E. General Development of the Administration of Justice under Hitler
EXTRACTS FROM THE TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT SCHLEGELBERGER[156]
Dr. Kubuschok (counsel for defendant Schlegelberger): Witness, what is your career, your professional career in particular?
Defendant Schlegelberger: I was born in 1875. After I had finished my legal studies and had passed my doctor’s examination, I became judge in the first and second instance. In 1904 I became judge of the Lyck District Court in East Prussia. In 1909 I became assistant at the Prussian Court of Appeals, Kammergericht. In 1914 I became Kammergerichtsrat. The Kammergericht is the Court of Appeals of Berlin, the highest court in Prussia.
At the Kammergericht, I worked in several senates: in the civil senate which dealt with the ordinary cases of civil law; in the commercial senate; in the patent senate, and in the senate for voluntary jurisdiction. During that period I wrote my first scientific works in that field which dealt with the experiences I have gained in practice. In 1918, that is to say at the end of the First World War, I became assistant at the then Reich Justice Office which later on became the Reich Ministry of Justice. That agency had very little to do with administrative tasks. At that time, it only dealt with one court. It was the highest court, in fact the Reich Supreme Court in Leipzig. Apart from that, the Reich Justice Office only dealt with legislative tasks.
As an assistant, I was put in charge of legislative preparatory work in the field of commercial and economic law, and I continued to do that work when after a few months I became Geheimer Regierungsrat and Vortragsrat at the Reich Justice Office. When in 1927 I became ministerial director, I still continued to deal with the same tasks. In 1931, the only Under Secretary of the Reich Justice Office, Dr. Joel, an old gentleman—not to be confused with the defendant Joel—was appointed minister, and I took his position as Under Secretary. I retained that position when in 1932 the Bruening cabinet was replaced by the Papen cabinet, and when Guertner, who had previously been Minister of Justice of Bavaria became Reich Minister of Justice. Reich Minister Joel, as well as Reich Minister Guertner at that time dealt with penal matters themselves. I merely dealt with matters of civil law.
Only when in 1934 the Prussian Ministry of Justice was merged with the Reich Ministry of Justice, and now a vast number of administrative tasks were transferred to the Reich Ministry of Justice, then a new Under Secretary position was created, and that for penal matters. The Under Secretary of the former Prussian Ministry, Under Secretary Freisler, obtained that post. That division of tasks in civil and penal matters remained in force when on 27 January 1941 quite suddenly Reich Minister of Justice Guertner died, and I, as the most senior Under Secretary, was placed in charge of the conduct of affairs. I retained my civil cases and Freisler dealt with penal matters. I was placed in charge of the conduct of affairs of the ministry as the senior Under Secretary. I was never appointed Deputy Minister of Justice, and I never had myself called so, because that was, of course, impossible. I only was in charge of the conduct of affairs.
This picture, that is to say, that I merely acted as a representative, but that I actually dealt with the same work which I had dealt with before, that became also outwardly apparent. On purpose, I never worked in the Minister’s office; I never moved into the Minister’s home; and I drew the salary of an Under Secretary, not that of a Minister. On 20 August 1942, at my own request, I resigned.
Q. You have described your work as Under Secretary, and you have said that you worked largely in the sphere of civil law. Which were the most important tasks with which you dealt?
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A. In accordance with the particular interest which I had always had in economic matters, and in accordance with the work I had done previously, I was allotted the task of cooperating during two particularly fateful years of the German Reich in the maintenance of support of the economic life of the country. It was the stabilization and maintenance of currency: that was in 1923 because of, and until the end of, the inflation, and later on in 1933 on the occasion of the economic collapse. The inflation period was followed by the establishment of the Rentenmark currency, a new currency which replaced the paper mark. The inflation was also followed by the ordinance at which I worked, under which businessmen had to draw up a balance in gold marks, and it was also followed by the tremendous task of remonetization legislation. The collapse of the banks necessitated many discussions and consultations, and ordinances as for instance concerning rates of interest. Later, I worked on the new law concerning drafts and checks, and I may quote as my special work the two big economic laws promulgated in 1937, the law on shares and the law on patents. When in 1942 I resigned from my office, a new law on companies with limited liability was just about to be issued. At that time the general reform of civil law had been started, not immediately by way of a new codification, but by individual laws. When I left my office, the marriage law and the testament law were completed.
Q. Apart from your professional work as a judge, and later on as an official in the Ministry, did you ever engage in any scientific research work?
A. I can wholeheartedly affirm that question. Immediately after I took my state examination, I started on my first big project, and the first book of mine, which appeared in 1904, was a treatise on the law of retention; it was a work of historical nature. At that time I intended to take on a university career, but nothing came of that, because my home university, Koenigsberg, did not create a new chair for commercial and economic law. But I could not give up my literary work, and ever since then that has occupied me consistently side by side with my official work. The special fields with which I dealt were economic law and voluntary jurisdiction, that is to say the law concerning the procedure in matters concerning family, hereditary, commercial law and document regulations. In 1923 I became Honorary Professor at the University of Berlin. Naturally, I followed that call while retaining my official position, and I held lectures at the University of Berlin until the outbreak of the war. In 1925 the University of Koenigsberg conferred upon me an honorary doctor’s degree of political science.
Q. Did you also deal with foreign law?
A. Yes, foreign law, too, has occupied me intensively for a long time. Perhaps I may first mention one of my latest works, a large comparative encyclopedia, the “Manual of Comparative Civil and Commercial Law.” That book summarizes reports on civil and commercial law of all countries, written mostly by national experts, and I may say the law of the United States is dealt with by Professor Atkinson of Kansas University. This work which necessitated a tremendous amount of correspondence, brought me in touch with eminent jurists all over the world. I have deepened those contacts since 1929, because I went abroad to hold lectures, and those trips were above all to give me an opportunity to observe the effect of the law, at least in some countries, actually on the spot. I did succeed in doing so in Argentina; in Chile, where I dealt especially with banking laws, I wrote an essay on that subject; and in Brazil where I became an honorary member of the Brazilian Lawyers’ Association. I held lectures in Budapest, Madrid, Warsaw, Stockholm, Copenhagen. I should like to add that I am coeditor of the periodical “Foreign and International Private Law”, a publication of the Kaiser-Wilhelm Association; and, also coeditor of a publication on Scandinavian law.[157]
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Q. Witness, were you active in party politics?
A. No, I never joined any party; I always stayed away from politics. My life was devoted to the practical administration of justice, and to legal research. If looking back now, I should say which one of parties of the German people I fitted into, I would call myself as belonging to the right one of the progressive, conservative direction which was promoted by the German People’s Party, [Deutsche Volkspartei] and which was also represented by the German Nationalist Party [Deutsch-Nationale Volkspartei].
Q. What was your attitude towards the NSDAP and national socialism?
A. In 1933 I was approached on the subject of joining the NSDAP; I refused. My reason was, first the fact that I could not subscribe to the program of the NSDAP. Furthermore, another reason was my view that Under Secretary of justice should remain neutral even on the surface and, therefore, must not be obliged to any parties. I was never a National Socialist. It is obvious that a party program, in its manifold aspects, has many a point which one can adopt; for example, the program’s aim of bridging class differences, that is to say, the creation of a true national community; that point I welcomed heartily, but, concerning the program of the NSDAP as a whole above all, the way in which it was to be put into effect, that was far removed from my own ideas. My own conservative attitude as a human being and as a jurist accounted for that. It came as a great surprise to me when, on 30 January 1938, the Fuehrer’s Chancellery informed me in a letter, signed by Bouhler, that Hitler had ordered that I was to join and be accepted by the NSDAP. I said that that came as a great surprise to me. I myself, like other Under Secretaries who had also come from the middle classes, had never heard of that order, and it was impossible to refuse because that would not merely have meant I would have given battle not only to the Party, but the State itself. But I never departed from that view. The membership which was ordered against my will and forced upon me, I never made use of. I never attended a Party conference or meeting. Naturally, I did not hold any office in the Party either.
Perhaps the fact that I never changed my attitude is also demonstrated by the fact that neither my wife nor my sons ever belonged to the Party. My social contacts, too, as far as they were not conditioned by official affairs, moved almost exclusively within the circles of non-Party members.
Q. The Hitler order by which Schlegelberger’s membership in the Party was decreed will be submitted by me as Schlegelberger Document 34, Schlegelberger Exhibit 92,[158] as soon as the document books shall have been completed.
Witness, what effect did that attitude of yours have on your official position?
A. I always saw to it that Party members and Party functionaries were treated just like every other citizen. That played a part particularly in personnel matters. I only appointed that person to an office who, in my view, was properly qualified; and I refused to reward Party stars by appointing them to an office.
On the other hand, the attitude of the Party toward the Ministry and myself—and I shall have to come back to that later on—made great difficulties and brought about many inner conflicts.
At this moment I should like to point out the case to which the prosecution referred concerning notaries and their hostile attitude to the Party. They demonstrated it so obviously that when I came to hear of it in my official capacity I could not form a proper opinion on it. If I had tried to suppress those cases it would have been unavoidable that the Party would interfere, which definitely would have claimed that the notaries had violated their duty of allegiance toward the State and the head of the State. Perhaps the Party would have welcomed it, because such opposition would have been a welcome cause to discredit the administration of justice and to jeopardize my personnel policy, on which depended the fate of many officials.
Dr. Kubuschok: The witness has referred to the case of the notaries which, under Document NG-901, Prosecution Exhibit 436,[159] was submitted by the prosecution.
Presiding Judge Brand: What was the exhibit number?
Dr. Kubuschok: Exhibit 436.
The prosecution refers to your lecture held at Rostock University in 1936.[160] That lecture is compared as to its aim with a speech by Reich Jurist Leader Frank, and the prosecution sees in it an avowal of national socialism. Please give us some explanations about that speech.
Defendant Schlegelberger: Counsel, you have pointed out that that speech was made in 1936. Before I discuss the details about that speech I should like to say a few words as to how, at that time, one was able at all to discuss political questions in public. It wasn’t that way that, when National Socialist quarters laid down program points, one was allowed to make a frontal attack. I ignore altogether the point of personal danger that might have arisen for an opponent. I would not have fought shy of that danger, because a person who held the office which I held was in daily danger. However, such a frontal attack would have resulted in the opposite of what I wanted to achieve, that is an increase of the opposition against reasonableness.
One had to look for opportunities which one could use, and for example, the locality had something to do with that. I chose the university for the place of my speech, and that had a decisive influence on my audience. I had to see to it that the National Socialist ideas which I wished to attack were beaten with their own weapons.
The actual reason for my speech was the fact that Freisler again and again, before the public, pointed out that the Party program was enforceable like law and was at least the framework of the law. Therefore, one was obliged to carry out that program immediately and completely.
I do not think I need to enter into any details here as to what it would have meant if that doctrine had been recognized. In the practice of the judges it would have meant separation from all legal provisions; the Party program could have been applied at random everywhere. It would, so to speak, have been the roof law under the protection of which, according to the wishes of those extreme National Socialists, legal life would have developed.
It was my aim to point out that such a construction would not be necessary at all, that the existing laws would also do justice to the fact that Germany was now a state under National Socialist government. I must point out that the law adapts itself automatically to changed conditions of life and ideologies, and from that the standard and the speed of legal changes are decided.
I intended to put in the place of the revolutionary changes of law, advocated by Freisler, an evolutionary development of law. I based myself on the principle of the interior change of the legal system, a principle which, for the first time, I propounded already in 1929 in one of my works where I also elucidated that principle. That was at a time when one could really not say that I might have based my arguments on the National Socialist thought. The compromise laws, which had already been promulgated, I mentioned intentionally without evaluating them. That was how I had argued against that thesis, and I believe had refuted it. I also used the opportunity to give my views concerning other important topical questions as well. I turned against the interference with the carrying out of sentences which I considered inadmissible. Due to previous incidents, I warned the judges against currying favor with high Party officers. I appealed to the pride of the judges and the consciousness of their independence. I also found reason to turn against it that some jurists in an absolutely inconsiderate manner, placed their own egotistic endeavors in the foreground, and did not show any understanding whatsoever for the sound idea of a true people’s community.
Generally, I used a tactic which I had employed repeatedly: I committed the high Party leaders to adhere to many of their good words which they had probably spoken without reflection. I reminded them that Hitler during his first speech before the Reichstag had declared the independence of the judges as necessary. I pointed out that Frank[161] had mentioned the internal value of justice; and, that Goering, in public, had spoken against interference with the administration of justice.
Q. What was your relationship with Hitler?
A. I believe that one must distinguish between the personal and the material evaluation, and at the same time one must connect the two. I believe that Hitler, concerning my own person, had a certain measure of respect. I believe he saw in me the experienced civil servant, who was without ambitions, and who devoted himself to work and research. Concerning my sphere of work, civil law, he had not the slightest interest in it. The fact that I was unpolitical, aroused a certain amount of distrust in him; that, I suppose, explains the fact that in contrast to civil servants of the same rank, I was never offered an honorary position either in the SS or the SA. That I, in contrast to other high civil servants of the same rank, was not awarded the Golden Party Badge; and that he restricted my connection with the Party to the absolute minimum, again explains in particular, I believe, the positively brutal attack on me in the well-known Reichstag speech of 26 April 1942. The fact that I was placed in charge of affairs after the death of Guertner certainly was not a demonstration of confidence. This is how I would like to put it: It was just a makeshift solution. At that time Hitler could not yet make up his mind to appoint a new Minister of Justice. What played a certain part, perhaps, was that the chief candidate for the office, Frank, was at that time Governor General of the Government General and was not available. Thus, there was no way out, but to let the Ministry put the Under Secretary, who had seniority in the office, in charge of the Ministry. Hitler’s distrust, as far as I was concerned, was altogether justified from an objective point of view. I may say, and I wish to place special emphasis on this, that I was never fooled or influenced by Hitler’s demoniacal qualities, and I saved my own conscience, as far as he was concerned. For myself, Hitler was the declared opponent, in fact, the person who held the administration of justice in contempt. That conviction naturally placed me in a clear position. As far as it did not jeopardize my goal, I upheld my different opinion quite openly toward Hitler. That was already the state of affairs at the time of Guertner. I may say that all my life, as long as I held office, I was out to fight for justice and against arbitrariness. In the avowal of justice there was no difference between Guertner and myself. Guertner was the recognized protector of justice, but he was not a fighter. If in the development, which was slow to begin with and later became faster, he gave up his opposition in some respects, that certainly is not due to a lack of the honest will to uphold justice. Frequently he came to me for advice and assistance. But that time was overshadowed by a continuous struggle with the Reich Jurists’ Leader [Reichsjustizfuehrer] Frank. In continuous attacks, Frank tried from his position as Reich legal office leader to achieve his final goal which was to get the office of Minister of Justice and then to change the Ministry and make it into a National Socialist Ministry. That struggle can only be understood if one knew who Frank was. Frank was the legal adviser and in difficult times the defense counsel of Hitler, and, therefore, he was particularly close to him. Before 1933 even, he had been the leader and propagandist of National Socialist legal ideas. If one bears that in mind, then one sees already on the one hand, the Ministry with its expert officials, the official activities; on the other hand, the combination of National Socialist ideas on law with the aim of overrunning the Ministry. Frank recognized Guertner’s qualities; therefore, he tried by the tactics of continuously wearing him down, to achieve his aim. If one knows National Socialist methods, one knows how stubborn and tenacious such a battle was in the methods with which it was waged, and that struggle had reached its climax when Guertner died, and I took over the conduct of affairs.
Q. What was the situation at that time?
A. One gets a true idea of that situation if one forms a picture in one’s mind of those three groups or parties which were fighting against the administration of justice with the aim of conquering the administration of justice in order to destroy it. I call these fighting groups by the names of their leaders, Himmler, Bormann, Goebbels; and, in so doing I would like to emphasize that during the whole time I only talked once to each of those three men.
Himmler proceeded by different roads; the undermining of confidence in the legal administration of justice and the conquering of its competence. Attacks were being made continuously on the administration of justice in the periodical of the SS which had already been mentioned in this trial, Das Schwarze Korps [The Black Corps]. They were not content with criticizing sentences, but proceeded to defame in public the judges who had passed the sentences. Himmler collected material by sending secret observers to the court sessions. The officials of the Ministry were watched and spied upon. Anonymous secret reports, in which the Ministry was attacked, were sent out. Persons who had been acquitted by court sentences were taken into police custody. Others, who had been sentenced to a term in prison, were seized by the police, and as the administration of justice heard later, many of those persons were killed by shooting. All these things were intended and designed to undermine the confidence in the administration of justice. The administration of justice was to be discredited in public again and again as a backward and outmoded institution both as regards personnel and the subject matter. Himmler proceeded, I should like to say, with cynical frankness, on the basis of this propaganda. He deprived the Ministry of Justice of many fields of competence, and claimed for himself even many more fields of competence from the Ministry of Justice. He invoked the power of his position under Hitler and demanded that the competence for penal cases concerning Poles and Jews should be transferred to the police. His attempts to conquer the public prosecutor’s offices for the police continued until the end. It is obvious that that aim, which was placed higher and higher, by necessity would lead to the thought of whether one would not have to show that by new and more stringent measures one was in a position to overcome the criticism which Himmler used as a pretense, and thereby take the wind out of his sails.
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Q. What part did Bormann play in that struggle against the administration of justice?
A. Bormann’s work extended, above all, to personnel policy. Under the existing provisions, no ministry could appoint an official or promote him against the opposition of the Party Chancellery. The Reich Ministry of Justice always made its selection entirely on the basis of professional qualifications. Bormann, on the other hand, attached importance exclusively to the political opinion and the merits for the Party. If he objected to a suggestion made by the Ministry of Justice, and it was not possible to overcome the opposition, there was nothing else to be done at first, but to wait for a better situation perhaps, and leave the position unfilled. I experienced it myself that the position of a president of a district court of appeal remained vacant for that reason for more than a year. But it is obvious that the possibilities of such action had a certain limit. It was inadvisable to leave an unlimited number of positions vacant. And sometimes one was forced to appoint to the administration of justice personnel of only moderate qualifications, whereas persons who were better qualified were left out. Bormann knew very well how to promote Hitler’s antipathy for the administration of justice on the one hand, and on the other hand how to exploit the naturally weak and unpolitical position of the Ministry under Hitler. Hitler continuously received newspaper clippings about court proceedings and sentences. Usually, the facts were distorted, or the reports, in any case, were always inadequate. Hitler was always approached on these subjects only at a moment when for some other reason he was disgruntled and his attention had to be distracted. Those reasons very often resulted from the war situation. For Bormann, the administration of justice was the lightning conductor. The Gauleiters cooperated with him. They collected the material with great glee by getting newspaper clippings from provincial newspapers. The Gauleiter of Munich [Gau Munich-Upper Bavaria], Wagner, excelled. Every opportunity was used to discredit the administration of justice before Hitler with entirely inadequate documentation. The key to that situation lies in a statement which Goering made to me at the time the administration of justice became centralized.[162] I will revert to that later. Therefore, our main endeavor had to be to inform Hitler at the earliest possible moment, and, of course, completely and honestly. I shall have an opportunity to explain how those attempts were constantly sabotaged by Bormann.
I should like to say now that our attempt was to prevent Hitler from changing sentences after they had been passed by suggesting that the presidents of the district court of appeal should confirm the sentences whereby merely a technical, nonpolitical review would have been carried out. That attempt was intentionally brought to naught by Bormann for he realized that thereby it would have been impossible for Hitler to reopen, on the initiative of Party, trials which had been concluded.
Q. The possibility which the witness mentioned concerning the possibility of Bormann’s interference with every appointment of an official results from the decree of 10 July 1937 published in the Reichsgesetzblatt of 1937, page 769.[163] I shall submit that decree in a supplement to my document book.
Witness, concerning the evidence submitted by the prosecution, could you discuss a case which reveals such efforts being made by the Party?
A. I am able to do that. I refer to the statements made by the prosecution witness Ferber. He dealt with a case about which Guertner had frequently talked to me. That was the case against Heller in which the law against motor car traps [Gesetz ueber die Autofallen-Stellung] had been applied. For the information of the Tribunal I may say that law was promulgated on 22 June 1938. It is based on the particular initiative of Hitler.
The facts of the case were as follows: Soon after that law had been promulgated, Heller and his mistress as the riders of a driving school [sic][164] had attacked a driver and had robbed his money. While the case was being tried before the Special Court in Nuernberg in the presence of Gauleiter Streicher, and Denzler, the Gau legal office leader, Hitler appeared in Nuernberg unexpectedly. A death sentence against Heller was expected for certain. Evidently Streicher and Denzler intended to submit to Hitler in his presence a proposal for a death sentence on the basis of this new law in which Hitler was particularly interested. A telephone call was put through to the Ministry of Justice to hear an opinion on the question of clemency. Opposition was encountered there on the part of the Referent. That Referent was Ministerialrat Westphal, who was indicted here.[165] He refused to give his opinion because the legal problem which had arisen in the Heller case was being dealt with in a case before the Reich Supreme Court which was still pending and was there to be submitted for the opinion of the Reich Supreme Court judges. At that point the Party representatives became busy. Denzler reported this information to Hitler implying that Guertner obviously was sabotaging the application of this law, which Hitler himself had promoted, and he boasted that that was enough to bring about Guertner’s fall. At any rate, that interference on the part of the Party led to the fact that Hitler, following Denzler’s report, ordered the death sentence to be executed without waiting for the Ministry of Justice to give its opinion.
In Berlin, Hitler took to account the Referent Westphal in great anger for sabotaging the law, and only because Guertner acted on behalf of his own staff and only with the greatest effort was it possible to save Westphal.
Q. The Heller case which has just been mentioned begins in the transcript, page 1324, English text.[166]
What part did Goebbels play in that struggle against the administration of justice?
A. Goebbels set the machinery of propaganda to work against the administration of justice. He deluded the public by telling them that the people no longer had any confidence in the judiciary. That was a delusion for the opposite was true.
His propaganda machine not only made direct or camouflaged attacks against the judiciary in public and tried to lower their prestige, but he also tried by his art of dialectics in his speeches on the administration of justice quite deliberately to lead the judges astray and to put their consciences as judges to sleep. He coined the concept of the exigency of the State, and said that the courts, too, ought to make that their starting point. For a sentence, first of all expedience was decisive, and only later, perhaps, justice might also be considered.
Q. Goebbels’ speech before the members of the People’s Court is contained in Document NG-417, Prosecution Exhibit 23.[167]
What were the opportunities at the disposal of those power groups and which they made use of in their struggle against the administration of justice?
A. Himmler, Bormann, and Goebbels were the closest confidants of Hitler. They had access to him at any time. For him they represented the uncompromising incarnation of national socialism. He listened to them when they alleged national socialism was being endangered by the administration of justice. The entire apparatus of Party politics, police, and espionage was at their disposal. On the other hand, the Ministry of Justice was entirely isolated. Contact between the ministries, which would have strengthened its position, no longer existed.
Q. Here I would like to refer to the verdict of the IMT, English transcript, page 16963[168], and I would like to quote that passage briefly: “As to the first reason for our decision, it is to be observed that from the time that it can be said that a conspiracy to make aggressive war existed the Reich cabinet did not constitute a governing body, but was merely an aggregation of administrative officers subject to the absolute control of Hitler.”
Witness, will you continue, please?
A. In view of that situation, what could a Ministry of Justice do which was directed merely by an Under-Secretary as acting Minister who, furthermore, was not a member of the Party and whose words, naturally, did not get the same hearing as those of a Minister; a man who, as the indictment said, never attained cabinet rank? According to an express instruction by Hitler, the chief only was told those things which were necessary for him to fulfill his own task. It is evident that that instruction made possible all kinds of limitations. * * *
(Recess)
Q. Witness, before the recess we discussed the possibilities at the disposal of these power groups. Please, will you continue.
A. I ventured to point out that Hitler had given an explicit order that a chief of any office should only be instructed about that which he had to know in order to carry out his tasks. And that went very far. That situation is better explained by the fact that Minister Guertner, for instance, only found out about the euthanasia decree[169] when in reports on the situation rendered by the presidents of the district courts of appeal, a certain suspicion arose that this decree was carried out, and Guertner categorically demanded an elucidation. Whereas other ministers were authorized to listen to foreign broadcasts, that was prohibited to the Minister of Justice under threat of punishment. When I objected against this, I was told in reply that I should turn to the Ministry of Propaganda which would inform me about everything that happened.
I may point out that the opinion of the International Military Tribunal states that on account of the control over broadcasting and the press, and the propaganda machine, an independent judgment based on freedom of thought became an absolute impossibility. I, from my own experience, can only confirm that statement. A significant example is given by the following occurrence—an example showing the extent of that spy system. The Gauleiter of East Prussia had protested against the administration of justice in his district. In order to examine these complaints in 1940 or 1941—I do not know the date precisely any more—I traveled to Koenigsberg and found out that as for the reports by the president of the district court of appeal, the Gauleiter was informed about these reports sooner than I was. Based on warnings received from reliable sources, I had to expect that in the various offices of the municipality which I had to visit, special microphones had been installed for the occasion of my visit, and I could only talk with my personal Referent by driving out to the beach and picking out an isolated beach chair there in order to be able to talk to him without anybody listening to us and spying on us.
Q. The passage in the opinion of the International Military Tribunal, to which the witness referred, is contained in the English transcript on page 16,813.[170] Witness, the prosecution charges you with the fact that the Ministry of Justice was in an official contact with these offices which you have just mentioned. What can you say about this?
A. I believe that that contact is inherent in the structure of the State: the distribution of tasks to the various agencies. A cooperation with the police was certainly to a certain extent unavoidable. According to German law of criminal procedure, the prosecution is not in a position at all, without the cooperation of the police, to carry out the required investigations pending trial. If a denouncement has been received by the prosecution, the prosecution has to conduct the necessary investigation first of all. That the prosecution should do all that itself, considering the large number of things to be done, is quite impossible. The prosecution, therefore, has to turn to the local police and, for good reasons, in the German Judicature Act and the German Code for Penal Procedure, the police are designated as an auxiliary organ for the prosecution and directed to cooperate upon request of the prosecution.
Apart from the police, frequently the SD is mentioned in the trial. On the part of Hitler, the SD apart from its function within the Party had received important tasks, such as the delivery of information to various Reich agencies, and therefore even the court authorities had to refer to that source of information.
Q. In this connection, may I refer to Document NG-219, Prosecution Exhibit 42.[171] Please continue.
A. The position of the Party Chancellery, was regulated legally in a way that changes of personnel, that is to say, promotions and appointments could only take place with the cooperation on the part of the Party Chancellery. That I have already pointed out. Added to this was the fact that in 1942, the Chief of the Party Chancellery was given the position of a Reich Minister participating in legislation. It was therefore necessary to let him participate in the preparation of every law.
Q. The decree of 16 January 1942, to which reference was just made, I shall submit as Schlegelberger Document 23, Schlegelberger Exhibit 63.[172]
A. And then finally the Ministry of Propaganda. The fact that this Ministry was directed by Goebbels may cause, to a non-German’s mind, the misconception that this was a Party function. That, as I said, would be a misconception because the Ministry of Propaganda was not a Party office but a Ministry, just as the Ministry of Justice or the Ministry of Finance, or the Foreign Office, and that there was an official channel between all the ministries is a matter of course in every state. But that connection was also a necessity from the point of view of [self] defense. Only thus was it possible, at least from time to time, to guard oneself against surprises. Only thus was it possible, perhaps in the very last moment, to make successful objections.
Q. The witness referred to a provision of the Code of Penal Procedure according to which the prosecution could authorize the police to make investigations. That is article 161 of the Code of Penal Procedure. Furthermore, in this connection, article 146 of the Judicature Act has to be considered. About the importance of reports and information from the SD, I shall submit as Schlegelberger Document 92, Schlegelberger Exhibit 85, a report from the handbook for allied troops.
Witness, in your own camp, that is to say in the field of the administration of justice itself, did you have to fight against opposition?
A. That question, unfortunately, I have to confirm emphatically. First of all, and very briefly, I again have to mention Frank in this connection, the representative of the National Socialist legal ideology, who through all available channels succeeded in bringing this thought before the public. As means, he had at his disposal, first the legal publications under his influence, the National Socialist Legal Workers’ League whose president he was, and the Academy of German Law which he had created. That academy which possibly, in view of its composition, could be considered a sort of scientific institute to aid the administration of justice, evolved by Frank as a competition in order to direct the Ministry of Justice, to overrule and to discredit it with the Party. As soon as he found out, from his own information sources, that the Ministry of Justice intended to carry out reforms, he mobilized his academy immediately which on its part was to prepare plans and to publish them, and not much emphasis was placed upon their quality. But the main purpose was to demonstrate that Frank was the leader of the living young justice in opposition to the old senile machinery of justice of the State. Apart from that goal to carry out his famous thesis, “Right is that which serves the German people,” he also for personal ambitions and, last but not least, for that ambition, had intentions to take over the post of Ministry of Justice.
Q. Could you name other personalities who in that manner fought against the administration of justice?
A. From the inside, unfortunately, yes. I have not completed my statement. I am thinking of Thierack. Thierack had very close connections to Bormann. He concentrated his efforts at first on the President of the People’s Court, a position he held at the time. Behind the back of the Ministry of Justice in 1936, he arranged that Hitler make a speech before the People’s Court. As these proceedings have shown, in 1937 he had attempted to arrange another speech of that kind.
Q. The witness refers here to Document NG-209, Prosecution Exhibit 105.[173]
A. The judges of the People’s Court in this manner should be brought to understand that the People’s Court was an institution of a special nature, in closest connection to Hitler himself; and that it was only by a mistaken step that the People’s Court had been incorporated into the administrative structure of the Ministry of Justice; and concerning that administrative connection in 1938, again in all secrecy, he tried through the Chief of the Reich Chancellery, to have the presidency of the People’s Court, following the Italian example, subordinated immediately to Hitler. To my knowledge, Thierack, after he became Minister,[174] did not continue with these attempts. As I was informed from various sources, in his attempts to become Minister, he is alleged to have promised to the Party that the office of the prosecution should be turned over to the police. I shall later refer to the occurrences during the trial of the Czech Minister-President Elias; but in the end I still have to emphasize what extraordinary difficulties were made for me by the personality of Freisler.
Q. Who was Freisler?
A. Well, the witness Behl once characterized Freisler as the representative of the Party interests in the Ministry of Justice. That was correct. His career was the following: Freisler was a prisoner of war in Russia during the First World War. After the end of the war he remained in Russia for a considerable period of time. About his activities during that period of time in Russia, a veil has never been completely lifted. After he returned, he became an attorney at Kassel, mainly acting as defense counsel for National Socialists. When the Prussian Ministry of Justice was put in the hands of Minister Kerrl, the latter called the old Party member, Freisler, to the post of Under Secretary. He remained there until in 1934, on the occasion of the merger of both offices in 1934, he was transferred to the Reich Ministry of Justice. Freisler no doubt possessed a high degree of intelligence, but quite apparently he was of abnormal spiritual inclinations that ranged from extreme brutality all the way to a rather feminine weakness. After he had insulted his assistants in the worst possible manner without any reason, it would occur that soon after he came to them to ask for their forgiveness in a very servile manner. The Tribunal has actually made the acquaintance of Freisler optically and acoustically.[175] He was quite well informed about problems of criminal law, but he lacked any continuity and seriousness in his work. He was restless and imbued with a lust for power, always looking for new tasks and new problems. He was an old Party member, and he had the Golden Party Badge, but he represented that type of National Socialist who again and again fearfully vied for the favor of Hitler. Hitler definitely recognized him as a one hundred percent National Socialist, but personally did not think as much of him as Freisler would have liked. Therefrom, and from his task to supervise the Ministry from the National Socialist point of view, and from his indisputable intelligence and his expert knowledge in the field of criminal law, the dangerous qualities in his personality could be seen. He knew where he had to start in order to achieve his goals. To work with him was extremely difficult, and I may well say here that Freisler was the one, after all, who undermined the work and the strength of Guertner and contributed to his early death. And so, as far as I was concerned, my continuous attempts to restrict Freisler made it extremely difficult for me in my position. He did not stick to decisions which we had made in long debates. He made secret promises to the [Nazi] Party which, after they became apparent, restricted the Minister in his possibilities of action.
Again and again I discovered that, partly intentionally, partly out of neglect, he had failed to report to me on important occurrences. He had prohibited his ministerial directors from reporting to me directly. He wanted to do everything alone. In addition, although he did not drink much, he could not restrain himself once he started to drink, and in a condition of that kind he frequently made statements which gave an entirely wrong picture of the intentions of the Minister. Then when the disappointment came, when the agencies concerned found out that the practice of the Ministry was not according to these statements, then, of course, there were serious accusations on the part of the Party and a renewed struggle.
His unstable nature brought it about that when I made objections to him he, frequently in tears, promised to better himself; but his moral strength was not sufficient to make him keep these promises for any length of time.
Of course, my position with regard to Freisler was weaker than that of Guertner. I was, indeed, in charge of the work of the Ministry, but only due to the fact that I was the senior Under Secretary; otherwise we were on the same level. The possibility of influencing him or influencing others against him, was very limited for me, all the more because my mission was not set for a certain time, but could be repealed any day. Therefore, I could only find the optimal accomplishment of my tasks in maintaining the status quo in the Ministry of Justice as it was at the time of Guertner’s death; especially if one takes into consideration as a matter of course that on the one hand the attacks from the Party became stronger, being faced with a weaker man in charge of the Ministry, and that on the other hand this weaker man was always confronted with the necessity of an increased resistance on his part.
In these proceedings here the witness, Father Wein,[176] confirmed that during the time when I was in charge of conducting the affairs, the administration of justice had not deteriorated and that only the appointment of Thierack brought about an absolute change-over. I ask you to try to understand that in that I found a justification for the work of my life under these conditions as I have described them.
Q. What did the taking over of the post of Minister by Thierack mean to you?
A. I believe I should continue at the point where the speech made by the prosecution left off. The prosecution said, “Schlegelberger had seen the storm brewing.” That is quite correct. I anticipated a storm, and I tried to prevent it. The attitude of Thierack up to that time and his close relations with Bormann did not leave any doubt as to his program, and just as I interpreted that, it came about. As soon as Thierack assumed office, a complete change-over occurred. It was not a gradual deterioration, but it was that famous construction of a strong National Socialist administration of justice as it had been ordered by Hitler. I merely point to the changes in the administration of justice and in legislation which are contained in material submitted by the prosecution. If one sees what had been demanded for a long time and which by all means was tried to achieve, if one sees how that all of a sudden now came into effect, I believe then only one can find the right measure for that which I, in a continuous struggle, had prevented or had delayed. I do not want to omit but to describe briefly the complete change in personnel policy. With the exception of the man in charge of the budget department, all ministerial directors were released by Thierack and many Referenten transferred. The entire top level of the Ministry had changed overnight. Furthermore, twenty-two presidents of district courts of appeal, eleven of them the best ones on the basis of their qualifications, and four general prosecutors were retired.
If in the dire situation of war such a unique measure is taken, one demonstrates most clearly that my dismissal and the appointment of Thierack, in the feeling of Hitler and Thierack, represent the point at which an entire new development starts. The purge measures by Thierack were extended also to the many non-Aryan judges or judges with Jewish relatives who at that time were still in service and to many officials who did not just belong to the Party.
I believe that my decision to fight until the very limit, and to stay that long in the Ministry, has found its justification. Clearly anticipating that with that new man [Thierack] chaos would start for the administration of justice, there was only one thing left to me; although the burden physically and psychologically was at times almost impossible to bear, to try and bear it, and to fight as resiliently as possible. Of course, it was clear to me, and I had to experience the fact too, that I would be beaten at times, and had to decide to make detours wherever I could take that upon my conscience.
Q. In your opinion, what was that extreme limit which could still be justified—of those which you have just mentioned?
A. If the Tribunal was good enough to follow me in the description of my life, then it will easily recognize what my work at that time meant to a man whose life was devoted to the law. At times, today, it is hard even for me to transfer myself back again into those days and to bring those days back. In a system which was worked out to the very last detail of expediency and power, there was a lonely island amidst the continuous storm in those days—that was the administration of justice. I had to experience how the storm hit again and again, and how certain sacrifices had to be made to this storm of power in order to prevent it from triumphing completely. For me, in that situation, there was only one consideration—can a measure be made compatible with the uncompromising principles of law such as I had considered them so far as a matter of course? Was not everything now only a question of power? How could I avoid that lust for power and prevent the accomplishment of these designs? What will go through regardless of my cooperation and what can I prevent without cooperation? And that deliberation led me to find that extreme limit which I have mentioned before. It was for me the final abolition of the independence of the courts. I had to try to maintain this independence at all costs. In spite of and in the face of the devilish propaganda on the part of Goebbels, I was of the firm conviction that the German courts and German judges were still in good shape. Although, now, from the large number of the many sentences, particularly of the more recent period, the prosecution may select a few in order to prove that legal principles were abandoned in the sentences. To deal with individual cases is not my task in these proceedings. A full examination of the entire field of the administration of justice would show that this conviction of mine was very well founded, and that the maintenance of the integrity of the German courts was a goal which was well worth my work and my trouble; because I was, and still am, of the opinion that the work of the courts is the most secure guaranty for the law. Therefore, I tried again and again to draw various fields within the scope of work of the courts. For instance, in the economic field, the problem of getting agriculture [farms] out of debt [Landwirtschaftliche Entschuldung], the question of hereditary and marriage health, but the basic prerequisite was that the courts had to remain independent. When, in 1937, in the German Civil Service Law, Hitler was given the right to retire any civil servant if this civil servant could not be expected at any time to fight for the National Socialist State, in my capacity as chief of the Department for Public Law at the Ministry, I had a security clause inserted for the judges; this clause provided that measures regarding the judicial civil servant could not be based on the objective contents of a judge’s decision. Once the independence of the courts was lost, the protection of the courts was lost, too. The activity of the courts could even become a danger. Therefore, I drew for myself this extreme limit for my stay in office. With the resolution of the Reichstag of 26 April 1942,[177] my struggle reached its final stage. It was not quite clear, as it appeared frequently with Hitler’s speeches whether or not his speech had attacked the administration of justice merely for tactical reasons, and whether the true objects were general ones.[178] Dr. Lammers, the Chief of the Reich Chancellery, to whom I spoke immediately after the speech about all these matters, confirmed that background to me as being the true objective of Hitler’s polemics. I had to create clarity. I wrote to Hitler a report [Fuehrerinformation] to the effect that the judges were extremely disturbed by that speech. I had explained to the judges that with all the weight of my office, I would protect every judge who acted according to his conscience and to the law. That clarified the situation as far as I was concerned. If Hitler’s speech really meant the beginning of the end of the independence of the courts, then he had to consider my statement as an open declaration of war. That was what I wanted, and I wanted to bring about a breach, in that case, on purpose.
Q. How did your dismissal come about?
A. Hitler at first did not answer that letter which I just mentioned. There was a lot of talk behind the scenes about a new appointment for the post of Minister. A few weeks later, Lammers, Chief of the Reich Chancellery, called me to him and told me that Hitler had made up his mind to appoint a new Minister of Justice, and he asked me what my attitude would be if the choice fell on Thierack. I replied that to work with Thierack was quite out of the question. Literally, I added, “I would not sit at the same table with Thierack.” Lammers replied, that was what he had thought, and for that eventuality he was instructed by Hitler to offer me another office comparable to the position I was holding. He had thought it over and was now prepared to offer me the position of President of the Reich Supreme Administrative Court. I rejected that offer and asked Lammers to inform Hitler that I would accept a new office under no circumstances, but wanted to be retired. Soon after, Lammers wrote me that I should come to his quarters at Zhitomir and receive the document concerning my retirement from office and thereafter, to report to Hitler at his headquarters at Vinnitsa in order to take my leave. That order I carried out. On that occasion, Lammers, on order from Hitler, gave me a check for 100,000 marks, which should make it easier for me to bridge the transition into retirement.
I was not happy about that donation; on the contrary, I was greatly disturbed. I got in touch with the Chief of the Presidential Chancellery, Dr. Meissner, and asked how I could avoid accepting that amount. Meissner replied that refusal was impossible, because it would mean an unfriendly act toward Hitler, and all the bad consequences would have to be accepted. Thereupon, I did not return the check and when the Russians came, that amount was still untouched in the bank. At Vinnitsa, Hitler received me. The conversation lasted about 20 minutes. Hitler told me approximately the following: He required his officials to carry out his instructions without criticism of any kind. He added, “Since you have already criticized my measures, I believe it is better if we separate.” He was referring to the report which I have already mentioned. I took advantage of that opportunity to tell Hitler with all the frankness at my disposal that an intact and independent administration of justice was a vital question for Germany; that his method to form his judgment on the basis of information received from Gauleiters, and his intention to retire judges who had done their duty, was an impossibility. The very concept of a judge required independence. People would never respect the judgment of a dependent judge as an expression of law. I added that if I had remained in office, I would have continued to protect anybody who was prosecuted unjustly.
Hitler took these statements on the whole quite calmly. Time and time again he even nodded approval; but when I touched upon the question of the independence of judges in connection with his Reichstag speech he suddenly harangued against the generals and got into a hot fury which slowly ebbed like a dying flame.
Q. The prosecution alleges that there was a conspiratorial cooperation between you and your codefendants. Will you briefly describe your relations with the codefendants?
A. As for these relations I have, in part, to answer absolutely in the negative. A number of my codefendants I have only met here. Not with a single one of the defendants here did I have any personal contact beyond official connections. These official contacts in most cases consisted of just occasional conferences required by the work.
As the defendants’ dock shows, the prosecution has selected a mere few from the large number of officials of the administration of justice. All of them, together with other colleagues, worked only in that field to which they were assigned. If one would follow the principle of conspiracy as expounded by the prosecution, the entire administration of justice since 1933 would have to be considered one organization in the meaning of the count of the indictment. And I believe that an opinion of that nature would best be rebutted by the fact that when I left the Ministry of Justice, that great change took place. That is sufficient rebuttal for the assertion of personal homogeneity of the officials and the judges.
Q. We want to depart now from personal matters and discuss the complaints made against you. The objective charges made against you begin with the centralization [Verreichlichung] of the administration of justice. Will you give us your general point of view concerning that question?
A. When the empire was founded in 1871, certain agencies of the Reich were founded as an over-all authority beyond the limits of the individual federal state. The same occurred in the field of justice. At that time, it was called the Reich Justice Office [Reichjustizamt] and, in fact, was a Reich Ministry. Later, it got that name. The Reich Justice Office had almost exclusively legislative functions. It had to deal with regulations for the administration of justice.
Once such a regulation had been passed, all states had to issue executive laws for the execution of the respective regulation. That meant that after each major Reich law had been passed, more than 20 laws had to be passed in the various states to carry out the principles of the Reich law.
What that machinery meant can be seen if one looks at the collection of these executive laws of various states. With great surprise you find that this fills two fat volumes. As for administrative tasks, the Reich Justice Office, as already mentioned, only had to take care of the Reich Supreme Court, and in the course of time, the Reich Patent Office. Here, also, the various states [Laender] had to cooperate. The selection of judges for the Reich Supreme Court required most difficult negotiations. One has to have seen that, in order to realize fully with what jealousy each individual state saw to it that these various posts were filled according to a definite key.
It could happen that a small state could not even offer an appropriate candidate for such a position at the Reich Supreme Court, but then one had to preserve the claim and register it very carefully so that the next time, they could be given it. It was just as difficult to select officials for the Ministry of Justice. That, too, required negotiations and thus it came about that, long before 1933, everywhere, the desire for a uniform administration of justice for the entire Reich was expressed. I may remind you that the witness Behl[179] has stated that even the Social Democratic Party of Germany was expressly of that same opinion.
Q. Witness, you referred to the assumption of the administration of justice by the Reich.
A. Before the recess I pointed out that the desire for a uniform, centralized administration of justice had already existed in the period prior to 1933. The Reich Minister of Justice, Guertner, worked for that idea of the centralization of the administration of justice with great energy. The fact that he as a Bavarian did so, although it is generally known how very much Bavaria was interested in a life of its own, explains best the fact that Guertner had very good reasons for doing so. As often occurs in life, by accident a circumstance arose which speeded up the execution of that idea. This is what happened:
Once when I had a conversation with Kerrl, the Minister of Justice of Prussia at that time, and visited with him the training camp for Prussian law students—a camp which has been repeatedly referred to in this trial—I said to him that it must have cost a great deal of money to set up that camp; Kerrl laughed and replied, quite frankly:
“Oh, it didn’t cost me anything. The amounts were donated by large firms, in whose cases we were very considerate about prosecuting them under penal law. Naturally, the money was not transferred to me directly, but it came to me via the Winter Relief [Winterhilfe] account. However, the Winter Relief Organization made it available to me, and with that money we built up a very decent camp, as you can see for yourself.”
I was more than disgusted when I heard about those practices he thus unveiled. I made a report to Guertner.
The right of supervision over the Ministries of Justice of the Laender, was not in the hands of the Reich Minister of Justice. Guertner and I agreed that those practices must be stopped at the earliest possible moment, all the more so since one did not know whether or not in other Laender, similar things might be happening as were happening in Prussia. One could not tell what was happening because the ministries of the Laender throughout had new men working with them concerning whose persons, in some cases, one had certain misgivings, and justified misgivings. Frank was the Minister of Justice for Bavaria, and Thierack was the Minister of Justice for Saxony.
That experience increased Guertner’s energy in carrying out his work of centralization. The basis for that work was laid down in the first and second centralization laws dated 16 February and 5 December 1934.[180]
The result of the centralization, the transfer of the tasks of the Ministries of Justice of the Laender to the Reich, was this, from the political angle: The entire administration of justice from now on lay in the hands of a minister who was not a member of the Party and who, as Minister of Justice for Bavaria, had enjoyed the confidence of all parties from the extreme right to the extreme left. I myself, who also was not a member of the Party, remained at my post. The National Socialist Ministers of Justice of the Laender lost their official positions in the administration of justice.
The opinions of the Party as to the centralization of the administration of justice is evidenced best by a statement of Goering’s, which he made to me in 1941 when, in the course of a conversation, I said to him that the Party at every opportunity made difficulties for our ministry, he said to me: “That cannot surprise you. The reason lies in the centralization of the administration of justice under the circumstances under which it was achieved. That is the reason why the Party as a group is opposed to the Reich Ministry of Justice and makes life as difficult as possible for that ministry. The Party is of the opinion that the administration of justice should again be taken over by National Socialist hands.” Goering added, “I myself will never pardon Guertner and you for the way you acted in 1934.”
Q. I shall submit Schlegelberger Document 26, Schlegelberger Exhibit 66,[181] in reference to the aforesaid statements. Will you please give us a brief description of the organization of the Reich Ministry of Justice?
A. Under the very top, that is, under the Reich Minister of Justice, there were two separate under secretariats: the under secretariat for civil law matters, the head of which was myself; the direction of the secretariat for penal law matters which was in the hands of Freisler. Further, he was in charge of the so-called organization section [Organisationreferat], the Hereditary Farm Law [Erbhofrecht] and the Inspection Office for Judicial Affairs [Justizpruefungsamt].
Under the two under secretariats there worked a total of six ministerial directors each of whom was the head of his specialized divisions. The number of these divisions and their sphere of work changed several times in the course of time.
Inside some departments, subsections had been created which were in charge of a Ministerialdirigent. The number of higher officials[182] in the Reich Ministry of Justice amounted to approximately 250. Personnel matters were divided into regions. As regards the East, I was only in charge of my own home province, East Prussia. Otherwise, I dealt with western and southern Germany, Freisler was in charge of the remaining [regions]. Freisler was in charge of the People’s Court. The Reich Supreme Court and the Reich patent office were in my charge. The two divisions, directed by Under Secretaries were entirely separate from one another. Freisler and myself had different times at which we went to report to the Minister. The Minister asked me to come to see him when Freisler had finished his report and had left the room. Only very rarely, and only when one of my officials was to be appointed to a head office in Freisler’s sphere, or vice versa, did the two of us meet at the Minister’s. If one of the under secretaries was absent, his affairs were dealt with by the Minister together with the competent ministerial director. The other under secretary did not deputize for the one who was absent.
May I cite an example? In 1938 I had to go to the hospital as a result of an accident, and at that time the Minister did not discuss the new German marriage law with Freisler, but with the head of the respective department. If the Minister were also absent, the Under Secretary, who was present in Berlin, did only a certain amount of duty for his colleague. That is to say, he was available for matters which could not possibly be postponed. In my recollection, that happened only very rarely, for this was one point over which Freisler and I were in absolute agreement. Neither had the wish to meddle with the other’s affairs.
Furthermore, Freisler when he went on a business trip or when he went away for the summer holidays was practically always in contact with Berlin. Therefore, he told Dr. Guertner that a deputy for which I was the only possible candidate was neither necessary nor desirable. It did happen that when the Minister did not feel well and left the office earlier, he asked me by telephone to sign and to dispatch letters which he had already signed in draft form. Now and then that could have concerned matters which fell into Freisler’s sphere when Freisler could not be reached.
I should like to cite as example the letter which the prosecution submitted about the fight against political Catholicism. Concerning details accompanying that letter, I know nothing about this. In particular, I do not know what particular pressure was exercised or what instructions Hitler had issued in virtue of his right to lay down the directives of policy but I should like on this occasion to say something about what was the practice of the Ministry in regard to church affairs. I should like to point out what the witness for the prosecution, the Catholic Priest, Schosser, testified here on 9 May. According to his testimony, the Ministry refused on the occasion of a church funeral for Poles to take steps against the Catholic clergymen.
Dr. Kubuschok: The letter which you have mentioned is Document NG-630, Prosecution Exhibit 428.[183] The examination which you mentioned here of Father Schosser is on page 3021 in the English transcript.[184]
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