APPENDIX
[CHAPTER IV, NOTE 16]
Of course this assumes that Aliso was at Haltern, which is far from being well established (see below). Even Oberaden is not so very much farther away from the Rhine, but it seems not to have been occupied any great number of years, as Aliso certainly was. Koepp’s remark (Die Römer in Deutschland, p. 102) that the extent of the fortifications at Aliso sets a minimum figure for the number of the troops that occupied it permanently, seems to be the reverse of probability. The camp was more likely laid out on a large scale so as to be able to hold the largest army that might be expected to operate in that region on its way forward and back, as well as great quantities of war supplies, but the actual number of troops which held the fort year in and year out was probably very small, since our literary sources are unanimous in representing the left bank of the Rhine as the permanent headquarters of the army. As for the camp at Oberaden, it has yet to be proved that it was occupied in force throughout the winter, as Koepp (loc. cit.) believes, and so accuses Velleius of an outright falsehood in a plain statement of fact, where he must have known better. Certainly its size does not prove this, as it might not have been occupied at full capacity all the time; nor does the ornamentation of certain wall posts upon which Koepp lays such stress. That beams were artistically shaped shows merely that the builders had plenty of time in which to do their work, or else loved a bit of ornamentation, not that whole armies wintered in these quarters. The probability is that if occupied at all during the winter, it was held by only a small body of troops. Finally, if it could be shown that it was occupied during the winter, is it impossible that this may have been one of the camps of Tiberius, who wintered once in Germany? Can the archaeologist really date a structure like a camp within a limit of 15 years (only 13 years separated Drusus’ death from Tiberius’ winter in Germany), in the case of a simple construction, whose general plan never varied greatly, and without the evidence of superposition and modification of structure? That a thing is “Augustan” may well be asserted; to claim that a fortification belongs to Drusus, and not to Tiberius, is perhaps going too far, particularly when one must reject utterly the literary evidence in order to do so. Koepp is at pains to insist upon this matter of permanent occupation, because, as he rightly observes, “ein grosses Land schwerlich erobert werden kann, wenn der Eroberer alljährlich bis zu seinem Ausgangspunkt zurückgeht, und nicht vielmehr einen von Jahr zu Jahr wachsenden Gebietsteil besetzt hält.” But even if one granted that Oberaden is Drusus’ first fort and Haltern a later or contemporary establishment (as Kropatschek, and Koepp, p. 20, believe), nothing is gained regarding an ever advancing limit of possession, for Haltern is nearer the Rhine than Oberaden. In order to prove that the Romans were actually moving forward in this systematic fashion, as indeed they must have done, if conquest was their purpose, one would have to be able to show not two neighboring camps of the same period, but a whole series of advancing forts, the later situated ever farther inland than the earlier. This has not been done, and one is inclined to doubt greatly if it ever can be.——Delbrück’s arguments against Haltern or Oberaden as Aliso (Gesch. d. Kriegskunst, 2nd ed., II, pp. 131-150) seem very convincing, but there are also grave difficulties in the way of setting Aliso near Paderborn. However, no matter in which place Aliso be located, the upper or the lower Lippe, our argument is not affected, for though the location near Paderborn is far inland, and, if held in great force, must have overawed the surrounding tribes, it is perfectly clear from Delbrück’s arguments (pp. 48-50, 130 ff.) that Aliso was never a “Zwingburg”, but only a center for munitions and supplies, probably as small as it could possibly have been made for easy defense. He has well emphasized the fallacy of parcelling out an army in fortresses so long as there remains a hostile force in the field. The point we wish to make, however, is that, if the whole country was subdued, or even any substantial portion thereof, it must have been necessary to move forward the legions into great permanent fortresses either in its midst, or on its farther borders, and that this was never done in Germany; the few castella of which we hear were certainly not far extended points held in full force by an army of permanent occupation.——We have hitherto paid no attention to the statement of Florus that “Drusus castella ubique disposuit per Mosam flumen, per Albin, per Visurgin” (II, 30, 26). Of course no one accepts this as being in any sense literally true of the Elbe and the Weser (cf. Abraham, Zur Gesch. d. germ, u. pannon. Kriege, etc., p. 4) and there is grave doubt even of the correctness of the statement regarding the “quinquaginta amplius castella”, that Drusus is supposed to have built along the Rhine (cf. Hübner, Römische Herrschaft, p. 110). So much however is clear, that the Romans did make a serious effort to pacify and control the coast, and castella may very well have been located at or near the mouth of the Weser and the Elbe (cf. Delbrück, op. cit., p. 51). The strategical value of such naval bases has already been pointed out (above, p. 51); their commercial significance is quite as great. Ancient commerce was, whenever possible, water-borne. With Germany, in the absence of even tolerable roads, it must have been almost wholly so. A close parallel is furnished by the conditions which prevailed in the American Middle West during the period of French occupation and even later. For the Roman trade with Germany see K. T. von Inama-Sternegg, Deutsche Wirtschaftsgeschichte, 2nd ed., Leipzig, 1909, I, p. 229 ff., a good though somewhat cursory summary, with references to the literature. The very carefully worded official statement of Augustus regarding the results of his activities in Germany, mentions this feature, and it alone, as a solid achievement: “Gallias et Hispanias provincias et Germaniam qua includit oceanus a Gadibus ad ostium Albis fluminis pacavi” (c. 26). “Pacavi” seems to be chosen in order to indicate that peaceful commercial enterprises had been made possible.
[CHAPTER IV, NOTE 49]
[For the following important note upon Palestine, and especially Judah, as a “buffer state”, I am indebted to my friend Professor F. C. Eiselen, who writes me the following under date of May 5, 1915. W. A. O.]: “The two great world powers in antiquity were Babylonia-Assyria on the one hand and Egypt on the other; only for a short time did the Hittites and the people of Urartu play a very important rôle in the ancient history of Western Asia. Between them lay Syria-Palestine; hence if we look for buffer states in antiquity we might expect to find them in that region. Now the strategical position of Syria-Palestine in relation to these two great powers has long been recognized, but historians do not seem to have considered it from the standpoint of buffer states, but more from the standpoint of a bone of contention, or the mixed character of its population and civilization, or the opportunity of exerting an influence in all directions” (E. Meyer, Geschichte des Altertums, zweite Auflage, I, 2, pp. 602 ff.). It is rather strange that the other question has received so little attention, but such is the case: while there are more or less indirect suggestions of such a situation, the idea of buffer states receives very little consideration. No doubt Klamroth is right in saying that the establishment of buffer states was not foreign to Assyrian policy. At any rate the line in the inscription of Tiglath-Pileser IV, to which he refers (II Rawlinson, 67) may well be interpreted as implying such a policy on the part of this ruler. It is translated by E. Schrader (Keilinschriftliche Bibliothek, II, p. 21) as follows: “Den (Stamm) Idibi-il machte ich zur Grenzwacht gegen Egypten”; similarly by A. S. Strong (Records of the Past, New Series, V, p. 125): “Idibi-ili as a watch over (against) Egypt I appointed.” (Cf. also the establishment of a Phoenician province by Tiglath-Pileser under the rule of his own son, to hold together the states along the Mediterranean, Hugo Winckler, Altorientalische Forschungen, II, p. 4; cf. p. 67). The interpretation by Rogers of the significance of Gaza and other Philistine cities [i. e. as possible buffer states for Egypt against the Assyrian] is undoubtedly quite correct. The relation of Israel and Judah and Assyria as reflected especially in 2 Kings 15-25, suggests that the Egyptians also considered Syria-Palestine in the nature of a buffer state. In describing the policy of Egypt during the eighth century J. H. Breasted uses these words—applicable also in other centuries: “Unable to oppose the formidable armies of Assyria, the petty kinglets of Egypt constantly fomented discontent and revolt among the Syro-Palestinian states in order, if possible, to create a fringe of buffer states between them and the Assyrian” (A History of Egypt, p. 549). The Egyptians succeeded in stirring up Hezekiah of Judah (Isa. 28-30), whereupon Sennacherib came, severely punishing the rebel (2 Kings 18, 19; Isa. 26, 37). May it not be that the transfer of some of Hezekiah’s territory to Ashdod, Ekron, and Gaza was for the purpose of maintaining or intensifying the good will of these buffer states? (Taylor Cylinder III, lines 1-26; Lehmann-Haupt, Israel, p. 122). The later history of Judah may be interpreted on the same principle. The rapid advance of Necoh against Assyria through the territory of Judah (2 Kings 22:28, 29) resembles the rapid advance of the Germans against the French, through the territory of Belgium; Nebuchadnezzar cannot afford to lose such a valuable buffer state (2 Kings 24:1); and after the revolt and destruction of Judah, he still attempts to maintain a state under Gedaliah (2 Kings 25:22). The restored community, after the exile, served as a buffer state between Persia and Egypt. Six years ago I wrote regarding the attitude of Cyrus toward the Jews: “A clash with Egypt was inevitable; hence it was to the interest of Cyrus to have on the Egyptian border a state that was bound to him by the strongest ties of gratitude, and upon the fidelity of which he could rely” (Prophecy and the Prophets, pp. 246, 247). Regarding the general policy of Cyrus see E. Schrader, Keilinschriften und das alte Testament, dritte Auflage, p. 115; L. W. Batten, Ezra and Nehemiah, p. 35. A similar situation continued to exist in later ages.”
[Addendum (p. 87)]
Perhaps the best ancient statement regarding the workings of Roman diplomacy with both friendly and hostile tribes beyond the Rhine is in Flavius Vopiscus, Probus, ch. 14 and 15, especially the succinct report of Probus himself to the senate (15, 2): “Omnes iam barbari vobis arant, vobis iam serunt et contra interiores gentes militant”. Though the period is late this is the same policy as that inaugurated by Augustus, perfected by Tiberius, and maintained doubtless by all the abler emperors.