CHAPTER I.
It will be remembered that the narrative of sir John Cradock’s proceedings was discontinued at the moment when that general, nothing shaken by the importunities of the regency, the representations of marshal Beresford, or the advice of Mr. Frere, resolved to await at Lumiar for the arrival of the promised reinforcements from England. While in this position, he made every exertion to obtain [Appendix, No. 5]. transport for the supplies, remounts for the cavalry, and draught animals for the artillery; but the Portuguese government gave him no assistance, and an attempt to procure horses and mules in Morocco proving unsuccessful, the army was so scantily furnished that, other reasons failing, this alone would have prevented any advance towards the frontier.
Sir J. Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS.
The singular inactivity of Victor surprised Cradock, but did not alter his resolution; yet, being continually importuned to advance, he, when assured that five thousand men of the promised reinforcements were actually off the rock of Lisbon, held a council of war. All the generals were averse to marching on Oporto, except Beresford, and he admitted that its propriety depended on Victor’s movements. Meanwhile, that marshal approached Badajos; Lapisse came down upon the Agueda, and Soult, having stormed Oporto, pushed his advanced posts to the Vouga.
[Appendix, No. 4], section 1.
A cry of treason then became general in Portugal, and both the people and the soldiers evinced a spirit truly alarming. The latter, disregarding the authority of Beresford, and menacing their own officers, declared that it was necessary to slay a thousand traitors in Lisbon; and the regiments in Abrantes even abandoned that post, and marched to join Trant upon the Vouga. But, when these disorders were at the worst, and when a vigorous movement of Victor and Lapisse would have produced fatal consequences, general Hill landed with about five thousand men and three hundred artillery horses. Cradock, then, resolved to advance, moved thereto chiefly by the representations of Sir J. Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS. Beresford, who thought such a measure absolutely necessary to restore confidence, to ensure the obedience of the native troops, and to enable him to take measures for the safety of Abrantes.
Thus, about the time that Tuy was relieved by the French, and that Sylveira was attacked at Penafiel by Laborde, the English army was put in motion, part upon Caldas and Obidos, part upon Rio Mayor; and the campaign was actually commenced by Cradock, when that general, although his measures had been all approved of by his government, was suddenly and unexpectedly required to surrender his command to sir Arthur Wellesley, and to proceed himself to Gibraltar.
Lord Londonderry’s Narrative.
It would appear that this arrangement was adopted after a struggle in the cabinet, and, certainly, neither the particular choice nor the general principle of employing men of talent without regard to seniority can be censured; nevertheless, sir John Cradock was used unworthily. A general of his rank would never have accepted a command on such terms; and it was neither just nor decent to expose him to an unmerited mortification.
Before the arrival of his successor, Cradock assembled the army at Leiria, and established his magazines at Abrantes, Santarem, and Peniché; but as the admiral fearing the difficult navigation at that season, would not send victuallers to the latter place, the magazines there were but scantily supplied. Meanwhile Lapisse made way by Alcantara to Merida, the re-capture of Chaves became known, and the insurrection in Beira and Tras os Montes took its full spring. Trant’s force also increased on the Vouga, and Beresford, who had succeeded in restoring order among the Portuguese battalions, was more than ever urgent for an attack upon Soult; but Cradock, unprovided with a due proportion of cavalry, unable to procure provisions or forage, and fearful for the safety of Lisbon, refused; and the 24th of April, hearing that his successor had arrived, he resigned the command and repaired to Gibraltar.
Sir Arthur Wellesley landed the 22d of April, and, on the 24th, signified to the British ministers [Appendix, No. 15]. that, affairs being in the condition contemplated by them, it was his intention to assume the command of the army; a circumstance worthy of attention, as indicating that the defence of Portugal was even then considered a secondary object, and of uncertain promise. The deliverance of the Peninsula was never due to the foresight and perseverance of the English ministers, but to the firmness and skill of the British generals, and to the courage of troops whom no dangers could daunt and no hardships dishearten, while they remedied the eternal errors of the cabinet.
The unexpected arrival of a man known only as a victorious commander created the greatest enthusiasm in Portugal. The regency immediately nominated him marshal-general of their troops. The people, always fond of novelty, hailed his presence with enthusiasm; and all those persons, whether Portuguese or British, who had blamed sir John Cradock’s prudent caution, now anticipating a change of system, spake largely and confidently of the future operations: in truth, all classes were greatly excited, and an undefined yet powerful sentiment that something great would soon be achieved pervaded the public mind.
Sir Arthur’s plans were, however, neither hastily adopted nor recklessly hurried forward; like Cradock, he felt the danger of removing far from Lisbon while Victor was on the Alemtejo frontier, and he anxiously weighed his own resources against those at the enemy’s disposal. Not that he wavered between offensive and defensive movements, for a general of his discernment could not fail to perceive that, if the French were acting upon any concerted plan, the false march of Lapisse to Merida had marred their combinations, by placing a whole nation, with all its fortresses and all its forces, whether insurgents, regular troops, or auxiliaries, between the armies of Victor and Soult, and that neither concert nor communication could longer exist between those marshals.
Soult’s offensive strength, also, was evidently exhausted; he might establish himself firmly in the provinces beyond the Douro, but he could not, alone, force his way to Lisbon, a distance of two hundred miles, in a season when the waters were full, and through a country tangled with rivers, mountains, and defiles. He could not hope, with twenty-four thousand men, to beat a whole people in arms, assisted by an auxiliary army of as high reputation, and nearly as numerous as his own; and, moreover, there were discontents and conspiracy in his camp; and of this sir Arthur was aware.
Soult alone, then, was no longer formidable to the capital; but that which weakened him increased the offensive power of Victor, who was now at the head of thirty thousand men, and might march straight upon Lisbon, and through an open country, the only barrier being the Tagus, a river fordable in almost all seasons. Such a movement, or even the semblance of it, must perforce draw the British and native armies to that side; and then Soult, coming down to the Mondego, might, from thence, connect his operations with Victor’s by the line of the Zezere, or advance at once on Lisbon as occasion offered.
Now, to meet the exigencies of the campaign, the military resources of the English general were,—
1º. His central position.
2º. His own British and German troops, about twenty-six thousand in number; of which the present under arms, including sergeants,[6] amounted to twenty-two thousand, with three thousand seven hundred horses and mules.
3º. The Portuguese troops of the line; of which there might be organised and armed about sixteen thousand.
Nearly all these troops were already collected, or capable of being collected in a short time, between the Tagus and Mondego; and beyond the latter river, Trant and Sylveira commanded separate corps; the one upon the Vouga, the other on the Tamega.
4º. The militia and the ordenanzas, which may be denominated the insurgent force.
5º. The fortresses of Almeida, Ciudad Rodrigo, Elvas, Abrantes, Peniché, and Badajos.
6º. The English fleet, the Portuguese craft, and the free use of the coast and river navigation for his supplies.
7º. The assistance of Cuesta’s army, which amounted to thirty thousand infantry and six thousand cavalry; of which twenty-five thousand were actually at or in front of the defile of Monasterio, close to Victor’s posts. Sir Arthur Wellesley’s moral resources were the high courage of his own troops; his personal popularity; the energy of an excited people; a favourable moment; the presentiment of victory; and a mind equal to the occasion.
In a strategic point of view, to fall upon Victor was best, because he was the most dangerous neighbour to Portugal; because his defeat would prove most detrimental to the French, most advantageous to the Spaniards; and because the greatest body of troops could be brought to bear against him.
On the other hand, Soult held a rich province, from whence the chief supply of cattle for the army was derived; he was in possession of the second city in the kingdom, where he was forming a French party; the feelings of the regency and the people were greatly troubled by the loss of Oporto; and their desire to regain it was strongly expressed.
To attack Victor, it was indispensable to concert operations with Cuesta; but that general was ill disposed towards the British, and to insure his co-operation would have required time, which could be better employed in expelling Soult. For these reasons, sir Arthur Wellesley determined to attack the last-named marshal without delay; intending, if successful, to establish a good system of defence in the northern provinces: and then, in conjunction with Cuesta, to turn his arms against Victor, hoping thus to relieve Gallicia more effectually than by following the French into that province.
The security of Lisbon being the pivot of the operations against Soult, time was the principal object to be gained. If Victor came fiercely on, he could not be stopped, but his course might be impeded; his path could not be blocked, but it might be planted with thorns: and to effect this, eight or ten thousand Portuguese troops were immediately directed upon Abrantes and Santarem, and two British battalions and two regiments of cavalry just disembarked, marched to the same places, where they were joined by three other battalions drafted from the army at Leiria.
A body of two thousand men, composed of a militia regiment and of the Lusitanian legion, which remained near Castello Branco after Lapisse had crossed the Tagus, were placed under the command of colonel Mayne, and directed to take post at the bridge of Alcantara, having orders to defend the passage of the river, and, if necessary, to blow up the structure. At the same time, the flying bridges at Villa Velha and Abrantes were removed, the garrison of the latter place was reinforced, and general Mackenzie was appointed to command all the troops, whether Portuguese or British, thus distributed along the right bank of the Tagus.
These precautions appeared sufficient, especially as there was a general disposition to believe the French weaker than they really were. Victor could not, by a mere demonstration, shake the line of defence. If he forced the bridge of Alcantara, and penetrated by the sterile and difficult route formerly followed by Junot, it would bring him, without guns, upon Abrantes; but Abrantes was already capable of a short resistance, and Mackenzie would have had time to line the rugged banks of the Zezere.
If, leaving Badajos and Elvas behind him, Victor should pass through the Alemtejo, and cross the Tagus between Abrantes and Lisbon, he was to be feared; but Cuesta had promised to follow closely in the French general’s rear, and it was reasonable to suppose that Mackenzie, although he might be unable to prevent the passage of the river, would not suffer himself to be cut off from the capital, where, having the assistance of the fleet, the aid of the citizens, and the chance of reinforcements from England, he might defend himself until the army could return from the Douro. Moreover, Victor was eighteen marches from Lisbon; it was only by accident that he and Soult could act in concert, while the allied army, having a sure and rapid mode of correspondence with Cuesta, was already within four marches of Oporto.
The main body of the allies was now directed upon Coimbra; and four of the best Portuguese battalions were incorporated in the British brigades. Marshal Beresford retained, under his personal command, about six thousand native troops; Trant remained stedfast on the Vouga; Sylveira on the Tamega; and sir Robert Wilson, quitting the command of the legion, was detached, with a small Portuguese force, to Viseu, where, hanging upon Franceschi’s left flank, he also communicated with Sylveira’s corps by the way of Lamego.
The difficulty of bringing up forage and provisions, which had pressed so sorely on sir John Cradock, was now somewhat lessened. The land transport was still scanty; and the admiral, dreading the long shore navigation for large vessels, was without the small craft necessary for victualling the troops by the coast; but the magazines at Caldas were partly filled, and twenty large country-boats being loaded with provisions, and the owners induced, by premiums, to make the run, had put safely into Peniché and the Mondego. In short, the obstacles to a forward movement, although great, were not insurmountable.
Sir Arthur Wellesley reached Coimbra the 2d of May. His army was concentrated there on the 5th, in number about twenty-five thousand sabres and bayonets; of which nine thousand were Portuguese, three thousand Germans, and the remainder British. The duke of Dalmatia was ignorant that the allies were thus assembled in force upon the Mondego, but many French officers knew it, and were silent, being engaged in a plot of a very extraordinary nature, and which was probably a part of the conspiracy alluded to in the first volume of this work, as being conducted through the medium of the princess of Tour and Taxis.
The French soldiers were impatient and murmuring; their attachment to Napoleon himself was deep and unshaken, but human nature shrinks from perpetual contact with death; and they were tired of war. This feeling induced some officers of high rank, serving in Spain, to form a plan for changing the French government. Generally speaking, these men were friendly to Napoleon personally; but they were republicans in their politics, and earnest to reduce the power of the emperor. Their project, founded upon the discontent of the troops in the Peninsula, was to make a truce with the English army, to elect a chief, and march into France with the resolution to abate the pride of Napoleon, or to pull him from his throne. The conspirators at first turned their eyes upon marshal Ney, but finally resolved to choose Gouvion St. Cyr for their leader. Yet it was easier to resolve than to execute. Napoleon’s ascendancy, supported by the love and admiration of millions, was not to be shaken by the conspiracy of a few discontented men: and, although their hopes were not entirely relinquished until after Massena’s retreat from Portugal in 1810, long before that period they discovered that the soldiers, tired as they were of war, were faithful to their great monarch, and would have slain any who openly stirred against him.
The foregoing facts are stated on the authority of a principal mover of the sedition; but many minor plots had cotemporary existence, for this was the spring time of folly. In the second corps, the conspirators were numerous, and, by their discourses and their slow and sullen execution of orders, had continually thwarted the operations of marshal Soult, yet without exciting his suspicions; but, as he penetrated into Portugal, their counteractions increased, and, by the time he arrived at Oporto, their design was ripe for execution.
In the middle of April, John Viana, the son of an Oporto merchant, appeared at marshal Beresford’s head-quarters, with proposals from the French malcontents. The latter desired to have an English officer sent to them, to arrange the execution of a plan, which was to be commenced by seizing their general, and giving him over to the British outposts: a detestable project, for it is not in the field, and with a foreign enemy, that soldiers should concert the overthrow of their country’s institutions, and although it would be idle and impertinent in a foreigner to say how much and how long men shall bear with what they deem an oppressive government, there is a distinct and especial loyalty due from a soldier to his general in the field; a compact of honour, which it is singularly base to violate; and so it has in all ages been considered. When the Argyraspides, or silver-shields of the Macedonians, delivered their general, Eumenes, in bonds, to Antigonus, the latter, although he had tempted them to the deed, and scrupled not to slay the hero, reproached the treacherous soldiers for their conduct, and, with the approbation of all men, destroyed them. Yet Antigonus was not a foreign enemy, but of their own kin and blood.
An English lieutenant-colonel attached to the Portuguese service reluctantly undertook the duty of meeting the conspirators, and penetrated, by night, but in uniform, behind the French outposts, by the lake of Aveiro or Ovar. He had previously arranged that one of the malcontents should meet him on the water; the boats unknowingly passed each other in the dark, and the Englishman returned to Aveiro; but he there found John Viana, in company with the adjutant-major, D’Argenton. The latter confirmed what Viana had declared at Thomar; he expressed great respect for Soult, but dwelt upon the necessity of removing him before an appeal could be made to the soldiers; and he readily agreed to wait, in person, upon Beresford, saying he was himself too strongly supported in the French army to be afraid.
Marshal Beresford was then at Lisbon, and thither D’Argenton followed; and, having seen him and sir Arthur Wellesley, and remained five days in that capital, returned to Oporto. While at Lisbon, he, in addition to his former reasons for this conspiracy, stated that Soult wished to make himself king of Portugal; an error into which he and many others naturally fell, from circumstances that I have already noticed.
When sir Arthur Wellesley arrived at Coimbra, D’Argenton appeared again at the English head-quarters; but this time, by the order of sir Arthur, he was conducted through bye-paths, and returned convinced, from what he had seen and heard, that although the allies were in force on the Mondego, many days must elapse before they could be in a condition to attack Oporto. During his absence, D’Argenton was denounced by general Lefebre, who was falsely imagined to be favourable to the conspiracy; passports, signed by admiral Berkely, which this unfortunate man, contrary to sir A. Wellesley’s urgent recommendation, had insisted upon having, completely proved his guilt; and Soult, until that moment, without suspicion, beheld with amazement the abyss that yawned beneath his feet: his firmness, however, did not desert him. He offered D’Argenton pardon, and even reward, if he would disclose the names of the other conspirators and relate truly what he had seen of the English and Portuguese armies. The prisoner, to save his life, readily told all that he knew of the British, but sir A. Wellesley’s foresight had rendered that tale useless; and with respect to his accomplices D’Argenton was immoveable. Exaggerating the importance of the conspiracy, he even defied the marshal’s power, and advised him, as the safest course, to adopt the conspirators’ sentiments; nor was this boldness fatal to him at the moment, for Soult, anxious to ascertain the extent of the danger, delayed executing him, and he effected his escape during the subsequent operations.
He was not the only person who communicated secretly with the British general; colonel Donadieu and colonel Lafitte were engaged in the conspiracy. The latter is said to have had an interview with sir Arthur, between the outposts of the two armies, and from the first the malcontents were urgent that the movements of the allied forces should be so regulated as to favour their proceedings; but sir Arthur Wellesley, having little dependence upon intrigue, sternly intimated that his operations could not be regulated by their plots, and hastened his military measures.
Under the impression that Sylveira was successfully defending the line of the Tamega, the British general at first resolved to reinforce him by sending Beresford’s and sir Robert Wilson’s corps across the Douro at Lamego, by which he hoped to cut Soult off from Tras os Montes, intending, when their junction was effected, to march with his own army direct upon Oporto, and to cross the Douro near that town, by the aid of Beresford’s corps, which would then be on the right bank. This measure, if executed, would, including Trant’s, Wilson’s, and Sylveira’s people, have placed a mass of thirty thousand troops, regulars and irregulars, between the Tras os Montes and Soult, and the latter must have fought a battle under very unfavourable circumstances, or have fallen back on the Minho, which he could scarcely have passed at that season while pressed by the pursuing army. But the plan was necessarily abandoned when intelligence arrived that the bridge of Amarante was forced, and that Sylveira, pursued by the enemy, was driven over the Douro.
The news of this disaster only reached Coimbra the 4th of May; on the 6th, a part of the army was already in motion to execute a fresh project, adapted to the change of affairs; and as this eagerness to fall on Soult may appear to justify those who censured sir J. Cradock’s caution, it may here be well to shew how far the circumstances were changed.
When Cradock refused to advance, the Portuguese troops were insubordinate and disorganized; they were now obedient and improved in discipline.
Sir John Cradock had scarcely any cavalry; four regiments had since been added.
In the middle of April, Cuesta was only gathering the wrecks of his forces after Medellin; he was now at the head of thirty-five thousand men.
The intentions of the British government had been doubtful; they were no longer so. Sir John Cradock’s influence had been restricted; but the new general came out with enlarged powers, the full confidence of the ministers, and with Portuguese rank. His reputation, his popularity, and the disposition of mankind always prone to magnify the future, whether for good or bad, combined to give an unusual impulse to public feeling, and enabled him to dictate at once to the regency, the diplomatists, the generals, and the people; to disregard all petty jealousies and intrigues, and to calculate upon resources from which his predecessor was debarred. Sir Arthur Wellesley, habituated to the command of armies, was moreover endowed by nature with a lofty genius, and a mind capacious of warlike affairs.