No. III.
JUSTIFICATORY EXTRACTS FROM SIR J. CRADOCK’s CORRESPONDENCE, MSS.
SECTION I.—STATE OF PORTUGAL.
Sir J. Cradock to sir R. Wilson, Oporto, December 8, 1808.
“I press this measure” (to move the legion from Oporto to Villa Real) “upon your adoption, for many reasons, &c. &c.; but the more especially that it will give an impulse to military preparation in general, and tend to eradicate the notion that, since the evacuation of Portugal by the French, the prospect of a future war is at an end.”
Sir J. Cradock to sir John Moore, December 9, 1808.
“I have pressed the adoption of such measures as appeared most likely to revive some notion of danger, and the necessity of activity and energy.”
Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, December 14, 1808, Lisbon.
“The inaction of the regency was apparent at Oporto to a lamentable degree; and, though I saw general Bernadim Friere, I could not gain from him any information as to the state or numbers of the Portuguese troops, where they were stationed, or who commanded them. I apprehend, from his conversation, that the general officers are all of equal authority; and that even seniority had not its usual effect. He concluded his observations to me with the strong expression, ‘That, from the evacuation of Portugal by the French, the nation had thought all war at an end.’”
Sir J. Cradock to sir J. Moore, December 28, 1808.
“Mr. Villiers and myself have both concurred upon the absolute necessity to arouse and animate the Portuguese to some sense of their situation.”
Colonel Kemmis to sir J. Cradock, Elvas, December 30, 1808.
“The apathy of the Portuguese is not to be expressed. Their general, Leite, is a most excellent character: a theorist, and, like his countrymen, supine.”
Extract from the Report of lieutenant Brotherton, (an officer employed to obtain intelligence in the north of Portugal,) February 11, 1809. Head-quarters of Romana’s army.
“From the totally defenceless state in which the two northern provinces are left, it will require at least eight days (I speak from authority) to prepare any thing like adequate means of defence.”
SECTION II.—LUSITANIAN LEGION.
Lord Castlereagh to sir J. Cradock, November 27, 1808.
“Its formation was proposed by the chevalier de Souza.”—“The pay, allowances, and clothing were settled by the chevalier de Souza. The former regulated, as I understood, upon the scale of increased pay, which the provisional government of Oporto had adopted for all the troops they were in progress of levying.”
Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, December 24, 1808.
“I have considerable doubt if ever they” (the legion) “can be incorporated, with effect and conciliation, with the body of the Portuguese army.”—“They are viewed with extreme jealousy by the regency; and the commanding officers of the Portuguese battalion resisted, universally, the allowing of volunteers from their regiments to enter into the legion.”
Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, January 19, 1809.
“The Lusitanian legion continues to give considerable uneasiness, from its peculiar state, under present circumstances.”
Captain Morgan (Lusitanian legion) to sir J. Cradock, January 19, 1809.
“Should a retreat be adopted, sir Robert would not retire to Oporto. It is the government of a mob, of which he has had too much experience.”
SECTION III.—PORTUGUESE ARMY.
Sir J. Cradock to sir J. Moore, December 9, 1808.
“I am sorry to state that I find, as far as my limited observation reaches, the Portuguese army, and every other military concern, in the worst possible state.”
Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, December 18, 1809.
“I am sure that the state of the Portuguese army is quite misunderstood in England; and that a reliance is placed upon it for the defence of the country that is entirely without foundation. Their” (Portuguese) “ministers will avow this to you after ten minutes’ conversation.”—“Even of the reduced numbers of their men enrolled, (not amounting to twenty thousand, at the very highest computation,) to make any thing out of them, it is necessary to recur to first principles, and give them officers, arms, clothing, accoutrements, horses, &c.; and I need not say that money is wanting to effect this: and the ministers positively declare that they have none; and that no collection of their forces can take place, much less a movement to the frontier, without a supply.”—“M. Forjas, secretary to the government, in answer to a strong question from me, stated that their army have not in possession ten thousand firelocks fit for use.”
Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, December 24, 1808.
“I am exerting myself to bring to account ‘the supposed Portuguese army.’”—“Your lordship will perceive that I talk of the regulars as if it were a regular force; but I should be guilty of a deceit, that might lead to bad consequences, if I did not fairly state that I conceive them to be of no moment at this time.”
Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, January 8, 1809.
“I am ready to go to the utmost verge of prudence; but Mr. Frere, when he talks of Portuguese troops and arrangements, really (as I believe you will allow) fait bâtir les châteaux.”
Major-general Cotton to sir J. Cradock, April 7, 1809.
“I yesterday inspected the Portuguese cavalry.”—“This cavalry is unformed, and totally unfit for any sort of service.”
Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, February 12.
“It appears that a report has reached your lordship that a conscription for horses in this country had been attended with great effect, and that above three thousand had been collected. It is, indeed, a matter of serious concern that such serious misrepresentations should be transmitted; for it is a well-known fact that many of the Portuguese regiments of cavalry are without horses; and, if I am to pursue the subject, their battalions of infantry are one-half without arms or clothing! But the total want of all means of regulations for subsistence from so deplorable a view, in the event of co-operation, that the result, in my opinion, cannot be attended with success. It is, however, but justice to say, that the disposition of the Portuguese seems well-inclined and faithful to the common cause; and that a very efficient soldiery may be formed under more favourable circumstances.”
Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Frere, February 27, 1809.
“I fear that your excellency is led to entertain a more favourable notion of the efficacy of the Portuguese army than, in any shape, it is entitled. In short, my opinion is that they want every thing that constitutes a respectable force, except about ten thousand English arms. I believe they have no others. Many of their cavalry regiments are without horses, without swords, pistols, &c. Their battalions are not clothed; and, as to subsistence, they live at free quarters upon the villages where they are stationed. To take the field with effect, or an assurance of food, seems to me out of the question. Since the first moment of my arrival, I wished to procure the advance of a small Portuguese force to Alcantara; but it has been impossible. It is a matter of serious lamentation that such mis-representations of the Portuguese force should go home, or reach your excellency.”
Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, April 3.
“No reliance whatever can be placed upon the Portuguese troops in their present state. If I said that the whole were ready to mutiny or revolt, I believe I speak general Beresford’s sentiments. They will not be commanded by their own officers and they do just as they please.”
SECTION IV.—CONDUCT OF THE REGENCY—TREATMENT OF FRENCH PRISONERS.
Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, January 26, 1809.
“I have hitherto directed that these prisoners should be subsisted at our charge, but I have no authority in this measure; they are in a most deplorable state, and really are a disgrace to all concerned.”
Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, February 5, 1809.
“It is absolutely necessary that the regency should give in an answer about the French prisoners. The whole is an unauthorised heavy charge, for which I give my warrant; and I see no end to the case: and, added to this, their situation is a reflection upon humanity.”
SECTION V.—NEGLECT, DUPLICITY, AND TIMIDITY.
Colonel Kemmis to sir J. Cradock, Elvas, December 17.
“Lalippe, on which the very existence of Elvas depends, has not been supplied with provisions as I have been taught to expect.”
Colonel Kemmis to sir J. Cradock, Elvas, December 25.
“The great importance of this fort” (Lalippe) “is well known to the Portuguese; and, therefore, they are jealous, notwithstanding the miserable condition of their troops, and total incapacity to defend the fort, if attacked.”
Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, December 26, 1808.
“The promises and apparently satisfactory language of the Portuguese government are, in my opinion, by no means sufficient to meet the case. I want to see some steps actually taken before my mind is decided that the nation will defend itself.”—“Indeed, I am told, on good authority, that the government are afraid to allow the people to arm.”—“The moment I see any materials to work upon, it will be my most anxious duty to give every effect, &c.”—“But, under the present inactivity and indifference, it is, &c.”
Reports of colonel Donkin (quarter-master-general) to Sir J. Cradock, March 21.
“I cannot, however, order officers of my department to check this irregularity” (forcing quarters) “when it originates solely in the neglect of the Portuguese civil magistrates; for troops will not obey orders, which expose them wantonly to great privations.”
Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, March 25.
“I have repeately urged this subject” (quarters of troops) “to the regency, in the strongest manner, but, as you perceive, without effect.”
Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, March 17.
“Whatever suits the momentary purpose, upon the most superficial view, seems to be the guide in the Portuguese councils. Ultimate objects, which, in the course of things, must arrive, are never brought into the calculation.”
Cradock to Berkely, January 17.
“The regency seem to decline giving any specific directions relative to the guns in fort St. Julian and the river batteries, and, above all, not to write any thing; but they are very willing to acquiesce in any thing we shall do, only anxious that, on a future day, it shall appear to be our act, not theirs.”
Admiral Berkely to sir J. Cradock, February 19, 1809.
“I imagine Mr. Villiers has transmitted a copy of the extraordinary note sent him by the regency; in which they complain of the conduct of the artillery-officer who dismantled the Bugio fort, and intimate their intention of sending for all the guns and powder from fort St. Julian; and add many particulars, as novel as they are suspicious.”—“Whether the language of this note arises from duplicity, or any other cause, it is equally to be resisted; and, therefore, stated some facts which may be retorted upon them, and which will not place their conduct in the most favourable point of view towards either their own sovereign or Great Britain.”
Extract from an official note, drawn up by sir John Cradock, Lisbon, February 20, 1809.
“It was told me, two or three times, by Mr. Villiers, that M. Forjas, or some other member of the regency, had expressed extreme solicitude about the forts on the Tagus, &c.”—“ I always urged Mr. Villiers to get from M. Forjas, or any other member, a declaration of what they wished, that we might exactly conform to it; for they seemed to be anxious to go beyond what we should venture to propose. Mr. Villiers, after some time, told me that the Portuguese government were unwilling to put down any thing upon paper, or give any specific instruction; but they would willingly leave all the arrangement to us.”—“After the above statement, which I declare, upon my honour, to be the accurate description of what has passed, I must express my surprise, and even indignation, at the protest now made by the regency; and when it is considered that the Bugio fort is often inaccessible for a week together, this part of their complaint is shameful to the highest degree. Their general object is, however, to be distinguished.”
SECTION VI.—ANARCHY IN PORTUGAL.
Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, February 20, 1809.
“Northern parts.—It may be difficult to manage any money-transactions in Oporto, for the populace in that town have been suffered to become the masters; and it was by an exchange of public and private property that the commissariat money has been lately secured.”
Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, February, 1809.
“To gratify a mob, the other day, at Oporto, a guard of the sixtieth regiment was given up, and disarmed by baron Eben.”
Captain Brotherton to sir J. Cradock, March 17, 1809, Lamego.
“Considering the tumults, and the state of effervescence of the public mind, and the blind fury of the populace—it will neither be useful nor safe to remain amongst them.”
Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, March 26, 1809.
“The disposition is good, but the proceedings are those of an ungovernable mob, exposed to the evil effects of designing persons.”—“I confine myself to the north of Portugal and Oporto, for the same excesses have not taken place at this side the Douro; but the principles of insubordination, I should fear, would prevail.”—“If the confusion and anarchy that prevail at Oporto will permit a defence some exertion may be expected.”—“Ammunition has been abundantly supplied, but no quantity would meet the consumption expended in the manner it has been in the Tras os Montes; an attempt to save which was, I believe, the occasion of Bernadim Friere’s death.”
Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, March 30, 1809.
“The anarchy that prevails at Oporto must, I fear, render every exertion unavailable for defence; and such is the ungovernable spirit of the populace, that it is very difficult to say what part they might take if the proceedings of the British did not suit their views.”
Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Frere, March 29.
“Oporto and all its concerns, with the bishop, nominally, at its head, is in the hands of a wild ungovernable populace, that has already committed the most cruel excesses. I fear the same spirit exists in what is called the Portuguese army.”
Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Frere, January 29, Lisbon.
“Without a British force in Lisbon, the authority of the regency would pass away, and the scenes of Oporto would take place here.”
Report of captain Lawson, January 30, Lisbon.
“Last night, my servant returning from the post-office was attacked by a party of Portuguese pike-men, headed by one of their own officers, who severely wounded the horse in two places, and slightly in several places, and obliged him, the servant, to put himself under the protection of the guard at the town-major’s office, to save his own life: the outrage was committed without the slightest provocation.”
General Langwerth to sir J. Cradock, February 1, Lisbon.
“The orderly, with the general orders, on his way to St. Julian’s, was stopped by a Portuguese sergeant and twenty men with pikes; the sergeant forced the orderly to deliver the letter containing the orders, broke it open, read the contents, and returned the enclosed receipt; the same guard stopped captain Clives, Royal Grenadier army, and lieutenants Beurman and Liners; these officers were in full uniform.”
General Sontag’s Official Report, February 3.
“Mr. Usher, deputy purveyor, and Mr. M’Carty, interpreter, both British subjects, arrived this day from Oporto, went to Moore’s Hotel, where they were arrested and brought to the minister of police. Mr. Usher was in his British uniform.”
Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, January 30.
“Some unpleasant incidents have lately occurred on the part of the Portuguese armed inhabitants of Lisbon towards British individuals, but I cannot persuade myself that they have proceeded from any fixed evil disposition.”—“The British army has not, in any instance, departed from the most regular discipline, and continues to manifest the greatest temper and moderation.”—“The excesses on the part of the Portuguese commence by an uncontrolled pursuit, without any authority from the police, after all persons whom they please to call Frenchmen, and, in their indiscriminate career, they often attack every foreigner, and will not even abstain from those in our service. Those persons seek refuge in our guard-room, and though the guards and patroles have positive orders not to interfere under any pretext with the police, yet it is very difficult to smother the feelings of humanity when the wretched persons are flying from a furious and unauthorised rabble. Mr. Villiers has exerted himself much with the Regency to check this disorder, and prevent the assembly of armed persons in the streets at night, who beat drums and discharge their pieces at all hours; but as yet his remonstrances have not had the desired effect.”
Mr. Villiers to sir J. Cradock, January 30.
“Finding the people beat to arms, and paraded about the streets after dark, on the very evening after the regency had settled that these irregularities should be restrained, I addressed the ministers of the home department upon the subject; and as other excesses came to my knowledge, I followed up my complaint.”
Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, January 30.
“I have, this morning, been taking such steps as appear necessary to secure our general situation from insult; and, at the same time, if practicable, not to manifest a distrust in the Portuguese nation, which, if sanctioned from head-quarters, would destroy any reason for our being here. I can assure you, every officer and soldier has received impressions that it is most difficult to act against, but I am determined to persevere in keeping the army from aggression to the last moment.”
Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers, February.
“When I reflect upon the frequent declarations of individual members of the regency, that they cannot control the populace; that there are at least seventy thousand armed inhabitants in Lisbon; that the regency dare not let them parade (their exercise has been at an end for some time, and the regency, at this moment, say they cannot look upon themselves as responsible,) it appears impossible that I should depart from the reasoning of my own mind, to meet a sensation of I do not know whom, and lessen the proper military appearance of our only guard. We are now beyond the power of surprise or insult, and I cannot, as my own individual act, alter the state of things. However, I never am devoted to my own way of thinking, and if you recommend the measure (the political reasoning, when the enemy is at a distance, may always be weighed against military regulation), or see any good consequences, I will immediately order back the guns to their former station in the artillery barracks.”
Marshal Beresford to sir J. Cradock, April 7, Santarem.
“I, this morning, met no less than three expresses, communicating to me the horrible state of mutiny, for I can call it no less, in which the troops every where are, and the inhabitants are in equal insubordination, and they encourage each other. I find two or three regiments have marched away (to what they call to oppose the enemy) where they pleased, in despite of their officers and generals, who are entirely commanded by them. This you will say is a pleasing state to be in; however, we must face it, and I hope for the best result, and I am sanguine enough to look for such. Colonel Trant will shortly have a pretty strong corps, if the regiments continue thus to volunteer for him.”
Mr. Villiers to sir J. Cradock, February 15.
“I should almost doubt whether the British subjects could be left in safety in Lisbon.”
SECTION VII.—FALSE INTELLIGENCE.
Sir J. Cradock to colonel Donkin.
“I believe it is certain that we cannot depend upon the activity of the Portuguese government upon this head,” (intelligence,) “either as to promptitude or security.”
Colonel Donkin to sir J. Cradock, January 1, Lisbon.
“Experience has shewn how utterly impossible it is to get correct intelligence here; an enemy may be within four or five days march of this city before it is known, unless he attacks on the very line our troops occupy.”
Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Frere, March 29.
“It is singular how imperfectly all intelligence, though of such important events, reaches this, and we have not had, for two days, any account from Oporto.”
Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, March 26.
“Yesterday the chevalier de Castro stated, from authority, a movement on the part of the French, quite different from a direct report from the junta of Badajos.”