CHAPTER II.
It was the advanced guard of the fourth corps that had approached Merida with the intention of proceeding to Badajos, and the emperor was, as we have seen, preparing to follow: but, in the night of the 26th of December, an officer carrying [Appendix, No. 2], sections 1 and 2. the intelligence of Moore’s movement, reached Merida, and, next morning, the French fell back, and marching hastily to the Tagus, crossed it, and rejoined their main body, from which another powerful detachment was immediately directed upon Placentia. This retrograde movement obviated the immediate danger; and sir John Cradock endeavoured to pacify the people of Lisbon.
He ordered general Stewart’s brigade, strengthened by two German battalions, to halt at Santarem. He explained his own motives to the Portuguese, and urged the regency to a more frank and vigorous system than they had hitherto followed; for, like the Spanish juntas, they promised every thing, and performed nothing; neither would they, although [Appendix, No. 3], section 5. consenting, verbally, to all the measures proposed, ever commit themselves by writing, having the despicable intention of afterwards disclaiming that which might prove disagreeable to the populace, or even to the French. Sir John Cradock, however, had no power beyond his own personal influence to enforce attention to his wishes. No successor to sir Charles Cotton had yet arrived, and Mr. Villiers seems to have wanted the decision and judgement required to meet such a momentous crisis.
In the north general Cameron, having sent the sick men and part of the stores from Almeida towards Oporto, gave up that fortress to sir Robert Wilson; and, on the 5th of January, marched, with two British battalions and a detachment of convalescents, by the Tras os Montes to join the army in Spain. On the 9th, hearing of sir John Moore’s retreat to Coruña, he would have returned to Almeida, but Lapisse, who had taken Zamora, threatened to intercept the line of march; wherefore, Cameron turned towards Lamego, giving notice of his movement to sir Robert Wilson, and advising him also to retire to the same place. Colonel Blunt, with seven companies of the 3d regiment, escorting a convoy for sir John Moore’s army, was likewise forced to abandon his route, and take the road to Oporto, on which town every thing British in the north of Portugal was now directed.
Notwithstanding the general dismay, sir Robert Wilson rejected Cameron’s advice, and, being reinforced by some Spanish troops, Portuguese volunteers, and straggling convalescents, belonging to Moore’s army, proceeded to put in practice all the arts of an able partizan. Issuing proclamations, enticing the French to desert, spreading false reports of his numbers, and, by petty enterprizes and great activity, arousing a spirit of resistance throughout the Ciudad Rodrigo country.
The continued influx of sick and stores at Oporto, together with the prospect of general Cameron’s arrival there, became a source of uneasiness to sir John Cradock. Oporto, with a shifting-bar and shoal water is the worst possible harbour for vessels to clear out, and one of the most dangerous for vessels to lie off, at that season of the year; hence, if the enemy advanced in force, a great loss, both of men and stores, was to be anticipated.
The departure of sir Charles Cotton had diminished the naval means at captain Halket’s disposal, and, for seventeen successive days, such was the state of Sir John Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS. the wind that no vessel could leave the Tagus; he, however, contrived at last to send tonnage for two thousand persons, and undertook to keep a sloop of war off Oporto. Sir Samuel Hood also despatched some vessels from Vigo, but the weather continued for a long time so unfavourable that these transports could not enter the harbour of Oporto, and the encumbrances hourly increasing, at last produced the most serious embarrassments.
Sir John Moore having now relinquished his communications with Portugal, sir John Cradock had to consider how, relying on his own resources, he could best fulfil his instructions and maintain his hold of that country, without risking the utter destruction of the troops intrusted to his care.
For an inferior army Portugal has no defensible frontier. The rivers, generally running east and west, are fordable in most places, subject to sudden rises and falls, offering but weak lines of resistance; and with the exception of the Zezere, presenting no obstacles to the advance of an enemy penetrating by the eastern frontier. The mountains, indeed, afford many fine and some impregnable positions, but such is the length of the frontier line and the difficulty of lateral communications, that a general who should attempt to defend it against superior forces would risk to be cut off from the capital, if he concentrated his troops; and if he extended them his line would be immediately broken.
The possession of Lisbon constitutes, in fact, the possession of Portugal, south of the Duero, and an inferior army can only protect Lisbon by keeping close to that capital. Sensible of this truth, sir John Cradock adopted the French colonel Vincente’s views for the defence of Lisbon; and proceeded, on the 4th of January, with seventeen hundred men to occupy the heights behind the creek of Saccavem—leaving, however, three thousand men in the forts and batteries at Lisbon.
At the earnest request of the regency, who in return promised to assemble the native troops at Thomar, Abrantes, and Vilha Velha, general Stewart’s brigade, two thousand seven hundred strong, Sir J. Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS. was ordered to halt at Santarem. But it had been marching incessantly for a month, and in the rain, the men’s clothes were worn out, their accoutrements nearly destroyed, and in common with the rest of the army, they were suffering severely from the want of shoes.
Thus, Cameron being on the Douro, the main body between Santarem and Lisbon, and colonel Kemmis at Elvas, with the fortieth regiment, an army of ten thousand men—with the encumbrances of an army of forty thousand—was placed on the three points of a triangle, the shortest side of which was above a hundred and fifty miles. The general commanding could not bring into the field above five thousand men; nor could that number be assembled in a condition for service at any one point of the frontier, under three weeks or a month; moreover, the uncertainty of remaining in the country at all, rendered it difficult to feed the troops, for the commissaries being unable to make large contracts for a fixed time, were forced to carry on, as it were, a retail system of supply.
Mr. Frere, however, with indefatigable folly, was urging sir John Cradock to make a diversion in Spain; and while Mr. Frere was calling for troops in the south, Mr. Villiers was as earnest that a force might be sent by sea to Vigo. The minister’s instructions prescribed the preservation of Lisbon, Elvas, and Almeida; the assembling, in concert with the Portuguese government, a combined force on the frontier, and the sending succours of men to Moore; but although sir John Cradock’s means were so scanty that the fulfilment of any one of these objects was scarcely possible, Mr. Canning writing officially to Mr. Villiers at this epoch, as if a mighty and well supplied army was in Portugal, enforced the “necessity of continuing to maintain possession of Portugal, as long as could be done with the force intrusted to sir John Cradock’s command, remembering always that not the defence of Portugal alone, but the employment of the enemy’s military force, and the diversion which would be thus created in favour of the south of Spain, were objects not to be abandoned, except in case of the most extreme necessity.” The enemy’s military force! It was three hundred thousand men, and this despatch was a pompous absurdity; but the ministers and their agents, eternally haunted by the phantoms of Spanish and Portuguese armies, were incapable of perceiving the palpable bulk and substance of the French hosts. The whole system of the cabinet was one of shifts and expedients; every week produced a fresh project,—minister and agent, alike, followed his own views, without reference to any fixed principle: and the generals were the only persons not empowered to arrange military operations.
The number of officers despatched to seek information of the French movements enabled sir John Cradock, notwithstanding the direct communications were cut off, to obtain intelligence of Moore’s advance towards Sahagun, and being still anxious to assist that general, he again endeavoured to send a reinforcement into Spain, by the route of Almeida; but the difficulty of obtaining supplies finally induced him to accede to Mr. Villiers’ wishes, and he shipped six hundred cavalry, and Sir J. Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS. thirteen hundred infantry, on the 12th of January, meaning to send them to Vigo; the vessels were, however, still in the river, when authentic intelligence of sir John Moore’s retreat upon Coruña with the intention of embarking there, was received, and rendered this project useless.
The 14th of January the Conqueror line-of-battle-ship, having admiral Berkeley on board, reached the Tagus, and for the first time since sir John Cradock’s Paper, MSS. Cradock took the command of the troops in Portugal, he received a communication from the ministers in England.
It now appeared that their thoughts were less intently fixed upon the defence of Portugal, than upon getting possession of Cadiz. Their anxiety upon this subject had somewhat subsided after the battle of Vimeira, but it revived with greater vigour when sir John Moore, contemplating a movement in the south, suggested the propriety of securing Cadiz as a place of arms; and in January an expedition was prepared to sail for that town, with the design of establishing a new base of operations for the English army. The project failed, but the transaction deserves notice, as affording proof of the perplexed and unstable policy of the day.
NEGOTIATION FOR THE OCCUPATION OF CADIZ.
Papers laid before Parliament, 1810.
While it was still unknown in England that the supreme junta had fled from Aranjuez, sir George Smith, who had conducted Spencer’s negotiation in 1808, was sent to Cadiz to prepare the way for the reception of an English garrison. Four thousand men destined for that service were soon afterwards embarked at Portsmouth, under the command of general Sherbrooke, but this officer’s instructions were repeatedly altered. He was first directed to touch at Lisbon in his way to Cadiz; he was afterwards commanded to make for Coruña, to receive orders from sir John Moore, but, on the 14th of January, his force being increased to five thousand men, he sailed under his first instructions; and Mr. Frere was directed to negotiate for the admission of these troops into Cadiz, as the only condition upon which a British army could be employed to aid the Spanish cause in that part of the Peninsula.
When the reverses in the north of Spain became known, the importance of Cadiz increased, and the importance of Portugal decreased in the eyes of the English ministers. Sir John Cradock was [Appendix, No. 8]. then made acquainted with Sherbrooke’s destination; he was himself commanded to obey any requisition for troops that might be made by the [Appendix, No. 5]. Spanish junta; and so independent of the real state of affairs were the ministerial arrangements, that Cradock, whose despatches had been one continued complaint of his inability to procure horses for his own artillery, was directed to furnish them for Sherbrooke’s.
Sir George Smith, a man somewhat hasty, but of remarkable zeal and acuteness, left England about the middle of December; and, on his arrival at Cadiz, at once discovered that there, as in every other part of the Peninsula, all persons being engaged in theories or intrigues, nothing useful for defence was executed. The ramparts of the city were in tolerable condition, but scarcely any guns were mounted; and yet, two miles in front of the town, an outwork had been commenced upon such a scale that it could not possibly be finished under four months; and, after the slow mode of Spanish proceedings, would have taken as many years to complete.
For a solid defence of all the fortifications, sir George Smith judged that twenty thousand good troops would be requisite, but that ten thousand would suffice for the city. There were, however, only five thousand militia and volunteers in the place, and not a regular soldier under arms, neither any within reach. The number of guns mounted and to be mounted exceeded four hundred; to serve them, two hundred and fifty peasants and volunteers were enrolled, and, being clothed in uniforms, were called artillery-men.
Knowing nothing of sir John Moore’s march to Sahagun, sir George Smith naturally calculated upon the immediate approach of the French; and seeing the helpless state of Cadiz, and being assured that the people would willingly admit an English garrison, he wrote to sir John Cradock for troops. The latter, little thinking that, at such a conjuncture, the supreme junta would be more Sir J. Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS. jealous of their allies than fearful of their enemies; and judging also, from the tenor of his latest instructions, that obedience to this requisition would be consonant to the minister’s wishes, immediately ordered colonel Kemmis to proceed from Elvas with the fortieth regiment, by the route of Seville, and, at the same time, embarked about three thousand of the best troops at Lisbon, and sent them to Cadiz. This force, commanded by major-general Mackenzie, sailed the 2d February, and reached their destination the 5th of the same month.
Parl. Papers, 1810.
Meanwhile, Mr. Frere, although acquainted with the sailing of Mackenzie’s armament, was ignorant that sir George Smith had applied to the governor of Cadiz for permission to take military possession of that town, for Smith had no instructions to correspond with Mr. Frere; and the latter had opened a separate negotiation with the central [Appendix, No. 9]. junta at Seville, in which he endeavoured to pave the way for the occupation by proposing to have the troops admitted as guests, and he sent Mr. Stuart to arrange this with the local authorities.
Mr. Frere had, however, meddled much with the personal intrigues of the day: he was, moreover, of too slender a capacity to uphold the dignity and just influence of a great power on such an occasion; and the flimsy thread of his negotiation snapped under the hasty touch of sir George Smith. The supreme junta, averse to every thing that threatened to interrupt their course of sluggish indolence, had sent the marquis de Villel, a member of their own body, to Cadiz, avowedly to prepare the way for the admission of the troops, but, in reality, to thwart that measure. The circumstance of Mackenzie’s arrival, with an object different from that announced by Mr. Frere, was instantly taken advantage of to charge England with treachery. For the junta, knowing Mr. Frere to be their own dupe, Parl. Papers, 1810. believed, or affected to believe, that he was also the dupe of the English minister; and that the whole transaction was an artifice, on the part of the latter, to get possession of the city with a felonious intent.
The admission of the British troops was nevertheless earnestly desired by the inhabitants of Cadiz, and of the neighbouring towns; and this feeling was so well understood by Mr. Stuart and sir George Smith, that they would, notwithstanding the reluctance of the supreme junta, have brought the affair to a good conclusion; but, at the most critical period of the negotiation, the former was sent on a secret mission to Vienna, by the way of Trieste, and the latter, who was in bad health, dying about the same period, the negotiation failed for want of a head to conduct it.
General Mackenzie, like sir George Smith, thought that the object might be attained: he observed, indeed, that the people, far from suspecting any danger, were ignorant of, or incredulous of the reverses in the north; that nothing had been done towards equipping the fleet for sea; and that, notwithstanding the earnest remonstrances of admiral Purvis and Mr. Stuart, the Spaniards would neither work themselves nor permit the English sailors to work for them. Still the general feeling was favourable to the British army, and the good wishes of the inhabitants were openly avowed: Mackenzie had, however, only a negative power, the affair being in the hands of Mr. Frere.
In the course of the negotiations carried on by that minister, the supreme junta proposed,
1º.—That the troops should land at Port St. Mary’s, and be quartered there and in the neighbouring towns.
2º.—That they should join Cuesta’s army.
3º.—That they should go to Catalonia.
4º.—That they should be parcelled out in small divisions, and attached to the different Spanish armies.
Nay, untaught by their repeated disasters, and pretending to hold the English soldiery cheap, these self-sufficient men proposed that the British should garrison the minor fortresses on the coast, in order to release an equal number of Spaniards for the field.
Mr. Frere wished to accept the first of these proposals, but general Mackenzie, sir George Smith, and Mr. Stuart agreed that it would be injurious for many reasons; not the least urgent of which was, that as the troops could not have been embarked again without some national dishonour, they must have marched towards Cuesta, and thus have been involved in the campaign without obtaining that which was their sole object, the possession of Cadiz as a place of arms.
Mr. Frere then suggested a modification of the second proposal, namely, to leave a small garrison in Cadiz, and to join Cuesta with the remainder of the troops. Sir G. Smith was dead; Mr. Stuart had embarked for Trieste; and general Mackenzie, reluctant to oppose Mr. Frere’s wishes, consented to march, if the necessary equipments for his force could be procured; but he observed, that the plan was contrary to his instructions, and to the known wishes of the English government, and liable, in part, to the objections against the first proposition.
His letter was written the 18th of February, and on the 22d a popular tumult commenced in Cadiz.
The supreme junta, to prove that that city did not require an English garrison, had ordered two regiments, composed of Poles, Germans, and Swiss, prisoners or deserters from the French, to march there. The people, aware that the junta disliked and intended to disarm the volunteers, were offended that deserters should be trusted in preference to themselves. They arose, and stopped the courier, with despatches from Seville, and imprisoned the marquis of Villel, who was obnoxious, because, while mild to persons suspected of favouring the French, he had been harsh, or rather brutal, in his conduct to some ladies of rank in Cadiz.
The populace, proceeding from one violence to another, endeavoured to kill the state prisoners; and being prevented in this bloody object, committed several excesses, and murdered don Joseph Heredia, the collector of the public rents. During the tumult, which lasted two days, the disembarkation of the English troops was repeatedly called for by the mob; and two British officers being sent on shore as mediators, were received with enthusiasm, and obeyed with respect, a manifest proof of the correct view taken by sir George Smith.
The 24th, tranquillity was restored; and the 25th, general Mackenzie, not having received from Mr. Frere an answer to his letter of the 18th, suggested, that of the three English battalions then in the harbour, [Appendix, No. 9]. two should be placed in Cadiz; and that the third, proceeding to Seville, should there unite with the 40th regiment, and both together march to join Cuesta.
Mr. Frere, however, instead of addressing the junta with an authority and dignity becoming the representative of a great nation, on whose support the independence of the whole Peninsula rested, had been endeavouring to gain his end by subtlety. The object was one that England had a right to seek, and the Spanish rulers no right to refuse; for the people wished to further it, and the threat of an appeal to them would soon have silenced the feeble negative of such a despicable and suspected government; but Mr. Frere, incapable of taking a single and enlarged view, was pressing and discussing, with the secretary of the junta, a variety of trifling points, as if to shew his epistolary dexterity; and, finally, when his opponent had conceded the point of admitting troops at all, broke off the negotiation, upon the question, as to whether the number to be admitted should be one or two thousand men, as if the way to drive a wedge was with the broad end foremost.
Self baffled in that quarter, the British plenipotentiary, turning towards Cuesta, the avowed enemy of the junta, and one much feared by them, sought to secure his assistance by holding out the lure of having a British force added to his command, but the sarcastic old general derided the diplomatist. “Although I do not,” said he, “discover any great difficulty in the actual state of things, which should Parl. Papers, 1810. prevent his British majesty’s troops from garrisoning Cadiz under such terms, and for the purpose which your excellency proposes; I am far from supposing that the supreme junta, which is fully persuaded of the importance of our union with England, is not grounded in its objections; and your excellency knows that it is sufficient that they should have them, to prevent my giving any opinion on so important a measure, unless they should consult me. With regard to the 4,300 men, which your excellency is pleased to mention, there is no doubt that I stand in need of them; but I flatter myself, England, sensible of the importance of Estremadura, will even lend me much greater assistance, particularly if, from any change of circumstances, the supreme junta should no longer manifest the repugnance we speak of.”
This answer having frustrated the projected intrigue, Mr. Frere, conscious perhaps of diplomatic incapacity, returned with renewed ardour to the task of directing the military affairs, in every part of the Peninsula. He had seen an intercepted letter of Soult’s, addressed to the king, in which the project of penetrating into Portugal was mentioned; and immediately concluding that general Mackenzie’s troops would be wanted for the defence of that kingdom, counselled him to abandon Cadiz and return to Lisbon; but the general, who knew that, even should he return, a successful defence of Portugal with so few troops would be impossible, and that every precaution was already taken for an embarkation in the last extremity, observed, that “the danger of Lisbon rendered the occupation of Cadiz more important.”
General Mackenzie’s reply was written the 26th of February. On the 3d of March he received another despatch from Mr. Frere. Cadiz, and the [Appendix, No. 9]. danger of Portugal, seemed to have passed from the writer’s mind, and were unnoticed; but entering into a minutely inaccurate statement of the situation of the French and Spanish armies, he observed, that Soult having failed in an attempt to penetrate Portugal by the Minho, it was impossible, from the position of the Spanish forces, assisted as they were by the Portuguese, that he could persevere in his plan. Wherefore, he proposed that the British force then in the harbour of Cadiz should proceed immediately [Appendix, No. 8]. to Tarragona, to aid Reding; and this wild scheme was only frustrated by an unexpected despatch from sir John Cradock, recalling the troops to Lisbon.
They arrived there on the 12th of March; and thus ended a transaction clearly indicating an unsettled policy, shallow combinations, and a bad choice of agents on the part of the English cabinet, and a most unwise and unworthy disposition in the supreme junta. General Mackenzie attributed the jealousy of the latter to French influence; Mr. Frere to the abrupt proceedings of sir George Smith, and to fear, lest the junta of Seville, who were continually on the watch to recover their ancient power, should represent the admission of the British troops as a treasonable proceeding on the part of the supreme government. It is, however, evident that the true cause was the false position in which the English ministers had originally placed themselves, by inundating Spain with arms and money, without at the same time asserting a just influence, and making their assistance the price of good order and useful exertion.