications do not contain even one article from the pen of the Defendant Streicher. If the latter had really been the man the Prosecution believes him to be, the most authoritative and influential propagandist of anti-Semitism, he would of necessity have been called upon to collaborate in these publications, which were issued to instruct the SA on the Jewish question. A publication intended to provide ideological instruction could never have dispensed with the collaboration of such a man.

The fact that not one word by Julius Streicher himself ever appeared in these papers demonstrates afresh that the picture drawn of him by the Prosecution does not correspond in any way with the actual facts. The Defendant Streicher could gain no influence over the SA through his paper and the columns of Der SA-Führer and Die SA were closed to him. Even the highest SA leaders refused to advocate his ideas. The SA Deputy Chief of Staff, SA Obergruppenführer Jüttner, testifying before the commission on 21 May 1946, made the following statement in this connection:

“At a leader conference, the former SA Chief of Staff, Lutze, stated that he did not want propaganda for Der Stürmer in the SA. In certain groups Der Stürmer was even prohibited. The contents of Der Stürmer disgusted and repelled most of the SA men. The policy of the SA with regard to the Jewish question was in no way directed at the extermination of the Jews; it aimed only at preventing a large-scale immigration of Jews from the East.”

The ideology of Der Stürmer was thus rejected on principle by the individual SA man as well as by the SA leaders, and there is therefore no question of Streicher’s having influenced the SA.

Not only was the Defendant Streicher not asked to collaborate in SA publications, but his articles did not appear in any other newspapers and publications. He was given no chance of contributing either to the Völkischer Beobachter or to other leading organs of the German press, although the Propaganda Ministry intended enlightenment on the Jewish question to form one of the noblest tasks of the German press.

The Defendant Streicher was given no opportunity, either by the State leadership or by the Propaganda Ministry, of impressing his ideas upon a wider circle. The Defendant Fritzsche, the man who shared the decisive authority in the Propaganda Ministry, testified that Streicher never exerted any influence upon propaganda and that he was completely disregarded. In particular, he was not entrusted with radio talks, although talks given over the radio would have had much greater effect on the masses than an article in Der Stürmer, which necessarily reached only a limited circle. The fact that even the official propaganda of the Third Reich made no use of the Defendant Streicher makes it clear that no results could be expected from his activities, and that, in fact, he had no influence at all. The official leaders of the German State recognized Streicher for what he actually was, the insignificant publisher of an entirely insignificant weekly. It must be stressed once more as clearly as possible that the fundamental attitude of the German people was no more radically anti-Semitic than that of German youth or the Party organizations. Success in instigating and inciting to criminal anti-Semitism is, therefore, not proven.

I now come to the last and decisive part of the accusation, that is, to the examination of the question: Who were the chief persons responsible for the orders given for the mass-extermination of Jewry; how was it possible that men could be found who were ready to execute these orders; and whether without the influence of the Defendant Streicher, such orders would not have been given or executed.

The main person responsible for the final solution of the Jewish question—the extermination of Jewry in Europe—is without doubt Hitler himself. Though this greatest of all trials in world history suffers from the fact that the chief offenders are not sitting in the dock, because they are either dead or not to be found, the facts ascertained have nevertheless resulted in cogent conclusions concerning the actual responsibility.

It can be considered as proved beyond any doubt that Hitler was a man of unique and even demoniacal brutality and ruthlessness who, in addition, later lost all sense of proportion and all self-control. The fact that his chief characteristic was ruthless brutality became apparent for the first time in its force when the so-called Röhm Putsch was suppressed in June 1934. On this occasion Hitler did not hesitate to have his oldest fellow combatants shot without any kind of trial. His unrestrained radicalism was further revealed in the way in which the war with Poland was conducted. He ordered the ruthless extermination of leading Polish circles merely because he feared an antagonistic attitude toward Germany on their part. The orders which he gave at the beginning of the Russian campaign were still more drastic. At that time he already ordered partial operations for the extermination of Jewry:

These examples show beyond doubt that respect for any principle of humanity was alien to this man. Furthermore the proceedings, by the depositions of all the defendants, have clearly established the fact that in basic decisions Hitler was not open to any outside influence.

Hitler’s basic attitude toward the Jewish question is well known. He had already become an anti-Semite during the time he spent in Vienna in the years before the first World War. There is, however, no actual proof that Hitler from the very beginning had in mind such a radical solution of the Jewish question as was finally effected in the annihilation of European Jewry. When the Prosecution declares that from the book Mein Kampf a direct road leads to the crematories of Mauthausen and Auschwitz, this is only an assumption; and no evidence for it has been given. The evidence rather suggests the fact that Hitler also wanted to see the Jewish problem in Germany solved by way of emigration. This thought, as well as the position of the Jewish part of the population under the laws governing aliens, formed the official State policy of the Third Reich. Many of the leading anti-Semites considered the Jewish question as settled after the laws of 1935 had been promulgated. The Defendant Streicher shared this opinion. The stiffening of Hitler’s attitude to the Jewish question cannot be traced back beyond the end of 1938 or the beginning of 1939. Only then did it become apparent that in case of war—which he believed was propagated by the Jews—he was planning a different solution. In his Reichstag speech on 30 January 1939 he predicted the extermination of Jewry should a second World War be let loose against Germany. He expressed the same ideas in a speech made in February 1942, on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the day on which the Party was founded. And, finally, his testament, too, confirms his exclusive responsibility for the murdering of European Jewry as a whole.

Though Hitler had adopted an increasingly implacable attitude on the Jewish question ever since the beginning of the war, there is nothing to show that he visualized the extermination of the Jews in the early stages of the war. His final resolution to this effect was undoubtedly formed when Hitler, probably as early as 1942, saw that it was impossible to secure a victory for Germany.

It can be assumed almost with certainty that the decision to exterminate the Jews originated—as did almost all of Hitler’s plans—exclusively with himself. It cannot be ascertained with certainty how far others who were closely attached to Hitler brought their influence to bear on him. If such influence did exist, it can only have come from Himmler, Bormann, and Goebbels. It can at least be stated beyond any doubt that during the decisive period from September 1939 to October 1942 Streicher did not influence him, nor, under the circumstances, could he have done so. At that time Streicher was living—deprived of all his offices and completely left in the cold—at his farm at Pleikershof. He had no connection with Hitler either personally or by correspondence. This has been proved beyond all doubt by the statements made by the witnesses Fritz Herrwerth and Adele Streicher, and by the statement under oath of the defendant himself. It cannot, however, be maintained in earnest that his reading of Der Stürmer moved Hitler to give orders for wholesale murder. This should make it clear that the Defendant Streicher had no influence whatever on either the man who made the decision to exterminate Jewry, or on the orders issued by him.

In October 1942 Bormann’s decree ordering the extermination of Jewry was issued (Document 3244-PS). It has been established beyond all question that this order came from Hitler and went to Reichsführer SS Heinrich Himmler, who was charged with the actual extermination of the Jews. He for his part charged the Chief of the Gestapo, Müller, and his commissioner for Jewish affairs, Eichmann, with the final execution of the order. These three men are the three who are chiefly responsible, next to Hitler. It has not been proved that Streicher had any possibility of influencing them, or that he did actually influence them. He states—and there is no proof to the contrary—that he never knew either Eichmann or Müller, and that his relations with Himmler were slight and far from friendly.

Casually it might be mentioned that Himmler was one of the most radical anti-Semites of the Party. From the beginning he had advocated a merciless fight against the Jews; and in any case, judging by what we know of him, he was not the man to allow himself to be influenced by others in matters of principle. Apart from that, however, a comparison of the two personalities shows that Himmler was in every way the stronger and superior man of the two, so that for this reason alone the exertion of any influence by the Defendant Streicher on Himmler may be ruled out. I believe I may refrain from further illustration of this point.

I now come to the question of whether the activity of the Defendant Streicher had a decisive influence on the men who actually carried out the orders; that is, on members of the Einsatzgruppen on the one hand, and on the execution Kommandos in the concentration camps on the other; and whether any spiritual and intellectual preparation was necessary to make these men willing to execute such measures.

In his speeches in Nikolaev, Posen, and Kharkov—which have often been mentioned here—the Reichsführer SS stated unequivocally not only that he besides Hitler was responsible for the final solution of the Jewish question, but also that the execution of the orders was only made possible by the employment of forces which he himself had selected from among the SS. We know from Ohlendorf’s testimony that the so-called Einsatzgruppen consisted of members of the Gestapo and the SD, companies of the Waffen-SS, members of the police force with long service records, and indigenous units.

It must be stated as a matter of principle that the Defendant Streicher never had the slightest influence on the ideological attitude of the SS. The extensive evidence material of this Trial contains no shadow of proof that Streicher had any connections with the SS. The alleged Enemy Number One of the Jews, the great propagandist of the persecution of the Jews—as he has been pictured by the Prosecution—the Defendant Streicher never had the opportunity of writing for the periodical Das Schwarze Korps or even for the SS Leithefte. These periodicals alone, however, as the official mouthpieces of the Reichsführer SS, determined the ideological attitude of the SS. These SS periodicals also determined their attitude toward the Jewish question. In these circles Der Stürmer had just as small a public; it was rejected, just as it was in other circles. Himmler himself rejected Streicher ironically as an ideologist. Therefore the Defendant Streicher could not have had any influence on the ideology of the SS members of the Einsatzgruppen, much less on the old members of the Police, and least of all on the foreign units. Nor could he dictate the ideology of the execution squad’s in the concentration camps. Those men originated for the most part from the Death’s Head Units, that is the old guard units, of whom the above statement is true to a greater degree. Added to this is the fact that the experienced members of the Police, as well as the SS men with long service records, were trained in absolute obedience to their leaders. Absolute obedience to a Führer command was a matter of course for both.

Even those experienced police force members, however, accustomed as they were to absolute obedience, even the veteran SS men, could not simply be charged by Himmler with carrying out the executions of the Jews. Rather did he have to select men whom he trusted to lead these execution squads and to make them personally responsible for their assignments, pointing out explicitly that he would take all responsibility and that he himself was only passing on a definite order from Hitler.

Even these men, whom the Prosecution alleges to have been the elite of Nazism, were so far from being enemies of the Jews in the meaning of the Indictment, that the entire authority of the head of State and Führer, and of his most brutal henchman, Himmler, was required to force upon the men responsible for carrying out the execution orders the conviction that their order was based on the will of the authoritarian head of the State; an order which, according to their conviction, had the power of a fundamental State law and therefore was above all criticism.

The men charged to carry out the annihilation, therefore, obeyed their orders not for ideological reasons and not because they were incited to do so by Streicher, as the Prosecution contends, but solely in obedience to an order from Hitler transmitted to them through Himmler, and knowing that disobedience to a Führer order meant death. In this respect, too, therefore, Streicher’s influence has not been proved.

The accusations brought against the defendant by the Prosecution are herewith exhausted. But, in order to reach a conclusion and to form a judgment of the defendant which will take the actual findings fully into account, it seems advisable to give once more a short account of his personality and his activities under the Hitler regime.

The Prosecution considers him to be the leading anti-Semite and the leading advocate of a ruthless determination to annihilate Jewry. This conception, however, does justice neither to the part played by the defendant and the influence actually exercised by him, nor to his personality. The manner of the defendant’s employment in the Third Reich and the way in which he was called upon to co-operate in the propagation and final solution of the Jewish question shows the Prosecution’s conception to be false. The only occasion on which the defendant was called upon to take an active part in the fight against Jewry was in his capacity as chairman of the Action Committee for the Anti-Jewish Boycott Day on 1 April 1933. His attitude on that day is in direct opposition to his violent utterances in Der Stürmer and makes it evident that the passages in his paper which have been attacked were pure propaganda. Although on that day he could have drawn upon the whole power of State and Party against Jewry, he was content to order that Jewish places of business be marked as such and put under guard. In addition, he gave explicit instructions that any molestation of the Jews or acts of violence, or any damage to Jewish property, was forbidden and would be punished. In the later stages no further use at all was made of the defendant. He was not even consulted on the ideological basis for the settlement of the Jewish question. He was unable to voice his ideas in the press or over the air. He was not asked to write on the clarification of the Jewish question either in the Schulungsbriefe of the Party or the periodicals belonging to the organizations.

Not he but the Defendant Rosenberg was charged by Hitler with the ideological training of the German people. The latter was responsible for the Institute for Research into the Jewish Question, set up in Frankfurt, and not the Defendant Streicher; in fact, the latter was not even considered as a collaborator in this institute. The Defendant Rosenberg was commissioned with the arrangement of an Anti-Jewish World Congress in 1944. It is true that this assembly did not take place, but it is significant that the plans made for it did not include the participation of the Defendant Streicher.

The whole of the anti-Jewish laws and decrees of the Third Reich were drafted without his participation. He was not even called in to draft the racial laws proclaimed at the Party rally in Nuremberg in 1935. The Defendant Streicher did not take part in a single conference on even moderately important questions in either peace or wartime. His name does not appear on any list of participants or on any minutes. Not even in the course of the discussions themselves is one single reference made to his name.

The fight against Jewry in the Third Reich grew more and more embittered from year to year, especially after the outbreak of war and during its course. In contrast to this, however, the influence of the Defendant Streicher yearly grew weaker. Already by 1939 he was almost entirely pushed aside and had no relations with Hitler or other leading men of State and Party. In 1940 he was relieved of his office as Gauleiter and after that he played no further part in political life.

If the Defendant Streicher had really been the man the Prosecution believes him to be, his influence and his activity would have increased automatically with the intensification of the fight against the Jews. His career would not have ended, as it actually did, in political powerlessness and banishment from the scene of action, but with the commission to carry out the destruction of Jewry.

It cannot be denied that by writing ad nauseam on the same subject for years in a clumsy, crude, and violent manner, the Defendant Streicher has brought upon himself the hatred of the world. By so doing, he has created a strong feeling against himself which led to his importance and influence being rated far higher than they actually were, for which he now runs the risk of having the extent of his responsibility similarly misjudged.

The defense counsel, who in this case had a difficult and thankless task, had to limit himself to presenting those aspects and facts which allow the true significance of this man and the role he played in the tragedy of National Socialism to be recognized. But it cannot be the task of the Defense to deny indisputable facts and to defend acts for which absolutely no excuse exists.

The fact remains, therefore, that this defendant took part in the demolition of the main synagogue of Nuremberg, and thus allowed a place of religious worship to be destroyed. The defendant states as an excuse that his aim in so doing was not the demolition of a building meant for religious worship, but the removal of an edifice which appeared out of place in the Old Town of Nuremberg, and that his opinion had been shared by art experts. The truth of this was proved by the fact that he left the second Jewish house of worship untouched until it finally, and without his connivance, went up in flames during the night of 9 to 10 November. However that may be, the defendant shows the same lack of scruple here as he does in his other actions. He must account here for his actions in this connection alone; the Defense cannot shield him. But here, too, the fact that the population of Nuremberg disapproved of these actions clearly and unmistakably must be stressed. It was clear to any impartial observer that the people viewed such actions with icy detachment and that only brute force could compel them to tolerate such measures and to look on at such senseless proceedings.

It is just as impossible for the Defense to express any opinion on the revival of the ritual murder myth. No interest whatsoever was taken in these articles; but their tendency is obvious. The only point in the defendant’s favor, apart from the good faith with which we must credit him, is the fact that the author of these articles was not himself, but Holz; he must, however, put up with the charge that he allowed it to happen.

It must appear incomprehensible that the defendant continued to play a part in the publication of Der Stürmer long after he had been politically crippled and vanished from the scene of action. This very fact reveals his one-track mind better than anything else.

When the Prosecution accuses the defendant of having aimed at the physical annihilation of the Jews and prepared the way for this later result by means of his publications, I would like to refer to the statements given by the defendant under oath at his interrogation, to which I am here referring in their entirety.

The defendant claims that in the long series of articles published by Der Stürmer since its foundation there were none demanding actual deeds of violence against the Jews. He also claims that among the issues, of which there were over one thousand, only about 15 were found to contain expressions which could form the basis for a charge against him in the meaning of the Indictment.

On the contrary, the defendant argued that his articles and speeches had always shown an unmistakable tendency to achieve a solution of the Jewish problem in its entirety throughout the world, since any kind of partial solution would serve no useful purpose and failed to reach the heart of the problem. Basing himself on this very point of view he had always expressed himself unequivocally as opposed to any kind of violence, and he would never have approved of an action such as that finally carried out by Hitler in such a gruesome manner.

This must raise serious doubts as to whether the defendant can be proved to have agreed with the mass murders practiced on Jewry, and I leave this decision to the Tribunal. In any case, he himself refers to the fact that he had no reasonably certain knowledge of these wholesale murders until 1944, a fact corroborated by the statements of the witnesses Adele Streicher and Hiemer.

He considered the articles published in the Israelitisches Wochenblatt as propaganda and consequently did not believe them. In this connection, the fact that up to the autumn of 1943 he did not in any article express satisfaction concerning the fate of Jewry in the East is in his favor. Although he did write then on the disappearance of the Jewish reservoir in the East, there is nothing to show that he had any reliable source of information at his command. He might, therefore, very well have believed that this process of disappearance was not identical with physical annihilation but might represent the evacuation of the Jewish population assembled there to neutral countries or the territory of the Soviet Union. As no evidence has been presented to show that the defendant had received hints from any quarter in regard to the intended extermination of Jewry, he could not have conceived of such a diabolical occurrence which appears to be utterly inconceivable to the human mind. And it certainly cannot be assumed that the mental capacity of the defendant should have enabled him to foresee a solution of the Jewish question such as could only have originated in the brain of a person who was no longer in his right senses.

The defendant describes himself as a fanatic and seeker of truth. He professes to have written nothing and to have expressed nothing in his speeches which he had not taken from some authentic source and properly confirmed.

There is no doubt that he was a fanatic. The fanatic, however, is a man who is so possessed or convinced of an idea or illusion that he is not open to any other consideration, and is convinced of the correctness of his own idea and no other. A psychiatrist might regard it as a sort of mental cramp. Fanaticism of any kind is not far removed from maniacal obsession. As a rule it goes along with considerable overestimation of oneself and overevaluation of one’s own personality and its influence on the world around it.

Not one of the defendants here on trial shows such a wide discrepancy between fact and fancy as does the Defendant Streicher.

The Prosecution showed him as he appeared to the outside world. What he really was—and is—has been shown by the Trial. But only actual facts can form the basis for the judgment. Base your judgment also, Gentlemen, on the fact that the defendant in his position as Gauleiter of Franconia also showed many humane characteristics—that he had a large number of political prisoners released from concentration camps, which even caused criminal proceedings to be started against him. It should also be borne in mind that he treated the prisoners of war and the foreign laborers working on his estate very well in every respect.

Whatever the judgment against the Defendant Streicher may be, it will concern the fate of a single individual. It seems to be established, however, that the German people and this defendant were never in agreement on this essential question. The German people always disapproved of the aims of this defendant as expressed in his publications, and retained its own opinion of and attitude toward the Jews.

The Prosecution’s assumption that the tendentious articles in Der Stürmer found an echo or a ready acceptance among the German population, or even produced an attitude which would readily accept criminal measures, is herewith fully refuted.

The overwhelming majority of the German nation preserved their sound common sense and showed themselves disinclined toward all acts of violence. The nation may therefore claim to be declared free of all moral complicity in, and co-responsibility for, those crimes before the public tribunal of the world, so as to be able again to take its place in the ranks of the nations.

I leave the decision on the guilt or innocence of this defendant in the hands of the High Tribunal.

THE PRESIDENT: I call on Dr. Sauter for the Defendant Funk.

DR. FRITZ SAUTER (Counsel for Defendant Funk): Gentlemen of the Tribunal, I have the task of examining the case of the Defendant Dr. Walter Funk. That is to say, I am to deal with a topic which unfortunately is especially dry and prosaic. May I first make a short statement.

I shall on principle refrain from making any statements on legal, political, historical, or psychological matters which may be too general, although the temptation to make such general statements, particularly within the framework of these proceedings, may be considerable. General statements of the kind have already been made in abundance by my colleagues and will probably be still further supplemented. Therefore, I shall limit myself to examining and presenting to you from the point of view of the Defense the picture which the evidence in this Trial shows of the personality of the Defendant Funk, his actions, and their underlying motives.

Gentlemen of the Tribunal, the entire course of this Trial and the particular evidence offered in his own case have shown that the Defendant Funk did not play a decisive part in the National Socialist regime at any time and in any of the cases indicted here.

Funk’s authority of decision was always limited by the superior powers of others. The defendant’s statement, made during his personal examination, that he was allowed to come up to the door, but was never permitted to enter, has been shown by the evidence to be quite correct.

Funk was entrusted with tasks by the Party—as distinct from the State—only during the last year prior to the seizure of power, that is, in 1932. These, however, were of no practical significance, as they were of very short duration. Funk was never appointed to any Party office after the seizure of power. He was never a member of any Party organization—SS, SA, or Corps of Political Leaders. Funk was a member of the Reichstag for only a little more than 6 months shortly before the seizure of power. Consequently he was not a member of the Reichstag when the fundamental laws for the consolidation of National Socialist power were passed. The Reich Cabinet passed the laws for which Funk is held responsible, in particular the Enabling Act, at a time when Funk had not yet been made a member of the Cabinet. At this, it will be remembered, he did not become a member until the close of 1937 by virtue of his appointment as Minister of Economics, that is, at a time when no further Cabinet sessions were held. As Press Chief of the Reich Cabinet Funk had neither a seat nor a vote in the Cabinet and could exert no influence whatsoever upon the contents of the bills drafted. I refer to Lammers’ statement in this connection. The same applies to the racial laws, the so-called Nuremberg Laws.

Funk’s relations with the Führer only became closer for a period of 18 months during which he had to give regular press reports to Hitler in his capacity as Press Chief of the Reich Cabinet, that is, from February 1933 to August 1934, up to the death of Reich President Von Hindenburg. Later, Funk reported to Hitler only on very rare occasions. In this connection the witness Dr. Lammers makes the following statement:

“Later he (Funk) only visited Hitler in his capacity of Reich Minister of Economics on very rare occasions. He was frequently not invited to attend conferences—even those to which he should have been invited. He complained to me about this frequently. The Führer often raised objections, saying that there were various reasons against Funk and that he himself viewed Funk skeptically and did not want him.”

That is the testimony given by Dr. Lammers on 8 April 1946. When asked whether Funk had often complained to him about his unsatisfactory position as Reich Minister for Economics and about the anxiety caused him by conditions generally, Dr. Lammers replied:

“I know that Funk was very much worried and that he wanted an opportunity to discuss his anxieties with the Führer. He was extremely anxious for an opportunity of reporting to the Führer in order to obtain information, at least, about the war situation.” (That was in 1943 and 1944). And Lammers continues: “With the best intentions in the world, Funk could not obtain an audience from the Führer, and I was unable to get him to the Führer.”

Funk explains the striking fact that he was invited to attend only four or five Führer conferences during the whole of his ministerial activity by saying that Hitler did not need him. Up to 1942 Hitler issued his instructions in economic affairs to Göring, who in his capacity of Delegate for the Four Year Plan was responsible for the entire economy. From the beginning of 1942 Hitler also issued instructions to Speer, who as Armament Minister had special authority to issue directives to all branches of production and from 1943 personally directed the entire production. Funk therefore never played the principal part in the economy of the National Socialist Reich, but always only a subordinate role. This was specifically confirmed by his Codefendant Göring in his statement on 16 March:

“Naturally, in view of the special powers delegated to me (Göring) he had to follow my directives in the field of economy and the Reichsbank. The responsibility for the directives and policy of the Minister for Economics and President of the Reichsbank Funk is entirely mine.”

In the session of 20 June the Defendant Speer also testified that in his capacity as Armament Minister he reserved to himself from the very beginning any authority of decision in the most important economic spheres such as coal, iron and steel, metal, aluminum, and the production of machinery. Prior to Speer’s commission at the beginning of 1942, electric power and building were entirely under the jurisdiction of Armament Minister Todt.

For the greater part, the evidence submitted by the Prosecution in the case of the Defendant Funk does not relate to acts personally committed by Funk or instructions issued by him, but rather to the various and widely differing positions which he occupied. On Page 29 of the trial brief the Prosecutor himself declares that the argument offered against Funk may be described as inferential. The Prosecution starts from the assumption that judging by the positions which he had held Funk must have had knowledge of the various events which form the subject of the accusation. Generally speaking, the Prosecution refers to instructions and directives issued by Funk personally only in the case of the application instructions which he issued in November 1938 in connection with the Four Year Plan decrees for the elimination of Jews from economic life. I shall deal with this chapter separately at a later stage.

Finally, Funk was not invited to attend political and military conferences. His position was that of a technical minister with very limited power of decision.

As Reich Minister for Economics Funk was subordinated to the Four Year Plan, that is, to Göring. Later on, the Armament Minister became Funk’s superior. And finally, as was shown by the testimony of Göring, Lammers, and Hayler, the Ministry of Economics became a regular trade ministry, which dealt mainly with the distribution of consumers’ goods and with the technicalities of foreign trade. Similarly in the case of the Reichsbank the Four Year Plan determined the use of gold and foreign currency. The Reichsbank was deprived of its right to decide on the credits to be granted to the Reich for the internal financing of the war when Funk took over office as its President. Funk is thereby exonerated of any responsibility for the financing of the war. The responsible agency so far had always been the Reich Minister of Finance: In other words, not Funk. Finally, as Plenipotentiary for Economics, Funk’s sole task in August 1938 was to co-ordinate the civil economic resources for such measures as would guarantee a smooth conversion from peace to wartime economy. These consultations resulted in the proposals presented by Funk to Hitler on 25 August 1939 in the letter which has been several times quoted under Document Number 699-PS. At his examination Funk stated that this letter did not portray matters with complete accuracy, since it was a purely private letter, a letter of thanks for birthday congratulations received from Hitler. This point will have to be taken up again later, as the Prosecution particularly emphasized Funk’s position as Plenipotentiary for Economics. The evidence shows that his position as Plenipotentiary General was Funk’s most disputed position, but also his weakest.

With regard to the occupied territories Funk had no decisive authority whatsoever. All the witnesses interrogated on the point testified to this. But all witnesses also confirmed that Funk always opposed the spoliation of the occupied territories. He fought against German purchases in the black markets; he opposed the abolition of the foreign exchange relations with Holland, a measure intended to facilitate German purchases in Holland; and, as we have heard from the witness Neubacher, he organized exports to Greece from Germany and the eastern European states, and even sent gold there. He also repeatedly opposed the financial overburdening of the occupied territories especially in 1942 and 1944, and the raising of the occupation costs in France. He defended the currency of the occupied countries against reported attempts at devaluation. In the case of Denmark he even succeeded in raising the value of the currency, in spite of all opposition. Furthermore, Funk fought against the arbitrary stabilization of exchange when currency arrangements were made with occupied countries. Germany’s clearing debt was always recognized by Funk as a true commercial debt even with regard to the occupied countries. This is shown especially by his proposal, mentioned here, to commercialize this clearing debt by a loan to be issued by Germany for subscription in all European countries. Funk was also opposed to the overworking and especially to the compulsory employment of foreign labor in Germany.

The Defendant Sauckel has already testified to this at his interrogation here. The witnesses Hayler, Landfried, Puhl, and Neubacher, and the Codefendant Seyss-Inquart, have all confirmed that these measures taken by Funk had favorable results for the occupied countries. According to these statements Funk always strove to keep order in the economic and social life of the occupied territories and to preserve it as far as possible from disintegration. He always disapproved and opposed radical and arbitrary measures and favored agreements and compromises. Even during the war Funk was always thinking of peace. This statement was made by the witnesses Landfried and Hayler, who added that Funk was repeatedly reproached for his attitude by the leading State and Party offices. The Defendant Speer also testified at his interrogation that during the war Funk had employed too many workers in the manufacture of consumers’ goods and that it was for this reason that Funk had to hand over the management of the consumers’ goods production in 1943.

That Funk revolted against the horrible “scorched earth” policy just as Speer did has been proved to the Court by Speer himself, as well as by the witness Hayler on 7 May 1946. This witness declared that he had seldom seen Funk so much upset as he was when informed of this order for destruction. Hayler testified that Funk, in his capacity of Reich Minister of Economics and President of the Reichsbank, gave orders that existing stocks should be protected from destruction as decreed, in order to insure a supply of consumers’ goods necessary for the population and to safeguard currency transactions in the German territory which had been abandoned.

The aim of Funk’s economic policy—one might call it the mainspring of his life work—was the formation of a European economic community based on a just and natural balance of interest of the sovereign states. Even during the war he relentlessly pursued this goal, although the exigencies of war and the restraints imposed on development by the war naturally impeded these efforts at every turn. Funk has given a graphic description of the economic Europe which he envisaged and strove to attain in some major speeches on economic policy. Extracts from some of these speeches, many of which received a hearing even in neutral and enemy countries, are included in the document book.

In judging the acts of the Defendant Funk, his whole personality must naturally be taken into consideration to some extent in investigating the motives from which he acted. Funk was never looked upon by the German people—as far as he was known at all—as a Party man capable of participating in brutal outrages, using methods of violence and terror or amassing fortunes at the expense of others. He inclined rather toward art and literature, which preference he shared with—for instance—his friend Baldur von Schirach. Originally, as you have been told, he wanted to study music, and in later years he preferred to have poets and artists in his house rather than, men of the Party and the State. In professional circles he was known and respected as an economist and a man with a wide theoretical and historical knowledge, who had risen from journalism and had been a brilliant stylist. His position as chief editor of the distinguished Berliner Börsenzeitung was on a sound economic basis; by accepting the office of Press Chief in the Reich Cabinet at the beginning of 1933, after Hitler’s assumption of power, he even incurred a financial loss. Therefore, he was not one of those desperados who were glad to get into a well-paid position through Hitler. On the contrary, he made a financial sacrifice when he took over the State office offered him, and it therefore seems perfectly credible that he did this out of patriotism, out of a sense of duty toward his people, and in order to put himself at the service of his country during the hard times of distress.

In judging the personality and character of the Defendant Funk, it is also significant that he never held or tried to obtain any rank in the Party. Other people who took over high State offices in the Third Reich were given the title of an SS Gruppenführer, or were given, for instance, the rank of SA Obergruppenführer. Funk, on the contrary, was only a plain Party member, from 1931 until the end of the Third Reich, who carried out his State functions conscientiously, but made no effort to obtain any honors within the Party.

The only incident with which the Defendant Funk was reproached in this connection was the fact that he accepted an endowment in 1940, on his fiftieth birthday. In itself, of course, that is not a punishable act; but the Tribunal evidently evaluated it as a moral charge against the defendant. Therefore, we shall briefly define our position with regard to this. We remember how this endowment came about: The President and Board of the Reich Chamber of Economics (Reichswirtschaftskammer), as the highest representatives of German economic life, presented him on his fiftieth birthday with a farmhouse in Upper Bavaria and about 110 acres of ground. This farmhouse, of course, existed for the time being only on the paper of the presentation document and had still to be built. This presentation was expressly approved by the head of the State, Adolf Hitler; therefore it was not made secretly to the Reich Minister of Economics, but quite officially, without any suppression or secrecy in the matter.

The gift subsequently turned out to be an unfortunate one for Funk, as the building proved much more expensive than had been expected and Funk was required to pay a very high donation tax. Funk, who, up to that time, had never incurred debts and whose finances had always been well regulated, now found himself plunged into debt through this “gift” of a farmhouse. Göring heard of it and came to Funk’s assistance with a generous sum. When Hitler heard of Funk’s financial difficulties through Minister Lammers, he had the cash necessary to settle Funk’s financial troubles transferred to him in the form of a gift. With this Funk was able to pay his taxes and his debts. He used the remainder to create two public endowments, one for dependents of officials of the Reichsbank killed in action, the other to the same end for the staff of the Ministry of Economics. The farm was also to become an endowment at some later date. Funk’s treatment of the matter shows his delicacy in this respect too. Even though such an endowment could not be legally disputed, he felt that it was better to avoid such endowments and to make them over to the public, since he could not refuse to accept a gift from the head of the State.

Mr. President, I now turn to a new subject. I would propose to have a recess now.

THE PRESIDENT: The Court will adjourn now.

[A recess was taken until 1400 hours.]

---