History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 5

by William Francis Patrick Napier

CHAPTER IV.

1812. October. When king Joseph retreated to Valencia he earnestly demanded a reinforcement of forty thousand men, from France, and, more earnestly, money. Three millions of francs he obtained from Suchet, yet his distress was greater even than that of the allies, and Wellington at one time supposed that this alone would drive the French from the Peninsula. The Anglo-Portuguese soldiers had not received pay for six months, but the French armies of the south, of the centre, and of Portugal, were a whole year behind-hand; and the salaries of the ministers, and civil servants of the court, were two years in arrears. Suchet’s army, the only one which depended entirely on the country, was by that marshal’s excellent management regularly paid, and the effect on its discipline was conformable; his troops refrained from plunder themselves, and repressed some excesses of Joseph’s and Soult’s soldiers so vigorously, as to come to blows in defence of the inhabitants. And thus it will ever be, since paid soldiers only may be kept under discipline. Soldiers without money must become robbers. Napoleon knew the king’s necessity to be extreme, but the war with Russia had so absorbed the resources of France, that little money, and only twenty thousand men, principally conscripts, could be sent to Spain.

The army of Portugal, at the moment when the siege of the castle commenced, had been quartered between Vittoria and Burgos; that is to say, at Pancorbo and along the Ebro as far as Logroña, an advanced guard only remaining at Briviesca; on this line they were recruited and reorganized, and Massena was appointed with full powers to command in the northern provinces. A fine opportunity to revenge his own retreat from Torres Vedras, was thus furnished to the old warrior; but whether he doubted the issue of affairs, or was really tamed by age, he pleaded illness, and sent general Souham to the army of Portugal. Then arose contentions, for Marmont had designated Clauzel as the fittest to lead, Massena insisted that Souham was the abler general, and the king desired to appoint Drouet. Clauzel’s abilities were certainly not inferior to those of any French general, and to more perfectLetter from the duke of Feltre to king Joseph, 4th Oct. 1812, MSS. acquaintance with the theatre of war, he added a better knowledge of the enemy he had to contend with; he was also more known to his own soldiers, and had gained their confidence by his recent operations, no mean considerations in such a matter. However, Souham was appointed.

Caffarelli anxious to succour the castle of Burgos, which belonged to his command, had united at Vittoria a thousand cavalry, sixteen guns, and eight thousand infantry, of which three thousand were of the young guard. The army of Portugal, reinforced from France with twelve thousand men, had thirty-five thousand present under arms, reorganized in six divisions, and by Clauzel’s care, its former excellent discipline had been restored. Thus forty-fourOfficial report of general Souham, MSS. thousand good troops were, in the beginning of October, ready to succour the castle of Burgos; but the generals, although anxious to effect that object, awaited, first the arrival of Souham, and then news from the king, with whose operations it was essential to combine their own. They had no direct tidings from him because the lines of correspondence were so circuitous, and so beset by the Partidas, that the most speedy as well as certain mode of communication, was through the minister of war at Paris; and that functionary found the information, best suited to his purpose, in the English newspapers. For the latter, while deceiving the BritishDuke of Feltre’s correspondence, MSS. public by accounts of battles which were never fought, victories which were never gained, enthusiasm and vigour which never existed, did, with most accurate assiduity, enlighten the enemy upon the numbers, situation, movements, and reinforcements of the allies.

Souham arrived the 3rd of October with the last of the reinforcements from France, but he imagined that lord Wellington had sixty thousand troopsSouham’s official correspondence, MSS. around Burgos, exclusive of the Partidas, and that three divisions were marching from Madrid to his aid; whereas none were coming from that capital, and little more than thirty thousand were present under arms round Burgos, eleven thousand being Gallicians scarcely so good as the Partidas. Wellington’s real strength was in his Anglo-Portuguese, then not twenty thousand, for besides those killed or wounded at the siege, the sick had gone to the rear faster than the recovered men came up. Some unattached regiments and escorts were, indeed, about Segovia, and other points north of the Guadarama, and a reinforcement of five thousand men had been sent from England in September; but the former belonged to Hill’s army, and of the latter, the lifeguards and blues had gone to Lisbon. Hence a regiment of foot-guards, and some detachments for the line, in all about three thousand, were the only available force in the rear.

During the first part of the siege, the English general seeing the French scattered along the Ebro, and only reinforced by conscripts, did not fear any interruption, and the less so, that sir Home Popham was again menacing the coast line. Even now, when the French were beginning to concentrate their troops, he cared little for them, and was resolved to give battle; for he thought that Popham and the guerillas would keep Caffarelli employed, and he felt himself a match for the army of Portugal. Nor were the Partidas inactive on any point, and their successes though small in themselves, were exceedingly harassing to the enemy.

Mina having obtained two or three thousand stand of English arms had re-entered Aragon and domineered on the left bank of the Ebro, while Duran, with four thousand men, operated uncontrolled on the right bank. The Empecinado, Villacampa, and Bassecour descended from Cuenca, the first against Requeña, the others against Albacete. The Frayle interrupted the communications between Valencia and Tortoza. Saornil, Cuesta, Firmin, and others, were in La Mancha and Estremadura, Juan Palarea, called the Medico, was near Segovia, and though Marquinez had been murdered by one of his own men, his partida and that of Julian Sanchez acted as regular troops with Wellington’s army. Meanwhile sir Home Popham, in conjunction with Mendizabel, Porlier, and Renovales, who had gathered all the minor partidas under their banners, assailed Gueteria; but unsuccessfully; for on the 30th of September, the Spanish chiefs were driven away, and Popham lost some guns which had been landed. About the same time the Empecinado being defeated at Requeña, retired to Cuenca, yet he failed not from thence to infest the French quarters.

Duran, when Soria was abandoned, fell upon Calatayud, but was defeated by Severoli, who withdrew the garrison. Then the Spanish chief attacked the castle of Almunia, which was only one march from Zaragoza, and when Severoli succoured this place also, and dismantled the castle, Duran attacked Borja between Tudela and Zaragoza, and took it before Severoli could come up. Thus Zaragoza was gradually deprived of its outposts, on the right of the Ebro; on the left, Mina hovered close to the gates, and his lieutenant, Chaplangara, meeting, near Ayerbe, with three hundred Italians, killed forty, and would have destroyed the whole but for the timely succour of some mounted gens-d’armes. At last Reille being undeceived as to Wellington’s march, restored the smaller posts which he had abandoned, and Suchet ordered the castle of Almunia to be refitted, but during these events, Bassecour and Villa Campa united to infest Joseph’s quarters about Albacete.

Soult’s march from Andalusia and his junction with the king, has been described; but while he was yet at Grenada, Hill, leaving three Portuguese regiments of infantry and one of cavalry at Almendralejo and Truxillo, to protect his line of supply, had marched to cross the Tagus at Almaraz, and Arzobispo. He entered Toledo the 28th of September, and the same day Elio took a small French garrison left in Consuegra. Hill soon after occupied a line from Toledo to Aranjuez, where he was joined by the fourth division, Victor Alten’s cavalry, and the detachments quartered about Ildefonsos and Segovia. On the 8th, hearing of Soult’s arrival at Hellin, he pushed his cavalry to Belmonte on the San Clemente road, and here in La Mancha as in Old Castile the stories of French devastation were belied by the abundance of provisions.

Bassecour, Villa Campa, and the Empecinado now united on the road leading from Cuenca to Valencia, while the Medico and other chiefs gathered in the Toledo mountains. In this manner the allies extended from Toledo on the right, by Belmonte, Cuenca, and Calatayud to near Jacca on the left, and were in military communication with the coast; for Caffarelli’s disposable force was now concentrated to relieve Burgos, and Mina had free intercourse with Mendizabal and Renovales, and with Popham’s fleet. But the French line of correspondence between the armies in the eastern and[Appendix, No. 8, B.] northern provinces, was so interrupted that the English newspapers became their surest, quickest, and most accurate channels of intelligence.

Souham, who over-rated the force of his adversary, and feared a defeat as being himself the only barrier left between Wellington and France, was at first so far from meditating an advance, that he expected and dreaded an attack from the allies; and as the want of provisions would not let him concentrate his army permanently near Monasterio, his dispositions were made to fight on the Ebro.Duke of Feltre’s official correspondence, MSS. The minister of war had even desired him to detach a division against the partidas. But when by the English newspapers, and other information sent from Paris, he learned that Soult was in march from Grenada,—that the king intended to move upon Madrid,—that no English troops had left that capital to join Wellington,—that the army of the latter was not very numerous, and that the castleGeneral Souham’s official correspondence, MSS. of Burgos was sorely pressed, he called up Caffarelli’s troops from Vittoria, concentrated his own at Briviesca and resolved to raise the siege.

On the 13th a skirmish took place on the stream beyond Monasterio, where captain Perse of the sixteenth dragoons was twice forced from the bridge and twice recovered it in the most gallant manner, maintaining his post until colonel F. Ponsonby, who commanded the reserves, arrived. Ponsonby and Perse were both wounded, and this demonstration was followed by various others until the evening of the 18th, when the whole French army was united, and the advanced guard captured a picquet of the Brunswickers which contrary to orders had remained in St. Olalla. This sudden movement apparently prevented Wellington from occupying the position of Monasterio, his outposts fell back on the 19th to Quintanapala and Olmos, and on the ridges behind those places he drew up his army in order of battle. The right was at Ibeas on the Arlanzan; the centre at Riobena and Majarradas on the main road behind Olmos; the left was thrown back near Soto Palaccio, and rested on a small river.

The 20th, Maucune, with two divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, drove the allies from Quintanapala, but Olmos was successfully defended by the Chasseurs Brittaniques, and Maucune, having no supports, was immediately outflanked on the right and forced back to Monasterio, by two divisions under sir Edward Paget. There were now in position, including Pack’s Portuguese, which blockaded the castle, about thirty-three thousand men under arms, namely, twenty-one thousand Anglo-Portuguese infantry and cavalry, eleven thousand Gallicians, and the horsemen of Marquinez and Julian Sanchez. Thus, there were four thousand troopers, but only two thousand six hundred of these were British and German, and the Spanish horsemen regular or irregular, could scarcely be counted in the line of battle. The number of guns and howitzers was only forty-two, including twelve Spanish pieces, extremely ill equipped and scant of ammunition.

Lord Wellington had long felt the want of artillery and had sent a memoir upon the subject, to the British government, in the beginning of the year, yet his ordnance establishment had not been augmented, hence his difficulties during the siege; and in the field, instead of ninety British and Portuguese cannon, which was the just complement for his army, he had now only fifty serviceable pieces, of which twenty-four were with general Hill; and all were British, for the Portuguese artillery had from the abuses and the poverty of their government entirely melted away. Now the French had,Official state of the army given to Massena, MSS. as I have before stated, forty-four thousand men, of which nearly five thousand were cavalry, and they had more than sixty guns, a matter of no small importance; for besides the actual power of artillery in an action, soldiers are excited when the noise is greatest on their side. Wellington stood, therefore, at disadvantage in numbers, composition, and real strength. In his rear was the castle, and the river Arlanzan, the fords and bridges of which were commanded by the guns of the fortress; his generals of division, Paget excepted, were not of any marked ability, his troops were somewhat desponding, and deteriorated in discipline. His situation was therefore dangerous, and critical; a victory could scarcely be expected, and a defeat would have been destructive; he should not have provoked a battle, nor would he have done so had he known that Caffarelli’s troops were united to Souham’s.

On the other hand, Souham should by all means have forced on an action, because his ground was strong, his retreat open, his army powerful and compact, his soldiers full of confidence, his lieutenants Clauzel, Maucune, and Foy, men of distinguished talents, able to second, and able to succeed him in the chief command. The chances of victory and the profit to be derived were great, the chances of defeat, and the dangers to be incurred comparatively small. And it was thus indeed that he judged the matter himself, for Maucune’s advance was intended to be the prelude to a great[Appendix, No. 8. A.] battle, and the English general, as we have seen, was willing to stand the trial. But generals are not absolute masters of events, and as the extraneous influence which restrained both sides, on this occasion, came from afar, it was fitting to show how, in war, movements, distant, and apparently unconnected with those immediately under a general’s eye, will break his measures, and make him appear undecided or foolish when in truth he is both wise and firm.

While Wellington was still engaged with the siege, the cortez made him commander of all the Spanish armies. He had before refused this responsible situation, but the circumstances were now changed, for the Spaniards, having lost nearly all their cavalry and guns in the course of the war, could not safely act, except in connexion with the Anglo-Portuguese forces, and it was absolutely necessary that one head should direct. The English general therefore demanded leave of his own government to accept the offer, although he observed, that the Spanish troops were not at all improved in their discipline, their equipments, or their military spirit; but he thought that conjoined with the British they might behave well, and so escape any more of those terrible disasters which had heretofore overwhelmed the country and nearly brought the war to a conclusion. He was willing to save the dignity of the Spanish government, by leaving it a certain body of men wherewith to operate after its own plans; but that he might exercise his own power efficiently, and to the profit of the troops under himself, he desired that the English government would vigorously insist upon the strict application of the subsidy to the payment of the Spanish soldiers acting with the British army, otherwise the care of the Spanish troops, he said, would only cramp his own operations.

In his reply to the Cortez, his acceptance of the offer was rendered dependent upon the assent of his own government; and he was careful to guard himself from a danger, not unlikely to arise, namely, that the Cortez, when he should finally accept the offer, would in virtue of that acceptance assume the right of directing the whole operations of the war. The intermediate want of power to move the Spanish armies, he judged of little consequence, because hitherto his suggestions having been cheerfully attended to by the Spanish chiefs, he had no reason to expect any change in that particular, but there he was grievously mistaken.

Previous to this offer the Spanish government had, at his desire, directed Ballesteros to cross the Morena, and place himself at Alcaraz and in support of the Chinchilla fort, where joined by Cruz Murgeon, by Elio, and by the Partidas, he would have had a corps of thirty thousand men, would have been supported by Hill’s army, and, having the mountains behind him for a retreat, could have safely menaced the enemy’s flank, and delayed the march against Madrid or at least have obliged the king to leave a strong corps of observation to watch him. But Ballesteros, swelling with arrogant folly, never moved from Grenada, and when he found that Wellington was created generalissimo, he published a manifesto appealing to the Spanish pride against the degradation of serving under a foreigner; he thus sacrificed to his own spleen the welfare of his country, and with a result he little expected; for while he judged himself a man to sway the destinies of Spain, he suddenly found himself a criminal and nothing more. The Cortez caused him to be arrested in the midst of his soldiers, who, indifferent to his fate, suffered him to be sent a prisoner to Ceuta. The count of Abisbal was then declared captain-general of Andalusia, and the duke del Parque was appointed to command Ballesteros’ army, which general Verues immediately led by Jaen towards La Mancha, but Soult was then on the Tormes.

That marshal united with the king on the 3d of October. His troops required rest, his numerous sick were to be sent to the Valencian hospitals, and his first interview with Joseph was of a warm nature, for each had his griefs and passions to declare. Finally the monarch yielded to the superior mental power of his opponent and resolved to profit from his great military capacity, yet reluctantly and more from prudence than liking; for the duke of Feltre, minister of war at Paris, although[Appendix, No. 6. A.] secretly an enemy of Soult, and either believing, or pretending to believe in the foolish charges of disorderly ambition made against that commander, opposed any decided exercise of the king’s authority until the emperor’s will was known: yet this would not have restrained the king if the marshals Jourdan and Suchet had not each declined accepting the duke of Dalmatia’s command when Joseph offered it to them.

Joseph’s Correspondence, MSS. Soult’s first operation was to reduce Chinchilla, a well-constructed fort, which, being in the midst of his quarters, commanded the great roads so as to oblige his army to move under its fire or avoid it by circuitous routes. A vigorous defence was expected, but on the 6th it fell, after a few hours’ attack; for a thunder-storm suddenly arising in a clear sky had discharged itself upon the fort, and killed the governor and many other persons, whereupon the garrison, influenced, it is said, by a superstitious fear, surrendered. This was the first bitter fruit of Ballesteros’ disobedience, for neither could Soult have taken Chinchilla, nor scattered his troops, as he did, at Albacete, Almanza, Yecla, and Hellin, if thirty thousand Spaniards had been posted between Alcaraz and Chinchilla, and supported by thirty thousand Anglo-Portuguese at Toledo under Hill. These extended quarters were however essential for the feeding of the French general’s numbers, and now, covered by the fort of Chinchilla, his troops were well lodged, his great convoys of sick and maimed men, his Spanish families, and other impediments, safely and leisurely sent to Valencia, while his cavalry scouring the country of La Mancha in advance, obliged Bassecour and Villa Campa to fall back upon Cuenca.

The detail of the operations which followed, belongs to another place. It will suffice to say here, that the king, being at the head of more than seventy thousand men, was enabled without risking Valencia to advance towards the Tagus, having previously sent Souham a specific order to combine his movements in co-operation but strictly to avoid fighting. General Hill also finding himself threatened by such powerful forces, and reduced by Ballesteros’ defection to a simple defence of the Tagus, at a moment when that river was becoming fordable in all places, gave notice of his situation to lord Wellington. Joseph’s letter was dispatched on the 1st, and six others followed in succession day by day, yet the last carried by colonel Lucotte, an officer of the royal staff, first reached Souham; the advantages derived from the allies’ central position, and from the Partidas, were here made manifest; for Hill’s letter, though only dispatched the 17th, reached Wellington at the same moment that Joseph’s reached Souham. The latter general was thus forced to relinquish his[Appendix, No. 8. A.] design of fighting on the 20th; nevertheless having but four days’ provisions left, he designed when those should be consumed, to attack notwithstanding the king’s prohibition, if Wellington should still confront him. But the English general considering that his own army, already in a very critical situation, would be quite isolated if the king should, as was most probable, force the allies from the Tagus, now resolved, though with a bitter pang, to raise the siege and retreat so far as would enable him to secure his junction with Hill.

While the armies were in presence some fighting had taken place at Burgos, Dubreton had again obtained possession of the ruins of the church of San Roman and was driven away next morning; and now in pursuance of Wellington’s determination to retreat, mines of destruction were formed in the horn-work by the besiegers, and the guns and stores were removed from the batteries to the parc at Villa Toro. But the greatest part of the draught animals had been sent to Reynosa, to meet the powder and artillery coming from Santander, and hence, the eighteen-pounders could not be carried off, nor, from some error, were the mines of destruction exploded. The rest of the stores and the howitzers were put in march by the road of Villaton and Frandovinez for Celada del Camino. Thus the siege was raised, after five assaults, several sallies and thirty-three days of investment, during which the besiegers lost more than two thousand men and the besieged six hundred in killed or wounded; the latter had also suffered severely, from continual labour, want of water, and bad weather, for the fortress was too small to afford shelter for the garrison and the greater part bivouacked between the lines of defence.

RETREAT FROM BURGOS.

This operation was commenced on the night of the 21st by a measure of great nicety and boldness, for the road, divaricating at Gamonal, led bySee [Plan 5.] Villatoro to the bridge of Villaton on the one hand, and the bridge of Burgos on the other, and Wellington chose the latter, which was the shortest, though it passed the Arlanzan river close under the guns of the castle. The army quitted the position after dark without being observed, and having the artillery-wheels muffled with straw, defiled over the bridge of Burgos with such silence and celerity, that Dubreton, watchful and suspicious as he was, knew nothing of their march until the Partidas, failing in nerve, commenced galloping; then he poured a destructive fire down, but soon lost the range. By this delicate operation the infantry gained Cellada del Camino and Hormillas that night, but the light cavalry halted at Estepar and the bridge of Villa Baniel. Souham, who did not discover the retreat until late in the evening of the 22d, was therefore fain to follow, and by a forced march, to overtake the allies, whereas, if Wellington to avoid the fire of the castle had gone by Villaton, and Frandovinez, the French might have forestalled him at Cellada del Camino.

The 23d the infantry renewing their march crossed the Pisuerga, at Cordovillas, and Torquemada, a little above and below its junction with the Arlanzan; but while the main body made this long march, the French having passed Burgos in the night of the 22d, vigorously attacked the allies’ rear-guard. This was composed of the cavalry and some horse artillery, commanded by Norman Ramsay and Major Downman; of two battalions of Germans under Colin Halket; and of the Partidas of Marquinez and Sanchez, the latter being on the left of the Arlanzan and the whole under the command of sir Stapleton Cotton. The piquets of light cavalry were vigorously driven from the bridge of Baniel as early as seven o’clock in the morning; but they rallied upon their reserves and gained the Hormaza stream which was disputed for some time, and a charge made by captain Perse of the sixteenth dragoons, was of distinguished bravery. However the French cavalry finally forced the passage and the British retiring behind Cellada Camino took post in a large plain. On their left was a range of hills the summit of which was occupied by the Partida of Marquinez, and on their right was the Arlanzan, beyond which Julian Sanchez was posted. Across the middle of the plain run a marshy rivulet cutting the main road, and only passable by a little bridge near a house called the Venta de Pozo, and half-way between this stream and Cellada there was a broad ditch with a second bridge in front of a small village. Cotton immediately retired over the marshy stream, leaving Anson’s horsemen and Halket’s infantry as a rear-guard beyond the ditch; and Anson to cover his own passage of that obstacle left the eleventh dragoons and the guns at Cellada Camino, which was situated on a gentle eminence.

COMBAT OF VENTA DE POZO.

When the French approached Cellada, major Money of the eleventh, who was in advance, galloping out from the left of the village at the head of two squadrons, overturned their leading horsemen, and the artillery plied them briskly with shot, but the main body advancing at a trot along the road soon outflanked the British, and obliged Money’s squadrons to rejoin the rest of the regiment while the guns went on beyond the bridge of Venta de Pozo. Meanwhile the French general Curto with a brigade of hussars ascended the hills on the left, and being followed by Boyer’s dragoons, put Marquinez’ Partida to flight; but a deep ravine run along the foot of these hills, next the plain, it could only be passed at certain places, and towards the first of these the Partidas galloped, closely chased by the hussars, at the moment when the leading French squadrons on the plain were forming in front of Cellada to attack the eleventh regiment. The latter charged and drove the first line upon the second, but then both lines coming forward together, the British were pushed precipitately to the ditch, and got over by the bridge with some difficulty, though with little loss, being covered by the fire of Halket’s infantry which was in the little village behind the bridge.

The left flank of this new line was already turned by the hussars on the hills, wherefore Anson fell back covered by the sixteenth dragoons, and in good order, with design to cross the second bridge at Venta de Pozo; during this movement Marquinez’ Partida came pouring down from the hills in full flight, closely pursued by the French hussars, who mixed with the fugitives, and the whole mass fell upon the flank of the sixteenth dragoons; and at the same moment, these last were also charged by the enemy’s dragoons, who had followed them over the ditch. The commander of the Partida was wounded, colonel Pelly with another officer, and thirty men of the sixteenth, fell into the enemy’s hands, and all were driven in confusion upon the reserves. But while the French were reforming their scattered squadrons after this charge, Anson got his people over the bridge of Venta de Pozo and drew up beyond the rivulet and to the left of the road, on which Halket’s battalions and the guns had already taken post, and the heavy German cavalry, an imposing mass, stood in line on the right, and farther in the rear than the artillery.

Hitherto the action had been sustained by the cavalry of the army of Portugal, but now Caffarelli’s horsemen consisting of the lancers of Berg, the fifteenth dragoons and some squadrons of “gens-d’armes,” all fresh men, came down in line to the rivulet, and finding it impassable, with a quick and daring decision wheeled to their right, and despite of the heavy pounding of the artillery, trotted over the bridge, and again formed line, in opposition to the German dragoons, having the stream in their rear. The position was dangerous but they were full of mettle, and though the Germans, who had let too many come over, charged with a rough shock and broke the right, the French left had the advantage and the others rallied; then a close and furious sword contest had place, but the “gens-d’armes” fought so fiercely, that the Germans, maugre their size and courage, lost ground and finally gave way in disorder. The French followed on the spur with shrill and eager cries, and Anson’s brigade which was thus outflanked and threatened on both sides, fell back also, but not happily, for Boyer’s dragoons having continued their march by the hills to the village of Balbaces there crossed the ravine and came thundering in on the left. Then the British ranks were broken, the regiments got intermixed, and all went to the rear in confusion; finally however the Germans, having extricated themselves from their pursuers turned and formed a fresh line on the left of the road, and the others rallied upon them.

The “gens-d’armes” and lancers, who had suffered severely from the artillery, as well as in the sword-fight, now halted, but Boyer’s dragoons forming ten squadrons, again came to the charge, and with the more confidence that the allies’ ranks appeared still confused and wavering. When within a hundred yards, the German officers rode gallantly out to fight, and their men followed a short way, but the enemy was too powerful, disorder and tumult again ensued, the swiftness of the English horses alone prevented a terrible catastrophe, and though some favourable ground enabled the line to reform once more, it was only to be again broken. However Wellington, who was present, had placed Halket’s infantry and the guns in a position to cover the cavalry, and they remained tranquil until the enemy, in full pursuit after the last charge, came galloping down and lent their left flank to the infantry; then the power of this arm was made manifest; a tempest of bullets emptied the French saddles by scores, and their hitherto victorious horsemen after three fruitless attempts to charge, each weaker than the other, reined up and drew off to the hills, the British cavalry covered by the infantry made good their retreat to Quintana la Puente near the Pisuerga, and the bivouacs of the enemy were established at Villadrigo. The loss in this combat was very considerable on both sides, the French suffered most, but they took a colonel and seventy other prisoners, and they had before the fight, also captured a small commissariat store near Burgos.

While the rear-guard was thus engaged, drunkenness and insubordination, the usual concomitants of an English retreat, were exhibited at Torquemada, where the well-stored wine-vaults became the prey of the soldiery: it is said, that twelve thousand men were to be seen at one time in a state of helpless inebriety. This commencement was bad, and the English general, who had now retreated some fifty miles, seeing the enemy so hot and menacing in pursuit, judged it fitting to check his course; for though the arrangements were surprisingly well combined, the means of transport were so scanty and the weather so bad, that the convoys of sick and wounded were still on the wrong side of the Duero. Wherefore, having with a short march crossed the Carion river on the 24th at its confluence with the Pisuerga, he turned and halted behind it.

Here he was joined by a regiment of the guards, and by detachments coming from Coruña, and his position extending from Villa Muriel to Dueñas below the meeting of the waters, was strong. The troops occupied a range of hills, lofty, yet descending with an easy sweep to the Carion; that river covered the front, and the Pisuerga did the same by the right wing. A detachment had been left to destroy the bridge of Baños on the Pisuerga; colonel Campbell with a battalion of the royals was sent to aid the Spaniards in destroying the bridges at Palencia; and in Wellington’s immediate front some houses and convents beyond the rivers, furnished good posts to cover the destruction of the bridges of Muriel and San Isidro on the Carion, and that of Dueñas on the Pisuerga.

Souham excited by his success on the 23d followed from Villadrigo early on the 24th, and having cannonaded the rear-guard at Torquemada passed the Pisuerga. He immediately directed Foy’s division upon Palencia, and ordered Maucune with the advanced guard to pursue the allies to the bridges of Baños, Isidro, and Muriel; but he halted himself at Magoz, and, if fame does not lie, because the number of French drunkards at Torquemada were even more numerous than those of the British army.

COMBAT ON THE CARION.

Before the enemy appeared, the summits of the hills were crowned by the allies, all the bridges were mined and that of San Isidro was strongly protected by a convent which was filled with troops. The left of the position was equally strong, yet general Oswald, who had just arrived from England and taken the command of the fifth division on the instant, overlooked the advantages to be derived from the dry bed of a canal with high banks, which, on his side, run parallel with the Carion, and he had not occupied the village of Muriel in sufficient strength. In this state of affairs Foy reached Palencia, where, according to some French writers, a treacherous attempt was made under cover of a parley, to kill him; he however drove the allies with some loss from the town and in such haste that all the bridges were abandoned in a perfect condition, and the French cavalry crossing the river and spreading abroad gathered up both baggage and prisoners.

This untoward event obliged Wellington to throw back his left, composed of the fifth division and the Spaniards, at Muriel, thus offering two fronts, the one facing Palencia, the other the Carion. Oswald’s error then became manifest; for Maucune having dispersed the eighth caçadores who were defending a ford between Muriel and San Isidro, fell with a strong body of infantry and guns upon the allies at Muriel, and this at the moment when the mine having been exploded, the party covering the bridge were passing the broken arch by means of ladders. The play of the mine which was effectual, checked the advance of the French for an instant, but suddenly a horseman darting out at full speed from the column, rode down under a flight of bullets, to the bridge, calling out that he was a deserter; he reached the edge of the chasm made by the explosion, and then violently checking his foaming horse, held up his hands, exclaiming that he was a lost man, and with hurried accents asked if there was no ford near. The good-natured soldiers pointed to one a little way off and the gallant fellow having looked earnestly for a few moments as if to fix the exact point, wheeled his horse round, kissed his hand in derision, and bending over his saddle-bow dashed back to his own comrades, amidst showers of shot, and shouts of laughter from both sides. The next moment Maucune’s column covered by a concentrated fire of guns passed the river at the ford thus discovered, made some prisoners in the village, and lined the dry bed of the canal.

Lord Wellington who came up at this instant immediately turned some guns upon the enemy and desired that the village and canal might be retaken; Oswald thought that they could not be held, yet Wellington, whose retreat was endangered by the presence of the enemy on that side of the river was peremptory; he ordered one brigade under general Barnes to attack the main body, while another brigade under general Pringle, cleared the canal, and he strengthened the left with the Spanish troops and Brunswickers. A very sharp fire of artillery and musquetry ensued, and the allies suffered some loss, especially by cannon-shot which from the other side of the river plumped into the reserves. The Spaniards, unequal to any regular movement, got into confusion, and were falling back, when their fiery countryman Miguel Alava, running to their head, with exhortation and example, for though wounded he would not retire, urged them forward to the fight; finally the enemy was driven over the river, the village was re-occupied in force, and the canal was lined by the allied troops. During these events at Villa Muriel, other troops attempted without success to seize the bridge of San Isidro, and the mine was exploded; but they were more fortunate at the bridge of Baños on the Pisuerga, for the mine there failed, and the French cavalry galloping over, made both the working and covering party prisoners.

The strength of the position was now sapped, for Souham could assemble his army on the allies’ left, by Palencia, and force them to an action with their back upon the Pisuerga, or he could pass that river on his own left, and forestall them on the Duero at Tudela. If Wellington pushed his army over the Pisuerga by the bridge of Duenas, Souham, having the initial movement, might be first on the ground, and could attack the heads of the allied columns while Foy’s division came down on the rear. If Wellington, by a rapid movement along the right bank of the Pisuerga, endeavoured to cross at Cabezon, which was the next bridge in his rear, and so gain the Duero, Souham by moving along the left bank, might fall upon him while in march to the Duero, and hampered between that river the Pisuerga and the Esquevilla. An action under such circumstances would have been formidable, and the English general once cut off from the Duero must have retired through Valladolid and Simancas to Tordesillas, or Toro, giving up his communications with Hill. In this critical state of affairs Wellington made no delay. He kept good watch upon the left of the Pisuerga, and knowing that the ground there was rugged, and the roads narrow and bad, while on the right bank they were good and wide, sent his baggage in the night to Valladolid, and withdrawing the troops before day-break on the 26th, made a clean march of sixteen miles to Cabezon, where he passed to the left of the Pisuerga and barricaded and mined the bridge. Then sending a detachment to hold the bridge of Tudela on the Duero behind him, he caused the seventh division, under lord Dalhousie, to secure the bridges of Valladolid, Simancas, and Tordesillas. His retreat behind the Duero, which river was now in full water, being thus assured, he again halted, partly because the ground was favourable, partly to give the commissary-general Kennedy time for some indispensible arrangements.

This functionary, who had gone to England sick in the latter end of 1811, and had returned to the army only the day before the siege of Burgos was raised, in passing from Lisbon by Badajoz to Madrid, and thence to Burgos, discovered that the inexperience of the gentleman who conducted the department during his absence had been productive of some serious errors. The magazines established between Lisbon and Badajos, and from thence by Almaraz to the valley of the Tagus, for the supply of the army in Madrid, had not been removed again when the retreat commenced, and Soult would have found them full, if his march had been made rapidly on that side; on the other hand the magazines on the line of operations, between Lisbon and Salamanca, were nearly empty. Kennedy had therefore the double task on hand to remove the magazines from the south side of the Tagus, and to bring up stores upon the line of the present retreat; and his dispositions were not yet completed when Wellington desired him to take measures for the removal of the sick and wounded, and every other incumbrance, from Salamanca, promising to hold his actual position on the Pisuerga until the operation was effected. Now there was sufficient means of transport for the occasion, but the negligence of many medical and escorting officers, conducting the convoys of sick to the rear, and the consequent bad conduct of the soldiers, for where the officers are careless the soldiers will be licentious, produced the worst effects. Such outrages were perpetrated on the inhabitants along the whole line of march that terror was every where predominant, and the ill-used drivers and muleteers deserted, some with, some without their cattle, by hundreds. Hence Kennedy’s operation in some measure failed, the greatest distress was incurred, and the commissariat lost nearly the whole of the animals and carriages employed; the villages were abandoned, and the under-commissaries were bewildered, or paralyzed, by the terrible disorder thus spread along the line of communication.

Souham having repaired the bridges on the Carion, resumed the pursuit on the 26th, by the right of the Pisuerga, being deterred probably from moving to the left bank, by the rugged nature of the ground, and by the king’s orders not to risk a serious action. In the morning of the 27th his whole army was collected in front of Cabezon, but he contented himself with a cannonade and a display of his force; the former cost the allies colonel Robe of the artillery, a practised officer and a worthy man; the latter enabled the English general, for the first time, to discover the numbers he had to contend with, and they convinced him that he could hold neither the Pisuerga nor the Duero permanently. However his object being to gain time, he held his position, and when the French, leaving a division in front of Cabezon, extended their right, by Cigales and Valladolid, to Simancas, he caused the bridges at the two latter places to be destroyed in succession.

Congratulating himself that he had not fought in front of Burgos with so powerful an army, Wellington now resolved to retire behind the Duero and finally, if pressed, behind the Tormes. But as the troops on the Tagus would then be exposed to a flank attack, similar to that which the siege of Burgos had been raised to avoid on his own part; and as this would be more certain if any ill fortune befell the troops on the Duero, he ordered Hill to relinquish the defence of the Tagus at once and retreat, giving him a discretion as to the line, but desiring him, if possible, to come by the Guadarama passes; for he designed, if all went well, to unite on the Adaja river in a central position, intending to keep Souham in check with a part of his army, and with the remainder to fall upon Soult.

On the 28th Souham, still extending his right, with a view to dislodge the allies by turning their left, endeavoured to force the bridges at ValladolidSee [plan 5.] and Simancas on the Pisuerga, and that of Tordesillas on the Duero. The first was easily defended by the main body of the seventh division, but Halket, an able officer, finding the French strong and eager at the second, destroyed it, and detached the regiment of Brunswick Oels to ruin that of Tordesillas. It was done in time, and a tower behind the ruins was occupied by a detachment, while the remainder of the Brunswickers took post in a pine-wood at some distance. The French arrived and seemed for some time at a loss, but very soon sixty French officers and non-commissioned officers, headed by captain Guingret, a daring man, formed a small raft to hold their arms and clothes, and then plunged into the water, holding their swords with their teeth, and swimming and pushing their raft before them. Under protection of a cannonade, they thus crossed this great river, though it was in full and strong water, and the weather very cold, and having reached the other side, naked as they were, stormed the tower. The Brunswick regiment then abandoned its position, and these gallant soldiers remained masters of the bridge.

Wellington having heard of the attack at Simancas, and having seen the whole French army in march to its right along the hill beyond the Pisuerga on the evening of the 28th, destroyed the bridges at Valladolid and Cabeçon, and crossed the Duero at Tudela and Puente de Duero on the 29th, but scarcely had he effected this operation when intelligence of Guingret’s splendid action at Tordesillas reached him. With the instant decision of a great captain he marched by his left, and having reached the heights between Rueda and Tordesillas on the 30th, fronted the enemy and forbad further progress on that point; the bridge was indeed already repaired by the French, but Souham’s main body had not yet arrived, and Wellington’s menacing position was too significant to be misunderstood. The bridges of Toro and Zamora were now destroyed by detachments, and though the French, spreading along the river bank, commenced repairing the former, the junction with Hill’s army was insured; and the English general, judging that the bridge of Toro could not be restored for several days, even hoped to maintain the line of the Duero permanently, because he expected that Hill, of whose operations it is now time to speak, would be on the Adaja by the 3d of November.