CHAPTER V.
FRENCH PASSAGE OF THE TAGUS—RETREAT FROM MADRID.
1812. October. King Joseph’s first intention was to unite a greatSee [Plan 6.] part of Suchet’s forces as well as Soult’s with his own, and Soult, probably influenced by a false report that Ballesteros had actually reached La Mancha, urged this measure. Suchet resisted, observing that Valencia must be defended against the increasing power of the Anglo-Sicilian and Spanish armies at Alicant, and the more so that, until the French army could cross the Tagus and open a new line of communication with Zaragoza, Valencia would be the only base for the king’s operations. Joseph then resolved to incorporate a portion of the army of the south with the army of the centre, giving the command to Drouet, who was to move by the road of Cuenca and Tarancon towards the Tagus; but this arrangement, which seems to have been dictated by a desire to advance Drouet’s authority, was displeasing to Soult. He urged that his army, so powerfully constituted, physically and morally, as to be the best in the Peninsula, owed its excellence to its peculiar organization and it would be dangerous to break that up. Nor was there any good reason for this change; for if Joseph only wished to have a strong body of troops on the Cuenca road, the army of the centre could be reinforced with one or two divisions, and the whole could unite again on the Tagus without injury to the army of the south. It would however be better, he said, to incorporate the army of the centre with the army of the south and march altogether by the road of San Clemente, leaving only a few troops on the Cuenca road, who might be reinforced by Suchet. But if the king’s plan arose from a desire to march in person with a large body he could do so with greater dignity by joining the army of the south, which was to act on the main line of operations. Joseph’s reply was a peremptory order to obey or retire to France, and Drouet marched to Cuenca.
Soult’s army furnished thirty-five thousand infantry, six thousand excellent cavalry under arms with seventy-twoImperial muster-rolls, MSS. guns, making with the artillery-men a total of forty-six thousand veteran combatants. The army of the centre including the king’s guards furnished about twelve thousand, of which two thousand were good cavalry with twelve guns. Thus fifty-eightJoseph’s correspondence, MSS. thousand fighting men, eight thousand being cavalry, with eighty-four pieces of artillery, were put in motion to drive Hill from the Tagus. Joseph’s project was to pass that river, and operate against Wellington’s rear, if he should continue the siege of Burgos; but if he concentrated on the Tagus, Souham was in like manner to operate on his rear by ArandaOfficial papers from the Bureau de la Guerre, MSS. de Duero, and the Somosierra, sending detachments towards Guadalaxara to be met by other detachments, coming from the king through Sacedon. Finally if Wellington, as indeed happened, should abandon both Burgos and Madrid, the united French forces were to drive him into Portugal. The conveying of Soult’s convoys of sick men to Valencia and other difficulties, retarded the commencement of operations to the king’s great discontent, and meanwhile he became very uneasy for his supplies, because the people of La Mancha, still remembering Montbrun’s devastations, were flying with their beasts and grain, and from frequent repetition, were become exceedingly expert in evading the researches of the foragers. Such however is the advantage of discipline and order, that while La Mancha was thus desolated from fear, confidence and tranquillity reigned in Valencia.
However on the 18th of October Joseph marched from Requeña upon Cuenca, where he found Drouet with a division of Soult’s infantry and some cavalry. He then proceeded to Tarancon, which was the only artillery road, on that side, leading to the Tagus, and during this time Soult marched by San Clemente upon Ocaña and Aranjuez. General Hill immediately sent that notice to Lord Wellington which caused the retreat, from Burgos, but he was in no fear of the enemy, for he had withdrawn all his outposts and united his whole force behind the Tagus. His right was at Toledo, his left at Fuente Dueñas, and there were Spanish and Portuguese troops in the valley of the Tagus extending as far as Talavera. The Tagus was however fordable, from its junction with the Jarama near Aranjuez, upwards; and moreover, this part of the line, weak from its extent, could not easily be supported, and the troops guarding it, would have been too distant from the point of action if the French should operate against Toledo. Hill therefore drew his left behind the Tajuna which is a branch of the Jarama, and running nearly parallel to the Tagus. His right occupied very strong ground from Añover to Toledo, he destroyed the bridges at Aranjuez, and securing that below the confluence of the Jarama and Henares, called the Puente Larga, threw one of boats over the former river a little above Bayona. The light division and Elio’s troops forming the extreme left were directed to march upon Arganda, and the head-quarters were fixed at Cienpozuelos.
The bulk of the troops were thus held in hand, ready to move to any menaced point, and as Skerrit’s brigade had just arrived from Cadiz, there was, including the Spanish regulars, forty thousand men in line, and a multitude of partidas were hovering about. The lateral communications were easy and the scouts passing over the bridge of Toledo covered all the country beyond the Tagus. In this state of affairs the bridges at each end of the line furnished the means of sallying upon the flanks of any force attacking the front; the French must have made several marches to force the right, and on the left the Jarama with its marshy banks, and its many confluents, offered several positions, to interpose between the enemy and Madrid.
Drouet passed the Tagus the 29th at the abandoned fords of Fuente Dueñas and Villa Maurique, and the king, with his guards, repaired to Zarza de la Cruz. Meanwhile Soult whose divisions were coming fast up to Ocaña, restored the bridge of Aranjuez, and passed the Tagus also with his advanced guard. On the 30th he attacked general Cole who commanded at the Puente Larga with several regiments and some guns, but though the mines failed and the French attempted to carry the bridge with the bayonet they were vigorously repulsed by the forty-seventh under Colonel Skerrit. After a heavy cannonade and a sharp musketry which cost the allies sixty men, Soult relinquished the attempt and awaited the arrival of his main body. Had the Puente Larga been forced, the fourth division which was atSoult’s official correspondence with the king, MSS. Añover would have been cut off from Madrid, but the weather being thick and rainy, Soult could not discover what supporting force was on the high land of Valdemoro behind the bridge and was afraid to push forward too fast.
The king discontented with this cautious mode of proceeding now designed to operate by Toledo, but during the night the Puente Larga was abandoned, and Soult, being still in doubt of Hill’s real object, advised Joseph to unite the army of the centre at Arganda and Chinchon, throwing bridges for retreat at Villa Maurique and Fuente Dueñas as a precaution in case a battle should take place. Hill’s movement was however a decided retreat, which would have commenced twenty-four hours sooner but for the failure of the mines and the combat at the Puente Larga. Wellington’s orders had reached him at the moment when Soult first appeared on the Tagus, and the affair was so sudden, that the light division, which had just come from Alcala to Arganda to close the left of the position, was obliged, without halting, to return again in the night, the total journey being nearly forty miles.
Wellington, foreseeing that it might be difficult for Hill to obey his instructions, had given him a discretionary power to retire either by the valley of the Tagus, or by the Guadarama; and a position taken up in the former, on the flank of the enemy, would have prevented the king from passing the Guadarama, and at the same time have covered Lisbon; whereas a retreat by the Guadarama exposed Lisbon. Hill, thinking the valley of the Tagus, in that advanced season, would not support the French army, and knowing Wellington to be pressed by superior forces in the north, chose the Guadarama. Wherefore, burning his pontoons, and causing La China and the stores remaining there to be destroyed in the night of the 30th, he retreated by different roads, and united his army on the 31st of October near Majadahonda. Meanwhile the magazines along the line of communication to Badajos were, as I have already noticed, in danger if the enemy had detached troops to seize them, neither were the removal and destruction of the stores in Madrid effected without disorders of a singular nature.
The municipality had demanded all the provision remaining there as if they wanted them for the enemy, and when this was refused, they excited a mob to attack the magazines; some firing even took place, and the assistance of the fourth division was required to restore order; a portion of wheat was finally given to the poorest of the people, and Madrid was abandoned. It was affecting to see the earnest and true friendship of the population. Men and women, and children, crowded around the troops bewailing their departure. They moved with them in one vast mass, for more than two miles, and left their houses empty at the very instant when the French cavalry scouts were at the gates on the other side. This emotion was distinct from political feeling, because there was a very strong French party in Madrid; and amongst the causes of wailing the return of the plundering and cruel partidas, unchecked by the presence of the British, was very loudly proclaimed. The “Madrileños” have been stigmatized as a savage and faithless people, the British army found them patient, gentle, generous, and loyal; nor is this fact to be disputed, because of the riot which occurred in the destruction of the magazines, for the provisions had been obtained by requisition from the country around Madrid, under an agreement with the Spanish government to pay at the end of the war; and it was natural for the people, excited as they were by the authorities, to endeavour to get their own flour back, rather than have it destroyed when they were starving.
With the Anglo-Portuguese troops marched Penne Villemur, Morillo, and Carlos D’España, and it was Wellington’s wish that Elio, Bassecour, and Villa Campa should now throw themselves into the valley of the Tagus, and crossing the bridge of Arzobispo, join Ballesteros’s army, now under Virues. A great body of men, including the Portuguese regiments left by Hill in Estremadura, would thus have been placed on the flank of any French army marching upon Lisbon, and if the enemy neglected this line, the Spaniards could operate against Madrid or against Suchet at pleasure. Elio, however, being cut off from Hill by the French advance, remained at the bridge of Auñion, near Sacedon, and was there joined by Villa Campa and the Empecinado.
Soult now brought up his army as quickly as possible to Valdemoro, and his information, as to Hill’s real force, was becoming more distinct; but there was also a rumour that Wellington was close at hand with three British divisions, and the French general’s movements were consequently cautious, lest he should find himself suddenly engaged in battle before his whole force was collected, for his rear was still at Ocaña, and the army of the centre had not yet passed the Tajuña. This disposition of his troops was probably intentional to prevent the king from fighting, for Soult did not think this a fitting time for a great battle unless upon great advantage. In the disjointed state of their affairs, a defeat would have been more injurious to the French than a victory would have been beneficial; the former would have lost Spain, the latter would not have gained Portugal.
November. On the 1st of November, the bulk of Soult’s army being assembled at Getafé, he sent scouting parties in all directions to feel for the allies, and to ascertain the direction of their march; the next day the army of the centre and that of the south were reunited not far from Madrid, but Hill was then in full retreat for the Guadarama covered by a powerful rear-guard under general Cole.
The 3d Soult pursued the allies, and the king entering Madrid, placed a garrison in the Retiro for the protection of his court and of the Spanish families attached to his cause; this was a sensible relief, for hitherto in one great convoy they had impeded the movements of the army of the centre. On the 4th Joseph rejoined Soult at the Guadarama with his guards, which always moved as a separate body; but he had left Palombini beyond the Tagus near Tarancon to scour the roads on the side of Cuenca, and some dragoons being sent towards Huete were surprised by the partidas, and lost forty men, whereupon Palombini rejoined the army.
General Hill was moving upon Arevalo, slowly followed by the French, when fresh orders from Wellington, founded on new combinations, changed the direction of his march. Souham had repaired the bridge of Toro on the 4th, several days sooner than the English general had expected, and thus when he was keenly watching for the arrival of Hill on the Adaja, that he might suddenly join him and attack Soult, his designs were again baffled; for he dared not make such a movement lest Souham, possessing both Toro and Tordesillas, should fall upon his rear; neither could he bring up Hill to the Duero and attack Souham, because he had no means to pass that river, and meanwhile Soult moving by Fontiveros would reach the Tormes. Seeing then that his combinations had failed, and his central position no longer available, either for offence or defence, he directed Hill to gain Alba de Tormes at once by the road ofSee [Plans 3] and [5.] Fontiveros, and on the 6th he fell back himself, from his position in front of Tordesillas, by Naval del Rey and Pituega to the heights of San Christoval.
Joseph, thinking to prevent Hill’s junction with Wellington, had gained Arevalo by the Segovia road on the 5th and 6th; the 8th Souham’s scouts were met with at Medina del Campo, and for the first time, since he had quitted Valencia, the king obtained news of the army of Portugal. One hundred thousand combatants, of which above twelve thousand were cavalry, with a hundred and thirty pieces of artillery, were thus assembled on those plains over which, three months before, Marmont had marched with so much confidence to his own destruction. Soult then expelled from Andalusia by Marmont’s defeat, was now, after having made half the circuit of the Peninsula, come to drive into Portugal, that very army whose victory had driven him from the south; and thus, as Wellington had foreseen and foretold, the acquisition of Andalusia, politically important and useful to the cause, proved injurious to himself at the moment, insomuch as the French had concentrated a mighty power, from which it required both skill and fortune to escape. Meanwhile the Spanish armies let loose by this union of all the French troops, kept aloof, or coming to aid, were found a burthen, rather than a help.
On the 7th Hill’s main body passed the Tormes, at Alba, and the bridge there was mined; the light division and Long’s cavalry remained on the right bank during the night but the next day the former also crossed the river. Wellington himself was in the position of San Christoval, and it is curious, that the king, even at this late period,Joseph’s correspondence, MSS. was doubtful if Ballesteros’s troops had or had not joined the allied army at Avila. Wellington also was still uncertain of the real numbers of the enemy, but he was desirous to maintain the line of the Tormes permanently, and to give his troops repose. He had made a retreat of two hundred miles; Hill had made one of the same distance besides his march from Estremadura; Skerrit’s people had come from Cadiz, and the whole army required rest, for the soldiers, especially those who besieged Burgos, had been in the field, with scarcely an interval of repose, since January; they were bare-footed, and their equipments were spoiled, the cavalry were becoming weak, their horses were out of condition, and the discipline of all was failing.
The excesses committed on the retreat from Burgos have already been touched upon, and during the first day’s march from the Tagus to Madrid, some of general Hill’s men had not behaved better. Five hundred of the rear-guard under Cole, chiefly of one regiment, finding the inhabitants had fled according to their custom whichever side was approaching, broke open the houses, plundered and got drunk. A multitude were left in the cellars of Valdemoro, and two hundred and fifty fell into the hands of the enemy. The rest of the retreat being unmolested, was made with more regularity, but the excesses still committed by some of the soldiers were glaring and furnished proof that the moral conduct of a general cannot be fairly judged by following in the wake of a retreating army. On this occasion there was no want of provisions, no hardships to exasperate the men, and yet I the author of this history, counted on the first day’s march from Madrid, seventeen bodies of murdered peasants; by whom killed, or for what, whether by English, or Germans, by Spaniards, or Portuguese, whether in dispute, in robbery, or in wanton villainy, I know not, but their bodies were in the ditches, and a shallow observer might thence have drawn the most foul and false conclusions against the English general and nation.
Another notable thing was the discontent of the veteran troops with the arrangements of the staff officers. For the assembling of the sick men, at the place and time prescribed to form the convoys, was punctually attended to by the regimental officers; not so by the others, nor by the commissaries who had charge to provide the means of transport; hence delay and great suffering to the sick and the wearing out of the healthy men’s strength by waiting with their packs on for the negligent. And when the light division was left on the right bank of the Tormes to cover the passage at Alba, a prudent order that all baggage or other impediments, should pass rapidly over the narrow bridge at that place without halting at all on the enemy’s side, was, by those charged with the execution, so rigorously interpreted, as to deprive the light division of their ration bullocks and flour mules, at the very moment of distribution; and the tired soldiers, thus absurdly denied their food, had the farther mortification to see a string of commissariat carts deliberately passing their post many hours afterwards. All regimental officers know that the anger and discontent thus created is one of the surest means of ruining the discipline of an army, and it is in these particulars that the value of a good and experienced staff is found.
Lord Wellington’s position extended from Christoval to Aldea Lengua on the right bank of the Tormes, and on the left of that river, to the bridge of Alba, where the castle which was on the right bank was garrisoned by Howard’s brigade of the second division. Hamilton’s Portuguese were on the left bank as a reserve for Howard; the remainder of the second division watched the fords of Huerta and Enciña, and behind them in second line the third and fourth divisions occupied the heights of Calvariza de Ariba. The light division and the Spanish infantry entered Salamanca, the cavalry were disposed beyond the Tormes, covering all the front, and thus posted, the English general desired to bring affairs to the decision of a battle. For the heights of Christoval were strong and compact, the position of the Arapiles on the other side of the Tormes was glorious as well as strong, and the bridge of Salamanca, and the fords furnished the power of concentrating on either side of that river by a shorter line than the enemy could move upon.
But while Wellington prepared for a battle, he also looked to a retreat. His sick were sent to the rear, small convoys of provisions were ordered up from Ciudad Rodrigo to certain halting places between that place and Salamanca; the overplus of ammunition in the latter town was destroyed daily by small explosions, and large stores of clothing, of arms and accoutrements, were delivered to the Spanish troops, who were thus completely furnished; one hour after the English general had the mortification to see them selling their equipments even under his own windows. Indeed Salamanca presented an extraordinary scene, and the Spaniards, civil and military, began to evince hatred of the British. Daily did they attempt or perpetrate murder, and one act of peculiar atrocity merits notice. A horse, led by an English soldier, being frightened, backed against a Spanish officer commanding at a gate, he caused the soldier to be dragged into his guard-house and there bayonetted him in cold blood, and no redress could be had for this or other crimes, save by counter-violence, which was not long withheld. A Spanish officer while wantonly stabbing at a rifleman was shot dead by the latter; and a British volunteer slew a Spanish officer at the head of his own regiment in a sword-fight, the troops of both nations looking on, but here there was nothing dishonourable on either side.
The civil authorities, not less savage, were more insolent than the military, treating every English person with an intolerable arrogance. Even the prince of Orange was like to have lost his life; for upon remonstrating about quarters with the sitting junta, they ordered one of their guards to kill him; and he would have been killed had not Mr. Steele of the forty-third, a bold athletic person, felled the man before he could stab; yet both the prince and his defender were obliged to fly instantly to avoid the soldier’s comrades. The exasperation caused by these things was leading to serious mischief when the enemy’s movements gave another direction to the soldiers’ passions.
On the 9th Long’s cavalry had been driven in upon Alba, and on the 10th Soult opened a concentrated fire of eighteen guns against that place. The castle, which crowned a bare and rocky knoll, had been hastily entrenched, and furnished scarcely any shelter from this tempest; for two hours the garrison could only reply with musketry, but finally it was aided by the fire of four pieces from the left bank of the river, and the post was defended until dark, with such vigour that the enemy dared not venture on an assault. During the night general Hamilton reinforced the garrison, repaired the damaged walls, and formed barricades, but the next morning after a short cannonade, and some musketry firing the enemy withdrew. This combat cost the allies above a hundred men.
On the 11th the king coming up from Medina del Campo reorganized his army. That is, he united the army of the centre with the army of the south, placing the whole under Soult, and he removed Souham from the command of the army of Portugal to make way for Drouet. Caffarelli had before this returned to Burgos, with his divisions and guns, and as Souham, besides his losses and stragglers, had placed garrisons in Toro, Tordesillas, Zamora, and Valladolid; and as the king also, had left a garrison in the Retiro, scarcely ninety thousand combatants of all arms were assembled on the Tormes; but twelve thousand were cavalry, nearly all were veteran troops, and they had at least one hundred and twenty pieces of artillery. Such a mighty power could not remain idle, for the country was exhausted of provisions, the soldiers were already wanting bread, and the king, eager enough for battle, for he was of a brave spirit and had something of his brother’s greatness of soul, sought counsel how to deliver it with most advantage.
Jourdan with a martial fire unquenched by age, was for bringing affairs to a crisis by the boldest and shortest mode. He had observed that Wellington’s position was composed of three parts, namely,[Appendix, No. 9.] the right at Alba; the centre at Calvariza Ariba; the left, separated from the centre by the Tormes, at San Christoval; the whole distance being about fifteen miles. Now the Tormes was still fordable in many places above Salamanca, and hence he proposed to assemble the French army in the night, pass the river at day-break, by the fords between Villa Gonzalo and Huerta, and so make a concentrated attack upon Calvariza de Ariba, which would force Wellington to a decisive battle.
French Official correspondence, MSS. Soult opposed this project, he objected to attacking Wellington in a position which he was so well acquainted with, which he might have fortified, and where the army must fight its way, even from the fords, to gain room for an order of battle. He proposed instead, to move by the left to certain fords, three in number, between Exéme and Galisancho, some seven or eight miles above Alba de Tormes. They were easy in themselves, he said, and well suited from the conformation of the banks, for forcing a passage if it should be disputed; and by making a slight circuit the troops in march could not be seen by the enemy. Passing there, the French army would gain two marches upon the allies, would be placed upon their flank and rear, and could fight on ground chosen by its own generals, instead of delivering battle on ground chosen by the enemy; or it could force on an action in a new position whence the allies could with difficulty retire in the event of disaster. Wellington must then fight to disadvantage, or retire hastily, sacrificing part of his army to save the rest; and the effect, whether militarily or politically, would be the same as if he was beaten by a front attack. Jourdan replied, that this was prudent, and might be successful if Wellington accepted battle, but that general could not thereby be forced to fight, which was the great object; he would have time to retreat before the French could reach the line of his communications with Ciudad Rodrigo, and it was even supposed by some generals that he would retreat to Almeida at once by San Felices and Barba de Puerco.
Neither Soult nor Jourdan knew the position of the Arapiles in detail, and the former, though heLetter to the king, MS. urged his own plan, offered to yield if the king was so inclined. Jourdan’s proposition was supported by all the generals of the army of Portugal, except Clausel who leaned to Soult’s opinion; but as that marshal commanded two-thirds of the army, while Jourdan had no ostensible command, the question was finally decided agreeably to his counsel. Nor is it easy to determine which was right, for though Jourdan’s reasons were very strong, and the result did not bear out Soult’s views, we shall find the failure was only in the execution. Nevertheless it would seem so great an army and so confident, for the French soldiers eagerly demanded a battle, should have grappled in the shortest way; a just and rapid development of Jourdan’s plan would probably have cut off Hamilton’s Portuguese and the brigade in the castle of Alba, from Calvariza Ariba.
On the other hand, Wellington, who was so well acquainted with his ground, desired a battle on either side of the Tormes; his hope was indeed to prevent the passage of that river until the rains rendered it unfordable, and thus force the French to retire from want of provisions, or engage him on the position of Christoval; yet he also courted a fight on the Arapiles, those rocky monuments of his former victory. He had sixty-eight thousand combatants under arms, fifty-two thousand of which, includingLetter to lord Liverpool, MS. four thousand British cavalry, were Anglo-Portuguese, and he had nearly seventy guns. This force he had so disposed, that besides Hamilton’s Portuguese, three divisions guarded the fords, which were moreover defended by entrenchments, and the whole army might have been united in good time upon the strong ridges of Calvariza Ariba, and on the two Arapiles, where the superiority of fifteen thousand men would scarcely have availed the French. A defeat would only have sent the allies to Portugal, whereas a victory would have taken them once more to Madrid. To draw in Hamilton’s Portuguese, and the troops from Alba, in time, would have been the vital point; but as the French, if they did not surprise the allies, must have fought their way up from the river, this danger might have proved less than could have been supposed at first view. In fine the general was Wellington and he knew his ground.
FRENCH PASSAGE OF THE TORMES. RETREAT TO CIUDAD RODRIGO.
Soult’s plan being adopted, the troops in the distant quarters were brought up; the army of Portugal was directed to make frequent demonstrations against Christoval, Aldea Lengua, and the fords between Huerta and Alba; the road over the hills to the Galisancho fords was repaired, and two trestle-bridges were constructed for the passage of the artillery. The design was to push over the united armies of the centre and the south, by these fords; and if this operation should oblige the allies to withdraw from Alba de Tormes, the army of Portugal was to pass by the bridge at that place and by the fords, and assail Wellington’s rear; but if the allies maintained Alba, Drouet was to follow Soult at Galisancho.
At day-break on the 14th the bridges were thrown, the cavalry and infantry passed by the fords, the allies’ outposts were driven back, and Soult took a position at Mozarbes, having the road from Alba to Tamames, under his left flank. Meanwhile Wellington remained too confidently in Salamanca, and when the first report informed him that the enemy were over the Tormes, made the caustic observation, that he would not recommend it to some of them. Soon, however, the concurrent testimony of many reports convinced him of his mistake, he galloped to the Arapiles, and having ascertained the direction of Soult’s march drew off the second division, the cavalry, and some guns to attack the head of the French column. The fourth division and Hamilton’s Portuguese remained at Alba, to protect this movement; the third division secured the Arapiles rocks until the troops from San Christoval should arrive; and Wellington was still so confident to drive the French back over the Tormes, that the bulk of the troops did not quit San Christoval that day. Nevertheless when he reached Mozarbes, he found the French, already assembled there, too strong to be seriously meddled with. However under cover of a cannonade, which kept off their cavalry, he examined their position, which extended from Mozarbes to the heights of Nuestra Señora de Utiero, and it was so good that the evil was without remedy; wherefore drawing off the troops from Alba, and destroying the bridge, he left three hundred Spaniards in the castle, with orders, if the army retired the next day, to abandon the place and save themselves as they best could.
During the night and the following morning the allied army was united in the position of the Arapiles, and Wellington still hoped the French would give battle there; yet he placed the first division at Aldea Tejada, on the Junguen stream, to secure that passage in case Soult should finally oblige him to choose between Salamanca and Ciudad Rodrigo. Meantime the army of Portugal finding the bridge of Alba broken, and the castle occupied, crossed the Tormes at Galisancho, and moved up to the ridge of Señora de Utiera; Soult, who had commenced fortifying Mozarbes, extended his left at the same time to the height of Señora de la Buena, near the Ciudad Rodrigo road, yet slowly because the ground was heavy, deep, and the many sources of the Junguen and the Valmusa streams were fast filling from the rain and impeded his march. This evolution was nearly the same as that practised by the duke of Ragusa at the battle of Salamanca; but it was made on a wider circle, by a second range of heights enclosing as it were those by which the duke of Ragusa moved on that day, and consequently, beyond the reach of such a sudden attack and catastrophe. The result in each case was remarkable. Marmont closing with a short quick turn, a falcon striking at an eagle, received a buffet that broke his pinions, and spoiled his flight. Soult, a wary kite, sailing slowly and with a wide wheel to seize a helpless prey, lost it altogether.
About two o’clock lord Wellington, feeling himself too weak to attack, and seeing the French cavalry pointing to the Ciudad Rodrigo road, judged the king’s design was to establish a fortified head of cantonments at Mozarbes, and then operate against the allies’ communication with Ciudad Rodrigo; wherefore suddenly casting his army into three columns, he crossed the Junguen, and then covering his left flank with his cavalry and guns, defiled, in order of battle, before the enemy at little more than cannon-shot. With a wonderful boldness and facility, and good fortune also, for there was a thick fog and a heavy rain which rendered the bye-ways and fields, by which the enemy moved, nearly impassable, while the allies had the use of the high roads, he carried his whole army in one mass quite round the French left: thus he gained the Valmusa river, where he halted for the night, in the rear of those who had been threatening him in front, only a few hours before. This exploit was certainly surprising, but it was not creditable to the generalship on either side; for first it may be asked why the English commander, having somewhat carelessly suffered Soult to pass the Tormes and turn his position, waited so long on the Arapiles as to render this dangerous movement necessary, a movement which a combination of bad roads, bad weather, and want of vigour on the other side, rendered possible and no more.
It has been said, that the only drawback to the duke of Dalmatia’s genius, is his want of promptness to strike at the decisive moment. It is certainly a great thing to fight a great battle; and against such a general as Wellington, and such troops as the British, a man may well be excused, if he thinks twice, ere he puts his life and fame, and the lives and fame of thousands of his countrymen, the weal or woe of nations, upon the hazard of an event, which may be decided by the existence of a ditch five feet wide, or the single blunder of a single fool, or the confusion of a coward, or by any other circumstance however trivial. To make such a throw for such a stake is no light matter. It is no mean consideration, that the praise or the hatred of nations, universal glory or universal, perhaps eternal contempt, waits on an action, the object of which may be more safely gained by other means, for in war there is infinite variety. But in this case it is impossible not to perceive, that the French general vacillated after the passage of the river, purposely perhaps to avoid an action, since, as I have before shown, he thought it unwise, in the disjointed state of the French affairs and without any fixed base or reserves in case of defeat, to fight a decisive battle. Nor do I blame this prudence, for though it be certain that he who would be great in war must be daring, to set all upon one throw belongs only to an irresponsible chief, not to a lieutenant whose task is but a portion of the general plan; neither is it wise, in monarch or general, to fight when all may be lost by defeat, unless all may be won by victory. However, the king, more unfettered than Soult, desired a battle, and with an army so good and numerous, the latter’s prudence seems misplaced; he should have grappled with his enemy, and, once engaged at any point, Wellington could not have continued his retreat, especially with the Spaniards, who were incapable of dexterous movements.
On the 16th the allies retired by the three roads which lead across the Matilla stream, through Tamames, San Munos, and Martin del Rio, to Ciudad Rodrigo; the light division and the cavalry closed the rear, and the country was a forest, penetrable in all directions. The army bivouacked in the evening behind the Matilla stream; but though this march was not more than twelve miles, the stragglers were numerous, for the soldiers meeting with vast herds of swine, quitted their colours by hundreds to shoot them, and such a rolling musketry echoed through the forest, that Wellington at first thought the enemy was upon him. It was in vain that the staff officers rode about to stop this disgraceful practice, which had indeed commenced the evening before; it was in vain that Wellington himself caused two offenders to be hanged, the hungry soldiers still broke from the columns, the property of whole districts was swept away in a few hours, and the army was in some degree placed at the mercy of the enemy. The latter however were contented to glean the stragglers, of whom they captured two thousand, and did not press the rear until evening near Matilla where their lancers fell on, but were soon checked by the light companies of the twenty-eighth, and afterwards charged by the fourteenth dragoons.
The 17th presented a different yet a not less curious scene. During the night the cavalry immediately in front of the light division, had, for some unknown reason, filed off by the flanks to the rear without giving any intimation to the infantry, who, trusting to the horsemen, had thrown out their picquets at a very short distance in front. At day-break, while the soldiers were rolling their blankets and putting on their accoutrements, some strange horsemen were seen in the rear of the bivouac and were at first taken for Spaniards, but very soon their cautious movements and vivacity of gestures, shewed them to be French; the troops stood to arms, and in good time, for five hundred yards in front, the wood opened on to a large plain on which, in place of the British cavalry, eight thousand French horsemen were discovered advancing in one solid mass, yet carelessly and without suspecting the vicinity of the British. The division was immediately formed in columns, a squadron of the fourteenth dragoons and one of the German hussars came hastily up from the rear, Julian Sanchez’ cavalry appeared in small parties on the right flank, and every precaution was taken to secure the retreat. This checked the enemy, but as the infantry fell back, the French though fearing to approach their heavy masses in the wood, sent many squadrons to the right and left, some of which rode on the flanks near enough to bandy wit, in the Spanish tongue, with the British soldiers, who marched without firing. Very soon however the signs of mischief became visible, the road was strewed with baggage, and the bât-men came running in for protection, some wounded, some without arms, and all breathless as just escaped from a surprise. The thickness of the forest had enabled the French horsemen to pass along unperceived on the flanks of the line of march, and, as opportunity offered, they galloped from side to side, sweeping away the baggage and sabring the conductors and guards; they had even menaced one of the columns but were checked by the fire of the artillery. In one of these charges general Paget was carried off, as it were from the midst of his own men, and it might have been Wellington’s fortune, for he also was continually riding between the columns and without an escort. However the main body of the army soon passed the Huebra river and took post behind it, the right at Tamames, the left near Boadilla, the centre at San Munoz, Buena Barba, and Gallego de Huebra.
When the light division arrived at the edge of the table-land, which overhangs the fords at the last-named place, the French cavalry suddenly thickened, and the sharp whistle of musket-bullets with the splintering of branches on the left showed that their infantry were also up. Soult in the hope of forestalling the allies at Tamames, had pushed his columns towards that place, by a road leading from Salamanca through Vecinos, but finding Hill’s troops in his front turned short to his right in hopes to cut off the rear-guard, which led to the
COMBAT OF THE HUEBRA.
The English and German cavalry, warned by the musketry, crossed the fords in time, and the light division should have followed without delay; because the forest ended on the edge of the table-land, and the descent from thence to the river, about eight hundred yards, was open and smooth, and the fords of the Huebra were deep. Instead of taking the troops down quickly, an order, more respectful to the enemy’s cavalry than to his infantry, was given to form squares. The officers looked at each other in amazement but at that moment Wellington fortunately appeared, and under his directions the battalions instantly glided off to the fords, leaving four companies of the forty-third and one of the riflemen to cover the passage. These companies, spreading as skirmishers, were immediately assailed in front and on both flanks, and with such a fire that it was evident a large force was before them; moreover a driving rain and mist prevented them from seeing their adversaries, and being pressed closer each moment, they gathered by degrees at the edge of the wood, where they maintained their ground for a quarter of an hour, then seeing the division was beyond the river, they swiftly cleared the open slope of the hill, and passed the fords under a very sharp musketry. Only twenty-seven soldiers fell, for the tempest, beating in the Frenchmen’s faces, baffled their aim, and Ross’s guns, playing from the low ground with grape, checked the pursuit, but the deep bellowing of thirty pieces of heavy French artillery showed how critically timed was the passage.
The banks of the Huebra were steep and broken, but the enemy spread his infantry to the right and left along the edge of the forest, making demonstrations on every side, and there were several fords to be guarded; the fifty-second and the Portuguese defended those below, Ross’s guns supported by the riflemen and the forty-third defended those above, and behind the right of the light division, on higher ground was the seventh division. The second division, Hamilton’s Portuguese, and a brigade of cavalry, were in front of Tamames, and thus the bulk of the army was massed on the right, hugging the Pena de Francia, and covering the roads leading to Ciudad, as well as those leading to the passes of the Gata hills.
In this situation one brisk attempt made to force the fords guarded by the fifty-second, was vigorously repulsed by that regiment, but the skirmishing, and the cannonade, which never slackened, continued until dark; and heavily the French artillery played upon the light and seventh divisions. The former, forced to keep near the fords, and in column, lest a sudden rush of cavalry should carry off the guns on the flat ground, were plunged into at every round, yet suffered little loss, because the clayey soil, saturated with rain, swallowed the shot and smothered the shells; but it was a matter of astonishment to see the seventh division kept on open and harder ground by its commander, and in one huge mass tempting the havoc of this fire for hours, when a hundred yards in its rear the rise of the hill, and the thick forest, would have entirely covered it without in any manner weakening the position.
On the 18th the army was to have drawn off before day-light, and the English general was anxious about the result, because the position of the Huebra, though good for defence, was difficult to remove from at this season; the roads were hollow and narrow, and led up a steep bank to a table-land, which was open, flat, marshy, and scored with water gullies; and from the overflowing of one of the streams the principal road was impassable a mile in rear of the position; hence to bring the columns off in time, without jostling, and if possible without being attacked, required a nice management. All the baggage and stores had marched in the night, with orders not to halt until they reached the high lands near Ciudad Rodrigo, but if the preceding days had produced some strange occurrences, the 18th was not less fertile in them.
Vol. I. In a former part of this work it has been observed, that even the confirmed reputation of lord Wellington could not protect him from the vanity and presumption of subordinate officers. The allusion fixes here. Knowing that the most direct road was impassable, he had directed the divisions by another road, longer, and apparently more difficult; this seemed such an extraordinary proceeding to some general officers, that, after consulting together, they deemed their commander unfit to conduct the army, and led their troops by what appeared to them the fittest line of retreat! Meanwhile Wellington, who had, before day-light, placed himself at an important point on his own road, waited impatiently for the arrival of the leading division until dawn, and then suspecting something of what had happened, galloped to the other road and found the would-be commanders, stopped by that flood which his arrangements had been made to avoid. The insubordination, and the danger to the whole army, were alike glaring, yet the practical rebuke was so severe and well timed, the humiliation so complete, and so deeply felt, that, with one proud sarcastic observation, indicating contempt more than anger, he led back the troops and drew off all his forces safely. However some confusion and great danger still attended the operation, for even on this road one water-gully was so deep that the light division, which covered the rear, could only pass it man by man over a felled tree, and it was fortunate that Soult unable to feed his troops a day longer, stopped on the Huebra with his main body and only sent some cavalry to Tamames. Thus the allies retired unmolested, but whether from necessity, or from negligence in the subordinates, the means of transport were too scanty for the removal of the wounded men, most of whom were hurt by cannon-shot; many were left behind, and as the enemy never passed the Huebra at this point, those miserable creatures perished by a horrible and lingering death.
The marshy plains, over which the army was now marching, exhausted the strength of the wearied soldiers, thousands straggled, the depredations on the herds of swine were repeated, and the temper of the army, generally, prognosticated the greatest misfortunes if the retreat should be continued. This was however the last day of trial, for towards evening the weather cleared up, the hills near Ciudad Rodrigo afforded dry bivouacs and fuel, the distribution of good rations restored the strength and spirits of the men, and the next day Ciudad Rodrigo and the neighbouring villages were occupied in tranquillity. The cavalry was then sent out to the forest, and being aided by Julian Sanchez’ Partidas, brought in from a thousand to fifteen hundred stragglers who must otherwise have perished. During these events Joseph occupied Salamanca, but colonel Miranda, the Spanish officer left at Alba de Tormes, held that place until the 27th and then carried off his garrison in the night.
Thus ended the retreat from Burgos. The French gathered a good spoil of baggage; what the loss of the allies, in men, was, cannot be exactly determined, because no Spanish returns were ever seen. An approximation may however be easily made. According to the muster-rolls, the Anglo-Portuguese under Wellington, had about one thousand men killed, wounded, and missing between the 21st and 29th of October, which was the period of their crossing the Duero, but this only refers to loss in action; Hill’s loss between the Tagus and the Tormes was, including stragglers, about four hundred, and the defence of the castle of Alba de Tormes cost one hundred. Now if the Spanish regulars, and Partidas, marching with the two armies, be reckoned to have lost a thousand, which considering their want of discipline is not exaggerated, the whole loss, previous to the French passage of the Tormes, will amount perhaps to three thousand men. But the loss between the Tormes and the Agueda was certainly greater, for nearly three hundred were killed andSee [Appendix, No. 9.] wounded at the Huebra, many stragglers died in the woods, and we have marshal Jourdan’s testimony, that the prisoners, Spanish Portuguese and English, brought into Salamanca up to the 20th November, were three thousand five hundred and twenty. The whole loss of the double retreat cannot therefore be set down at less than nine thousand including the cost of men in the siege of Burgos.
I have been the more precise on this point, because some French writers have spoken of ten thousand being taken between the Tormes and the Agueda, and general Souham estimated the previous loss, including the siege of Burgos, at seven thousand. But the king in his despatches called the whole loss twelve thousand, including therein the garrison of Chinchilla, and he observed that if the generals of cavalry, Soult and Tilley, had followed the allies vigorously from Salamanca, the loss would have been much greater. Certainly the army was so little pressed that none would have supposed the French horsemen were numerous. On the other hand English authors have most unaccountably reduced the British loss to as many hundreds.
Although the French halted on the Huebra, the English general kept his troops together behind the Agueda, because Soult retired with the troops under his immediate command to Los Santos on the Upper Tormes, thus pointing towards the pass of Baños, and it was rumoured he designed to march that way, with a view to invade Portugal by the valley of the Tagus. Wellington disbelieved this rumour, but he could not disregard it, because nearly all his channels of intelligence had been suddenly dried up by a tyrannical and foolish decree of the Cortez, which obliged every man to justify himself for having remained in a district occupied by the enemy, and hence to avoid persecution, those who used to transmit information, fled from their homes. Hill’s division was therefore moved to the right as far as Robledo, to cover the pass of Perales, the rest of the troops were ready to follow, and Penne Villemur, leading the fifth Spanish army over the Gata mountains occupied Coria.
December. Joseph, after hesitating whether he should leave the army of the south, or the army of Portugal in Castile, finally ordered the head-quarters of the latter to be fixed at Valladolid, and of the former at Toledo; the one to maintain the country between the Tormes and the Esla, the other to occupy La Mancha with its left, the valley of the Tagus, as far as the Tietar, with its centre, and Avila with its right. The army of the centre went to Segovia, where the king joined it with his guards, and when these movements, which took place in December, were known, Wellington placed his army also in winter-quarters.
The fifth Spanish army crossing the Tagus at Alcantara entered Estremadura.
Hill’s division occupied Coria, and Placentia, and held the town of Bejar by a detachment.
Two divisions were quartered on a second line behind Hill about Castelo Branco, and in the Upper Beira.
The light division remained on the Agueda, and the rest of the infantry were distributed along the Duero from Lamego downwards.
The Portuguese cavalry were placed in Moncorvo, and the British cavalry, with the exception of Victor Alten’s brigade which was attached to the light division, occupied the valley of the Mondego.
Carlos D’España’s troops garrisoned Ciudad Rodrigo, and the Gallicians marched through the Tras os Montes to their own country.
In these quarters the Anglo-Portuguese were easily fed, because the improved navigation of the Tagus, the Douro, and the Mondego, furnished water carriage close to all their cantonments; moreover the army could be quickly collected on either frontier, for the front line of communication from Estremadura passed by the bridge of Alcantara to Coria, and from thence through the pass of Perales to the Agueda. The second line run by Penamacor and Guinaldo, and both were direct; but the post of Bejar, although necessary to secure Hill’s quarters from a surprise, was itself exposed.
The French also had double and direct communications across the Gredos mountains. On their first line they restored a Roman road leading from Horcajada, on the Upper Tormes, by the Puerto de Pico to Monbeltran, and from thence to Talavera. To ease their second line they finished a road, begun the year before by Marmont, leading from Avila, by the convent of Guisando and Escalona to Toledo. But these communications though direct, were in winter so difficult, that general Laval crossing the mountains from Avila was forced to harness forty horses to a carriage; moreover Wellington having the interior and shorter lines, was in a more menacing position for offence, and a more easy position for defence; wherefore, though he had ordered all boats to be destroyed at Almaraz, Arzobispo, and other points where the great roads came down to the Tagus, the French, as anxious to prevent him from passing that river, as he was to prevent them, sent parties to destroy what had been overlooked. Each feared that the other would move, and yet neither wished to continue the campagin, Wellington, because his troops wanted rest, more than one-third being in the hospitals! the French because they could not feed their men and had to refix their general base of operations, broken up and deranged as it was by the Guerillas.
The English general was however most at his ease. He knew that the best French officers thought it useless to continue the contest in Spain, unless the British army was first mastered, Soult’s intercepted letters showed him how that general desired to fix the war in Portugal, and there was now a most powerful force on the frontier of that kingdom. But on the other hand Badajos, Ciudad Rodrigo, and Almeida blocked the principal entrances, and though the two former were very ill provided by the Spaniards, they were in little danger because the last campaign had deprived the French of all their ordnance, arsenals, and magazines, in Andalusia, Almaraz, Madrid, Salamanca, and Valladolid; and it was nearly impossible for them to make any impression upon Portugal, until new establishments were formed. Wherefore Wellington did not fear to spread his troops in good and tranquil quarters, to receive reinforcements, restore their equipments, and recover their health and strength.
This advantage was not reciprocal. The secondary warfare which the French sustained, and which it is now time again to notice, would have been sufficient to establish the military reputation of any nation before Napoleon’s exploits had raised the standard of military glory. For when disembarrassed of their most formidable enemy, they were still obliged to chase the Partidas, to form sieges, to recover and restore the posts they had lost by concentrating their armies, to send moveable columns by long winter marches over a vast extent of country for food, fighting for what they got, and living hard because the magazines filled from the fertile districts were of necessity reserved for the field operations against Wellington. Certainly it was a great and terrible war they had in hand, and good and formidable soldiers they were to sustain it so long and so manfully amidst the many errors of their generals.