CHAPTER III.
1812. August. While the various military combinations, described in the foregoing chapter, were thickening, Wellington, as we have seen, remained in Madrid, apparently inactive, but really watching the fitting moment to push his operations, and consolidate his success in the north, preparatory to the execution of his designs in the south. The result was involved in a mixed question, of time, and of combinations dependant upon his central position, and upon the activity of the partidas in cutting off all correspondence between the French armies. His mode of paralyzing Suchet’s and Caffarelli’s armies, by the Sicilian armament in the east and Popham’s armament in the north, has been already described, but his internal combinations, to oppose the united forces of Soult and the king, were still more important and extensive.
When it was certain that Soult had actually abandoned Andalusia, Hill was directed upon Toledo, by the bridge of Almaraz, and colonel Sturgeon’s genius had rendered that stupendous ruin, although more lofty than Alcantara, passable for artillery. Elio also was induced to bring the army of Murcia to the same quarter, and Ballesteros was desired to take post on the mountain of Alcaraz, and look to the fortress of Chinchilla, which, situated at the confines of Murcia and La Mancha, and perched on a rugged isolated hill in a vast plain, was peculiarly strong both from construction and site, and it was the knot of all the great lines of communication. The partizan corps of Bassecour, Villa Campa, and the Empecinado, were desired to enter La Mancha, and thus, as Hill could bring up above twenty thousand men, and as the third, fourth, and light divisions, two brigades of cavalry, and Carlos D’España’s troops, were to remain near Madrid, whilst the rest of the army marched into Old Castile, above sixty thousand men, thirty thousand being excellent troops and well commanded, would have been assembled, with the fortified post of Chinchilla in front, before Soult could unite with the king.
The British troops at Carthagena were directed, when Soult should have passed that city, to leave only small garrisons in the forts there, and join the army at Alicant, which with the reinforcements from Sicily, would then be sixteen thousand strong, seven thousand being British troops. While this force was at Alicant Wellington judged that the French could not bring more than fifty thousand against Madrid without risking the loss of Valencia itself. Not that he expected the heterogeneous mass he had collected could resist on a fair field the veteran and powerfully constituted army which would finally be opposed to them; but he calculated that ere the French generals could act seriously, the rivers would be full, and Hill could then hold his ground, sufficiently long to enable the army to come back from Burgos. Indeed he had little doubt of reducing that place, and being again on the Tagus in time to take the initial movements himself.
Meanwhile the allies had several lines of operation.
Ballasteros from the mountains of Alcaraz, could harass the flanks of the advancing French, and when they passed, could unite with Maitland to overpower Suchet.
Hill could retire if pressed, by Madrid, or by Toledo, and could either gain the passes of the Guadarama or the valley of the Tagus.
Elio, Villa Campa, Bassecour, and the Empecinado could act by Cuenca and Requeña against Suchet, or against Madrid if the French followed Hill obstinately; or they could join Ballesteros. And besides all these forces, there were ten or twelve thousand new Spanish levies in the Isla waiting for clothing and arms which under the recent treaty were to come from England.
May. To lord Wellington, the English ministers had nominally confided the distribution of these succours, but following their usual vicious manner of doing business, they also gave Mr. Stuart a controul over it, without Wellington’s knowledge, and hence the stores, expected by the latter at Lisbon or Cadiz, were by Stuart unwittingly directed to Coruña, with which place the English general had no secure communication; moreover there were very few Spanish levies there, and no confidential person to superintend the delivery of them. Other political crosses, which shall be noticed in due time, he also met with, but it will suffice here to say that the want of money was an evil now become intolerable. The army was many months in arrears; those officers who went to the rear sick suffered the most cruel privations, and those who remained in Madrid, tempted by the pleasures of the capital, obtained some dollars at an exorbitant premium from a money-broker, and it was grievously suspected that his means resulted from the nefarious proceedings of an under commissary; but the soldiers, equally tempted, having no such resource, plundered the stores of the Retiro. In fine, discipline became relaxed throughout the army, and the troops kept in the field were gloomy, envying those who remained at Madrid.
September That city exhibited a sad mixture of luxury and desolation. When it was first entered a violent, cruel, and unjust persecution of those who were called “Afrancesados,” was commenced, and continued, until the English general interfered, and as an example made no distinction in his invitations to the palace feasts. Truly it was not necessary to increase the sufferings of the miserable people, for though the markets were full of provisions, there was no money wherewith to buy; and though the houses were full of rich furniture, there were neither purchasers nor lenders; even noble families secretly sought charity that they might live. At night the groans, and stifled cries of famishing people were heard, and every morning emaciated dead bodies, cast into the streets, shewed why those cries had ceased. The calm resignation with which these terrible sufferings were borne was a distinctive mark of the national character; not many begged, none complained, there was no violence, no reproaches, very few thefts; the allies lost a few animals, nothing more, and these were generally thought to be taken by robbers from the country. But with this patient endurance of calamity the “Madrileños” discovered a deep and unaffected gratitude for kindness received at the hands of the British officers who contributed, not much for they had it not, but, enough of money to form soup charities by which hundreds were succoured. It was the third division, and I believe the forty-fifth regiment which set the example, and surely this is not the least of the many honourable distinctions those brave men have earned.
Wellington desirous of obtaining shelter from the extreme heat for his troops, had early sent four divisions and the cavalry, to the Escurial and St. Ildefonso, from whence they could join Hill by the valley of the Tagus, or Clinton by Arevalo; but when he knew that the king’s retreat upon Valencia was decided, that Soult had abandoned Cordoba, and that Clinton was falling back before Clauzel, he ordered the first, fifth, and seventh divisions, Pack’s and Bradford’s Portuguese brigades, Ponsonby’s light horsemen, and the heavy German cavalry, to move rapidly upon Arevalo, and on the 1st of September quitted Madrid himself to take the command. Yet his army had been so diminished by sickness that only twenty-one thousand men, including three thousand cavalry, were assembled in that town, and he had great difficulty to feed the Portuguese soldiers, who were also very ill equipped.
The regency instead of transmitting money and stores to supply their troops, endeavoured to throw off the burthen entirely by an ingenious device; for having always had a running account with the Spanish government, they now made a treaty, by which the Spaniards were to feed the Portuguese troops, and check off the expense on the national account which was then in favour of the Portuguese; that is, the soldiers were to starve under the sanction of this treaty, because the Spaniards could not feed their own men, and would not, if they could, have fed the Portuguese. Neither could the latter take provisions from the country, because Wellington demanded the resources of the valleys of the Duero and Pisuerga for the English soldiers, as a set-off against the money advanced by sir Henry Wellesley to the Spanish regency at Cadiz. Wherefore to force the Portuguese regency from this shameful expedient he stopped the payments of their subsidy from the chest of aids. Then the old discontents and disputes revived and acquired new force; the regency became more intractable than ever, and the whole military system of Portugal was like to fall to pieces.
On the 4th the allies quitted Arevalo, the 6th they passed the Duero by the ford above Puente de Duero, the 7th they entered Valladolid, and meanwhile the Gallicians, who had returned to the Esla, when Foy retreated, were ordered to join the Anglo-Portuguese army. Clauzel abandoned Valladolid in the night of the 6th, and though closely followed by Ponsonby’s cavalry, crossed the Pisuerga and destroyed the bridge of Berecal on that river. The 8th the allies halted, for rest, and to await the arrival of Castaños; but seldom during this war did a Spanish general deviate into activity; and Wellington observed that in his whole intercourse with that people, from the beginning of the revolution to that moment, he had not met with an able Spaniard, while amongst the Portuguese he had found several. The Gallicians came not, and the French retreated slowly up the beautiful Pisuerga and Arlanzan valleys, which, in denial of the stories about French devastation, were carefully cultivated and filled to repletion with corn, wine, and oil.
Nor were they deficient in military strength. Off the high road, on both sides, ditches and rivulets impeded the troops, while cross ridges continually furnished strong parallel positions flanked by the lofty hills on either side. In these valleys Clauzel baffled his great adversary in the most surprising manner. Each day he offered battle, but on ground which Wellington was unwilling to assail in front, partly because he momentarily expected the Gallicians up, but chiefly because of the declining state of his own army from sickness, which, combined with the hope of ulterior operations in the south, made him unwilling to lose men. By flank movements he dislodged the enemy, yet each day darkness fell ere they were completed, and the morning’s sun always saw Clauzel again in position. At Cigales and Dueñas, in the Pisuerga valley; at Magoz, Torquemada, Cordobilla, Revilla, Vallejera, and Pampliega in the valley of the Arlanzan, the French general thus offered battle, and finally covered Burgos on the 16th, by taking the strong position of Cellada del Camino.
But eleven thousand Spanish infantry, three hundred cavalry, and eight guns, had now joined the allies, and Wellington would have attacked frankly on the 17th, had not Clauzel, alike wary and skilful, observed the increased numbers and retired in the night to Frandovinez; his rear-guard was however next day pushed sharply back to the heights of Burgos, and in the following night he passed through that town leaving behind him large stores of grain. Caffarelli who had come down to place the castle of Burgos in a state of defence, now joined him, and the two generals retreated upon Briviesca, where they were immediately reinforced by that reserve which, with such an extraordinary foresight, the emperor had directed to be assembled and exercised on the Pyrennees, in anticipation of Marmont’s disaster. The allies entered Burgos amidst great confusion, for the garrison of the castle had set fire to some houses impeding the defence of the fortress, the conflagration spread widely, and the Partidas who were already gathered like wolves round a carcass, entered the town for mischief. Mr. Sydenham, an eye-witness, and not unused to scenes of war, thus describes their proceedings, “What with the flames and the plundering of the Guerillas, who are as bad as Tartars and Cossacks of the Kischack or Zagatay hordes, I was afraid Burgos would be entirely destroyed, but order was at length restored by the manful exertions of Don Miguel Alava.”
The series of beautiful movements executed by Clauzel, merit every praise, but it may be questioned if the English general’s marches were in the true direction, or made in good time; for though Clinton’s retreat upon Arevalo influenced, it did not absolutely dictate the line of operations. Wellington had expected Clauzel’s advance to Valladolid; it was therefore no surprise, and on the 26th of August, Foy was still at Zamora. At that period the English general might have had his army, Clinton’s troops excepted, at Segovia; and as the distance from thence to Valladolid, is rather less than from Valladolid to Zamora, a rapid march upon the former, Clinton advancing at the same time, might have separated Clauzel from Foy. Again, Wellington might have marched upon Burgos by Aranda de Duero and Lerma, that road being as short as by Valladolid; he might also have brought forward the third, or the light division, by the Somosierra, from Madrid, and directed Clinton and the Spaniards to close upon the French rear. He would thus have turned the valleys of the Pisuerga and the Arlanzan, and could from Aranda, or Lerma, have fallen upon Clauzel while in march. That general having Clinton and the Gallicians on his rear, and Wellington, reinforced by the divisions from Madrid, on his front or flank, would then have had to fight a decisive battle under every disadvantage. In fine the object was to crush Clauzel, and this should have been effected though Madrid had been entirely abandoned to secure success. It is however probable that want of money and means of transport decided the line of operations, for the route by the Somosierra was savage and barren, and the feeding of the troops even by Valladolid was from hand to mouth, or painfully supported by convoys from Portugal.
SIEGE OF THE CASTLE OF BURGOS.
Caffarelli had placed eighteen hundred infantry, besides artillery-men, in this place, and general Dubreton the governor, was of such courage and skill that he surpassed even the hopes of his sanguine and warlike countryman. The castle and its works enclosed a rugged hill, between which and the river, the city of Burgos was situated. An old wall with a new parapet and flanks constructedColonel Jones’s Sieges, 2nd edit. by the French offered the first line of defence; the second line, which was within the other, was earthen, of the nature of a field retrenchment and well palisaded; the third line was similarly constructed and contained the two most elevated points of the hill, on one of which was an entrenched building called the White Church, and on the other the ancient keep of the castle; this last was the highest point, and was not only entrenched but surmounted with a heavy casemated work called the Napoleon battery. Thus there were five separate enclosures.
The Napoleon battery commanded every thing around it, save to the north, where at the distance of three hundred yards there was a second height scarcely less elevated than that of the fortress. It was called the Hill of San Michael, and was defended by a large horn-work with a hard sloping scarp twenty-five, and a counterscarp ten feet high. This outwork was unfinished and only closedSee [Plan 4.] by strong palisades, but it was under the fire of the Napoleon battery, was well flanked by the castle defences, and covered in front by slight entrenchments for the out picquets. The French had already mounted nine heavy guns, eleven field-pieces, and six mortars or howitzers in the fortress, and as the reserve artillery and stores of the army of Portugal were also deposited there, they could increase their armament.
FIRST ASSAULT.
The batteries so completely commanded all the bridges and fords over the Arlanzan that two days elapsed ere the allies could cross; but on the 19th the passage of the river being effected above the town, by the first division, major Somers Cocks, supported by Pack’s Portuguese, drove in the French outposts on the hill of San Michael. In the night, the same troops, reinforced with the forty-second regiment, stormed the horn-work. The conflict was murderous. For though the ladders were fairly placed by the bearers of them, the storming column, which, covered by a firing party, marched against the front, was beaten with great loss, and the attack would have failed if the gallant leader of the seventy-ninth had not meanwhile forced an entrance by the gorge. The garrison was thus actually cut off, but Cocks, though followed by the second battalion of the forty-second regiment, was not closely supported, and the French being still five hundred strong, broke through his men and escaped. This assault gave room for censure, the troops complained of each other, and the loss was above four hundred, while that of the enemy was less than one hundred and fifty.
Wellington was now enabled to examine the defences of the castle. He found them feeble and incomplete, and yet his means were so scant that he had slender hopes of success, and relied more upon the enemy’s weakness than upon his own power. It was however said that water was scarce with the garrison and that their provision magazines could be burned, wherefore encouraged by this information he adopted the following plan of attack.
Twelve thousand men composing the first and sixth divisions and the two Portuguese brigades, were to undertake the works; the rest of the troops, about twenty thousand, exclusive of the Partidas, were to form the covering army.
The trenches were to be opened from the suburb of San Pedro, and a parallel formed in the direction of the hill of San Michael.
Jones’s Sieges. A battery for five guns was to be established close to the right of the captured horn-work.
A sap was to be pushed from the parallel as near the first wall as possible, without being seen into from the upper works, and from thence the engineer was to proceed by gallery and mine.
When the first mine should be completed, the battery on the hill of San Michael was to open against the second line of defence, and the assault was to be given on the first line. If a lodgement was formed, the approaches were to be continued against the second line, and the battery on San Michael was to be turned against the third line, in front of the White Church, because the defences there were exceedingly weak. Meanwhile a trench for musketry was to be dug along the brow of San Michael, and a concealed battery was to be prepared within the horn-work itself, with a view to the final attack of the Napoleon battery.
The head-quarters were fixed at Villa Toro, colonel Burgoyne conducted the operations of the engineers, colonel Robe and colonel Dickson those of the artillery, which consisted of three eighteen-pounders, and the five iron twenty-four-pound howitzers used at the siege of the Salamanca forts; and it was with regard to these slender means, rather than the defects of the fortress, that the line of attack was chosen.
When the horn-work fell a lodgement had been immediately commenced in the interior, and it was continued vigorously, although under a destructive fire from the Napoleon battery, because the besiegers feared the enemy would at day-light endeavour to retake the work by the gorge; good cover was, however, obtained in the night, and the first battery was also begun.
The 21st the garrison mounted several fresh field-guns, and at night kept up a heavy fire of grape, and shells, on the workmen who were digging the musketry trench in front of the first battery.
The 22d the fire of the besieged was redoubled, but the besiegers worked with little loss, and their musketeers galled the enemy. In the night the first battery was armed with two eighteen-pounders and three howitzers, and the secret battery within the horn-work was commenced; but lord Wellington, deviating from his first plan, now resolved to try an escalade against the first line of defence. He selected a point half-way between the suburb of San Pedro and the horn-work, and at midnight four hundred men provided with ladders were secretly posted, in a hollow road, fifty yards from the wall, which was from twenty-three to twenty-five feet high but had no flanks; this was the main column, and a Portuguese battalion was also assembled in the town of Burgos to make a combined flank attack on that side.
SECOND ASSAULT.
The storm was commenced by the Portuguese, but they were repelled by the fire of the common guard alone, and the principal escalading party which was composed of detachments from different regiments under major Lawrie 79th regiment, though acting with more courage, had as little success. The ladders were indeed placed, and the troops entered the ditch, yet all together, and confusedly; Lawrie was killed and the bravest soldiers who first mounted the ladders were bayonetted; combustible missiles were then thrown down in great abundance, and after a quarter of an hour’s resistance, the men gave way, leaving half their number behind. The wounded were brought offLord Wellesley’s speech, House of Lords, 12th March 1813. the next day under a truce. It is said that on the body of one of the officers killed the French found a complete plan of the siege, and it is certain that this disastrous attempt, which delayed the regular progress of the siege for two days, increased the enemy’s courage, and produced a bad effect upon the allied troops, some of whom were already dispirited by the attack on the horn-work.
The original plan being now resumed, the hollow way from whence the escaladers had advanced, and which at only fifty yards’ distance run along the front of defence, was converted into a parallel, and connected with the suburb of San Pedro. The trenches were made deep and narrow to secure them from the plunging shot of the castle, and musketeers were also planted to keep down the enemy’s fire; but heavy rains incommoded the troops, and though the allied marksmen got the mastery over those of the French immediately in their front, the latter, having a raised and palisaded work on their own right which in someSee [Plan 4.] measure flanked the approaches, killed so many of the besiegers that the latter were finally withdrawn.
In the night a flying sap was commenced, from the right of the parallel, and was pushed within twenty yards of the enemy’s first line of defence; but the directing engineer was killed, and with him many men, for the French plied their musketry sharply, and rolled large shells down the steep side of the hill. The head of the sap was indeed so commanded as it approached the wall, that a six-feet trench, added to the height of the gabion above, scarcely protected the workmen, wherefore the gallery of the mine was opened, and worked as rapidly as the inexperience of the miners, who were merely volunteers from the line, would permit.
The concealed battery within the horn-work of San Michael being now completed, two eighteen-pounders were removed from the first battery to arm it, and they were replaced by two iron howitzers, which opened upon the advanced palisade below, to drive the French marksmen from that point; but after firing one hundred and forty rounds without success this project was relinquished, and ammunition was so scarce that the soldiers were paid to collect the enemy’s bullets.
This day also a zigzag was commenced in front of the first battery and down the face of San Michael, to obtain footing for a musketry trench to overlook the enemy’s defences below; and though the workmen were exposed to the whole fire of the castle, at the distance of two hundred yards, and were knocked down fast, the work went steadily on.
On the 26th the gallery of the mine was advanced eighteen feet, and the soil was found favourable, but the men in passing the sap, were hit fast by the French marksmen, and an assistant engineer was killed. In the night the parallel was prolonged on the right within twenty yards of the enemy’s ramparts, with a view to a second gallery and mine, and musketeers were planted there to oppose the enemy’s marksmen and to protect the sap; at the same time the zigzag on the hill of San Michael was continued, and the musket trench there was completed under cover of gabions, and with little loss, although the whole fire of the castle was concentrated on the spot.
The 27th the French were seen strengthening their second line, and they had already cut a step, along the edge of the counterscarp, for a covered way, and had palisaded the communication. Meanwhile the besiegers finished the musketry trench on the right of their parallel, and opened the gallery for the second mine; but the first mine went on slowly, the men in the sap were galled and disturbed, by stones, grenades, and small shells, which the French threw into the trenches by hand; and the artillery fire also knocked over the gabions of the musketry trench, on San Michael, so fast, that the troops were withdrawn during the day.
In the night a trench of communication forming a second parallel behind the first was begun and nearly completed from the hill of San Michael towards the suburb of San Pedro, and the musketry trench on the hill was deepened.
The 28th an attempt was made to perfect this new parallel of communication, but the French fire was heavy, and the shells, which passed over, came rolling down the hill again into the trench, so the work was deferred until night and was then perfected. The back roll of the shells continued indeed to gall the troops, but the whole of this trench, that in front of the horn-work above, and that on the right of the parallel below, were filled with men whose fire was incessant. Moreover the first mine was now completed and loaded with more than a thousand weight of powder, the gallery was strongly tamped for fifteen feet with bags of clay, and all being ready for the explosion Wellington ordered the
THIRD ASSAULT.
At midnight the hollow road, fifty yards from the mine, was lined with troops to fire on the defences, and three hundred men, composing the storming party, were assembled there, attended by others who carried tools and materials to secure the lodgement when the breach should be carried. The mine was then exploded, the wall fell, and an officer with twenty men rushed forward to the assault. The effect of the explosion was not so great as it ought to have been, yet it brought the wall down, the enemy was stupified, and the forlorn hope, consisting of a sergeant and four daring soldiers, gained the summit of the breach, and there stood until the French, recovering, drove them down pierced with bayonet wounds. Meanwhile the officer and the twenty men, who were to have been followed by a party of fifty, and these by the remainder of the stormers, missed the breach in the dark, and finding the wall unbroken, returned, and reported that there was no breach. The main body immediately regained the trenches, and before the sergeant and his men returned with streaming wounds to tell their tale, the enemy was reinforced; and such was the scarcity of ammunition that no artillery practice could be directed against the breach, during the night; hence the French were enabled to raise a parapet behind it and to place obstacles on the ascent which deterred the besiegers from renewing the assault at day-light.
This failure arose from the darkness of the night, and the want of a conducting engineer, for out of four regular officers, of that branch, engaged in the siege, one had been killed, one badly wounded, and one was sick, wherefore the remaining one was necessarily reserved for the conducting of the works. The aspect of affairs was gloomy. Twelve days had elapsed since the siege commenced, one assault had succeeded, two had failed, twelve hundred men had been killed, or wounded, little progress had been made, and the troops generally shewed symptoms of despondency, especially the Portuguese, who seemed to be losing their ancient spirit. Discipline was relaxed, the soldiers wasted ammunition, and the work in the trenches was avoided or neglected both by officers and men; insubordination was gaining ground, and reproachful orders were issued, the guards only being noticed as presenting an honourable exception.
October. In this state it was essential to make some change in the operations, and as the French marksmen, in the advanced palisadoed work below, were now become so expert that every thing which could be seen from thence was hit, the howitzer battery on San Michael was reinforced with a French eight-pounder, by the aid of which this mischievous post was at last demolished. At the same time the gallery of the second mine was pushed forward, and a new breaching battery for three guns was constructed behind it, so close to the enemy’s defences that the latter screened the work from the artillery fire of their upper fortress; but the parapet of the battery was only made musket-proof because the besieged had no guns on the lower line of this front.
In the night the three eighteen-pounders were brought from the hill of San Michael without being discovered, and at day-light, though a very galling fire of muskets thinned the workmen, they persevered until nine o’clock when the battery was finished and armed. But at that moment the watchful Dubreton brought a howitzer down from the upper works, and with a low charge threw shells into the battery; then making a hole through a flank wall, he thrust out a light gun which sent its bullets whizzing through the thin parapet at every round, and at the same time his marksmen plied their shot so sharply that the allies were driven from their pieces without firing a shot. More French cannon were now brought from the upper works, the defences of the battery were quite demolished, two of the gun-carriages were disabled, a trunnion was knocked off one of the eighteen-pounders, and the muzzle of another was split. And it was in vain that the besiegers’ marksmen, aided by some officers who considered themselves good shots, endeavoured to quell the enemy’s fire, the French being on a height were too well covered and remained masters of the fight.
In the night a second and more solid battery was formed at a point a little to the left of the ruined one, but at day-light the French observed it; and their fire plunging from above made the parapet fly off so rapidly, that the English general relinquished his intention and returned to his galleries and mines, and to his breaching battery on the hill of San Michael. The two guns still serviceable were therefore removed towards the upper battery to beat down a retrenchment formed by the French behind the old breach. It was intended to have placed them on this new position in the night of the 3d, but the weather was very wet and stormy, and the workmen, those of the guards only excepted, abandoned the trenches; hence at day-light the guns were still short of their destination and nothing more could be done until the following night.
On the 4th, at nine o’clock in the morning, the two eighteen-pounders, and three iron howitzers, again opened from San Michael’s, and at four o’clock in the evening, the old breach being cleared of all incumbrances, and the second mine being strongly tamped for explosion, a double assault was ordered. The second battalion of the twenty-fourth British regiment, commanded by captain Hedderwick was selected for this operation, and was formed in the hollow way, having one advanced party, under Mr. Holmes, pushed forward as close to the new mine as it was safe to be, and a second party under Mr. Frazer in like manner pushed towards the old breach.
FOURTH ASSAULT.
At five o’clock the mine was exploded with a terrific effect, sending many of the French up into the air and breaking down one hundred feet of the wall, the next instant Holmes and his brave men went rushing through the smoke and crumbling ruins, and Frazer, as quick and brave as his brother officer, was already fighting with the defenders on the summit of the old breach. The supports followed closely, and in a few minutes both points were carried with a loss to the assailants of thirty-seven killed and two hundred wounded, seven of the latter being officers and amongst them the conducting engineer. During the night lodgements were formed, in advance of the old, and on the ruins of the new breach, yet very imperfectly, and under a heavy destructive fire from the upper defences. But this happy attack revived the spirits of the army, vessels with powder were coming coastwise from Coruña, a convoy was expected by land from Ciudad Rodrigo, and as a supply of ammunition sent by sir Home Popham had already reached the camp, from Santander, the howitzers continued to knock away the palisades in the ditch, and the battery on San Michael’s was directed to open a third breach at a point where the first French line of defence was joined to the second line.
This promising state of affairs was of short duration.
On the 5th, at five o’clock in the evening, while the working parties were extending the lodgements, three hundred French came swiftly down the hill, and sweeping away the labourers and guards from the trenches, killed or wounded a hundred and fifty men, got possession of the old breach, destroyed the works, and carried off all the tools. However in the night the allies repaired the damage and pushed saps from each flank to meet in the centre near the second French line, and to serve as a parallel to check future sallies. Meanwhile the howitzers on the San Michael continued their fire, yet ineffectually, against the palisades; the breaching battery in the horn-work also opened, but it was badly constructed, and the guns being unable to see the wall sufficiently low, soon ceased to speak, the embrasures were therefore masked. On the other hand the besieged were unable, from the steepness of the castle-hill, to depress their guns sufficiently to bear on the lodgement at the breaches in the first line, but their musquetry was destructive, and they rolled down large shells to retard the approaches towards the second line.
On the 7th the besiegers had got so close to the wall below that the howitzers above could no longer play without danger to the workmen, wherefore two French field-pieces, taken in the horn-work, were substituted and did good service. The breaching battery on San Michael’s being altered, also renewed its fire, and at five o’clock had beaten down fifty feet from the parapet of the second line; but the enemy’s return was heavy, and another eighteen-pounder lost a trunnion. However in the night block-carriages with supports for the broken trunnions were provided, and the disabled guns were enabled to recommence their fire yet with low charges. But a constant rain had now filled the trenches, the communications were injured, the workmen were negligent, the approaches to the second line went on slowly, and again Dubreton came thundering down from the upper ground, driving the guards and workmen from the new parallel at the lodgements, levelling all the works, carrying off all the tools, and killing or wounding two hundred men. Colonel Cocks, promoted for his gallant conduct at the storming of San Michael, restored the fight, and repulsed the French, but he fell dead on the ground he had recovered. He was a young man of a modest demeanour, brave, thoughtful, and enterprising, and he lived and died a good soldier.
After this severe check the approaches to the second line were abandoned, and the trenches were extended so as to embrace the whole of the fronts attacked; the battery on San Michael had meantime formed a practicable breach twenty-five feet wide, and the parallel, at the old breach of the first line, was prolonged by zigzags on the left towards this new breach, while a trench was opened to enable marksmen to fire upon the latter at thirty yards distance. Nevertheless another assault could not be risked because the great expenditure of powder had again exhausted the magazines, and without a new supply, the troops might have found themselves without ammunition in front of the French army which was now gathering head near Briviesca. Heated shot were however thrown at the White Church with a view to burn the magazines; and the miners were directed to drive a gallery, on the other side of the castle, against the church of San Roman, a building pushed out a little beyond the French external line of defence on the side of the city.
On the 10th, when the besiegers’ ammunition was nearly all gone, a fresh supply arrived from Santander, but no effect had been produced upon the White Church, and Dubreton had strengthened his works to meet the assault; he had also isolated the new breachSee [Plan, No. 4.] on one flank by a strong stockade extending at right angles from the second to the third line of defence. The fire from the Napoleon battery had obliged the besiegers again to withdraw their battering guns within the horn-work, and the attempt to burn the White Church was relinquished, but the gallery against San Roman was continued. In this state things remained for several days with little change, save that the French, maugre the musketry from the nearest zigzag trench, had scarped eight feet at the top of the new breach and formed a small trench at the back.
On the 15th the battery in the horn-work was again armed, and the guns pointed to breach the wall of the Napoleon battery; they were however over-matched and silenced in three-quarters of an hour, and the embrasures were once more altered, that the guns might bear on the breach in the second line. Some slight works and counter-works were also made on different points, but the besiegers were principally occupied repairing the mischief done by the rain, and in pushing the gallery under San Roman, where the French were now distinctly heard talking in the church, wherefore the mine there was formed and loaded with nine hundred pounds of powder.
On the 17th the battery of the horn-work being renewed, the fire of the eighteen-pounders cleared away the enemy’s temporary defences at the breach, the howitzers damaged the rampart on each side, and a small mine was sprung on the extreme right of the lower parallel, with a view to take possession of a cavalier or mound which the French had raised there, and from which they had killed many men in the trenches; it was successful, and a lodgement was effected, but the enemy soon returned in force and obliged the besiegers to abandon it again. However on the 18th the new breach was rendered practicable, and Wellington ordered it to be stormed. The explosion of the mine under San Roman was to be the signal; that church was also to be assaulted; and at the same time a third detachment was to escalade the works in front of the ancient breach and thus connect the attacks.
FIFTH ASSAULT.
At half-past four o’clock the springing of the mine at San Roman broke down a terrace in front of that building, yet with little injury to the church itself; the latter was, however, resolutely attacked by colonel Browne, at the head of some Spanish and Portuguese troops, and though the enemy sprung a countermine which brought the building down, the assailants lodged themselves in the ruins. Meanwhile two hundred of the foot-guards, with strong supports, poured through the old breach in the first line, and escaladed the second line, beyond which in the open ground between the second and third lines, they were encountered by the French, and a sharp musketry fight commenced. At the same time a like number of the German legion, under major Wurmb, similarly supported, stormed the new breach, on the left of the guards, so vigourously, that it was carried in a moment, and some men, mounting the hill above, actually gained the third line. Unhappily at neither of these assaults did the supports follow closely, and the Germans being cramped on their left by the enemy’s stockade, extended by their right towards the guards, and at that critical moment Dubreton, who held his reserves well in hand, came dashing like a torrent from the upper ground, and in an instant cleared the breaches. Wurmb and many other brave men fell, and then the French, gathering round the guards, who were still unsupported, forced them beyond the outer line. More than two hundred men and officers were killed or wounded in this combat, and the next night the enemy recovered San Roman by a sally.
The siege was thus virtually terminated, for though the French were beaten out of St. Roman again, and a gallery was opened from that church against the second line; and though two twenty-four pounders, sent from Santander, by sir Home Popham, had passed Reynosa on their way to Burgos, these were mere demonstrations. It is now time to narrate the different contemporary events which obliged the English general, with a victorious army, to abandon the siege of a third-rate fortress, strong in nothing but the skill and bravery of the governor and his gallant soldiers.