History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 6

by William Francis Patrick Napier

CHAPTER V.

The two armies being now once more in presence of1814. March. each other and with an equal resolution to fight, it is fitting to show the peculiar calculations upon which the generals founded their respective combinations. Soult, born in the vicinity, knew the country and chose Toulouse as a strategic post, because that ancient capital of the south contained fifty thousand inhabitants, commanded the principal passage of the Garonne, was the centre of a great number of roads on both sides of that river, and the chief military arsenal of the south of France. Here he could most easily feed his troops, assemble arm and discipline the conscripts, controul and urge the civil authorities, and counteract the machinations of the discontented. Posted at Toulouse he was master of various lines of operations. He could retire upon Suchet by Carcassone, or towards Lyons by Alby. He could take a new position behind the Tarn and prolong the contest by defending successively that river and the Lot, retreating if necessary upon Decaen’s army of the Gironde, and thus drawing the allies down the right bank of the Garonne as he had before drawn them up the left bank, being well assured that lord Wellington must follow him, and with weakened forces as it would be necessary to leave troops in observation of Suchet.

His first care was to place a considerable body of troops, collected from the depôts and other parts of the interior at Montauban, under the command of general Loverdo, with orders to construct a bridge-head on the left of the Tarn. The passage of that river, and a strong point of retreat and assembly for all the detachments sent to observe the Garonne below Toulouse, was thus secured, and withal the command of a number of great roads leading to the interior of France, consequently the power of making fresh combinations. To maintain himself as long as possible in Toulouse was however a great political object. It was the last point which connected him at once with Suchet and with Decaen; and while he held it, both the latter general and the partizans in the mountains about Lourdes could act, each on their own side, against the long lines of communications maintained by Wellington with Bordeaux and Bayonne. Suchet also could do the same, either by marching with his whole force or sending a detachment through the Arriege department to the Upper Garonne, where general Lafitte having seven or eight hundred men, national guards and other troops, was already in activity. These operations Soult now strongly urged Suchet to adopt, but the latter treated the proposition, as he had done all those before made from the same quarter, with contempt.

Toulouse was not less valuable as a position of battle.

The Garonne, flowing on the west, presented to the allies a deep loop, at the bottom of which was the bridge, completely covered by the suburb of St. Cyprien, itself protected by an ancient brick wall three feet thick and flanked by two massive towers: these defences Soult had improved and he added a line of exterior entrenchments.

Beyond the Garonne was the city, surrounded byPlan 10. an old wall flanked with towers, and so thick as to admit sixteen and twenty-four pound guns.

The great canal of Languedoc, which joined the Garonne a few miles below the town, wound for the most part within point-blank shot of the walls, covering them on the north and east as the Garonne and St. Cyprien did on the west.

The suburbs of St. Stephen and Guillermerie, built on both sides of this canal, furnished outworks on the west, for they were entrenched and connected with and covered by the hills of Sacarin and Cambon, also entrenched and flanking the approaches to the canal both above and below these suburbs.

Eight hundred yards beyond these hills a strong ridge, called the Mont Rave, run nearly parallel with the canal, its outer slope was exceedingly rugged and overlooked a marshy plain through which the Ers river flowed.

The south side of the town opened on a plain, but the suburb of St. Michel lying there, between the Garonne and the canal, furnished another advanced defence, and at some distance beyond, a range of heights called the Pech David commenced, trending up the Garonne in a direction nearly parallel to that river.

Such being the French general’s position, he calculated, that as lord Wellington could not force the passage by the suburb of St. Cyprien without an enormous sacrifice of men, he must seek to turn the flanks above or below Toulouse, and leave a sufficient force to blockade St. Cyprien under pain of having the French army issue on that side against his communications. If he passed the Garonne above its confluence with the Arriege, he would have to cross that river also, which could not be effected nearer than Cintegabelle, one march higher up. Then he must come down by the right of the Arriege, an operation not to be feared in a country which the recent rains had rendered impracticable for guns. If the allies passed the Garonne below the confluence of the Arriege, Soult judged that he could from the Pech David, and its continuation, overlook their movements, and that he should be in position to fall upon the head of their column while in the disorder of passing the river: if he failed in this he had still Toulouse and the heights of Mont Rave to retire upon, where he could fight again, his retreat being secure upon Montauban.

For these reasons the passage of the Garonne above Toulouse would lead to no decisive result and he did not fear it, but a passage below the city was a different matter. Lord Wellington could thus cut him off from Montauban and attack Toulouse from the northern and eastern quarters; and if the French then lost the battle they could only retreat by Carcassonne to form a junction with Suchet in Roussillon, where having their backs to the mountains and the allies between them and France they could not exist. Hence feeling certain the attack would finally be on that side, Soult lined the left bank of the Garonne with his cavalry as far as the confluence of the Tarn, and called up general Despeaux’s troops from Agen in the view of confining the allies to the space between the Tarn and the Garonne: for his first design was to attack them there rather than lose his communication with Montauban.

On the other hand lord Wellington whether from error from necessity or for the reasons I have before touched upon, having suffered the French army to gain three days’ march in the retreat from Tarbes, had now little choice of operations. He could not halt until the Andalusians and Del Parque’s troops should join him from the Bastan, without giving Soult all the time necessary to strengthen himself and organize his plan of defence, nor without appearing fearful and weak in the eyes of the French people, which would have been most dangerous. Still less could he wait for the fall of Bayonne. He had taken the offensive and could not resume the defensive with safety, the invasion of France once begun it was imperative to push it to a conclusion. Leading an army victorious and superior in numbers his business was to bring his adversary to battle as soon as possible, and as he could not force his way through St. Cyprien in face of the whole French army, nothing remained but to pass the Garonne above or below Toulouse.

It has been already shown that in a strategic view this passage should have been made below that town, but seeing that the south side of the city was the most open to attack, the English general resolved to cast his bridge at Portet, six miles above Toulouse, designing to throw his right wing suddenlyManuscript notes by the duke of Wellington. into the open country between the Garonne and the canal of Languedoc, while with his centre and left he assailed the suburb of St. Cyprien. With this object, at eight o’clock in the evening of the 27th, one of Hill’s brigades marched up from Muret, some men were ferried over and the bridge was commenced, the remainder of that general’s troops being to pass at midnight. But when the river was measured the width was found too great for the pontoons and there were no means of substituting trestles, wherefore this plan was abandoned. Had it been executed some considerable advantage would probablyFrench Official Correspondence, MSS. have been gained, since it does not appear that Soult knew of the attempt until two days later, and then only by his emissaries, not by his scouts.

Wellington thus baffled tried another scheme, he drove the enemy from the Touch river on the 28th, and collected the infantry of his left and centre about Portet, masking the movement with his cavalry. In the course of the operation a single squadron of the eighteenth hussars, under major Hughes, being inconsiderately pushed by colonel Vivian across the bridge of St. Martyn de la Touch, suddenly came uponMemoir by colonel Hughes, MSS. a whole regiment of French cavalry; the rashness of the act, as often happens in war, proved the safety of the British, for the enemy thinking that a strong support must be at hand discharged their carbines and retreated at a canter. Hughes followed, the speed of both sides increased, and as the nature of the road did not admit of any egress to the sides, this great body of French horsemen was pushed headlong by a few men under the batteries of St. Cyprien.

During these movements Hill’s troops were withdrawn to St. Roques, but in the night of the 30th a new bridge being laid near Pensaguel, two miles above the confluence of the Arriege, that general passed the Garonne with two divisions of infantry, Morillo’s Spaniards, Gardiner’s and Maxwell’s artillery, and Fane’s cavalry, in all thirteen thousand sabres and bayonets, eighteen guns, and a rocket brigade. The advanced guard moved with all expedition by the great road, having orders to seize the stone bridge of Cintegabelle, fifteen miles up the Arriege, and, on the march, to secure a ferry-boat known to be at Vinergue. The remainder of the troops followed, the intent being to pass the Arriege river hastily at Cintegabelle, and so come down the right bank to attack Toulouse on the south while lord Wellington assailed St. Cyprien. This march was to have been made privily in the night, but the bridge, though ordered for the evening of the 30th, was not finished until five o’clock in the morning of the 31st. Soult thus got notice of the enterprise in time to observe from the heights of Old Toulouse the strength of the column, and to ascertain that the great body of the army still remained in front of St. Cyprien. The marshy nature of the country on the right of the Arriege was known to him, and the suburbs of St. Michel and St. Etienne being now in a state to resist a partial attack, the matter appeared a feint to draw off a part of his army from Toulouse while St. Cyprien was assaulted, or the Garonne passed below the city. In this persuasion he keptOfficial Correspondence, MSS. his infantry in hand, and sent only his cavalry up the right bank of the Arriege to observe the march of the allies; but he directed general Lafitte, who had collected some regular horsemen and the national guards of the department, to hang upon their skirts and pretend to be the van of Suchet’s army. He was however somewhat disquieted, because the baggage, which to avoid encumbering the march had been sent up the Garonne to cross at Carbonne, being seen by his scouts, was reported to be a second column, increasing Hill’s force to eighteen thousand men.

While in this uncertainty he heard of the measurement of the river made at Portet on the night of the 27th, and that many guns were still collected there, wherefore, being ignorant of the cause why the bridge was not thrown, he concluded there was a design to cross there also when Hill should descend the Arriege. To meet this danger, he put fourOfficial Correspondence, MSS. divisions under Clauzel, with orders to fall upon the head of the allies if they should attempt the passage before Hill came down, resolving in the contrary case to fight in the suburbs of Toulouse and on the Mont-Rave, because the positions on the right of the Arriege were all favourable to the assailants. He was however soon relieved from anxiety. General Hill effected indeed the passage of the Arriege at Cintegabelle and sent his cavalry towards Villefranche and Nailloux, but his artillery were quite unable to move in the deep country there, and as success and safety alike depended on rapidity he returned during the night to Pinsaguel, recrossed the Garonne, and taking up his pontoons left only a flying bridge with a small guard of infantry and cavalry on the right bank. His retreat was followed by Lafitte’s horsemen who picked up a few stragglers and mules, but no other event occurred, and Soult remained well pleased that his adversary had thus lost three or four important days.

The French general was now sure the next attemptApril. would be below Toulouse, yet he changed his design of marching down the Garonne to fight between that river and the Tarn rather than lose his communications with Montauban. Having completed his works of defence for the city and the suburbs, and fortified all the bridges over the canal, he concluded not to abandon Toulouse under any circumstances, and therefore set his whole army and all the working population to entrench the Mont Rave, between the canal and the Ers river, thinking he might thus securely meet the shock of battle let it come on which side it would. Meanwhile the Garonne continued so full and rapid that lord Wellington was forced to remain inactive before St. Cyprien until the evening of the 3d; then the waters falling, the pontoons were carried in the night to Grenade, fifteen miles below Toulouse, where the bridge was at last thrown and thirty guns placed in battery on the left bank to protect it. The third fourth and sixth divisions of infantry and three brigades of cavalry, the whole under Beresford, immediately passed, and the cavalry being pushed out two leagues on the front and flanks captured a large herd of bullocks destined for the French army. But now the river again swelled so fast, that the light division and the Spaniards were unable to follow, the bridge got damaged and the pontoons were taken up.

This passage was made known to Soult immediately by his cavalry scouts, yet he knew not the exact force which had crossed, and as Morillo’s Spaniards, whom he mistook for Freyre’s, had taken the outposts in front of St. Cyprien he imagined Hill also had moved to Grenade, and that the greatest part of the allied army was over the Garonne. Wherefore merely observing Beresford with his cavalry he continued to strengthen his field of battle about Toulouse, his resolution to keep that city being confirmed by hearing on the 7th that the allied sovereigns had entered Paris.

On the 8th the waters subsided, the allies’ bridge was again laid down, Freyre’s Spaniards and the Portuguese artillery crossed, and lord Wellington taking the command in person advanced to the heights of Fenoulhiet within five miles of Toulouse. Marching up both banks of the Ers his columns were separated by that river, which was impassable without pontoons, and it was essential to secure as soon as possible one of the stone bridges. Hence when his left approached the heights of Kirie Eleison, on the great road of Alby, Vivian’s horsemen drove Berton’s cavalry up the right of the Ers towards the bridge of Bordes, and the eighteenth hussars descended towards that of Croix d’Orade. The latter was defended by Vial’s dragoons, and after some skirmishing the eighteenth was suddenly menaced by a regiment in front of the bridge, the opposite bank of the river being lined with dismounted carbineers. The two parties stood facing each other, hesitating to begin, until the approach of some British infantry, when both sides sounded a charge at the same moment, but the English horses were so quick the French were in an instant jammed up on the bridge, their front ranks were sabred, and the mass breaking away to the rear went off in disorder, leaving many killed and wounded and above a hundred prisoners in the hands of the victors. They were pursued through the village of Croix d’Orade, but beyond it they rallied on the rest of their brigade and advanced again, the hussars then recrossed the bridge, which was now defended by the British infantry whose fire stopped the French cavalry. The communication between the allied columns was thus secured.

The credit of this brilliant action was given to Colonel Vivian in the despatch, incorrectly, for that officer was wounded by a carbine shot previous to the charge at the bridge: the attack was conceived and conducted entirely by major Hughes of the eighteenth.

Lord Wellington from the heights of Kirie Eleison, carefully examined the French general’s position and resolved to attack on the 9th. Meanwhile to shorten his communications with general Hill he directed the pontoons to be removed from Grenade and relaid higher up at Seilh. The light division were to cross at the latter place at daybreak, but the bridge was not relaid until late in the day, and the English general extremely incensed at the failure was forced to defer his battle until the 10th.

Soult’s combinations were now crowned with success. He had by means of his fortresses, his battles, the sudden change of his line of operations after Orthes, his rapid retreat from Tarbes, and his clear judgment in fixing upon Toulouse as his next point of resistance, reduced the strength of his adversary to an equality with his own. He had gained seventeen days for preparation, had brought the allies to deliver battle on ground naturally adapted for defence, and well fortified; where one-third of their force was separated by a great river from the rest, where they could derive no advantage from their numerous cavalry, and were overmatched in artillery notwithstanding their previous superiority in that arm.

His position covered three sides of Toulouse. Defending St. Cyprien on the west with his left, he guarded the canal on the north with his centre, and with his right held the Mont Rave on the east. His reserve under Travot manned the ramparts of Toulouse, and the urban guards while maintaining tranquillity aided to transport the artillery and ammunition to different posts. Hill was opposed to his left, but while the latter, well fortified at St. Cyprien, had short and direct communication with the centre by the great bridge of Toulouse, the former could only communicate with the main body under Wellington by the pontoon bridge at Seilh, a circuit of ten or twelve miles.

The English general was advancing from the north, but his intent was still to assail the city on the south side, where it was weakest in defence. With this design he had caused the country on the left of the Ers to be carefully examined, in the view of making, under cover of that river, a flank march round the eastern front and thus gaining the open ground which he had formerly endeavoured to reach by passing at Portet and Pinsaguel. But again he was baffled by the deep country, which he could not master so as to pass the Ers by force, because all the bridges with the exception of that at Croix d’Orade were mined or destroyed by Soult, and the whole of the pontoons were on the Garonne. There was then no choice save to attack from the northern and eastern sides. The first, open and flat, and easily approached by the great roads of Montauban and Alby, was yet impregnable in defence, because the canal, the bridges over which were strongly defended by works, was under the fire of the ramparts of Toulouse, and for the most part within musquet-shot. Here then, as at St. Cyprien, it was a fortress and not a position which was opposed to him, and his field of battle was necessarily confined to the Mont Rave or eastern front.

This range of heights, naturally strong and rugged, and covered by the Ers river, which as we have seen was not to be forded, presented two distinct platforms, that of Calvinet, and that of St. Sypiere on which the extreme right of the French was posted. Between them, where the ground dipped a little, two roads leading from Lavaur and Caraman were conducted to Toulouse, passing the canal behind the ridge at the suburbs of Guillemerie and St. Etienne.

The Calvinet platform was fortified on its extreme left with a species of horn-work, consisting of several open retrenchments and small works, supported by two large redoubts, one of which flanked the approaches to the canal on the north: a range of abbatis was also formed there by felling the trees on the Alby road. Continuing this line to the right, two other large forts, called the Calvinet and the Colombette redoubts, terminated the works on this platform.

On that of St. Sypiere there were also two redoubts, one on the extreme right called St. Sypiere, the other without a name nearer to the road of Caraman.

The whole range of heights occupied was about two miles long, and an army attacking in front would have to cross the Ers under fire, advance through ground, naturally steep and marshy, and now rendered almost impassable by means of artificial inundations, to the assault of the ridge and the works on the summit; and if the assailants should even force between the two platforms, they would, while their flanks were battered by the redoubts above, come upon the works of Cambon and Saccarin. If these fell the suburbs of Guillemerie and St. Steven, the canal, and finally the ramparts of the town, would still have to be carried in succession. But it was not practicable to pass the Ers except by the bridge of Croix d’Orade which had been seized so happily on the 8th. Lord Wellington was therefore reduced to make a flank marchManuscript Notes by the Duke of Wellington. under fire, between the Ers and the Mont Rave, and then to carry the latter with a view of crossing the canal above the suburb of Guillemerie, and establishing his army on the south side of Toulouse, where only the city could be assailed with any hope of success.

To impose this march upon him all Soult’s dispositions had been directed. For this he had mined all the bridges on the Ers, save only that of Croix d’Orade, thus facilitating a movement between the Ers and the Mont Rave, while he impeded one beyond that river by sending half his cavalry over to dispute the passage of the numerous streams in the deep country on the right bank. His army was now disposed in the following order. General Reille defended the suburb of St. Cyprien with Taupin’s and Maransin’s divisions. Daricau’s division lined the canal on the north from its junction with the Garonne to the road of Alby, defending with his left the bridge-head of Jumeaux, the convent of the Minimes with his centre, and the Matabiau bridge with his right. Harispe’s division was established in the works on the Mont-Rave. His right at St. Sypiere looked towards the bridge of Bordes, his centre was at the Colombette redoubt, about which Vial’s horsemen were also collected; his left looked down the road of Alby towards the bridge of Croix d’Orade. On this side a detached eminence within cannon-shot, called the Hill of Pugade, was occupied by St. Pol’s brigade, drawn from Villatte’s division. The two remaining divisions of infantryPlan 10. were formed in columns at certain points behind the Mont Rave, and Travot’s reserve continued to man the walls of Toulouse behind the canal. This line of battle presented an angle towards the Croix d’Orade, each side about two miles in length and the apex covered by the brigade on the Pugade.

Wellington having well observed the ground on the 8th and 9th, made the following disposition of attack for the 10th. General Hill was to menace St. Cyprien, augmenting or abating his efforts to draw the enemy’s attention according to the progress of the battle on the right of the Garonne, which he could easily discern. The third and light divisions and Freyre’s Spaniards, being already on the left of the Ers, were to advance against the northern front of Toulouse. The two first supported by Bock’s German cavalry were to make demonstrations against the line of canal defended by Daricau. That is to say, Picton was to menace the bridge of Jumeaux and the convent of the Minimes, while Alten maintained the communication between him and Freyre who, reinforced with the Portuguese artillery, was to carry the hill of Pugade and then halt to cover Beresford’s column of march. This last composed of the fourth and sixth division with three batteries was, after passing the bridge of Croix d’Orade, to move round the left of the Pugade and along the low ground between the French heights and the Ers, until the rear should pass the road of Lavaur, when the two divisions were to wheel into line and attack the platform of St. Sypiere. Freyre was then to assail that of Calvinet, and Ponsonby’s dragoons following close were to connect that general’s left with Beresford’s column. Meanwhile lord Edward Somerset’s hussars were to move up the left of the Ers, while Vivian’s cavalry moved up the right of that river, each destined to observe Berton’s cavalry, which, having possession of the bridges of Bordes and Montaudran higher up, could pass from the right bank to the left, and destroying the bridge fall upon the head of Beresford’s troops while in march.

BATTLE OF TOULOUSE.

The 10th of April at two o’clock in the morning the light division passed the Garonne by the bridge at Seilh, and about six o’clock the whole army moved forwards in the order assigned for the different columns. Picton and Alten, on the right, drove the French advanced posts behind the works at the bridge over the canal. Freyre’s columns, marching along the Alby road, were cannonaded by St. Pol with two guns until they had passed a small stream by the help of some temporary bridges, when the French general following his instructions retired to the horn-work on the Calvinet platform. The Spaniards were thus established on the Pugade, from whence the Portuguese guns under major Arentschild opened a heavy cannonade against Calvinet. Meanwhile Beresford, preceded by the hussars, marched from Croix d’Orade in three columns abreast. Passing behind the Pugade, through the village of Montblanc, he entered the marshy ground between the Ers river and the Mont Rave, but he left his artillery at Montblanc, fearing to engage it in that deep and difficult country under the fire of the enemy. Beyond the Ers on his left, Vivian’s cavalry, now under colonel Arentschild, drove Berton’s horsemenMemoir by general Berton, MSS. back with loss, and nearly seized the bridge of Bordes which the French general passed and destroyed with difficulty at the last moment. However the German hussars succeeded in gaining the bridge of Montaudran higher up, though it was barricaded, and defended by a detachment of cavalryMemoir by colonel Hughes, MSS. sent there by Berton who remained himself in position near the bridge of Bordes, looking down the left of the Ers.

While these operations were in progress, general Freyre who had asked as a favour to lead the battle at Calvinet, whether from error or impatience assailed the horn-work on that platform about eleven o’clock and while Beresford was still in march. The Spaniards, nine thousand strong, moved in two lines and a reserve, and advanced with great resolution at first, throwing forwards their flanks so as to embrace the end of the Calvinet hill. The French musquetry and great guns thinned the ranks at every step, yet closing upon their centre they still ascended the hill, the formidable fire they were exposed to increasing in violence until their right wing, which was also raked from the bridge of Matabiau, unable to endure the torment wavered. The leading ranks rushing madly onwards jumped for shelter into a hollow road, twenty-five feet deep in parts, and covering this part of the French entrenchments; but the left wing and the second line run back in great disorder, the Cantabrian fusiliers under colonel Leon de Sicilia alone maintaining their ground under cover of a bank which protected them. Then the French came leaping out of their works with loud cries, and lining the edge of the hollow road poured an incessant stream of shot upon the helpless crowds entangled in the gulph below, while the battery from the bridge of Matabiau, constructed to rake this opening, sent its bullets from flank to flank hissing through the quivering mass of flesh and bones.

The Spanish generals rallying the troops who had fled, led them back again to the brink of the fatal hollow, but the frightful carnage below and the unmitigated fire in front filled them with horror. Again they fled, and again the French bounding from their trenches pursued, while several battalions sallying from the bridge of Matabiau and from behind the Calvinet followed hard along the road of Alby. The country was now covered with fugitives whose headlong flight could not be restrained, and with pursuers whose numbers and vehemence increased, until lord Wellington, who was at that point, covered the panic-stricken troops with Ponsonby’s cavalry, and the reserve artillery which opened with great vigour. Meanwhile the Portuguese guns on the Pugade never ceased firing, and a brigade of the light division, wheeling to its left, menaced the flank of the victorious French who immediately retired to their entrenchments on Calvinet: but more than fifteen hundred Spaniards had been killed or wounded and their defeat was not the only misfortune.

General Picton, regardless of his orders, which, his temper on such occasions being known were especially given, had turned his false attack into a real one against the bridge of Jumeaux, and the enemy fighting from a work too high to be forced without ladders and approachable only along an open flat, repulsed him with a loss of nearly four hundred men and officers: amongst the latter colonel Forbes of the forty-fifth was killed, and general Brisbane who commanded the brigade was wounded. Thus from the hill of Pugade to the Garonne the French had completely vindicated their position, the allies had suffered enormously, and beyond the Garonne, although general Hill had now forced the first line of entrenchments covering St. Cyprien and was menacing the second line, the latter being much more contracted and very strongly fortified could not be stormed. The musquetry battle therefore subsided for a time, but a prodigious cannonade was kept up along the whole of the French line, and on the allies’ side from St. Cyprien to Montblanc, where the artillery left by Beresford, acting in conjunction with the Portuguese guns on the Pugade, poured its shot incessantly against the works on the Calvinet platform: injudiciously it has been said because the ammunition thus used for a secondary object was afterwards wanted when a vital advantage might have been gained.

It was now evident that the victory must be won or lost by Beresford, and yet from Picton’s error lord Wellington had no reserves to enforce the decision; for the light division and the heavy cavalry only remained in hand, and these troops were necessarily retained to cover the rallying of the Spaniards, and to protect the artillery employed to keep the enemy in check. The crisis therefore approached with all happy promise to the French general. The repulse of Picton, the utter dispersion of the Spaniards, and the strength of the second line of entrenchments at St. Cyprien, enabled him to draw, first Taupin’s whole division, and then one of Maransin’s brigades from that quarter, to reinforce his battle on the Mont Rave. Thus three divisions and his cavalry, that is to say nearly fifteen thousand combatants, were disposable for an offensive movement without in any manner weakening the defence of his works on Mont Rave or on the canal. With this mass he might have fallen uponMorning States, MSS. Beresford, whose force, originally less than thirteen thousand bayonets, was cruelly reduced as it made slow and difficult way for two miles through a deep marshy country crossed and tangled with water-courses. For sometimes moving in mass, sometimes filing under the French musquetry, and always under the fire of their artillery from the Mont Rave, without a gun to reply, the length of the column had augmented so much at every step from the difficulty of the way that frequent halts were necessary to close up the ranks.

The flat miry ground between the river and the heights became narrower and deeper as the troops advanced, Berton’s cavalry was ahead, an impassable river was on the left, and three French divisions supported by artillery and horsemen overshadowed the right flank! Fortune came to their aid. Soult always eyeing their march, had, when the Spaniards were defeated, carried Taupin’s division to the platform of St. Sypiere, and supporting it with a brigade of D’Armagnac’s division disposed the whole about the redoubts. From thence after a short hortative to act vigorously he ordered Taupin to fall on with the utmost fury, at the same time directing a regiment of Vial’s cavalry to descend the heights by the Lavaur road and intercept the line of retreat, while Berton’s horsemen assailed the other flank from the side of the bridge of Bordes. But this was not half of the force which the French general might have employed. Taupin’s artillery, retarded in its march, was still in the streets of Toulouse, and that general instead of attacking at once took ground to his right, waiting until Beresford having completed his flank march had wheeled into lines at the foot of the heights.

Taupin’s infantry, unskilfully arranged for action it is said, at last poured down the hill, but some rockets discharged in good time ravaged the ranks and with their noise and terrible appearance, unknown before, dismayed the French soldiers; then the British skirmishers running forwards plied them with a biting fire, and Lambert’s brigade of the sixth division, aided by Anson’s brigade and some provisional battalions of the fourth division, for it is an error to say the sixth division alone repulsed this attack, Lambert’s brigade I say, rushed forwards with a terrible shout, and the French turning fled back to the upper ground. Vial’s horsemen trotting down the Lavaur road now charged on the right flank, but the second and third lines of the sixth division being thrown into squares repulsed them, and on the other flank general Cole had been so sudden in his advance up the heights, that Berton’s cavalry had no opportunity to charge. Lambert, following hard upon the beaten infantry in his front, killed Taupin, wounded a general of brigade, and without a check won the summit of the platform, his skirmishers even descended in pursuit on the reverse slope, and meanwhile, on his left, general Cole meeting with less resistance had still more rapidly gained the height at that side: so complete was the rout that the two redoubts were abandoned from panic, and the French with the utmost disorder sought shelter in the works of Sacarin and Cambon.

Soult astonished at this weakness in troops from whom he had expected so much, and who had but just before given him assurances of their resolution and confidence, was in fear that Beresford pushing his success would seize the bridge of the Demoiselles on the canal. Wherefore, covering the flight as he could with the remainder of Vial’s cavalry, he hastily led D’Armagnac’s reserve brigade to the works of Sacarin, checked the foremost British skirmishers and rallied the fugitives; Taupin’s guns arrived from the town at the same moment, and the mischief being stayed a part of Travot’s reserve immediately moved to defend the bridge of the Demoiselles. A fresh order of battle was thus organized, but the indomitable courage of the British soldiers overcoming all obstacles and all opposition, had decided the first great crisis of the fight.

Lambert’s brigade immediately wheeled to its right across the platform on the line of the Lavaur road, menacing the flank of the French on the Calvinet platform, while Pack’s Scotch brigade and Douglas’s Portuguese, composing the second and third lines of the sixth division, were disposed on the right with a view to march against the Colombette redoubts on the original front of the enemy. And now also the eighteenth and German hussars, having forced the bridge of Montaudran on the Ers river, came round the south end of the Mont Rave, where in conjunction with the skirmishers of the fourth division they menaced the bridge of the Demoiselles, from whence and from the works of Cambon and Sacarin the enemy’s guns played incessantly.

The aspect and form of the battle were thus entirely changed. The French thrown entirely on the defensive occupied three sides of a square. Their right, extending from the works of Sacarin to the redoubts of Calvinet and Colombette, was closely menaced by Lambert, who was solidly posted on the platform of St. Sypiere while the redoubts themselves were menaced by Pack and Douglas. The French left thrown back to the bridge-head of Matabiau awaited the renewed attack of the Spaniards, and the whole position was very strong, not exceeding a thousand yards on each side with the angles all defended by formidable works. The canal and city of Toulouse, its walls and entrenched suburbs, offered a sure refuge in case of disaster, while the Matabiau on one side, Sacarin and Cambon on the other, insured the power of retreat.

In this contracted space were concentrated Vial’s cavalry, the whole of Villatte’s division, one brigade of Maransin’s, another of D’Armagnac’s, and with the exception of the regiment driven from the St. Sypiere redoubt the whole of Harispe’s division. On the allies’ side therefore defeat had been staved off, but victory was still to be contended for, and with apparently inadequate means; for Picton being successfully opposed by Darricau was so far paralyzed, the Spaniards rallying slowly were not to be depended upon for another attack, and there remained only the heavy cavalry and the light division, which lord Wellington could not venture to thrust into the action under pain of being left without any reserve in the event of a repulse. The final stroke therefore was still to be made on the left, and with a very small force, seeing that Lambert’s brigade and the fourth division were necessarily employed to keep in check the French troops at the bridge of the Demoiselles, Cambon and Sacarin. This heavy mass, comprising one brigade of Travot’s reserve, the half of D’Armagnac’s division and all of Taupin’s, together with the regiment belonging to Harispe which had abandoned the forts of St. Sypiere, was commanded by general Clauzel, who disposed the greater part in advance of the entrenchments as if to retake the offensive.

Such was the state of affairs about half-past two o’clock, when Beresford renewed the action with Pack’s Scotch brigade, and the Portuguese of the sixth division under colonel Douglas. These troops, ensconced in the hollow Lavaur road on Lambert’s right, had been hitherto well protected from the fire of the French works, but now scrambling up the steep banks of that road, they wheeled to their left by wings of regiments as they could get out, and ascending the heights by the slope facing the Ers, under a wasting fire of cannon and musquetry carried all the French breast-works, and the Colombette, and Calvinet redoubts. It was a surprising action when the loose disorderly nature of the attack imposed by the difficulty of the ground is considered; but the French although they yielded at first to the thronging rush of the British troops soon rallied and came back with a reflux. Their cannonade was incessant, their reserves strong, and the struggle became terrible. For Harispe, who commanded in person at this part, and under whom the French seemed always to fight with redoubled vigour, brought up fresh men, and surrounding the two redoubts with a surging multitude absolutely broke into the Colombette, killed or wounded four-fifths of the forty-second, and drove the rest out. The British troops were however supported by the seventy-first and ninety-first, and the whole clinging to the brow of the hill fought with a wonderful courage and firmness, until so many men had fallen that their order of battle was reduced to a thin line of skirmishers. Some of the British cavalry then rode up from the low ground and attempted a charge, but they were stopped by a deep hollow road, of which there were many, and some of the foremost troopers tumbling headlong in perished. Meanwhile the combat about the redoubts continued fiercely, the French from their numbers had certainly the advantage, but they never retook the Calvinet fort, nor could they force their opponents down from the brow of the hill. At last when the whole of the sixth division had rallied and again assailed them, flank and front, when their generals Harispe and Baurot had fallen dangerously wounded and the Colombette was retaken by the seventy-ninth, the battle turned, and the French finally abandoned the platform, falling back partly by their right to Sacarin, partly by their left towards the bridge of Matabiau.

It was now about four o’clock. The Spaniards during this contest had once more partially attacked, but they were again put to flight, and the French thus remained masters of their entrenchments in that quarter; for the sixth division had been very hardly handled, and Beresford halted to reform his order of battle and receive his artillery: it came to him indeed about this time, yet with great difficulty and with little ammunition in consequence of the heavy cannonade it had previously furnished from Montblanc. However Soult seeing that the Spaniards, supported by the light division, had rallied a fourth time, that Picton again menaced the bridge of Jumeaux and the Minime convent, while Beresford, master of three-fourths of Mont Rave, was now advancing along the summit, deemed farther resistance useless and relinquished the northern end of the Calvinet platform also. About five o’clock he withdrew his whole army behind the canal, still however holding the advanced works of Sacarin and Cambon. Lord Wellington then established the Spaniards in the abandoned works and so became master of the Mont Rave in all its extent. Thus terminated the battle of Toulouse. The French had five generals, and perhaps three thousand men killed or wounded and they lost one piece of artillery. The allies lost four generals and four thousand six hundred and fifty-nine men and officers, of which two thousand were Spaniards. A lamentable spilling of blood, and a useless, for before this period Napoleon had abdicated the throne of France and a provisional government was constituted at Paris.

During the night the French general, defeated but undismayed, replaced the ammunition expended in the action, re-organized and augmented his field artillery from the arsenal of Toulouse, and made dispositions for fighting the next morning behind the canal. Yet looking to the final necessity of a retreat he wrote to Suchet to inform him of the result of the contest and proposed a combined plan of operations illustrative of the firmness and pertinacity of his temper. “March,” said he, “with the whole of your forces by Quillan upon Carcassonne, I will meet you there with my army, we can then retake the initiatory movement, transfer the seat of war to the Upper Garonne, and holding on by the mountains oblige the enemy to recall his troops from Bordeaux, which will enable Decaen to recover that city and make a diversion in our favour.”

On the morning of the 11th he was again ready to fight, but the English general was not. The French position, within musquet-shot of the walls of Toulouse, was still inexpugnable on the northern and eastern fronts. The possession of Mont Rave was only a preliminary step to the passage of the canal at the bridge of the Demoiselles and other points above the works of Sacarin and Cambon, with the view of throwing the army as originally designed on to the south side of the town. But this was a great affair requiring fresh dispositions, and a fresh provision of ammunition only to be obtained from the parc on the other side of the Garonne. Hence to accelerate the preparations, to ascertain the state of general Hill’s position, and to give that general farther instructions, lord Wellington repaired on the 11th to St. Cyprien; but though he had shortened his communications by removing the pontoon bridge from Grenade to Seilh, the day was spent before the ammunition arrived and the final arrangements for the passage of the canal could be completed. The attack was therefore deferred until daylight on the 12th.

Meanwhile all the light cavalry were sent up the canal, to interrupt the communications with Suchet and menace Soult’s retreat by the road leading to Carcassonne. The appearance of these horsemen on the heights of St. Martyn, above Baziege, together with the preparations in his front, taught Soult that he could no longer delay if he would not be shut up in Toulouse. Wherefore, having terminated all his arrangements, he left eight pieces of heavy artillery, two generals, the gallant Harispe being one, and sixteen hundred men whose wounds were severe, to the humanity of the conquerors; then filing out of the city with surprising order and ability, he made a forced march of twenty-two miles, cut the bridges over the canal and the Upper Ers, and the 12th established his army at Villefranche. On the same day general Hill’s troops were pushed close to Baziege in pursuit, and the light cavalry, acting on the side of Montlaur, beat the French with the loss of twenty-five men, and cut off a like number of gensd’armes on the side of Revel.

Lord Wellington now entered Toulouse in triumph, the white flag was displayed, and, as at Bordeaux, a great crowd of persons adopted the Bourbon colours, but the mayor, faithful to his sovereign, had retired with the French army. The British general, true to his honest line of policy, did not fail to warn the Bourbonists that their revolutionary movement must be at their own risk, but in the afternoon two officers, the English colonel Cooke, and the French colonel St. Simon, arrived from Paris. Charged to make known to the armies the abdication of Napoleon they had been detained near Blois by the officiousness of the police attending the court of the empress Louisa, and the blood of eight thousand brave men had overflowed the Mont Rave in consequence. Nor did their arrival immediately put a stop to the war. When St. Simon in pursuance of his mission reached Soult’s quarters on the 13th, that marshal, not without just cause, demurred to his authority, and proposed to suspend hostilities until authentic information could be obtained from the ministers of the emperor: then sending all his incumbrances by the canal to Carcassonne, he took a position of observation at Castelnaudary and awaited the progress of events. Lord Wellington refused to accede to his proposal, and as general Loverdo, commanding at Montauban, acknowledged the authority of the provincial government and readily concluded an armistice, he judged that Soult designed to make a civil war and therefore marched against him. The 17th the outposts were on the point of engaging when the duke of Dalmatia, who had now received official information from the chief of the emperor’s staff, notified his adhesion to the new state of affairs in France: and with this honourable distinction that he had faithfully sustained the cause of his great monarch until the very last moment.

A convention which included Suchet’s army was immediately agreed upon, but that marshal had previously adopted the white colours of his own motion, and lord Wellington instantly transmitted the intelligence to general Clinton in Catalonia and to the troops at Bayonne. Too late it came for both and useless battles were fought. That at Barcelona has been already described, but at Bayonne misfortune and suffering had fallen upon one of the brightest soldiers of the British army.

SALLY FROM BAYONNE.

During the progress of the main army in the interior sir John Hope conducted the investment of Bayonne, with all the zeal the intelligence and unremitting vigilance and activity which the difficult nature of the operation required. He had gathered great stores of gabions and fascines and platforms, and was ready to attack the citadel when rumours of the events at Paris reached him, yet indirectly and without any official character to warrant a formal communication to the garrison without lord Wellington’s authority. These rumours were however made known at the outposts, and perhaps lulled the vigilance of the besiegers, but to such irregular communications which might be intended to deceive the governor naturally paid little attention.

The piquets and fortified posts at St. Etienne were at this time furnished by a brigade of the fifth division, but from thence to the extreme right the guards had charge of the line, and they had also one company in St. Etienne itself. General Hinuber’s German brigade was encamped as a support to the left, the remainder of the first division was encamped in the rear, towards Boucaut. In this state, about one o’clock in the morning of the 14th, a deserter, coming over to general Hay who commanded the outposts that night, gave an exact account of the projected sally. The general not able to speakBeamish’s History of the German Legion. French sent him to general Hinuber, who immediately interpreting the man’s story to general Hay, assembled his own troops under arms, and transmitted the intelligence to sir John Hope. It would appear that Hay, perhaps disbelieving the man’s story, took no additional precautions, and it is probable that neither the German brigade nor the reserves of the guards would have been put under arms but for the activity of general Hinuber. However at three o’clock the French, commencing with a false attack on the left of the Adour as a blind, poured suddenly out of the citadel to the number of three thousand combatants. They surprised the piquets, and with loud shouts breaking through the chain of posts at various points, carried with one rush the church, and the whole of the village of St. Etienne with exception of a fortified house which was defended by captain Forster of the thirty-eighth regiment. Masters of every other part and overthrowing all who stood before them they drove the picquets and supports in heaps along the Peyrehorade road, killed general Hay, took colonel Townsend of the guards prisoner, divided the wings of the investing troops, and passing in rear of the right threw the whole line into confusion. Then it was that Hinuber, having his Germans well in hand, moved up on the side of St. Etienne, rallied some of the fifth division, and being joined by a battalion of general Bradford’s Portuguese from the side of St. Esprit bravely gave the counter-stroke to the enemy and regained the village and church.

The combat on the right was at first even more disastrous than in the centre, neither the piquets nor the reserves were able to sustain the fury of the assault and the battle was most confused and terrible; for on both sides the troops, broken into small bodies by the enclosures and unable to recover their order, came dashing together in the darkness, fighting often with the bayonet, and sometimes friends encountered sometimes foes: all was tumult and horror. The guns of the citadel vaguely guided by the flashes of the musquetry sent their shot and shells booming at random through the lines of fight, and the gun-boats dropping down the river opened their fire upon the flank of the supporting columns, which being put in motion by sir John Hope on the first alarm were now coming up from the side of Boucaut. Thus nearly one hundred pieces of artillery were in full play at once, and the shells having set fire to the fascine depôts and to several houses, the flames cast a horrid glare over the striving masses.

Amidst this confusion sir John Hope suddenly disappeared, none knew how or wherefore at the time, but it afterwards appeared, that having brought up the reserves on the right, to stem the torrent in that quarter, he pushed for St. Etienne by a hollow road which led close behind the line of picquets; the French had however lined both banks, and when he endeavoured to return a shot struck him in the arm, while his horse, a large one as was necessary to sustain the gigantic warrior, received eight bullets and fell upon his leg. His followers had by this time escaped from the defile, but two of them, captain Herries, and Mr. Moore a nephew of sir John Moore, seeing his helpless state turned back and alighting endeavoured amidst the heavy fire of the enemy to draw him from beneath the horse. While thus engaged they were both struck down with dangerous wounds, the French carried them all off, and sir John Hope was again severely hurt in the foot by an English bullet before they gained the citadel.

The day was now beginning to break and the allies were enabled to act with more unity and effect. The Germans were in possession of St. Etienne, and the reserve brigades of the guards, being properly disposed, by general Howard who had succeeded to the command, suddenly raised a loud shout, and running in upon the French drove them back into the works with such slaughter that their own writers admit a loss of one general and more than nine hundred men. But on the British side general Stopford was wounded, and the whole loss was eight hundred and thirty men and officers. Of these more than two hundred were taken, besides the commander-in-chief; and it is generally acknowledged that captain Forster’s firm defence of the fortified house first, and next the readiness and gallantry with which general Hinuber and his Germans retook St. Etienne, saved the allies from a very terrible disaster.

A few days after this piteous event the convention made with Soult became known and hostilities ceased.

All the French troops in the south were now reorganized in one body under the command of Suchet, but they were so little inclined to acquiesce in the revolution, that prince Polignac, acting for the duke of Angoulême, applied to the British commissary-general Kennedy for a sum of money to quiet them.

The Portuguese army returned to Portugal. The Spanish army to Spain, the generals being it is said inclined at first to declare for the Cortez against the king, but they were diverted from their purpose by the influence and authority of lord Wellington.

The British infantry embarked at Bordeaux, some for America, some for England, and the cavalry marching through France took shipping at Boulogne.

Thus the war terminated, and with it all remembrance of the veteran’s services.