CHAPTER III.
The effort made to secure Cadiz was an act of disinterested zeal on the part of sir John Cradock. The absence of his best troops exposed him to the most galling peevishness from the regency, and to the grossest insults from the populace. With his reduced force, he could not expect to hold even a contracted position at the extremity of the rock of Lisbon against the weakest army likely to invade Portugal; and, as there was neither a native force nor a government to be depended upon, there remained for him only the prospect of a forced and, consequently, disgraceful embarkation, and the undeserved obloquy that never fails to follow disaster.
In this disagreeable situation, as Elvas and Almeida no longer contained British troops, the general’s attention was necessarily fixed upon Lisbon and Oporto. The violence of the gales rendered the latter a sealed port; but the hospitals and magazines of Almeida, and even of Salamanca, being evacuated upon Lamego, that town was crowded with fifteen hundred sick men, besides escorts, and the hourly accumulating stores. The river had overflowed its banks, the craft could not ply; and one large boat, attempting to descend, was overset, and eighty persons, soldiers and others, perished.
General Cameron, hearing of this confusion, relinquished the idea of embarking his detachment at Oporto, and, re-crossing the Douro, made for Lisbon, where he arrived the beginning of February with about two thousand men; but they were worn down by fatigue, having marched eight hundred miles under continued rains.
Sir Robert Wilson sent his guns to Abrantes, by the road of Idanha Nova; but, partly from a spirit [Appendix, No. 6], sect. 1. of adventure, partly from an erroneous idea that sir John Cradock wished him to defend the frontier, he remained with his infantry in the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo. His force had been increased by a Spanish detachment under don Carlos d’España, and by some volunteers; but it was still weak, and his operations were necessarily confined to a few trifling skirmishes: yet, like many others, his imagination [Appendix, No. 6], sect. 1. so far outstripped his judgement that, when he had only felt the advanced post of a single division, he expressed his conviction that the French were going to abandon Spain altogether.
Sir John Cradock entertained no such false expectations; he was informed of the battle of Coruña and the death of Moore; he knew too well the vigour and talent of that general to doubt that he had been oppressed by an overwhelming force; he knew that Zaragoza had fallen, and that twenty-five thousand French troops were thus free to act in other quarters; he knew that Soult, with at least twenty thousand men, was on the Minho; that Romana was incapable of making any head, that Portugal was one wide scene of helpless confusion, and that a French army was again in the neighbourhood of Merida, threatening Lisbon by the line of the Tagus; in fine, that his own embarrassments were hourly increasing, and that the moment was arrived when the safety of his troops must become the chief consideration.
The tenor of the few despatches he had received from England led him to suppose that the ministers [Appendix, No. 10], sect. 1. designed to abandon Portugal; but, as their intentions on that head were never clearly explained, he resolved to abide by the literal interpretation of his first instructions, and to keep his hold of the country as long as it was possible to do so without risking the utter destruction of his army. To avoid that danger, he put every incumbrance at Lisbon on board the transports in the Tagus, proceeded to dismantle the batteries at the mouth of the river, and, in concert with the admiral, made preparations for carrying away or destroying the military and naval stores in the arsenal. At the same time, he renewed his efforts to embark the sick men and stores at Oporto; but the weather continued so unfavourable that he was finally obliged to remove the invalids and many stores by land, yet he could not procure carriages for the whole.
After the arrival of Cameron’s detachment, the effective British force under arms, including convalescents and fifteen hundred stragglers from sir John [Appendix, No. 11]. Moore’s army, was about eight thousand men; but, when the security of the forts and magazines, and the tranquillity of Lisbon, was provided for, only five thousand men, and those not in the best order, could be brought into the field. As this force was infinitely too weak to cover such a town as Lisbon, the general judged that it would be unwise to take up a position in advance, whence he should be obliged to retreat through the midst of a turbulent and excited population, which had already given too many indications of ill-temper to leave any doubt of its hostility under such circumstances. He, therefore, came to the resolution of withdrawing from Saccavem and Lisbon, and concentrating his whole force on a position at Passa D’Arcos, near the mouth of the [Appendix, No. 10], sect. 2 and 3. river, where he could embark with least danger, and where he had the best chance of defending himself, if necessary, against superior numbers.
This reasoning was sound, and Cradock’s intention was, undoubtedly, not to abandon the country, unless driven from it by force, or in pursuance of orders from England: but his arrangements seem to have carried more the appearance of alarm than was either politic or necessary; for the position of Passa D’Arcos might have been prepared, and the means necessary for an embarkation secured, and yet the bulk of the troops kept in advance until the last moment. To display a bold and confident front in war is, of all things, the most essential, as well to impose upon friends as upon enemies; and sir John Cradock did not fail to experience the truth of this maxim.
The population of Lisbon, alarmed by the reverses in Spain, and yet, like all the people in the Peninsula, confident in their own prowess and resolution until the very moment of attack, became extremely exasperated; and the regency, partly from their natural folly and insincerity, but more from the dread of the lower orders, countenanced, if they did not instigate, the latter to commit excesses, and to interrupt the proceedings of the British naval and military authorities.
[Appendix, No. 3], sect. 5.
Although the measures of precaution relative to the forts had originated with the regency, they now formally protested against them; and, with a view to hamper the general, encouraged their subalterns to make many false and even ridiculous charges against the British executive officers; and it would appear that the remonstrances of the admiral and generals were but imperfectly supported by Mr. Villiers.
In this manner the people’s violence was nourished until the city was filled with tumult; mobs, armed with English pikes and muskets, collected night and [Appendix, No. 3], section 6. day in the streets and on the high-roads, and, under the pretext of seeking for, and killing, Frenchmen, attacked, indiscriminately, all foreigners, even those in the British service and wearing the British uniform. The guards, who endeavoured to protect the victims of this ferocity, were insulted. Couriers, passing with despatches, were intercepted and deprived of their papers; English officers were outraged in the streets; and such was the audacity of the people that the artillery was placed in the squares, in expectation of an affray. In fine, the state of Lisbon was similar to what it had been at the period of Junot’s convention; and, if the British had abandoned the country at this time, they would have been assailed with as much obloquy by the Portuguese, for, such has been, and will be, the fate of all unsuccessful auxiliaries: a reflection that should render historians cautious of adopting accusations upon the authority of native writers on the like occasions.
This spirit was not confined to Lisbon. In Oporto the disposition to insult the British was more openly encouraged than in the capital, and the government of the multitude was more decidedly [Appendix, No. 3], section 6. pronounced. From the cities it spread to the villages. The people of the Alemtejo frontier were, indeed, remarkably apathetic; but, from the Minho to the Tagus, the country was in horrible confusion; [Appendix, No. 3], section 6. the soldiers were scattered, without regard to military system, and, being unpaid, lived at free quarters; the peasantry of the country assembling in bands, and the populace of the towns in mobs, intercepted the communications, appointed or displaced the generals at their pleasure, and massacred all persons of whom they were suspicious. The ammunition which had been supplied from England was wasted, by constant firing in token of insubordination; and, as if the very genius of confusion was abroad, some of the British troops, [Appendix, No. 6], section 2. principally malingerers,[3] of sir John Moore’s army, added their quota of misconduct, to increase the general distress.
The leading instigator of the excesses at Oporto was one Raymundo, a coadjutor and creature of the bishop’s, a turbulent and cruel fellow, who, by taking a share in the first insurrection against the French, obtained a momentary influence, and has since been elevated, by a very credulous writer, into a patriotic hero. He was, however, a worthless coward, fitted for secret villany, but incapable of a noble action.
This state of affairs, productive of so much misery and danger, continuing, without intermission, caused many of the upper classes to despair of their country’s safety by war, and increased the number of those who, wishing to attach themselves to the fortune of France, were ready to accept of a foreign prince for their sovereign, if, with him, they could obtain tranquillity and an ameliorated constitution; and when, soon afterwards, the edge of the enemy’s sword, falling upon the senseless multitude, filled the streets of Oporto with blood, there was a powerful French party already established in Portugal. The bulk of the people were, however, stanch in their country’s cause; they were furious and disorderly, but imbued with hatred of the French; ready at the call of honour; and susceptible of discipline, without any loss of energy.
The turbulence of the citizens, the remonstrances of the regency, and the representations of Mr. Villiers, who was in doubt for the personal safety of the British subjects residing in Lisbon, convinced sir John Cradock that political circumspection and adroitness were as important as military arrangement, to prevent a catastrophe at this critical period; and, as contrary to what might have been expected, the enemy had not yet made any actual movement across the frontier, he was induced to suspend his design of falling back to Passa D’Arcos; and in this unsettled state affairs remained until March, when intelligence arriving that the French fleet was at sea, two of the line-of-battle ships in the Tagus were despatched to reinforce sir Thomas Duckworth’s squadron, and the batteries at the mouth of the river were again armed.
Meanwhile, Soult was making progress in the north; the anarchy at Oporto was continually increasing, and the English government had certainly come to the resolution of abandoning Portugal if the enemy advanced; for, although sir John Cradock was not informed of their views, an officer in England, well acquainted with Portuguese customs, actually received orders, and was embarking, to aid the execution of this measure, when, suddenly, the policy of the cabinet once more changed, and it was resolved to reinforce the army. This resolution, which may be attributed partly to the Austrian war, partly to the failure at Cadiz, and partly to the necessity of satisfying public opinion in England, was accompanied by a measure judicious in principle and of infinite importance, inasmuch as it formed the first solid basis on which to build a reasonable hope of success.
The Portuguese government, whether spontaneously or brought thereto by previous negotiation, [Appendix, No. 6]. had offered the command of all the native troops to an English general,—with power to alter and amend the military discipline, to appoint British officers to the command of the regiments, and to act, without control, in any manner he should judge fitting to ameliorate the condition of the Portuguese army; and this was the more important, because the military polity of Portugal, although fallen into neglect, was severe, precise, and admirably calculated to draw forth the whole strength of the kingdom, for the regular army could be completed by coercion, and the militia were bound to assemble in regiments, numbered, clothed, and armed like the regulars, but only liable to serve within the frontier. The whole of the remaining population, capable of bearing arms, were enrolled under the name of ordenanças, numbered by battalions in their different districts and obliged, under very severe punishments, to assemble at the order of the local magistrates either to work, to fight, or to assist the operations of the other forces.
The English government, accepting of this offer, agreed to supply arms, ammunition, and other succours, granted a subsidy for the payment of the regular forces, and thus obtained, for the first time, a firm hold of the military resources of Portugal, and a position in the Peninsula suitable to the dignity of England and to the great contest in which she was engaged.
The Portuguese government wished that sir Arthur Wellesley should be their general; and the English cabinet offered the situation to him, but he refused it; and it is said, that sir John Doyle, sir John Murray, (he who afterwards failed at Tarragona,) general Beresford, and even the marquis of Hastings, then earl of Moira, sought for the appointment. The last was, undoubtedly, a man well fitted by his courtly manners, his high rank, and his real talents, both in the cabinet and in the field, for such an office; but powerful parliamentary interest prevailing, major-general Beresford was appointed, to the great discontent of many officers of superior rank, who were displeased that a man, without any visible claim to superiority, should be placed over their heads.
Information of this change was instantly conveyed to sir John Cradock, and general Sherbrooke was ordered to put into Lisbon. The latter was overtaken at the mouth of Cadiz harbour; and his and general Mackenzie’s divisions arriving in the Tagus together, on the 12th of March, gave a new turn to the affairs of Portugal. But if Mr. Frere’s plan had been pursued—If general Sherbrooke’s troops had not [Appendix, No. 8]. been detained by bad weather at sea—If the first had proceeded to Tarragona, and nothing but a foul wind prevented it—If the second sailing from port to port without any artillery had, as was most probable, been engaged in some other enterprise—If Victor, obeying his orders, had marched to Abrantes—If any one of these events had happened, sir John Cradock must have abandoned Portugal; and then how infinitely absurd these proceedings of the English ministers would have appeared, and how justly their puerile combinations would have been the scorn of Europe.
Marshal Beresford arrived at Lisbon the beginning of March; and having received the confirmation of his power from the regency, fixed his head-quarters at Thomar, collected the Portuguese troops in masses, and proceeded to recast their system on the model of the British army; commencing, with stern but wholesome rigour, a reform that, in process of time, raised out of chaos an obedient, well disciplined, and gallant army, worthy of a high place among the best in Europe; for the Portuguese people, though easily misled and excited to wrath, are of a docile and orderly disposition, and very sensible of a just and honourable conduct in their officers. But this reform was not effected at once, nor without many crosses and difficulties being raised by the higher orders and by the government—difficulties that general Beresford could never have overcome, if he had not been directed, sustained, and shielded, by the master spirit under whom he was destined to work.
The plan of giving to English officers the command of the Portuguese troops was at first proceeded on with caution; but after a time, the ground being supposed safe, it was gradually enlarged, until almost all the military situations of emolument and importance were held by Englishmen; and this, combined with other causes, gave rise to numerous intrigues, not entirely confined to the natives, and as we shall find, in after times, seriously threatening the power of the marshal, the existence of the British influence, and the success of the war.
Sir John Cradock’s situation was now materially alleviated. The certainty of the Austrian war produced a marked change in the disposition of the regency. The arrival of Sherbrooke’s and Mackenzie’s divisions having increased the British force to fourteen thousand men, the populace became more cautious of offering insults; and, about the middle of March, two thousand men being left to maintain tranquillity in Lisbon, the remainder of the army was encamped at Lumiar and Saccavem; and while these things were passing at Lisbon, the aspect of affairs changed also in other parts of the kingdom. For, the bulk of the Portuguese regular troops, amounting to ten or twelve thousand men, was collected by marshal Beresford, between the Tagus and the Mondego.
Beyond the valley of the Mondego, colonel Trant commanded a small corps of volunteers, students from the university; and general Vittoria was at the head of two regular battalions in Upper Beira.
The bishop of Oporto was preparing to defend that town, with a mixed, but ferocious and insubordinate multitude. General Sylveira, with four or five thousand men, had taken post in the Tras os Montes; and Romana, who had collected seven or eight thousand at Monterey, was in communication with him.
Sir Robert Wilson was at the head of about three thousand men; he had withdrawn the legion from Almeida, sent a detachment to Bejar, and remained himself on the Agueda, watching the advanced posts of Lapisse. A few Portuguese regiments were extended from Salvatierra and Idanha to Alcantara. There was a permanent bridge of boats over the Tagus at Abrantes, and there were small garrisons in that town and at Elvas.
But all these forces united would not, with the exception of the British, have been capable of sustaining the shock of ten thousand French soldiers for half an hour; and the whole mass of the latter, then hanging on the frontier of Portugal, was above fifty thousand. Gathering like clouds on the horizon, they threatened many points, but gave no certain indication of where the storm would break. Soult, indeed, with about twenty thousand men, was endeavouring to pass the Minho; but Lapisse, although constantly menacing Ciudad Rodrigo, kept his principal masses at Salamanca and Ledesma; while Victor had concentrated his between the Alberche and the Tietar.
Thus Lapisse might join either Soult or Victor; and the latter could march by Placentia against Ciudad Rodrigo, while Soult attacked Oporto; or he might draw Lapisse to him, and penetrate Portugal by Alcantara. He might pass the Tagus, attack Cuesta, and pursue him to Seville; or, after defeating him, he might turn short to the right, and enter the Alemtejo.
In this uncertainty, sir John Cradock, keeping the British concentrated at Lumiar and Saccavem, waited for the enemy to develop his plans, and, in the mean time, endeavoured to procure the necessary equipments for an active campaign. He directed magazines to be formed at Coimbra and Abrantes; urged the regency to exertion; took measures to raise money, and despatched officers to Barbary to procure mules. But while thus engaged, intelligence arrived that Victor had suddenly forced the passage of the Tagus at Almaraz, and was in pursuit of Cuesta on the road to Merida; that Soult, having crossed the Minho, and defeated Romana and Sylveira, was within a few leagues of Oporto; and that Lapisse had made a demonstration of assaulting Ciudad Rodrigo.
The junta of Oporto now vehemently demanded aid from the regency, and the latter, although not much inclined to the bishop’s party, proposed that sir John Cradock should unite a part of the British Sir J. Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS. forces to the Portuguese troops under marshal Beresford, and march to the succour of Oporto. Beresford was averse to trust the Portuguese under his immediate command, among the mutinous multitude in that city, but he thought the whole of the British army should move in a body to Leiria, and from thence either push on to Oporto, or return, according to the events that might occur in the latter town, and he endeavoured to persuade Cradock to follow this plan.
It was doubtful, he said, if Victor and Soult intended to co-operate in a single plan; but, on the [Appendix, No. 12], section 1. supposition that it was so, he considered it essential to drive back or to overcome one before the other could come to his assistance. Victor was then in pursuit of Cuesta; if he continued that pursuit, it must be to enter Seville, or to cripple his opponent previous to the invasion of Portugal; in either case he would be in the Sierra Morena before he could hear of the march from Leiria, and, as Cradock had daily intelligence of Victor’s movements, there would be full time to relieve Oporto, and to return again to the defence of Lisbon. If, however, Soult depended on the co-operation of Victor, he would probably remain on the right of the Duero until the other was on the Tagus, and Lapisse also would be contented for the present with capturing Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida.
This reasoning, so evidently unsound, did not weigh with sir John Cradock, who resolved to preserve his central position, covering the capital at such a distance as to preclude the danger of being cut off from it by one army while he was engaged [Appendix, No. 12], section 2. with another. Lisbon and Oporto, he observed, were the enemy’s objects; the former was of incomparably greater importance than the latter. Portugal was in a state of anarchy equally incompatible with firm resistance and rapid movements. The peasantry were tumultuous and formidable to everybody but the enemy; and Beresford himself acknowledged that the regular forces were mutinous, disregarding their officers, choosing when and where to rest; when to fight, and when to remain in quarters; and altogether unfit to be trusted within the circle of the Oporto mischief. The British troops, therefore, were the only solid resource; but they were too few to divide, and must act in a body, or not at all.
Was it most desirable to protect Lisbon or Oporto? The first was near, the second two hundred miles off; and, although the utmost exertions had been made, the army was not yet equipped for an active campaign. The troops were ill-clothed, and wanted shoes; the artillery was unhorsed; the commissariat possessed only a fourth part of the transport necessary for the conveyance of provisions and ammunition, and no activity could immediately supply these deficiencies, inasmuch as some of the articles required were not to be had in the country, and, to obtain others, the interference of the regency was necessary, but hitherto all applications to that quarter had been without any effect. Was it wise to commence offensive operations in the north? Soult and Lapisse together were estimated at thirty thousand men, of which above five thousand were cavalry, and he himself could only bring fifteen guns and twelve thousand men, of all arms, into the field; yet, if the British army, marched with the avowed intention of relieving Oporto, it must accomplish it, or be dishonoured!
Was it consistent with reason to march two hundred miles in search of a combat, which the very state of Oporto would render it almost impossible to gain, and for an object perhaps already lost? Suspicion was alive all over the country: if Oporto was already taken, the army must come back; that would be the signal for fresh tumults—for renewed cries that the country was to be abandoned; Lisbon would instantly be in a state of insurrection, and would be even more formidable to the British than the enemy; besides, it was impossible to reckon upon Cuesta’s aid in keeping Victor employed. He was personally inimical to the English, and his principal object was to gain time for the increase and discipline of his own force.
Victor was apparently pursuing Cuesta, but his parties had already appeared in the neighbourhood of Badajos, and there was nothing but a weak Portuguese garrison in Elvas to impede his march through the Alemtejo. To cover Lisbon and the Tagus was the wisest plan: fixed in some favourable position, at a prudent distance from that capital, he could wait for the reinforcements he expected from England. He invited the Portuguese troops to unite with him; a short time would suffice to establish subordination, and then the certainty that the capital could not be approached, except in the face of a really-formidable army, would not only keep the enemy in check, but, by obliging him to collect in greater numbers for the attempt, would operate as a diversion in favour of Spain.
The general soundness of this reasoning is apparent, and it must not be objected to sir John Cradock that he disregarded the value of a central position, which might enable him to be beforehand with the enemy in covering Lisbon, if the latter should march on his flank. The difficulty of obtaining true intelligence from the natives and his own want of cavalry rendered it utterly unsafe for him to divide his army, or to trust it any distance from the capital.
Marshal Beresford’s plan, founded on the supposition that Cradock could engage Soult at Oporto, and yet quit him, and return at his pleasure to Lisbon, if Victor advanced, was certainly fallacious; the advantages rested on conjectural, the disadvantages on positive data: it was conjectural that they could relieve Oporto; it was positive that they would endanger Lisbon; the proposition was, however, not made upon partial views. But, at this period, other men, less qualified to advise, pestered sir John Cradock with projects of a different stamp, yet deserving of notice, as showing that the mania for grand operations, which I have before marked as the malady of the time, was still raging.
To make a suitable use of the British army was the object of all these projectors, but there was a marvellous variety in their plans. While the regency desired that the Portuguese and English troops should, without unfurnishing Lisbon, co-operate for the relief of Oporto, and while marshal Beresford recommended that the latter only should march, the bishop was importunate to have a detachment of the British army placed under his command, and he recalled Sir Robert Wilson to the defence of Oporto. It appeared reasonable that the legion should defend the city in which it was raised; but Mr. Frere wrote from Seville that sir Robert could do better where he was; and the latter dreading the anarchy in Oporto, accepted Spanish rank, and refused obedience to the prelate’s orders, yet retained his troops. The regency, however, adopted the Lusitanian legion as a national corps, Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS. and approved of sir Robert’s proceedings. Meanwhile Romana was earnest with sir John Cradock for money, and that a thousand British soldiers might be sent to aid the insurrection at Vigo; and at the same time Mr. Frere and colonel D’Urban, a corresponding officer placed at Cuesta’s head-quarters, proposed other plans of higher pretensions.
Zaragoza, said the latter, has fallen; and ten thousand French troops being thus released, are marching towards Toledo; this is the moment to give a fatal blow to Marshal Victor! It is one of those critical occasions that seldom recur in war! Cradock’s Correspondence, MSS. In a day or two sir Robert Wilson will be on the Tietar with two thousand five hundred men; augment his force with a like number of Portuguese, who may be drawn from Sobreira, Idanha, and Salvatierra. He shall thus turn the right and rear of Victor’s army, and his movement cannot be interrupted by the French force now at Salamanca and Alva; because the communication from thence to the Tagus by the passes of Baños and Tornevecas is sealed up; and while sir Robert Wilson thus gets in the rear of Victor with five thousand men, Cuesta, with twelve thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry, shall attack the latter in front, matter of easy execution; because Cuesta can throw a pontoon bridge over the Tagus, near Almaraz, in an hour and a half; and the Conde de Cartoajal, who is at Manzanares in La Mancha, with ten thousand infantry and two thousand horse, will keep Sebastiani in check. The hope is great, the danger small; and if a few British troops can be added to the force on the Tietar, the success will be infallible.
There were, however, some grave objections to this infallible plan. General Cuesta was near Almaraz; sir John Cradock was at Lisbon, and sir Robert Wilson was at Ciudad Rodrigo. This circuitous line of correspondence being above four hundred miles long, it is not very clear how the combination was to be effected with that rapidity, which was said to be essential to the success. Neither is it very evident, that operations to be combined at such a distance, and executed by soldiers of different nations, would have been successful at all. On the one side, twenty thousand Portuguese and Spanish recruits were to act on double external lines of operation; on the other, twenty-five thousand French veterans waited in a central position, with their front and flanks covered by the Tagus and the Tietar. In such a contest it is possible to conceive a different result from that anticipated by colonel D’Urban.
Mr. Frere’s plans were not less extensive, and he was equally sanguine. When his project for assisting Catalonia had been frustrated, by the recall of general Mackenzie from Cadiz, he turned his attention [Appendix, No. 7]. to the north. Soult, he wrote to sir John Cradock, tired of the resistance he has met with, will probably desist from his “unaccountable project of entering Portugal, and occupying Gallicia at the same time.” Let the British army, therefore, make a push to drive the enemy out of Salamanca, and the neighbouring towns; while the Asturians, on their side, shall take possession of Leon and Astorga, and thus open the communication between the northern and southern provinces.
Fearing, however, that if this proposal should not be adopted, the English general might be at a loss for some enterprise, Mr. Frere also recommended that the British army should march to Alcantara; and that the fortieth regiment, which hitherto he had retained at Seville, contrary to sir John Cradock’s wishes, should join it at that place; and then, the whole operating by the northern bank of the Tagus, might, in concert with Cuesta, “beat the French out of Toledo, and consequently out of Madrid.”
Now, with respect to the first of these plans, Soult never had the intention of holding Gallicia, which was Marshal Ney’s province; but he did propose to penetrate into Portugal, and he was not likely to abandon his purpose; because, the only army capable of opposing him was quitting that kingdom, and making a “push” of four hundred miles to drive Lapisse out of Salamanca; moreover, Muster Rolls of the French Army, MSS. the Asturians were watched by general Bonnet’s division on one side, and by Kellerman on the other; and the fifth corps, not ten, but fifteen thousand strong, having quitted Zaragoza, were at this time in the Valladolid country, and therefore close to Leon and Astorga.
With respect to the operations by the line of the Tagus, which were to drive Joseph out of Madrid, and consequently to attract the attention of all the French corps, it is to be observed, that sir John Cradock could command about twelve thousand men, Cuesta sixteen thousand, Cartoajal twelve thousand, making a total of forty thousand. Now, Soult had twenty-three thousand, Lapisse nine thousand, Victor was at the head of twenty-five thousand, Sebastiani could dispose of fifteen thousand, Mortier of a like number, the King’s guards and the garrison of Madrid were twelve thousand, making a total of nearly a hundred thousand men.
But while Mr. Frere and colonel D’Urban, confiding in Soult’s inactivity, were thus plotting the destruction of Victor and Sebastiani, the first marshal stormed Oporto; the second, unconscious of his danger, crossed the Tagus, and defeated Cuesta’s army at Medellin, and at the same moment Sebastiani routed Cartoajal’s at Ciudad Real.