History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 5

by William Francis Patrick Napier

CHAPTER V.

OPERATIONS NORTH OF THE TAGUS.

1813. April. On this side as in the south, one part of the French fronted lord Wellington’s forces, while the rest warred with the Partidas, watched the English fleets on the coast, and endeavoured to maintain a free intercourse with France; but the extent of country was greater, the lines of communication longer, the war altogether more difficult, and the various operations more dissevered.

Four distinct bodies acted north of the Tagus.

1º. The army of Portugal, composed of six divisions under Reille, observing the allies from behind the Tormes; the Gallicians from behind the Esla.

2º. That part of the army of the south which, posted in the valley of the Tagus, observed Hill from behind the Tietar, and the Spaniards of Estremadura from behind the Tagus.

3º. The army of the north, under Caffarelli, whose business was to watch the English squadrons in the Bay of Biscay, to scour the great line of communication with France, and to protect the fortresses of Navarre and Biscay.

4º. The army of the centre, under count D’Erlon whose task was to fight the Partidas in the central part of Spain, to cover Madrid and to connect the other armies by means of moveable columns radiating from that capital. Now if the reader will follow the operations of these armies in the order of their importance and will mark their bearing on the main action of the campaign, he will be led gradually to understand how it was, that in 1813, the French, although apparently in their full strength, were suddenly, irremediably and as it were by a whirlwind, swept from the Peninsula.

1813. The army of the centre was composed of Darmagnac’s and Barrois’ French divisions, of Palombini’s Italians, Casa Palacio’s Spaniards, Trielhard’s cavalry, and the king’s French guards. It has been already shewn how, marching from the Tormes, it drove the Empecinado and Bassecour from the capital; but in passing the Guadarama one hundredVacani. and fifty men were frozen to death, a catastrophe produced by the rash use of ardent spirits. Palombini immediately occupied Alcala, and, having foraged the country towards Guadalaxara, brought in a large convoy of provisions to the capital. He would then have gone to Zaragoza to receive the recruits and stores which had arrived from Italy for his division, but Caffarelli was at this time so pressed that the Italian division finally marched to his succour, not by the direct road, such was the state of the northern provinces, but by the circuitous route of Valladolid and Burgos. The king’s guards then replaced the Italians at Alcala, and excursions were commenced on every side against the Partidas, which being now recruited and taught by French deserters were become exceedingly wary and fought obstinately.

On the 8th of January, Espert, governor of Segovia, beat Saornil not far from Cuellar.

On the 3d of February, general Vichery, marching upon Medina Celi, routed a regiment of horse called the volunteers of Madrid, and took six hundred prisoners. The Empecinado with two thousand infantry and a thousand cavalry intercepted him on his return, but Vichery beat him with considerable slaughter, and made the retreat good with a loss of only seventy men. However the Guerilla chief being reinforced by Saornil and Abril, still kept the hills about Guadalaxara, and when D’Erlon sent fresh troops against him, he attacked a detachment under colonel Prieur, killed twenty men, took the baggage and recovered a heavy contribution.

During these operations the troops in the valley of the Tagus were continually harassed, especially by a chief called Cuesta who was sometimes in the Guadalupe mountains, sometimes on the Tietar, sometimes in the Vera de Placentia, and he was supported at times on the side of the Guadalupe by Morillo and Penne Villemur. The French were however most troubled by Hill’s vicinity, for that general’s successful enterprises had made a profound impression, and the slightest change of his quarters, or even the appearance of an English uniform beyond the line of cantonments caused a concentration of French troops as expecting one of his sudden blows.

Nor was the army of Portugal tranquil. The Gallicians menaced it from Puebla Senabria and the gorges of the Bierzo; Silveira from the Tras os Montes; the mountains separating Leon from the Asturias were full of bands; Wellington was on the Agueda; and Hill, moving from Coria by the pass of Bejar might make a sudden incursion towards Avila. Finally the communication with the army of the north was to be kept up, and on every side the Partidas were enterprising, especially the horsemen in the plains of Leon. Reille however did not fail to war down these last.

Early in January Foy, returning from Astorga to relieve general Leval, then at Avila, killed some of Marquinez’ cavalry in San Pedro, and more of them at Mota la Toro; and on the 15th of that month the French captain Mathis killed or took four hundred of the same Partida at Valderas. A convoy of Guerilla stores coming from the Asturias was intercepted by general Boyer’s detachments, and one Florian, a celebrated Spanish Partizan in the French service, destroyed the band of Garido, in the Avila district. The same Florian on the 1st of February defeated the Medico and another inferior chief, and soon after, passing the Tormes, captured some Spanish dragoons who had come out of Ciudad Rodrigo. On the 1st of March he crushed the band of Tonto and at the same time captain Mathis, acting on the side of the Carrion river, again surprised Marquinez’ band at Melgar Abaxo, and that Partida, reduced to two hundred men under two inferior chiefs called Tobar and Marcos, ceased to be formidable.

Previous to this some Gallician troops having advanced to Castro Gonzalo on the Esla, were attacked by Boyer who beat them through Benevente with the loss of one hundred and fifty men, and then driving the Spanish garrison from Puebla Senabria, raised contributions with a rigour and ferocity said to be habitual to him. His detachments afterwards penetrating into the Asturias, menaced Oviedo, and vexed the country in despite of Porlier and Barceña who were in that province. General Foy also having fixed his quarters at Avila, feeling uneasy as to Hill’s intentions, had endeavoured on the 20th of February to surprise Bejar with the view of ascertaining if any large body was collected behind it, but he was vigorously repulsed by the fiftieth regiment and sixth caçadores under the command of colonel Harrison. However this attack and the movements of Florian beyond the Tormes, induced Lord Wellington to bring up another division to the Agueda, which, by a reaction, caused the French to believe the allies were ready to advance.

During these events Caffarelli vainly urged Reille to send him reinforcements, the insurrection in the north gained strength, and the communications were entirely intercepted until Palombini, driving away Mendizabal and Longa from Burgos, enabled the great convoy and all Napoleon’s despatches, which had been long accumulating there, to reach Madrid in the latter end of February. Joseph then reluctantly prepared to abandon his capital and concentrate the armies in Castile, but he neglected those essential ingredients of the emperor’s plan, rapidity and boldness. By the first Napoleon proposed to gain time for the suppression of the insurrection in the northern provinces. By the second to impose upon Lord Wellington and keep him on the defensive. Joseph did neither, he was slow and assumed the defensive himself, and he and the other French generals expected to be attacked, for they had not fathomed the English general’s political difficulties; and French writers since, misconceiving the character of his warfare, have attributed to slowness in the man what was really the long-reaching policy of a great commander. The allied army was not so lithe as the French army; the latter carried on occasion ten days’ provisions on the soldiers’ backs, or it lived upon the country, and was in respect of its organization and customs a superior military machine; the former never carried more than three days’ provisions, never lived upon the country, avoided the principle of making the war support the war, payed or promised to pay for every thing, and often carried in its marches even the corn for its cavalry. The difference of this organization resulting from the difference of policy between the two nations, was a complete bar to any great and sudden excursion on the part of the British general and must always be considered in judging his operations.

It is true that if Wellington had then passed the Upper Tormes with a considerable force, drawing Hill to him through Bejar, and moving rapidly by Avila, he might have broken in upon the defensive system of the king and beat his armies in detail, and much the French feared such a blow, which would have been quite in the manner of Napoleon. But Wellington’s views were directed by other than mere military principles. Thus striking, he was not certain that his blow would be decisive, his Portuguese forces would have been ruined, his British soldiers seriously injured by the attempt, and the resources of France would have repaired the loss of the enemy, sooner than he could have recovered the weakness which must necessarily have followed such an unseasonable exertion. His plan was to bring a great and enduring power early into the field, for like Phocion he desired to have an army fitted for a long race and would not start on the short course.

Joseph though he conceived the probability and dreaded the effect of such a sudden attack, could by no means conceive the spirit of his brother’s plans. It was in vain that Napoleon, while admitting the bad moral effect of abandoning the capital, pointed out the difference between flying from it and making a forward movement at the head of an army; the king even maintained that Madrid was a better military centre of operations than Valladolid, because it had lines of communication by Segovia, Aranda de Duero, and Zaragoza; nothing could be more unmilitary, unless he was prepared to march direct upon Lisbon if the allies marched upon the Duero. His extreme reluctance to quit Madrid induced slowness, but the actual position of his troops at the moment likewise presented obstacles to the immediate execution of the emperor’s orders; for as Daricau’s division had not returned from Valencia, the French outposts towards the Morena could not be withdrawn, nor could the army of the centre march upon Valladolid until the army of the south relieved it at Madrid. Moreover Soult’s counsels had troubled the king’s judgment; for that marshal agreeing that to abandon Madrid at that time was to abandon Spain, offered a project for reconciling the possession of the capital with the emperor’s views. This was to place the army of Portugal, and the army of the south, in position along the slopes of the Avila mountains, and on the Upper Tormes menacing Ciudad Rodrigo, while the king with the army of the centre remained at Madrid in reserve. In this situation he said they would be an over-match for any force the allies could bring into the field, and the latter could not move either by the valley of the Tagus or upon the Duero without exposing themselves to a flank attack.

The king objected that such a force could only be fed in that country by the utter ruin of the people, which he would not consent to; but he was deceived by his ministers; the comfortable state of the houses, the immense plains of standing corn seen by the allies in their march from the Esla to the Carrion proved that the people were not much impoverished. Soult, well acquainted with the resources of the country and a better and more practised master of such operations, looked to the military question rather than to the king’s conciliatory policy, and positively affirmed that the armies could be subsisted; yet it does not appear that he had taken into his consideration how the insurrection in the northern provinces was to be suppressed, which was the principal object of Napoleon’s plan. He no doubt expected that the emperor would, from France send troops for that purpose, but Napoleon knowing the true state of his affairs foresaw that all the resources of France would be required in another quarter.

March. Hatred and suspicion would have made Joseph reject any plan suggested by Soult, and the more so that the latter now declared the armies could exist without assistance in money from France; yet his mind was evidently unsettled by that marshal’s proposal, and by the coincidence of his ideas as to holding Madrid, for even when the armies were in movement towards the northern parts, he vacillated in his resolutions, at one time thinking toMarshal Jourdan’s Official correspondence, MSS. stay at Madrid, at another to march with the army of the centre to Burgos, instead of Valladolid. However upon the 18th of March he quitted the capital leaving the Spanish ministers Angulo and Almenara to govern there in conjunction with Gazan. The army of the south then moved in two columns, one under Couroux across the Gredos mountains to Avila, the other under Gazan upon Madrid to relieve the army of the centre, which immediately marched to Aranda de Duero and Lerma, with orders to settle at Burgos. Meanwhile Villatte’s division and all the outposts withdrawn from La Mancha remained on the Alberche, and the army of the south was thus concentrated between that river, Madrid, and Avila.

North of the Tagus the troops were unmolested, save by the bands during these movements, which were not completed before April, but in La Mancha the retiring French posts had been followed by Del Parque’s advanced guard under Cruz Murgeon, as far as Yebenes, and at the bridge of Algobar the French cavalry checked the Spanish horsemen so roughly, that Cruz Murgeon retired again towards the Morena. At the same time on the Cuenca side, the Empecinado having attempted to cut off a party of French cavalry, escorting the marquis of Salices to collect his rents previous to quitting Madrid, was defeated with the loss of seventy troopers. Meanwhile the great dépôt at Madrid being partly removed, general Villatte marched upon Salamanca and Gazan fixed his head-quarters at Arevalo. The army of the south was thus cantoned between the Tormes, the Duero, and the Adaja, with exception of six chosen regiments of infantry and four of cavalry, in all about ten thousand men; these remained at Madrid under Leval, who was ordered to push advanced guards to Toledo, and the Alberche, lest the allies should suddenly march that way and turn the left of the French army. But beyond the Alberche there were roads leading from the valley of the Tagus over the Gredos mountains into the rear of the advanced positions which the French had on the Upper Tormes, wherefore these last were now withdrawn from Pedrahita and Puente Congosto.

In proportion as the troops arrived in Castile Reille sent men to the army of the north, and contracting his cantonments, concentrated his remaining forces about Medina de Rio Seco with his cavalry on the Esla. But the men recalled by the emperor were now in full march, the French were in a state of great confusion, the people urged by Wellington’s emissaries and expecting great events every where showed their dislike by withholding provisions, and the Partida warfare became as lively in the interior as on the coast, yet with worse fortune. Captain Giordano, a Spaniard of Joseph’s guard killed one hundred and fifty of Saornil’s people near Arevalo, and the indefatigable Florian defeated Morales’ band, seized a dépôt in the valley of the Tietar, beat the Medico there, and then crossing the Gredos mountains, destroyed near Segovia on the 28th the band of Purchas; the king’s Spanish guards also crushed some smaller Partidas, and Renovales with his whole staff was captured at Carvajales and carried to Valladolid. Meanwhile the Empecinado gained the hills above Sepulveda and joining with Merino obliged the people of the Segovia district, to abandon their houses and refuse the supplies demanded by the army of the centre. When D’Armagnac and Cassagne marched against them, Merino returned to his northern haunts, the Empecinado to the Tagus, and D’Erlon then removed his head-quarters to Cuellar.

April. During April Leval was very much disturbed, and gave false alarms, which extending to Valladolid caused an unseasonable concentration of the troops and D’Erlon abandoned Cuellar and Sepulveda. Del Parque and the Empecinado were saidFrench Papers captured at Vittoria, MSS. to have established the bridge of Aranjuez, Elio to be advancing in La Mancha, Hill to be in the valley of the Tagus and moving by Mombeltran with the intention of seizing the passes of the Guadarama. All of this was false. It was the Empecinado and Abuelo who were at Aranjuez, the Partidas of Firmin, Cuesta, Rivero, and El Medico who were collecting at Arzobispo, to mask the march of the Spanish divisions from Estremadura, and of the reserve from Andalusia; it was the prince of Anglona who was advancing in La Mancha to cover the movement of Del Parque upon Murcia. When disabused of his error, Leval easily drove away the Empecinado who had advanced to Alcala; afterwards chasing Firmin from Valdemoro into the valley of the Tagus, he re-established his advanced posts in Toledo and on the Alberche, and scoured the whole country around. But Joseph himself was anxious to abandon Madrid altogether, and was only restrained by the emperor’s orders and by the hope of still gathering some contributions there to support his court at Valladolid. With reluctance also he had obeyed his brother’s reiterated orders to bring the army of the centre over the Duero to replace the detached divisions of the army of Portugal. He wished D’Erlon rather than Reille, to reinforce the north, and nothing could more clearly show how entirely the subtle spirit of Napoleon’s instructions had escaped his perception. It was necessary that Madrid should be held, to watch the valley of the Tagus and if necessary to enable the French armies to fall back on Zaragoza, but principally to give force to the moral effect of the offensive movement towards Portugal. It was equally important and for the same reason, that the army of Portugal instead of the army of the centre should furnish reinforcements for the north.

In the contracted positions which the armies now occupied, the difficulty of subsisting was increased, and each general was dissatisfied with his district, disputes multiplied, and the court clashed with the army at every turn. Leval also inveighed against the conduct of the Spanish ministers and minor authorities left at Madrid, as being hurtful to both troops and people, and no doubt justly, since it appears to have been precisely like that of the Portuguese and Spanish authorities on the other side towards the allies. Joseph’s letters to his brother became daily more bitter. Napoleon’s regulations for the support of the troops were at variance with his, and when the king’s budget shewed a deficit of many millions, the emperor so little regarded it that he reduced the French subsidy to two millions per month, and strictly forbad the application of the money to any other purpose than the pay of the soldiers. When Joseph asked, how he was to find resources? his brother with a just sarcasm on his political and military blindness, desired him to seek what was necessary in those provinces of the north which were rich enough to nourish the Partidas and the insurrectional juntas. The king thus pushed to the wall prevailed upon Gazan secretly to lend him fifty thousand francs, for the support of his court, from the chest of the army of the south; but with the other generals he could by no means agree, and instead of the vigour and vigilance necessary to meet the coming campaign there was weakness, disunion, and ill blood.

All the movements and arrangements for concentrating the French forces, as made by Joseph, displeased Napoleon. The manner in which the army of the centre stole away from Madrid by the road of Lerma was, he said, only calculated to expose his real views and draw the allies upon the French before the communication with France was restored. But more than all his indignation was aroused by the conduct of the king after the concentration. The French armies were held on the defensive and the allies might without fear for Portugal embark troops to invade France, whereas a bold and confident offensive movement sustained by the formation of a battering train at Burgos, as if to besiege Ciudad Rodrigo, would have imposed upon the English general, secured France from the danger of such an insult, and would at the same time have masked the necessary measures for suppressing the insurrection in the northern provinces. To quell that insurrection was of vital importance, but from the various circumstances already noticed it had now existed for seven months, five of which, the king, although at the head of ninety thousand men, and uninterrupted by Wellington, had wasted unprofitably, having done no more than chase a few inferior bands of the interior while this formidable warfare was consolidating in his rear; and while his great adversary was organizing the most powerful army which had yet taken the field in his front. It is thus kingdoms are lost. I shall now trace the progress of the northern insurrection so unaccountably neglected by the king, and to the last misunderstood by him; for when Wellington was actually in movement; when the dispersed French corps were rushing and crowding to the rear to avoid the ponderous mass which the English general was pushing forward; even then, the king, who had done every thing possible to render defeat certain, was urging upon Napoleon the propriety of first beating the allies and afterwards reducing the insurrection by the establishment of a Spanish civil government beyond the Ebro!

NORTHERN INSURRECTION.

1813. It has been already shewn how the old Partidas had been strengthened and new corps organized on a better footing in Biscay and Navarre; how in the latter end of 1812 Caffarelli marched to succour Santona, and how Longa taking advantage of his absence captured a convoy near Burgos while other bands menaced Logroño. All the littoral posts, with the exception of Santona and Gueteria were then in the possession of the Spaniards, and Mendizabel made an attempt on Bilbao the 6th of January. Repulsed by general Rouget he rejoined Longa and together they captured the little fort of Salinas de Anara, near the Ebro, and that of Cuba in the Bureba, while the bands of Logroño invested Domingo Calçada in the Rioja. On the 26th of January, Caffarelli, having returned from Santona, detached Vandermaesen and Dubreton to drive the Spaniards from Santander, and they seized many stores there, but neglected to make any movement to aid Santona which was again blockaded by the Partidas; meanwhile the convoy with all the emperor’s despatches was stopped at Burgos. Palombini re-opened the communications and enabled the convoy to reach Madrid, but his division did not muster more than three thousand men, and various detachments belonging to the other armies were now in march to the interior of Spain. The regiments recalled to France from all parts were also in full movement, together with many convoys and escorts for the marshals and generals quitting the Peninsula; thus the army of the north was reduced, as its duties increased, and the young French soldiers died fast of a peculiar malady which especially attacked them in small garrisons. Meanwhile the Spaniards’ forces increased. In February Mendizabel and Longa were again in the Bureba intercepting the communication between Burgos and Bilbao, and they menaced Pancorbo and Briviesca. This brought Caffarelli from Vittoria and Palombini from Burgos. The latter surprised by Longa, lost many men near Poza de Sal, and only saved himself by his courage and firmness yet he finally drove the Spaniards away. But now Mina returning from Aragon after his unsuccessful action near Huesca surprized and burned the castle of Fuenterrabia in a most daring manner on the 11th of March, after which, having assembled five thousand men in Guipuscoa, he obtained guns from the English fleet at Motrico, invested Villa Real within a few leagues of Vittoria, and repulsed six hundred men who came to relieve the fort. This brought Caffarelli back from Pancorbo. Mina then raised the siege, and Palombini marching into the Rioja, succoured the garrison of San Domingo Calçada and drove the Partidas towards Soria. The communication with Logroño was thus re-opened, and the Italians passing the Ebro marched by Vittoria towards Bilbao where they arrived the 21st of February; but the gens-d’armes and imperial guards immediately moved from Bilbao to France, Caffarelli went with them, and the Spanish chiefs remained masters of Navarre and Biscay. The people now refused war contributions both in money and kind, the harvest was not ripe, and the distress of the French increased in an alarming manner because the weather enabled the English fleets to keep upon the coast and intercept all supplies from France by sea. The communications were all broken; in front by Longa who was again at the defile of Pancorbo; in the rear by Mina who was in the hills of Arlaban; on the left by a collection of bands at Caroncal in Navarre. Abbé, governor of Pampeluna severely checked these last, but Mina soon restored affairs; for leaving the volunteers of Guipuscoa to watch the defiles of Arlaban, he assembled all the bands in Navarre, destroyed the bridges leading to Taffalla from Pampeluna and from Puente la Reyna, and though Abbé twice attacked him, he got stronger, and bringing up two English guns from the coast besieged Taffalla.

February.Napoleon, discontented with Caffarelli’s mode of conducting the war, now gave Clauzel the command in the north, with discretionary power to draw as many troops from the army of Portugal as he judged necessary. He was to correspond directly with the emperor to avoid loss of time, but was to obey the king in all things not clashing with Napoleon’s orders, which contained a complete review of what had passed and what was necessary to be done. “The Partidas,” the emperor said, “were strong, organized, exercised, and seconded by the exaltation of spirit which the battle of Salamanca had produced. The insurrectional juntas had been revived, the posts on the coast abandoned by the French and seized by the Spaniards gave free intercourse with the English; the bands enjoyed all the resources of the country, and the system of warfare hitherto followed had favoured their progress. Instead of forestalling their enterprises the French had waited for their attacks, and contrived to be always behind the event; they obeyed the enemy’s impulsion and the troops were fatigued without gaining their object. Clauzel was to adopt a contrary system, he was to attack suddenly, pursue rapidly, and combine his movements with reference to the features of the country. A few good strokes against the Spaniards’ magazines, hospitals, or dépôts of arms would inevitably trouble their operations, and after one or two military successes some political measures would suffice to disperse the authorities, disorganise the insurrection, and bring the young men who had been enrolled by force back to their homes. All the generals recommended, and the emperor approved of the construction of block-houses on well-chosen points, especially where many roads met; the forests would furnish the materials cheaply, and these posts should support each other and form chains of communication. With respect to the greater fortresses, Pampeluna and Santona were the most important, and the enemy knew it, for Mina was intent to famish the first and the English squadron to get hold of the second. To supply Pampeluna it was only necessary to clear the communications, the country around being rich and fertile. Santona required combinations. The emperor wished to supply it by sea from Bayonne and St. Sebastian, but the French marine officers would never attempt the passage, even with favourable winds and when the English squadron were away, unless all the intermediate ports were occupied by the land forces.

“Six months before, these ports had been in the hands of the French, but Caffarelli had lightly abandoned them, leaving the field open to the insurgents in his rear while he marched with Souham against Wellington. Since that period the English and Spaniards held them. For four months the emperor had unceasingly ordered the retaking of Bermeo and Castro, but whether from the difficulty of the operations or the necessity of answering more pressing calls, no effort had been made to obey, and the fine season now permitted the English ships to aid in the defence. Castro was said to be strongly fortified by the English, no wonder, Caffarelli had given them sufficient time, and they knew its value. In one month every post on the coast from the mouth of the Bidassoa to St. Ander should be again re-occupied by the French, and St. Ander itself should be garrisoned strongly. And simultaneous with the coast operations should be Clauzel’s attack on Mina in Navarre and the chasing of the Partidas in the interior of Biscay. The administration of the country also demanded reform, and still more the organization and discipline of the army of the north should be attended to. It was the pith and marrow of the French power in Spain, all would fail if that failed, whereas if the north was strong, its administration sound, its fortresses well provided and its state tranquil, no irreparable misfortune could happen in any other part.”

Clauzel assumed the command on the 22d of February, Abbé was then confined to Pampeluna, Mina, master of Navarre, was besieging Taffalla; Pastor, Longa, Campillo, Merino and others ranged through Biscay and Castile unmolested; and the spirit of the country was so changed that fathers now sent their sons to join Partidas which had hitherto been composed of robbers and deserters. Clauzel demanded a reinforcement of twenty thousand men from the army of Portugal, but Joseph was still in Madrid and proposed to send D’Erlon with the army of the centre instead, an arrangement to which Clauzel would not accede. Twenty thousand troops were, he said, wanted beyond the Ebro. Two independent chiefs, himself and D’Erlon, could not act together; and if the latter was only to remain quiet at Burgos his army would devour the resources without aiding the operations of the army of the north. The king might choose another commander, but the troops required must be sent. Joseph changed his plan, yet it was the end of March before Reille’s divisions moved, three upon Navarre, and one upon Burgos. Meanwhile Clauzel repaired with some troops to Bilbao, where general Rouget had eight hundred men in garrison besides Palombini’s Italians.

March. This place was in a manner blockaded by the Partidas. The Pastor with three thousand men was on the right of the Durango river, in the hills of Guernica, and Navarnis, between Bilbao and the fort of Bermeo. Mendizabal with from eight to ten thousand men was on the left of the Durango in the mountains, menacing at once Santoña and Bilbao and protecting Castro. However the French had a strong garrison in the town of Durango, the construction of new works round Bilbao was in progress, and on the 22d of March Clauzel moved with the Italians and a French regiment to assault Castro. Campillo and Mendizabel immediately appeared from different sides and the garrison made a sally; the Spaniards after some sharp fighting regained the high valleys in disorder, and the design of escalading Castro was resumed, but again interrupted by the return of Mendizabel to Trucios, only seven miles from the French camp, and by intelligence that the Pastor with the volunteers of Biscay and Guipuscoa was menacing Bilbao. Clauzel immediately marched with the French regiments to the latter place, leaving Palombini to oppose Mendizabel. Finding all safe at Bilbao, he sent Rouget with two French battalions to reinforce the Italians, who then drove Mendizabel from Trucios into the hills about Valmaceda. It being now necessary to attack Castro in form, Palombini occupied the heights of Ojeba and Ramales, from whence he communicated with the garrison of Santona, introduced a convoy of money and fresh provisions there, received ammunition in return, and directed the governor Lameth to prepare a battering train of six pieces for the siege. This done, the Italians who had lost many men returned hastily to Bilbao, for the Pastor was again menacing that city.

April. On the evening of the 31st Palombini marched against this new enemy and finding him too strong retreated, but being promised a reinforcement of two regiments from Durango he returned; Pastor was then with three thousand men in position at Navarnis, Palombini gave him battle on the 3d and was defeated with the loss of eighty men, but on the 5th being joined by the French regiments from Durango he beat the Spaniards. They dispersed and while some collected in the same positions behind him, and others under Pastor gained the interior, one column retired by the coast towards the Deba on the side of St. Sebastian. Palombini eagerly pursued these last, because he expected troops from that fortress to line the Deba, and hoped thus to surround the Spaniards, but the English squadron was at Lequitio and carried them off. Pastor meanwhile descending the Deba drove the French from that river to the very walls of St. Sebastian, and Palombini was forced to make for Bergara on the road to Vittoria.

At Bergara he left his wounded men with a garrison to protect them, and returning on the 9th of April attacked the volunteers of Guipuscoa at Ascoytia; repulsed in this attempt he retired again towards Bergara, and soon after took charge of a convoy of artillery going from St. Sebastian for the siege of Castro. Meanwhile Bilbao was in great danger, for the volunteers of Biscay coming from the Arlaban, made on the 10th a false attack at a bridge two miles above the entrenched camp, while Tapia, Dos Pelos, and Campillo fell on seriously from the side of Valmaceda. Mendizabel, who commanded, did not combine his movements well and was repulsed by Rouget although with difficulty; the noise of the action reached Palombini who hastened his march, and having deposited his convoy, followed the volunteers of Biscay to Guernica and drove them upon Bermeo where they got on board the English vessels.

During these events Clauzel was at Vittoria arranging the general plan of operations. Mina had on the 1st of April defeated one of his columns near Lerin with the loss of five or six hundred men. The four divisions sent from the army of Portugal, together with some unattached regiments furnished, according to Reille, the twenty thousand men demanded, yet only seventeen thousand reached Clauzel; and as the unattached regiments merely replaced a like number belonging to the other armies, and now recalled from the north, the French general found his expected reinforcements dwindled to thirteen thousand. Hence notwithstanding Palombini’s activity, the insurrection was in the beginning of April more formidable than ever; the line of correspondence from Torquemada to Burgos was quite unprotected for want of troops, neither was the line from Burgos to Irun so well guarded that couriers could pass without powerful escorts, nor always then. The fortifications of the castle of Burgos were to have been improved, but there was no money to pay for the works, the French, in default of transport, could not collect provisions for the magazines ordered to be formed there by the king, and two generals, La Martiniere and Rey, were disputing for the command. Nearly forty thousand irregular Spanish troops were in the field. The garrison of Taffalla, five hundred strong, had yielded to Mina, and that chief, in concert with Duran, Amor, Tabueca, the militia men of Logroña, and some minor guerillas occupied both sides of the Ebro, between Calahora, Logroño, Santa Cruz de Campero, and Guardia. They could in one day unite eighteen thousand infantry and a thousand horsemen. Mendizabel, Longa, Campillo, Herrera, El Pastor, and the volunteers of Biscay, Guipuscoa, and Alava, in all about sixteen thousand, were on the coast acting in conjunction with the English squadrons, Santander, Castro, and Bermeo were still in their hands, and maritime expeditions were preparing at Coruña and in the Asturias.

This Partizan war thus presented three distinct branches, that of Navarre, that of the coast, and that on the lines of communication. The last alone required above fifteen thousand men; namely ten thousand from Irun to Burgos, and the line between Tolosa and Pampeluna, which was destroyed, required fifteen hundred to restore it, while four thousand were necessary between Mondragon and Bilbao, comprising the garrison of the latter place; even then no post would be safe from a sudden attack. Nearly all the army of the north was appropriated to the garrisons and lines of communication, but the divisions of Abbé and Vandermaesen could be used on the side of Pampeluna, and there were besides, disposable, Palombini’s Italians and the divisions sent by Reille. But one of these, Sarrut’s, was still in march, and all the sick of the armies in Castile were now pouring into Navarre, when, from the loss of the contributions, there was no money to provide assistance for them. Clauzel had however ameliorated both the civil and the military administrations, improved the works of Gueteria, commenced the construction of block-houses between Irun and Vittoria, and as we have seen had shaken the bands about Bilbao. Now dividing his forces he destined Palombini to besiege Castro, ordering Foy and Sarrut’s divisions when the latter should arrive, to cover the operation and to oppose any disembarkation.

The field force thus appropriated, together with the troops in Bilbao under Rouget, was about ten thousand men, and in the middle of April, Clauzel, beating Mina from Taffalla and Estella, assembled the remainder of the active army, composed of Taupin and Barbout’s divisions of the army of Portugal, Vandermaesen’s and Abbé’s divisions of the army of the north, in all about thirteen thousand men, at Puenta La Reyna in Navarre. He urged general L’Huillier, who commanded the reserve at Bayonne, to reinforce St. Sebastian and Gueteria and to push forward his troops of observation into the valley of Bastan, and he also gave the commandant of Zaragoza notice of his arrival, that he might watch Mina on that side. From Puente la Reyna he made some excursions but he lost men uselessly, for the Spaniards would only fight at advantage, and to hunt Mina without first barring all his passages of flight was to destroy the French soldiers by fatigue. And here the king’s delay was most seriously felt because the winter season, when, the tops of the mountains being covered with snow, the Partidas could only move along the ordinary roads, was most favourable for the French operations, and it had passed away. Clauzel despairing to effect any thing with so few troops was even going to separate his forces and march to the coast, when in May Mina, who had taken post in the valley of Ronçal, furnished an occasion which did not escape the French general.

May. On the 13th Abbé’s and Vandermaesen’s divisions and the cavalry entered that valley at once by the upper and lower parts, and suddenly closing upon the Guerilla chief killed and wounded a thousand of his men and dispersed the rest; one part fled by the mountains to Navarquez, on the side of Sanguessa, with the wounded whom they dropped at different places in care of the country people. Chaplangarra, Cruchaga, and Carena, Mina’s lieutenants, went off, each with a column, in the opposite direction and by different routes to the valley of the Aragon, they passed that river at St. Gilla, and made their way towards the sacred mountain of La Pena near Jaeca. The French cavalry following them by Villa Real, entered that town the 14th on one side, while Mina with twelve men entered it on the other, but he escaped to Martes where another ineffectual attempt was made to surprise him. Abbé’s columns then descended the smaller valleys leading towards the upper valley of the Aragon, while Vandermaesen’s infantry and the cavalry entered the lower part of the same valley, and the former approaching Jacca sent his wounded men there and got fresh ammunition.

Meanwhile Mina and the insurgent junta making a push to regain Navarre by the left of the Aragon river were like to have been taken, but again escaped towards the valley of the Gallego, whither also the greater part of their troops now sought refuge. Clauzel was careful not to force them over that river, lest they should remain there and intercept the communication from Zaragoza by Jacca, which was the only free line the French now possessed and too far removed from Clauzel’s true theatre of operations to be watched. Abbé therefore returned to Roncal in search of the Spanish dépôts, and Vandermaesen entered Sos at one end just as Mina, who had now one hundred and fifty horsemen and was always intent upon regaining Navarre, passed out at the other; the light cavalry pursuing overtook him at Sos Fuentes and he fled to Carcastillo, but there unexpectedly meeting some of his own squadrons which had wandered over the mountains after the action at Roncal, he gave battle, was defeated with the loss of fifty men and fled once more to Aragon, whereupon the insurrectional junta dispersed, and dissentions arose between Mina and the minor chiefs under his command. Clauzel anxious to increase this discord sent troops into all the valleys to seek out the Spanish dépôts and to attack their scattered men, and he was well served by the Aragonese, for Suchet’s wise administration was still proof against the insurrectional juntas.

1813. During these events four battalions left by Mina at Santa Cruz de Campero in the Amescoas, were chased by Taupin, who had remained at Estella when the other divisions marched up the valley of Roncal. Mina, however, reassembled at Barbastro in Aragon a strong column, crowds of deserters from the other Spanish armies were daily increasing his power, and so completely had he organized Navarre that the presence of a single soldier of his in a village sufficed to have any courier without a strong escort stopped. Many bands also were still in the Rioja, and two French regiments rashly foraging towards Lerim were nearly all destroyed. In fine the losses were well balanced, and Clauzel demanded more troops, especially cavalry, to scour the Rioja. Nevertheless the dispersion of Mina’s troops lowered the reputation of that chief, and the French general taking up his quarters in Pampeluna so improved this advantage by address, that many townships withdrew from the insurrection, and recalling their young men from the bands commenced the formation of eight free Spanish companies to serve on the French side. Corps of this sort were raised with so much facility in every part of Spain, that it would seem nations, as well as individuals, have an idiosyncrasy, and in these changeable warriors we again see the Mandonius and Indibilis of ancient days.

Joseph, urged by Clauzel, now sent Maucune’s division and some light cavalry of the army of Portugal, to occupy Pampleiga, Burgos, and Briviesca, and to protect the great communication, which the diverging direction of Clauzel’s double operations had again exposed to the partidas. Meanwhile the French troops had not been less successful in Biscay than in Navarre. Foy reached Bilbao the 24th of April, and finding all things there ready for the siege of Castro marched to Santona to hasten the preparations at that place, and he attempted also to surprise the chiefs Campillo and Herrera in the hills above Santona, but was worsted in the combat. The two battering trains then endeavoured to proceed from Bilbao and Santona by sea to Castro, but the English vessels, coming to the mouth of the Durango, stopped those at Bilbao, and obliged them to proceed by land, but thus gave an opportunity for those at Santona to make the sea-run in safety.

SIEGE OF CASTRO.

May. This place situated on a promontory was garrisoned by twelve hundred men, under the command of Don Pedro Alvarez, three English sloops of war commanded by the captains Bloye, Bremen, and Tayler, were at hand, some gun-boats were in the harbour, and twenty-seven guns were mounted on the works. An outward wall with towers, extended from sea to sea on the low neck which connected the promontory with the main land; this line of defence was strengthened by some fortified convents, behind it came the town, and behind the town at the extremity of the promontory stood the castle.

On the 4th of May, Foy, Sarrut, and Palombini, took post at different points to cover the siege; the Italian general St. Paul invested the place; the engineer Vacani conducted the works, having twelve guns at his disposal. The defence was lively and vigorous, and captain Tayler with great labour landed a heavy ship-gun on a rocky island to the right of the town, looking from the sea, which he worked with effect against the French counter-batteries. On the 11th a second gun was mounted on this island, but that day the breaching batteries opened, and in a few hours broke the wall while the counter-batteries set fire to some houses with shells, wherefore the English guns were removed from the island. The assault was then ordered but delayed by a sudden accident, for a foraging party having been sent into the hills, came flying back, pursued by a column of Spaniards which had passed unperceived through the positions of the French; and the besiegers were for some time in confusion as thinking the covering army had been beaten; however they soon recovered, and the assault and escalade took place in the night.

The attack was rapid and fierce, the walls were carried, and the garrison driven through the town to the castle which was maintained by two companies, while the flying troops got on board the English vessels; finally the Italians stormed the castle, but every gun had been destroyed, and the two companies safely rejoined their countrymen on board the ships. The English had ten seamen wounded, the Spaniards lost about a hundred and eighty, and the remainder were immediately conveyed to Bermeo from whence they marched inland to join Longa. The besiegers lost only fifty men killed and wounded, and the Italian soldiers committed great excesses, setting fire to the town in many places. Foy and Sarrut, separating after the siege, marched, the former through the district of Incartaciones to Bilbao defeating a battalion of Biscay volunteers on his route; the latter to Orduña with the design of destroying Longa; but that chief crossed the Ebro at Puente Lara, and finding the additional troops sent by Joseph were beginning to arrive in the vicinity of Burgos, recrossed the river, and after a long chase escaped in the mountains of Espinosa. Sarrut having captured a few gun-carriages and one of Longa’s forest dépôts of ammunition, returned towards Bilbao, and Foy immediately marched from that place against the two remaining battalions of Biscay volunteers, which under the chiefs Mugartegui and Artola were now at Villaro and Guernica.

These battalions, each a thousand strong, raised by conscription, and officered from the best families, were the champions of Biscay; but though brave and well-equipped, the difficulty of crushing them and the volunteers of Guipuscoa, was not great, because neither would leave their own peculiar provinces. The third battalion had been already dispersed in the district of Incartaciones, and Foy having in the night of the 29th combined the march of several columns to surround Villaro, fell at day-break upon Mugartegui’s battalion and dispersed it with the loss of all its baggage. Two hundred of the volunteers immediately returned to their homes, and the French general marched rapidly, through Durango, against Artola, who was at Guernica. The Italians who were still at Bilbao, immediately turned Guernica on the west by Mungia, while a French column turned it eastward by Marquinez; then Artola fled to Lequitio, but the column from Marquinez, coming over the mountain, fell upon his right flank just as he was defiling by a narrow way along the sea-coast. Artola himself escaped, but two hundred Biscayens were killed or drowned, more than three hundred with twenty-seven officers were taken, and two companies which formed his rear-guard dispersed in the mountains, and some men finding a few boats rowed to an English vessel. The perfect success of this action, which did not cost the French a man killed or wounded, was attributed to the talents and vigour of captain Guinget, the daring officer who won the passage of the Douro at Tordesillas in Wellington’s retreat from Burgos.

When the three battalions of Biscay were thus disposed of, all their magazines, hospitals, and dépôts fell into Foy’s hands, the junta dispersed, the privateers quitted the coast for Santander, Pastor abandoned Guipuscoa, and the Italians recovered Bermeo from which the garrison fled to the English ships. They also destroyed the works of the little island of Isaro, which being situated three thousand yards from the shore, and having no access to the summit, save by a staircase cut in the rock, was deemed impregnable, and used as a dépôt for the English stores; but this was the last memorable exploit of Palombini’s division in the north. That general himself had already gone to Italy to join Napoleon’s reserves, and his troops being ordered to march by Aragon to join Suchet, were in movement, when new events caused them to remain in Guipuscoa, with the reputation of being brave and active but ferocious soldiers, barbarous and devastating, differing little from their Roman ancestors.

It has been already observed that, during these double operations of the French on the coast and in Navarre, the partidas had fallen upon the line of communication with France, thus working out the third branch of the insurrectional warfare. Their success went nigh to balance all their losses on each flank. For Mendizabel settled with Longa’s partida upon the line between Burgos and Miranda de Ebro; the volunteers of Alava and Biscay, and part of Pastor’s bands concentrated on the mountains of Arlaban above the defiles of Salinas and Descarga; Merino and Salazar came up from the country between the Ebro and the Duero; and the three battalions left by Mina in the Amescoa, after escaping from Taupin, reassembled close to Vittoria. Every convoy and every courier’s escort was attacked at one or other of these points without hindering Mendizabel from making sudden descents towards the coast when occasion offered. Thus, on the 11th of April, as we have seen, he attacked Bilbao. On the 25th of April Longa, who had four thousand men and several guns, was repulsed at Armiñion, between Miranda and Trevino, by some of the drafted men going to France; but on the 3d of May at the same place Longa met and obliged a large convoy, coming from Castile with an escort of eight hundred men, to return to Miranda, and even cannonaded that place on the 5th. Thouvenot the commandant of the government, immediately detached twelve hundred men and three guns from Vittoria to relieve the convoy; but then Mina’s battalions endeavoured to escalade Salvatierra, and they were repulsed with difficulty. Meanwhile the volunteers of Alava gathered above the pass of Salinas to intercept the rescued convoy, and finding that the latter would not stir from Vittoria, they went on the 10th to aid in a fresh attack on Salvatierra; being again repulsed they returned to the Arlaban, where they captured a courier with a strong escort in the pass of Descarga near Villa Real. A French regiment sent to succour Salvatierra finally drove these volunteers towards Bilbao where, as we have seen, Foy routed them, but Longa continued to infest the post of Armiñion until Sarrut arriving from the siege of Castro chased him also.

June. Notwithstanding these successes Clauzel, whose troops were worn out with fatigue, declared that it would require fifty thousand men and three months’ time to quell the insurrection entirely. And Napoleon more discontented than ever with the king, complained that the happy enterprizes of Clauzel, Foy, Sarrut, and Palombini, had brought no safety to his couriers and convoys; that his orders about the posts and the infantry escorts had been neglected; that the reinforcements sent to the north from Castile had gone slowly and in succession instead of at once; finally that the cautious movement of concentration by the other armies was inexcusable, since the inaction of the allies, their distance, their want of transport, their ordinary and even timid circumspection in any operation out of the ordinary course, enabled the French to act in the most convenient manner. The growing dissentions between the English and the Spaniards, the journey of Wellington to Cadiz, and the changes in his army, were, he said, all favourable circumstances for the French, but the king had taken no advantage of them; the insurrection continued, and the object of interest was now changed. Joseph defended himself with more vehemence than reason against these charges, but Wellington soon vindicated Napoleon’s judgement, and the voice of controversy was smothered by the din of battle, for the English general was again abroad in his strength, and the clang of his arms resounded through the Peninsula.