CHAPTER VIII.
From the 1st of October until the 3d, the French army was in disorder. The 4th, Massena resumed his march by Condeixa and Leiria, leaving his sick and wounded, with a slender guard, (in all about four thousand seven hundred men,) at Coimbra. His hospital was established at the convent of Santa Clara, on the left bank of the river, and all the inhabitants, who were averse or unable to reach the Lines, came down from their hiding-places in the mountains. But scarcely had the prince left the city, when Trant, Miller, and Wilson, with nearly ten thousand militia, closed upon his rear, occupying the sierras on both sides of the Mondego, and cutting off all communication with Almeida.
On the evening of the 4th, the French drove the English picquets from Pombal, and, the next morning, pushed so suddenly upon Leiria, as to create some confusion; but the road being crossed at right angles, by a succession of parallel ravines, captain Somers Cocks took advantage of one, to charge the head of the enemy, and checked him until general Anson’s brigade of cavalry, and captain Bull’s troop of artillery, arrived to his support. The French then, forming three columns, endeavoured to bear down the British with the centre, while the others turned the flanks. The ravines were, however, difficult to pass; Bull’s artillery played well into the principal body, and Anson, charging as it emerged from every defile, slew a great number. The British lost three officers and about fifty men, the enemy considerably more, and, in five hours, he did not gain as many miles of ground, although he had thirty-six squadrons opposed to ten. During this delay, Leiria was cleared, and the army retreated; the right by Thomar and Santarem, the centre by Batalha and Rio Mayor, the left by Alcobaça and Obidos, and at the same time a native force, under colonel Blunt, was thrown into Peniché. Massena followed, in one column, by the way of Rio Mayor; but, meanwhile, an exploit, as daring and hardy as any performed by a Partizan officer during the war, convicted him of bad generalship, and shook his plan of invasion to its base.
SURPRISE OF COIMBRA.
Colonel Trant reached Milheada, intending to form a junction with Wilson and Miller; but these last were still distant, and, believing that his own arrival was unknown at Coimbra, he resolved, alone to attack the French in that city. Having surprised a small post at Fornos early in the morning of the 7th, he sent his cavalry, at full gallop, through the streets of Coimbra, with orders to pass the bridge, and cut off all communication with the French army, of whose progress he was ignorant. Meanwhile, his infantry penetrated at different points into the principal parts of the town, and the enemy, astounded, made little or no resistance. The convent of Santa Clara surrendered at discretion, and thus, on the third day after the prince of Esling had quitted the Mondego, his depôts and hospitals, and nearly five thousand prisoners wounded and unwounded, amongst which there was a company of the marines of the imperial guards, fell into the hands of a small militia force! The next day, Miller and Wilson, arriving, spread their men on all the lines of communication, and picked up above three hundred more prisoners, while Trant conducted his to Oporto.
During the first confusion, the Portuguese committed some violence on the prisoners; and the Abbé du Pradt and other French writers have not hesitated to accuse Trant of disgracing his country and his uniform by encouraging this conduct; whereas, his exertions repressed it; and if the fact, that not more than ten men lost their lives under such critical circumstances, was not sufficient Appendix, [No. VIII.]refutation, the falsehood is placed beyond dispute in a letter of thanks, written to colonel Trant, by the French officers who fell into his hands.
This disaster made no change in Massena’s dispositions. He continued his march, and, on the 8th, his advanced guard drove the cavalry picquets out of Rio Mayor. General Slade, who commanded, took no heed of this; and the enemy, pushing rapidly on, was like to have taken the brigade of artillery in Alcoentre; a good deal of confusion ensued, but the royals and the sixteenth drove the French out of the town, sabred many, and made twelve prisoners. The next day the skirmish was renewed with various turns of fortune, but, finally, the British retreated.
Meanwhile the allied army was entering the Lines. The first, fourth, and fifth divisions in the centre by Sobral, the third division on the left by Torres Vedras, and Hill’s corps on the right by Alhandra. The light division and Pack’s brigade should also have entered by Aruda. But Crawfurd, who had reached Alemquer on the 9th, was still there, at three o’clock, p. m. on the 10th. The weather being stormy, the men were placed under cover, and no indication of marching was given by the general. The cavalry had already filed into the Lines; yet no guards were posted, no patroles sent forward, nor any precaution taken against surprise, although the town, situated in a deep ravine, was peculiarly favourable for such an attempt.
Some officers, uneasy at this state of affairs, anxiously watched the height in front, and, about four o’clock, observed some French dragoons on the summit, which was within cannon shot. The alarm was given, and the regiments got under arms, but the posts of assembly had been marked on an open space, very much exposed, and from whence the road led through an ancient gateway to the top of the mountain behind. The enemy’s numbers increased every moment, and they endeavoured to create a belief that their artillery was come up. This feint was easily seen through, but the general desired the regiments to break and re-form on the other side of the archway, out of gun range, and in a moment all was disorder. The baggage animals were still loading, the streets were crowded with the followers of the division, and the whole in one confused mass rushed or were driven headlong to the archway. Several were crushed, and with worse troops, a general panic must have ensued; but the greatest number of the soldiers, ashamed of the order, stood firm in their ranks until the first confusion had abated.
Nevertheless the mischief was sufficiently great, and the enemy’s infantry descending the heights, endeavoured some to turn the town on the left, while others pushed directly through the streets in pursuit, and thus with his front in disorder, and his rear skirmishing, Crawfurd commenced a retreat. The weather was, however, so boisterous that the fire soon ceased, and a few men wounded and the loss of some baggage was all the hurt sustained; yet so uncertain is every thing in war, that this affair had like to have produced the most terrible results in another quarter.
The division, instead of marching by Caregada and Cadafaes, followed the route of Sobral, and was obliged in the night to make a flank march of several miles along the foot of the Lines to gain Aruda, which was meanwhile left open to the enemy. Hence, the cavalry patroles from Villa Franca, meeting some stragglers and followers of the camp near Caregada, were by them told that the light division was cut off, a report confirmed in some measure by the unguarded state of Aruda, and by the presence of the enemy’s scouts on that side. This information alarmed general Hill for the safety of the second line, and the more so that the weakest part was in the vicinity of Aruda; he made a retrograde movement towards Alverca with a view to watch the valley of Calandrix, or to gain the pass of Bucellas according to circumstances. Hence, when the enemy was in full march against the Lines, the front from Alhandra to the forts above Sobral, a distance of eight or nine miles, was quite disgarnished of troops. The true state of affairs was, however, quickly ascertained, and Hill regained Alhandra before day-light on the 11th.
During this time the second and the eighth corps passed Alemquer, the former marching upon Villa Franca, the latter upon Sobral. Reynier’s movements were languid, he did not discover the unguarded state of Alhandra, and his picquets did not enter Villa Franca until the next day; but general Clausel, one of the most distinguished officers in the French army, coming upon Sobral in the dusk with the head of the eighth corps dislodged the troops of the first division, occupied the ridge on which the town is built, and in the night threw up some entrenchments close under the centre of the allies position.
It is however time to give a more detailed description of those celebrated works, improperly called
THE LINES OF TORRES VEDRAS.
Memoranda of the lines, &c. by Col. J. T. Jones, Royal Engineers, printed for private circulation.
It has been already said, that they consisted of three distinct ranges of defence.
The first, extending from Alhandra on the Tagus to the mouth of the Zizandre on the sea-coast, was, following the inflections of the hills, twenty-nine miles long.
The second, traced at a distance varying from six to ten miles in rear of the first, stretched from Quintella on the Tagus to the mouth of the St. Lorenza, being twenty-four miles in length.
The third, intended to cover a forced embarkation, extended from Passo d’Arcos on the Tagus to the tower of Junquera on the coast. Here an outer line, constructed on an opening of three thousand yards, enclosed an entrenched camp designed to cover the embarkation with fewer troops, should the operation be delayed by bad weather; and within this second camp, Fort St. Julian’s (whose high ramparts and deep ditches defied an escalade) was armed and strengthened to enable a rear-guard to protect both itself and the army.
The nearest part of the second line was twenty-four miles from these works at Passo d’Arcos, and some parts of the first line were two long marches distant; but the principal routes led through Lisbon, where measures were taken to retard the enemy and give time for the embarkation.
Of these stupendous Lines, the second, whether regarded for its strength or importance, was undoubtedly the principal, and the others only appendages, the one as a final place of refuge, the other as an advanced work to stem the first violence of the enemy, and to enable the army to take up its ground on the second line without hurry or pressure. Massena having, however, wasted the summer season on the frontiers, the first line acquired such strength, both from labour and from the fall of rain, that lord Wellington resolved to abide his opponent’s charge there.
The ground presented to the French being, as it were, divided into five parts or positions, shall be described in succession from right to left.
1º. From Alhandra to the head of the valley of Calandrix. This distance, of about five miles, was a continuous and lofty ridge, defended by thirteen redoubts, and for two miles rendered inaccessible by a scarp fifteen to twenty feet high, executed along the brow. It was guarded by the British and Portuguese divisions under general Hill, and flanked from the Tagus by a strong flotilla of gun-boats, manned by British seamen.
2º. From the head of the vale of Calandrix to the Pé de Monte. This position, also five miles in length, consisted of two salient mountains forming the valley of Aruda, that town being exactly in the mouth of the pass. Only three feeble redoubts, totally incapable of stopping an enemy for an instant, were constructed here; the defence of the ground was entrusted to general Crawfurd and the light division.
3º. The Monte Agraça. This lofty mountain overtopped the adjacent country in such a manner, that from its summit the whole of the first line could be distinctly observed. The right was separated from the Aruda position, by a deep ravine which led to nothing, the left overlooked the village and valley of Zibreira, and the centre overhung the town of Sobral. The summit of this mountain was crowned by an immense redoubt, mounting twenty-five guns, and having three smaller works, containing nineteen guns, clustered around. The garrisons, amounting to two thousand men, were supplied by Pack’s brigade, and on the reverse of the position, which might be about four miles in length, the fifth division, under general Leith, was posted in reserve.
4º. From the valley of Zibreira to Torres Vedras. This position, seven miles long, was at first without works, because it was only when the rains had set in, that the resolution to defend the first line permanently, was adopted. But the ground being rough and well defined, and the valley in front watered by the Zizandre, now become a considerable river, it presented a fine field of battle for a small army. The first and fourth, and a sixth division formed of troops just arrived from England and from Cadiz, were there posted, under the immediate command of lord Wellington himself; and his head-quarters were fixed at Pero Negro, near the Secorra, a rock, on which a telegraph was erected, communicating with every part of the Lines.
5º. From the heights of Torres Vedras to the mouth of the Zizandre. The right flank of this position and the pass in front of the town of Torres Vedras were secured, first, by one great redoubt, mounting forty guns, and, secondly, by several smaller forts, judiciously planted so as to command all the approaches. From these works to the sea a range of moderate heights were crowned with small forts; but the chief defence there, after the rains had set in, was to be found in the Zizandre, which was not only unfordable, but overflowed its banks, and formed an impassable marsh. A paved road, parallel to the foot of the hills, run along the whole front, that is, from Torres Vedras, by Runa Sobral and Aruda, to Alhandra. This was the nature of the first line of defence; the second was still more formidable.
1º. From the mouth of the St. Lourença to Mafra, a distance of seven miles, there was a range of hills naturally steep, artificially scarped, and covered by a deep, and in many parts impracticable ravine. The salient points were secured by forts, which flanked and commanded the few accessible points; but as this line was extensive, a secondary post was fortified a few miles in the rear, to secure a road leading from Ereceira to Cintra.
2º. On the right of the above line the Tapada, or royal park of Mafra, offered some open ground for an attack. Yet it was strong, and, together with the pass of Mafra, was defended by a system of fourteen redoubts, constructed with great labour and care, well considered with respect to the natural disposition of the ground, and, in some degree, connected with the secondary post spoken of above: in front, the Sierra de Chypre, covered with redoubts, obstructed all approaches to Mafra itself.
3º. From the Tapada to the pass of Bucellas, a space of ten or twelve miles, which formed the middle of the second line, the country is choked by the Monte Chique, the Cabeça, or head of which is in the centre of, and overtopping all the other, mountain masses. A road, conducted along a chain of hills, high and salient, but less bold than any other parts of the line, connected Mafra with the Cabeça, and was secured by a number of forts. The country in front was extremely difficult, and a second and stronger range of heights, parallel to and behind the first, offered a good fighting position, which could only be approached with artillery by the connecting road in front, and to reach that, either the Sierra de Chypre, on the left, or the pass of the Cabeça de Monte Chique, on the right, must have been carried. Now the works covering the latter consisted of a cluster of redoubts constructed on the inferior rocky heads in advance of the Cabeça, and completely commanding all the approaches, and both from their artificial and natural strength, nearly impregnable to open force. The Cabeça and its immediate flanks were considered secure in their natural precipitous strength; and, in like manner, the ridges connecting the Cabeça with the pass of Bucellas, being impregnable, were left untouched, save the blocking of one bad mule road that led over them.
4º. From Bucellas (the pass of which was difficult and strongly defended by redoubts on each side) a ridge, or rather a collection of impassable rocks, called the Sierra de Serves, stretches to the right for two miles without a break, and then dies away by gradual slopes in the low ground about the Tagus. These declivities and the flat banks of the river offered an opening two miles and a half wide, which was laboriously and carefully strengthened by redoubts, water-cuts, and retrenchments, and connected by a system of forts with the heights of Alhandra, but it was the weakest part of the whole line in itself, and the most dangerous from its proximity to the valleys of Calandrix and Aruda.
There were five roads practicable for artillery piercing the first line of defence, namely, two at Torres Vedras, two at Sobral, and one at Alhandra; but as two of these united again at the Cabeça, there were, in fact, only four points of passage through the second line, that is to say, at Mafra, Monte Chique, Bucellas, and Quintella in the flat ground. The aim and scope of all the works was to bar those passes and to strengthen the favourable fighting positions between them, without impeding the movements of the army. These objects were attained, and it is certain that the loss of the first line would not have been injurious, save in reputation, because the retreat was secure upon the second and stronger line, and the guns of the first were all of inferior calibre, mounted on common truck carriages, and consequently immoveable and useless to the enemy.
The movements of the allies were free and unfettered by the works. But the movements of the French army were impeded and cramped by the great Monte Junta, which, rising opposite the centre of the first line, sent forth a spur called the Sierra de Baragueda in a slanting direction, so close up to the heights of Torres Vedras that the narrow pass of Ruña alone separated them. As this pass was commanded by heavy redoubts, Massena was of necessity obliged to dispose his forces on one or other side of the Baragueda, and he could not transfer his army to either without danger; because the sierra, although not impassable, was difficult, and the movement, which would require time and arrangement, could always be overlooked from the Monte Agraça, whence, in a few hours, the allied forces could pour down upon the head, flank, or rear of the French while in march. And this with the utmost rapidity, because communications had been cut by the engineers to all important points of the Lines, and a system of signals were established, by which orders were transmitted from the centre to the extremities in a few minutes.
Thus much I have thought fit to say respecting the Lines, too little for the professional reader, too much, perhaps, for a general history. But I was desirous to notice, somewhat in detail, works, more in keeping with ancient than modern military labours, partly that a just idea might be formed of the talents of the British engineers who constructed them, and partly to show that lord Wellington’s measures of defence were not, as some French military writers have supposed, dependent upon the first line. Had that been stormed, the standard of Portuguese independence could still have been securely planted amidst the rocks of the second position.
To occupy fifty miles of fortification, to man one hundred and fifty forts, and to work six hundred pieces of artillery, required a number of men; but a great fleet in the Tagus, a superb body of marines sent out from England, the civic guards of Lisbon, the Portuguese heavy artillery corps, the militia and the ordenança of Estremadura furnished, altogether, a powerful reserve. The native artillery and the militia supplied all the garrisons of the forts on the second, and most of those on the first line. The British marines occupied the third line: the navy manned the gun-boats on the river, and aided, in various ways, the operation in the field. The recruits from the depôts, and all the men on furlough, being called in, rendered the Portuguese army stronger than it had yet been; and the British army, reinforced, as I have said, both from Cadiz and England, and remarkably healthy, presented such a front as a general would desire to see in a dangerous crisis.
Vol. 3, Plate 8.
LINES of Torres Vedras
1810.
Published by T. & W. Boone 1830.
It was, however, necessary not only to have strength, but the appearance of strength; and lord Wellington had so dealt with Romana that, without much attention to the wishes of his own government, the latter agreed to join the allies with two divisions. The first, under his own command, crossed the Tagus at Aldea Gallega on the 19th of October, reached head-quarters the 24th, and was posted at Enxara de los Cavalleros, just behind the Monte Agraça; the other followed in a few days: and thus, before the end of October, not less than one hundred and thirty thousand fighting men received rations within the Lines; more than seventy thousand being regular troops, completely disposable and unfettered by the works.
Meanwhile, Mendizabel, with the remainder of the Spanish army, reinforced by Madden’s Portuguese dragoons, advanced towards Zafra. Ballasteros, at the same time, moved upon Araceña; and Mortier, ignorant of Romana’s absence, retired across the Morena on the 8th, for Soult was then seriously menacing Cadiz. Thus fortune combined, with the dispositions of the English general, to widen the distance, and to diversify the objects of the French armies, at the moment when the allies were concentrating the greatest force on the most important point.
Massena, surprised at the extent and strength of works, the existence of which had only become known to him five days before he came upon them, employed several days to examine their nature. The heights of Alhandra he judged inattackable; but the valleys of Calandrix and Aruda attracted his attention. Through the former he could turn Hill’s position, and come at once upon the weakest part of the second line; yet the abattis and the redoubts erected, and hourly strengthening, gave him little encouragement to attack there; while the nature of the ground about Aruda was such that he could not ascertain what number of troops guarded it, although he made several demonstrations, and frequently skirmished with the light division, to oblige Crawfurd to shew his force. That general, by making the town of Aruda an advanced post, rendered it impossible to discover his true situation without a serious affair; and, in a short time, his division, with prodigious labour, secured the position in a manner really worthy of admiration.
Across the ravine on the left, a loose stone wall, sixteen feet thick and forty feet high, was raised; and across the great valley of Aruda, a double line of abattis was drawn; not composed, as is usual, of the limbs of trees, but of full-grown oaks and chestnuts, dug up with all their roots and branches, dragged, by main force, for several hundred yards, and then reset and crossed, so that no human strength could break through. Breast-works, at convenient distances, to defend this line of trees, were then cast up; and along the summits of the mountain, for a space of nearly three miles, including the salient points, other stone walls, six feet high and four in thickness, with banquettes, were built; so that a good defence could have been made against the attacks of twenty thousand men.
The next points that drew Massena’s attention were the Monte Agraça and the vale of the Upper Zizandre, where, from the recent period at which lord Wellington had resolved to offer battle on the first line, no outworks had been constructed; and the valley of Zibreira, and even the hills above Runa, had not been fortified. Here it was possible to join battle on more equal terms, but the position of the allies was still very formidable; the flanks and rear were protected by great forts, and not only was a powerful mass of troops permanently posted there, but six battalions, drawn from Hill’s corps, and placed at Bucellas, could, in a very short time, have come into action.
Beyond Runa, the Baragueda ridge and the forts of Torres Vedras forbad any flank movement by the French general; and it only remained for him to dispose his troops in such a manner between Villa Franca and Sobral that, while the heads of the columns menaced the weakest points of the Lines, a few hours would suffice to concentrate the whole army at any part between the Tagus and the Baragueda ridge. The second corps, still holding the hills opposite Alhandra, extended its right along some open ground as far as Aruda, and being covered, at that point, by a force of cavalry, was connected with the eighth corps; the head of which was pushed forward on Sobral, occupying the lower ridges of the Baragueda, and lining the banks of the Zizandre as far as Duas Portas on the road to Runa: the outposts of the two armies being nearly in contact.
Massena did not bring the sixth corps beyond Otta, and his dispositions were not made without several skirmishes, especially near Sobral, on the morning of the 14th, when, attempting to dislodge the seventy-first regiment from a field-work, his troops were repulsed, pursued, and driven from their own retrenchments, which were held until evening; and only evacuated because the whole of the eight corps was advancing for the purpose of permanently establishing its position. The loss of the allies in these petty affairs amounted to one hundred and fifty; of which, the greatest part fell at Sobral; that of the enemy was estimated higher. The English general Harvey was wounded, and at Villa Franca the fire of the gun-boats killed the French general St. Croix, a young man of signal ability and promise.
The war was now reduced to a species of blockade: Massena’s object being to feed his army until reinforcements reached it; lord Wellington’s to starve the French before succour could arrive. The former spread his moveable columns in the rear to seek for provisions, and commenced forming magazines at Santarem, where his principal depôt was established; but the latter drew down all the militia and ordenança of the north on the French rear, putting their right in communication with the garrison of Peniché, and their left with the militia of Lower Beira. To strengthen the latter he prevailed on Carlos d’España to cross the Tagus, and act between Castello Branco and Abrantes; and thus the French were completely enclosed, without any weakening of the regular army.
To aid the communication between Peniché and the militia, a Spanish light battalion and a strong body of English cavalry advanced to Ramalhal. Obidos, surrounded by old walls, was placed in a temporary state of defence, and garrisoned by three hundred Portuguese, under major Fenwick; and a moveable column, under colonel Waters, issuing from Torres Vedras, made incursions against the enemy’s marauding detachments, capturing many prisoners, and part of a considerable convoy which was passing the Baragueda. The French were thus continually harassed, yet their detachments scoured the whole country, even beyond Leiria, and obtained provisions in considerable quantities.
Meanwhile, the main bodies of the hostile forces remained quiet, although the French right was greatly exposed. Lord Wellington had four British divisions and Romana’s corps, forming a mass of twenty-five thousand men, close round Sobral, and, by directing the greatest part of his cavalry and the six battalions, at Bucellas, upon Aruda, he could have assembled from eight to ten thousand men there also, who, advancing a short distance into the plain, could, in conjunction with Hill, have kept the second corps in check; while the twenty-five thousand, pouring down at daylight from the Monte Agraça, from the valley of Zibreira, and from the side of Ruña, could have enveloped and crushed the head of the eighth corps long before the sixth could have reached the scene of action. But war is a curious and complicated web! and while the purely military part was thus happily situated and strong, the political part was one of weakness and alarm. Scarcely could the English See Annals of the Peninsular War, Vol. II. p. 331.general maintain a defensive attitude, struggling as he was against the intrigues and follies of men who have, nevertheless, been praised for their “earnest and manly co-operation.”