No. II.
SECTION I.—STATE OF SPAIN.
Colonel Kemmis to sir J. Cradock, December 17, 1808.
“In consequence of the unfavourable news from Spain, yesterday, the populace, in Badajos, murdered a Spanish colonel, and one or two more of note.”
Lieutenant Ellis (an officer employed to gain intelligence) to colonel Kemmis, Loboa, December 27.
“The French entered Truxillo, yesterday, at eleven o’clock; and, from the circumstance of their having reconnoitred the intermediate villages, might be expected to arrive at Merida in two hours after we left it.”
Colonel Kemmis to sir John Cradock, Elvas, December 28.
“Badajos cannot make resistance in any degree, either to check or to stop the progress of the enemy. From the statement made to me, last night, by the governor, they want arms, ammunition, and provisions.”—“The enemy marched into Truxillo, on the 26th, at half-past twelve o’clock in the day; but, at two, on the following morning, a French officer arrived there, and they fell back four leagues.”
Lieutenant Ellis to colonel Kemmis, December 28.
“I proceeded cautiously to Truxillo. The main body of the enemy, six thousand in number, had retired across the bridge of Almaraz, and had not taken the road to Madrid, but had proceeded to Plasencia, leaving behind more than half the requisition for money which had been imposed on the town of Truxillo.”
Mr. Stuart to sir John Moore, Seville, January 2, 1809.
“The corps of four thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry, which had marched from Talavera, and had actually passed the bridge of Almaraz, has fallen back, and is already near Plasencia, on its way northward.”—“The extreme attention of Buonaparte being at this moment directed to the English army, everything which can be collected is opposed to you alone.”
SECTION II.
Mr. Stuart to sir J. Moore, December 27, 1808.
“You will receive, together with this, several letters from Doyle, which describe events in Catalonia no way differing from what we have witnessed in other parts of Spain!”—“The junta have established themselves here, and, whatever may have been the expectation which their alarm on the road may have induced Mr. Frere to form of their future proceedings, a culpable relapse into their former apathy seems susceptible of no other remedies but such as will be much stronger than any Spaniard is likely to adopt.”—“Although Caro promised to write every particular of his conversation with you to the junta, I have hitherto been unable to see his letter. I therefore thought it expedient to put the whole to writing, and, at the same time, to express my conviction both of the justice and propriety of your whole conduct during the late events, when it was impossible, under any circumstances, to have adopted other determination consistently with the safety of the army committed to your charge. Though I doubt if this will stop the clamour which has been raised on the subject; and, though events have probably since taken place, which may materially change the state of affairs, it may be satisfactory to tell you that Mr. Frere appears to enter into the reasons alleged by you, and to feel, in their full force, the motives which induced you to act so cautiously, and to ground no operation on the hope of any effectual support from the Spaniards.”
Mr. Stuart to sir J. Moore, Seville, January 2.
“The president, Florida Blanca, died two days since, and I was in hopes that the junta would have availed themselves of this event to make some change in their government.”—“I see, however, little but good disposition, and am still to look for that energy in rewarding service and punishing treachery which can alone mend matters.”
Mr. Stuart to sir J. Moore, Seville, January 10.
“Reding is at Tarragona, expecting to be attacked, and possessing a force composed chiefly of peasantry, but of which he certainly cannot command above ten thousand men in a situation to face his opponents at any given point.”—“Whittingham arrived here yesterday, last from the duke of Infantados’ head-quarters. He assures me the duke had already twenty thousand men when he left Cuença.”—“On the side of Estremadura, matters are not going on well: Galluzzo, who allowed the enemy to pass the bridges, is here prisoner, and his corps is placed under the command of Cuesta. I cannot say, however, that I see much activity since the change; parties of the enemy cover the country between Madrid and Almaraz, while the corps of six thousand men, which had been pushed forward from Madrid, have, I understand, already passed Plasencia, and probably are on the other side of the Puerto, for the purpose of falling on the Salamanca country, and, if possible, cutting off your communication with Ciudad Rodrigo.”
SECTION III.
Mr. Frere to Mr. Canning, Seville, May 8.
“Besides the advantages which may be looked for from placing so extensive a command under a person of such tried abilities as general Blake, it is to be hoped that it will put an end to the distractions arising from the contracted views of those who directed the provincial junta, particularly that of Valencia, which have been so embarrassing to his predecessors.”
Mr. Frere to Mr. Canning, Seville, July 10, 1809.
“As the devastations which have been committed have, in many instances, deprived the peasants of the means of paying what is due to the proprietors and to the church, a general spirit of resistance to all claims of this kind has begun to show itself.”
Sir John Cradock to lord Castlereagh, December 24, 1808.
“I much fear that alarm and despondency has gained ground about Badajos and that part of Spain, and that there is so little co-operation in the acts of their several juntas, and such a want of subordination and common consent among the armed bodies, to which the defence of the country is entrusted, against such an united force as that of the French, that extreme confusion prevails everywhere.”
Colonel Kemmis to sir John Cradock, Elvas, December 30.
“He (lieutenant Ellis) has been living with general Cuesta for the last two days,”—“who has assured him that the Spanish troops, in Madrid, forced their way through the French army; and he expressed great sorrow in adding that, though a Spanish force is often collected, the smallest check disperses them; that in few instances depôts were provided, and those ill supplied,” &c.—“that, such was the dispersion and flight of the Spanish armies, between Badajos and Madrid, there did not remain a single man.”
Colonel Kemmis to lieut.-colonel Reynel, military secretary to sir John Cradock, Seville, February 7, 1809.
“In passing through the Sierra Morena mountains, where Nature has done much for the defence of this province, it was painful to observe the pitiful works they were about to throw up. In this whole direction there is but one body that has anything like the appearance of a soldier, viz. dismounted cavalry.”
General Mackenzie to sir John Cradock, Cadiz, February 9, 1809.
“The Spaniards here seem lulled in the most fatal security. They are ignorant of the events in the north of Spain, or will not give credit when they do hear them. Vague reports of the emperor of Austria’s having declared war, and Buonaparte’s return to France gains unlimited credit.”—“The equipment of the fleet goes on very slowly, though there is no want of exertion now on the part of admiral Purvis or Mr. Stuart; offers of every assistance are daily made, but they will neither work themselves nor permit our people to work for them. The preparations of the ships for carrying off the French prisoners goes on equally ill.”
Duc de Albuquerque to Mr. Frere, Talavera, July 31, 1809.
“During our marches we stop to repose, like flocks of sheep, without taking up any position, so that, if the enemy knew the condition we were in, they would defeat us wherever they attacked us. If, in the evening of the 26th, I had not gone out directly with my division, and succeeded in checking the enemy, the whole army would have dispersed, and all the artillery and baggage, which were in the streets of St. Ollalla, would have been lost; and as a proof of what would have happened, had not the enemy, who was within musket-shot, been checked, for many had already thrown away their arms, &c. the commissaries abandoning more than fifteen hundred rations of bread, the carts occupying and blocking up the streets of the town; and to this, I repeat, we are daily exposed, as we march, as if it were on a pilgrimage, without any regard to distance, order, or method, and with the whole parc of artillery, which ought always to remain at the distance of two, three, or more leagues.”
Sir Arthur Wellesley to lord Wellesley, Merida, September 1, 1809.
“I am much afraid, from what I have seen of the proceedings of the central junta, that, in the distribution of their forces, they do not consider military defence and military operations so much as they do political intrigue and the attainment of trifling political objects.”
Lord Wellesley to Mr. Canning, Seville, September 2, 1809.
“While the intelligence received from sir Arthur Wellesley, to the date of the 24th instant, continued to furnish irresistible proofs of the failure of every promise or effort made by this government for the immediate relief of our troops, no satisfaction was afforded to me respecting any permanent plan for their future supply.”—“The troops of Portugal, which entered Spain, under general Beresford, suffered similar distress, and experienced similar ill-treatment; although the efforts of Portugal, in the cause of Spain, have been as gratuitous as those of Great Britain; and although Spain possesses no claim, of any description, to the aid of a Portuguese army.”—“In this calamity, the people of Spain cannot fail to acknowledge the natural consequences of their own weakness, nor to discover the urgent necessity of enforcing a more steady, pure, and vigorous system, both of council and action. A relaxed state of domestic government and an indolent reliance on the activity of foreign assistance have endangered all the high and virtuous objects for which Spain has armed and bled. It must now be evident that no alliance can protect her from the inevitable result of internal disorder and national infirmity. She must amend and strengthen her government; she must improve the administration of her resources, and the structure and discipline of her armies, before she can become capable of deriving benefit from foreign aid. Spain has proved untrue to our alliance, because she is not true to herself.”—“Until some great change shall be effected in the conduct of the military resources of Spain, and in the state of her armies, no British army can safely attempt to co-operate with the Spanish troops in the territory of Spain.”