CHAPTER III.
Tortoza, with a population of ten thousand1810. Dec. souls and a garrison of from eight to nine thousand regular troops, was justly considered the principal bulwark of both Catalonia and Valencia, but it was under the command of general Lilli, Conde d’Alacha, a feeble man, whose only claim was, that he had shewn less incapacity than others before the battle of Tudela in 1808. However, so confident were the Spaniards in the strength of the place that the French attack was considerably advanced ere any interruption was contemplated, and had any well considered project for its relief been framed, it could not have been executed, because jealousy and discord raged amongst the Spanish chiefs. Campo Verde was anxious to succeed O’Donnel in command of the Catalonian army, Bassecourt held unceasing dispute with his own officers, and with the members of the junta or congress of Valencia; and Villa Campa repelled the interference both of Carbajal and Bassecour.
At this critical time therefore every thing was stagnant, except the English vessels which blockaded Rosas, Barcelona, and the mouths of the Ebro, or from certain head-lands observed and pounced upon the enemy’s convoys creeping along from port to port: they had thrown provisions, ammunition, and stores of all kinds into Taragona and Tortoza, and were generally successful, yet at times met with disasters. Thus captain Rogers of the Kent, having with him the Ajax, Cambrian, Sparrow-hawk, and Minstrel, disembarked six hundred men and two field-pieces under captain Fane at Palamos, where they destroyed a convoy intended for Barcelona; but as the seamen were re-embarking in a disorderly manner, the French fell upon them and took or killed two hundred, captain Fane being amongst the prisoners.
The Catalan army was thirty thousand strong,Official Abstract of Mr. Wellesley’s despatches MSS. including garrisons, and in a better state than it had hitherto been; the Valencians, although discouraged by the defeat at Uldecona, were still numerous, and all things tended to confirm the Spaniards in the confident expectation that whether succoured or unsuccoured the place would not fall. But O’Donnel, who had been created Conde de’ Bispal was so disabled by wounds, that he resigned the command soon after the siege commenced, and Campo Verde was by the voice of the people raised in his stead; for it was their nature always to believe that the man who made most noise was the fittest person to head them, and in this instance, as in most others, they were greatly mistaken.
Tortoza, situated on the left of the Ebro, communicatedVacani. with the right bank by a bridge of boats, which was the only Spanish bridge on that river,Rogniat. from Zaragoza to the sea; and below and above the place there was a plain, but so narrowed bySuchet. the juttings of the mountains at the point where the town was built, that while part of the houses stood close to the water on flat ground, the other part stood on the bluff rocky points shot from the hills above; and thus appeared to tie the mountains, the river, and the plains together.
Five of these shoots were taken into the defence, either by the ramparts or by outworks. That on the south of the town was crowned by the fort of Orleans, and on the north another was occupied by a fort called the Tenaxas. To the east a horn-work was raised on a third shoot, which being prolonged, and rising suddenly again between the suburbs and the city, furnished the site of a castle or citadel: the other two, and the deep ravines between them were defended by the ramparts of the place, which were extremely irregular, and strong from their situation, rather than their construction.
There were four fronts.
1º. The northern defending the suburb. Although this front was built on the plain, it was so imbedded between the Ebro, the horn-work, the citadel, and the Tenaxas, that it could not even be approached without first taking the latter fort.
2º. The eastern. Extending from the horn-work to the bastion of San Pico. Here the deep ravines and the rocky nature of the ground, which was also overlooked by the citadel and flanked by the horn-work, rendered any attack very difficult.
3º. The south eastern. From the bastion of San Pico to the bastion of Santa Cruz. This front, protected by a deep narrow ravine, was again covered by the fort of Orleans, which was itself covered by a second ravine.
4º. The southern. From the Santa Cruz to the Ebro. The ground of approach here was flat, the soil easy to work in, and the fort of Orleans not sufficiently advanced to flank it with any dangerous effect; wherefore against this front Suchet resolved to conduct his attack.
The Rocquetta, a rising ground opposite the bridge-head on the right bank of the Ebro, was fortified and occupied by three regiments, but the other troops were collected at Xerta; and the 15th, before day-break, Suchet crossed the Ebro by his own bridge at that point, with eight battalions, the sappers, and two squadrons of hussars. He marched between the mountains and the river upon the fort of Tenaxas, while general Habert, with two regiments and three hundred hussars, moved from the side of Perillo, and attacked a detachment of the garrison which was encamped on the Col d’Alba eastward of the city. When Suchet’s column arrived in sight of the works, the head took ground, but the rear, under general Harispe, filed off to the left, across the rugged shoots from the hills, and swept round the place, leaving in every ravine and on every ridge a detachment, until the half circle ended on the Ebro, below Tortoza. The investment was then perfected on the left bankSuchet. by the troops from Rocquetta; and during this movement Habert, having seized the Col d’Alba, entered the line of investment, driving before himOfficial extract of Mr. Wellesley’s despatches MSS. six hundred men, who hardly escaped being cut off from the place by the march of Harispe. The communication across the water was then established by three, and afterwards by four flying bridges, placed above and below the town; a matter of some difficulty and importance, because all the artillery and stores had to come from Rocquetta, across the water, which was there two hundred yards wide, and in certain winds very rough.
The camps of investment were now secured, and meanwhile Macdonald, sending the greatest part of his cavalry, for which he could find no forage, back to Lerida by the road of Lardecans, marched, from Mas de Mora, across the hills to Perillo, to cover the siege. His patroles discovered a Spanish division in a position resting upon the fort of Felipe de Balaguer, yet he would not attack them, and thinking he could not remain for want of provisions, returned on the 19th to Gniestar; but this retrograde movement was like to have exposed the investing troops to a disaster, for as the seventh corps retired, a second Spanish division coming from Reus reinforced the first. However, Macdonald, seeing this, placed Frere’s division of six thousand infantry and a regiment of cavalry at Suchet’s disposal, on condition that the latter should feed them, which he could well do. These troops were immediately stationed behind the investing force, on the road of Amposta, by which the Spaniards from Taragona could most easily approach; and the remainder of the seventh corps encamped at Gniestar, a strong position covering the siege on the side of Falcet, only fifteen miles distant from Tortoza. In this situation it could be more easily fed from Lerida, and could with greater facility send detachments up the Ebro, to protect the convoy of the third corps coming from Mequinenza.
The Catalan army was now divided, part beingWimphen’s Memoir. kept on the Llobregat, under general Caro, part under general Yranzo at Momblanch, and part, under Campo Verde, on the hills watching Frere’s covering division. O’Donnel had before directed two convoys upon Tortoza, but the rapidity with which the investment had been effected prevented them from entering the place; and while he was endeavouring to arrange with Bassecour and Campo Verde a general plan of succour, his wounds forced him to embark for Valencia, when the command, of right, belonged to Yranzo, but the people, as I have before said, insisted upon having Campo Verde.
Vol. 4 Plate 1.
Explanatory Sketch
OF THE
SIEGE of TORTOZA,
1811.
London. Published by T. & W. BOONE.
SIEGE OF TORTOZA.
The half bastion of San Pedro, which was situated in the plain, and close to the river, was the first object of the French attack, and to prevent the fire of Fort Orleans from incommoding the trenches, the line of approach was traced in a slanting direction, refusing the right, and pushing forward the left; and to protect its flanks on the one side, Fort Orleans was masked by a false attack, while, on the other side of the Ebro, trenches were opened against the bridge-head, and brought down close to the water.
The 19th the posts of the besieged were all driven in, and an unfinished Spanish work, commenced on the heights in advance of Fort Orleans, was taken possession of. In the night, a flying sap was commenced upon an extent of three hundred and sixty yards, and at a distance of only one hundred and sixty from the fort; but in the following night, the true attack was undertaken in the plain, during a storm of wind which, together with the negligence of the Spaniards, who had placed no guards in front of their covered way, enabled the besiegers to begin this work at only one hundred and fifty yards from the half bastion of San Pedro. This parallel was above five hundred yards long, extending from the false attack against Fort Orleans, down to the bank of the river; two communications were also begun, and on the left bank ground was broken against the bridge-head.
The 21st, at day-break, the Spaniards, perceiving the works, commenced a heavy fire, and soon after made a sally; but they were overwhelmed by musketry from the false attack of Fort Orleans, and from the trenches on the right bank of the Ebro.
In the night of the 21st, the communication in the plain was extended to fourteen hundred yards, nine batteries were commenced, and bags of earth were placed along the edge of the trenches, whence chosen men shot down the Spanish artillery-men.
On the 23rd, a night sally, made from the bridge-head, was repulsed; and on the 24th, the second parallel of the true attack was commenced.
In the night of the 25th, at eleven o’clock and at one o’clock, separate sallies were again made, but both were repulsed, and the works were advanced to within twenty-five yards of the pallisades; a tenth battery was also commenced, and when day broke the Spanish gunners quailed under the aim of the chosen marksmen.
In the night of the 26th, the besieged fell upon the head of the sap, which they overturned, and killed the sappers, but were finally repulsed by the reserve, and the approach was immediately pushed forward to the place of arms. Thus, on the seventh night of open trenches, the besiegers were lodged in the covered way, before a shot had been fired from either breaching or counter-batteries; a remarkable instance of activity and boldness, and a signal proof that the defence was ill-conducted.
The night of the 27th, the works were enlarged as much as the fire of the place which was untouched would permit; but the Spaniards seeing the besiegers’ batteries ready to open, made a general sally through the eastern gates, against the false attack at Fort Orleans; and through the southern gates against the works in the plain. General Habert drove them back with slaughter from the former point, but at the latter they beat the French from the covered way, and arriving at the second parallel, burnt the gabions and did much damage ere the reserves could repulse them.
The night of the 28th, the batteries were armed with forty-five pieces, of which seventeen were placed on the right bank, to take the Spanish works at the main attack in reverse and to break the bridge. At day-break all these guns opened, and with success, against the demi-bastion, on the left bank of the river; but the fire from the castle, the bridge-head, the horn-work, and the quay, overpowered the French guns on the right bank, and although the bridge was injured, it was not rendered impassable.
On the 30th, the Spanish fire was in turn overpowered by the besiegers, the bridge was then broken, and in the following night an attempt was made to pass the ditch at the true attack; but two guns which were still untouched and flanked the point of attack, defeated this effort.
In the morning of the 31st, the Spaniards abandoned the bridge-head, and the French batteries on the right bank dismounted the two guns which had defended the half bastion of San Pedro. The besiegers then effected the passage of the ditch without difficulty, and attached the miner to the scarp.
In the night of the 31st, the miner worked into the wall, and the batteries opened a breach in the curtain, where a lodgement was established in preparation for an assault. At ten o’clock in the morning the besieged, alarmed at the progress of the attack, displayed the white flag. The negotiations for a surrender were, however, prolonged until evening by the governor, without any result, and the miner resumed his work in the night.
At seven o’clock on the 1st of January, two1811. January. practicable breaches besides that in the curtain were opened by the artillery, and the mine was ready to explode, when three white flags were seen to wave from different parts of the fortress; nevertheless the disposition of the garrison was mistrusted, and Suchet demanded as a preliminary the immediate possession of one of the forts,—a necessary precaution, for disputes arose amongst the besieged, and general Lilli intimated to Suchet, that his own authority was scarcely recognised.
In this critical moment, the French general gave proof that his talents were not those of a mere soldier, for suddenly riding up to the gates with a considerable staff, and escorted only by a company of grenadiers, he informed the Spanish officer on guard, that hostilities had ceased, and then, leaving his grenadiers on the spot, desired to be conducted to the governor who was in the citadel. Lilli still wavering, was upon the point of renewing the defence, in compliance with the desires of the officers about him, when the French general thus came suddenly into his presence, and, although the appearance of the Spanish guards was threatening, assumed an imperious tone, spoke largely of the impatience of the French army, and even menaced the garrison with military execution if any further delay occurred; during this extraordinary scene general Habert brought in the grenadiers from the gate, and the governor then signing a short capitulation, gave over the citadel to the French.
When this event was known in the city, the Spanish troops assembled, and Alacha, in the presence of Suchet ordered them to lay down their arms. Four hundred French and about fourteen hundred Spaniards had fallen during the siege; and many thousand prisoners, nine standards, one hundred pieces of artillery, ten thousand muskets, and immense magazines, enhanced the value of the conquest, which by some was attributed to general Lilli’s treachery, by others to his imbecility, and it would seem that there was reason for both charges.
The fall of Tortoza, besides opening the western passage into Catalonia, and cutting off the communication between that province and Valencia, reduced the Spanish army to twenty thousand men, including the garrisons of the towns which still remained in their possession. Campo Verde immediately retired from Falcet to Momblanch, and Suchet, always prompt to make one success the prelude to another, endeavoured in the first moment of consternation and surprise to get possession of the forts of Peniscola and of Felipe de Balaguer: nor was he deceived with respect to the last, for that place, in which were five guns and a hundred men, was taken on the 9th by Habert; but at Peniscola his summons was disregarded and his detachment returned.
Meanwhile Macdonald leaving the Neapolitan brigade still on the Ebro, passed by Falcet to Reus, where he encamped the 11th, as if to invest Taragona; but without any real intention to do so, for his cavalry and field artillery were left at Lerida and Tortoza, and his actual force did not exceed twelve thousand men. Campo Verde, who had retreated before him, then posted Sarsfield with six thousand men at Valls, from whence he made incursions against Macdonald’s foragers, and also surprised at Tarega, on the other side of the mountains, a regiment of Italian dragoons, which would have been destroyed but for the succour of a neighbouring post.
On the 14th Macdonald having marched towards Valls, Sarsfield retired to Pla, and was pursued by general Eugenio with two thousand Italian infantry. This officer being of a headstrong intractable disposition, pushed into the plain of Pla, contrary to his orders, and was nearing that town, when a strong body of cavalry poured out of it; and on each side the Spanish infantry were seen descending the hill in order of battle. Eugenio, instead of retiring, attacked the first that enteredVacani. the plain, but he fell mortally wounded, and his men retreated fighting: meanwhile the firing being heard at Valls Palombini marched to his assistance,Victoires et Conquêtes. but was himself beaten and thrown into confusion, and Sarsfield at the head of the Spanish horse was preparing to complete the victory, when theGeneral Doyle’s despatches MSS. French colonel Delort bringing up some squadrons charged with great fury, and so brought off the Italians; yet Delort himself was desperately wounded, and the whole loss was not less than six hundred men.
Macdonald would not suffer his main body to stir, and Vacani asserts that it was only by entreaty, that Palombini obtained permission to succour Eugenio, which was certainly a great error, for so hot and eager was Sarsfield in the pursuit, that he was come within two miles of Valls, and being on open ground might have been crushed in turn. He, however, returned unmolested to the pass of Cabra, leaving his cavalry as before in Pla, whence through bye-roads they communicated with Taragona.
A few days after this fight Sarsfield came out again in order of battle, and at the same time Campo Verde appeared with a division on the hills in rear of Valls. Macdonald was thus surrounded, but Palombini’s brigade sufficed to send Campo Verde back to Taragona, and Sarsfield refused battle; then the French marshal, who had resolved to go to Lerida, but wished to move without fighting, broke up from Valls in the night, and, with great order and silence, passed by the road of Fuencalde, between the defiles of Cabra and Ribas, and though both were occupied by the Spaniards, they did not discover his movements until the next day. From thence he marched by Momblanch, upon Lerida, where he arrived the 19th, and three days afterwards spread his troops over the plains of Urgel, to collect provisions, money, and transport, and to watch the defiles of the mountains.
On the other hand the Catalan general, who had1811. February. received stores and arms both from England and Cadiz, renewed the equipment of his troops, and called out all the Miguelettes and Somatenes, of the hills round the plain of Urgel, to replace the loss sustained by the fall of Tortoza. These new levies were united at Santa Coloma de Querault under Sarsfield, while the regular army assembled at Igualada and Villafranca, by which the Spaniards holding a close and concentrated position themselves, cut off Macdonald equally from Barcelona and the Ampurdan; and this latter district was continually harassed by Errolles, Rovira, and the brigade of Martinez, which still kept the mountains behind Olot, Vich, and the Cerdaña.
Meanwhile Suchet being called by the exigences of his government to Zaragoza, carried one division there, and distributed another under Musnier at Teruel, Molina, Alcanitz, and Morella: he also withdrew his troops from Cambril, which Habert had surprised on the 7th of February, but he left that general, with a division, in command of Tortoza, having two thousand men at Perillo to connect the city with San Felipe de Balaguer. Thus all things seemed to favour the Spanish side, and give importance to their success, against Eugenio; for they did not fail to attribute both Suchet’s and Macdonald’s retreats, to fear occasioned by the skirmish with that general; and with some shew of reason as regarded the latter, seeing that his night march had all the appearance of a flight.
Macdonald, while gathering provisions at Lerida, and stores and guns at Tortoza, also repaired the works of Balaguer near Lerida, to serve as a pivot for the troops employed to forage the country watered by the Noguera, Cinça, and Segre rivers. However Sarsfield and Campo Verde kept about Cervera and Calaf, watching for an opportunity to fall on the French detachments, and meanwhile the organization of the province went on.
It may appear extraordinary that the war could[Appendix, No. I.] Section 2. have been continued by either side under such difficulties, but the resources were still great. A patriotic junta had been formed in Catalonia to procure provisions, and although the English orders in council interfered with the trade of neutral vessels bringing grain, bread could be bought at the rate of 12 lbs. to the dollar, while with lord Wellington’s army in Castile it often cost half a dollar a pound. When the French foraging parties came out from Barcelona, their march could be always traced by the swarms of boats, loaded with people and provisions, which shooting out from the coast-towns, would hover, for a while, under the protection of the English vessels, and then return when the danger was over: and the enemy did never meddle with these boats lest they should remove the cover to their own supplies. Suchet however armed Rapita, and other small places, at the mouth of the Ebro, with a view to afford shelter to certain craft, which he kept to watch for provision-vessels, sailing from Valencia for Taragona, and to aid French vessels engaged in a like course coming from France.
To feed Barcelona, Maurice Mathieu at times occupied the head-lands from St. Filieu, to Blanes, with troops, and thus small convoys crept along shore; a fleet loaded with provisions and powder, escorted by three frigates, entered it in February, and a continual stream of supply was also kept up by sailing-boats and other small vessels, which could not be easily detected amidst the numerous craft belonging to the people along the coast. And besides these channels, as the claims of hunger are paramount to all others, it was necessary, for the sake of the inhabitants, to permit provision sometimes to reach Barcelona by land; the Spanish generals winked at it, and Milans and Lacy, have even been charged with permitting corn to pass into that city for private profit, as well as from consideration for the citizens. By these, and like expedients, the war was sustained.
No important event occurred after the skirmish1811. March. in which Eugenio fell, until the 3d of March, when the Spaniards having observed that the garrison of Tortoza was weakened by the detachment at Perillo, endeavoured to cut the latter off, intending if successful to assault Tortoza itself. At the same timeOfficial Abstract of Mr. Wellesley’s Despatches. MSS. they also attacked the fort of San Filippe, but failed, and the French at Perillo effected their retreat although with considerable loss. This attempt was however followed by a more important effort. On the 19th of March, Campo Verde having assembled eight thousand men at Molinos del Rey, four thousand at Guisols, and three thousand at Igualada, prepared to surprise the city and forts of Barcelona, for he had, as he thought, corrupted the town-major of Monjuic. Trusting to this treason, he first sent eight hundred chosen grenadiers in the night by the hills of Hospitalette, to enter that place, and they descended into the ditch in expectation of having the gate opened; but Maurice Mathieu, apprized of the plan, had prepared every thing to receive this unfortunate column, which was in an instant overwhelmed with fire.
Napoleon now changed the system of the war. All that part of Catalonia west of the Upper Llobregat, and from Igualada by Ordal to the sea, including the district of Tortoza, was placed under Suchet’s government, and seventeen thousand of Macdonald’s troops were united to the third corps, which was thus augmented to forty-two thousand men, and took the title of the “Army of Aragon.” It was destined to besiege Taragona, while Macdonald, whose force was thus reduced to twenty-seven thousand under arms, including fifteen thousand in garrison and in the Ampurdan, was restricted to the upper part of Catalonia. His orders were to attack Cardona, Berga, Seu d’Urgel, and Montserrat, and to wear down Martinez, Manso, Rovira, and other chiefs, who kept in the mountains between Olot and the Cerdaña: and a division of five thousand men, chiefly composed of national guards, was also ordered to assemble at Mont Louis, for the purpose of acting in the Cerdaña, and on the rear of the partizans in the high valleys. By these means the line of operations for the invasion of Catalonia was altered from France to Aragon, the difficulties were lessened, the seventh corps reduced in numbers, became, instead of the principal, the secondary army; and Macdonald’s formal method was thus exchanged for the lively vigorous talent of Suchet. But the delay already caused in the siege of Tortoza, could never be compensated; Suchet had been kept on the Ebro, when he should have been on the Guadalaviar, and this enabled the Murcians to keep the fourth corps in Grenada, when it should have been on the Tagus aiding Massena.