CHAPTER IV.
When the troops of the seventh corps were incorporated1811. March. with the army of Aragon, the preparations for the siege of Taragona, were pushed forward with Suchet’s usual activity; but previous to touching upon that subject it is necessary to notice the guerilla warfare, which Villa Campa, and others, had carried on against Aragon during the siege of Tortoza. This warfare was stimulated by the appointment of the secret juntas, and by the supplies which England furnished, especially along the northern coast, from Coruña to Bilbao, where experience had also produced a better application of them than heretofore. The movements of the English squadrons, in that sea, being from the same cause better combined with the operations of the Partidas, rendered the latter more formidable, and they became more harassing to the enemy as they acquired something of the consistency of regular troops in their organization, although irregular in their mode of operations: for it must not be supposed, that because the guerilla system was in itself unequal to the deliverance of the country, and was necessarily accompanied with great evils, that as an auxiliary it was altogether useless. The interruption of the French correspondence was, as I have already said, tantamount to a diminution on their side of thirty thousand regular troops, without reckoning those who were necessarily employed to watch and pursue the Partidas; this estimate may even be considered too low, and it is certain that the moral effect produced over Europe by the struggle thus maintained, was very considerable.
Nevertheless the same number of men under a good discipline would have been more efficacious, less onerous to the country people, and less subversive of social order. When the regular army is completed, all that remains in a country may be turned to advantage as irregulars, yet they are to be valued as their degree of organization approaches that of the regular troops: thus militia are better than armed bodies of peasantry, and these last, if directed by regular officers, better than sudden insurrections of villagers. But the Spanish armies were never completed, never well organized; and when they were dispersed, which happened nearly as often as they took the field, the war must have ceased in Spain, had it not been kept alive by the Partidas, and it is there we find their moral value. Again, when the British armies kept the field, the Partidas harassed the enemy’s communications, and this constituted their military value; yet it is certain[Appendix, No. I.] Section 2. that they never much exceeded thirty thousand in number; and they could not have long existed in any numbers without the supplies of England, unless a spirit of order and providence, very different from any thing witnessed during the war, had arisen in Spain. How absurd then to reverse the order of the resources possessed by an invaded country, to confound the moral with the military means, to place the irregular resistance of the peasants first, and that of the soldiers last in the scale of physical defence.
That many of the Partida chiefs became less active, after they received regular rank, is undeniable; but this was not so much a consequence of the change of denomination, as of the inveterate abuses which oppressed the vigour of the regular armies, and by which the Partidas were necessarily affected when they became a constituent part of those armies; many persons of weight have indeed ascribed entirely to this cause, the acknowledged diminution of their general activity at one period. It seems, however, more probable that a life of toil and danger, repeated defeats, the scarcity of plunder, and the discontent of the people at the exactions of the chiefs, had in reality abated the desire to continue the struggle; inactivity was rather the sign of subjection than the result of an injudicious interference by the government. But it is time to support this reasoning by facts.
During the siege of Tortoza, the concentration of the third and seventh corps exposed Aragon and Catalonia to desultory enterprises at a moment when the Partidas, rendered more numerous and powerful by the secret juntas, were also more ardent, from the assembly of the Cortez, by which the people’s importance in the struggle seemed at last to be acknowledged. Hence no better test of their real influence on the general operations can be found than their exploits during that period, when two French armies were fixed as it were to one spot, the supplies from France nearly cut off by natural difficulties, the district immediately around Tortoza completely sterile, Catalonia generally exhausted, and a project to create a fictitious scarcity in the fertile parts of Aragon diligently and in some sort successfully pursued by the secret juntas. The number of French foraging parties, and the distances to which they were sent were then greatly increased, and the facility of cutting them off proportionably augmented. Now the several operations of Villa Campa during the blockade have been already related, but, although sometimes successful, the results were mostly adverse to the Spaniards; and when that chief, after the siege was actually commenced, came down, on the 19th December 1810, towards the side of Daroca, his cavalry was surprised by colonel Kliski, who captured or killed one hundred and fifty in the village of Blancas. The Spanish chief then retired, but being soon after joined by the Empecinado from Cuença, he returned in January to the frontier of Aragon, and took post between Molina and Albaracin.
At this period Tortoza had surrendered, and Musnier’s division was spread along the western part of Aragon, wherefore Suchet immediately detached general Paris with one column from Zaragoza, and general Abbé with another from Teruel, to chase these two Partidas. Paris fell in with the Empecinado near Molina, and the latter then joined Villa Campa, but the French general forced both from their mountain position near Frias, where he was joined by Abbé; and they continued the pursuit for several days, but finding that the fugitives took different routes, again separated; Paris followed Villa Campa, and Abbé pursued the Empecinado through Cuença, from whence Carbajal and the secret junta immediately fled. Paris failing to overtake Villa Campa, entered Beleta, Cobeta, and Paralejos, all three containing manufactories for arms, which he destroyed, and then returned; and the whole expedition lasted only twelve days, yet the smaller Partidas, in Aragon, had taken advantage of it to cut off a detachment of fifty men near Fuentes: and this was followed up on the side of Navarre by Mina, who entered the Cinco Villas in April, and cut to pieces one hundred and fifty gens-d’armes near Sadava. However Chlopiski pursued him also so closely, that he obliged his band to disperse near Coseda in Navarre.
During this time the Valencians had been plunged1811. April. in disputes, Bassecour was displaced, and Coupigny appointed in his stead. The notables, indeed, raised a sum of money for recruits, but Coupigny would not take the command, because the Murcian army was not also given to him; and that army, although numerous, was in a very neglected state, and unable to undertake any service. However, when Tortoza fell, the Valencians were frightened, and set about their own defence. They repaired and garrisoned the fort of Oropesa, and some smaller posts on the coast, along which runs the only artillery-road to their capital: they commenced fortifying Murviedro, or rather the rock of Saguntum overhanging it, and they sent fifteen hundred men into the hills about Cantavieja. These last were dispersed on the 5th of April by a column from Teruel; and on the 11th another body having attempted to surprise Uldecona, which was weakly guarded, were also defeated and sabred by the French cavalry.
These different events, especially the destruction of the gun-manufactories, repressed the activity of the partizans, and Suchet was enabled to go to Lerida, in the latter end of March, to receive the soldiers to be drafted from the seventh corps: Macdonald himself could not, however, regain Barcelona without an escort, and hence seven thousand men marched with him on the 29th of the month, not by Igualada, which was occupied in force by Sarsfield, but by the circuitous way of Manresa; for neither Macdonald nor Suchet wished to engage in desultory actions with the forces destined for the siege. Nevertheless Sarsfield, getting intelligence of the march, passed by Calaf with his own and Eroles’ troops, and waited on Macdonald’s flanks and rear near the Cardenera river, while a detachment, barricading the bridge of Manresa, opposed him in front. This bridge was indeed carried, but the town being abandoned, the Italian soldiers wantonly set fire to it in the night; an act which was immediately revenged, for the flames being seen to a great distance, so enraged the Catalans, that in the morning all the armed men in the district, whether regulars, Miguelettes, or Somatenes, were assembled on the neighbouring hills, and fell with infinite fury upon Macdonald’s rear, as it passed out from the ruins of the burning city. The head of the French column was then pushing for the bridge of Villamara, over the Llobregat, which was two leagues distant; and as the country between the rivers was one vast mountain, Sarsfield, seeing that the French rear stood firm to receive the attack of the Somatenes, while the front still advanced, thought to place his division between, by moving along the heights which skirted the road. Macdonald, however, concentrated his troops, gained the second bridge, and passed the Llobregat, but with great difficulty and with the loss of four hundred men, for his march was continually under Sarsfield’s fire, and some of his troops were even cut off from the bridge, and obliged to cross by a ford higher up. During the night, however, he collected his scattered men, and moved upon Sabadel, whence he pushed on alone for Barcelona, and on the 3d of April, Harispe, who commanded the escort, recommenced the march, and passing by Villa Franca, Christina, Cabra, and Momblanch, returned to Lerida the 10th.
The invasion of Catalonia was now divided into three parts, each assigned to a distinct army.
1º. Suchet, with that of Aragon, was to take Taragona and subdue the lower part of the province.
2º. Macdonald, with that part of the seventh corps called the active army of Catalonia, was to break the long Spanish line extending from Taragona, through Montserrat to the Cerdaña, and the high mountains about Olot.
3º. Baraguay d’Hilliers, having his head-quarters at Gerona, was to hold the Ampurdan with the troops before assigned to his charge, and to co-operate, as occasion might offer, with Macdonald, under whose orders he still remained; and the division of five thousand men before mentioned as having been collected near Mount Louis, at the entrance of the French Cerdaña, was to act on the rear of the Spaniards in the mountains, while the others attacked them in front. Nor did the success appear doubtful, for the hopes and means of the province were both sinking. The great losses of men sustained at Tortoza and in the different combats; the reputation of Suchet; the failure of the attempts to surprise Barcelona, Perillo, and San Filippe de Balaguer; the incapacity of Campo Verde, which was now generally felt, and the consequent desertion of the Miguelettes, would probably have rendered certain the French plans, if at the very moment of execution they had not been marred by Rovira, who surprised the great fortress of Figueras, the key of the Pyrenees on that side of Catalonia. This, the boldest and most important stroke made by a Partida chief, during the whole war, merits a particular detail.
SURPRISE OF FERNANDO DE FIGUERAS.
The governor of the place, general Guillot, enforcedVacani. no military discipline, his guards were weak, he permitted the soldiers to use the pallisades forOfficial Abstract of Mr. Wellesley’s Despatches. MSS. fuel, and often detached the greatest part of the garrison to make incursions to a distance from the place; in all things disregarding the rules of service.General Campbell’s MSS. The town, which is situated below the hill, upon which the great fortress of Fernando stands,General Doyle’s MSS. was momentarily occupied by the Italian general Peyri, with about six hundred men, who wereCapt. Codrington’s MSS. destined to join Macdonald, and who trusting to the strength of the fortress above, were in noMr. Stuart’s Papers. MSS. manner on their guard. And the garrison above was still more negligent; for Guillot had on the 9th of April sent out his best men to disperse some Somatenes assembled in the neighbouring hills, and this detachment having returned at night fatigued, and being to go out again the next day, slept while the gates were confided to convalescents, or men unfit for duty: thus the ramparts were entirely unguarded. Now there were in the fort two Catalan brothers named Palopos, and a man called Juan, employed as under-storekeepers, who being gained by Rovira had, such was the negligence of discipline, obtained from the head of their department the keys of the magazines, and also that of a postern under one of the gates.
Rovira, having arranged his plan, came down from the mountain of St. Lorens de Muga in the night of the 9th, and secretly reached the covered way with seven hundred chosen men of his own Partida. General Martinez followed in support with about three thousand Miguelettes, and the Catalan brothers, having previously arranged the signals, opened the postern, and admitted Rovira, who immediately disarmed the guard and set wide the gates for the reserve; and although some shots were fired, which alarmed the garrison, Martinez came up so quickly that no effectual resistance could be made. Thirty or forty men were killed or wounded, the magazines were seized, the governor and sixteen hundred soldiers and camp-followers were taken in their quarters, and thus in an hour Rovira mastered one of the strongest fortresses in Europe: three cannon-shot were then fired as a signal to the Somatenes in the surrounding mountains, that the place was taken, and that they were to bring in provisions as rapidly as possible. Meanwhile general Peyri alarmed by the noise in the fortress and guessing at the cause, had collected the troops, baggage, sick men, and stores in the town below, and sent notice to Gerona, but he made no attempt to retake the place, and at daylight retired to Bascara. For having mounted the hills during the night, to observe how matters went, he thought nothing could be done, an opinion condemned by some as a great error; and indeed it appears probable that during the confusion of the first surprise, a brisk attempt by six hundred fresh men might have recovered the fortress. At Bascara five hundred men detached from Gerona, on the spur of the occasion, met him with orders to re-invest the place, and Baraguay d’Hilliers promised to follow with all his forces without any delay. Then Peyri, although troubled by the fears of his troops, many of whom were only national guards, returned to Figueras, and driving the Spaniards out of the town took post in front of the fort above; but he could not prevent Martinez from receiving some assistance in men and provisions from the Somatenes. The news of Rovira’s exploit spread with inconceivable rapidity throughout the Peninsula, extending its exhilarating influence, even to the Anglo-Portuguese army, then not much given to credit or admire the exploits of the Spaniards, but Baraguay d’Hilliers with great promptness assembled his dispersed troops, and on the 13th invested the fort with six thousand infantry and five hundred cavalry; and this so quickly that the Spaniard had not time, or, more probably neglected, to remove, sixteen thousand muskets which were in the place.
Martinez remained governor, but Rovira was again in the mountains, and all Catalonia, animated by the Promethean touch of this Partida chief, seemed to be moving at once upon Figueras. Campo Verde came up to Vich, intending first to relieve Figueras, and then in concert with the English and Spanish vessels to blockade Rosas by land and sea. Rovira himself collected a convoy of provisions near Olot. Captain Bullen with the Cambrian and Volontaire frigates, taking advantage of the French troops having been withdrawn from Gerona, drove out the small garrison from San Filieu and Palamos, destroyed the batteries, and made sail to join captain Codrington at Rosas. A Spanish frigate, with a fleet of coasting-vessels loaded with supplies, anchored at Palamos; and Francisco Milans, after beating a small French detachment near Arens de Mar, invested Hostalrich; Juan Claros hovered about Gerona, and Eroles and Manso coming from Montserrat reduced Olot and Castelfollit. Sarsfield however remained in the Seu d’Urgel, and directed the mountaineers to establish themselves at Balaguer, but they were driven away again with great loss by a detachment from the garrison of Lerida.
On the 3d of May, Rovira having brought his convoy up to Besalu, Campo Verde, who had arranged that captain Codrington should make a diversion by an attack on Rosas, drew Milans from Hostalrich, and having thus united eleven thousand men marched in several columns from Avionet and Villa Fan against the town, hoping to draw Baraguay d’Hilliers to that side; and to beat him, while Rovira, forcing a small camp near Llers, at the opposite quarter, should introduce the convoy and its escort into the fortress. The circuit of investment was wide, and very difficult, and therefore slightly furnished of men; but it was strengthened by some works, and when the Spanish columns first advanced, the French general reinforced the camp near Llers, and then hastened with four thousand men against Campo Verde, who was already in the valley of Figueras, and only opposed by one battalion. Baraguay d’Hilliers immediately fell on the right flank of the Spaniards and defeated them; the French cavalry, which had been before driven in from the front, rallied and completed the victory, and the Spaniards retreated with a loss of fifteen hundred including prisoners. This affair was exceedingly ill-managed by Campo Verde, who was so sure of success that he kept the sheep of the convoy too far behind, to enter, although the way was open for some time, hence the succour was confined to a few artillery-men, some tobacco, and medicines. Meanwhile the English ships landed some men at Rosas, but neither did this produce any serious effect, and the attempt to relieve Figueras having thus generally failed, that place was left to its own resources which were few; for the French with an unaccountable negligence had always kept a scanty supply of provisions and stores there. Martinez, who had now above four thousand men, was therefore obliged to practise the most rigorous economy in the distribution of food, and in bearing such privations the peninsular race are unrivalled.
Macdonald was so concerned for the loss of Figueras, that, setting aside all his own plans, he earnestly adjured Suchet to suspend the siege of Taragona, and restore him the troops of the seventh corps: Maurice Mathieu also wrote from Barcelona in a like strain, thinking that the possession of Upper Catalonia depended upon one powerful effort to recover the lost fortress. But Suchet, who had no immediate interest in that part of the province, whose hopes of obtaining a marshal’s staff rested on the taking of Taragona, and whose preparations were all made for that siege, Suchet I say, whose judgement was unclouded, and whose military talent was of a high order, refused to move a step towards Figueras, or even to delay, for one moment, his march against Taragona.
He said that “his battalions being scattered, in search of supplies, he could not reunite them, and reach Figueras under twenty-five days; during that time the enemy, unless prevented by Baraguay d’Hilliers, could gather in provisions, receive reinforcements, and secure the fortress. A simple blockade might be established by the nearest troops, and to accumulate great numbers on such a sterile spot would not forward the recapture, but would create infinite difficulties with respect to subsistence. It was probable Napoleon had already received information of the disaster, and given orders for the remedy; and it was by no means reasonable to renounce the attack on Taragona, the only remaining bulwark of Catalonia, at the very moment of execution, because of the loss of a fort; it was in Taragona, the greatest part of the forces of Catalonia would be shut up, and it was only in such a situation that they could be made prisoners; at Lerida, Mequinenza, and Tortoza, eighteen thousand men and eight hundred officers had been captured, and if ten or twelve thousand more could be taken in Taragona, the strength of Catalonia would be entirely broken. If the Spaniards failed in revictualling Figueras, that place, by occupying their attention, would become more hurtful than useful to them; because Campo Verde might, and most probably would, march to its succour, and thus weaken Taragona, which was a reason for hastening rather than suspending the investment of the latter; wherefore he resolved, notwithstanding the separation of his battalions and the incomplete state of his preparations, to move down immediately and commence the siege.” A wise determination and alone sufficient to justify his reputation as a general.
Macdonald was now fain to send all the troops he could safely draw together, to reinforce Baraguay d’Hilliers. In June, when a detachment from Toulon, and some frontier guards had arrived at Figueras, the united forces amounting to fifteen thousand men, he took the command in person and established a rigorous blockade, working day and night, to construct works of circumvallation and contravallation; his lines six miles in length, crowning the tops of the mountains and sinking into the deepest valleys, proved what prodigious labours even small armies are capable of. Thus with incessant wakefulness Macdonald recovered the place; but this was at a late period in the year, and when Suchet’s operations had quite changed the aspect of affairs.
When Tortoza fell, that general’s moveable columns traversing the borders of Castile, the eastern districts of Valencia, a portion of Navarre, and all the lower province of Catalonia, protected the collection of supplies, and suppressed the smaller bands which swarmed in those parts; hence, when the siege of Taragona was confided to the third corps, the magazines, at Lerida and Mora, were already full; and a battering train was formed at Tortoza, to which place the tools, platforms, and other materials, fabricated at Zaragosa were conveyed. Fifteen hundred draft horses, the greatest part of the artillery-men and engineers, and ten battalions of infantry were also collected in that town, and from thence shot and shells were continually forwarded to San Felippe de Balaguer. This was a fine application of Cæsar’s maxim, that war should maintain itself, for all the money, the guns, provisions, and materials, collected for this siege, were the fruits of former victories; nothing was derived from France but the men. It is curious, however, that Suchet so little understood the nature and effects of the English system of finance, that he observes, in his memoirs, upon the ability with which the ministers, made Spain pay the expense of this war by never permitting English gold to go to the Peninsula; he was ignorant, that the paper money system had left them no English gold to send.
The want of forage in the district of Tortoza, and the advantage of the carriage-road by the Col de Balaguer, induced the French general to direct his artillery that way; but his provisions, and other stores, passed from Mora by Falcet and Momblanch to Reus, in which latter town he proposed to establish his stores for the siege, while Mora, the chief magazine, was supplied from Zaragoza, Caspe, and Mequinenza. Divers other arrangements, of which I shall now give the outline, contributed to the security of the communications, and enabled the army of Aragon to undertake the great enterprize for which it was destined.
1º. Detachments of gens-d’armes and of the frontier guards of France, descending the high valleys of Aragon, helped to maintain tranquillity on the left bank of the Ebro, and occupied the castles of Venasque and Jaca, which had been taken by Suchet in his previous campaign.
2º. The line of correspondence from France, instead of running as before through Guipuscoa and Navarre, by Pampeluna, was now directed by Pau, Oleron, and Jaca to Zaragoza; and in the latter city, and in the towns around it, four or five battalions, and a proportion of horsemen and artillery, were disposed, to watch the Partidas from Navarre and the Moncayo mountains.
3º. Four battalions with cavalry and guns, were posted at Daroca under general Paris, whose command extended from thence to the fort of Molina, which was armed and garrisoned.
4º. General Abbé was placed at Teruel with five battalions, three hundred cuirassiers, and two pieces of artillery, to watch Villa Campa, and the Valencian army which was again in the field.
5º. Alcanitz and Morella were occupied by fourteen hundred men, whereby that short passage through the mountains from Aragon to Valencia was secured; and from thence the line to Caspe, and down the Ebro from Mequinenza to Tortoza, was protected by twelve hundred men; Tortoza itself was garrisoned by two battalions, the forts at the mouth of the Ebro were occupied, and four hundred men were placed in Rapita.
This line of defence from right to left was fourteen days march, but the number of fortified posts enabled the troops to move from point to point, without much danger; and thus the army of the great and rich province of Valencia, the division of Villa Campa, the Partidas of New Castile and Navarre, including Mina and the Empecinado, the most powerful of those independent chiefs, were all set at nought by twelve thousand French, although the latter had to defend a line of one hundred and fifty miles. Under cover of this feeble chain of defence, Suchet besieged a strong city which had a powerful garrison, an open harbour, a commanding squadron of ships, and a free communication, by sea, with Cadiz, Valencia, Gibraltar, and the Balearic islands. It is true that detachments from the army of the centre, acting on a large circuit round Madrid, sometimes dispersed, and chased the Partidas that threatened Suchet’s line of defence, but at this period, from circumstances to be hereafter mentioned, that army was in a manner paralysed.
While the French general’s posts were being established, he turned his attention to the arrangements for a permanent supply of food. The difficulty of procuring meat was become great, because he wisely refrained from using up the sheep and cattle of Aragon, lest the future supply of his army should be anticipated, and the minds of the people of that province alienated by the destruction of their breeding flocks; to avoid this, he engaged contractors to furnish him from France, and so completely had he pacified the Aragonese, through whose territories the flocks were brought, and with whose money they were paid for, that none of his contracts failed. But as these resources were not immediately available, the troops on the right bank of the Ebro made incursions after cattle beyond the frontiers of Aragon; and when Harispe returned from Barcelona, eight battalions marched upon a like service up the higher valleys of the Pyrenees.
It was in this state of affairs that Suchet received intelligence of the surprise of Figueras, which induced him to hasten the investment of Taragona. Meanwhile, fearing that Mina might penetrate to the higher valleys of Aragon, and in conjunction with the partidas of Upper Catalonia cut off all correspondence with France, he detached Chlopiski with four battalions and two hundred hussars to watch the movements of that chief only, and demanded of the emperor, that some troops from Pampeluna should occupy Sanguessa, while others, from the army of the north, should relieve the detachments of the army of Aragon, at Soria and Calatayud.
The battalions sent up the high valleys of Catalonia returned in the latter end of April. Suchet then reviewed his troops, issued a month’s pay, and six day’s provisions to each soldier, loaded many carriages and mules with flour, and, having first spread a report, that he was going to relieve Figueras, commenced his march to Taragona by the way of Momblanch. Some Miguelettes entrenched in the pass of Ribas, were dispersed by Harispe’s division on the 1st of May, and the army descended the hills to Alcover; but four hundred men were left in Momblanch, where a post was fortified, to protect the line of communication with Lerida, and to prevent the Spanish partizans on that flank, from troubling the communication between Mora and Reus. The 2d the head-quarters were fixed at Reus, and the 3d the Spanish outposts were driven over the Francoli; meanwhile Habert, sending the artillery from Tortoza by the Col de Balaguer, moved himself with a large convoy from Mora by Falcet to Reus.