CHAPTER VI.
1813. While the French power in Spain was being disorganized by the various circumstances related in the former chapter, Lord Wellington’s diligence and energy had reorganized the allied army with greater strength than before. Large reinforcements, especially of cavalry, had come out from England. The efficiency and the spirit of the Portuguese had been restored in a surprizing manner, and discipline had been vindicated, in both services, with a rough but salutary hand; rank had not screened offenders; some had been arrested, some tried, some dismissed for breach of duty; the negligent were terrified, the zealous encouraged; in short every department was reformed with vigour, and it was full time. Confidential officers commissioned to detect abuses in the general hospitals and dépôts, those asylums for malingerers, discovered and drove so many skulkers to their duty, that the second division alone recovered six hundred bayonets in one month; and this salutary scouring was rendered more efficient by the establishment of both permanent, and ambulent regimental hospitals, a wise measure, and founded on a principle which cannot be too widely extended; for it is certain that as the character of a battalion depends on its fitness for service, a moral force will always be brought to bear upon the execution of orders under regimental controul which it is in vain to look for elsewhere.
The Douro had been rendered navigable as high up as Castillo de Alva above the confluence of the Agueda; a pontoon train of thirty-five pieces had been formed; carts of a peculiar construction had been built to repair the great loss of mules during the retreat from Burgos, and a recruit of these animals was also obtained by emissaries who purchased them with English merchandize, even at Madrid, under the beards of the enemy, and at the very time when Clauzel was unable for want of transport to fill the magazines of Burgos. The ponderous iron camp-kettles of the soldiers had been laid aside for lighter vessels carried by men, the mules being destined to carry tents instead; it is, however, doubtful if these tents were really useful on a march in wet weather, because when soaked they became too heavy for the animal, and seldom arrived in time for use at the end of a march. Their greatest advantage was found when the soldiers halted for a few days. Beside these amendments many other changes and improvements had taken place, and the Anglo-Portuguese troops conscious of a superior organization, were more proudly confident than ever, while the French were again depressed by intelligence of the defection of the Prussians following on the disasters in Russia. Nor had the English general failed to amend the condition of those Spanish troops which the Cortez had placed at his disposal. By a strict and jealous watch over the application of the subsidy he had kept them clothed and fed during the winter, and now reaped the benefit by having several powerful bodies fit to act in conjunction with his own forces. Wherefore being thus prepared he was anxious to strike, anxious to forestall the effects of his Portuguese political difficulties as well as to keep pace with Napoleon’s efforts in Germany, and his army was ready to take the field in April, but he could not concentrate before the green forage was fit for use, and deferred the execution of his plan until May. What that plan was and what the means for executing it shall now be shewn.
May. The relative strength of the contending armies in the Peninsula was no longer in favour of the French. Their force which at the termination of Wellington’s retreat into Portugal was above two hundred and sixty thousand men and thirty-two thousand horses, two hundred and sixteen thousand[Appendix, No. 18.] being present with the eagles, was by the loss in subsequent operations, and by drafts for the army in Germany reduced in March, 1813, to two hundred and thirty-one thousand men and twenty-nine thousand horses. Thirty thousand of these were in hospital, and only one hundred and ninety-seven thousand men, including the reserve at Bayonne, were present with the eagles. Of this number sixty-eight thousand including sick, were in Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia. The remainder with the exception of the ten thousand left at Madrid, were distributed on the northern line of communication, from the Tormes to Bayonne, and it has been already shewn how scattered and how occupied.
But Wellington had so well used the five months’ cessation of active operations that nearly two hundred thousand allied troops were ready to take the field, and on each flank there was a British fleet, now a more effective aid than before, because the French lines of retreat run parallel to, and near the sea-coast on each side of Spain, and every part opened by the advance of the allies would furnish a fresh dépôt for the subsistence of their armies. This mass of troops was composed in the following manner.
The first army under Copons nominally ten thousand, really about six thousand strong, was in Catalonia.
The second army under Elio was in Murcia about twenty thousand, including the divisions of Villa Campa, Bassecour, Duran, and Empecinado.
The Anglo-Sicilian army under Murray, near Alicant, about sixteen thousand.
The third army under Del Parque, in the Morena about twelve thousand.
The first army of reserve under the Conde d’Abispal, in Andalusia, about fifteen thousand.
The fourth army, under Castaños, which included the Spanish divisions in Estremadura, Julian Sanchez’ Partida and the Gallicians under Giron, the Asturians under Porlier and Barceña, together with the Partidas of Longa and Mina, likewise belonged to this army and were mustered amongst its divisions. This army was computed at forty thousand men, to which may be added the minor bands and volunteers in various parts.
Lastly there was the noble Anglo-Portuguese army which now furnished more than seventy thousand fighting men, with ninety pieces of artillery; and the real difference between the French and the allies was greater than the apparent difference. The French returns included officers, sergeants, drummers, artillery-men, engineers, and waggoners, whereas the allies’ numbers were all sabres and bayonets. Moreover this statement of the French number was on the 15th of March, and as there were drafts made by Napoleon after that period, and as Clauzel and Foy’s losses, and the reserves at Bayonne must be deducted, it would be probably more correct to assume that the whole number of sabres and bayonets in June, was not more than one hundred and sixty thousand, of which one hundred and ten thousand were on the northern line of invasion.
The campaign of 1812 had taught the English general the strength of the French lines of defence, especially on the Duero, which they had since entrenched in different parts, and most of the bridges over it, he had himself destroyed in his retreat. But for many reasons it was not advisable to operate in the central provinces of Spain. The country there was exhausted, the lines of supply would be longer and more exposed, the army further removed from the sea, the Gallicians could not be easily brought down to co-operate, the services of the northern Partidas would not be so advantageous, and the ultimate result would be less decisive than operations against the great line of communication with France; wherefore against the northern provinces he had early resolved to direct his attack and had well considered how to evade those lines which he could scarcely hope to force.
All the enemy’s defences on the Lower Duero could be turned by a movement on the right, across the Upper Tormes, and from thence skirting the mountains towards the Upper Duero; but that line although most consonant to the rules of art, because the army would thus be kept in one mass, led through a very difficult and wasted country, the direct aid of the Gallicians must have been dispensed with, and moreover it was there the French looked for the allies. Hence Wellington resolved not to operate by his right, and with great skill and dexterity, he had by the disposition of his troops in winter-quarters, by false reports and false movements masked his real intentions. For the gathering of the Partidas in the valley of the Tagus, the demonstrations made in Estremadura and La Mancha by Penne Villemur, Morillo and Del Parque’s army, together with the presence of Hill at Coria, that general’s hold of the passes of Bejar, and the magazines formed there, all intimated a design of moving either by the valley of the Tagus or by the district of Avila; and the great magazines collected at Celerico, Viseu, Penamacor, Almeida, and Ciudad Rodrigo, in no manner belied the other indications. But half the army widely cantoned in the interior of Portugal, apparently for the sake of subsistence or health, was really so placed as to be in the direction of the true line of operations which was by the left through the Tras os Montes.
Wellington’s plan was to pass the Duero, within the Portuguese frontier, with a part of his army; to ascend the right bank of that river towards Zamora, and then crossing the Esla, to unite with the Gallician forces, while the remainder of the army, advancing from the Agueda, forced the passage of the Tormes. By this great movement, which he hoped to effect so suddenly that the king would not have time to concentrate the French armies in opposition, the front of the allies would be changed to their right, the Duero and the Pisuerga would be turned, and the enemy forced in confusion over the Carion. Then with his powerful army well in hand the English general could march in advance without fear, strong enough to fight and strong enough to turn the right flank of any position which the French might take up; and with this advantage also, that at each step he would gain additional help by the junction of the irregular Spanish forces until he gave his hand to the insurgents in Biscay, and every port opened would furnish him a new dépôt and magazines.
But in executing this movement the army would necessarily be divided into three separate divisions each too weak to beat the whole French force singly; the march of the centre division by the Tras os Montes, upon the nice execution of which the concentration of the whole depended, would be through an extremely difficult and mountainous country, and there were three great rivers to pass. The operation was therefore one of extreme delicacy requiring nice and extensive arrangements; yet there was not much danger to be apprehended from failure; because as each separate corps had a strong country to retire upon, the probable extent of the mischief would only be the loss of time, and the disadvantage of pursuing other operations when the harvest being ripe the French could easily keep in masses. The secret then was to hide the true plan as long as possible, to gain some marches for the centre corps, and by all means to keep the French so scattered and occupied by minor combinations, that they should be unable to assemble in time to profit from their central positions. Now the bridge equipage being prepared at Abrantes in the interior of Portugal was unknown, and gave no intimation of the real design, for the bullocks which drew it came with cars from Spain to Lamego and from thence went down to Abrantes; the free navigation of the Douro up to the Agueda was more conducive to a movement by the right, and it furnished abundance of large boats wherewith to pass that river without creating any suspicion from their presence; the wide cantonments of the allies permitted various changes of quarters under the pretence of sickness, and the troops thus gradually closed upon the Douro, within the Portuguese frontier, unobserved of the enemy who was likewise deceived by many reports purposely spread abroad. The menacing head which Hill, and the Spaniards in southern Estremadura and Andalusia, carried towards the valley of the Tagus and towards the Avila district, also contributed to draw the enemy’s attention away from the true point of danger; but more than all other things the vigorous excitement of the insurrection in the north occupied the French, scattered their forces, and rendered the success of the English general’s plan nearly certain.
1813. Neither did lord Wellington fail to give ample employment to Suchet’s forces, for his wings were spread for a long flight even to the Pyrennees, and he had no desire to find that marshal’s army joined with the other French forces on the Ebro. The lynx eyes of Napoleon had scanned this point of war also, and both the king and Clauzel had received orders to establish the shortest and most certain line of correspondence possible with Suchet, because the emperor’s plan contemplated the arrival of the army of Aragon in the north, but Wellington furnished a task for it elsewhere. Sir John Murray as we have seen, had just repulsed the French at Castalla, and general Frere’s cavalry had joined the Andalusian reserve under Abispal, but Elio with the third army remained near Alicant and Wellington destined Del Parque’s army to join him. This with the Anglo-Sicilian army made more than fifty thousand men, including the divisions of Duran, Villa Campa, the Empecinado, and other partizans always lying on Suchet’s right flank and rear. Now with such a force, or even half this number of good troops, the simplest plan would have been to turn Suchet’s right flank and bring him to action with his back to the sea; but the Spanish armies were not efficient for such work and Wellington’s instructions were adapted to the actual circumstances. To win the open part of the kingdom, to obtain a permanent footing on the coast beyond the Ebro, and to force the enemy from the lower line of that river by acting in conjunction with the Catalans, these were the three objects which Wellington proposed to reach and in the following manner. Murray was to sail against Taragona, to save it Suchet would have to weaken his army in Valencia; Elio and Del Parque might then seize that kingdom. If Taragona fell, good. If the French proved too strong, Murray could return instantly by sea, and secure possession of the country gained by the Spanish generals. These last were however to remain strictly on the defensive until Murray’s operations drew Suchet away, for they were not able to fight alone, and above all things it was necessary to avoid a defeat which would leave the French general free to move to the aid of the king.
The force necessary to attack Taragona Wellington judged at ten thousand, and if Murray could not embark that number there was another mode of operating. Some Spanish divisions, to go by sea, were then to reinforce Copons in Catalonia and enable him to hold the country between Taragona, Tortoza, and Lerida; meanwhile Murray and Elio were to advance against Suchet in front, and Del Parque in conjunction with the Portuguese troops to turn his right flank by Requeña; and this operation was to be repeated until the allies communicated with Copons by their left, the partizans advancing in proportion and cutting off all communication with the northern parts of Spain. Thus in either case Suchet would be kept away from the Upper Ebro, and there was no reason to expect any interruption from that quarter.
But Wellington was not aware that the infantry of the army of Portugal were beyond the Ebro; the spies deceived by the multitude of detachments passing in and out of the Peninsula supposed the divisions which reinforced Clauzel to be fresh conscripts from France; the arrangements for the opening of the campaign were therefore made in the expectation of meeting a very powerful force in Leon. Hence Freire’s cavalry, and the Andalusian reserve under the Conde de Abispal, received orders to march upon Almaraz, to pass the Tagus there by a pontoon bridge which was established for them, and then crossing the Gredos by Bejar or Mombeltran, to march upon Valladolid while the Partidas of that quarter should harass the march of Leval from Madrid. Meanwhile the Spanish troops in Estremadura were to join those forces on the Agueda which were destined to force the passage of the Tormes. The Gallicians under Giron were to come down to the Esla, and unite with the corps destined to pass that river and turn the line of the Duero. Thus seventy thousand Portuguese and British, eight thousand Spaniards from Estremadura, and twelve thousand Gallicians, that is to say, ninety thousand fighting men would be suddenly placed on a new front, and marching abreast against the surprised and separated masses of the enemy would drive them refluent to the Pyrennees. A grand design and grandly it was executed! For high in heart and strong of hand Wellington’s veterans marched to the encounter, the glories of twelve victories played about their bayonets, and he the leader so proud and confident, that in passing the stream which marks the frontier of Spain, he rose in his stirrups and waving his hand cried out “Farewell Portugal!”
But while straining every nerve, and eager to strike, as well to escape from the Portuguese politics as to keep pace with Napoleon’s efforts in Germany, the English general was mortified by having again to discuss the question of a descent on Italy. Lord William Bentinck had relinquished his views upon that country with great reluctance, and now, thinking affairs more favourable than ever, again proposed to land at Naples, and put forward the duke of Orleans or the arch-duke Francis. He urged in favour of this project the weak state of Murat’s kingdom, the favourable disposition of the inhabitants, the offer of fifteen thousand auxiliary Russians made by admiral Grieg, the shock which would be given to Napoleon’s power, and the more effectual diversion in favour of Spain. He supported his opinion by an intercepted letter of the queen of Naples to Napoleon, and by other authentic documents, and thus, at the moment of execution, Wellington’s vast plans were to be disarranged to meet a new scheme of war which he had already discussed and disapproved of, and which, however promising in itself, would inevitably divide the power of England and weaken the operations in both countries.
His reply was decisive. His opinion on the state of affairs in Sicily was, he said, not changed, by the intercepted letters, as Murat evidently thought himself strong enough to attack the allies. Lord William Bentinck should not land in Italy with less than forty thousand men of all arms perfectly equipped, since that army would have to depend upon its own means and to overcome all opposition before it could expect the people to aid or even to cease to oppose it. The information stated that the people looked for protection from the French and they preferred England to Austria. There could be no doubt of this, the Austrians would demand provisions and money and would insist upon governing them in return, whereas the English would as elsewhere defray their own expenses and probably give a subsidy in addition. The south of Italy was possibly for many reasons the best place next to the Spanish Peninsula for the operations of a British army, and it remained for the government to choose whether they would adopt an attack on the former upon such a scale as he had alluded to. But of one thing they might be certain, that if it were commenced on a smaller scale, or with any other intention than to persevere to the last, and by raising, feeding, and clothing armies of the natives, the plan would fail and the troops would re-embark with loss and disgrace.
April. This remonstrance at last fixed the wavering judgment of the ministers, and Wellington was enabled to proceed with his own plans. He designed to open the campaign in the beginning of May, and as the green forage was well advanced, on the 21st of April, he directed Murray, Del Parque, Elio, and Copons to commence their operations on the eastern coast; Abispal and Freire were already in march and expected at Almaraz on the 24th; the Spanish divisions of Estremadura had come up to the Coa, and the divisions of the Anglo-Portuguese force were gradually closing to the front. But heavy rains broke up the roads, and the cumbrous pontoon train being damaged, on its way from the interior, did not reach Sabugal before the 13th and was not repaired before the 15th. Thus the opening of the campaign was delayed, yet the check proved of little consequence, for on the French side nothing was prepared to meet the danger.
May. Napoleon had urged the king to send his heavy baggage and stores to the rear and to fix his hospitals and dépôts at Burgos, Vittoria, Pampeluna, Tolosa, and San Sebastian. In neglect of this the impediments remained with the armies, the sick were poured along the communications, and in disorder thrown upon Clauzel at the moment when that general was scarcely able to make head against the northern insurrection.
Napoleon had early and clearly fixed the king’s authority as generalissimo and forbad him to exercise his monarchical authority towards the French armies. Joseph was at this moment in high dispute with all his generals upon those very points.
Napoleon had directed the king to enlarge and strengthen the works of Burgos castle and to form magazines in that place, and at Santona, for the use of the armies in the field. At this time no magazines had been formed at either place, and although a commencement had been made to strengthen the castle of Burgos, it was not yet capable of sustaining four hours’ bombardment and offered no support for the armies.
Napoleon had desired that a more secure and shorter line of correspondence than that by Zaragoza should be established with Suchet; for his plan embraced though it did not prescribe the march of that general upon Zarogoza, and he had warned the king repeatedly how dangerous it would be to have Suchet isolated and unconnected with the northern operations. Nevertheless the line of correspondence remained the same and the allies possessed the means of excising Suchet’s army from the operations in the north.
Napoleon had long and earnestly urged the king to put down the northern insurrection in time to make head against the allies on the Tormes. Now when the English general was ready to act, that insurrection was in full activity, and all the army of the north and the greatest part of the army of Portugal was employed to suppress it instead of being on the lower Duero.
Napoleon had clearly explained to the king the necessity of keeping his troops concentrated towards the Tormes in an offensive position, and he had desired that Madrid might be held in such a manner that it could be abandoned in a moment. The campaign was now being opened, the French armies were scattered, Leval was encumbered at Madrid, with a part of the civil administration, with large stores and parcs of artillery, and with the care of families attached to Joseph’s court, while the other generals were stretching their imaginations to devise which of the several projects open to him Wellington would adopt. Would he force the passage of the Tormes and the Duero with his whole army, and thus turn the French right? Would he march straight upon Madrid either by the district of Avila or by the valley of the Tagus or by both; and would he then operate against the north, or upon Zaragoza, or towards the south in co-operation with the Anglo-Sicilians? Every thing was vague, uncertain, confused.
The generals complained that the king’s conduct was not military, and Napoleon told him if he would command an army he must give himself up entirely to it, thinking of nothing else; but Joseph was always demanding gold when he should have trusted to iron. His skill was unequal to the arrangements and combinations for taking an initiatory and offensive position, and he could neither discover nor force his adversary to show his real design. Hence the French armies were thrown upon a timid defensive system, and every movement of the allies necessarily produced alarm, and the dislocation of troops without an object. The march of Del Parque’s army towards Alcaraz, and that of the Spanish divisions from Estremadura, towards the Agueda, in the latter end of April were judged to be the commencement of a general movement against Madrid, because the first was covered by the advance of some cavalry into La Mancha, and the second by the concentration of the Partidas, in the valley of the Tagus. Thus the whole French army was shaken by the demonstration of a few horsemen, for when Leval took the alarm, Gazan marched towards the Guadarama with three divisions, and D’Erlon gathered the army of the centre around Segovia.
Early in May a fifth division of the army of Portugal was employed on the line of communication at Pampliega, Burgos, and Briviesca, and Reille remained at Valladolid with only one division of infantry and his guns, his cavalry being on the Esla. D’Erlon was then at Segovia and Gazan at Arevalo, Conroux’s division was at Avila, and Leval still at Madrid with outposts at Toledo. The king who was at Valladolid could not therefore concentrate more than thirty-five thousand infantry on the Duero. He had indeed nine thousand excellent cavalry and one hundred pieces of artillery, but with such dispositions to concentrate for a battle in advance was not to be thought of, and the first decided movement of the allies was sure to roll his scattered forces back in confusion. The lines of the Tormes and the Duero were effaced from the system of operations.
About the middle of May, D’Armagnac’s division of the army of the centre came to Valladolid, Villatte’s division of the army of the south reinforced by some cavalry occupied the line of the Tormes from Alba to Ledesma. Daricau’s, Digeon’s, and D’Armagnac’s divisions were at Zamora, Toro, and other places on both sides of the Duero, and Reille’s cavalry was still on the Esla. The front of the French was thus defined by these rivers, for the left was covered by the Tormes, the centre by the Duero, the right by the Esla. Gazan’s head-quarters were at Arevalo, D’Erlon’s at Segovia, and the point of concentration was at Valladolid; but Conroux was at Avila, and Leval being still at Madrid was thrown entirely out of the circle of operations. At this moment Wellington entered upon what has been in England called, not very appropriately, the march to Vittoria. That march was but one portion of the action. The concentration of the army on the banks of the Duero was the commencement, the movement towards the Ebro and the passage of that river was the middle, the battle of Vittoria was the catastrophe, and the crowning of the Pyrennees the end of the splendid drama.