FOOTNOTES
[1] The whole history of Iran has been dominated by the ever recurring struggle with Turan, the barbarians of the northeastern steppes and deserts, down even to the 18th century. Compare Ed. Meyer’s excellent characterization of this relation, Gesch. d. Alt., III, p. 103 ff.
[2] The feeble Greek colonies on the north coast of the Black Sea, though dependent upon the Empire, were hardly an integral part thereof, and really existed more through the favor of the barbarians, for selfish personal ends, than by reason of their own strength or the protecting arm of Rome. They were little more than trading posts preserved for their mutual serviceability, not the frontiers of empire. Compare Mommsen, Röm. Gesch., V, p. 277 ff., especially 286.
[3] See V. Chapot, La frontière de l’Euphrate de Pompée à la conquête arabe, Paris, 1907, pp. 377, 381.
[4] Upon the general inadequacy of rivers as frontier lines there are some good remarks by Lord Curzon, The Romanes Lecture: Frontiers, Oxford, 1908, p. 20 ff., and Miss Ellen Semple, Influences of Geographic Environment, New York, 1911, p. 360 ff. It is only rarely in fact that a large river actually forms a boundary line; exceptions like the Rio Grande, a short stretch on the upper St. Lawrence, the La Plata, the Amur, the lower Aras and the lower Danube, only emphasize the rareness of the phenomenon. Besides, rivers play a relatively slight rôle in military history; they can be crossed only too easily, if not in the direct face of the foe, as at Wagram, Fredericksburg, or the Yalu, at least at some point above or below. In the long course of the German wars the river Rhine plays a most subordinate part; battles were fought freely on one side or the other, but none, that we have noted, for its actual passage, unless an exception be made of an action of Drusus in 12 B. C., which Dio 54, 32, 1, thus describes: “Having watched for the Kelts until they were crossing the Rhine he cut them to pieces.” This may have been a battle for a crossing, but it seems much more plausible that it was a mere attack from an ambuscade, the river playing merely an incidental part. Of course these remarks apply only to the period of mobile armies. In modern trench warfare, with solid lines hundreds of miles long, any ditch, even such as the trifling Yser canal, may be a formidable obstacle; but this is a wholly new phase of military tactics.
[5] The North American Indians were incomparably less numerous and more widely scattered than the Germans, but our Indian wars were frequent, difficult, and costly to life and property. Probably no other nations with which civilized peoples have had to deal have made such a cult of valor and of rapine as did the ancient Germans and the North American Indians.
[6] O. Seeck (Kaiser Augustus, p. 110 f.) only partly recognizes the difficulties involved in the constant pushing forward of the lines of empire. It is wrong to ascribe to Augustus the absurdities which a policy of indefinite advance entails. Cf. p. 67.
[8] These are perhaps the “strategical considerations which tempted the Romans beyond [the Rhine and the Danube], as the English have been tempted across the Indus”, to which Lord Curzon (The Romanes Lecture: Frontiers, Oxford, 1908, p. 21) refers. His interesting discussion of the problems of imperial boundaries calls occasional attention to the similarity between the conditions faced by the Roman Empire, and by those of the great modern empires in Asia and Africa; e. g., pp. 8, 32, 38f., and 54. Upon one point, however, Lord Curzon’s generalization is not quite satisfactory. It is that of the difference between the policy in the East, where protectorates were freely established, and that in the West, where, to use his own words: “protectorates, strictly so-called, were not required because the enemy with whom contact was to be avoided was the barbarian, formidable not from his organization, but from his numbers; and against this danger purely military barriers, whether in Britain, Gaul, Germany, or Africa, required to be employed” (p. 38). Organized states long since accustomed to the rule of a monarch did not exist in the West, and of course the Romans could not be expected to create them, but their nearest equivalent under the circumstances, tribes closely bound to Rome by treaties of friendship and alliance, did exist, at all events in the earlier period of the empire. Certainly this was the situation in Germany, where at one time all the tribes between the Rhine, and the Weser seem to have been socii of Rome, and it was the case in Gaul before the advent of Caesar, where the Haedui had long been allies (called actually “fratres”) of the Romans (at least since 121 B. C., cf. Kraner-Dittenberger-Meusel on Caesar, Bell. Gall., I, 11, 3 and 33, 2), and even the newcomer Ariovistus, as a possible source of danger, had been solemnly recognized as rex and amicus in 59 B. C. That Ariovistus had made overtures for this recognition, having attempted to ingratiate himself with the proconsul of Gaul as early as 62 B. C., is no doubt to be admitted, as M. Bang (Die Germanen im römischen Dienst bis zum Regierungsantritt Constantins I., Berlin, 1906, p. 2f.) has convincingly argued (cf. also T. Rice Holmes, Caesar’s Conquest of Gaul, 2nd ed., 1911, p. 40), but the Romans were apparently even more eager to give than was Ariovistus to receive, in order to secure his neutrality before the impending Helvetian invasion, no doubt—nothing else would excuse the abandonment of their old allies the Haedui in the face of the outrageous treatment which Ariovistus had accorded them. A certain case of the establishment of a buffer state in Africa will be noted below. To a later period, when the Romans put all their faith in palisade and trench, Lord Curzon’s statement is no doubt perfectly applicable. But that was the time of marked decadence, when the vigorous offensive-defensive of the early period had changed to a defensive pure and simple, and when, instead of foreseeing and preventing invasion, men merely clung despairingly to a wall, and prayed that the barbarian might dash himself to pieces against it.
[9] A good example of the way in which such affairs might be managed, is Caesar’s treatment of Indutiomarus and Cingetorix, rivals among the Treveri (Bell. Gall., V, 3 f.).
[10] Tacitus, Ann., II, 26: “Se noviens a divo Augusto in Germaniam missum plura consilio quam vi perfecisse”.
[11] Ibid.: “internis discordiis relinqui.” Cf. above p. 34. An example of such diplomacy on the part of the Romans is the way in which a special territory (that of the Ubii) had been assigned to the Chatti, who, for a time at least, were thereby prevented from joining the Sugambri and the national cause (Dio, 54, 36, 3; Gardthausen, Augustus, I, p. 1085). Similarly the Frisii were treated with marked friendliness, and cordial relations were maintained for more than a generation (Gardthausen, Augustus, I, p. 1076). A party friendly to Rome was long supported against great obstacles among the Cherusci. Domitius experienced a humiliating diplomatic reverse in an effort to compel their return from exile in 2 B. C. (Dio, 55, 10ᵃ, 3), but later commanders were more successful. Only after it became impossible to support them in their own land were the leaders of this party transferred to a position of safety within the empire.
[12] The Ubii had made a treaty of friendship and given hostages even before Caesar crossed the Rhine in 55 B. C. (Bell. Gall., IV, 16, 5).
[13] Compare Caesar’s admirable characterization of the Gauls (Bell. Gall., IV, 5), who in this respect are typical of many, if not most, primitive peoples.
[14] Compare the remark of Tiberius noted above (Ch. IV, n. 10). In his two expeditions into Germany Caesar fought nothing that he could dignify with the appellation of a battle (cf. Florus, I, 45, 15: “fuga rursus in silvas et paludes, et quod acerbissimum Caesari fuit, non fuere qui vincerentur”). The same is true of Agrippa in 37—“he crossed the Rhine for the purpose of making war”, says Dio (48, 49, 2), not that he actually fought a battle; and such is the case with the other German campaigns, always the vaguest terms, never any details of a severe engagement; a few skirmishes undoubtedly took place, and there was plenty of ravaging and burning, but pitched battles must have been very rare. Even the disgraceful defeat of Lollius was not followed by any battle (Dio, 54, 20, 6). The tumultuous assault on Drusus in 11 B. C. (Dio, 54, 33, 3) was hardly more than a skirmish, as the enemy remained in the field, and is represented merely as growing more cautious thenceforward. This was hardly a “decisive, brilliant victory” as Gardthausen (Augustus, I, p. 1083) calls it. Indeed the defeat of Varus, and the two engagements of Germanicus, which Tacitus describes, are the only certain “battles” that were fought in more than 50 years of intermittent campaigning.
[15] Roman traders were active far beyond the limits of the empire. They constitute a familiar feature of Caesar’s campaigns in Gaul. For example, they were present in such numbers and with such equipment at the surrendering of the Aduatuci (Bell. Gall., II, 33) as to purchase and take over at once 53,000 captives, and a small campaign in the Alps was undertaken upon one occasion merely to open up a trade route for them (Ibid., III, 1). They mingled with the Suebi under Ariovistus (Ibid., I, 49, 1) and had frequently entered Germany, where they exerted a marked influence upon the Ubii (Ibid., IV, 3, 3) long before Caesar’s advent into Gaul. In later years we hear of them occasionally in Germany (Dio, 53, 26, 4; 54, 20, 4 etc.). Varus’ army had a large tross (Dio, 56, 20, 2), which must have been in part at least composed of traders. A. C. Redderoth (Der Angrivarierwall und die letzten Römerschlachten des Jahres 16 p. C., Toronto, 1912, p. 10 f.) is doubtless correct in emphasizing the importance of commercial considerations at this time in Germany, although our sources (like ancient historians in general) give only the scantiest indications of the influence of economic interests upon history. See [Appendix, Chapter IV, note 16.]
[16] See [Appendix, Chapter IV, note 16.]
[17] Tacitus, Ann., I, 56: “positoque castello super vestigia paterni praesidii in monte Tauno.” This is probably the same fort which Dio (54, 36, 3) describes as “among the Chatti beside the Rhine”; (cf. Koepp, op. cit., p. 20). The location is generally thought to be not far from Höchst, only a few miles up the Main. A castellum here would merely command the entrance to a road into the interior; it would be no “Zwingburg.”
[18] Kornemann (Klio, IX, 1909, p. 436) regards the words of Tacitus, Ann., IV, 72: “haud spernanda illic civium sociorumque manus litora Oceani praesidebat,” as proving that “das Kastell eine starke Besatzung hatte.” On the other hand the inability of the garrison to do more than hold the fort against the uprising (IV, 73) would indicate that the force was rather small. A Roman fort was an easy thing to protect against the Germans; even the feeble garrison of Aliso held out easily against great numbers after the disaster to Varus (cf. Delbrück, Gesch. d. Kriegskunst, 2nd ed., 1909, II, p. 138). That Flevum was not established until the time of Germanicus, Kornemann (loc. cit., p. 437) has argued, in refusing to accept the plausible identification of Drusus’ naval base with Flevum, and locating Borma (Florus, II, 30, 26, a form which he very properly defends) between the Cannanefates and the Frisii (loc. cit., pp. 430 ff., especially 437-8). Our argument is not seriously affected thereby, for Borma must have been yet closer to the Rhine than Flevum (Kornemann, loc. cit., p. 437), and neither was so situated as to be a far flung outpost designed to hold conquests fast. At the very most they were merely starting points for hostile or commercial activity. To be sure, if Borma could be identified with the modern Borkum, as has been frequently attempted (cf. Kornemann, loc. cit., p. 433, n. 1), its foundation might, with a certain degree of plausibility, be regarded as a serious move looking towards conquest, but Kornemann’s localization of Borma seems unassailable, the philological obstacles are great, and the military difficulty of setting a naval base at this period so far away from the Rhine quite insuperable.
[19] Velleius, II, 105, 3. Dio indeed (56, 18, 2) speaks of the Roman soldiers in Varus’ time as “spending the winter in Germany”. The tense used, however, the imperfect, at the head of a series of the same tenses which are used in the inceptive sense, shows clearly that the word means no more than: “were beginning to spend the winter.” A single instance would be sufficient justification for the expression.
[20] This is generally changed, following Lipsius, to caput Lupiae, and is identified with Aliso. If Aliso be at Haltern it is strange indeed that he did not move on to the Rhine; if near Paderborn there is good reason for his having remained at a depot of supplies fully 90 miles away from Vetera.
[21] Ritterling (op. cit., p. 181) suggests the possibility that these “hiberna” are the same as those that were occupied the preceding winter, while others speak without reserve of a second winter in Germany (e. g., Gardthausen, Augustus, I, p. 1168). But Velleius uses “reduxit”, which distinctly implies that the legions were being led back across the Rhine. Besides, “in hiberna reducere” was a phrase which any one acquainted with the conduct of the German wars would at once understand as implying the recrossing of the Rhine. For “hiberna” alone as meaning the Rhine forts, see Velleius, II, 120, 3: “ad inferiora hiberna”; see also §2 of the same chapter: “in hiberna revertitur”, of the campaign of Tiberius in 10 A. D., where there is no doubt that the Rhine forts are meant (see Zonaras, 10, 37 ex.). Compare also Tacitus, Ann., I, 38: “reduxit in hiberna”; ibidem, I, 51: “miles in hibernis locatur”; II, 23: “legionum aliae ... in hibernacula remissae”; and II, 26, “reductus inde in hiberna miles”; and finally, Dio, 55, 2, 1, where Tiberius with the corpse of Drusus comes from the interior of Germany “as far as to the winter camp”, i. e., across the Rhine. It is clear that “hiberna” or the equivalent, when used without a special qualifying phrase, as in Velleius II, 107, 3, means the Rhine forts and nothing else. In order to make clear that these “hiberna” were in the interior of Germany it would have been necessary to add some special note calling attention to that fact. Finally, as the spending of the preceding winter in Germany is told with such a flourish (“in cuius mediis finibus ... princeps locaverat”), the repetition of the same deed, as enhancing its significance, could not have failed to be emphasized.
[22] The most important was certainly the fossa Drusiana which led from the Rhine to the North Sea, through a lake, probably that of Flevum (Tacitus, Ann., II, 8). This may very well be identical with the fossae Drusinae (Suetonius, Claud., 1). Drusus also did some work to regulate the course of the Rhine (Tacitus, Ann., XIII, 53, and Hist., V, 19). Whether he built corduroy roads (pontes longi) over the swampy land is not so certain, though Becker, Domaszewski, and Kornemann (the references in Kornemann, Klio, IX, p. 432 ff.) are probably correct when they interpret pontibus (Floras, II, 30, 26) in this sense. If this was actually a coast road connecting two naval bases, Borma, a short distance from the Rhine, with Gesoriacum-Bononia (Boulogne-sur-mer), as Kornemann very plausibly argues (p. 432, 435), then it really connected only such naval bases as were necessary to hold the mouth of the Rhine with the general military road system of Gaul. Of course both banks of a river at its mouth must be seized in order to insure certain control, but neither the establishment of Borma nor the construction of this particular bit of road can properly be regarded as measures which necessarily had the conquest of Germany in mind, nor would they have furthered very materially such a conquest, even if it had been intended. Professor Frank (Roman Imperialism, New York, 1914, p. 352) seems to make too much of this canal of Drusus as evidence “that serious measures were planned from the first”. The Romans unquestionably made preparations to march into Germany and to support armies upon such excursions; the critical consideration, however, is what they did after entering the country, not their preliminary preparations. If they constantly marched out again every fall, it is impossible to speak of permanent occupation. Nor is it satisfactory to restrict the attempts at conquest to the campaigns of Drusus, 12-9 B. C., and of Tiberius, 4-5 A. D., alone. Domitius penetrated deeper into Germany than either of them, as he alone crossed the Elbe. If some invasions imply conquest then all should, or else Augustus was guilty of an incredibly shilly-shally policy. And if all the invasions aimed at conquest, then there is an absurd disparity between their number, scale, and extent and the utterly negligible results obtained. Kornemann’s view (p. 440 ff.) that Drusus constructed a coast road as far as the mouth of the Ems can hardly be established by the evidence which he presents. It does not appear how any number of campaigns along the coast could have accomplished the conquest of the remote interior. Even if the view be accepted, however, it could only show the importance of the control of the coast, a circumstance to which we shall revert later.
[23] For the literature on these see Gardthausen, Augustus, II, p. 763 f. Nothing definite is known about them. If very significant for the “conquest” of Germany, why was their construction deferred to the period of Domitius, years after Drusus and Tiberius had been engaged in carrying on the most extensive campaigns? The very fact that these early incursions into Germany had been repeatedly made without the erection of any elaborate network of solidly constructed roads, is the clearest evidence that no permanent occupation of the country was intended. For the purposes of the occasional demonstration mere “war-paths”, supplemented here and there with some light, temporary construction were entirely adequate. It is a striking fact that of permanent road construction not a trace has been found in Germany, not in the lower Lippe valley, where, if anywhere, the highways of armies must have been solidly constructed if Germany was to be held as a province, nor even before the very gates of the camp at Haltern (cf. Koepp, Die Römer in Deutschland, 2nd ed., p. 136). Yet along the limes roads were regularly constructed, and were an essential part of the system of defense. Tiberius seems to have begun a limes in the silva Caesia, but not to have completed it (Tacitus, Ann., I, 50: “limitemque a Tiberio coeptum”). It was obviously a slight undertaking.
[24] Tacitus, Ann., II, 7. These were probably roads (Delbrück, Gesch. d. Kriegskunst, 2nd ed., p. 128 ff.). The use of “novis” indicates that such structures had been erected earlier. Their flimsy nature is to be inferred from the fact that the work had to be repeated in a few years, and the construction of Germanicus was doubtless no more lasting ([see the preceding note]).
[25] As for example Agrippa’s system of roads for Gaul. Yet Gaul needed them far less than Germany, for it was a relatively civilized country with means of rapid communication. Caesar seems to have been embarrassed but little in his campaigns by poor roads, in sharp contrast with the conditions prevailing in Germany.
[26] Dio (56, 18, 2) states that “their (i. e. Roman) soldiers were beginning to winter there and were founding cities”, but just what these “cities” were, he neglects to say, and they appear nowhere else either in his narrative, or in that of any other ancient writer; yet the destruction of such incipient “cities” after the defeat of Varus is just the sort of event that could not possibly have been passed over in silence by all our sources. When Dio comes to the appropriate section in his later narrative (22, 2ᵃ = Zonaras) where these should be mentioned, he speaks of nothing but “forts” (ἐρύματα). It is perfectly clear that his sources knew nothing about real “cities”, and that from his knowledge of the way in which settlements grow up about any army post however small, he is indulging in a little exaggeration in telling of the foundation of “cities” so as to give the desired background for his picture of a complete reversal of conditions in Germany.
[27] These defects in method have not escaped the sharp eyes of the latest historian of the German wars, Camille Jullian, Histoire de la Gaule, IV, Paris, 1914, p. 117 ff. He notes especially the failure to create a great system of converging roads, establish numerous strong garrisons, found colonies, and maintain a powerful army in the land. Yet under the influence of the theory of conquest he can explain all these grave errors only as due to the ignorance and incapacity of the ageing emperor and his entourage. “Il y a eu, de la part d’Auguste, de veritables aberrations militaires” (p. 117) ... “Une puérile ignorance des situations se montra dans la politique romaine au delà du Rhin” (p. 118) ... “L’empereur vieillissait, et il semblait que sa vieillesse pesât sur tout son entourage” (p. 119). Such a position is logical indeed but quite inadmissable. One must surely recognize in this the reductio ad absurdum of the whole theory of conquest.
[28] The amount of such legal business that Varus did is emphasized by Velleius (II, 118) and Florus (II, 30, 31), but not mentioned at all by Dio (56, 18, 1) who says merely that the Germans “were establishing markets and making peaceful gatherings”. Dio’s account is a more military and political document; Varus there is acting in an understandable if not wholly sagacious fashion. But Velleius and Florus wish to point a contrast between the man of the forum and the man of the camp, and in so doing make Varus out to have been an utter fool. Of course advocates and law suits belong to the conventional equipment of the forum, and must be played up in such a picture. There is grave doubt whether Varus had any more of such matters to adjust than any other Roman general after the presence of the Roman soldier and merchant came to be no unusual thing in the land.
[29] This time Dio alone (56, 18, 3) mentions this feature: “he gave them orders like slaves and in particular collected property from them as from subjects.” It is singular indeed that neither Velleius nor Florus is aware of any such striking change in Roman policy, the more so as Velleius (II, 117) expressly calls attention to the avarice of Varus (“pecuniae vero ... non contemptor”) in a short character study and sketch of his previous record, so that some reference to his exactions must inevitably have been made had Velleius ever heard of them. The fact that he mentions nothing of the kind is the very strongest argumentum ex silentio against the correctness of Dio’s statement, as far as it can be considered a matter of general policy. Or, to look at the situation for a moment in its broader connections: our three main sources are equally at pains to explain the reversal of the situation in Germany, and this they very naturally do by assuming that there was a marked change of policy under Varus. All are at the same time noticeably under the ban of a tradition which represented the earlier campaigns in Germany as having produced a marked change in the character of the inhabitants: so profound was the peace established by Drusus that even the climate seemed to have been affected thereby (Florus, II, 30, 37); Tiberius as early as 8 B. C. had made Germany practically a tribute-paying province (Velleius, II, 97, 4); the barbarians established fairs and conventions, and were rapidly growing Romanized without realizing it (Dio, 56, 18, 3). Now inconsistently enough with this picture, both Velleius and Florus, when they come to the time of Varus, describe the Germans as fierce and warlike barbarians who found irksome the piping times of peace and were ready to fall upon their masters at the slightest occasion (Velleius, II, 117, 118; Florus, II, 30, 30 and 32). On the other hand the more philosophical or consistent Dio recognized a discrepancy in these two pictures of the Germans, and sought to avoid it by representing the Germans as experiencing a re-transformation. Peaceful and pious men would not attack their masters even if they were weak and incautious, therefore Varus must be presented as a typical tyrant who treats the Germans “as slaves” and levies tribute upon them “as subjects.” Florus also (II, 30, 31) ascribes to Varus the characteristics of the conventional tyrant (libidinem ac superbiam ... saevitiam), traits about which his contemporary Velleius, who had no occasion to flatter Varus, and certainly did not do so, knows nothing whatsoever. These rhetorical flourishes in Florus are the less excusable, as they are perfectly gratuitous, for the attack of the Germans is already otherwise quite sufficiently motived in his own narrative. Of course, the mere facts are that the Germans had never been broken, pacified and civilized, and that therefore their attack on Varus needs no specific explanation other than that he was careless enough to give them their chance. Dio’s artless acceptance of the palpably exaggerated reports concerning the earlier campaigns leads him to falsify history in the interests of an illusory consistency.
[30] Certainly if the causarum patroni excited the peculiar animosity of the Germans the publicani must have done so much more, yet not even Florus mentions the latter.
[31] It is an axiom of historians of the ancient history of the East not to accept at face value the numerous boastful announcements of the receipt of tribute. In a very great many cases this was nothing more than an exchange of gifts, as little “tribute” on one side as on the other. Of course the Romans gave many valuable presents to German chieftains, otherwise it would have been impossible to maintain their friendship, the case of Flavus, the brother of Arminius, being especially in point (Tacitus, Ann., II, 9).
[32] Tacitus, Ann., IV, 72 ff. The very phrase which Tacitus uses of the outbreak of war, “pacem exuere” (IV, 72, 1), shows clearly that it was nothing like a revolt; no civil or military commanders are mentioned, only “qui tributo aderant milites.” On the friendly relations with the Frisians which were long maintained after their first contact with the Romans, see Gardthausen, Augustus, I, p. 1076.
[33] The parallel case of the friendly Indians, who, especially in the early period of colonization, frequently gave the white men valuable aid and material assistance, is very much in point.
[34] We must here consider the impassioned language which Tacitus (Ann., I, 59) puts in the mouth of Arminius: “Germanos numquam satis excusaturos, quod inter Albim et Rhenum virgas et secures et togam viderint. aliis gentibus ignorantia imperi Romani inexperta esse supplicia, nescia tributa: quae quoniam exuerint”, etc. That this is a violent ex parte harangue, and in no sense to be regarded as an exact statement of facts Tacitus makes sufficiently clear by calling Arminius “vaecordem” at the very moment of introducing him. On the other hand these expressions may not be wholly without justification. That criminals, outlaws, and marauders may have been beaten and beheaded is not in itself improbable. How else should a Roman commander punish injuries to his fellow citizens, or disloyalty to political or military agreements? That an occasional legal adviser was to be found on the staff of the commander in chief is altogether natural. And finally that assistance of any kind in the form of service or the furnishing of supplies may have been called “tribute” by an excited patriot need occasion no surprise. But it must be a weak case indeed that can find no better arguments than such statements as these for its support.
[35] Dio, 56, 19, 1 and 5; 22, 2ᵃ (Zonaras).
[36] The siege of Aliso is, of course, abundantly described. The sea coast was not given up at all, as is well known, and whatever castella may have been there were no doubt maintained. A small force was kept among the Chauci, to the remote northwest (doubtless on the sea coast), until after the death of Augustus (Tacitus, Ann., I, 38; Gardthausen, Augustus, I, p. 1227). The Taunus fort is the only other whose location is even approximately known. Germanicus found it a ruin some years later (see references [n. 17] above), and it might conceivably have been destroyed at this time, but it is much more likely that the enemy did not appear in sufficient force to do this so far from the seat of the uprising, and so close to the unshaken legions of the upper Rhine. It was no doubt abandoned and dismantled voluntarily by the Romans when they felt constrained to concentrate their strength. Now these three regions are the only ones in which we have any definite record that Roman outposts were stationed. As usually happens when one examines these rhetorical flosculi they are found to be either in flat contradiction to the definite facts, or else improbable in themselves.
[37] A brief summary of the provocations offered by the Germans may not be superfluous in support of such a statement. Caesar’s first campaign in Germany, in 56 B. C., was preceded by the invasion of the Usipetes and Tencteri (Bell. Gall., IV, 1), and by the refusal of the Sugambri to yield up the survivors (Bell. Gall., IV, 16). The second crossing, in 53 B. C., was due to the fact that the Treveri had received assistance from across the Rhine (Bell. Gall., V, 27; VI, 9). Disturbances in Gaul and Germany compelled Agrippa’s crossing in 37 B. C. (Dio, 48, 49, 2). In 29 B. C. the Suebi crossed the Rhine, and were defeated by Carinas, but no invasion of Germany followed (Dio, 51, 21, 6). The punitive expedition of M. Vinicius in 25 B. C. was occasioned by the maltreatment of merchants (Dio, 53, 26, 4). In 19 B. C. Gaul was disturbed by German invaders, but Agrippa restored order without being compelled to invade Germany (Dio, 54, 11, 1). The campaign of Lollius in 17 B. C. was to drive out the Sugambri and others who had crossed the Rhine after having put to death Roman citizens in their own confines (Dio, 54, 20, 4). The first act in Drusus’ campaigns was to beat back the Sugambri who began the war with a raid into Gaul (Strabo, VII, 1, 4; Dio, 54, 32, 1). Rome was by this time clearly disgusted with a situation which allowed so much opportunity for disturbance, and decided now to spread the terror of her arms far and wide on the right bank of the Rhine. For the next few years the Germans were too busy defending themselves to take the offensive. The moment, however, pressure was relaxed, new troubles started, as in 7 B. C. (Dio, 55, 3, 3), although no serious reprisal was undertaken by the Romans this time. Again, after Tiberius went into exile, “Germania ... rebellavit” (Velleius, II, 100, 1), and this disturbance must surely be brought into connection with the extensive campaigns of Domitius in 2 B. C. (Dio, 55, 10ᵃ, 2; Tacitus, Ann., IV, 44). More troubles in Germany which required to be “pacified” in 4 A. D., inaugurated the second period of activity (Suetonius, Tib., 16). Tiberius remained on the offensive until the Pannonian revolt called him away in 6 A. D. From this time until the defeat of Varus there is a blank in our information; nevertheless, from the consistent record of other Roman leaders who never went into Germany except on strong provocation, and not always even then, we feel certain that some threat of trouble in the back country alone could have tempted Varus forth on this occasion. Rome always let the Germans studiously alone as long as they kept the peace; it would have been utterly unprecedented for Varus to go into the German forests in search of trouble, were his presence not demanded there. Under the circumstances, while the Pannonian revolt was still in progress, to have wantonly run any serious risks with so small an army would have been sheer madness (cf. pp. 95, 99, 100 f.).
[38] Besides, as noted just above, this was only the crowning act of a general extensive policy of reprisal, which was intended to forestall the possibility of trouble in this quarter for a long time to come. On Maroboduus see Gardthausen, Augustus, I, p. 1152 ff.
[39] For the statements of Florus regarding the general establishment of castella, see [Appendix, Chapter IV, note 16] sub finem.
[40] Compare A. Wittneben, “Dareios’ Zug gegen die Skythen im Lichte des russischen Krieges von 1812”, Zeitschr. f. d. Gymnasialwesen, LXVI (1912), pp. 577-94, especially 588 ff. Wittneben quite properly insists that the move was not intended for conquest, but rather to clear the right flank of the Persians in a contemplated offensive against Hellas. As a demonstration it was eminently sagacious and successful, and he very properly draws a close parallel between this move and Caesar’s invasions of Britain and Germany (p. 593 f.). G. B. Grundy, The Great Persian War, London, 1901, p. 58 f., shows clearly “that the expedition in the form it was made was not ... an attempt at conquest”, and he regards it as either “a reconnaissance in force” or “a display intended to strike awe into the tribes beyond the newly won territory.” J. Beloch, Griech. Gesch., 2nd ed., II, 1914, p. 5 f., agrees with Grundy that no conquest was intended: “er wollte nur den Skythen seine Macht zeigen, um ihnen die Lust zu nehmen, den Istros zu überschreiten” (p. 6). Any other interpretation of this campaign seems to be quite untenable. On the date we follow Ed. Meyer, Gesch. d. Alt., III, p. 114 f.
[41] Xenophon, Anab., I, 1, 9.
[42] The purpose in both cases is excellently expressed by Caesar himself, Bell. Gall., IV, 20: “in Britanniam proficisci contendit (sc. Caesar), quod omnibus fere Gallicis bellis hostibus nostris inde subministrata auxilia intellegebat”; and IV, 16: “cum videret (sc. Caesar), Germanos tam facile impelli, ut in Galliam venirent, suis quoque rebus eos timere voluit, cum intellegerent et posse et audere populi Romani exercitum Rhenum transire.”
[43] On this expedition see Mommsen, Res Gestae Divi Augusti, p. 106 ff.; Gardthausen, Augustus, I, p. 789 f.
[44] See Mommsen, Res Gestae Divi Augusti, p. 108 f.
[45] On these see Mommsen, Res Gestae, p. 130 ff.; Gardthausen, Augustus, I, p. 1181 ff., II, p. 779 ff.; Domaszewski, Geschichte der römischen Kaiser, I, p. 222 f. The Dacians seem to have given provocation in every instance, and even in 11 A. D. once more invaded the empire, though we know nothing about a retaliatory campaign in Dacia on the part of the Romans upon this occasion; cf. Mommsen, op. cit., p. 132.
[46] Cf. M. Bang, The Cambridge Mediaeval History, 1911, vol. I, p. 195.
[47] An historical study of the buffer or allied state, as a device to strengthen a frontier, would be a profitable one to undertake. There seems to exist no comprehensive treatment of the phenomenon.
[48] See H. R. Hall, The Ancient History of the Near East, London, 1913, p. 466, for a brief statement of the facts. For the idea of a buffer state in this connection, compare E. Klamroth, Die wirtschaftliche Lage und das geistige Lehen der jüdischen Exulanten in Babylonien. Diss. Königsberg, 1912, p. 20, n. 4.
[49] For the events compare Hall, op. cit., p. 543 ff.; for the interpretation in terms of a buffer state, Klamroth, op. cit., p. 20. See [Appendix, Chapter IV, note 49].
[50] We accept upon this point B. Niese’s convincing arguments, “Neue Beiträge zur Geschichte und Landeskunde Lakedämons”, Nachr. d. Götting. Ges. d. Wiss., 1906, p. 101 ff., esp. pp. 131-7.
[51] See J. G. Droysen, Geschichte des Hellenismus, I, 2, p. 163 ff. This interpretation of events is much more plausible than that of J. Kaerst (Geschichte des hellenistischen Zeitalters, I, p. 369, and n. 2), who argues that the kingdoms of Taxiles and Porus were actually parts of the empire. J. B. Bury (A History of Greece, 2nd ed., 1913, p. 807) very properly maintains the position taken by Droysen.
[52] The Romanes Lecture: Frontiers, Oxford, 1898, p. 38.—J. Geffcken: Kaiser Julianus, 1914, p. 117 uses the expression “Pufferstaat” in speaking of Armenia.
[53] The most elaborate recent study of the policy of Augustus towards Armenia is by A. Abbruzzese, “Le relazioni fra l’impero romano e l’Armenia a tempo di Augusto”, Riv. di storia antica, VII (1903), pp. 505-21; 721-34; VIII (1904), pp. 32-61 (also separate, Padova, 1903). His attitude towards the diplomatic policy which Augustus followed is, however, hypercritical, and his thesis that a policy of economic absorption should have been followed is illusory. (Cf. De Sanctis, Riv. di filol. LIII (1905), p. 159 f.). A fairly satisfactory statement, though somewhat superficial, is P. P. Asdourian’s dissertation, Die politischen Beziehungen zwischen Armenien und Rom von 190 v. Chr. bis 428 n. Chr., Venedig, 1911. His statement, p. 79, of the policy of Augustus as one that attempted to maintain the controlling position in Armenia by peaceful means, or through political manoeuvers, is correct enough, but the sneering remark that this was due not to Augustus’ own inclination, but rather to the rivalry of Parthia is quite superfluous. Of course Rome’s relations to Armenia would have been quite different had there not been a powerful Parthian monarchy. In the mutual rivalries of Rome and Parthia lay the whole difficulty. The best general statement of the problem in its large outlines is in V. Chapot, La frontière de l’Euphrate etc., p. 377 ff. He also can make nothing out of Abbruzzese’s “lotta commerciale” theory (p. 382, note). Mommsen’s statement (Röm. Gesch., V, p. 370 ff.) of the general course of Augustus’ Armenian policy is admirable.
[54] This has been recognized by Gardthausen, Augustus, I, p. 706. That this danger was a real one is clear from the wars with the Gaetulians and Musulami, which seem to have broken out about the time of the accession of Juba, and, after dragging on intermittently for a generation, were ended only by the vigorous interposition of the Roman army under Cn. Cornelius Lentulus in 6 A. D. This is R. Cagnat’s certain interpretation of Dio, 55, 28 (L’armée romaine d’Afrique et l’occupation militaire de l’Afrique sous les Empereurs, 2nd ed., Paris, 1913, I, p. 3 ff., esp. 7 and 8). It seems that Augustus had let Juba struggle on as best he could for a whole generation against these wild tribes, and finally when he seemed unable longer to cope with the situation, he was given the assistance of a Roman army in an effort to end the trouble once for all. The whole situation and its treatment are perfectly typical of a developed buffer state policy.
[55] Even then the transformation was made rudely and without sufficient preparation, for a vigorous revolt broke out which was not completely put down until the year 42 or 43. It may very well be that Caligula’s act in dethroning and later executing Ptolemaeus was instigated solely by greed, as Mommsen (Röm. Gesch., V, p. 629, following Dio, 59, 25), remarks, but that the land itself was not turned over to another native prince was surely due to the belief now prevalent at Rome, that the work of the local dynasts was completed, and it was safe to incorporate the kingdom into the empire. This is also the view of R. Cagnat, op. cit., I, p. 28. On the whole the act of Caligula seems to have been justified; after the first revolt was put down we hear only of slight disturbances in the reign of Domitian (Cagnat, p. 38 ff.), and Hadrian (p. 45 f.), and thenceforward at occasional intervals until the great revolt of the third century. Upwards of 40 years of peace followed the inclusion in the empire, which is a long period, considering the time and the circumstances.