CHAPTER II.
CAMPAIGN ON THE DOURO.
After the victory at Amarante, Laborde was recalled to Oporto, but a brigade of cavalry and a regiment of infantry were left to keep up the communication with Loison; and as the insurgent general Bonthielo had reappeared on the Lima, general Lorge’s dragoons were directed on that side. Mermet’s division was then pushed towards the Vouga, and thus the French army was extended by detachments from that river to the Tamega; and the wings separated by the Douro and occupying two sides of a triangle, were without communication, except by the boat-bridge of Oporto. It required three days, therefore, to unite the army on its centre, and five days to concentrate it on either extremity.
The situation of the allies was very different;—sir Arthur Wellesley having, unknown to Soult, assembled the bulk of the troops at Coimbra, commanded the choice of two lines of operation; the one through Viseu and Lamego, by which, in four or five marches, he could turn the French left, and cut them off from Tras os Montes; the other by the roads leading upon Oporto, by which, in two marches, he could throw himself unexpectedly, and in very superior numbers, upon the enemy’s right, with a fair prospect of crushing it between the Vouga and the Douro.
In taking the first of these two lines, which were separated by the lofty ridges of the Sierra de Caramula, the march could be covered by Wilson’s corps, at Viseu, and by Sylveira’s, near Lamego. Along the second the movement could be screened by Trant’s corps on the Vouga.
The duke of Dalmatia’s dispositions were made in ignorance of sir Arthur Wellesley’s position, numbers, and intentions. He was not even aware of the vicinity of such an antagonist, but sensible that to advance directly upon Lisbon was beyond his own strength, he already meditated to cross the S.
Journal of Operations MSS. Tamega, and then covered by that river and the Douro, to follow the great route of Bragança, and so enter the Salamanca country. It was in this view that Loison had been directed to get possession of Mezamfrio and Pezo de Ragoa, and the march of Mermet was only intended to support Franceschi’s retreat, when the army should commence its movement towards the Tamega.
The 9th of May, D’Argenton was arrested; the film fell from Soult’s eyes, and all the perils of his position broke at once upon his view. Treason in his camp, which he could not probe, a powerful enemy close in his front, the insurgents again active in his rear, and the French troops scattered from the Vouga to the Tamega, and from the Douro to the Lima, and commanded by officers, whose fidelity was necessarily suspected, while the extent of the conspiracy was unknown.
Appalling as this prospect was, the duke of Dalmatia did not quail at the view. The general officers assured him of the fidelity of the troops; and Loison was immediately ordered to keep Mezamfrio and Ragoa, if he could, but, under any circumstances, to hold Amarante fast. The greatest part of the guns and stores at Oporto were at the same time directed upon the Tamega, and the ammunition that could not be removed was destroyed. General Lorge was commanded to withdraw the garrison from Viana, and to proceed likewise to Amarante, and, while D’Argenton was closely, although vainly, pressed to discover the names of the conspirators, Soult prepared to execute his intended movement through the Tras os Montes. But the war was coming on with a full and swift tide; Loison, upon whose vigour the success of the operation depended, was already giving way; sir Arthur Wellesley was across the Vouga, and Franceschi and Mermet were struggling in his grasp.
The English general resolved to operate along both the routes before spoken of, but the greater facility of supplying the troops by the coast-line, and, above all, the exposed position of the French right wing, so near the allies and so distant from succour, induced him to make the principal attack by the high road leading to Oporto.
The army was formed in one division of cavalry and three of infantry, exclusive of Beresford’s separate corps.
The first division, consisting of two brigades of infantry and twelve guns, was commanded by lieut.-general Paget.
The second, consisting of three brigades of infantry and six guns, by lieut.-general Sherbrooke.
The third, consisting of two brigades of infantry and six guns, by major-general Hill.
The cavalry by lieut.-general Payne.
The whole amounted to about fourteen thousand five hundred infantry, fifteen hundred cavalry, and twenty-four guns, of which six were only three-pounders.
The 6th of May, Beresford, with six thousand Portuguese, two British battalions, five companies of riflemen, and a squadron of heavy cavalry, marched upon Lamego by the road of Viseu.
The 7th, the light cavalry and Paget’s division advanced towards the Vouga by the Oporto road, but halted, on the 8th, to give Beresford time to reach the Upper Douro, before the attack on the French right should commence.
The 9th, they resumed their march for the bridge of Vouga, and, at the same time, Hill’s division, taking the Aveiro road, the whole reached the line of the Vouga river that evening; but Paget’s division was not brought up until after dark, and then with caution, to prevent the enemy’s guards from seeing the columns, the intent being to surprise Franceschi the next morning.
That general, with all his cavalry, a regiment of Mermet’s division, and six guns, occupied a village, about eight miles beyond Vouga bridge, called Albergaria Nova; the remainder of Mermet’s infantry were at Grijon, one march in the rear, and on the main road to Oporto. Franceschi had that day informed Soult that the allied forces were collecting on the Mondego, and that Trant’s posts had closed upon the Vouga; but he was far from suspecting that the whole army was upon the last river, although, from the imprudent conversation of an English officer, bearing a flag of truce, he had reason to expect an attack of some kind.
Sir Arthur Wellesley’s plan was partly arranged upon the suggestion of the field-officer who had met D’Argenton. He had observed, during his intercourse with the conspirators, that the lake of Ovar was unguarded by the French, although it extended twenty miles behind their outposts, and that all the boats were at Aveiro, which was in possession of the allies. On his information it was decided to turn the enemy’s right by the lake.
Accordingly, general Hill embarked, the evening of the 9th, with one brigade, the other being to follow him as quickly as possible. The fishermen looked on at first with surprise; but, soon comprehending the object, they voluntarily rushed in crowds to the boats, and worked with such a will that the whole flotilla arrived at Ovar precisely at sunrise on the 10th, and the troops immediately disembarked. That day, also, marshal Beresford, having rallied Wilson’s corps upon his own, reached Pezo de Ragoa, and he it was that had repulsed Loison, and pursued him to Amarante.
Both flanks of the French army were now turned, and at the same moment sir Arthur, with the main body, fell upon Franceschi, for, while the flotilla was navigating the lake of Ovar, the attempt to surprise that general, at Albergaria Nova, was in progress. Sherbrooke’s division was still in the rear; but general Cotton, with the light cavalry, crossing the Vouga, a little after midnight, endeavoured to turn the enemy’s left, and to get into his rear; the head of Paget’s division, marching a little later, was to pass through the defiles of Vouga, directly upon Albergaria, and Trant’s corps was to make way between Paget’s division and the lake of Aveiro.
This enterprise, so well conceived, was baffled by petty events, such as always abound in war. Sir Arthur Wellesley did not perfectly know the ground beyond the Vouga; and, late in the evening of the 9th, colonel Trant, having ascertained that an impracticable ravine, extending from the lake to Oliveira de Azemis, would prevent him from obeying his orders, passed the bridge of Vouga, and carried his own guns beyond the defiles, in order to leave the bridge clear for the British artillery and for general Richard Stewart’s brigade.
Stewart was charged to conduct the guns through the defile; but the task was difficult, several carriages broke down, and Trant’s corps thus took the lead of Paget’s column, the march of which was impeded by the broken gun-carriages. Meanwhile the cavalry, under Cotton, were misled by the guides, and came, in broad daylight, upon Franceschi, who, with his flank resting upon a wood, garnished with infantry, boldly offered a battle that Cotton durst not, under such circumstances, accept. Thus, an hour’s delay, produced by a few trifling accidents, marred a combination that would have shorn Soult of a third of his infantry and all his light cavalry, for it is not to be supposed that, when Franceschi’s horsemen were cut off, and general Hill at Ovar, Mermet’s division could have escaped across the Douro.
When sir Arthur Wellesley came up to Albergaria with Paget’s infantry, Franceschi was still in position, skirmishing with Trant’s corps, and evidently ignorant of what a force was advancing against him. Being immediately attacked, and his foot dislodged from the wood, he retreated along the road to Oliveira de Azemis, and was briskly pursued by the allied infantry; but, extricating himself valiantly from his perilous situation, he reached Oliveira without any serious loss; and continuing his march during the night, by Feria, joined Mermet the next morning at Grijon.
Franceschi, in the course of the 10th, could see the whole of the English army, including the troops with Hill; and it may create surprise that he should pass so near the latter general without being attacked: but Hill was strictly obedient to his orders, which forbade him to act on the enemy’s rear; and those orders were wise and prudent, because the principle of operating with small bodies on the flanks and rear of an enemy is vicious; and, while the number of men on the left of the Douro was unknown, it would have been rash to interpose a single brigade between the advanced-guard and the main body of the French. General Hill was sent to Ovar, that the line of march might be eased, and the enemy’s attention distracted, and that a division of fresh soldiers might be at hand to follow the pursuit, so as to arrive on the bridge of Oporto pell mell with the flying enemy. The soldier-like retreat of Franceschi prevented the last object from being attained.
General Paget’s division and the cavalry halted the night of the 10th at Oliveira; Sherbrooke’s division passed the Vouga later in the day, and remained in Albergaria. But the next morning the pursuit was renewed, and the men, marching strongly, came up with the enemy at Grijon, about eight o’clock in the morning.
COMBAT OF GRIJON.
The French were drawn up on a range of steep hills across the road. A wood, occupied with infantry, covered their right flank; their front was protected by villages and broken ground, but their left was ill placed. The British troops came on briskly in one column, and the head was instantly and sharply engaged. The 16th Portuguese regiment, then quitting the line of march, gallantly drove the enemy out of the wood covering his right, and, at the same time, the Germans, who were in the rear, bringing their left shoulders forward, without any halt or check, turned the other flank of the French. The latter immediately abandoned the position, and, being pressed in the rear by two squadrons of cavalry, lost a few killed and about a hundred prisoners. The heights of Carvalho gave them an opportunity to turn and check the pursuing squadrons; yet, when the British infantry, with an impetuous pace, drew near, they again fell back; and thus, fighting and retreating, a blow and a race, wore the day away.
During this combat, Hill was to have marched by the coast-road towards Oporto, to intercept the enemy’s retreat; but, by some error in the transmission of orders, that general, taking the route of Feria, crossed Trant’s line of march, and the time lost could not be regained.
The British halted at dark, but the French, continuing their retreat, passed the Douro in the night, and at two o’clock in the morning the bridge was destroyed. All the artillery and baggage still in Oporto were immediately directed along the road to Amarante, and Mermet’s division without halting at Oporto followed the same route as far as Vallonga and Baltar, having instructions to secure all the boats, and vigilantly to patrole the right bank of the Douro. Loison, also, whose retreat from Pezo de Ragoa was still unknown, once more received warning to hold on by the Tamega without fail, as he valued the safety of the army. Meanwhile the duke of Dalmatia commanded all the craft in the river to be secured, and, having placed guards at the most convenient points, proposed to remain at Oporto during the 12th, to give time for Lorge’s dragoons and the different detachments of the army to concentrate at Amarante.
Soult’s personal attention was principally directed to the river in its course below the city; for the reports of his cavalry led him to believe that Hill’s division had been disembarked at Ovar from the ocean, and he expected that the vessels would come round, and the passage be attempted at the mouth of the Douro. Nevertheless, thinking that Loison still held Mesamfrio and Pezo with six thousand men, and knowing that three brigades occupied intermediate posts between Amarante and Oporto, he was satisfied that his retreat was secured, and thought there was no rashness in maintaining his position for another day.
The conspirators, however, were also busy; his orders were neglected, or only half obeyed, and false reports of their execution transmitted to him; and, in this state of affairs, the head of the British columns arrived at Villa Nova, and, before eight o’clock in the morning of the 12th, they were concentrated in one mass, but covered from the view of the enemy by the height on which the convent of Sarea stands.
The Douro rolled between the hostile forces. Soult had suffered nothing by the previous operations, and in two days he could take post behind the Tamega, from whence his retreat upon Bragança would be certain, and he might, in passing, defeat Beresford, for that general’s force was feeble as to numbers, and in infancy as to organization; and the utmost that sir Arthur expected from it was that, vexing the French line of march, and infesting the road of Villa Real, it would oblige Soult to take the less accessible route of Chaves, and so retire to Gallicia instead of Leon; but this could not be, unless the main body of the allied troops followed the French closely. Now, Soult, at Salamanca, would be more formidable than Soult at Oporto, and hence the ultimate object of the campaign, and the immediate safety of Beresford’s corps, alike demanded that the Douro should be quickly passed. But, how force the passage of a river, deep, swift, and more than three hundred yards wide, while ten thousand veterans guarded the opposite bank? Alexander the Great might have turned from it without shame!
The height of Sarea, round which the Douro came with a sharp elbow, prevented any view of the upper river from the town; but the duke of Dalmatia, confident that all above the city was secure, took his station in a house westward of Oporto, whence he could discern the whole course of the lower river to its mouth. Meanwhile, from the summit of Sarea, the English general, with an eagle’s glance, searched all the opposite bank and the city and country beyond it. He observed horses and baggage moving on the road to Vallonga, and the dust of columns as if in retreat, and no large body of troops was to be seen under arms near the river. The French guards were few, and distant from each other, and the patroles were neither many nor vigilant; but a large unfinished building standing alone, yet with a short and easy access to it from the river, soon fixed sir Arthur’s attention.
This building, called the Seminary, was surrounded by a high stone wall, which coming down to the water on either side, enclosed an area sufficient to contain at least two battalions in order of battle; the only egress being by an iron gate opening on the Vallonga road. The structure itself commanded every thing in its neighbourhood, except a mound, within cannon-shot, but too pointed to hold a gun. There were no French posts near, and the direct line of passage from the height of Sarea, across the river to the building, being to the right hand, was of course hidden from the troops in the town. Here, then, with a marvellous hardihood, sir Arthur resolved, if he could find but one boat, to make his way, in the face of a veteran army and a renowned general.
PASSAGE OF THE DOURO.
A boat was soon obtained; for a poor barber of Oporto, evading the French patroles, had, during the night, come over the water in a small skiff; this being discovered by colonel Waters, a staff officer, of a quick and daring temper, he and the barber, and the prior of Amarante, who gallantly offered his aid, crossed the river, and in half an hour returned, unperceived, with three or four large barges. Meanwhile, eighteen or twenty pieces of artillery were got up to the convent of Sarea; and major-general John Murray, with the German brigade, some squadrons of the 14th dragoons, and two guns, reached the Barca de Avintas, three miles higher up the river, his orders being to search for boats, and to effect a passage there also, if possible.
Some of the British troops were now sent towards Avintas, to support Murray; while others came cautiously forwards to the brink of the river. It was ten o’clock; the enemy were tranquil and unsuspicious; and an officer reported to sir Arthur Wellesley that one boat was brought up to the point of passage, “Well, let the men cross,” was the reply; and upon this simple order, an officer and twenty-five soldiers, of the Buffs, entered the vessel, and in a quarter of an hour were in the midst of the French army.
The Seminary was thus gained without any alarm being given, and every thing was still quiet in Oporto: not a movement was to be seen; not a hostile sound was to be heard: a second boat followed the first, and then a third passed a little higher up the river; but scarcely had the men from the last landed, when a tumultuous noise of drums and shouts arose in the city; confused masses of the enemy were seen hurrying forth in all directions, and throwing out clouds of skirmishers, who came furiously down upon the Seminary. The citizens were descried gesticulating vehemently, and making signals from their houses; and the British troops instantly crowded to the bank of the river; Paget’s and Hill’s divisions at the point of embarkation, and Sherbrooke’s where the old boat-bridge had been cut away from Villa Nova.
Paget himself passed in the third boat, and, mounting the roof of the Seminary, was immediately struck down, severely wounded. Hill took Paget’s place; the musketry was sharp, voluble, and increasing every moment as the number accumulated on both sides. The enemy’s attack was fierce and constant; his fire augmented faster than that of the British, and his artillery, also, began to play on the building. But the English guns, from the convent of Sarea, commanded the whole enclosure round the Seminary, and swept the left of the wall in such a manner as to confine the French assault to the side of the iron gate. Murray, however, did not appear; and the struggle was so violent, and the moment so critical, that sir Arthur would himself have crossed, but for the earnest representations of those about him, and the just confidence he had in general Hill.
Some of the citizens now pushed over to Villa Nova with several great boats; Sherbrooke’s people begun to cross in large bodies; and, at the same moment, a loud shout in the town, and the waving of handkerchiefs from all the windows, gave notice that the enemy had abandoned the lower part of the city; and now, also, Murray’s troops were seen descending the right bank from Avintas. By this time three battalions were in the Seminary; and Hill, advancing to the enclosure wall, opened a destructive fire upon the French columns as they passed, in haste and confusion, by the Vallonga road. Five pieces of French artillery were coming out from the town on the left; but, appalled by the line of musketry to be passed, the drivers suddenly pulled up, and while thus hesitating, a volley from behind stretched most of the artillery-men on the ground; the rest, dispersing among the enclosures, left their guns on the road. This volley was given by a part of Sherbrooke’s people, who, having forced their way through the streets, thus came upon the rear. In fine, the passage was won; and the allies were in considerable force on the French side of the river.
To the left, general Sherbrooke, with the brigade of guards, and the 29th regiment, was in the town, and pressing the rear of the enemy, who were quitting it. In the centre, general Hill, holding the Seminary and the wall of the enclosure, with the Buffs, the 48th, the 66th, the 16th Portuguese, and a battalion of detachments, sent a damaging fire into the masses as they passed him; and his line was prolonged on the right, although with a considerable interval, by general Murray’s Germans, and two squadrons of the 14th dragoons. The remainder of the army kept passing the river at different points; and the artillery, from the height of Sarea, still searched the enemy’s columns as they hurried along the line of retreat.
If general Murray had then fallen boldly in upon the disordered crowds, their discomfiture would have been complete; but he suffered column after column to pass him, without even a cannon shot, and seemed fearful lest they should turn and push him into the river. General Charles Stewart and major Hervey, however, impatient of this inactivity, charged with the two squadrons of dragoons, and rode over the enemy’s rear-guard, as it was pushing through a narrow road to gain an open space beyond. Laborde was unhorsed, Foy badly wounded; and, on the English side, major Hervey lost an arm; and his gallant horsemen, receiving no support from Murray, were obliged to fight their way back with loss.
This finished the action; the French continued their retreat, and the British remained on the ground they had gained. The latter lost twenty killed, a general and ninety-five men wounded; the former had about five hundred men killed and wounded, and five pieces of artillery were taken in the fight; a considerable quantity of ammunition, and fifty guns (of which the carriages had been burnt) were afterwards found in the arsenal, and several hundred men were captured in the hospitals.
Plate 4. to face Pa. 290.
Sketch Explanatory
OF THE PASSAGE OF THE RIVER DOURO,
by SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY,
May 12th, 1809,
AND OF THE STORMING OF OPORTO,
by MARSHAL SOULT,
March 1809.
London. Published by T. & W. BOONE, July 1829.
Napoleon’s veterans were so experienced, so inured to warfare that no troops in the world could more readily recover from such a surprise, and before they reached Vallonga their columns were again in order, with a regular rear guard covering the retreat. A small garrison at the mouth of the Douro was cut off, but, guided by some friendly Portuguese, it rejoined the army in the night; and Soult, believing that Loison was at Amarante, thought he had happily escaped a great danger and was still formidable to his enemies.
Sir Arthur Wellesley employed the remainder of the 12th, and the next day, in bringing over the rear of the army, together with the baggage, the stores, and the artillery. General Murray’s Germans, however, pursued, on the morning of the 13th, but not further than about two leagues on the road of Amarante. This delay has been blamed as an error in sir Arthur; it is argued that an enemy once surprised should never be allowed to recover, and that Soult should have been followed up, even while a single regiment was left to pursue. But the reasons for halting were, first, that a part of the army was still on the left bank of the Douro;—secondly, that the troops had out marched provisions, baggage, and ammunition, and having passed over above eighty miles of difficult country in four days, during three of which they were constantly fighting, both men and animals required rest; thirdly, that nothing was known of Beresford, whose contemporary operations it is time to relate.
The moment of his arrival on the Douro was marked by the repulse of Loison’s division, which immediately fell back, as I have already related, to Mezamfrio, followed by the Portuguese patroles only, for Beresford halted on the left bank of the river, because the British regiments were still in the rear. This was on the 10th. Sylveira, who was at Villa Real, had orders to feel towards Mezamfrio for the enemy, and the marshal’s force was thus, with the assistance of the insurgents, in readiness to turn Soult from the route of Villa Real to Bragança.
The 11th, Loison continued his retreat, and Beresford finding him so timid, followed, skirmishing with his rear guard, and at the same time Sylveira advanced from Villa Real. On the 12th, the French outposts, in front of Amarante were driven in, and the 13th Loison abandoned that town, and took the route of Guimaraens.
These events were unknown to sir Arthur Wellesley on the evening of the 13th, but he heard that Soult, after destroying his artillery and ammunition, near Penafiel, had passed over the mountain towards Braga; and judging this to arise from Beresford’s operations on the Tamega, he reinforced Murray with some cavalry, ordering him to proceed by Penafiel, and if Loison still lingered near Amarante, to open a communication with Beresford. The latter was at the same time directed to ascend the Tamega, and intercept the enemy at Chaves.
Meanwhile, the main body of the army marched in two columns upon the Minho, the one by the route of Barca de Troffa and Braga, the other by the Ponte d’Ave and Bacellos. But, on the evening of the 14th, the movements of the enemy about Braga gave certain proofs that not Valença and Tuy, but Chaves or Montalegre, would be the point of his retreat. Hereupon, the left column was drawn off from the Bacellos road and directed upon Braga, and Beresford was instructed to move by Monterey, upon Villa del Rey, if Soult took the line of Montalegre.
The 15th, sir Arthur reached Braga. Murray was at Guimaraens on his right, and Beresford, who had anticipated his orders, was near Chaves, having sent Sylveira towards Salamonde, with instructions to occupy the passes of Ruivaens and Melgassy. But at this time Soult was fifteen miles in advance of Braga, having, by a surprising effort, extricated himself from one of the most dangerous situations that a general ever escaped from. To understand this, it is necessary to describe the country through which his retreat was effected.
I have already observed that the Sierra de Cabreira and the Sierra de Catalina line the right bank of the Tamega; but, in approaching the Douro, the latter slants off towards Oporto, thus opening a rough but practicable slip of land, through which the road leads from Oporto to Amarante. Hence, the French in retreating to the latter town had the Douro on their right hand and the Sierra de Catalina on their left.
Between Amarante, and Braga which is on the other side of the Catalina, a route practicable for artillery, runs through Guimaraens, but it is necessary to reach Amarante to fall into this road. Thus, Soult, as he advanced along the narrow pass between the mountains and the Douro, rested his hopes of safety entirely upon Loison’s holding Amarante. Several days, however, had elapsed since that general had communicated, and an aide-de-camp was sent on the morning of the 12th to ascertain his exact position. Colonel Tholosé, the officer employed, found Loison at Amarante, but neither his remonstrances, nor the after coming intelligence that Oporto was evacuated, and the army in full retreat upon the Tamega, could induce that general to remain there, and, as we have seen, he marched towards Guimaraens, on the 13th, abandoning the bridge of Amarante, without a blow, and leaving his commander and two-thirds of the army to what must have appeared inevitable destruction.
The news of this unexpected calamity reached Soult at one o’clock on the morning of the 13th, just as he had passed the rugged banks of the Souza river, the weather was boisterous, the men were fatigued, voices were heard calling for a capitulation, and the whole army was stricken with dismay. Then it was that the duke of Dalmatia justified, by his energy, that fortune which had raised him to his high rank in the world. Being, by a Spanish pedlar, informed of a path that, mounting the right bank of the Souza, led over the Sierra de Catalina to Guimaraens, he, on the instant, silenced the murmurs of the treacherous or fearful in the ranks, destroyed the artillery, abandoned the military chest and baggage, and loading the animals with sick men and musket ammunition, repassed the Souza, and followed his Spanish guide with a hardy resolution.
The rain was falling in torrents, and the path was such as might be expected in those wild regions, but the troops made good their passage over the mountains to Pombeira, and, at Guimaraens, happily fell in with Loison. During the night they were joined by Lorge’s dragoons from Braga, and thus, almost beyond hope, the whole army was concentrated.
If Soult’s energy in command was conspicuous on this occasion, his sagacity and judgement were not less remarkably displayed in what followed. Most generals would have moved by the direct route upon Guimaraens to Braga; but he, with a long reach of mind, calculated, from the slackness of pursuit after he passed Vallonga, that the bulk of the English army must be on the road to Braga, and would be there before him; or that, at best, he should be obliged to retreat fighting, and must sacrifice the guns and baggage of Loison’s and Lorge’s corps in the face of an enemy—a circumstance that might operate fatally on the spirit of his soldiers, and would certainly give Noble’s Campagne de Galice. opportunities to the malcontents; and already one of the generals (apparently Loison) was recommending a convention like Cintra.
But, with a firmness worthy of the highest admiration, Soult destroyed all the guns and the greatest part of the baggage and ammunition of Loison’s and Lorge’s divisions; then, leaving the high road to Braga on his left, and once more taking to the mountain paths, he made for the heights of Carvalho d’Este, where he arrived late in the evening of the 14th, thus gaining a day’s march, in point of time. The morning of the 15th he drew up his troops in the position he had occupied just two months before at the battle of Braga; and this spectacle, where twenty thousand men were collected upon the theatre of a former victory, and disposed so as to produce the greatest effect, roused all the sinking pride of the French soldiers. It was a happy stroke of generalship, an inspiration of real genius!
Soult now re-organised his army; taking the command of the rear-guard himself, and giving that of the advanced guard to general Loison. Noble, the French historian of this campaign, says “the whole army was astonished;” as if it was not a stroke of consummate policy that the rear, which was pursued by the British, should be under the general-in-chief, and that the front, which was to fight its way through the native forces, should have a commander whose very name called up all the revengeful passions of the Portuguese. Maneta durst not surrender; and the duke of Dalmatia dextrously forced those to act with most zeal who were least inclined to serve him: and, in sooth, such was his perilous situation, that all the resources of his mind and all the energy of his character were needed to save the army.
From Carvalho he retired to Salamonde, from whence there were two lines of retreat. The one through Ruivaens and Venda Nova, by which the army had marched when coming from Chaves two months before; the other, shorter, although more impracticable, leading by the Ponte Nova and Ponte Miserella into the road running from Ruivaens to Montalegre. But the scouts brought intelligence that the bridge of Ruivaens, on the little river of that name, was broken, and defended by twelve hundred Portuguese, with artillery; and that another party had been, since the morning, destroying the Ponte Nova on the Cavado river.
The destruction of the first bridge blocked the road to Chaves; the second, if completed, and the passage well defended, would have cut the French off from Montalegre. The night was setting in, the soldiers were harassed, barefooted, and starving; the ammunition was damp with the rain, which had never ceased since the 13th, and which was now increasing in violence, accompanied with storms of wind. The British army would certainly fall upon the rear in the morning; and if the Ponte Nova, where the guard was reported to be weak, could not be secured, the hour of surrender was surely arrived.
In this extremity, Soult sent for major Dulong, an officer justly reputed for one of the most daring in the French ranks. Addressing himself to this brave man, he said, “I have chosen you from the whole army to seize the Ponte Nova, which has been cut by the enemy. Do you choose a hundred grenadiers and twenty-five horsemen; endeavour to surprise the guards, and secure the passage of the bridge. If you succeed, say so, but send no other report; your silence will suffice.” Thus exhorted, Dulong selected his men, and departed.
Favoured by the storm, he reached the bridge unperceived of the Portuguese, killed the centinel before any alarm was given, and then, followed by twelve grenadiers, began crawling along a narrow slip of masonry, which was the only part of the bridge undestroyed. The Cavado river was in full flood, and roaring in a deep channel; one of the grenadiers fell into the gulph, but the noise of the storm and the river was louder than his cry; Dulong, with the eleven, still creeping onwards, reached the other side, and falling briskly on the first posts of the peasants, killed or dispersed the whole. At that moment, the remainder of his men advanced close to the bridge; and some crossing, others mounting the heights, shouting and firing, scared the Portuguese supporting-posts, who imagined the whole army was upon them; and thus the passage was gallantly won.
At four o’clock, the bridge being repaired, the advanced guards of the French commenced crossing; but as the column of march was long, and the road narrow and rugged, the troops filed over slowly; and beyond the Ponte Nova there was a second obstacle still more formidable. For the pass in which the troops were moving being cut in the side of a mountain, open on the left for several miles, at last came upon a torrent called the Misarella, which, breaking down a deep ravine, or rather gulph, was only to be crossed by a bridge, constructed with a single lofty arch, called the Saltador, or leaper; and so narrow that only three persons could pass abreast. Fortunately for the French, the Saltador was not cut, but entrenched and defended by a few hundred Portuguese peasants, who occupied the rocks on the S.
Journal of Operations MS. farther side; and here the good soldier Dulong again saved the army: for, when a first and second attempt had been repulsed with loss, he carried the entrenchments by a third effort; but, at the same instant, fell deeply wounded himself. The head of the column now poured over, and it was full time, for the English guns were thundering in the rear, and the Ponte Nova was choked with dead.
Sir Arthur Wellesley, quitting Braga on the morning of the 16th, had come, about four o’clock, upon Soult’s rear-guard, which remained at Salamonde to cover the passage of the army over the bridges. The right was strongly protected by a ravine, the left occupied a steep hill; and a stout battle might have been made, but men thus circumstanced, and momentarily expecting an order to retreat, will seldom stand firmly; and, on this occasion, when some light troops turned the left, and general Sherbrooke, with the guards, mounting the steep hill, attacked the front, the French made but one discharge, and fled in confusion to the Ponte Nova. As this bridge was not on the direct line of retreat, they were for some time unperceived, and gaining ground of their pursuers, formed a rear-guard; but, after a time, being discovered, some guns were brought to bear on them; and then man and horse, crushed together, went over into the gulph; and the bridge, and the rocks, and the defile beyond were strewed with mangled bodies.
This was the last calamity inflicted by the sword upon the French army in this retreat; a retreat attended by many horrid as well as glorious events; for the peasants in their fury, with an atrocious cruelty, tortured and mutilated every sick man and straggler that fell into their power; and on the other hand, the soldiers, who held together in their turn, shot the peasants; while the track of the columns might be discovered from afar by the smoke of the burning houses.
The French reached Montalegre on the 17th; and an English staff-officer, with some cavalry, being upon their rear, as far as Villella, picked up some stragglers; but sir Arthur, with the main body of the army, halted that day at Ruivaens. The 18th he renewed the pursuit, and a part of his cavalry passed Montalegre, followed by the guards; the enemy was, however, drawn up behind the Salas in force, and no action took place. Sylveira, indeed, had entered Montalegre, from the side of Chaves, before the British came up from Ruivaens; but instead of pursuing, he put his men into quarters; and a Portuguese officer of his division, who was despatched to marshal Beresford with orders to move from Villa Perdrices upon Villa del Rey, loitered on the road so long, that all chance of intercepting the French line of march was at an end; for though Beresford, on the 19th, pushed colonel Talbot with the 14th dragoons as far as Ginjo, Franceschi turned in force, and obliged that officer to retire; and thus the pursuit terminated, with the capture of a few stragglers on the Salas.
Soult himself crossed the frontier by Allaritz on the 18th; and on the 19th entered Orense, but without guns, stores, ammunition, or baggage; his men exhausted with fatigue and misery, the greatest part being without shoes, many without accoutrements, and in some instances even without muskets. He had quitted Orense seventy-six days before, with about twenty-two thousand men, and three thousand five hundred had afterwards joined him from Tuy. He returned with nineteen thousand five hundred, having lost by the sword and sickness, by assassination and capture, six thousand good soldiers; of which number above three thousand were taken in hospitals,[7] and about a thousand were killed by the Portuguese, or had died of sickness, previous to the retreat. The remainder were captured, or had perished within the last eight days. He had carried fifty-eight pieces of artillery into Portugal, and he returned without a gun; yet was his reputation as a stout and able soldier no wise diminished.
Plate 5. to face Pa. 300.
Sketch Explanatory of the
OPERATIONS
between the
MINHO & DOURO,
1809.
London. Published by T. & W. BOONE, July 1829.
OBSERVATIONS.
The duke of Dalmatia’s arrangements being continually thwarted by the conspirators, his military conduct cannot be fairly judged of. Nevertheless, the errors of the campaign may, without injustice, be pointed out, leaving to others the task of tracing them to their true sources.
1º. The disposition of the army, on both sides of the Douro, and upon such extended lines, when no certain advice of the movements and strength of the English force had been received, was rash. It was, doubtless, right, that to clear the front of the army, and to gather information, Franceschi should advance to the Vouga; but he remained too long in the same position, and he should have felt Trant’s force more positively. Had the latter officer (whose boldness in maintaining the line of the Vouga was extremely creditable) been beaten, as he easily might have been, the anarchy in the country would have increased; and as Beresford’s troops at Thomar wanted but an excuse to disband themselves, the Portuguese and British preparations must have been greatly retarded.
2º. That Soult, when he had secured, as he thought, all the boats on an unfordable river three hundred yards wide, should think himself safe from an attack for one day, is not wonderful. The improbability that such a barrier could be forced in half an hour might have rendered Fabius careless; but there were some peculiar circumstances attending the surprise of the French army which indicate Noble’s Campagne de Galice. great negligence. The commanding officer of one regiment reported, as early as six o’clock, that the English were crossing the river; the report was certainly premature, because no man passed before ten o’clock; but it reached Soult, and he sent general Quesnel, the governor of Oporto, to verify the fact. Quesnel stated, on his return, and truly, that it was an error, and Soult took no further precaution. The patroles were not increased; no staff-officers appear to have been employed to watch the river, and no signals were established; yet it was but three days since D’Argenton’s conspiracy had been discovered, and the extent of it was still unknown. This circumstance alone should have induced the duke of Dalmatia to augment the number of his guards and posts of observation, that the multiplicity of the reports might render it impossible for the malcontents to deceive him. The surprise at Oporto must, therefore, be considered as a fault in the general, which could only be atoned for by the high resolution and commanding energy with which he saved his army in the subsequent retreat.
3º. When general Loison suffered marshal Beresford to drive him from Pezo de Ragoa and Mezamfrio, he committed a grave military error; but when he abandoned Amarante, he relinquished all claim to military reputation, as a simple statement of facts will prove. The evening of the 12th he wrote to Soult that one regiment had easily repulsed the whole of the enemy’s forces; yet he, although at the head of six thousand men, cavalry, infantry, and artillery, that night and without another shot being fired, abandoned the only passage by which, as far as he knew, the rest of the army could escape from its perilous situation with honour. It was not general Loison’s fault if England did not triumph a second time for the capture of a French marshal.
MOVEMENTS OF THE BRITISH GENERAL.
1º. If sir Arthur Wellesley’s operation be looked at as a whole, it is impossible to deny his sagacity in planning, his decision and celerity in execution. When he landed at Lisbon, the nation was dismayed by previous defeats, distracted with anarchy, and menaced on two sides by powerful armies, one of which was already in possession of the second city in the kingdom. In twenty-eight days he had restored public confidence; provided a defence against one adversary; and having marched two hundred miles through a rugged country, and forced the passage of a great river—caused his other opponent to flee over the frontier, without artillery or baggage.
2º.—Such being the result, it is necessary to show that the success was due, not to the caprice of fortune, but to the talents of the general; that he was quick to see, and active to strike; and, first, the secresy and despatch with which the army was collected on the Vouga belongs entirely to the man; for, there were many obstacles to overcome; and D’Argenton, as the sequel proved, would, by his disclosures, have ruined sir Arthur’s combinations, if the latter had not providently given him a false view of affairs. The subsequent march from the Vouga to the Douro was, in itself, no mean effort, for, it must be recollected, that this rapid advance against an eminent commander, and a veteran army of above twenty thousand men, was made with a heterogeneous force, of which only sixteen thousand men were approved soldiers, the remainder being totally unformed by discipline, untried in battle, and, only three weeks before, were in a state of open mutiny.
3º.—The passage of the Douro, at Oporto, would, at first sight, seem a rash undertaking; but, when examined closely, it proves to be an example of consummate generalship, both in the conception and the execution. The careless watch maintained by the French may, indeed, be called fortunate, because it permitted the English general to get a few men over unperceived; but it was not twenty-five, nor twenty-five hundred, soldiers that could have maintained themselves, if heedlessly cast on the other side. Sir Arthur, when he so coolly said—“let them pass,” was prepared to protect them when they had passed. He did not give that order until he knew that Murray had found boats at Avintas, to ferry over a considerable number of troops, and, consequently, that that general, descending the Douro, could cover the right flank of the Seminary, while the guns planted on the heights of Sarea could sweep the left flank, and search all the ground enclosed by the wall round the building. If general Murray’s troops only had passed, they would have been compromised; if the whole army had made the attempt at Avintas, its march would have been discovered; but in the double passage all was secured: the men in the Seminary by the guns, by the strength of the building, and by Murray’s troops; the latter by the surprise on the town, which drew the enemy’s attention away from them. Hence, it was only necessary to throw a few brave men into the Seminary unperceived, and then the success was almost certain; because, while that building was maintained, the troops in the act of passing could neither be prevented nor harmed by the enemy. To attain great objects by simple means is the highest effort of genius!
4º.—If general Murray had attacked vigorously, the ruin of the French army would have ensued. It was an opportunity that would have tempted a blind man to strike; the neglect of it argued want of military talent and of military hardihood; and how would it have appeared if Loison had not abandoned Amarante? If Soult, effecting his retreat in safety, and reaching Zamora or Salamanca in good order, had turned on Ciudad Rodrigo, he would have found full occupation for sir Arthur Wellesley in the north; and he would have opened a free communication with the duke of Belluno. The latter must, then, have marched either against Seville or Lisbon; and thus the boldness and excellent conduct of the English general, producing no adequate results, would have been overlooked, or, perhaps, have formed a subject for the abuse of some ignorant, declamatory writer.
5º.—Sir Arthur Wellesley’s reasons for halting at Oporto, the 13th, have been already noticed, but they require further remarks. Had he followed Soult headlong, there is no doubt that the latter would have been overtaken on the Souza river, and destroyed; but this chance, arising from Loison’s wretched movements, was not to be foreseen. Sir Arthur Wellesley knew nothing of Beresford’s situation; but he naturally supposed that, following his instructions, the latter was about Villa Real; and that, consequently, the French would, from Amarante, either ascend the Tamega to Chaves, or taking the road to Guimaraens and Braga, make for the Minho. Hence, he remained where he could command the main roads to that river, in order to intercept Soult’s retreat and force him to a battle; whereas, if he had once entered the defile formed by the Douro and the Sierra de Catalina, he could only have followed his enemy in one column by a difficult route, a process promising little advantage. Nevertheless, seeing that he detached general Murray by that route at last, it would appear that he should have ordered him to press the enemy closer than he did; but there a political difficulty occurred.
The English cabinet, although improvident in its preparations, was very fearful of misfortune, and the general durst not risk the safety of a single brigade, except for a great object, lest a slight disaster should cause the army to be recalled. Thus, he was obliged to curb his naturally enterprising disposition, and to this burthen of ministerial incapacity, which he bore even to the battle of Salamanca, may be traced that over-caution which has been so often censured as a fault, not only by military King Joseph’s captured Correspondence, MS. writers, but by Napoleon, who, judging from appearances, erroneously supposed it to be a characteristic of the man, and often rebuked his generals for not taking advantage thereof.
6º.—The marches and encounters, from the 14th to the 17th, were excellent on both sides. Like the wheelings and buffeting of two vultures in the air, the generals contended, the one for safety, the other for triumph; but there was evidently a failure in the operations of marshal Beresford. Soult did not reach Salamonde until the evening of the 15th, and his rear guard was still there on the evening of the 16th. Beresford was in person at Chaves on the 16th, and his troops reached that place early on the morning of the 17th. Soult passed Montalegre on the 18th, but from Chaves to that place is only one march.
Again, marshal Beresford was in possession of Amarante on the 13th, and as there was an excellent map of the province in existence, he must have known the importance of Salamonde, and that there were roads to it through Mondin and Cavez, shorter than by Guimaraens and Chaves. It is true that Sylveira was sent to occupy Ruivaens and Melgacy; but he executed his orders slowly, and Misarella was neglected. Major Warre, an officer of the marshal’s staff, endeavoured, indeed, to break down the bridges of Ponte Nova and Ruivaens; and it was by his exertions that the peasants, surprised at the former, had been collected; but he had only a single dragoon with him, and was without powder to execute this important task. The peasantry, glad to be rid of the French, were reluctant to stop their retreat, and still more to destroy the bridge of Misarella, which was the key of all the communications, and all the great markets of the Entre Minho e Douro; and therefore sure to be built up again, in which case the people knew well that their labour and time would be called for without payment. It is undoubted that Soult owed his safety to the failure in breaking those bridges; and it does appear that if major Warre had been supplied with the necessary escort and materials he would have effectually destroyed them.
Sylveira did not move either in the direction or with the celerity required of him by Beresford, there seems to have been a misunderstanding between them; but allowance must be made for the numerous mistakes necessarily arising in the transmission of orders by officers speaking different languages; and for the difficulty of moving troops not accustomed, or perfectly willing to act together.
CHAPTER III.
S.
Journal of Operations MS.
The duke of Dalmatia halted at Orense the 20th, but on the 21st put his troops in motion upon Lugo, where general Fournier, of the 6th corps, with three battalions of infantry and a regiment of dragoons, was besieged by twelve or fifteen thousand Spaniards, under the command of general Mahi. But to explain this it is necessary to relate Romana’s operations, after his defeat at Monterey on the 6th of March.
Having re-assembled the fugitives at Puebla de Senabria, on the borders of Leon, he repaired his losses by fresh levies, and was soon after joined by three thousand men from Castile, and thus, unknown to Ney, he had, as it were, gained the rear of the sixth corps. Villa Franca del Bierzo was, at this time, occupied by two weak French battalions, and their nearest support was at Lugo: Romana resolved to surprise them, and, dividing his forces, sent Mendizabel with one division by the valley of the Syl to take the French in rear, and marched himself by the route of Calcabellos. The French, thus surrounded in Villa Franca, after a short skirmish, in which the Spaniards lost about a hundred men, surrendered, and were sent into the Asturias.
Romana then detached a part of his forces to Orense and Ponte Vedra, to assist Morillo and the insurrection in the western parts of Gallicia, where, with the aid of the English ships of war, and notwithstanding the shameful neglect of the supreme central junta, the patriots were proceeding vigorously. The moveable columns of the sixth corps daily lost a number of men; some in open battle, but a still greater number by assassinations, which were rigorously visited upon the districts where they took place; and thus, in Gallicia, as in every other part of Spain, the war hourly assumed a more horrid character. Referring to this period, colonel Barios afterwards told Mr. Frere that, to repress the excesses of marshal Ney’s troops, Parl. Papers, 1810. he, himself, had, in cold blood, caused seven hundred French prisoners to be drowned in the Minho; an avowal recorded by Mr. Frere, without animadversion, but which, happily for the cause of humanity, there is good reason to believe was as false as it was disgraceful.
After the capture of Vigo, the Spanish force on the coast increased rapidly. Barios returned to Seville; Martin Carrera assumed the command of the troops near Orense, and the Conde Noroña of those near Vigo. General Maucune returned to St. Jago from Tuy, and Ney, apprized of the loss at Villa Franca, advanced to Lugo. Romana immediately abandoned Gallicia, and, entering the Asturias by the pass of Cienfuegos, marched along the line of the Gallician frontier, until he reached Navia de Suarna. Here he left Mahi, with the army, to observe Ney, but repaired, himself, to Oviedo, to redress the crying wrongs of the Asturians.
It is unnecessary to recapitulate the evil doings of the Asturian junta, which was notoriously corrupt and incapable. Romana, after a short inquiry, dismissed the members in virtue of his supreme authority, and appointed new men; but this act of justice gave great offence to Jovellanos and others. It appeared too close an approximation to Cuesta’s manner, in Leon, the year before; and as the central government, always selfish and jealous, abhorred any indication of vigour or probity in a general, Romana was soon afterwards deprived of his command. Meanwhile, he was resolutely reforming abuses, when his proceedings were suddenly arrested by an unexpected event.
As soon as Ney understood that the Spanish army was posted on the Gallician side of the Asturian frontier, and that Romana was likely to excite the energy of the Asturian people, he planned a combined movement, to surround and destroy, not only Romana and his army, but also the Asturian forces, which then amounted to about fifteen thousand men, including the partida of Porlier, commonly called the Marquisetto. This force, commanded by general Ballasteros and general Voster, occupied Infiesta, on the eastern side of Oviedo, and Castropol on the coast. Ney, with the consent of Joseph, arranged that Kellerman, who was at Astorga, with six guns and eight thousand seven hundred men, composed of detachments, drawn together from the different corps, should penetrate the Asturias from the south east by the pass of Pajares; that Bonnet, who always remained at the town of St. Andero, should break in, from the north east, by the coast road; and that the sixth corps should make an irruption by the Concejo de Ibias, a short but difficult route leading directly from Lugo.
When the period for these combined movements was determined, Ney, appointing general Marchand to command in Gallicia during his own absence, left three battalions under Maucune at St. Jago, three others in garrison at Coruña under general D’Armagnac, one at Ferrol, and three with a regiment of cavalry under Fournier at Lugo; and then marched himself, with twelve battalions of infantry and three regiments of cavalry, against Mahi. The latter immediately abandoned his position at Navia de Suarna, and drawing off by his left, without giving notice to Romana, returned to Gallicia and again entered the valley of the Syl. Ney, either thinking that the greatest force was near Oviedo, or that it was more important to capture Romana than to disperse Mahi’s troops, continued his route by the valley of the Nareca, and with such diligence that he reached Cornellana and Grado, one march from Oviedo, before Romana knew of his approach. The Spanish general, thus surprized, made a feeble and fruitless endeavour to check the French at the bridge of Peñaflor, after which, sending the single regiment he had with him to Infiesta, he embarked on board an English vessel at Gihon, and so escaped.
The 18th of May, Ney entered Oviedo, where he was joined by Kellerman, and the next day pursued Romana to Gihon. Bonnet, likewise, executed his part, but somewhat later; and thus Vorster, being unmolested by Ney, had time to collect his corps on the coast. Meanwhile Ballasteros, finding that Bonnet had passed between him and Vorster, boldly marched upon St. Andero and retook it, making the garrison and sick men (in all eleven hundred) prisoners. The Amelia and Statira, British frigates, arrived off the harbour at the same moment, and captured three French corvettes and two luggers, on board of which some staff-officers were endeavouring to escape.
Bonnet, however, followed hard upon Ballasteros, and, the 11th of June, routed him so completely that he, also, was forced to save himself on board an English vessel, and the French recovered all the prisoners, and, amongst them, the men taken at Villa Franca, by Romana. But, before this, Ney, uneasy for his posts in Gallicia, had returned to Coruña by the coast-road through Castropol, and Kellerman, after several trifling skirmishes with Vorster, had also retired to Valladolid. This expedition proved that Asturia was not calculated for defence, although, with the aid of English ships, it might become extremely troublesome to the French.
While Ney was in Asturia, Carrera, advancing from the side of Orense, appeared in front of St. Jago di Compostella at the moment that colonel D’Esmenard, a staff-officer sent by the marshal to give notice of his return to Coruña, arrived with an escort of dragoons in Maucune’s camp. This escort was magnified by the Spaniards into a reinforcement of eight hundred men; but Carrera, who had been joined by Morillo, commanded eight thousand, and, on the 23d, having attacked Maucune, at a place called “Campo de Estrella,” totally defeated him, with a loss of six hundred men and several guns. The Spaniards did not pursue, but the French retreated in confusion to Coruña. Nor was this the only check suffered by the 6th corps; for Mahi, having united a great body of peasants to his army, drove back Fournier’s outposts, and closely invested him in Lugo on the 19th.
Such was the state of affairs in Gallicia when Soult arrived at Orense; and as the inhabitants of that town, from whom he got intelligence of these S.
Journal of Operations MS. events, rather exaggerated the success of their countrymen, the French marshal immediately sent forward an advanced guard of his stoutest men to relieve Lugo, and followed himself, by the route of Monforte, with as much speed as the exhausted state of his troops would permit. The 22d, he reached Gutin, and, the same day, his van being descried on the mountains above Lugo, Mahi broke up his camp, and fell back to Mondenedo.
The 23d, Soult entered Lugo, where he heard of the emperor’s first successes in Austria, and, with renewed energy, prepared for fresh exertions himself. The 30th, he was joined by Ney, who, uninformed of Mahi’s position at Mondenedo, had missed a favourable opportunity of revenging the loss at St. Jago. Meanwhile Romana, disembarking at Ribadeo, joined Mahi at Mondenedo, and immediately marched along the line of the Asturias frontier, until he arrived at the sources of the Neyra, then, crossing the royal road, a little above Lugo, plunged, once more, into the valley of the Syl; and, having gained Orense, the 6th of June, opened a communication with Carrera at St. Jago, and with the insurgents at Vigo. This movement of Romana’s was able, energetic, and worthy of every praise.
In pursuance of an order from the emperor, Soult now sent eleven hundred men, composed of dismounted dragoons and skeletons of cavalry regiments, to France; and, having partially restored the artillery and equipments of the second corps, from the arsenals of Coruña and Ferrol, he, in concert with the duke of Elchingen, arranged a fresh plan for the destruction of Romana, the execution of which failed, as shall be hereafter noticed; but, at present, it is necessary to resume the narrative of
VICTOR’S OPERATIONS.
After the abortive effort to gain Badajos, the duke of Belluno, in obedience to the king’s orders, proceeded Semelé’s Journal of Operations MSS. to recover Alcantara. His rear was still within two marches of Merida when the head of his columns, under Lapisse, drove back some cavalry posts, entered the town of Alcantara, and the next day attempted the passage of the bridge.
The Portuguese force consisted of two thousand infantry, fifty cavalry, and six guns; and some works of defence were constructed on the right bank of the river; but, on the 14th of May, Lapisse lining the rocks on the left bank of the river, skirmished so sharply that the militia regiment of Idanha gave way. Colonel Mayne then sprung a mine, but the explosion doing little injury to the bridge, the French made good the passage. The Portuguese, who had suffered considerably, retired to the Puente de Segura, and Lapisse immediately sent patroles towards Castello Branco, Salvatierra, and Idanha Nova.
Intelligence of this attack having reached general Mackenzie, he directed preparations to be made for destroying the boat-bridge at Abrantes, and marched, in person, by Cortiçada to Sobreira Formosa; this movement, and a rumour that Soult had retreated from Oporto, afforded an excuse to Victor for again abandoning Alcantara, and resuming his former camp. During his absence, Cuesta, true to the promise he had given, attacked the fort of Merida; but, on the return of the French advanced guard, re-crossed the Guadiana, and fell back to Zafra, having first ravaged all the flat country, and obliged the inhabitants to withdraw into the mountains.
Some time before this, king Joseph had received a despatch from the French minister of war, giving notice that reinforcements had sailed from England, and warning him to lose no time in marching against Lisbon, to create a useful diversion in favour of Soult. It might be supposed that the original plan of the emperor would then have been acted upon, and this was the first thought of Joseph himself; but other circumstances created doubt and hesitation in his councils, and, finally, induced him to abandon all thoughts of Portugal.
When Napoleon returned to Paris, he imagined hostilities with Austria, although certain, would not break out so suddenly, but that he should have time to organise a sufficient army in Germany, without drawing his veteran troops from Spain. Hence, he still left the imperial guards at Vittoria, and sending the prince of Neufchatel to command the troops on the Danube, he himself remained at Paris, to superintend the preparations for opening the campaign. The Austrians were, however, not inattentive observers of the perfidy which accompanied the invasion of Spain; and, aptly taking the hint, attacked the French outposts and published their own declaration of war at the same moment.
Berthier, incapable of acting a principal part, was surprised, and made a succession of false movements that would have been fatal to the French army, if the emperor, journeying day and night, had not arrived at the very hour when his lieutenant was on the point of consummating the ruin of the army. Then, indeed, was seen the supernatural force of Napoleon’s genius: in a few hours he changed the aspect of affairs, in a few days, maugre their immense number, his enemies, baffled and flying in all directions, proclaimed his mastery in an art which, up to that moment, was imperfect; for never, since troops first trod a field of battle, was such a display of military skill made by man.
But previous to these successes, so threatening had been the aspect of affairs in Germany, that the imperial guards had been recalled from Vittoria, and hurried to the Danube, the great reserve of infantry was, as we have seen, struck off the rolls of the army in Spain, and the skeletons of the fourth squadrons of every cavalry regiment were ordered to return to their depôts in France. Even the fifth corps, under Mortier, then on its way to Valladolid from Zaragoza, was directed to halt, and hold itself in readiness to march for Germany; and thus, while Victor was reluctant to move, while Ney was demanding more troops to preserve Gallicia, and while the fate of the second corps was unknown, the whole army was actually diminished by forty thousand men, and fifteen thousand more were paralysed with regard to offensive operations.
These things rendered Joseph timid. Madrid, it was argued in his councils, was of more consequence than Lisbon. Soult might be already at the latter place; or, if not, he might extricate himself from his difficulties, for the capital of Spain must be covered. In pursuance of this reasoning, Sebastiani was forbidden any forward movement; and the duke of Belluno, whose army was daily wasting with the Guadiana fever, took a position at Torre-Mocha, a central point between Truxillo, Merida, and Alcantara. His cavalry Semelé’s Journal of Operations MS. posts watched all the passages over the Guadiana and the Tagus; and his communications with Madrid, between the Tietar and the Tagus, were protected by twelve hundred men, detached for that purpose by the king.
But one timid measure in war generally produces another. The neighbourhood of the English force at Castel Branco increased the energy of the Spanish insurgents, who infested the valley of the Tagus, and communicated secretly with those of the Sierra de Guadalupe; hence, Victor, alarmed for his bridge at Almaraz, sent a division there the 22d of May; and, as from that period until the 10th of June, he remained quiet: his campaign, which had opened so brilliantly, was annulled. He had neither assisted Soult, nor crushed Cuesta, nor taken Badajos nor Seville; yet he had wasted and lost, by sickness, more men than would have sufficed to reduce both Lisbon and Seville. The Spaniards were daily recovering strength and confidence; and sir Arthur Wellesley, after defeating Soult, had full leisure to return to the Tagus, and to combine his future operations with the Spanish armies in the south.
Information that Lapisse had forced the bridge of Alcantara reached the English general on the night of the 17th. That part of the army which was still behind Salamonde received immediate orders to retrace their steps to Oporto; and when the retreat of Soult by Orense was ascertained, the remainder of the troops, including three Portuguese brigades under Beresford, followed the same route. Colonel Trant was then appointed military governor of Oporto; and it was thought sufficient to leave Sylveira with some regular battalions and militia to defend the northern provinces; for Soult’s army was considered a crippled force, which could not for a long time appear again in the field; a conclusion drawn, as we shall see, from false data, and without due allowance being made for the energy of that chief.
As the army proceeded southward, the contracted scope of Lapisse’s movements was ascertained. Colonel Mayne was directed again to take post at Alcantara; and a reinforcement of five thousand men having landed at Lisbon, the rapidity of the march slackened. Passing by easy journeys through Coimbra, Thomar, and Punhete, the troops reached Abrantes the 7th of June, and encamped on the left bank of the Tagus; but there was sickness and a great mortality in his ranks.
From the moment of his arrival in Portugal, sir Arthur Wellesley had looked to the defeat of Victor as the principal, and the operation against Sir A. Wellesley’s Correspondence,
Parl. Papers, 1810. Soult as the secondary, object of the campaign; and the English government, acceding to his views, now gave him a discretionary power to enter the nearest provinces of Spain, if Portugal should not thereby be endangered. In his correspondence with the junta and with Cuesta, he had strongly urged the necessity of avoiding any serious collision with the enemy until the British troops could act in concert with the Spanish armies. This advice, approved of by the junta, was attended to by Cuesta; insomuch that he did not seek a battle, but he exposed his advanced posts, as if in derision of the counsel; and, disdainful of the English general’s abilities, expressed his belief that the latter had no desire to act heartily, “because,” said he, “the system of the British appears to be never to expose their troops; owing to which, they never gain decisive actions by land.”
Cuesta’s knowledge of the enemy’s strength and positions was always inaccurate, and his judgement false; hence he himself not only never gained any decisive action, but lost every army entrusted to his command. He was discontented with the movement against Soult, asserting that his hold of Gallicia would only be strengthened thereby, unless that favourite folly of all Spanish generals were adopted, namely, surrounding the enemy, without regarding whether the troops to be surrounded were more or less numerous than the surrounders. Sir Arthur Wellesley, however, affirmed that if Soult were first driven over the Minho, a combined attack afterwards made upon Victor would permanently deliver Gallicia; and this plan being followed, Gallicia was abandoned by the French, and they never returned to that province.
When the English army was again free to act, Cuesta was importunate that a joint offensive operation against Victor should be undertaken; but, obstinately attached to his own opinions, he insisted upon tracing the whole plan of campaign. Yet his views were so opposed to all sound military principles, that sir Arthur, although anxious to conciliate his humour, could scarcely concede the smallest point, lest a vital catastrophe should follow. Valuable time was thus lost in idle discussions which might have been employed in useful action; for the return of the British army from the Douro had falsified Victor’s position at Torremocha. That marshal, as late as the 10th of June, had only one division guarding the bridge at Almaraz; and it was difficult for him to ascertain the movements of sir Arthur Wellesley, covered, as they were, by the Tagus, the insurgents, and Mackenzie’s corps of observation: hence, by rapid marches, it was possible for the English general, while Victor was still at Torremocha, to reach the valley of the Tagus, and cutting the first corps off from Madrid, to place it between two fires.
Semelé’s Journal of Operations MS.
This did not escape the penetration of either commander; but sir Arthur was forced to renounce the attempt, partly because of the sick and harassed condition of his troops, the want of shoes and [Appendix, No. 16]. money, and the difficulty of getting supplies; but chiefly that Cuesta’s army was scattered over the open country, between the defiles of Monasterio and the Guadiana, and, as he refused to concentrate Parliamentary Papers, 1810. or retire, Victor might have marched against and crushed him, and yet found time to meet the British on the Tietar. Early in June, however, marshal Beresford was, with three brigades, directed upon Castello Branco, and the duke of Belluno, immediately taking the alarm, and being also assured, by despatches from Madrid, of Soult’s retreat, resolved to re-cross the Tagus. But, previous to commencing this movement, he resolved to secure his flank, by causing the bridge of Alcantara to be destroyed.
Colonel Mayne, as I have already observed, had been again entrusted with that post; but, unfortunately, his first orders to blow up the bridge, if the enemy advanced, were not rescinded, although the return of the army from the north rendered such a proceeding unnecessary. Mayne did not keep his instructions secret; and Victor, hearing of them, sent a detachment to the bridge with no other view than to cause its destruction. He succeeded; and this noble monument of Trajan’s genius was overturned. But such is the nature of war that, not long afterwards, each army found its fall injurious to their interests, and, as a matter of taste and of military advantage, both sides alike sighed over the ruins of Alcantara.
Having completed this operation, Victor passed the Tagus, at Almaraz, on the 19th, without being molested by Cuesta, and, removing his boat-bridge, proceeded to take post at Plasencia. Meanwhile Beresford was obliged to return to the defence of the northern provinces of Portugal, which Soult was again menacing, for, during the forced inactivity of the British, at Abrantes, the cause of which I shall explain in another place, changes in the relative positions of the hostile armies were taking place; and it is important that these changes should be well understood, because on them the fate of the succeeding campaign hinged.
When Ney and Soult met at Lugo, they, although still on bad terms, agreed, after some discussion, that the first should march from Coruña, by the route of St. Jago and Vigo, against Carrera and the Conde de Noroña; and that the second, entering the valley of the Syl, should attack Romana, and drive him upon Orense, at which place it was expected that Ney, after taking or blocking Vigo, would be able to reach him, and thus the whole force of Gallicia be crushed at once. Soult was then to menace the Tras os Montes, by the side of Bragança, with the view of obliging sir Arthur Wellesley to remain in that province, while the second corps opened a direct communication with Madrid and with the first corps.
Ney returned to Coruña; and, on the 1st of June, two divisions of infantry and a brigade of dragoons, of the second corps, marched upon Monforte: they were followed, the next day, by two other divisions of infantry; and, at the same time, Franceschi, who was on the Fereira river, supported by La Houssaye’s dragoons, was directed, after scouring the road to St. Jago, to fall down the right bank of the Tambuga, towards Orense.
From the 2d to the 9th the main body halted at Monforte, to get up stores from Lugo, and to scour the country on the flanks; for Romana, in his passage, had again raised the peasantry of all the valleys. Loison also, with a division, entered the Val des Orres, having orders to feign a movement towards Villa Franca and Puente Ferrada, as if for the purpose of meeting a French column in that direction.
The 10th, Loison passed the Syl, and took post at the Puente de Bibey.
S.
Journal of Operations MSS.
The 12th, Franceschi, reinforced with a division of infantry, arrived at Monte Furada on the Syl, and, sending a detachment to Laronco, connected his division with Loison’s. The remainder of the infantry followed this movement, and detachments were sent up the course of the Syl, and towards Dancos, on the road from Villa Franca to Lugo. Loison also forced the passage of the Puente de Bibey, and drove the insurgents to Puebla de Tribes. The French army thus cleared all the valleys opening on the course of the Upper Minho, and Romana was confined to the lower part of that river.
The 13th, Franceschi, ascending the valley of the Bibey, took post at Bollo and the bridge of the Hermitage, and then pushed his patroles even to Gudina and Monterey on one side, and into the Sierra de Porto on the other, as far as the sources of the Bibey, with a view of ascertaining, first, the exact direction which Romana would take to avoid Loison’s column; secondly, to prevent the Spanish general from passing the left of the French army, and gaining the Asturias by the route of Puebla de Senabria. These precautions occupied the duke of Dalmatia till the 19th, when, being assured that Romana had fallen back to Monterey, he judged that the latter would attempt the same march towards Puebla de Senabria, by which he had escaped after the action in the month of March. The French army was therefore directed up the valley of the Bibey, upon Viana, where there was a bridge, and where many of the mountain roads united. The same day Franceschi fell in with the head of Romana’s army, and repulsed it; and the evening of the 20th the whole of the French troops were concentrated near Viana, intending to give battle to the Spaniards the next morning; but the latter retreated precipitately during the night, and many of the men dispersed.
Soult continued his movement by the left until he reached the great road running from Castile to Orense, and from thence, having sent Heudelet’s division to Villa Vieja to threaten the Tras os Montes frontier, and Mermet’s division and Lorge’s dragoons towards La Canda to observe the road of Puebla de Senabria, he marched himself, with an advanced guard, to La Gudina, leaving Laborde and La Houssaye in reserve between Gudina and Villa Vieja. These divers movements, through the rugged passes of Gallicia, led to a variety of slight skirmishes, the most important of which took place at the Puente de Bibey, a place of such prodigious strength that it is scarcely conceivable how men, with arms, could be brought to abandon such a post.
Romana’s situation was now nearly hopeless, but he was saved by a misunderstanding between the French marshals. It appears that Ney, having marched from Coruña, entered St. Jago with about ten thousand men, and Carrera fell back upon Ponte Vedra, where the Conde de Noroña joined him with some fresh troops, and, assuming the command, continued the retreat to the Octavem river, behind which he took post, placing his main body at the bridge of San Payo, and sending detachments to guard some secondary points. On the 7th of June, the French came up. The Spaniards had thirteen thousand men, two eighteen-pounders, and nine field-pieces. Of these forces, seven thousand men armed, three thousand unarmed, and the whole of the artillery, were in position to defend the passage at San Payo; the bridge was cut, and overlooked by a battery of two eighteen-pounders. Three thousand were in reserve at Redondela; and, at Vigo, about sixty stragglers, from sir John Moore’s army, were landed, and, in conjunction with a detachment of seamen and marines, occupied the forts. Some Spanish gun-boats, one of which was manned by English seamen, under captain Winter, also proceeded up the river to the bridge of San Payo.
During the 7th, a desultory and useless fire took place on both sides; but, on the 8th, the French were repulsed in some feeble attempts made to force a passage at San Payo and at Soto Mayor, higher up the river, the loss on either side being about a hundred men. These attacks were merely to keep the Spaniards employed until the reports of the officers, sent by Ney to ascertain the situation and projects of Soult’s army, were received, and, in the evening of the 8th, those officers returned with information, obtained from the peasants, that the second corps was retreating upon Castile. I have been assured by persons, then on marshal Ney’s staff, that he, amazed at these tidings, rashly concluded that Soult, swayed by personal feelings, wished to endanger the sixth corps, and filled with indignation, immediately retired to Coruña; while Soult, on the other hand, viewed this retreat as a breach of their engagements, and an underhand policy to oblige him to remain in Gallicia. Certain it is that by these ebullitions of temper, both Romana and Noroña were saved; for there was nothing to prevent Ney from sending a column against Orense, whilst he himself occupied Noroña, on the Octavem; and, however spirited the conduct of the Spaniards was at San Payo, it would be ridiculous to imagine that ten thousand of the best soldiers of France, led by an officer so quick and resolute as Ney, could have been resisted by an equal number of raw troops and peasants, one-third of whom were without arms. But the history of the quarrel between these marshals is involved in mystery, the clearing of which must be left to those who shall write the memoirs of the men. For the purposes of this history it is sufficient to know that there was ill-blood, and that therein the Gallicians found safety.
Soult, informed of Ney’s retreat and of sir Arthur Wellesley’s arrival on the Tagus, ceased to pursue Romana, and marched to Zamora, where his sick had been before sent, and where his brother, general Soult, had conducted three or four thousand stragglers and convalescents. Here, also, he requested the king to send the artillery and stores necessary to re-equip the second corps; and here he proposed to give his harassed troops some rest, for they had now been for eight months incessantly marching and fighting, and men and officers were alike dispirited by the privations they had endured, and by the terrible nature of a war in which the most horrid scenes were daily enacted.
To put the king in possession of his views, Soult sent general Franceschi to Madrid; but this celebrated officer, refusing an escort, fell into the hands S.
Journal of Operations MSS. of the Capuchino. Being transferred to Seville, the central junta, with infamous cruelty, treated him as if he had been a criminal instead of a brave soldier, and confined him in a dungeon at Carthagena. The citizens there, ashamed of their government, endeavoured to effect his escape; but he perished at the moment when his liberation was certain. When his young wife, a daughter of count Mathieu Dumas, heard of his fate, she refused all nourishment; and, in a few days, by her death, added one more to the thousand instances of the strength of woman’s affections.
The 25th of June, Soult reached Puebla de Senabria.
The 28th, he marched to Mombuey.
The 29th and 30th, he crossed the Esla, by the bridges of San Pelayo and Castro Gonzales.
The 2d of July, he entered Zamora, having previously rejected a proposition of Ney’s, that the two corps should jointly maintain Gallicia, a rejection which induced the duke of Elchingen to evacuate that province.
Plate 6. to face Pa. 326.
Sketch Explanatory of
NEY & SOULT’S,
OPERATIONS IN GALLICIA,
in June 1809.
London. Published by T. & W. BOONE, July 1829.
To effect this, Ney formed a camp near Betanzos; and, on the 22d of July, withdrew his garrisons from Coruña and Ferrol, having previously destroyed all the stores and arsenals and disabled the land defences. Nevertheless, his influence was still so powerful that captain Hotham, commanding the English squadron, off Coruña, seeing the hostile attitude maintained by the inhabitants, landed his seamen on the 24th, and spiked the guns on the sea-line; and, in like manner, compelled a Spanish garrison, left by Ney in the forts of Ferrol, to surrender on the 26th. The marshal, however, marched, unmolested, by the high road to Astorga, where he arrived on the 30th, having brought off all his own sick and those of the second corps also, who had been left in Lugo. Thus Gallicia was finally delivered.
This important event has been erroneously attributed to the exertions of the Spaniards. Those exertions were creditable to the Gallicians, although the most powerful motive of action was to protect their personal property; and, when the French withdrew, this same motive led them to repair their losses by resisting the payment of tithes and rents, a compensation by no means relished by the proprietors or the church. But it is certain that their efforts were only secondary causes in themselves, and chiefly supported by the aid of England, whose ships, and arms, and stores were constantly on the coast.
How can the operations of the Spaniards be said to have driven the sixth corps from Gallicia, when Ney retained every important post in that province to the last; when single divisions of his army, at two different periods, traversed the country, from Coruña to Tuy, without let or hindrance; and when the Spaniards could not prevent him from over-running the Asturias without losing his hold of Gallicia? It is true, Soult, writing to Joseph, affirmed that the Gallicians would wear out the strongest army; that is, if a wrong system was pursued by the French, but he pointed out the right method of Intercepted Despatches, Parl. Pap. 1810. subduing them, namely, in pursuance of Napoleon’s views, to fortify some principal central points, from whence the moveable columns could overrun the country; and this, he estimated, would only require fifty thousand pounds and six weeks’ labour. It is plain the real causes of the deliverance were—First, The quarrels between the marshals, which saved Romana and Noroña from destruction.—Secondly, The movements of sir Arthur Wellesley on the Tagus; for, in an intercepted letter from Soult to Joseph, that marshal expressly assigns the danger hanging over Madrid and the first corps as the reason of his refusing to remain in Gallicia. Now, although Soult’s views were undoubtedly just, and his march provident, the latter necessarily drew after it the evacuation of Gallicia; because, it would have been absurd to keep the sixth corps cooped up in that corner of the Peninsula, deprived of communication, and estranged from the general operations.
The movement of the second corps, after quitting Monforte, being along the edge of the Portuguese frontier, and constantly threatening the northern provinces, drew marshal Beresford, as I have before stated, from Castello Branco; and all the regular Portuguese forces capable of taking the field were immediately collected by him round Almeida. The duke del Parque was at Ciudad Rodrigo; and as that part of Romana’s force, which had been cut off by Soult’s movement upon Gudina, fell back upon Ciudad Rodrigo, not less than twenty-five thousand men, Portuguese and Spaniards, were assembled, or assembling, round those two fortresses: and the change of situation thus brought about in the armies on the northern line was rendered more important by the events which were simultaneously taking place in other parts, especially in Aragon, where general Blake, whose army had been augmented to more than twenty thousand men, inflated with his success at Alcanitz, advanced to Ixar and Samper.
Suchet, himself, remained close to Zaragoza, but kept a detachment, under general Faber, at Longares and Villa Muel, near the mountains on the side of Daroca. Blake, hoping to cut off this detachment, marched, himself, through Carineña, and sent general Arisaga, with a column, to Bottorita; the latter captured a convoy of provisions on the Huerba; but Faber retired to Plasencia, on the Xalon.
The 14th of June, the advanced guards skirmished at Bottorita; and Blake, endeavouring to surround the enemy, pushed a detachment to Maria, in the plain of Zaragoza.
The excitement produced in that city, and in Aragon generally, by this march, was so great, that Suchet doubted if he should not abandon Zaragoza, and return towards Navarre. The peasantry had assembled on many points in the mountains around, and it required great vigilance to keep down the spirit of insurrection in the city itself. The importance of that place, however, made him resolve to fight a battle, for which the near approach of Blake, who came on in the full confidence that the French general would retreat, furnished an opportunity which was not neglected.
BATTLE OF MARIA.
The 14th, after some skirmishing, the Spanish army was concentrated at Bottorita.
The 15th, Blake slowly and unskilfully formed his troops in order of battle, near the village of Maria, and perpendicular to the Huerba, of which he occupied both banks. Towards two o’clock in the day, he extended his left wing to outflank the right of the French; but Suchet, who had just then been rejoined by Faber, and by a brigade from Tudela, immediately stopped this evolution, by attacking the wing with some cavalry and light troops. The Spaniards then fell back to their line of battle; and Blake, drawing men from his right to reinforce his centre and left, was immediately engaged in a severe conflict. He repulsed the foremost of the enemy’s columns; but so violent a storm arose at the moment, that neither army could see the other, although close together, and the action ceased for a time. Blake’s position was so ill chosen, that he was surrounded by ravines, and had only one line of retreat, by the bridge of Maria, which was on the extremity Suchet’s Memoirs. of his right flank. Suchet, observing this error, when the storm had cleared off a little, briskly engaged the centre and left of the Spaniards, and forming his cavalry and two regiments of infantry in column, by one vigorous effort broke quite through the Spanish horse, and seized the bridge of Maria. Notwithstanding this, Blake, who was at all times intrepid, collected the infantry of his centre and left wing in a mass, and stood for the victory; but the French troops overthrew his with a great slaughter. A general, twenty-five guns, and many stands of colours were taken; yet few prisoners, for the darkness enabled the dispersed Spaniards to escape by the ravines; and Blake rallied them the next day at Bottorita. The French lost nearly a thousand men, and general Harispé was wounded.
During this action, a French brigade held the position of Monte Torrero, without mixing in the fight, lest the citizens of Zaragoza, being released from their presence, should rise against the garrison; but after the victory, this brigade marched down the Ebro to cut off Blake’s retreat. General Laval, who commanded it, did not, however, execute his orders; and the Spanish army retired on the night of the 16th.
The 17th, the rear guard suffered some loss at Torrecilla; and on the 18th, the two armies were again in presence at Belchite. Blake, reinforced by some detachments, was about fourteen thousand strong; but he had lost the greatest part of his artillery, and his men were dispirited. Suchet, on the contrary, having by the success at Maria awed the Aragonese, was able to bring twenty-two battalions and seven squadrons, or about fifteen thousand men, flushed with victory, into action.
BATTLE OF BELCHITE.
Suchet’s Memoirs.
The Spaniards were drawn up on a range of hills half enclosing the town; their right, resting on a hermitage and some buildings, was inaccessible to cavalry; the left was also well covered; and behind the right, a hill with a building on it, overtopping all the position and occupied by a reserve, served Blake’s Despatch. as a rallying point, because there was an easy line of communication between it and the left wing. The centre, being on rough ground containing the town of Belchite which had a wall and gates, was also very strong; and the whole position was so compact, that Blake, after completely filling his line, had yet a considerable reserve in hand. His dispositions were made to fight by his centre and right, his left being rather in the nature of an advanced post.
A French battalion commenced the action, by skirmishing with the Spanish centre; but, at the same time, two columns of attack marched, the one against the right, the other against the left. The latter, which was the principal one, preceded by a fire of artillery, soon closed upon the Spanish troops, and Blake’s guns opened from his centre and right; but an ammunition-waggon blowing up was the signal for a panic, which, commencing on the left, reached to all parts of the line. The Spanish general then made a charge of cavalry, to retrieve the day, but it was easily repulsed, and the confusion that followed is thus described by himself:—“One regiment fled without firing a shot; it was followed by another, and a third, all flying without having discharged a gun; and, in a few moments, the whole position was abandoned.”—“Thus we, the generals and officers, were left alone, without being able to rally a body which could make any opposition; and I had the mortification to see our army dispersed, abandoning all its baggage, and throwing away its arms, and even its clothes, before a single corps of the enemy; nor were we able to avail ourselves of the defence of any strong place, as it was impossible to collect two hundred men to make head against the enemy.”
Blake, although a bad general, was a man of real courage: stung to the quick by this disgrace, he reproached his troops with bitterness, demanded an inquiry into his own conduct, and, with a strong and sincere feeling of honour, restored to the junta the estate which had been conferred upon him for the success at Alcanitz.
This battle and the pursuit, in which Suchet took about four thousand prisoners, and all the artillery, ammunition, and baggage of the Spaniards, not only made him master of the operations in Aragon, but also rendered the fifth corps, under Mortier, who were now at Valladolid, completely disposable for offensive operations. Thus, on the 1st of July, there were, exclusive of Kellerman’s and Bonnet’s divisions, three complete corps d’armée, furnishing six thousand cavalry and fifty thousand infantry, collected between Astorga, Zamora, and Valladolid. The inroad on Portugal had failed, and the loss of Gallicia followed; but Napoleon’s admirable system of invasion was unbroken. His troops, deprived of his presiding genius, had been stricken severely and shrunk from further aggression; they had been too widely spread for a secure grasp, but the reaction disclosed all the innate strength of his arrangements.