CHAPTER IX.
The presence of the enemy, in the heart of the country, embarrassed the finances, and the Regency Mr. Stuart’s Papers. MSS.applied to England for an additional subsidy. Mr. Stuart, seeing the extreme distress, took upon himself to direct the house of Sampayo to furnish provisions to the troops on the credit of the first subsidy; he also made the greatest exertions to feed the fugitive inhabitants, forty thousand of whom arrived before the 13th of October, and others were hourly coming in, destitute and starving. Corn, purchased at any price, was sought for in all countries; from Ireland, America, and Egypt; and one thousand tons of government shipping were lent to merchants to fetch grain from Algiers. One commission of citizens was formed to facilitate the obtaining cattle and corn from the northern provinces; another to regulate the transport of provisions to the army, and to push a trade with Spain through the Alemtejo. Small craft were sent up the Tagus to carry off both the inhabitants and their stock, from the islands and from the left bank, and post-vessels were established along the coast to Oporto. Bullion and jewels were put on board the men of war, a proclamation was issued, calling upon the people to be tranquil, and a strong police was established to enforce this object. Finally, to supply the deficiency of tonnage created by the sending off the transports in search of corn, an embargo was laid upon the port of Lisbon; it was strongly protested against by the Americans, but an imperious necessity ruled.
All these measures were vehemently opposed by the Patriarch and his faction; and that nothing might be wanting to shew how entirely the fate of the Peninsula depended, in that hour, upon lord Wellington’s firmness, the fears of the British cabinet, which had been encreasing as the crisis approached, were now plainly disclosed. During the retreat from the north, affairs seemed so gloomy to the eyes of some officers of rank, that their correspondence bore evidence of their feelings; and the letters of general Spencer and general Charles Stewart appeared so desponding to lord Liverpool, that he transmitted them to lord Wellington, and, by earnestly demanding an opinion upon their contents, shewed how deeply they had disturbed his own mind.
Thus beset on every side, the English general rose like a giant. Without noticing either the arguments or the forebodings in these letters, he took a calm historical review of the grounds upon which he had undertaken the defence of Portugal, and which he had before pointed out to the minister he was addressing; then shewing that, up to that period, his views had been in every instance borne out by the results, he demonstrated that it was reasonable to confide in his judgement of what was to come. Having thus vindicated his own prudence and foresight by irresistible facts, he proceeded to trace the probable course of future events, entered largely into both his own and the enemy’s designs, and with such a judgement and sagacity that the subsequent course of the war never belied his anticipations. This remarkable letter exists, and, were all other records of lord Wellington’s genius to be lost, it would alone suffice to vindicate his great reputation to posterity.
Having with conscious superiority replied to his own government, he, with a fierceness rendered necessary by the crisis, turned upon the patriarch and his coadjutors. Reproaching them for their unpatriotic, foolish, and deceitful conduct, he told Appendix, [No. V.] Section 3.them plainly, that they were unfaithful servants of their country and their prince, and threatened to withdraw the British army altogether, if the practices of which he complained were not amended.
“The king of England and the prince regent of Portugal had,” he said, “entrusted him with the conduct of the military operations, and he would not suffer any person to interfere. He knew what to do, and he would not alter his plans to meet the senseless suggestions of the Regency. Let the latter look to their own duties! Let them provide food for the army and the people, and keep the capital tranquil.” “With principal Souza,” he said, “it was not possible to act, and, if that person continued in power, the country would be lost. Either the principal or himself must quit their employments; if himself, he would take care that the world should know the reasons; meanwhile he would address the prince upon the conduct of the Regency.”
Appendix [No. V.] Section 4.
“He had hoped,” he resumed in another letter, “that the Portuguese government was satisfied with his acts, and that instead of endeavouring to render all defence useless by disturbing the minds of the populace at Lisbon, they would have adopted measures to secure the tranquillity of that capital. But, like other weak individuals, they added duplicity to weakness, and their past expressions of approbation and gratitude he supposed were intended to convey censure. All he asked from them was to preserve tranquillity, to provide food for their own troops while employed in the Lines, and to be prepared, in case of disaster, to save those persons and their families who were obnoxious to the enemy.” “I have,” he said “little doubt of final success, but I have fought a sufficient number of battles to know, that the result of any is not certain, even with the best arrangements.” These reproaches were neither too severe nor ill-timed, for the war had been hanging in even balance, and the weight of interested folly thus thrown in by the Regency, was beginning to sink the scale. Yet to shew the justice of lord Wellington’s complaints, it is necessary to resume the thread of those intrigues which have been before touched upon.
Appendix [No. V.] Section 8.
Instead of performing their own duties, the government assumed, that the struggle could be maintained on the frontier, and when they should have been removing the people and the provisions from the line of retreat, they were discussing the expediency of military operations which were quite impracticable. When convinced of their error by facts, they threw the burthen of driving the country upon the general, although they knew that he was ignorant even of the names and places of abode of those officers and magistrates who were to execute it, and that there was but one Portuguese agent at head-quarters to give assistance in translating the necessary orders.
When this was remarked to them, they issued the orders themselves, but made the execution referable to the general, without his knowledge, and well knowing that he had no means of communicating with the country people, and this at the very moment of the enemy’s advance. The battle of Busaco, by delaying the French army, alone enabled the orders even to reach the persons to whom they were addressed. But it was the object of the Regency, by nourishing and soothing the national indolence, to throw the odium of harsh and rigorous measures upon the British authorities. Lord Wellington, however, while he reproached them for this conduct, never shrunk from the odium; he avowed himself, in his proclamations, the author of the plan for wasting the country, and he was willing the Regency should shelter themselves under his name, but he was not willing to lose the fruit of his responsibility, or, that those whose courage did shrink from the trial, “should seek popularity with the populace at the expense of the best interests of the country.”
After the disputes which followed the fall of Almeida, the English government convinced that a more secure and powerful grasp must be taken of Portugal, insisted, at the instance of lord Wellington, that their envoy, Mr. Stuart, should have a seat in the Regency, and that the subsidy should be placed under the control of the British instead of the native authorities. The 2d of October, Mr. Stuart took his seat, and together with doctor Noguera, the Conde de Redondo, and the marquis Olhao (the former of whom was decidedly averse to the Souzas’ faction, and the two latter moderate in their conduct) proceeded to control the intrigues and violence of the Patriarch and principal Souza. It was full time, for both were formally protesting against the destruction of the mills in Beira, and vigorously opposing every measure proposed by lord Wellington. They were deeply offended by the suppression of the Lusitanian legion, which about this time was incorporated with the regular forces; and they had openly declared, that the Portuguese troops should not retreat from the frontiers, and that if the enemy obliged the British army to embark, not a native, whether soldier or citizen, should go with it. When the allies, notwithstanding this, fell back to the Lines, Souza proposed that the Regency should fly to the Algarves, which being indignantly protested against by Mr. Stuart, Souza threatened to quit the government. The dispute was then referred to lord Wellington, and, on the 6th of October, drew from him those severe expressions of which an abstract has been given above.
Meanwhile, the restless Principal pursued his designs with activity, and, in conjunction with his brothers and the Patriarch, established a regular and systematic opposition to lord Wellington’s plans of defence. Factious in council, they were also clamorous out of doors, where many echoed their sentiments, from anger at some wanton ravages, that, in despite of the general’s utmost efforts, had marked the retreat. They courted the mob of Lisbon servilely and grossly; and Antonio Souza getting the superintendence of the succours for the fugitive population, became the avowed patron of all persons preferring complaints. He took pains to stimulate and exasperate the public griefs, and to exaggerate the causes of them, frequently hinting that the Portuguese people and not the British army had formerly driven out the French. All these calumnies being echoed by the numerous friends and partisans of the caballers, and by the fidalgos, who endeavoured to spread discontent as widely as possible; there wanted but slight encouragement from the Brazils, to form a national party, and openly attack the conduct of the war.
To obtain this encouragement, Raymundo, the old tool of the party in the Oporto violences, was sent to the court of Rio Janeiro, to excite the prince regent against lord Wellington; and the Patriarch himself wrote to the prince of Wales and to the duke of Sussex, thinking to incense them also against the English general. The extent and nature of the intrigues may be estimated from a revelation made at the time by baron Eben, and by the editor of a Lisbon newspaper, called the Brazilienza.
Those persons abandoning the faction, asserted that the Patriarch, the Souzas, and (while he remained in Portugal) the ex-plenipotentiary, Mr. Villiers, were personally opposed to lord Wellington, marshal Beresford, and Mr. de Forjas, and had sought to remove them from their situations, and to get the duke of Brunswick appointed generallissimo in Portugal; that they had also endeavoured to engage the duke of Sussex to take a leading part, but that his royal highness had repulsed them at the outset; that their plan was to engage a newspaper to be their organ in London, as the Brazilienza was to have been in Lisbon; that in their correspondence lord Wellington was designated under the name of Alberoni; lord Wellesley, Lama; Beresford, Ferugem; Mr. Stuart, Labre; the Patriarch, Saxe; Antonio Souza, Lamberti; colonel Bunbury and Mr. Peel, then under secretaries of state, as Thin and By-Thin. That after Mr. Villier’s departure, the intrigue was continued by the Patriarch and the Souzas, but upon a different plan; for, overborne by the vigour of Mr. Stuart in the council, they agreed to refrain from openly opposing either him or Forjas, but resolved to write down what either might utter, and transmit, that which suited their purpose, to the Conde de Linhares and the chevalier Souza; these persons undertaking to represent the information so received, after their own fashion, to the cabinets of St. James’ and Rio Janeiro.
The violent temper of the Patriarch unfitted him to execute this plan; he made open display of his hostility to the English general; and it is worthy of observation that, while thus thwarting every measure necessary to resist the enemy, his faction did not hesitate to exercise the most odious injustice and cruelty against those whom they denominated well-wishers to the French. By a decree of the prince regent’s, dated the 20th of March, 1809, private denunciations in cases of disaffection, were permitted, the informer’s name to be kept secret; and in September, 1810, this infamous system, although strenuously opposed by Mr. Stuart, was acted upon, and many persons suddenly sent to the islands, and others thrown into dungeons. Some might have been guilty; and the government pretended that a traitorous correspondence with the enemy was carried on through a London house, which they indicated; but it does not appear that a direct crime was brought home to any, and it is certain that many innocent persons were oppressed.
All these things shewing that vigorous measures were necessary to prevent the ruin of the general cause, lord Wellesley dealt so with the Brazilian court, that every intrigue there was soon crushed, lord Wellington’s power in Portugal confirmed, and his proceedings approved of. Authority was also given him to dismiss or to retain Antonio Souza and even to remove lord Strangford, the British envoy at Rio Janeiro, if it suited him so to do. The subsidies were placed under his and Mr. Stuart’s control; admiral Berkeley was appointed to a seat in the Regency; and, in fine, Portugal was reduced to the condition of a vassal state. A policy which could never have been attempted, however necessary, if the people at large had not been willing to acquiesce; but firm in their attachment to independence and abhorring the invaders, they submitted cheerfully to this temporary assumption of command, and fully justified the sagacity of the man, who thus dared to grasp at the whole power of Portugal with one hand, while he kept the power of France at bay with the other.
Although so strongly armed, lord Wellington removed no person, but with equal prudence and moderation reserved the exercise of this great authority until further provocation should render it absolutely necessary. But this remedy for the disorders above related was not perfected for a long time, nor until after a most alarming crisis of affairs had been brought on by the conduct of the Lisbon cabal.
From the strength of the Lines, it is plain that offensive operations were far more to be dreaded on the left, than on the right bank of the Tagus. In the Alemtejo, the enemy could more easily subsist, more effectually operate to the injury of Lisbon, and more securely retreat upon his own resources. Now lord Wellington had repeatedly urged the Regency to oblige the inhabitants to abandon their dwellings, and carry off their herds and grain, especially those near the banks, and on the numerous islands in the river, and above all things to destroy or remove every boat. To carry this into effect a commission had been appointed, but so many delays and obstacles were interposed by the Patriarch and his coadjutors, that the commissioners did not leave Lisbon until the enemy were close upon that river; both banks Appendix, [No. V.] Section 5.being still stocked with cattle and corn, and what was worse forty large boats on the right side, by which the French immediately made themselves masters of the islands, especially of Lizirias, where they obtained abundance of provisions. But while the Regency thus provided for the enemy, they left the fortresses of Palmella, St. Felippe de Setuval, and Abrantes with empty magazines.
Lord Wellington thinking that the ordenança on the left bank, of whom four hundred were armed with English muskets and furnished with three pieces of artillery, would be sufficient to repel plundering parties attempting to cross the Tagus, was unwilling to spare men from the Lines. He wanted numbers there and he also judged that the ordenança would, if once assisted by a regular force, leave the war to their allies. But Antonio Souza was continually urging the planting of ambuscades, and other like frivolities, upon the left bank of the Tagus; and as his opinions were spread abroad by his party, the governor of Setuval adopted the idea, and suddenly advanced with his garrison to Salvatierra on the river side.
This ridiculous movement attracted the enemy’s attention, and lord Wellington fearing they would pass over a detachment, disperse the Portuguese troops, and seize Setuval before it could be succoured, peremptorily ordered the governor to return to that fortress. This retrograde movement caused the dispersion of the ordenança, and consternation reigned in the Alemtejo. The supply of grain coming from Spain was stopped, the chain of communications broken, and, the alarm spreading to Lisbon, there was no remedy but to send general Fane, with some guns and Portuguese cavalry, that could be ill spared from the Lines, to that side. Fane immediately destroyed all the boats he could find, hastened the removal of provisions, and patrolling the banks of the river as high as the mouth of the Zezere, kept a strict watch upon the enemy’s movements.
Other embarrassments were however continually arising. The number of prisoners in Lisbon had accumulated so as to become a serious inconvenience; because, for some reason which does not appear, the English Admiralty would not permit them to be transported to England in ships of war, and other vessels could not be spared. About this time also admiral Berkeley, whose elaborate report the year before, stated that, although the enemy should seize the heights of Almada, he could not injure the fleet in the river, now admitted that he was in error; and the engineers were directed to construct secondary lines on that side.
Another formidable evil, arising from the conduct of the Regency, was the state of the Portuguese army. The troops were so ill supplied that more Appendix, [No. V.] Section 7.than once they would have disbanded, had they not been relieved from the British magazines. Ten thousand soldiers of the line deserted between April and December, and the militia and ordenança abandoned their colours in far greater numbers; for, as no remonstrance could induce the Regency to put the laws in force against the delinquents, that which was at first the effect of want became a habit; so that even when regularly fed from the British stores within the Lines, the desertion was alarmingly great.
Notwithstanding the mischiefs thus daily growing up, neither the Patriarch nor the Principal ceased their opposition. The order to fortify the heights of Almada caused a violent altercation in the Regency, and lord Wellington, greatly incensed, denounced them to the Prince Regent; and his letter produced such a paroxysm of anger in the Patriarch, that he personally insulted Mr. Stuart, and vented his passion in the most indecent language against the general. Soon after this, the deplorable state of the finances obliged the government to resort to the dangerous expedient of requisitions in kind for the feeding of the troops: and in that critical moment the Patriarch, whose influence was, from various causes, very great, Appendix, [No. V.] Section 10.took occasion to declare that “he would not suffer burthens to be laid upon the people which were evidently for no other purpose than to nourish the war in the heart of the kingdom.”
But it was his and his coadjutors’ criminal conduct that really nourished the war, for there were ample means to have carried off in time ten-fold the quantity of provisions left for the enemy. Massena could not then have remained a week before the Lines, and his retreat would have been attended with famine and disaster, if the measures previously agreed to by the Regency had been duly executed. Whereas now, the country about Thomar, Torres Novas, Gollegao, and Santarem was absolutely untouched; the inhabitants remained; the mills, but little injured, were quickly repaired, and lord Wellington had the deep mortification to find that his well considered design was frustrated by the very persons from whom he had a right to expect the most zealous support. There was, indeed, every reason to believe that the prince of Esling would be enabled to maintain his positions Appendix, [No. V.] Section 7.until an overwhelming force should arrive from Spain to aid him. “It is heart-breaking,” was the bitter reflection of the British general, “to contemplate the chance of failure from such obstinacy and folly.”